America Transformed: The Rise and Legacy of American Progressivism

INTRODUCTION

PROGRESSIVISM’S ENDURING RELEVANCE

This book marks the culmination of years of writing about American progressivism since the 2005 publication of my monograph on Woodrow Wilson’s political thought, and the related publication of two edited volumes of Progressive Era writings in 2005 and 2008. After the original Wilson project, my work dug deeper into Wilson’s thought itself, into the thought of other important progressives, and into the effect of all of this on American politics and law today. A selection of those essays and articles forms the backbone of the present volume; the essays have been substantially revised for the book, with new work woven in, and have been arranged to make a coherent case proceeding from first principles to the practical politics of our own day. The aim is to demonstrate how an understanding of Progressive Era thought is essential to grasping the stakes of our present political debates.

Like many students of American political thought, I was initially interested in studying the American Constitution and the first principles of the American founding—a period on which I wrote my first book. Since I had been trained in political philosophy, the founding period was compelling, due in part to the facts that its leading figures were well-versed in the tradition of Western political thought and that one could see ample evidence of this in their major speeches and writings. The circumstances of the founding also provided a unique opportunity to see how some of the most important ideas from the Western tradition played out in the crucible of real events. My scholarly interest was in statesmanship, in other words, as much as it was in a more abstract understanding of the ideas that provide statesmanship with its ultimate ends. These scholarly interests coincided with my interests as a citizen: being disposed to think both that the Constitution was good and that it should continue to matter in the politics of our own day, the ideas that gave rise to it came to occupy the bulk of my attention as a student and as a young scholar.

Yet neither a scholar nor a citizen can ignore the reality that today’s political world is vastly different from that of the founding, and the prevailing political ideas and culture mark a sharp departure from the regime’s original principles. Much of this departure is due to the ordinary passage of time and the onset of circumstances that could not possibly have been foreseen hundreds of years ago. The founders themselves understood this inevitability perfectly well. Yet certain core principles were understood by them to be permanent, meant to endure through the unforeseeable exigencies of historical events. This is because they believed—in keeping with much of the Western tradition of thought—that core political ideas were grounded in the very nature of man, and thus that certain first principles of government were applicable to all men and all times, to use the words that Abraham Lincoln once used to describe the founders’ ideas.¹ But that way of looking at politics does not prevail today, as even the core first principles spoken of by the founders and by Lincoln have lost their influence on our culture and our political institutions. This is where the progressives come in. As a student of the founding, I became interested in why its principles no longer held sway in the world in which I was engaged as a citizen, and this interest led me to the study of American progressivism.

In this quest to learn more about the fate of America’s first principles in contemporary culture and government, I was fortunate to be studying among Harry Jaffa and his students at Claremont, and within the orbit of scholars associated with the Claremont Institute. This was not only an excellent setting in which to learn about the founding itself; it was also about the only environment of political theorists at that time where some initial work was being done on the American progressives. It was my teacher Charles R. Kesler, along with other Claremont scholars like John Marini, who first pointed me to the critical role played by the progressives in transforming the core ideas of the American regime, and thus in helping to give rise to modern liberalism. Other than this very small school of political theorists, the only scholarly work that had been done on the progressives prior to the last decade was by historians. The consensus in the major historical works was that there was nothing really radical about American progressivism; it represented, instead, the inevitable adjustments by statesmen in response to the onset of the profoundly new social and economic circumstances that emerged at the turn of the twentieth century. But the political theorists saw something different, deeper, and more radical at work: for them, American progressivism had been a direct assault on the core ideas of the American founding and was thus uniquely influential in the change of the country’s direction and the rise of the modern state. My own work on the progressives took off from this basic way of seeing things—first in a book on Woodrow Wilson,² and later expanding into writings on progressivism more broadly, culminating in the present volume.

It would be difficult to understate the size of that original group of political theorists who had been pointing to the transformative role of American progressivism. Before the likes of Kesler,³ Marini,⁴ and (eventually) myself, Paul Eidelberg’s Discourse on Statesmanship may have been among the first to make the case for progressivism’s transformative role in the American political tradition.⁵ James Ceaser emerged as a lead scholar in the modern presidency school, which attributed major changes in the institution of the presidency to progressive statesmen;⁶ Dennis J. Mahoney (another Jaffa student) did pioneering work on the connection between progressivism and the development of political science as a discipline;⁷ and later Bradley C. S. Watson wrote on the progressive turn in constitutional jurisprudence.⁸ There were others who are inevitably left out in lists such as this, but not many. This situation of relative obscurity changed with the national political cycle of 2008, which brought with it the prominent embrace by the Left of its Progressive Era roots and culminated in the election of President Barack Obama. Progressivism—theretofore an object of interest occupying a very small corner in the discipline of political theory—went mainstream, both in academic circles and in the public discourse.

In the national political debates of the 1980s the term liberal had become a dirty word, and thus in the new millennium those who once called themselves liberals embraced the term progressive instead. This embrace went deeper than a mere re-packaging: progressive politicians pointed to the original Progressive Era as the source of their principles. Hillary Clinton specifically mentioned Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt as the inspirations for her progressivism during the 2008 primary debates, and Obama later launched a major economic initiative by making a speech at Osawatomie, Kansas⁹—where Roosevelt had delivered his famous New Nationalism speech in 1910. Among other things, the embrace of the progressive mantle helped to clear up any confusion that might have existed between modern liberals—those who favor an expansive and active central government of the kind we have seen in America since the early part of the twentieth century—and those whom we might call classical liberals, who see the fundamental purpose of government as the protection of individual rights and thus view with suspicion any extension of governmental power into spheres beyond this limited purpose. More important, by increasingly identifying themselves as progressives, modern liberals had come home. The most influential think tank on the Left—founded by former Clinton aide John Podesta—came to be the Center for American Progress; and Podesta published a popular book titled The Power of Progress: How America’s Progressives Can (Once Again) Save Our Economy, Our Climate, and Our Country.¹⁰

Faced with this unapologetic embrace of progressive ideas and policies, which was backed with the real political power of Obama’s ascension to the presidency, conservatives suddenly became interested in understanding progressivism and in finding ways to battle it in public discourse. The new energy on the Left was met with new energy on the Right, as conservatives realized that Obama and the new progressives were quite serious in their stated goal to change and transform America. This progressive argument that new principles were needed for new times, and that history had passed by the old American ideas, found its perfect intellectual antecedent in the original Progressive Era. And the perfect antecedent of the conservative counterargument was to be found in the principles of the American Revolution, which had proclaimed permanent truths about human nature and correspondingly timeless ends of government that were not subject to redefinition from age to age. It was in this way that the Tea Party movement became the popular manifestation, on the Right, of a deeper and more thoughtful commitment among conservative intellectuals to engage progressive ideas with a renewed explication of those of the American founding. And this is why those of us who had, until then, been talking about American progressivism within small academic circles, came to be drawn into the major debates of the public square—writing in popular outlets and even going on television to shed light on the progressive origins of contemporary liberalism and to explain how progressivism had played a central role in the loss of our constitutional culture.¹¹ And while the Tea Party phenomenon itself faded after a couple of election cycles, the deeper commitment in at least some circles on the Right to bringing constitutional principles to bear on public policy remains. As progressives have come to rely more on the organs of the administrative state as the primary means of pursuing their policy goals, conservatives have increasingly fallen back on reasserting the role of the Constitution’s traditional branches of government and its principle of the separation of powers. President Trump’s advisor Stephen Bannon famously articulated a main goal of the administration as the deconstruction of the administrative state,¹² and politicians and judges on the Right have come to question the very legitimacy of the post-New Deal order in ways that were not common just a generation earlier. Put differently, the disputes that we see in national politics are, increasingly, fundamental disputes, reflecting a deep divide over first principles. This reality explains, perhaps more than any other factor, the renewed interest in the core principles of the founding order, and the core arguments made by the original progressives for a transformation of that order. It also helps to explain the rapid rise in scholarship on American progressivism, from both sides of the divide.

This divide, however, is more complicated than Right vs. Left. While conservatives are quite united in opposition to the policies of the contemporary progressives, intellectuals on the Right are of diverse views on the role of the original progressives, and on the progressives’ relationship to the American founding. To know what one thinks of the progressives, one must first know what to make of the founding, since the original progressives defined their movement as a fundamental move away from the founders’ political thought. And conservative intellectuals have never agreed on what to make of the founding. The different strands of the conservative intellectual movement have, for decades, had sharply and fundamentally different views of the American founding, and of just who is to blame for the rise and victory of the modern liberal state. When the Tea Party movement rose up in 2009 and the energy in conservative politics (not to mention the fundraising opportunities) became focused on a return to founding principles and on resisting the progressive transformation of those principles, conservative organizations scrambled to promote projects on the founding or on progressivism. For many of them, this was new territory. Just a few years prior, many of the same organizations were not at all sure that they liked anything about the founding and would have had trouble identifying any but the most obvious among American progressives. Even today, as coalescing around the Constitution and against progressivism has become ubiquitous in the popular politics of the Right, conservative intellectuals still sharply diverge on this question.

I have argued, and will continue to argue in this book, that the turn in American politics toward the modern liberal state was grounded in the progressive rejection of the founders’ political principles. The major challenge to that argument within conservative intellectual circles has come from those who agree that the turn to modern liberalism has been disastrous for America, but disagree that the progressives are principally to blame for this development. It’s not that these conservatives embrace progressivism; rather, they see progressivism as the inevitable result of dangerous ideas and trends that have much earlier origins in American political development. These scholars are profoundly uncomfortable with the founding itself—with the alleged modernism of its political philosophy or with the fact that the Federalists rather than the Anti-Federalists emerged with the upper hand. From this perspective, the fault in my argument lies in failing to view the founding with a sufficiently critical eye—in blaming the progressives for developments which grew out of defects that the founders themselves baked into the system from the beginning, even if unwittingly. The most well-known recent example would have to be Patrick Deneen,¹³ though this uneasiness with the founding is hardly novel in the history in the conservative movement.¹⁴

There are many facets to this conservative critique and a serious account of it lies beyond the purpose of this book, though oddly Alexis de Tocqueville is often employed in making the criticism. Tocqueville is the principal authority on American government for this group of conservative intellectuals, because he saw the potential in democratic individualism for the rise of the soft despotism of the modern state. And so those of us who primarily blame the progressives for America’s wrong turn (with an assist from the German ideas they imported) make matters worse by failing to give Tocqueville’s analysis of America’s defects pride of place. This failure, the critique continues, causes us to look outside of the American tradition—to the German ideas of the progressives—for the source of our wrong turn, when the real source lies with the Americans themselves, as Tocqueville allegedly taught us. As Deneen has written, Democracy in America perceived the seeds of progressivism’s major tenets already embedded in the basic features and attributes of liberal democracy as established at the founding.¹⁵ Yet this contention that Tocqueville sees the defects of "liberal democracy as established at the founding" seems to conflate his general account of democracy with the American version of it. The point of Tocqueville’s book is to praise American democracy by distinguishing it from other, purer forms, and by showing how it cuts against the general trends of democratic times. Far from seeing a future progressive utopia baked into the principles of American democracy, Tocqueville mimics The Federalist on what it will take to make self-government work. He, like the Federalist framers of the Constitution, understands that the gravest threat to republicanism is majority tyranny.¹⁶ And of course it is the Constitution’s protections against majority tyranny that are the greatest source of irritation to America’s progressives, as this book will show. Tocqueville distinguishes American constitutionalism, in other words, from the very form of anti-constitutionalist democracy that progressives would later champion.

And the contention that the progressives were simply taking advantage of principles that were present all along in American government runs up against another stubborn fact: the progressives themselves. There is a reason that almost every theoretical work written by an American progressive—and many practical ones as well—begins with a sustained and direct attack on the philosophy of the American founding and on the principles of the American Constitution—and that reason is not that the progressives saw in the founding the secret source of their own vision for the modern state. This isn’t to suggest that there weren’t native influences on the rise of progressivism, or that there weren’t receptive elements of the American political tradition which made the importation of German state theory more plausible¹⁷—history is complicated and shifts of this magnitude almost always involve a combination of factors that can be difficult to disentangle. But the social compact principles of the founding provide a clear contrast to the ideas and philosophers championed by the progressives, and the progressives themselves knew it.

This book grounds itself on that fact and will detail how and why American progressives saw the principles of the founding as ideas that had to be refuted and replaced if their vision for the modern state was to be fulfilled.

It will do so in Part I by beginning with an overview of progressivism and the Progressive Era—an essential primer, before more focused analyses follow in subsequent chapters. In showing how progressivism can be understood as a single, coherent, identifiable idea or principle, one runs the risk of criticism from those who would point to important differences among the prominent progressives on the major issues of the day. Most obviously, the two most prominent national progressives addressed in this book—Roosevelt and Wilson—not only were from different political parties but opposed one another in a hard-fought presidential election. Perhaps even more importantly, there was a split among national progressives about the viability of the two-party system itself, to mention just one of the differences on the issues that characterized Progressive Era debates. Nonetheless, the book will contend that progressivism can be understood as a coherent set of principles, with a common purpose. The differences among progressives over issues like reforming the party system were, in the end, differences over particular means, not over fundamental ideas of what government is or ought to be, and certainly not over the need with which all progressives identified to revolutionize both the theory and practice of American government.

Because of the coherent set of principles that characterizes this movement, we can think of it as an -ism as much as we think of it as an era. The meaning of progressivism, and its profound relevance for American politics today, transcends any boundaries that might be placed upon it by a particular set of dates or figures. Progressivism and the ideas that constitute it are alive and well today, as is evidenced by the reclaiming of that title by today’s liberals. Understanding progressivism thus requires both an historical and a theoretical perspective. One cannot comprehend progressivism without paying careful attention to the particular events and figures of the Progressive Era and thinking about how these shaped the character of the movement; nor can one comprehend the progressives without perceiving the core ideas that gave them their identity and thinking about the relevance of these ideas in their own right.

After the opening chapter provides a primer on progressivism and the Progressive Era, Part I will continue with a deeper dive into the political philosophy of progressivism, showing in two chapters what the first principles of the movement were and the way in which these principles departed from the political theory of the American Constitution. Chapter Two will lay out the contrast by showing how liberalism underwent a fundamental transformation—from classical to modern—in the works of the most important progressive thinkers. Chapter Three will look at two of these thinkers—Roosevelt and Wilson—in greater detail, concentrating on their democratic theory, which aimed to popularize American government but also delegate power to expert administrators.

Part II of the book moves from progressive first principles to the actual development of progressive politics in American history. Progressive changes to American government did not take place in a vacuum, or as a merely theoretical exercise; they played out in real time and were shaped by the important events and figures of American history. This part of the book examines the manner in which key figures and events affected the progressive transformation described in Part I. Specifically, Chapter Four shows how the major transformative event of the nineteenth century—the Civil War—and its central figure—Abraham Lincoln—influenced progressive thinking and how the progressives’ ideas developed out of a view they had of Lincoln and the sectional conflict. Progressivism was also deeply intertwined with a major cultural and religious movement coming out of the nineteenth century—the Social Gospel movement—and Chapter Five shows how the major progressive figures were part of, and influenced by, that movement. Richard T. Ely and Walter Rauschenbusch played major roles here, in addition to more well-known figures like Roosevelt—though there was tension between religious and secular progressives that will also be addressed. Finally, in addition to the Civil War and the Social Gospel, America’s emergence as a major player in international affairs was a critical historical setting for the progressives; indeed, international involvement is arguably the context in which progressive figures like Wilson are best-known. Chapter Six will detail the critical international events in which progressives were involved, and will also show how the conventional understanding of progressive internationalism stands at odds, on key points, with the progressive principles outlined in Part I.

And while these historical events are important to understanding American progressivism, the recent explosion of interest in progressivism comes not from an antiquarian curiosity in a bygone era but from the relevance that Progressive Era changes have for the practice of government today. Part III will look to the connection between the original theory and development of progressivism and the shape of American government today. The rise and dominance of the administrative state will draw the most attention, given its obvious relevance in today’s politics and the connection to the progressives’ first principles. Chapter Seven looks to the origins of the administrative state in the institutional arguments of Wilson, Frank Goodnow, and James Landis, while Chapter Eight carries the analysis into present national policy disputes, identifying the key holdings in constitutional and administrative law that have set the stage for contemporary administrative discretion. Finally, Chapter Nine concludes the book by looking to the area of government which was most immediately impacted by the Progressives, in which the most obvious structural changes took place: state and local politics. This is a major legacy of progressivism today, and it seems the most suitable way to conclude a book on the movement’s transformative effect. At the state and local level—which is where the vast majority of Americans have any regular interaction with government—the effects of progressivism are so thorough and so long-established that they are barely noticed; for this reason they are also a good place to underscore the transformative role and enduring relevance of American progressivism.

1  Abraham Lincoln to Henry L. Pierce and Others, April 6, 1859, in Abraham Lincoln: Speeches and Writings, 1859–1865, ed. Don E. Fehrenbacher (New York: Library of America, 1989), 19.

2  Ronald J. Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005).

3  Charles R. Kesler, Woodrow Wilson and the Statesmanship of Progress, in Natural Right and Political Right, ed. Thomas B. Silver and Peter W. Schramm (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1984), 103–27.

4  John Marini, Theology, Metaphysics, and Positivism: The Origins of the Social Sciences and the Transformation of the American University, in Challenges to the American Founding: Slavery, Historicism, and Progressivism in the Nineteenth Century, ed. Ronald J. Pestritto and Thomas G. West (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005), 163–194; Marini and Ken Masugi, eds., The Progressive Revolution in Politics and Political Science: Transforming the American Regime (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005). Much of this earlier work is incorporated in Marini’s recent book, Unmasking the Administrative State (New York: Encounter Books, 2019).

5  Paul Eidelberg, Discourse on Statesmanship: The Design and Transformation of the American Polity (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1974).

6  James W. Ceaser, Presidential Selection: Theory and Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); Ceaser, Glen E. Thurow, Jeffrey K. Tulis, Joseph M. Bessette, The Rise of the Rhetorical Presidency, Presidential Studies Quarterly 11, no. 2 (Spring 1981): 158–171. For additional examples of work in the modern presidency school, see also Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); Robert Eden, Opinion Leadership and the Problem of Executive Power: Woodrow Wilson’s Original Position, Review of Politics 57, no. 3 (Summer 1995): 483–503; Eden, "The Rhetorical Presidency and the Eclipse of Executive Power: Woodrow Wilson’s Constitutional Government in the United States," Polity 28, no. 3 (Spring 1996): 357–378; Charles R. Kesler, Separation of Powers and the Administrative State, in The Imperial Congress, ed. Gordon S. Jones and John A. Marini (New York: Pharos Books, 1988), 20–40; Charles R. Kesler, The Public Philosophy of the New Freedom and the New Deal, in The New Deal and Its Legacy, ed. Robert Eden (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), 155–66; Kesler, Woodrow Wilson and the Statesmanship of Progress, 103–127.

7  Dennis Mahoney, Politics and Progress: The Emergence of American Political Science (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004).

8  Bradley C. S. Watson, Living Constitution, Dying Faith: Progressivism and the New Science of Jurisprudence (Wilmington: ISI Books, 2009). Paul D. Moreno has also recently written on the progressive influence on constitutional history; see Moreno, The American State from the Civil War to the New Deal: The Twilight of Constitutionalism and the Triumph of Progressivism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); and Moreno, The Bureaucrat Kings: The Origins and Underpinnings of America’s Bureaucratic State (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2017).

9  Barack Obama, Remarks at Osawatomie High School in Osawatomie, Kansas, December 6, 2011, accessed February 8, 2020, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-osawat-omie-high-school-osawatomie-kansas.

10  John Podesta, The Power of Progress: How America’s Progressives Can (Once Again) Save Our Economy, Our Climate, and Our Country (New York: Crown, 2008).

11  For an instructive account, see Robert D. Johnston, Long Live Teddy/Death to Woodrow: The Polarized Politics of The Progressive Era in the 2012 Election, Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era 13, no. 3 (July 2014): 411–443. For those interested in a broader historiography of work on the progressives, Johnston has a thorough one: Johnston, Re-Democratizing the Progressive Era: The Politics of Progressive Era Political Historiography, Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era 1, no. 1 (2002): 68–92.

12  Philip Rucker and Robert Costa, Bannon Vows a Daily Fight for ‘Deconstruction of the Administrative State,’ The Washington Post, February 23, 2017, accessed February 8, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/top-wh-strategist-vows-a-daily-fight-for-deconstruction-of-the-administrative-state/2017/02/23/03f6b8da-f9ea-11e6-bf01-d47f8cf9b643_story.html.

13  Patrick J. Deneen, Why Liberalism Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018); for an opposing view, see Dennis Hale and Marc Landy, Blame the Fathers, review of Why Liberalism Failed, by Patrick J. Deneen, Claremont Review of Books (Summer 2018).

14  See, for example, Robert H. Bork, Slouching Toward Gomorrah (New York: ReganBooks, 1996); Peter Lawler, Natural Law, Our Constitution, and Our Democracy, in Modern America and the Legacy of the Founding, ed. by Ronald J. Pestritto and Thomas G. West (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005), 207–237.

15  Patrick J. Deneen, Tocqueville on the Individualist Roots of Progressivism, The Imaginative Conservative, November 29, 2013, accessed February 8, 2020, https://theimaginativeconservative.org/2013/11/tocqueville-individualist-roots-progressivism.html.

16  Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. and trans. Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 249.

17  There is little secondary scholarship on the potential pre-Civil War sources of progressive thought from within the American tradition itself, though in an as-yet unpublished dissertation, Nathan E. Gill credibly points to New England intellectuals and politicians as one possibility. Gill, The Decline and Rejection of Social Contract Theory in Antebellum New England (Doctoral Dissertation, Hillsdale College, 2018).

PART I

PROGRESSIVE FIRST PRINCIPLES

CHAPTER ONE

A PRIMER ON PROGRESSIVISM AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

What is progressivism?¹ The chapters in this book will lay out its characteristics in detail, but to begin we can think of it as an argument to move beyond the political principles of the American founding. It is an argument to enlarge vastly the scope of national government for the purpose of responding to a set of economic and social conditions which, progressives contend, could not have been envisioned at the founding and for which the founders’ limited, constitutional government is inadequate. Whereas the founders posited what they held to be a permanent understanding of just government, based upon a permanent account of human nature, progressives have countered that the ends and scope of government are to be defined anew in each historical epoch. They have coupled this belief in historical contingency with a deep faith in historical progress, suggesting that, due to historical evolution, government was becoming less of a danger to the governed and more capable of solving the great array of problems besetting the human race. Historically, these ideas formed a common thread among the most important American thinkers from the 1880s into the 1920s and beyond, manifesting themselves in the writings and speeches of Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Herbert Croly, John Dewey, Robert La Follette, and several others. The arguments of these central figures will be explored in the following chapters; the task here is to speak more generally to the fundamental characteristics in the thought of these figures that gave them common cause as progressives.

THE PRINCIPLES OF PROGRESSIVISM

The Progressive Era was the first major period in American political development to feature, as a primary characteristic, the open and direct criticism of the Constitution. While criticism of the Constitution can be found during any period of American history from 1787 onward, the Progressive Era was unique in that such criticism formed the backbone of the entire movement. Progressive Era criticism of the Constitution came not from a few fringe figures, but from the most prominent thinkers and politicians of that time. Readers are reminded, in almost any progressive text they will pick up, that the Constitution is old, and that it was written to deal with circumstances that had long ago been replaced by a whole new set of pressing social and economic ills. The progressives understood the intention and structure of the Constitution very well; they knew that it established a framework for limited government, and that these limits were to be upheld by a variety of institutional restraints and checks. They also knew that the limits placed on the national government by the Constitution represented major obstacles to implementing the progressive policy agenda. Progressives had in mind a variety of legislative programs aimed at regulating significant portions of the American economy and society, and at redistributing private property in the name of social justice. The Constitution, if interpreted and applied faithfully, stood in the way of this agenda.

The Constitution, however, was only a means to an end. It was crafted and adopted for the sake of achieving the natural rights principles of the Declaration