Whose Ideas Matter?: Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism

1 Why Study the Norm Dynamics of Asian Regionalism?

Why didn’t a regional multilateral security organization take root in Asia in the aftermath of World War II?¹ Why do Asia’s regional institutions remain soft, and resist demands for reform and change since the end of the Cold War? As Peter Katzenstein observes, while Europe is undergoing fundamental institutional change, with far-reaching efforts to redefine state prerogatives…Asia is characterized by marginal adjustments, insistence on state sovereignty and a preference for bilateralism.²

Empirical Puzzles

This book investigates these two puzzles about Asia’s post-war regional institutional architecture, which have attracted growing interest from academics (table 1.1) and policymakers.³ Realists seeking to explain the first puzzle argue that U.S. strategic policies and power differential relative to Asian actors hold the clue to the absence of an Asian NATO. Functional perspectives explain Asia’s late and weak regional institutionalism by stressing the role of rational calculations and the pursuit of self-interest linked to levels of regional economic interdependence.⁴ One constructivist perspective finds U.S. perceptions of its collective identity, whereby U.S. policymakers saw their potential Asian allies as inferior to their potential European ones, to have been the critical reason why there could be no NATO in Asia. Analysts have also offered mixed explanations that include domestic political structures, the structural features of the region, and the influence of international norms.

Table 1.1. Selected Perspectives on Asian Regionalism

I offer a different explanation. While accepting the constructivist view that ideational forces mattered, I argue that these forces were generated from within the region. Take, for example, the power gap and identity-dissonance explanations of why there is no Asian NATO. These are primarily arguments about why the United States did not pursue a multilateral approach in Asia, rather than why Asian actors did not want it. It was either U.S. power or U.S. perceptions of collective identity that mattered. Missing here is any serious consideration of intra-regional interactions and norms developed by Asians themselves. This is a major gap.

Challenging this top-down constructionist view, this book argues that after the end of World War II, but especially after the outbreak of the Korean War, U.S. policymakers were not strategically averse to, or culturally predisposed against, an Asian multilateral security organization. However, their ability to create such an organization was challenged by strong normative opposition from an influential segment of Asia’s nationalist leaders. At a series of regional gatherings, these leaders framed the idea of a regional collective defense organization as a new form of Western dominance damaging to their newfound national sovereignty and regional autonomy. The normative outcome of this contestation was the delegitimation of collective defense as a regional security framework.

This argument leads to the second question raised in the opening paragraph: What explains the institutional features of Asian regionalism such as its aversion to legalization and bureaucratization? The answer is that early post-war interactions, while expanding the scope of the non-intervention norm also predisposed the region toward a softer form of multilateralism. They constituted elements of a regional cognitive prior, conditioning subsequent regional institution-building efforts, including those inspired by new ideas about multilateralism and institutional strengthening.

Theoretical Arguments

The theoretical purpose of this book is to contribute to our understanding of how ideas and norms spread in world politics. Despite much recent work on norms, the literature on international relations remains underspecified with regard to the causal mechanisms and processes by which…ideas spread.⁵ It offers little systematic investigation of a key question: Why do some emerging ideas and norms find acceptance in a particular locale while others do not?⁶

Scholarship on normative change is biased in favor of a moral cosmopolitanism. It concentrates on moral struggles in which good global norms (championed by mainly Western norm entrepreneurs) displace bad local beliefs and practices (mainly in the non-Western areas). It overlooks local beliefs and practices which, as part of a legitimate normative order, determine the fate of new norms.

This book focuses on the agency role of norm-takers. Central to the norm dynamic is contestation between emerging norms and existing local beliefs and practices. The outcome is shaped by the ideas and initiative of local actors. This is not simply a question of the existential fit between local norms and external norms. Rather, it is a dynamic process of constitutive localization that enables norm-takers to build congruence between the local (including norms previously institutionalized in a region) and external norms. In this process, external norms, which may not initially cohere with existing local beliefs and practices, are incorporated after undergoing modifications to their meaning and scope. This book identifies several conditions that facilitate this process. The evidence shows that a strategy of norm diffusion that provides opportunities for localization is more likely to succeed than one that does not.

The idea of constitutive localization, outlined in detail in chapter 2, can be summarily presented with the help of the following propositions:

1. New international norms do not enter into a local normative vacuum. Local norms, including norms previously borrowed from the global arena, may enjoy a robust legitimacy and therefore influence the reception of new international norms.

2. The global prominence of a norm and the reputational power of transnational norm entrepreneurs are necessary but not sufficient conditions for successful norm diffusion. The congruence between outside norms and local norms also matters.

3. Congruence between emerging and existing ideas is to be understood not as a static fit, but as a dynamic process. Local actors do not passively accept new international ideas and simply adjust their beliefs to fit with them. Instead, they assess outside ideas in terms of their suitability for local reconstruction. Norms that can be made to fit local conditions and traditions spread more easily than those that cannot. Normative change occurs because of the successful fusion of foreign ideas with local ones.

4. The localization of new ideas and norms does not extinguish existing local beliefs and practices, but may instead universalize and amplify the latter. The borrowing and reconstructing of new ideas could enhance the prestige of local beliefs, identities, and practices before a larger stage or a wider community.

The constitutive localization perspective accepts that ideas and norms matter in international relations. However, it seeks to remedy the neglect of legitimate resistance to outside norms by local actors. It pays special attention to local historical and institutional contexts often ignored by both rationalist and constructivist explanations of norm diffusion.

Moreover, the constitutive localization perspective goes beyond constructivists who tend to pick out successful or dramatic cases of moral transformation and avoid the dog who didn’t bark.⁷ Challenging this tendency, Ted Hopf argues that constructivism should be agnostic about change in world politics…. What [it] does offer is an account of how and where change may occur.⁸ The constitutive localization perspective accounts for a range of responses to new norms that fall in between outright compliance and total rejection. It highlights path-dependent forms of acceptance—an evolutionary form of norm diffusion that produces everyday forms of normative change in world politics.

Structure of the Book

The normative explanation of Asian regionalism presented in this book can be traced through two stages of constitutive localization. (See figure 1.1 for illustration of this framework.) During the first phase, described in chapter 3 and covering the immediate post–World War II period, Asia’s leaders faced two ideas about how to promote regional security and order: non-intervention and collective defense. These ideas interacted with their prior beliefs about anti-colonialism and aversion to great power sphere of influences. After a period of contestation and compromises, non-intervention found broad acceptance. It was even enhanced to include an injunction against superpower-led military pacts. In contrast, collective defense, promoted by the United States and represented by the South East Asian Treaty Organization, failed.

Figure 1.1. Constitutive localization in Asian regionalism.

* The presentation and discussion of these norms follows the historical sequence of their appearance in the Asian regionalist context. Thus in the 1950s, non-intervention was prior to collective defense, whereas in the 1990s, common security predated the prominence in Asia of collective intervention. For definitions and interpretations of these concepts, see the appendix.

** Regional cognitive priors include enhanced non-intervention, soft institutionalism, defense bilateralism, and security proto multilateralism.

This outcome, and attendant ones such as a framework of soft institutionalism and principles and mechanisms of cooperative security, created a regionalist cognitive prior, which is the subject of chapter 4. This cognitive prior not only diffused through subsequent institution-building processes (especially through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations established in 1967), but also shaped post–Cold War era institutional change. Then, it became the receptacle for new international norms through a second post–Cold War phase of constitutive localization. During this phase, traced in chapter 5, Asia’s leaders considering a new regional security architecture were faced with two sets of norms: common security and collective intervention. The outcome of this second phase was the acceptance and institutionalization of the former, and the rejection (at least for the immediate future) of the latter.

Neither power politics nor functional imperative adequately explains the institutional trajectory and outcomes of Asian regionalism. Normative contestations and compromises through which local ideas and cognitive priors shaped the borrowing of international norms of sovereignty and cooperation are crucial to understanding and explaining institution building in Asian regionalism.

In developing this argument, I hold that the diffusion of ideas and normative change in world politics is not produced by universal moral entrepreneurs whereas local actors remain passive targets. Local actors also condition the reception of global norms by acting out of a historically constructed normative base. The constitutive localization dynamic explains the successes, limitations, and prospects for Asian regionalism. Instead of expecting it to replicate the European institutional purpose and design, normative change and institution-building in Asia are better viewed as evolutionary processes contingent upon prior regional norms and processes.

A broader implication is that contestations over seemingly incompatible universal values and ideas on the one hand, and local ones on the other hand, often result in compromises imbued with moral purpose and defined by mutual adaptations. As ideational or civilizational entities, regions do not always clash, but learn and borrow from each other.⁹ The ideational foundation of world politics is formed by a continuous process of constitutive localization, which does not result in instant or comprehensive wins and defeats of one set of ideas over another. Rather, it rests on gradual, evolutionary, and everyday forms of normative and institutional change and a progressive blending of local and universal norms and values.

1. The major Cold War era exception to this, the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), is widely regarded as ineffectual and moribund almost from the start—it was no Asian NATO. Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, Why Is There No NATO in Asia: Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism, International Organization 56, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 575–607. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF), established in 1994, is not only a latecomer but is also wedded to a softer cooperative security, rather than collective security or collective defense approach. For distinctions among cooperative security, collective security, and collective defense, see appendix of this book; Charles A. Kupchan, Regionalizing Europe’s Security: The Case for a New Mitteleuropa, in The Political Economy of Regionalism, ed. Edward Mansfield and Helen Milner (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 220–21.

2. Peter J. Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 103, 148.

3. The soft institutionalism of Asia prevails in both economic and security institutions, such as Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the ARF. Realist and functionalist explanations of this feature that are focused on economic institutions can also apply to soft institutionalism in multipurpose or security institutions such as ASEAN and the ARF.

4. Apart from Kahler (see table 1.1), other functionalist, interest-based neo-liberal explanations of Asian regionalism include Peter Drysdale, International Economic Pluralism: Economic Policy in East Asia and the Pacific (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1988); Wendy Dobson and Lee Tsao Yuan, APEC: Cooperation Amidst Diversity, ASEAN Economic Bulletin 10, no.3 (1994): 231–44; Andrew Elek, APEC Beyond Bogor: An Open Economic Association in the Asian-Pacific Region, Asia-Pacific Economic Literature 9, no. 1 (1995): 183–223; Peter Drysdale, The APEC Initiative: Maintaining the Momentum in Manila, Asia-Pacific Magazine, May 1996, 44–46; and Peter Drysdale and Ross Garnut, The Pacific: An Application of a General Theory of Economic Integration, in Pacific Economic Dynamism and the International Economic System, ed. C. Fred Bergsten and Marcus Nolan (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1993), 183–223.

5. Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction, in The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, ed. Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 4.

6. The terms norm-maker and norm-taker are taken from Jeffrey Checkel, Norms, Institutions and National Identity in Contemporary Europe, ARENA Working Papers, 98/16 (Oslo: Advanced Research on the Europeanization of the Nation-State, University of Oslo, 1998), 2.

7. Checkel, Norms, Institutions and National Identity in Contemporary Europe, 4.

8. Ted Hopf, The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory, International Security 23, no. 1 (1998): 180.

9. Samuel Huntington offers a contrary perspective in The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). Huntington sees the tendency of elites in developing countries to retreat into their local religious or cultural values (a phenomenon he calls de-Westernization and indigenization of elites) as a major reason behind the clash of civilizations, whereas I see the localization of ideas by such elites as being motivated by a desire to achieve an incremental and progressive promotion of universal ideas and norms (whether it be Gandhi’s localization of nationalism and passive resistance in India or more recent efforts to introduce cooperative security and collective intervention norms in Asia).

2 Perspectives on Norm Diffusion

Why do some ideas and norms find acceptance in a particular locale and others do not? For some time, rationalists and constructivists have debated the causal and transformative impact of ideas and norms. However, questions about normative change in world politics are not only about whether ideas matter, but also whose ideas matter.

Perspectives on Norm Diffusion

Moral Cosmopolitanism

The first wave of norm scholarship in the constructivist literature can be termed as a moral cosmopolitanism perspective with four distinctive features. First, the norms that are being propagated are cosmopolitan, or universal, such as campaigns against land mines, bans on chemical weapons, the protection of endangered species, struggles against racism, interventions against genocide, and the promotion of human rights.¹ Second, the key actors who spread these norms are transnational agents, whether individual moral entrepreneurs or social movements.² Third, despite recognizing the role of persuasion in norm diffusion, this literature focuses heavily on proselytism and pressure: what Ethan Nadelman has described as the moral proselytism of transnational moral entrepreneurs.³ Influenced by sociological institutionalism, many norm scholars tend to reproduce its underlying assumptions of a global social structure that acts as a wellspring of good normative ideas and standards.⁴ The social movement perspective on norm diffusion stresses shaming over framing, and sanctions over saving face, thereby according little space to positive action or voluntary initiative by the norm-takers.⁵ Finally, this perspective is generally more concerned with conversion rather than contestation, although the latter is acknowledged,⁶ viewing resistance to cosmopolitan norms as illegitimate or immoral.⁷

Despite pioneering the study of norm diffusion, moral cosmopolitanism has contributed to two unfortunate tendencies. First, many moral cosmopolitanists view norm diffusion as teaching by transnational agents, which tends to overlook the agency role of local actors.⁸ Second, and closely related, by assigning causal primacy to international prescriptions, it ignores the appeal and feedback potential of norms that are rooted in regional, national, or subnational groups.⁹ The strong ethos of normative universalism predisposes constructivist norm theorists to view regional or local norms as morally deficient. Moreover, it sets up an implicit dichotomy between good global/universal norms and bad regional/local norms.¹⁰ This view is misleading. Some universal norms can have negative consequences; for example, self-determination, a supposedly good cosmopolitan norm, can result in narrow nationalism and violent ethnic conflict. In contrast, there are many examples of local norms that successfully promote pacific management of disputes; for example, the cultural norms of Japan discussed by Katzenstein, or the norms of consensus in some Asian societies.¹¹ Yet, for moral cosmopolitanists, norms that make a universalistic claim about what is good are considered more desirable and more likely to prevail than norms that are localized or particularistic.¹²

Domestic Fit

The second wave of norm scholarship centers on the role of domestic political structures and agents in shaping normative change.¹³ It looks beyond international prescriptions and stresses the role of domestic political, organizational, and cultural variables in conditioning the reception of new global norms.¹⁴ Legro’s notion of organizational culture refers to the pattern of assumptions, ideas, and beliefs, which acts as a heuristic filter for perceptions and calculation employed by actors in responding to outside norms.¹⁵ Checkel’s notion of cultural match describes a situation where the prescriptions embodied in an international norm are convergent with domestic norms, as reflected in discourse, the legal system (constitutions, judicial codes and laws), and bureaucratic agencies (organizational ethos and administrative agencies).¹⁶ Norm diffusion is therefore more rapid when a cultural match exists between a systemic norm and a target country, in other words, when it resonates with historically constructed domestic norms.¹⁷

Domestic politics perspectives can be unduly static, however. They explain how historically constructed domestic identity norms create barriers to agent learning from systemic norms¹⁸ rather than a dynamic process of matchmaking. Moreover, congruence is often conceptualized as a fit with domestic institutional and historical contexts.¹⁹ One finds echoes of historical institutionalism, which offers an essentially static perspective on the importance of prior choices.²⁰ Prior action or agreement is a constraining device that conditions the reception of emerging ideas, but we know little about how local actors use prior choices to localize and reconstruct ideas in order to make them fit their circumstances and preferences.²¹

The constructivist notions of framing and grafting, offer a more dynamic view of congruence between emerging and existing norms. Framing is necessary for norm diffusion because the linkages between existing and emergent norms are not often obvious and must be actively constructed by proponents of new norms. Through framing, norm advocates highlight and create issues by using language that names, interprets, and dramatizes them.²² Audie Klotz’s study of the anti-apartheid campaign shows the critical role the framing of the global norm of racial equality and the global anti-apartheid campaign played in the context of the prevailing civil rights discourse in the United States. Framing can thus make a global norm appear local.²³

Grafting is a tactic employed by norm entrepreneurs to institutionalize a new norm by associating it with an existing one, resulting in a similar prohibition or injunction. Richard Price has shown how invoking the prior norm against poison helped the campaign to develop a norm against chemical weapons.²⁴ However both framing and grafting are largely acts of reinterpretation or representation rather than reconstruction. Neither is necessarily a local act; outsiders usually perform them. Moreover, framing and grafting are undertaken with a view to produce change at the receiving end without altering the persuader’s beliefs.

Constitutive Localization

In this book I conceptualize and test a different process, termed constitutive localization. It may start with the reinterpretation and rerepresentation of the external norm, but may also extend into more complex processes of reconstitution to make an external norm congruent with an existing local normative order. The role of local actors, the persuadee’s choice, is more crucial than that of external actors in producing norm diffusion. Instead of treating framing, grafting, and other adaptive processes as distinct and unrelated phenomena, I use localization to bring them together under a single conceptual framework that stresses the role of local agents.

In developing the concept of constitutive localization, I draw on Southeast Asian historiographical arguments claiming that Southeast Asian societies were not passive recipients of foreign (Indian and Chinese) cultural and political ideas, but active borrowers and localizers.²⁵ To localize something is to invest [it] with the characteristics of a particular place.²⁶ I define localization as the active construction (through discourse, framing, grafting, and cultural selection) of foreign ideas by local actors, which results in the latter developing significant congruence with local beliefs and practices.²⁷

A key aspect of localization is the agency role of local actors. Constructivist argue that the task of transnational moral entrepreneurs is to mobilize popular opinion and political support both within their host country and abroad; stimulate and assist in the creation of likeminded organizations in other countries’ and play a significant role in elevating their objectives beyond its identification with the national interests of their government. Much of their effort is directed toward persuading foreign audiences, especially foreign elites.²⁸ The constitutive localization perspective shifts the understanding of norm entrepreneurship from outsider proponents committed to a transnational or universal moral agenda toward insider proponents committed to a localized normative order, albeit one that can be legitimized by building congruence with universal norms.²⁹

Norm diffusion strategies that accommodate local sensitivities and contexts are more likely to succeed than those seeking to dismiss or supplant the