Security and Suspicion: An Ethnography of Everyday Life in Israel

Introduction: The Practice of Everyday Security

It was early February 2004, and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon had recently announced plans to remove all Israeli settlers from Gaza. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) launched armored raids in the Gaza Strip, killing numerous Hamas militants. A Palestinian police officer from Bethlehem killed eight Israelis in a suicide bombing of a Jerusalem bus, for which al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed responsibility. Israelis and Palestinians were in the midst of a war for territory, sovereignty, and security fought through air strikes and gunfire, Qassam rockets and suicide bombs, curfews and land seizures. But in Holon, an industrial city outside Tel Aviv, in the home of Vered Malka, the war assumed a more intimate form.

The marriage of Vered’s niece Ronit in Jerusalem was only a week away, and Vered was dreading the trip. Vered, who immigrated to Israel from Egypt in 1956 and settled in Holon soon after, lived in a small attached house in close proximity to her nine siblings. All were terrified of this journey to Jerusalem, a drive of under an hour. It was not the navigation itself that made Vered uneasy, for she was a taxi driver who spent her days driving the streets of Tel Aviv and Jaffa. What do you mean, why am I afraid? From the terrorists, from the rocks they throw, from the hijacking, from it all. I never felt good in Jerusalem. To Vered and her family, Jerusalem had been off limits since the start of the second intifada in 2000. Jerusalem, to them, was a place of violence and danger, a place of bombings and precarious borders, and a place of Palestinians. Vered’s young granddaughters had never been to Israel’s capital, but Vered and her siblings were committed to attending the celebration and decided to put aside their fears, or at least to find a way around them. I can’t not go, Vered said. On the Friday afternoon of the wedding, wearing dresses and suits, energized but focused, the siblings and their spouses piled into four cars and drove from Holon to Jerusalem convoy-style, one car in front of the other, straight to Beit Shmuel, an event space overlooking the Old City of Jerusalem. We went there and we returned, all together.

Security for Vered was not about constructing walls or exchanging hostages, but rather about relying on familiarity to generate a sense of control and protection. Driving in procession kept Vered’s family members off and at a remove from buses, a common target of Palestinian suicide bombings and, even beyond that, surrounded each individual car with a familial buffer. The resultant protection was mobile and transient, shifting through space and time as they drove. Surrounded by familiar vehicles, the family found a way to travel to Jerusalem not only with minimized risk but also without perceiving the presence of Palestinians or feeling present in the city. At their weekly family Saturday lunches, the fears Vered and her siblings articulated in anticipation of this trip were enveloped in politicized discourses of threat and separation, and yet a simple family cavalcade enabled them to attain a sense of safety. In Vered’s quest for security, the violence and fear of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict became inextricably bound with the routines and relationships of daily life.

If Israel exists in a permanent state of emergency,¹ security has become a medium of this unending crisis. Security was a central motif of the second intifada. It was not just that Israel’s defense budget, approximately $10 billion in 2004, was the twelfth highest in the world, or that, in 2002, Israel’s nongovernmental security services market was estimated at $700 million, with over 100,000 workers employed throughout the country (Lagerquist 2002: 1).² Even beyond this immense industry, security dominated Israelis’ rhetorical framings and daily experiences. The government and media spoke of security measures, security lapses, security zones, and security threats. Military activities were often carried out in the name of Israeli security, from the construction of the separation wall (often called the security fence) to the assassination of Palestinian leaders. Only security will lead to peace, as Sharon put it.³ In daily life, Israeli Jews described their neighborhoods as desirable or deficient from the perspective of security, and malls became places with good security (or bad security) even more than they were places to shop. Israelis called the conflict itself the security situation (ha-matsav ha-bitḥoni), a naming that avoided direct reference to Palestinians while depicting the conflict as, above all, an effort to protect Israeli citizens from Palestinians.

The origin of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict lies in a very tangible clash: the claim by Jews and Palestinians in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to the same piece of land. Concrete as the core conflict may be, its intensification and expansion came as the result of the more elusive but no less forceful factors of ideology, identity, and emotion. The intersection of these tangible and intangible aspects of the conflict is at the heart of national security’s complexity. Security is a set of military strategies and political beliefs, but it is also a guiding force for daily experience. In one of the most conflict-ridden regions in modern history, in the clash between Israeli statehood and Palestinian desires for self-determination, between Israeli territorial expansion and Palestinian nationalism, security has become a part of Israeli culture. Security is a national discourse and partisan rallying cry that also assumes social, material, and aesthetic forms in daily life. It is the substance of conflict that manifests itself in everyday gestures, feelings, and intimate relationships.

For centuries, the legitimacy of the modern state has been built on its ability to protect its citizens.⁴ Security has long rationalized state power and justified its monopoly over lawful violence. With the advent of security studies after the Cold War, scholars have studied national security as a state and military strategy; they have shown how diplomacy can isolate threats, how civil defense can facilitate national resilience, and how states can marshal economic power to compel international cooperation.⁵ Recent fears of terrorism and the protrusion of national security on a global scale, however, draw our attention to the specifically social effects and underlying cultural character of national security.⁶ That is, to the ways history can isolate threats, collective memory can facilitate national resilience, and states can marshal social capital to propel fear.

This book addresses the ways national security delineates individual experience as much as it demarcates sovereignty. Traditional political anthropology has tended to depict holistic political systems and organized political institutions, but this book sees security as a politics that is often intangible and fleeting, inconsistent and intimate, taking form in impressions and senses. Likewise, security does not refer in this book, as it often does, to state policies of preserving the integrity of the nation-state or to a formal political-military institution of defense. Here, security consists of everyday, routine, and sometimes unconscious engagements (Certeau 1988) with national ideologies of threat and defense. I use the term everyday security to describe the practices of self-protection that become the substance of people’s lives and the discourses of danger and threat that, in contexts of conflict, delineate people’s days. Like anthropological notions of everyday violence (Das et al. 2000, Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004), everyday security is a cultural practice and a communal experience that crafts social life and is also an intimate experience that shapes individual subjectivity. Intimacy, involving feelings and practices of closeness and reciprocity, is a crucial domain for the everyday experience of security. If intimacy, as Lauren Berlant (2000) shows, builds public worlds and creates public spaces, then even when national security took the form of intimate signs and gestures, it laid claim to a collective and activated state power.

Observing national security through an anthropological lens, this book weaves together three distinct but interrelated arguments regarding the proliferation of state security in daily life. First, I argue that national discourses of security are reproduced at the level of bodily practice. Based on an ethnographic study of the daily life of Israeli Jews between 2003 and 2005, this book shows how discourses of security permeate individual sensibilities and habits and shape people’s encounters with the state. Government rhetoric on danger, threat, and separation is not simply internalized but generated in visceral, emotive ways. Security takes shape at the intersection of government technologies and everyday sensibilities, of political rationalities and embodied behavior. The cyclical, selfperpetuating nature of security has been a recent theoretical concern to social and political theorists (Bauman 2007) and a longtime source of international military and diplomatic conflict. By describing the ways people embody state discourses of danger and effect senses of threat in their daily lives, I offer one way to understand why fear propagates a willingness to engage in violence in the name of security and why security becomes more likely only to provide senses of comfort than to proscribe violence.

The second argument of this book concerns the ways people see their fear and their desires for security as beyond politics, and thus become ignorant of the structural logics of exclusion that discourses of fear and security serve to reproduce. Israelis’ avoidance of Palestinians and reliance on the country’s military-industrial complex of security were often portrayed as strategies of coping with intense anxiety and fear. The seeming innocuousness of citizens’ craving comfort and desiring bodily safety and the seemingly instinctive virtue of protecting family enabled Israeli Jews, including both those critical of the Israeli occupation and those who supported continued Israeli settlement, to think of themselves as participating in something private and impervious to politics. However, in this context of conflict, desires for comfort and well-being were often nationalism and exclusion in another form. The security that materialized in everyday habits and desires tended to extend, rather than oppose, sovereignty and violence. Everyday ways of talking about danger and threat, together with routines of circumnavigating feared spaces, cultivated the discursive and spatial invisibility of Palestinians to Israelis. People’s desires for security and their engagement with the artifacts and procedures of national security legitimized state security and helped produce and sustain the idea of the nation. Security, in this way, gained momentum and sway even as it produced a pervasive sense of vulnerability. It proliferated the very fears and suspicions it claimed to obviate. Security may stand as the core principle of state activity, but as Israeli fear rationalized fortification and separation and as anxiety perpetuated anticipations of danger, security transcended its position as a state domain, swelling larger than the state to generate and sustain sovereignty.

The third claim of this book is that fantasies about threat and protection were a crucial mode through which Israelis embodied security. Fantasies of security are different from illusions or delusions of threat and different from imaginaries of violence. They are also different from the psychology of fear that deals with emotional and cognitive responses to public fear-arousing messages, ranging from heightened anxiety to complacency. Fantasy, according to Yael Navaro-Yashin, describes the elements of the political that survive discursive deconstruction, criticism, and skepticism because of unconscious psychic attachments to state power (2002: 4). Fantasy is not opposed to reality but what sits at its very core (Aretxaga 2003: 402). Through fantasy, Israelis embodied national security even through practices that questioned, mocked, or ignored official registers. When I speak of fantasies of security, and likewise when I talk about imaginaries of danger or threat, this is not to disregard the very real danger that Palestinian aggression posed to Israel and the very real fears that Israelis held. Rather, I refer to the attachments that people develop to their anxieties and to state presentations of violence. Fantasy was a rubric through which people absorbed and resisted national discourses, and through which they personalized the effects of those discourses.

I carried out the fieldwork on which this book is based during a particularly severe period of violence during the second intifada, also called the al-Aqsa intifada. Intifada means shaking off in Arabic and is often translated as uprising.⁷ The concerns that undergirded this uprising had been present throughout decades of hostility, attack, confiscation, and occupation. At least since the founding of the State of Israel in 1948, Jewish nationalism and territorial control stood at odds with Palestinian desires for self-determination and national liberation. Since 1967, the status and future of the occupied territories and East Jerusalem, the question of a Palestinian state, the future of Palestinian refugees, and the fate of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories have fueled diplomatic dispute and military aggression. While Israel persistently supported Jewish settlement in Palestinian territory and restricted Palestinian life and livelihood, Palestinians did not recognize the right of the State of Israel to exist as a Jewish state. The Palestinian revolt that broke out in September 2000 was thus less inexplicable or abrupt than the media reported, a shift more in scale than in kind.

Once symbolically instigated by Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount on September 28, 2000, the uprising escalated into an armed military conflict. The militarization on both sides far surpassed that of the first intifada. Palestinian society now had a political structure in place, with a parliament and an armed security apparatus, and political solidarity was fortified both by a religious framework and by the growing power of media.⁸ Unlike earlier forms of Palestinian resistance, this time the militant wing of Fatah had a substantial supply of small arms to fire on Israeli troops and Qassam rockets (named after the military wing of Hamas) to fire into Israeli residential areas. Militant groups including Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades waged a high-intensity campaign against Israel, in which stone throwing youth were joined by combatants, who referred to themselves as revolutionaries, martyrs, nationalists, or freedom fighters to underscore their right to self-determination (Hage 2003: 72).⁹ Palestinian combatants carried out a record number of suicide bombings against Israeli civilian targets in public spaces such as city buses and cafés.

In March 2002, in the largest military operation in the West Bank since 1967, Israel launched Operation Defensive Shield (Mivtsa Ḥomat Magen), seeking to dismantle the infrastructure of the Palestinian Authority. With the stated aim of catching Palestinian militants, confiscating their weapons, and destroying weapons facilities, the IDF attacked Palestinian Authority installations, carried out assassinations of political and religious leaders, and imposed a series of collective punishments on the Palestinian civilian population. Sharon directed the IDF to avoid harming the civilian population (Sharon 2002), but, in reality, Israel targeted Palestinian militants and civilians alike by demolishing homes, destroying local infrastructure, and paralyzing movement and economic production.

Scholars of international relations often speak of the second intifada as a low-intensity conflict,¹⁰ a euphemistic term that called attention to Israel’s use of intelligence information to carry out assassinations of Palestinian leaders while obscuring the deadly nature of Israeli hostility (Pappe 2006). The popularity of the term in Israeli military discourse and the desire on behalf of Israeli political leaders to depict the conflict as low-intensity reflects the country’s particular efforts in this period to veil and normalize violence. The government worked to keep IDF operations, including the Shin Bet’s interrogation of Palestinians (categorized as torture by Israeli human rights groups), largely invisible to the public (B’Tselem 2007).

Despite claims of restraint and normalization, violence reverberated. When I began my fieldwork in Jerusalem in the summer of 2003, Yasser Arafat, chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and leader of Fatah, had just appointed Mahmoud Abbas as Palestinian prime minister; the U.S. government had begun to promote a roadmap for Israeli peace and a Palestinian state; and Hamas and Islamic Jihad had recently declared a hudna, a temporary armistice on attacks against Israel. Violence decreased but only for forty-five days. In August, Israel’s Special Police Unit killed four Palestinians and the Hamas leader Abdullah Qawasmeh during a gun and tank raid on Askar. Hamas responded with two suicide bombings, including one of a Jerusalem bus that killed over twenty Israelis, and Fatah with a third. The IDF captured or killed the plotters of the Jerusalem suicide bombings; enforced strict curfews in Nablus, Jenin, and Tulkarem; and demolished dozens of Palestinian shops. With each act, Israeli and Palestinian politicians sanctioned their own violence by presenting it as reprisal, such that every military action was rendered a reciprocal reaction. Sharon, Arafat, and the subsequent Palestinian prime minister Ahmed Qurei acted as if the threat of violence would accelerate diplomatic negotiations and dissuade opposing hostility, but this posture only exacerbated the conflict. The hudna soon ended.

During the second intifada, talk of terror and terrorist threat ricocheted around the world, their political force and emotional substance gaining momentum as governments unified against a shared and supposedly shadowy enemy. The events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, caused Israeli and American discourses of terror and counterterrorism to mingle and reinforce each other. A widespread demonization of and intense xenophobia toward Arabs seemed to give international sanction to long-standing Israeli fears. Still, terror was spoken of in Israel with specific connotations. In Hebrew, the English loanword terror referred broadly to violence against civilians but specifically connoted Palestinian militancy. In the words of Israel’s Home Front Command (Pikud ha-Oref), founded as a unit of the IDF in February 1992 following the Gulf War and responsible for civilian defense, terror casts a threat and spreads fear in a calculated manner through the helpless civilian population. Always ethnically inflected, the discourse of terror depicted Palestinian military actions as illegitimate, unpredictable, and lacking a motive beyond terrorizing (Hajjar 2005: 42). It generally did so, however, without explicit reference to Palestinians, whom Israelis visualized but whose agency was concealed by generic terms like terror and suicide bombings. Like the terms terrorism and terror, reference to terror functioned simultaneously to describe and delegitimize violence committed by non-state political bodies. When I use the term terror in this book, I refer to the Israeli discourse of terror rather than to any specific political acts it might designate.

The term piguʿa (pl. piguʿim) described terrorist attacks in general, but it came during this period to refer almost exclusively to Palestinian suicide bombings. (Similarly, while piguʿa yeri literally means a shooting, the term came to connote almost exclusively a Palestinian shooting.) Israelis saw suicide bombings (piguʿa hitʾabdut) as the most emblematic form of Palestinian terror. Influenced by politicians and IDF spokespeople, Israeli Jews saw Palestinian suicide bombers as lacking strategy and system, as aiming to destroy Israel’s modernity and openness, as incoherent and invasive. The confrontation with terror wrought by suicide strikers is like the fight against viruses, said one reserve colonel (Barzilai 2004). If most Palestinians saw the second intifada as a renewed effort to resist Israeli occupation, Israeli Jews tended to see the intifada foremost as a military campaign against suicide bombings.

Whether Palestinian bombings triggered Israelis’ feelings of vulnerability or vice versa, Israeli society quickly became increasingly conservative in its views toward Palestinians and toward national security. Sharon, already the chairman of the center-right Likud Party, was easily elected prime minister in 2001 by promising greater force against Palestinians and greater security for Israelis. Political views once considered hawkish became centrist and, by the 2003 election, despite the deteriorating economic situation and increasing violence, voters strongly supported Sharon’s reelection. In this climate, post-Zionist debates about Israel’s democratic character, about its dispossession of the Palestinians, or about citizenship rather than religion as the determinant of rights, debates that had thrived in academic and popular arenas in the 1990s, lost their context as well as their conditions for possibility. Post-Zionism had entered a deep freeze, as a headline in Haʾaretz declared in April 2004 (Shehori 2004). Palestinian terrorism is pushing us back into the Zionist womb, journalist Tom Segev stated. There were certainly Israelis who described themselves as post-Zionists. As one woman in her mid-thirties who lived outside Jerusalem put it, Post-Zionism is about our right to live here without any religious reasons and without a real narrative, a Zionist narrative, without any context. Just that we live here and this is our normal life, and we don’t need to find reasons or to justify ourselves. Yet this woman and indeed nearly all the Israeli Jews I interviewed for this book considered themselves to be Zionists—even those who also called themselves post-Zionists, even those who were applying for European citizenship should the situation become untenable for them in Israel. Zionism was a multivalent concept, but its comfortable use during the second intifada reflected a greater concern for Jewish nationalism than for Israeli democracy.

Fear, specifically fear of terror (paḥad mi-terror), was spoken about as a social force that propelled government action and shaped everyday behavior. People spoke about living in constant fear, and newspapers reported on the large percentages of Israelis who were afraid they would be harmed in a suicide bombing. Israelis were deeply afraid for their own lives and for the existence of the State of Israel. As much as people looked toward the state for protection, they also disparaged their government for its inability to protect its citizens. To the right of the political spectrum, there was a need for greater state presence. To the left, the state was focused on goals other than protection of its citizens. Both the right and the left expressed a sense of abandonment by the state. As one young mother said to me: What do I need a state for? They need to create order for me and for my family. If the government can’t protect us, then the state is not functioning. The media griped that there was no umbrella institution to collect data on and respond to terrorism and that more money was going to security guards than to developing substantive protective technologies. As the director of the Shin Bet stated in 2003, We have to say honestly, the defense establishment and, within it, the General Security Service have not provided the people of Israel the protective ‘suit’ they deserve (O’Sullivan 2003).

The discourse of terror may have expressed profound fear, but the designation of something as terror was also a political tactic that delegitimized suicide bombings as a mode of political struggle by decoupling this form of resistance from a larger Palestinian nationalist effort. Israeli discourses of terror cloaked military operations in a veil of necessity and depicted state violence as a routine military response. Joseba Zulaika and William Douglass described a similar phenomenon in one of the first ethnographic studies to appraise representations of modern terrorism: Once something that is called ‘terrorism’—no matter how loosely it is defined—becomes established in the public mind, ‘counterterrorism’ is seemingly the only prudent course of action (1996: ix).¹¹ In Israel, state officials presented the IDF killing of Palestinian militants as reprisals and the closure of Palestinian towns as operational activities. Government rhetoric classified air strikes against Palestinian houses, restrictions of Palestinian movement through checkpoints, and the erection of barriers outside a book fair in Jerusalem as forms of security, because all responded to Palestinian threat, or, more accurately, to Israeli anticipation of Palestinian violence. Even left-wing media sources presented the IDF’s collective punishments of Palestinians as necessary reactions to Palestinian terror and tended to conceal that Palestinian violence was often a reaction to Israeli force (Korn 2004). When something was designated as terror, it was as if it already necessitated and legitimated a security response.

Particularly after 9/11, Israeli discourse of security refracted global rhetoric on security and counterterrorism. As Joel Beinin (2003) argues, Sharon’s government harnessed the George W. Bush administration’s rhetoric on security in an attempt to legitimize its repression of Palestinians and align itself with the United States.¹² Security, nonetheless, already had local resonance in Israel, where it has long referred to a broader ideology of Jewish strength and power. Over the course of many decades, security practices in Israel became synonymous with Israeli sovereignty and national identity. The state harnessed security not only as a military strategy but also as a politics of identity to delineate a self and another in time and in space. Security came to connote a desire for the normal, whether the normality of a comfortable, routine life or the normalization of Jewish politics.

In Hebrew, security is generally spoken about with two words, avtaḥa and bitaḥon, both deriving from the same root (b-t-ḥ). Avtaḥa refers to the act of securing, while bitaḥon refers to the resultant state of safety. Bitaḥon is used most commonly, often in both senses, to speak of security. Shmira refers to guarding, distinguished in everyday parlance from avtaḥa in that the latter is assumed to be armed. The term hagana can also be translated as security, or defense, but it tends to refer to full-scale war and military efforts to maintain national borders. In daily conversation, bitaḥon evokes imaginaries of internal Palestinian threat while hagana, or defense, evokes an external threat from neighboring Arab states. bitaḥon refers to ongoing conflict with Palestinians while hagana refers to circumscribed war. Frequently, however, these designations shift and overlap. With the invocation of bitaḥon, senses of inside and outside threats impinge equally on people’s senses of political, bodily, and emotional security.

National discourse in this period depicted the nation as fighting less for expanded settlement than for personal security, that is, for the safety of people’s bodies and minds as they moved through their day. Security had not always instantly implied personal bodily safety. In the first half of the 1990s, for example, early proponents of a barrier between Israel and the West Bank defended the barrier in