Augustine, Philosopher of Freedom: A Study in Comparative Philosophy

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AUGUSTINE

PHILOSOPHER OF FREEDOM

A Study in Comparative Philosophy

BY

MARY T. CLARK, R.S.C.J.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

DEDICATION 5

FOREWORD 6

PREFACE 8

INTRODUCTION 10

PART ONE—THE NOTION OF FREEDOM IN THE PAGAN PHILOSOPHERS 13

CHAPTER I—FREE WILL IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY 13

CHAPTER II—THE TREATISE ON FREE WILL OF PLOTINUS 19

CHAPTER III—RESUME OF THE PAGAN POSITION ON FREE WILL 31

PART TWO—THE NOTION OF FREEDOM IN AUGUSTINE 36

CHAPTER IV—FREE WILL IN THE DE LIBERO ARBITRIO OF ST. AUGUSTINE 36

CHAPTER V—FREEDOM IN THE EARLY DIALOGUES OF ST. AUGUSTINE 45

CHAPTER VI—FREE WILL AND FREEDOM IN THE CONFESSIONS OF ST. AUGUSTINE 53

CHAPTER VII—GENESIS OF THE AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE OF FREEDOM 62

CHAPTER VIII—THEOLOGICAL FREEDOM AND ITS PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS 86

CHAPTER IX—PLOTINUS AND AUGUSTINE 96

PART THREE—THE NOTION OF FREEDOM AFTER AUGUSTINE 112

CHAPTER X—ANSELMIAN AND AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINES OF FREEDOM COMPARED 112

CHAPTER XI—DEVELOPMENT OF THE AUGUSTINIAN NOTION OF FREEDOM BY ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 125

CHAPTER XII—TWENTIETH CENTURY VIEWS ON FREEDOM 137

CHAPTER XIII—CONCLUSION 156

BIBLIOGRAPHY 172

Primary Sources: 172

Secondary Works: 173

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 181

DEDICATION

To

my Mother

FOREWORD

That we live our lives in dependence on a heritage of cultural traditions stemming from the remote past, is evident to all who read history. Without a past, the race of men would lack a great dimension. Of course, modern people are tremendously indebted to Greece and Rome for the seeds of western civilization. One writer has asserted that nothing moves in our world today which is not Greek in origin. Another has claimed that we owe it all to Plato. It does not really matter who these historians are, for they are wrong. There are obvious values in our society which came from Judaeo-Christian sources and not from the classic thinkers of Greece and Rome.

Perhaps no reader’s equanimity will be disturbed at learning that the sages of pre-Christian philosophy knew little of the Will of God. What may disconcert some who look at this book is the judgment that these classic thinkers knew almost as little about the will of man. Mother Clark draws her conclusions with scholarly caution: she is prepared to admit that Plato and the Stoics made certain obscure overtures toward a theory of human volition. I should incline toward a more sweeping generalization: there seems to me to be no real awareness of the importance of will in any pagan thinker of antiquity. If Plotinus be an exception, it must be remembered that he lived centuries after Christ, may have studied under a Christian master, and certainly had students who knew Christianity.

Indeed, I do not know what word in classic Greek fully conveys the present meaning of the English word, will. They had terms for appetitive consent, for decision, for choice, for desire—but they were all different words. If we look for a Greek noun with the full connotation of will, we are driven to the conclusion that the Greeks did not have it. Even Aristotle, that busy coiner of scientific and philosophic terminology, hesitated here. In a famous passage (Nicomachean Ethics, VI, 2) he is forced to circumlocution, saying that choice is either an understanding-which-desires or a desire-which-understands. Here we see a great mind straining to break the bonds of Greek necessitarianism and not quite achieving the freedom of a personal will.

However this may be, it is clear that will as a power of self-commitment, of free choice, of turning toward or away from the good, is fully appreciated in early Christian writings and particularly in the works of St. Augustine of Hippo. He saw this capacity as one of the most essential attributes of the human person. For Augustine, man is understanding, is memory, is will. It was apparent to him that, without will man’s political, social, cultural freedom would be but an empty negation. Liberty cannot mean merely the absence of external restraint, for there must be some positive ability to act when constraining bonds have been removed.

This is the important message of the present book. Of late years, many studies have been made and published on the role of freedom in modern society. Great impetus was given these investigations by a program initiated by Dwight D. Eisenhower while he was at Columbia University. What many of these studies overlooked is what Mother Clark’s book makes clear. You cannot have a free Society unless its citizens be free men. You cannot have free men unless you have free choice within each person. You may spend millions on learned studies of the origins of western democracy and its free institutions—but if you have a psychology which gives no place to the will in the human person, you end with citizen robots automatically stamping out business machine decisions, in complete conformity with the data that they are fed.

That we should be reminded of this practical truth, in a book which takes us back to the very origins of our modern concepts of will and human freedom, is now most opportune. The struggle for the hearts and minds of men today is basically an ideological one. And since all human wills are but the shadow of the divine Will, and all man’s freedoms but images of the transcendent Freedom, it may be that only one who meditates upon the prototype can describe the copy.

VERNON J. BOURKE

Saint Louis University.

PREFACE

This book makes no pretence to be anything more than a listening post. Within these pages can be heard many voices uplifted to share with us their insights into freedom. Freedom is important to every man, and for our times it has a special significance. Freedom, however, is that kind of reality that people do not merely want to know about but to experience. Freedom is somehow bound up with the dialectic between man and God Who chose to communicate with free men. That is why the thinker who was the first to see history as evolving from the tension between nature and supernature is strategically situated to report on freedom. Augustine was interested, moreover, not only in teaching the meaning of freedom, but in showing how freedom can be personalized.

The novelty and the permanence of the Augustinian contribution are of interest, and discoverable only by textual studies which reveal how free will was treated by predecessors and successors. Since such studies have more of a philosophical purpose than an historical one, the principle of the comparative critique has been allowed to modify the principle of the immanent critique. Since knowledge is ever advancing, we should expect the notion of freedom to be fuller in modern times, but it seems that not only time but Christianity has made the difference. If we measure the contributions to the notion of freedom offered by the ancients against subsequent elucidations, this is not done in a spirit of censure but in an effort at clarification.

I hope that it is unnecessary to insist that there is no intention on the author’s part to speak definitively upon the profound and limitless subject of freedom. There is only a hope that this work may be a point of departure for a deeper penetration into the Augustinian doctrine of freedom through the combined explorations of philosophers and theologians.

With sincere appreciation for their kind encouragement, I wish to thank Reverend Mother Gertrude Bodkin, without whom this work would never have been undertaken, Mother Eleanor O’Byrne, formerly Dean and now President of Manhattanville, Reverend Denis Kavanagh, O.S.A., and my brothers, Reverend James D. Clark, O.S.A. and Mr. George A. Clark.

To Mother Louise Keyes, Dr. Robert C. Pollock and the Philosophy Faculty of Fordham University’s Graduate School, I am indebted for numerous insights that could not have been gained from libraries.

I have profited likewise from the suggestions of my kind critics. I wish to thank Reverend John Courtney Murray, S.J., editor of Theological Studies, and Reverend Norris Clarke, S.J., of Fordham University for their valued comments. I especially thank Mr. Jacques Maritain for his courteous criticism of the pages devoted to his position, Dr. Elizabeth Salmon for her criticism of the chapter on St. Thomas, Dr. James Collins for his very valuable help with the chapter on modern thought.

There is one to whom I am particularly indebted for his inspiring lectures on the Philosophy of Plotinus, for his guidance in tutorial courses on Augustine, and for the wealth of his own deep scholarship so willingly shared with others. It is a great pleasure for me to acknowledge the generous help that Reverend Paul Henry, S.J. of the Institut Catholique in Paris and now Visiting Professor in Philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania, has given me. My work owes very much to Father Henry’s counsel and I thank him sincerely for his illuminating comments and criticisms. If the present book is not better than it is, the responsibility does not rest with any of these kind critics, but with the author.

Finally, I should like to thank Reverend Mario Zicarelli for his generosity in carefully proof-reading the text and for the many valuable suggestions that he offered. I am grateful also to Miss Judith Garson for her kind assistance with proof-reading.

Mary T. Clark, R.S.C.J., Ph.D.

Manhattanville College of the Sacred Heart

Purchase, New York

March 25, 1957.

INTRODUCTION

There is a hunger in the human heart for freedom. Struggles for freedom fill the pages of history. Since the state is the individual writ large, is not the ceaseless quest for political freedom a reflection of the deep longing of every man for personal freedom? But the freedom so ardently desired by men cannot be merely a power of free choice that is as universal as human nature itself. It would seem that the freedom men deeply desire is even more than a freedom from external or internal constraint, though this is not unimportant. Is there not a more profound meaning of freedom: the freedom to be all that one can and should be, the freedom to fulfill the true human vocation? There is little common agreement today on the character of this freedom in the broad sense of the word, and still less agreement upon how it is to be attained. The admiration, the discussion, the praise expended on freedom today cannot supply for a true understanding of it. Confusion about the meaning of freedom can be the cause of can be the effect of a confusion about the meaning of man. And yet there can be no dynamic conception of man if the notion of freedom is neglected. Of speculative interest, its import for the practical life is immense. Thinkers of all ages, philosophers as well as theologians, have pondered the reality of freedom. Some have attacked freedom as a problem to be solved; others have approached freedom as a mystery awakening wonder. Just as all the philosophical analyses have not succeeded in eliminating the mystery of man, so there will ever remain something mysterious about human freedom. Yet as long as man has the experience of free will and the longing for freedom in the broad sense, he will seek to understand it.

This book is concerned chiefly with Saint Augustine’s teaching on free choice in relation to the larger liberty that comes from loving God. We know that it is quite impossible to exhaust the theological aspects of the topic of freedom in Augustine, and we shall not attempt to do so. Yet, as long as grace builds upon nature, there will be philosophical dimensions to any theological reality. There is no intent to state what should be thought about freedom, but only to set forth what Augustine said about it, and to compare his doctrine with certain characteristic philosophical positions before and after him. Despite the treasury of literature on every phase of Augustine’s doctrine, his teaching on freedom has not hitherto been extensively presented to the English reading public. Because of the importance of the topic of freedom in the Augustinian outlook, this notion is objectively studied within the texts and the context of Augustine’s writings. We shall try as thoroughly as we can to set forth Augustine’s doctrine in itself, to compare and contrast it with the doctrines of Plotinus, of St. Anselm and of St. Thomas Aquinas. If Augustine’s teaching on freedom in seen to differ considerably from that of Plotinus, may one not conclude that Augustine’s independence of Plotinus is greater than some have thought? If there prove to be numerous points of contact between the Augustinian and the Anselmian and the Thomistic doctrines of freedom, can we not see in Augustine a pioneer philosopher of freedom?

After a preliminary investigation of how the subject of freedom was handled by non-Christian philosophers, and especially by Plotinus, Augustine’s own teaching on freedom is presented. Chronologically, the philosophical dialogues were written before the Confessions, yet Augustine’s experience with free will as revealed in the Confessions of 400 A.D. preceded his writing of the Dialogues of 386 A.D. and after. Following the chronological order of the writings, the teaching in the dialogues has been placed first, that is, before the Confessions. But Augustine’s own experience had posed for him the problem of freedom even before he began to compose the dialogues.{1} So, those dialogues—especially the De Libero Arbitrio—present a theoretical treatment of free choice as well as a concrete description of its former state and present state in man. Accordingly, we have distinguished in them what Augustine said of will or choice as such, and what he said of the freedom or slavery of the human will in accordance with the use made of it. His statements about the freedom or the slavery of the will seem to have originated with the experience of his free will that he reveals in the Confessions, as well as from the notion of freedom as efficacy in the direction of the good, a notion that he discovered in the epistles of St. Paul. There have been attempts by critics to bring Augustine’s statements concerning free will and concerning freedom into contradiction. Yet in Augustine’s own experience, when that experience is viewed in its full theological dimensions, the realities of free choice and of freedom are reconciled. He learned that for the slavery of doing evil the human will sufficed, but for the freedom of doing good both man’s consent and God’s grace are needed. Augustine’s defence of free will as a reality and as a source of responsibility is more than a polemical answer to Manichaeans—it is a recall to the sense of sin. Augustine’s doctrine of theological freedom through grace is more than a polemical answer to the Pelagians—it is a recall to the sense of the dignity of man and of the greatness of God. So it is that in this work we shall keep distinct what Augustine’s vocabulary has first distinguished,{2} free choice as a capacity for good or evil, a capacity found in every man, and freedom as an actuality that is the fruit of an engraced will. After the textual analyses, the doctrine of freedom is envisaged within the total Augustinian framework and is illuminated by the interpretations of outstanding Augustinian scholars.

Having been thought out by a Christian convert, a thinker steeped in classical culture, reacting forcefully against the naturalistic mental dime of his day, this doctrine is necessarily related to its intellectual and to its religious milieu. These relations have served to hasten the formation of the Augustinian doctrine of freedom but they have not, as some have suggested, jeopardized its integrity. Thus, Augustine’s evaluation of free choice in the De Libero Arbitrio cannot be dismissed as the undeveloped thought of an early work, and Augustine’s conception of freedom as the simultaneous work of God and man cannot be treated as an ecclesiastic’s answer to the momentary challenge of Pelagianism. For, three years before his death, in the Retractations,{3} Augustine reiterates his teaching that free will is a power that can be badly used but without which we can do no good, a teaching that he had fully expounded in the early dialogue; and in this last expression of his mind he insists just as strongly as he had insisted against the Pelagians that the good use of free will comes from God. So it is that the Retractations provide certainty that all Augustine’s statements with regard to free will, whether he is trying to show philosophically to the Manichaeans that God is not the cause of evil or whether he is trying to show scripturally to the Pelagians that God is the cause of the good will, are equally representative of his mature thought on the topic of freedom.

Through his genius and his versatility, as well as his happy facility for striking a sympathetic chord in the human heart, Augustine has been the contemporary of every age; he is of kindred spirit with our own. He will always remain a modern man. Hence, Augustinism has exerted a vital influence on every age, and Augustine’s teaching on freedom is both of historical interest and of present-day value. A thorough investigation of the Augustinian influence would take us far beyond the scope of this present work. But just as the originality of Augustine is highlighted by the doctrinal comparison with Plotinus, so the permanence of his contribution to our understanding of freedom can be spotlighted by the comparison of his teaching with that of two great philosophers, St. Anselm and St. Thomas Aquinas. Through their works the notion of freedom has been widely disseminated, while in the works of modern philosophers like Jacques Maritain and Maurice Blondel the notion of freedom developed by the great Christian philosophers of the past has been preserved intact, and is being presented today through their writings and their disciples with the dynamism that is demanded by the impact of the present crisis of freedom in our modern world. Yet there are some today who do not admit the existence of free will; still others do not agree on the purpose of free will. And so two basic questions remain with us: Is freedom possible? In what does freedom consist? Explicitly or implicitly, materialists and rationalists will deny the possibility of freedom. Christian realists will disagree with atheistic existentialists and totalitarian of all kinds upon the meaning of freedom. Yet in the twentieth century the yearning for freedom on the part of all is accompanied by an appreciation of its value on the part of many. This bespeaks a growing understanding of the relation of freedom to personality, to which the statements of many modern thinkers bear witness. The chapter on the twentieth century will reveal the wide variety of views on freedom, among which can be detected the authentic voice of Augustine.

So it is that after a close doctrinal study of freedom in the writings of Augustine, it will be of interest to see how this notion of freedom, after being submitted to the precision of Anselm, and to the metaphysical analysis of Thomas Aquinas, can be fruitful today:

...whereas in classical culture man reached an understanding of the power and value of thought, through Christianity there is added a new dimension, that of freedom, and out of the fusion of thought and freedom has come a higher and more potent form of intellectuality.{4}

PART ONE—THE NOTION OF FREEDOM IN THE PAGAN PHILOSOPHERS

CHAPTER I—FREE WILL IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY

Freedom to mould one’s world within and without, freedom to find fulfillment in communal living was such freedom explored by the ancient philosophers? It seems that only slowly, very slowly, did human personality emerge and extricate itself from social structures. It was not that the potency for freedom did not reside within the ancient man. It was there, a power belonging to human nature, but because it was not fully evaluated, it seems to have been unappreciated. The man of antiquity was aware of novelty, of contingency, but he seems to have feared it and to have preferred necessity. He recognized necessity as the law of his mental life, knew the inexorable static security of the changeless idea, felt certainty in conclusions that inevitably followed from valid premises. He had not witnessed that great moment that was to come to change the face of the earth, when the Roman world had worn out and ideas could not revive it nor long preserve it from interior collapse—that second peak-moment in the history of freedom when Christ, without any necessity, entered history. Nor had he heard of that first peak-moment in the history of freedom, the moment of its birth, when God, without any necessity, created the world of free men. Outside the influence of divine revelation, the Greek was not outside the influence of religion. All religion is a belief in the dependence of man, and the Greek felt himself under the power of the gods. Because his gods were divinized forces of nature, the foremost Greek thinkers concluded that all is done by necessity. This teaching is attributed by Cicero{5} to Democritus, Heraclitus and Empedocles, as well as to Aristotle; it is attributed by Plutarch to Thales, Pythagoras and Parmenides.{6} The early Hellenic Philosophers concentrated on accounting for nature They were concerned with the certain causes of things, with science as such. They were cosmologists. When Plato, inspired by Socrates, became interested in the psychological aspect of reality, we might expect to hear him mention choice and desire. We are not disappointed in that expectation The place accorded to Goodness and to eros by Plato is significant. It is a forward step in the appreciation of the affective aspects of man. But Goodness in the Platonic universe does not cease to be the Idea of Goodness, and eros remains a necessary élan. The Platonic ethic, therefore, is on the speculative level and its end is eudaimonistic. The will is not speculatively distinguished from free will, and the truth of the practical judgment is not recognized as dependent upon free will. The words Plato uses, such as to choose and to will, must not deceive us as to the true Platonic position on this point. Like Socrates who thought that if we do evil it is by ignorance, Plato does not seem to admit that man is free to choose either the general end of his acts, or the means when he knows the end clearly. According to Plato,{7} one is never unjust voluntarily, although the unjust act can be accomplished voluntarily. In an unjust action one is merely mistaken in the choice of means. This power of free choice belongs in the realm of opinion, the region of the undetermined. It is a lack of power, a lack of perfection. Perfection flows rather from the determinism of the Good. Plato would be consistent if he eliminated praise or blame, but he does not do this. In the Republic {8} we are shown judges who command the just to ascend by the heavenly way and the unjust to descend by the lower way; these also bore the symbols of their deeds, but fastened on their backs....Even for the last corner, if he chooses wisely and lives diligently, there is appointed a happy and not undesirable existence. But Plato should stipulate greater punishments for voluntary than for involuntary crimes, a distinction recognized by all peoples. Because he will not admit that anyone does injustice willingly,{9} he finds another basis for the division of punishments, that of the kind of offence.

Although Plato does not defend a robust freedom of will, his keen awareness of the profound place of intellect in the human being prevents him from making of man a victim of physical forces. He would have this to say to the materialistic determinist of today:

There is surely a strange confusion of causes and conditions in all this [materialist way of reasoning]. It may be said, indeed, that without bones and muscles and the other parts of the body I cannot execute my purposes. But to say that I do as I do because of them, and this is the way in which mind acts, and not from the choice of the best, is a very careless and idle mode of speaking. I wonder that they cannot distinguish the cause from the condition.{10}

This choice of the best occurs when the better elements of the mind which lead to order and philosophy prevail.{11} One can see that for Plato the fairest jewel in the philosopher-king’s crown is wisdom, the companion inseparable and, he would seem to suggest, the raison d’être of virtue.{12}

Aristotle likewise grapples with the meaning of the voluntary and discusses the position that Plato had inherited from his predecessors.

The saying that ‘no one is voluntarily wicked nor involuntarily happy’ seems to be partly false and partly true; for no one is involuntarily happy, but wickedness is voluntary. Or else we shall have to dispute what has just been said, at any rate, and deny that man is a moving principle or begetter of his actions as of children.{13}

That man is the master of his acts is, according to Aristotle, I the implication of all punishment whether private or public. Such punishment is withheld if it can be proved that one acted under compulsion or through invincible ignorance. It is also the implication of all rewards for virtuous conduct, rewards which seek to encourage others to be likewise virtuous. If certain acts inevitably spring from certain characters, it must be remembered that it is activities exercised on particular objects that make the corresponding character.{14} Aristotle realizes that each man is somehow responsible for his state of mind, and therefore he will also be himself somehow responsible for the appearance, that is, for what appears good to him.{15} Aristotle states that the origin of action...its efficient, not its final cause...is choice, and that of choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end.{16} Aristotle here implies psychological liberty, but does he say that the free choice comes from the will determining itself? Does he explain the reciprocal causality of desire and reasoning in the act of choice? Has he ever decided whether the will is appetitive intellect or intellectual appetite? Gilson states that it remains a fact that Aristotle spoke neither of liberty nor of free will. {17} As for will itself, could it be properly understood apart from a transcendent object? If will is not an infinite capacity, can the radical indetermination of free will be grasped? Is there any mention of that freedom born of man’s efficacious choice of the good, by which he is free for attaining his end? Or, if virtue rather than God is for Aristotle the end of man, when he evaluates free choice in relation to this end, does he not implicitly agree with the Stoics that liberty is conformity to the laws of nature? There are some who point to the frequent use that Aristotle makes of the word freedom in the Politics. The text shows that he equates freedom with the political asset of independence, freedom from external constraint. He defined the free man by opposition to a slave.{18} Even in the Metaphysics where the free man is referred to, it is clear that the notion has a political origin.{19} The political ideal, the aesthetic ideal, not the formally moral ideal, is offered.{20} But if psychological freedom has not a purpose that raises the individual above the purposes of the state, the way is open to refuse to man the freedoms which flow from his psychological liberty whenever the well being of the state may seem more important.

To note that Aristotle did not give us an explicit notion of the meaning and grandeur of freedom is to recognize that he has not fully elaborated the notion of person, although he faithfully describes some aspects of its functioning. He points to the reality of free will and gropes towards an appreciation of freedom—it is a case of deficiency, not denial.{21}

What are one’s reasons for questioning the adequacy of the Aristotelian treatment of the will? It seems that for Aristotle as for Plato the indetermination of the will is not something of which we can be proud. It signifies a contingency that is not proper to the spirit world. It does belong to human nature, (Aristotle is too scientific to refuse the evidence of free choice), as matter Belongs to human nature, and possibly belongs to human nature because