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    The Principles of Psychology, Vol. II
    The Principles of Psychology, Vol. II
    The Principles of Psychology, Vol. II
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    The Principles of Psychology, Vol. II

    By William James

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    Experience the life-changing power of William James with this unforgettable book.
    LanguageEnglish
    PublisherScarlet Tree Press
    Release dateDec 16, 2020
    ISBN9791220251761
    The Principles of Psychology, Vol. II
    Author

    William James

    William James (1842–1910) was an American philosopher, physician, and psychologist. The brother of novelist Henry James, William James is remembered for his contributions to the fields of pragmatism and functional psychology. 

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      The Principles of Psychology, Vol. II - William James

      The Principles of Psychology

      Volume 2

      by William James

      CONTENTS.

      CHAPTER XVII.

      SENSATION

      Its distinction from perception. Its cognitive

      function--acquaintance with qualities. No pure sensations after the

      first days of life. The 'relativity of knowledge'. The law of

      contrast. The psychological and the physiological theories of it.

      Hering's experiments. The 'eccentric projection' of sensations.

      CHAPTER XVIII.

      IMAGINATION

      Our images are usually vague. Vague images not necessarily general

      notions. Individuals differ in imagination; Gabon's researches.

      The 'visile' type, 58. The 'audile' type. The 'motile' type.

      Tactile images, 65. The neural process of imagination. Its

      relations to that of sensation.

      CHAPTER XIX.

      THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS'

      Perception and sensation. Perception is of definite and probable

      things. Illusions;--of the first type;--of the second

      type. The neural process in perception. 'Apperception'.

      Is perception an unconscious inference? Hallucinations,

      114. The neural process in hallucination. Binet's theory.

      'Perception-time'.

      CHAPTER XX.

      THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE

      The feeling of crude extensity. The perception of spatial order.

      Space-'relations'. The meaning of localization. 'Local

      signs'. The construction of 'real' space. The subdivision

      of the original sense-spaces. The sensation of motion over

      surfaces. The measurement of the sense-spaces by each other.

      Their summation. Feelings of movement in joints. Feelings

      of muscular contraction. Summary so far. How the blind

      perceive space. Visual space. Helmholtz and Reid on the

      test of a sensation. The theory of identical points. The

      theory of projection. Ambiguity of retinal impressions;--of

      eye-movements. The choice of the visual reality. Sensations

      which we ignore. Sensations which seem suppressed. Discussion

      of Wundt's and Helmholtz's reasons for denying that retinal sensations

      are of extension. Summary. Historical remarks.

      CHAPTER XXI.

      THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY

      Belief and its opposites. The various orders of reality.

      'Practical' realities. The sense of our own bodily existence is

      the nucleus of all reality. The paramount reality of sensations.

      The influence of emotion and active impulse on belief. Belief

      in theories. Doubt. Relations of belief and will.

      CHAPTER XXII.

      REASONING

      'Recepts'. In reasoning, we pick out essential qualities.

      What is meant by a mode of conceiving. What is involved in the

      existence of general propositions. The two factors of reasoning.

      Sagacity. The part played by association by similarity.

      The intellectual contrast between brute and man: association by

      similarity the fundamental human distinction. Different orders of

      human genius.

      CHAPTER XXIII.

      THE PRODUCTION OF MOVEMENT

      The diffusive wave. Every sensation produces reflex effects on the

      whole organism.

      CHAPTER XXIV.

      INSTINCT

      Its definition. Instincts not always blind or invariable.

      Two principles of non-uniformity in instincts: 1) Their inhibition by

      habits; 2) Their transitoriness. Man has more instincts than

      any other mammal. Reflex impulses. Imitation. Emulation.

      Pugnacity. Sympathy. The hunting instinct. Fear.

      Acquisitiveness. Constructiveness. Play. Curiosity.

      Sociability and shyness. Secretiveness. Cleanliness.

      Shame. Love. Maternal love.

      CHAPTER XXV.

      THE EMOTIONS

      Instinctive reaction and emotional expression shade imperceptibly into

      each other. The expression of grief; of fear; of hatred.

      Emotion is a consequence, not the cause, of the bodily expression.

      Difficulty of testing this view. Objections to it discussed.

      The subtler emotions, 468. No special brain-centres for emotion.

      Emotional differences between individuals. The genesis of the

      various emotions.

      CHAPTER XXVI.

      WILL

      Voluntary movements: they presuppose a memory of involuntary movements.

      Kinæsthetic impressions, 488. No need to assume feelings of

      innervation. The 'mental cue' for a movement may be an image of

      its visual or auditory effects as well as an image of the way it feels.

      Ideo-motor action. Action after deliberation. Five types

      of decision. The feeling of effort. Unhealthiness of will:

      1) The explosive type; 2) The obstructed type. Pleasure

      and pain are not the only springs of action. All consciousness

      is impulsive. What we will depends on what idea dominates in

      our mind. The idea's outward effects follow from the cerebral

      machinery. Effort of attention to a naturally repugnant idea is

      the essential feature of willing. The free-will controversy.

      Psychology, as a science, can safely postulate determinism, even if

      free-will be true. The education of the Will. Hypothetical

      brain-schemes.

      CHAPTER XXVII.

      HYPNOTISM

      Modes of operating and susceptibility. Theories about the hypnotic

      state. The symptoms of the trance.

      CHAPTER XXVIII.

      NECESSARY TRUTHS AND THE EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE

      Programme of the chapter. Elementary feelings are innate.

      The question refers to their combinations. What is meant by

      'experience'. Spencer on ancestral experience. Two ways

      in which new cerebral structure arises: the 'back-door' and the

      'front-door' way. The genesis of the elementary mental categories.

      The genesis of the natural sciences. Scientific conceptions

      arise as accidental variations. The genesis of the pure sciences.

      Series of evenly increasing terms. The principle of mediate

      comparison. That of skipped intermediaries. Classification.

      Predication. Formal logic. Mathematical propositions.

      Arithmetic. Geometry. Our doctrine is the same as

      Locke's. Relations of ideas _v._ couplings of things The

      natural sciences are inward ideal schemes with which the order of

      nature proves congruent. Metaphysical principles are properly only

      postulates. Æsthetic and moral principles are quite incongruent

      with the order of nature. Summary of what precedes. The

      origin of instincts. Insufficiency of proof for the transmission

      to the next generation of acquired habits. Weismann's views.

      Conclusion.

      INDEX.

      PSYCHOLOGY.

      CHAPTER XVII.

      SENSATION.

      After inner perception, outer perception! The next three chapters will

      treat of the processes by which we cognize at all times the present

      world of space and the material things which it contains. And first, of

      the process called Sensation.

      SENSATION AND PERCEPTION DISTINGUISHED.

      _The words Sensation and Perception_ do not carry very definitely

      discriminated meanings in popular speech, and in Psychology also their

      meanings run into each other. Both of them name processes in which we

      cognize an objective world; both (under normal conditions) need the

      stimulation of incoming nerves ere they can occur; Perception always

      involves Sensation as a portion of itself; and Sensation in turn never

      takes place in adult life without Perception also being there. They are

      therefore names for different cognitive _functions_, not for different

      sorts of mental _fact_. The nearer the object cognized comes to being a

      simple quality like 'hot,' 'cold,' 'red,' 'noise,' 'pain,' apprehended

      irrelatively to other things, the more the state of mind approaches

      pure sensation. The fuller of relations the object is, on the contrary;

      the more it is something classed, located, measured, compared, assigned

      to a function, etc., etc.; the more unreservedly do we call the state

      of mind a perception, and the relatively smaller is the part in it

      which sensation plays.

      _Sensation, then, so long as we take the analytic point of view,

      differs from Perception only in the extreme simplicity of its object or

      content._[1] Its function is that of mere _acquaintance_ with a fact.

      Perception's function, on the other hand, is knowledge _about_[2] a

      fact; and this knowledge admits of numberless degrees of complication.

      But in both sensation and perception we perceive the fact as an

      _immediately present outward reality_, and this makes them differ from

      'thought' and 'conception,' whose objects do not appear present in this

      immediate physical way. _From the physiological_ _point of view both

      sensations and perceptions differ from 'thoughts'_ (in the narrower

      sense of the word) _in the fact that nerve-currents coming in from

      the periphery are involved in their production. In perception these

      nerve-currents arouse voluminous associative or reproductive processes

      in the cortex; but when sensation occurs alone, or with a minimum of

      perception, the accompanying reproductive processes are at a minimum

      too._

      I shall in this chapter discuss some general questions more especially

      relative to Sensation. In a later chapter perception will take its

      turn. I shall entirely pass by the classification and natural history

      of our special 'sensations,' such matters finding their proper place,

      and being sufficiently well treated, in all the physiological books.[3]

      THE COGNITIVE FUNCTION OF SENSATION.

      _A pure sensation is an abstraction;_ and when we adults talk of our

      'sensations' we mean one of two things: either certain _objects_,

      namely simple _qualities_ or _attributes_ like _hard, hot, pain;_ or

      else those of our thoughts in which acquaintance with these objects

      is least combined with knowledge about the relations of them to other

      things. As we can only think or talk about the relations of objects

      with which we have _acquaintance_ already, we are forced to postulate

      a function in our thought whereby we first become aware of the _bare

      immediate natures_ by which our several objects are distinguished.

      This function is sensation. And just as logicians always point out

      the distinction between substantive terms of discourse and relations

      found to obtain between them, so psychologists, as a rule, are ready to

      admit this function, of the vision of the terms or matters meant, as

      something distinct from the knowledge about them and of their relations

      _inter se_. Thought with the former function is sensational, with the

      latter, intellectual. Our earliest thoughts are almost exclusively

      sensational. They merely give us a set of _thats_, or _its_, of

      subjects of discourse, with their relations not brought out. The

      first time we see _light_, in Condillac's phrase we _are_ it rather

      rather than see it. But all our later optical knowledge is about what

      this experience gives. And though we were struck blind from that first

      moment, our scholarship in the subject would lack no essential feature

      so long as our memory remained. In training-institutions for the blind

      they teach the pupils as much _about_ light as in ordinary schools.

      Reflection, refraction, the spectrum, the ether-theory, etc., are all

      studied. But the best taught born-blind pupil of such an establishment

      yet lacks a knowledge which the least instructed seeing baby has. They

      can never show him what light is in its 'first intention'; and the loss

      of that sensible knowledge no book-learning can replace. All this is so

      obvious that we usually find sensation 'postulated' as an element of

      experience, even by those philosophers who are least inclined to make

      much of its importance, or to pay respect to the knowledge which it

      brings.[4]

      But the trouble is that most, if not all, of those who admit it,

      admit it as a fractional _part_ of the thought, in the old-fashioned

      atomistic sense which we have so often criticised.

      Take the pain called toothache for example. Again and again we feel it

      and greet it as the same real item in the universe. We must therefore,

      it is supposed, have a distinct pocket for it in our mind into which it

      and nothing else will fit. This pocket, when filled, is the sensation

      of toothache; and must be either filled or half-filled whenever and

      under whatever form toothache is present to our thought, and whether

      much or little of the rest of the mind be filled at the same time.

      Thereupon of course comes up the paradox and mystery: If the knowledge

      of toothache be pent up in this separate mental pocket, how can it be

      known _cum alio_ or brought into one view with anything else? This

      pocket knows nothing else; no other part of the mind knows toothache.

      The knowing of toothache _cum alio_ must be a miracle. And the miracle

      must have an Agent. And the Agent must be a Subject or Ego 'out of

      time,'--and all the rest of it, as we saw in Chapter X. And then begins

      the well-worn round of recrimination between the sensationalists and

      the spiritualists, from which we are saved by our determination from

      the outset to accept the psychological point of view, and to admit

      knowledge whether of simple toothaches or of philosophic systems as

      an ultimate fact. There are realities and there are 'states of mind,'

      and the latter know the former; and it is just as wonderful for a

      state of mind to be a 'sensation' and know a simple pain as for it to

      be a thought and know a system of related things.[5] But there is no

      reason to suppose that when different states of mind know different

      things about the same toothache, they do so by virtue of their all

      _containing_ faintly or vividly the original pain. Quite the reverse.

      The by-gone sensation of my gout was painful, as Reid somewhere says;

      the _thought_ of the same gout as by-gone is pleasant, and in no

      respect resembles the earlier mental state.

      Sensations, then, first make us acquainted with innumerable things, and

      then are replaced by thoughts which know the same things in altogether

      other ways. And Locke's main doctrine remains eternally true, however

      hazy some of his language may have been, that

       "though there be a great number of considerations wherein things

       may be compared one with another, and so a multitude of relations;

       yet they all _terminate in_, and are concerned about, those simple

       ideas[6] either of sensation or reflection, which I think to be the

       whole materials of all our knowledge.... The simple ideas we receive

       from sensation and reflection are the _boundaries_ of our thoughts;

       beyond which, the mind whatever efforts it would make, is not able to

       advance one jot; nor can it make any discoveries when it would pry

       into the nature and hidden causes of those ideas."[7]

      The nature and hidden causes of ideas will never be unravelled till

      the _nexus_ between the brain and consciousness is cleared up. All

      we can say now is that sensations are _first_ things in the way of

      consciousness. Before conceptions can come, sensations must have

      come; but before sensations come, no psychic fact need have existed,

      a nerve-current is enough. If the nerve-current be not given, nothing

      else will take its place. To quote the good Locke again:

       "It is not in the power of the most exalted wit or enlarged

       understanding, by any quickness or variety of thoughts, to invent or

       frame one new simple idea [i.e. sensation] in the mind.... I would

       have any one try to fancy any taste which had never affected his

       palate, or frame the idea of a scent he had never smelt; and when

       he can do this, I will also conclude that a blind man hath ideas of

       colors, and a deaf man true distinct notions of sounds."[8]

      The brain is so made that all currents in it run one way. Consciousness

      of some sort goes with all the currents, but it is only when new

      currents are entering that it has the sensational _tang_. And it is

      only then that consciousness directly _encounters_ (to use a word of

      Mr. Bradley's) a reality outside itself.

      The difference between such encounter and all conceptual knowledge is

      very great. A blind man may know all _about_ the sky's blueness, and

      I may know all _about_ your toothache, conceptually; tracing their

      causes from primeval chaos, and their consequences to the crack of

      doom. But so long as he has not felt the blueness, nor I the toothache,

      our knowledge, wide as it is, of these realities, will be hollow

      and inadequate. Somebody must _feel_ blueness, somebody must _have_

      toothache, to make human knowledge of these matters real. Conceptual

      systems which neither began nor left off in sensations would be like

      bridges without piers. Systems about fact must plunge themselves into

      sensation as bridges plunge their piers into the rock. Sensations are

      the stable rock, the _terminus a quo_ and the _terminus ad quem_ of

      thought. To find such termini is our aim with all our theories--to

      conceive first when and where a certain sensation may be had, and then

      to have it. Finding it stops discussion. Failure to find it kills the

      false conceit of knowledge. Only when you deduce a possible sensation

      for me from your theory, and give it to me when and where the theory

      requires, do I begin to be sure that your thought has anything to do

      with truth.

      _Pure sensations can only be realized in the earliest days of life._

      They are all but impossible to adults with memories and stores of

      associations acquired. Prior to all impressions on sense-organs the

      brain is plunged in deep sleep and consciousness is practically

      non-existent. Even the first weeks after birth are passed in almost

      unbroken sleep by human infants. It takes a strong message from the

      sense-organs to break this slumber. In a new-born brain this gives

      rise to an absolutely pure sensation. But the experience leaves its

      'unimaginable touch' on the matter of the convolutions, and the next

      impression which a sense-organ transmits produces a cerebral reaction

      in which the awakened vestige of the last impression plays its part.

      Another sort of feeling and a higher grade of cognition are the

      consequence; and the complication goes on increasing till the end of

      life, no two successive impressions falling on an identical brain, and

      no two successive thoughts being exactly the same. (See Vol. I, p. 230

      ff.)

      _The first sensation which an infant gets is for him the Universe._

      And the Universe which he later comes to know is nothing but an

      amplification and an implication of that first simple germ which,

      by accretion on the one hand and intussusception on the other,

      has grown so big and complex and articulate that its first estate

      is unrememberable. In his dumb awakening to the consciousness of

      _something there_, a mere _this_ as yet (or something for which

      even the term _this_ would perhaps be too discriminative, and the

      intellectual acknowledgment of which would be better expressed by

      the bare interjection 'lo!'), the infant encounters an object in

      which (though it be given in a pure sensation) all the 'categories

      of the understanding' are contained. _It has objectivity, unity,

      substantiality, causality, in the full sense in which any later object

      or system of objects has these things._ Here the young knower meets

      and greets his world; and the miracle of knowledge bursts forth, as

      Voltaire says, as much in the infant's lowest sensation as in the

      highest achievement of a Newton's brain. The physiological condition

      of this first sensible experience is probably nerve-currents coming

      in from many peripheral organs at once. Later, the one confused Fact

      which these currents cause to appear is perceived to be many facts,

      and to contain many qualities.[9] For as the currents vary, and the

      brain-paths are moulded by them, other thoughts with other 'objects'

      come, and the 'same thing' which was apprehended as a present _this_

      soon figures as a past _that_, about which many unsuspected things have

      come to light. The principles of this development have been laid down

      already in Chapters XII and XIII, and nothing more need here be added

      to that account.

      THE RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE.

      To the reader who is tired of so much _Erkenntnisstheorie_ I can only

      say that I am so myself, but that it is indispensable, in the actual

      state of opinions about Sensation, to try to clear up just what the

      word means. Locke's pupils seek to do the impossible with sensations,

      and against them we must once again insist that sensations 'clustered

      together' cannot build up our more intellectual states of mind. Plato's

      earlier pupils used to admit Sensation's existence, grudgingly, but

      they trampled it in the dust as something corporeal, non-cognitive,

      and vile.[10] His latest followers seem to seek to crowd it out of

      existence altogether. The only reals for the neo-Hegelian writers

      appear to be _relations_, relations without terms, or whose terms

      are only speciously such and really consist in knots, or gnarls of

      relations finer still _in infinitum_.

       "Exclude from what we have considered real all qualities constituted

       by relation, we find that none are left. Abstract the many relations

       from the one thing and there is nothing.... Without the relations it

       would not exist at all.[11] The single feeling is nothing real."

       "On the recognition of relations as constituting the _nature_ of

       ideas, rests the possibility of any tenable theory of their reality."

      Such quotations as these from the late T. H. Green[12] would be matters

      of curiosity rather than of importance, were it not that sensationalist

      writers themselves believe in a so-called 'Relativity of Knowledge,'

      which, if they only understood it, they would see to be identical

      with Professor Green's doctrine. They tell us that the relation of

      sensations to each other is something belonging to their essence, and

      that no one of them has an absolute content:

       "That, e.g., black can only be felt in contrast to white, or at

       least in distinction from a paler or a deeper black; similarly a

       tone or a sound only in alternation with others or with silence; and

       in like manner a smell, a taste, a touch, only, so to speak, _in

       statu nascendi_, whilst, when the stimulus continues, all sensation

       disappears. This all seems at first sight to be splendidly consistent

       both with itself and with the facts. But looked at more closely, it is

       seen that neither is the case."[13]

      The two leading facts from which the doctrine of universal relativity

      derives its wide-spread credit are these:

      1) The _psychological fact_ that so much of our actual knowledge _is_

      of the relations of things--even our simplest sensations in adult life

      are habitually referred to classes as we take them in; and

      2) The _physiological fact_ that our senses and brain must have periods

      of change and repose, else we cease to feel and think.

      Neither of these facts proves anything about the presence or

      non-presence to our mind of absolute qualities with which we become

      sensibly acquainted. Surely not the psychological fact; for our

      inveterate love of relating and comparing things does not alter the

      intrinsic qualities or nature of the things compared, or undo their

      absolute givenness. And surely not the physiological fact; for the

      length of time during which we can feel or attend to a quality is

      altogether irrelevant to the intrinsic constitution of the quality

      felt. The time, moreover, is long enough in many instances, as

      sufferers from neuralgia know.[14] And the doctrine of relativity,

      not proved by these facts, is flatly disproved by other facts even

      more patent. So far are we from not knowing (in the words of Professor

      Bain) "any one thing by itself, but only the difference between it

      and another thing," that if this were true the whole edifice of our

      knowledge would collapse. If all we felt were the _difference_ between

      the _C_ and _D_, or _c_ and _d_, on the musical scale, that being the

      same in the two pairs of notes, the pairs themselves would be the same,

      and language could get along without substantives. But Professor Bain

      does not mean seriously what he says, and we need spend no more time on

      this vague and popular form of the doctrine.[15] The facts which seem

      to hover before the minds of its champions are those which are best

      described under the head of a physiological law.

      THE LAW OF CONTRAST.

      I will first enumerate the main facts which fall under this law, and

      then remark upon what seems to me their significance for psychology.[16]

      [Nowhere are the phenomena of contrast better exhibited, and their

      laws more open to accurate study, than in connection with the sense

      of sight. Here both kinds--simultaneous and successive--can easily be

      observed, for they are of constant occurrence. Ordinarily they remain

      unnoticed, in accordance with the general law of economy which causes

      us to select for conscious notice only such elements of our object as

      will serve us for æsthetic or practical utility, and to neglect the

      rest; just as we ignore the double images, the _mouches volantes_,

      etc., which exist for everyone, but which are not discriminated

      without careful attention. But by attention we may easily discover

      the general facts involved in contrast. We find that _in general the

      color and brightness of one object always apparently affect the color

      and brightness of any other object seen simultaneously with it or

      immediately after_.

      In the first place, if we look for a moment at any surface and then

      turn our eyes elsewhere, the complementary color and opposite degree

      of brightness to that of the first surface tend to mingle themselves

      with the color and the brightness of the second. This is _successive

      contrast_. It finds its explanation in the fatigue of the organ of

      sight, causing it to respond to any particular stimulus less and

      less readily the longer such stimulus continues to act. This is

      shown clearly in the very marked changes which occur in case of

      continued fixation of one particular point of any field. The field

      darkens slowly, becomes more and more indistinct, and finally, if

      one is practised enough in holding the eye perfectly steady, slight

      differences in shade and color may entirely disappear. If we now turn

      aside the eyes, a negative after-image of the field just fixated at

      once forms, and mingles its sensations with those which may happen to

      come from anything else looked at. This influence is distinctly evident

      only when the first surface has been 'fixated' without movement of

      the eyes. It is, however, none the less present at all times, even

      when the eye wanders from point to point, causing each sensation to

      be modified more or less by that just previously experienced. On this

      account successive contrast is almost sure to be present in cases of

      simultaneous contrast, and to complicate the phenomena.

      A _visual image is modified not only by other sensations just

      previously experienced, but also by all those experienced

      simultaneously with it, and especially by such as proceed from

      contiguous portions of the retina_. This is the phenomenon of

      _simultaneous contrast_. In this, as in successive contrast, both

      brightness and hue are involved. A bright object appears still brighter

      when its surroundings are darker than itself, and darker when they are

      brighter than itself. Two colors side by side are apparently changed by

      the admixture, with each, of the complement of the other. And lastly,

      a gray surface near a colored one is tinged with the complement of the

      latter.[17]

      The phenomena of simultaneous contrast in sight are so complicated

      by other attendant phenomena that it is difficult to isolate

      them and observe them in their purity. Yet it is evidently of the

      greatest importance to do so, if one would conduct his investigations

      accurately. Neglect of this principle has led to many mistakes being

      made in accounting for the facts observed. As we have seen, if the eye

      is allowed to wander here and there about the field as it ordinarily

      does, successive contrast results and allowance must be made for

      its presence. It can be avoided only by carefully fixating with the

      well-rested eye a point of one field, and by then observing the changes

      which occur in this field when the contrasting field is placed by its

      side. Such a course will insure pure simultaneous contrast. But even

      thus it lasts in its purity for a moment only. It reaches its maximum

      of effect immediately after the introduction of the contrasting field,

      and then, if the fixation is continued, it begins to weaken rapidly

      and soon disappears; thus undergoing changes similar to those observed

      when any field whatever is fixated steadily and the retina becomes

      fatigued by unchanging stimuli. If one continues still further to

      fixate the same point, the color and brightness of one field tend to

      spread themselves over and mingle with the color and brightness of the

      neighboring fields, thus substituting '_simultaneous induction_' for

      simultaneous contrast.

      Not only must we recognize and eliminate the effects of successive

      contrast, of temporal changes due to fixation, and of simultaneous

      induction, in analyzing the phenomena of simultaneous contrast, but we

      must also take into account _various other influences which modify its

      effects_. Under favorable circumstances the contrast-effects are very

      striking, and did they always occur as strongly they could not fail to

      attract the attention. But they are not always clearly apparent, owing

      to various disturbing causes which form no exception to the laws of

      contrast, but which have a modifying effect on its phenomena. When,

      for instance, the ground observed has many distinguishable features--a

      _coarse grain, rough surface, intricate pattern,_ etc.--the contrast

      effect appears weaker. This does not imply that the effects of contrast

      are absent, but merely that the resulting sensations are overpowered

      by the many other stronger sensations which entirely occupy the

      attention. On such a ground a faint negative after-image--undoubtedly

      due to retinal modifications--may become invisible; and even weak

      objective differences in color may become imperceptible. For example, a

      faint spot or grease-stain on woollen cloth, easily seen at a distance,

      when the fibres are not distinguishable, disappears when closer

      examination reveals the intricate nature of the surface.

      Another frequent cause of the apparent absence of contrast is the

      presence of narrow dark intermediate fields, such as are formed by

      _bordering a field with black lines, or by the shaded contours of

      objects_. When such fields interfere with the contrast, it is because

      black and white can absorb much color without themselves becoming

      clearly colored; and because such lines separate other fields too far

      for them to distinctly influence one another. Even weak objective

      differences in color may be made imperceptible by such means.

      A third case where contrast does not clearly appear is where the _color

      of the contrasting fields is too weak or too intense_, or where there

      is _much difference in brightness between the two fields_. In the

      latter case, as can easily be shown, it is the contrast of brightness

      which interferes with the color-contrast and makes it imperceptible.

      For this reason contrast shows best between fields of about equal

      brightness. But the intensity of the color must not be too great, for

      then its very darkness necessitates a dark contrasting field which

      is too absorbent of induced color to allow the contrast to appear

      strongly. The case is similar if the fields are too light.

      _To obtain the best contrast-effects, therefore, the contracting fields

      should be near together, should not be separated by shadows or black

      lines, should be of homogeneous texture, and should be of about equal

      brightness and medium intensity of color._ Such conditions do not

      often occur naturally, the disturbing influences being present in case

      of almost all ordinary objects, thus making the effects of contrast

      far less evident. To eliminate these disturbances and to produce the

      conditions most favorable for the appearance of good contrast-effects,

      various experiments have been devised, which will be explained in

      comparing the rival theories of explanation.

             *       *       *       *       *

      There are _two theories--the psychological and the

      physiological_--which attempt to explain the phenomena of contrast.

      Of these the _psychological one_ was the first to gain prominence.

      _Its most able advocate has been Helmholtz. It explains contrast

      as a_ DECEPTION OF JUDGMENT. In ordinary life our sensations have

      interest for us only so far as they give us practical knowledge.

      Our chief concern is to recognize objects, and we have no occasion

      to estimate exactly their absolute brightness and color. Hence we

      gain no facility in so doing, but neglect the constant changes in

      their shade, and are very uncertain as to the exact degree of their

      brightness or tone of their color. When objects are near one another

      "we are inclined to consider those differences which are clearly and

      surely perceived as greater than those which appear uncertain in

      perception or which must be judged by aid of memory,"[18] just as we

      see a medium-sized man taller than he really is when he stands beside

      a short man. Such deceptions are more easily possible in the judgment

      of small differences than of large ones; also where there is but one

      element of difference instead of many. In a large number of cases of

      contrast, in all of which a whitish spot is surrounded on all sides

      by a colored surface--Meyer's experiment, the mirror experiment,

      colored shadows, etc., soon to be described--the contrast is produced,

      according to Helmholtz, by the fact that "a colored illumination or a

      transparent colored covering appears to be spread out over the field,

      and observation does not show directly that it fails on the white

      spot."[19] We therefore believe that we see the latter through the

      former color. Now

       "Colors have their greatest importance for us in so far as they are

       properties of bodies and can serve as signs for the recognition

       of bodies.... We have become accustomed, in forming a judgment in

       regard to the colors of bodies, to eliminate the varying brightness

       and color of the illumination. We have sufficient opportunity to

       investigate the same colors of objects in full sunshine, in the blue

       light of the clear sky, in the weak white light of a cloudy day, in

       the reddish-yellow light of the sinking sun or of the candle. Moreover

       the colored reflections of surrounding objects are involved. Since

       we see the same colored objects under these varying illuminations,

       we learn to form a correct conception of the color of the object in

       spite of the difference in illumination, i.e. to judge how such an

       object would appear in white illumination; and since only the constant

       color of the object interests us, we do not become conscious of the

       particular sensations on which our judgment rests. So also we are

       at no loss, when we see an object through a colored covering, to

       distinguish what belongs to the color of the covering and what to

       the object. In the experiments mentioned we do the same also where

       the covering over the object is not at all colored, because of the

       deception into which we fall, and in consequence of which we ascribe

       to the body a false color, the color complementary to the colored

       portion of the covering."[20]

      We think that we see the complementary color through the colored

      covering,--for these two colors together would give the sensation of

      white which is actually experienced. If, however, in any way the white

      spot is recognized as an independent object, or if it is compared with

      another object known to be white, our judgment is no longer deceived

      and the contrast does not appear.

       "As soon as the contrasting field is recognized as an independent

       body which lies above the colored ground, or even through an adequate

       tracing of its outlines is seen to be a separate field, the contrast

       disappears. Since, then, the judgment of the spatial position, the

       material independence, of the object in question is decisive for the

       determination of its color, it follows that the contrast-color arises

       not through an act of sensation but through an act of judgment."[21]

      In short, the apparent change in color or brightness through contrast

      is due to no change in excitation of the organ, to no change in

      sensation; but in consequence of a false judgment the unchanged

      sensation is wrongly interpreted, and thus leads to a changed

      _perception_ of the brightness or color.

             *       *       *       *       *

      In opposition to this theory has been developed one which attempts to

      explain all cases of contrast as depending purely on _physiological

      action of the terminal apparatus of vision. Hering is the most

      prominent supporter of this view._ By great originality in devising

      experiments and by insisting on rigid care in conducting them, he has

      been able to detect the faults in the psychological theory and to

      practically establish the validity of his own. Every visual sensation,

      he maintains, is correlated to a physical process in the nervous

      apparatus. Contrast is occasioned, not by a false idea resulting from

      unconscious conclusions, but by the fact that the excitation of any

      portion of the retina--and the consequent sensation--depends not only

      on its own illumination, but on that of the rest of the retina as well.

       "If this psycho-physical process is aroused, as usually happens, by

       light-rays impinging on the retina, its nature depends not only on

       the nature of these rays, but also on the constitution of the entire

       nervous apparatus which is connected with the organ of vision, and on

       the state in which it finds itself."[22]

      When a limited portion of the retina is aroused by external stimuli,

      the rest of the retina, and especially the immediately contiguous

      parts, tends to react also, and in such a way as to produce

      therefrom the sensation of the opposite degree of brightness and the

      complementary color to that of the directly-excited portion. When a

      gray spot is seen alone, and again when it appears colored through

      contrast, the objective light from the spot is in both cases the same.

      Helmholtz maintains that the neural process and the corresponding

      _sensation_ also remain unchanged, but are differently _interpreted_;

      Hering, that the neural process and the sensation are themselves

      changed, and that the 'interpretation' is the direct conscious

      correlate of the altered retinal conditions. According to the one, the

      contrast is psychological in its origin; according to the other, it is

      purely physiological. In the cases cited above where the contrast-color

      is no longer apparent--on a ground with many distinguishable features,

      on a field whose borders are traced with black lines, etc.,--the

      psychological theory, as we have seen, attributes this to the fact

      that under these circumstances we judge the smaller patch of color to

      be an independent object on the surface, and are no longer deceived

      in judging it to be something over which the color of the ground is

      drawn. The physiological theory, on the other hand, maintains that the

      contrast-effect is still produced, but that the conditions are such

      that the slight changes in color and brightness which it occasions

      become imperceptible.

             *       *       *       *       *

      The two theories, stated thus broadly, may seem equally plausible.

      Hering, however, has conclusively proved, by experiments with

      after-images, that the process on one part of the retina does modify

      that on neighboring portions, under conditions where deception of

      judgment is impossible.[23] A careful examination of the facts of

      contrast will show that its phenomena must be due to this cause. _In

      all the cases which one may investigate it will be seen that the

      upholders of the psychological theory have failed to conduct their

      experiments with sufficient care._ They have not excluded successive

      contrast, have overlooked the changes due to steady fixation, and have

      failed to properly account for the various modifying influences which

      have been mentioned above. We can easily establish this if we examine

      the most striking experiments in simultaneous contrast.

      Of these one of the best known and most easily arranged is that known

      as _Meyer's experiment_. A scrap of gray paper is placed on a colored

      background, and both are covered by a sheet of transparent white paper.

      The gray spot then assumes a contrast-color, complementary to that of

      the background, which shines with a whitish tinge through the paper

      which covers it. Helmholtz explains the phenomenon thus:

       "If the background is green, the covering-paper itself appears to be

       of a greenish color. If now the substance of the paper extends without

       apparent interruption over the gray which lies under it, we think that

       we see an object glimmering through the greenish paper, and such an

       object must in turn be rose-red, in order to give white light. If,

       however, the gray spot has its limits so fixed that it appears to be

       an independent object, the continuity with the greenish portion of the

       surface fails, and we regard it as a gray object which lies on this

       surface."[24]

      The contrast-color may thus be made to disappear by tracing in black

      the outlines of the gray scrap, or by placing above the tissue paper

      another gray scrap of the same degree of brightness, and comparing

      together the two grays. On neither of them does the contrast-color now

      appear.

      Hering[25] shows clearly that this interpretation is incorrect, and

      that the disturbing factors are to be otherwise explained. In the first

      place, the experiment can be so arranged that we could not possibly be

      deceived into believing that we see the gray through a colored medium.

      Out of a sheet of gray paper cut strips 5 mm. wide in such a way that

      there will be alternately an empty space and a bar of gray, both of the

      same width, the bars being held together by the uncut edges of the gray

      sheet (thus presenting an appearance like a gridiron). Lay this on a

      colored background--e.g. green--cover both with transparent paper, and

      above all put a black frame which covers all the edges, leaving visible

      only the bars, which are now alternately green and gray. The gray bars

      appear strongly colored by contrast, although, since they occupy as

      much space as the green bars, we are not deceived into believing that

      we see the former through a green medium. The same is true if we weave

      together into a basket pattern narrow strips of green and gray and

      cover them with the transparent paper.

      Why, then, if it is a true sensation due to physiological causes, and

      not an error of judgment, which causes the contrast, does the color

      disappear when the outlines of the gray scrap are traced, enabling us

      to recognize it as an independent object? In the first place, it does

      not necessarily do so, as will easily be seen if the experiment is

      tried. The contrast-color often remains distinctly visible in spite

      of the black outlines. In the second place, there are many adequate

      reasons why the effect should be modified. Simultaneous contrast is

      always strongest at the border-line of the two fields; but a narrow

      black field now separates the two, and itself by contrast strengthens

      the whiteness of both original fields, which were already little

      saturated in color; and on black and on white, contrast-colors show

      only under the most favorable circumstances. Even weak objective

      differences in color may be made to disappear by such tracing of

      outlines, as can be seen if we place on a gray background a scrap of

      faintly-colored paper, cover it with transparent paper and trace its

      outlines. Thus we see that it is not the recognition of the contrasting

      field as an independent object which interferes with its color, but

      rather a number of entirely explicable physiological disturbances.

      The same may be proved in the case of holding above the tissue paper a

      second gray scrap and comparing it with that underneath. To avoid the

      disturbances caused by using papers of different brightness, the second

      scrap should be made exactly like the first by covering the same gray

      with the same tissue paper, and carefully cutting a piece about 10 mm.

      square out of both together. To thoroughly guard against successive

      contrast, which so easily complicates the phenomena, we must carefully

      prevent all previous excitation of the retina by colored light. This

      may be done by arranging thus: Place the sheet of tissue paper on a

      glass pane, which rests on four supports; under the paper put the first

      gray scrap. By means of a wire, fasten the second gray scrap 2 or 3 cm.

      above the glass plate. Both scraps appear exactly alike, except at the

      edges. Gaze now at both scraps, with eyes not exactly accommodated, so

      that they appear near one another, with a very narrow space between.

      Shove now a colored field (green) underneath the glass plate, and the

      contrast appears at once on both scraps. If it appears less clearly

      on the upper scrap, it is because of its bright and dark edges, its

      inequalities, its grain, etc. When the accommodation is exact, there is

      no essential change, although then on the upper scrap the bright edge

      on the side toward the light, and the dark edge on the shadow side,

      disturb somewhat. By continued fixation the contrast becomes weaker

      and finally yields to simultaneous induction, causing the scraps to

      become indistinguishable from the ground. Remove the green field and

      both scraps become green, by successive induction. If the eye moves

      about freely these last-named phenomena do not appear, but the contrast

      continues indefinitely and becomes stronger. When Helmholtz found that

      the contrast on the lower scrap disappeared, it was evidently because

      he then really held the eye fixed. This experiment may be disturbed by

      holding the upper scrap wrongly and by the differences in brightness of

      its edges, or by other inequalities, but not by that recognizing of it

      'as an independent body lying above the colored ground,' on which the

      psychological explanation rests.

      In like manner the claims of the psychological explanation can be

      shown to be inadequate in other cases of contrast. Of frequent use

      are revolving disks, which are especially efficient in showing good

      contrast-phenomena, because all inequalities of the ground disappear

      and leave a perfectly homogeneous surface. On a white disk are arranged

      colored sectors, which are interrupted midway by narrow black fields in

      such a way that when the disk is revolved the white becomes mixed with

      the color and the black, forming a colored disk of weak saturation on

      which appears a gray ring. The latter is colored by contrast with the

      field which surrounds it. Helmholtz explains the fact thus:

       "The difference of the compared colors appears greater than it really

       is either because this difference, when it is the only existing one

       and draws the attention to itself alone, makes a stronger impression

       than when it is one among many, or because the different colors of the

       surface are conceived as alterations of the one ground-color of the

       surface such as might arise through shadows falling on it, through

       colored reflexes, or through mixture with colored paint or dust. In

       truth, to produce an objectively gray spot on a green surface, a

       reddish coloring would be necessary."[26]

      This explanation is easily proved false by painting the disk with

      narrow green and gray concentric rings, and giving each a different

      saturation. The contrast appears though there is no ground-color, and

      no longer a single difference, but many. The facts which Helmholtz

      brings forward in support of his theory are also easily turned against

      him. He asserts that if the color of the ground is too intense, or

      if the gray ring is bordered by black circles, the contrast becomes

      weaker; that no contrast appears on a white scrap held over the

      colored field; and that the gray ring when compared with such scrap

      loses its contrast-color either wholly or in part. Hering points out

      the inaccuracy of all these claims. Under favorable conditions it is

      impossible to make the contrast disappear by means of black enclosing

      lines, although they naturally form a disturbing element; increase

      in the saturation of the field, if disturbance through increasing

      brightness-contrast is to be avoided, demands a darker gray field, on

      which contrast-colors are less easily perceived; and careful use of the

      white scrap leads to entirely different results. The contrast-color

      does appear upon it when it is first placed above the colored field;

      but if it is carefully fixated, the contrast-color diminishes very

      rapidly both on it and on the ring, from causes already explained.

      To secure accurate observation, all complication through successive

      contrast should be avoided thus: first arrange the white scrap, then

      interpose a gray screen between it and the disk, rest the eye, set the

      wheel in motion, fixate the scrap, and then have the screen removed.

      The contrast at once appears clearly, and its disappearance through

      continued fixation can be accurately watched.

      Brief mention of a few other cases of contrast must suffice. The

      so-called mirror experiment consists of placing at an angle of 45º a

      green (or otherwise colored) pane of glass, forming an angle with two

      white surfaces, one horizontal and the other vertical. On each white

      surface is a black spot. The one on the horizontal surface is seen

      through the glass and appears dark green, the other is reflected from

      the surface of the glass to the eye, and appears by contrast red. The

      experiment may be so arranged that we are not aware of the presence of

      the green glass, but think that we are looking directly at a surface

      with green and red spots upon it; in such a case there is no deception

      of judgment caused by making allowance for the colored medium through

      which we think that we see the spot, and therefore the psychological

      explanation does not apply. On excluding successive contrast by

      fixation the contrast soon disappears as in all similar experiments.[27]

      _Colored shadows_ have long been thought to afford a convincing proof

      of the fact that simultaneous contrast is psychological in its origin.

      They are formed whenever an opaque object is illuminated from two

      separate sides by lights of different colors. When the light from one

      source is white, its shadow is of the color of the other light, and

      the second shadow is of a color complementary to that of the field

      illuminated by both lights. If now we take a tube, blackened inside,

      and through it look at the colored shadow, none of the surrounding

      field being visible, and then have the colored light removed, the

      shadow still appears colored, although 'the circumstances which

      caused it have disappeared.' This is regarded by the psychologists as

      conclusive evidence that the color is due to deception of judgment.

      It can, however, easily be shown that the persistence of the color

      seen through the tube is due to fatigue of the retina through the

      prevailing light, and that when the colored light is removed the color

      slowly disappears as the equilibrium of the retina becomes gradually

      restored. When successive contrast is carefully guarded against, the

      simultaneous contrast, whether seen directly or through the tube, never

      lasts for an instant on removal of the colored field. The physiological

      explanation applies throughout to all the phenomena presented by

      colored shadows.[28]

      If we have a small field whose illumination remains constant,

      surrounded by a large field of changing brightness, an increase or

      decrease in brightness of the latter results in a corresponding

      apparent decrease or increase respectively in the brightness of the

      former, while the large field seems to be unchanged. Exner says:

       "This illusion of sense shows that we are inclined to regard as

       constant the dominant brightness in our field of vision, and hence to

       refer the changing difference between this and the brightness of a

       limited field to a change in brightness of the latter."

      The result, however, can be shown to depend not on illusion, but on

      actual retinal changes, which alter the sensation experienced. The

      irritability of those portions of the retina lighted by the large field

      becomes much reduced in consequence of fatigue, so that the increase

      in brightness becomes much less apparent than it would be without this

      diminution in irritability. The small field, however, shows the change

      by a change in the contrast-effect induced upon it by the surrounding

      parts of the retina.[29]

      The above cases show clearly that _physiological processes, and not

      deception of judgment, are responsible for contrast of color_. To say

      this, however, is not to maintain that our perception of a color is

      never in any degree modified by our judgment of what the particular

      colored thing before us may be. We have unquestionable illusions of

      color due to wrong inferences as to what object is before us. Thus Von

      Kries[30] speaks of wandering through evergreen forests covered with

      snow, and thinking that through the interstices of the boughs he saw

      the deep blue of pine-clad mountains, covered with snow and lighted by

      brilliant sunshine; whereas what he really saw was the white snow on

      trees near by, lying in shadow].[31]

      Such a mistake as this is undoubtedly of psychological origin. It is

      a wrong _classification_ of the appearances, due to the arousal of

      intricate processes of association amongst which is the suggestion of a

      different hue from that really before the eyes. In the ensuing chapters

      such illusions as this will be treated of in considerable detail. But

      it is a mistake to interpret the simpler cases of contrast in the light

      of such illusions as these. These illusions can be rectified in an

      instant, and we then wonder how they could have been. They come from

      insufficient attention, or from the fact that the impression which we

      get is a sign of more than one possible object, and can be interpreted

      in either way. In none of these points do they resemble simple

      color-contrast, which _unquestionably is a phenomenon of sensation

      immediately aroused_.

             *       *       *       *       *

      I have dwelt upon the facts of color-contrast at such great length

      because they form so good a text to comment on in my struggle

      against the view that sensations are immutable psychic things which

      coexist with higher mental functions. Both sensationalists and

      intellectualists agree that such sensations exist. They _fuse_, say

      the pure sensationalists, and _make_ the higher mental function;

      they _are combined_ by activity of the Thinking Principle, say the

      intellectualists. I myself have contended that they _do not exist_ in

      or alongside of the higher mental function when that exists. The things

      which arouse them exist; and the higher mental function also knows

      these same things. But just as its knowledge of the things supersedes

      and displaces their knowledge, so it supersedes and displaces them,

      when it comes, being as much as they are a direct resultant of whatever

      momentary brain-conditions may obtain. The psychological theory of

      contrast, on the other hand, holds the sensations still to exist in

      themselves unchanged before the mind, whilst the 'relating activity' of

      the latter deals with them freely and settles to its own satisfaction

      what each shall be, in view of what the others also are. Wundt says

      expressly that the Law of Relativity is "not a law of sensation but

      a law of Apperception;" and the word Apperception connotes with him

      a higher intellectual spontaneity.[32] This way of taking things

      belongs with the philosophy that looks at the _data_ of sense as

      something earth-born and servile, and the 'relating of them together'

      as something spiritual and free. Lo! the spirit can even change the

      intrinsic quality of the sensible facts themselves if by so doing it

      can relate them better to each other! But (apart from the difficulty of

      seeing how changing the sensations should relate them better) is it not

      manifest that the relations are part of the 'content' of consciousness,

      part of the 'object,' just as much as the sensations are? Why ascribe

      the former exclusively to the _knower_ and the latter to the _known_?

      The _knower_ is in every case a unique pulse of thought corresponding

      to a unique reaction of the brain upon its conditions. All that the

      facts of contrast show us is that the _same real thing_ may give us

      quite different sensations when the conditions alter, and that we

      must therefore be careful which one to select as the thing's truest

      representative.

             *       *       *       *       *

      _There are many other facts beside the phenomena of contrast_ which

      prove that _when two objects act together on us the sensation which

      either would give alone becomes a different sensation_. A certain

      amount of skin dipped in hot water gives the perception of a certain

      heat. More skin immersed makes the heat much more intense, although

      of course the water's heat is the same. A certain extent as well

      as intensity, in the quantity of the stimulus is requisite for any

      quality to be felt. Fick and Wunderli could not distinguish heat

      from touch when both were applied through a hole in a card, and so

      confined to a small part of the skin. Similarly there is a _chromatic

      minimum_ of size in objects. The image they cast on the retina must

      needs have a certain extent, or it will give no sensation of color

      at all. Inversely, more intensity in the outward impression may make

      the subjective object more extensive. This happens, as will be shown

      in Chapter XIX, when the illumination is increased: The whole room

      expands and dwindles according as we raise or lower the gas-jet. It is

      not easy to explain any of these results as illusions of judgment due

      to the inference of a wrong objective cause for the sensation which we

      get. No more is this easy in the case of Weber's observation that a

      thaler laid on the skin of the forehead feels heavier when cold than

      when warm; or of Szabadföldi's observation that small wooden disks

      when heated to 122° Fahrenheit often feel heavier than those which are

      larger but not thus warmed;[33] or of Hall's observation that a heavy

      point moving over the skin seems to go faster than a lighter one moving

      at the same rate of speed.[34]

      Bleuler and Lehmann some years ago called attention to a strange

      idiosyncrasy found in some persons, and consisting in the fact that

      impressions on the eye, skin, etc., were accompanied by distinct

      sensations of _sound_.[35] _Colored hearing_ is the name sometimes

      given to the phenomenon, which has now been repeatedly described. Quite

      lately the Viennese aurist Urbantschitsch has proved that these cases

      are only extreme examples of a very general law, and that all our

      sense-organs influence each other's sensations.[36] The hue of patches

      of color so distant as not to be recognized was immediately, in U.'s

      patients, perceived when a tuning-fork was sounded close to the ear.

      Sometimes, on the contrary, the field was darkened by the sound. The

      acuity of vision was increased, so that letters too far off to be read

      could be read when the tuning-fork was heard. Urbantschitsch, varying

      his experiments, found that their results were mutual, and that sounds

      which were on the limits of audibility became audible when lights of

      various colors were exhibited to the eye. Smell, taste, touch, sense

      of temperature, etc., were all found to fluctuate when lights were

      seen and sounds were heard. Individuals varied much in the degree and

      kind of effect produced, but almost every one experimented on seems to

      have been in some way affected. The phenomena remind one somewhat of

      the 'dynamogenic' effects of sensations upon the strength of muscular

      contraction observed by M. Féré, and later to be described. The most

      familiar examples of them seem to be the increase of _pain_ by noise

      or light, and the increase of _nausea_ by all concomitant sensations.

      Persons suffering in any way instinctively seek stillness and darkness.

             *       *       *       *       *

      Probably every one will agree that the best way of formulating all such

      facts is physiological: it must be that the cerebral process of the

      first sensation is reinforced or otherwise altered by the other current

      which comes in. No one, surely, will prefer a psychological explanation

      _here_. Well, it seems to me that _all_ cases of mental reaction

      to a plurality of stimuli must be like these cases, and that the

      physiological formulation is everywhere the simplest and the best. When

      simultaneous red and green light make us see yellow, when three notes

      of the scale make us hear a chord, it is not because the sensations of

      red and of green and of each of the three notes enter the mind as such,

      and there 'combine' or 'are combined by its relating activity' into

      the yellow and the chord, it is because the larger sum of light-waves

      and of air-waves arouses new cortical processes, to which the yellow

      and the chord directly correspond. Even when the sensible qualities of

      things enter into the objects of our highest thinking, it is surely

      the same. Their several _sensations_ do not continue to exist there

      tucked away. They are _replaced_ by the higher thought which, although

      a different psychic unit from them, knows the same sensible qualities

      which they know.

      The principles

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