Hostage Rescue Manual: Tactics of the Counter-Terrorist Professionals, Revised Edition

THE INITIAL RESPONSE

In each of these situations, police patrol officers will normally be the first on the scene. Upon arrival, if the hostage-taker is not actually shooting people at the time, responding officers should attempt to contain the incident by setting up a perimeter which will keep the hostage-taker or -takers contained and innocent bystanders from wandering into the area. Initially, the first officers on the scene will try to take up positions which allow them to observe as much of the area around the site as possible; then, as additional officers arrive, gaps in the perimeter may be filled in. K-9 officers can be especially valuable in setting up an initial perimeter and later in manning an outer perimeter.

CONTAINING SUSPECTS AND HOSTAGES

It is extremely important to keep the hostage-taker and hostages from ‘going mobile’ if possible. That is, try to avoid allowing the hostage-taker to enter a vehicle with the hostage or to take a driver hostage and force him or her to drive away. It is also important during the setting of the initial perimeter to retain any witnesses who might be on the scene so that they may be questioned to gain intelligence about the hostage-takers, the hostages and the venue in which the hostage-taker has gone to ground.

The four basic precepts which govern the initial response to a hostage incident are:

CONTAIN – remove the hostage-taker’s mobility.

CONTROL – limit the hostage-taker’s movements as well as the movements of those who might attempt to enter the area.

COMMUNICATE – establish contact with the hostage-taker at the earliest opportunity. However, actual negotiations should wait for a trained hostage negotiator.

COORDINATE – begin evaluating what other assets will be necessary to resolve the incident (i.e., SWAT personnel, emergency medical team, fire department, hostage negotiator, media relations person, etc.).

ARE HOSTAGES PRESENT?

One of the most important pieces of information, which can be gleaned early in an incident, is whether there are or are not hostages. Once the presence or absence of hostages has been determined, then the response can be planned based on whether authorities are facing a hostage or barricade situation. While setting up the initial perimeter, it may be necessary to evacuate nearby residents who might be injured by gunfire. The first officers on the scene should also develop a quick contingency plan in case the hostage-taker starts killing hostages or attempts to leave with a hostage. This plan will often be as simple as designating officers who will enter the building and attempt to stop a shooter. However, since patrol officers normally lack heavier body armour and heavier weapons such an entry carries the potential for substantial casualties.

DEALING WITH ACTIVE SHOOTERS

Although some agencies have standard operating procedures (SOPs) covering the responsibilities of those initially responding to a hostage or barricade incident, it is also necessary to be prepared to deal with an ‘active shooter’, as many who carry out armed attacks in schools, post offices or other heavily populated buildings have been termed. Agencies which have SWAT personnel who are assigned to patrol duties when not on a callout may find that a few trained officers are on the scene, possibly with their special equipment in their vehicles. In this case, these officers can prepare for an entry if immediate action appears necessary to save lives. An important initial decision, however, is: what are the consequences of taking action? of not taking action?

SLOWING THINGS DOWN

It also important to remember that time is an important element in defusing a hostage situation. Normally, the first thirty minutes are very critical in barricade or hostage situations because that is when the hostage-taker/shooter is most excited. That is why initial containment is so important. The normal rule of thumb is: the longer an incident lasts, the more likely it will be settled without violence. Therefore, unless hostages or bystanders are being killed, once the incident is contained, the initial responders should try to slow things down until SWAT and a negotiator are on the scene.

ESTABLISING A TIGHT PERIMETER

Setting up a tight perimeter as soon as possible serves many useful purposes. It removes control from the hostage-taker and maybe help to convince him to negotiate. A tight perimeter also prevents family and friends of the hostage-taker interfering, a problem in some domestic hostage situations. It also prevents the hostage-taker from taking additional hostages. When establishing the perimeter, leave a reactionary gap to give officers room to manoeuvre and a chance to react to a hostile suspect attempting to exit.

THE INNER AND OUTER PERIMETERS

When enough officers are on the scene an inner and an outer perimeter will be established.

PLACEMENT

It is especially important that officers on the inner perimeter should try to find protection which gives cover but also allows them to observe doors and windows where the hostage-taker might appear. These officers should also be careful that they are not placing themselves in a position to be caught in crossfire between other officers and the hostage-taker. Knowing what weapons the hostage-taker has can help officers determine what type of cover is appropriate and whether they need to establish the outer perimeter further back, as in situations where the shooter is armed with a rifle.

THE INNER AND OUTER PERIMETER TEAMS

Normally, as soon as specially trained SWAT, TAC or other entry/hostage rescue personnel are on the scene they will take over the inner perimeter. Once they are in position, they will assume the primary responsibility for containing the hostage-takers and will immediately plot ranges should the subjects opt to ‘go mobile’. The outer perimeter team will deal with bystanders, the press and other outsiders. If an entry team is deployed to ‘go in’ then the inner perimeter team can give covering fire while this team is moving into position. The inner perimeter team will often be in charge of deploying chemical weapons such as tear gas. When those manning the perimeter are law enforcement personnel or military police it is important to remember that at some point the venue of the hostage incident will probably be considered a crime scene. As a result, perimeter personnel must be prepared to secure the area for crime scene technicians at the conclusion of an incident.

THE BRIEF

Inner perimeter personnel must be fully briefed so that all are aware of certain basic operational procedures. They must know the rules of engagement and the positions of all other personnel on the perimeter so that they can establish fields of fire. They must also be aware of the suspects’ armament and position so they can assess their own danger of taking fire. Perimeter personnel should constantly monitor their radios. While modern communications equipment generates very little noise, if restricted to older equipment the volume should be sufficiently low to be inaudible to the hostage-taker, who might otherwise learn about SWAT movement or tactical operations.

EXAMPLE

Radio noise can also be a problem. For example, a Detroit SRT member was killed when a senior commander approached the scene with her radio turned up, thus compromising the element of surprise.

Unless relieved or so ordered, no perimeter personnel should leave their positions. Once the entry team carries out an entry, perimeter personnel should not be authorised to fire their weapons unless it is necessary to save a life. Finally, it must be emphasised that movement around the incident site should be carried out using cover and concealment. A route should be planned in advance. It should be borne in mind that the shortest route to a position may not be the safest. In some situations other personnel will cover while an officer moves into position. During movement at night, it is important to be aware of back lighting which can silhouette personnel.

THE COMMAND POST

As soon as the ranking military or police officer who will be the incident commander arrives on the scene, he should find a command post and stay there so that he can be easily located. It may be advisable at this point to begin setting up a tactical operations center (TOG) or command post (CP) to coordinate intelligence and maintain contact with the various elements on the scene.

LOCATION OF CP

This CP should be located close enough to the action that command personnel can visually inspect the scene and retain close contact with officers on the scene yet far enough away that they are not likely to take fire. Many larger agencies have a mobile command post which can be quickly brought to the scene of an emergency or incident. Such mobile CPs are very useful as they already contain telephones, televisions, briefing materials and various other items.

AUTHOR’S NOTE

To prevent them giving away information about SWAT operations, the press should be kept away form the command post.

MANNING THE CP

There are two schools of thought about incorporating hostage negotiators and those who will make the decision about authorising the use of snipers or entry teams in the same CP. There is the possibility, especially with inexperienced negotiators, that they will inadvertently give away an impending assault by a change in voice or manner if they are aware that the teams are ‘going in’. On the other hand, the negotiator is an invaluable source of intelligence and can help distract the hostage-taker during an entry or lure him into position for a sniper to take a shot. One solution is to have the negotiator in the same CP, but in a separate room from those planning the assault.

ROLE OF THE INCIDENT COMMANDER

The incident commander needs to identify the key elements of the situation and decide if special personnel and equipment will be needed. Additionally, he should make sure that the perimeter is set and press and bystanders are being kept at a safe distance.

The incident commander will also need to assemble knowledgeable advisors such as the hostage negotiator, SWAT commander and fire marshal (the official in the US fire department who checks public buildings for safety) or others who have knowledge of the area in which the hostages are held. As soon as possible, too, the incident commander needs to assess realistically the capabilities of the personnel at his disposal to determine if he needs to request assistance from state or federal police or military special units. He will need to begin development of a simple yet flexible plan as early as possible in case the hostage-taker begins killing hostages, or other events necessitate immediate action.

As soon as enough personnel are on the scene, the commander needs to chose competent subordinates and delegate responsibilities. One important choice will be a public information officer to deal with the press so that the commander may remain focused on the incident. Those in the command element must also arrange for simple necessities such as the availability of food and water and toilet facilities for personnel manning the perimeter and for SWAT personnel.

THE INTERMEDIATE PHASE

During the intermediate stage of a hostage incident, it is important to ‘tie down’ the phone lines going into the scene as soon as possible so only the authorities can talk with the hostage-taker. This aspect will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3 on hostage negotiations. During the early and intermediate stage of an incident, it is possible that hostages or others will escape from, or be released from, the building. In this case, it is important to treat them with care to be sure they really have been released or have escaped and are not one of the hostage-takers attempting to leave the scene. Once their identities have been established, released or escaped hostages must be thoroughly debriefed for any intelligence they can give.

As SWAT personnel take over the inner perimeter, then officers who had been occupying those positions are available to augment outer perimeter personnel or to return to patrol duties. As the incident progresses, the outer perimeter personnel will have to watch the press to make sure no one has attempted to move closer to the incident and also to make sure they are not filming preparations by SWAT which might compromise a rescue operation.

Although the black-clad entry team member, the precision tactical marksman or the tireless hostage negotiator are the most recognisable elements of the team attempting to resolve a hostage incident, it is important to remember that the containment and security provided by those personnel manning the perimeter allow the other elements of a hostage rescue team to operate.

Intelligence is invaluable in dealing with a hostage situation. For both the entry team which may have to go in to resolve the incident with gunfire, or the negotiator attempting to end the incident without violence, intelligence can make the difference between a successful conclusion to the incident and a tragic one.

CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE

Critical intelligence in a hostage incident can include information on:

the hostage-takers

hostage-takers’ criminal and medical histories

hostage-takers’ mind sets

hostages

number of hostages

why the hostage-takers have taken the hostages

hostage-takers’ propensity towards violence

weapons

layout of the building

barricades or booby traps in place

best entry route and as much other useful data as possible.

For the information gathered to become useful intelligence it must be:

Timely.

Relevant.

Accurate.

Refined.

Communicated to those who need it.

Timeliness is extremely important. A hostage-taker who has indicated he will kill a hostage within five minutes has imposed time limits on the response which may dictate that snipers will be given the order to ‘take him out’ or that an entry team will be given the ‘go’ order.

Likewise, the information must be relevant to the actual event. The fact that a suspect was a demolitions expert in the army is important because it might indicate the likelihood of explosives being present, while the fact that he likes a certain rock group might offer a piece of useful information to the negotiator but is certainly less relevant.

That information is accurate is obviously of absolute importance. If members of an entry team are told that all of the hostages are in a certain room, they must be confident that they can focus on clearing that room as rapidly as possible.

EXAMPLE

A good example of the problems with inaccurate intelligence occurred during the SAS assault at Princes Gate (see Appendix 1). Frame charges were used on the windows of the embassy by Pagoda units, which created a new hazard: fire from the curtains. The SAS had no substantial fire-proof kit at this time. They were also unaware that one interior doorway they had planned to use had been blocked and was unusable. As a result, though accurate intelligence is the goal, plans must remain flexible to allow for some of the data on which a plan has been based proving incorrect.

Refinement of information is the job of the intelligence specialist or specialists in the CP. They must sort which facts are of importance from the mass of information which they will be accumulating.

Most of all, intelligence needs to be communicated to those who need it. If a sniper/observer team notices the hostage-taker leaving the hostages alone for a moment, he must immediately communicate this fact as it may influence an entry or an order for him to take a shot. Likewise, if a negotiator learns something from background noise or from the hostage-taker, he or she should immediately write the information down and pass it to the intelligence analyst.

USING FAMILIAR CONTACTS

Useful intelligence about the hostage-taker or -takers may be gleaned from many sources, including family members of the hostage-taker or takers, co-workers, neighbours, bystanders, police officers who have previously encountered the individual, initial response officers, mail carriers, UPS drivers or other delivery personnel and other observers. The hostage-taker’s criminal records, hospital records, military discharge, school records or employee records may also offer useful data.

THE HOSTAGE-TAKER’S CRIMINAL AND MEDICAL HISTORIES

In assessing the likelihood of the hostage-taker committing a violent act, there are various factors which must