The Trinity and the Vindication of Christian Paradox: An Interpretation and Refinement of the Theological Apologetic of Cornelius Van Til

The Trinity and the Vindication of Christian Paradox

An Interpretation and Refinement of the Theological Apologetic of Cornelius Van Til

B. A. Bosserman

Foreword by 
K. Scott Oliphint

The Trinity and the Vindication of Christian Paradox

An Interpretation and Refinement of the Theological Apologetic of Cornelius Van Til

Copyright © 2014 B. A. Bosserman. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in critical publications or reviews, no part of this book may be reproduced in any manner without prior written permission from the publisher. Write: Permissions. Wipf and Stock Publishers, 199 W. 8th Ave., Suite 3, Eugene, OR 97401.

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ISBN 13: 978-1-62564-128-1

EISBN 13: 978-1-63087-496-4

Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

Bosserman, B. A.

The Trinity and the vindication of Christian paradox : an interpretation and refinement of the theological apologetic of Cornelius Van Til / B. A. Bosserman, with a foreword by K. Scott Oliphint

xxiv + 268 p. ; 23 cm. Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 13: 978-1-62564-128-1

1. Van Til, Cornelius, 1895–1987. 2. Apologetics. 3. Trinity. 4. Christianity—Philosophy. I. Oliphint, K. Scott. II. Title.

BX9225.V37 B788 2014

Manufactured in the U.S.A.

Scripture Quotations are taken from the New American Standard Bible. Copyright 1997 by the Lockman Foundation

To Thomas George Bossserman

Who taught me to love the biblical Scriptures

The Triune God from whom they came

And to whom they bear witness

Foreword

As one who has labored for decades to understand, articulate, and re-articulate Cornelius Van Til’s Reformed approach to the discipline of apologetics, I have normally been aware of other scholars in the field whose concerns have been coincident with mine. One day, I received an email from Brant Bosserman, with his doctoral dissertation attached, from which this work is taken. I had never heard of Dr. Bosserman, so my instinct was to do (unfortunately) what I do with virtually all emails of this nature—consign it to the digital trash bin. I rarely have time to read what is required of me, much less what comes to me out of the blue. But, since this work was focused on Van Til’s thought, I decided that I should at least skim it.

My attempt to skim Dr. Bosserman’s dissertation turned to serious and concentrated reading. I read every page, some more than once. By the time I had finished this work, I recognized that Dr. Bosserman had successfully focused his energies on a topic that is not only central to the Christian faith, but that is central to all of Van Til’s thought. I set this work aside and thought, Why hasn’t this been done before?

There are a number of responses to that question. One response would be that, though Van Til’s apologetic method has its genesis in an affirmation of the ontological Trinity, many of the criticisms of Van Til’s thought have, historically, focused on other things. For example, there has been, and continues to be, serious misunderstandings about what, exactly, Van Til means by the notion of presupposition. There have been those who have seen Van Til’s rejection of the standard formulations of the theistic proofs as a concession to fideism. There have been, in other words, pressing matters of clarity that needed, and still need, to be addressed. Whatever the reasons, however, the topic that is given its due herein is not by any means tangential to Van Til’s thinking; it is the warp and woof of everything that he believed, taught and wrote.

Without question, the most radical, revolutionary, requisite and Reformed aspect of the apologetic set forth by Van Til was his insistence that one’s defense of Christianity must begin with the ontological Trinity. No apologist prior to him had argued such a thing, in part because it meant that the discipline of apologetics must self-consciously begin with Scripture. So, says Van Til:

[A] consistently Christian method of apologetic argument, in agreement with its own basic conception of the starting point, must be by presupposition. To argue by presupposition is to indicate what are the epistemological and metaphysical principles that underlie and control one’s method. The Reformed apologist will frankly admit that his own methodology presupposes the truth of Christian theism. Basic to all the doctrines of Christian theism is that of the self-contained God, or, if we wish, that of the ontological trinity. It is this notion of the ontological trinity that ultimately controls a truly Christian methodology. Based upon this notion of the ontological trinity and consistent with it, is the concept of the counsel of God according to which all things in the created world are regulated.¹

Everything that Van Til wrote and taught has its center in the distinctly Christian, biblical truth of God’s Triunity. The fact that God is One in Three must take its rightful place in the theology of any Christian, and especially any Reformed Christian. Not only so, but as goes one’s theology, so ought to go one’s apologetic; a Trinitarian theology demands a Trinitarian apologetic as well.

But, in spite of Van Til’s consistent emphasis throughout his career and his writings, the fact of God’s Triunity has not yet ascended to its rightful place, especially in the area of a Christian defense of the faith, and the theology that must undergird that defense. Generally speaking, when mention is made of Van Til’s emphasis on the Trinity, the discussion usually turns to the philosophical problem of the one and the many. Aside from that, little is said, and even less is elaborated.

One can peruse the books and writings of authors who follow in Van Til’s line (including mine!) and there will not be a primary and focused articulation of the Trinity, and the implications of that doctrine, in virtually any of them. There is honorable mention made in most works, and some have wanted to move from that doctrine to possible implications, but none of us has, in my opinion, drawn out the deep and rich entailments that a rich, robust, Reformed doctrine of the Trinity requires for the way that we think about the world, about our theology, and about apologetics. This is not as it should be.

We owe Dr. Bosserman a debt of deep gratitude for mounting the difficulties of Van Til’s Trinitarian thought, grabbing the reins, spurring it in the side, and moving it forward, as he guides us through the trail of the rich and radical contours that have otherwise been lying pent up and dormant, virtually hidden from view.

With the pathway now clearer because of Dr. Bosserman’s work, those of us who seek to follow in Van Til’s line can better recognize its direction, as well as its boundaries. There will be more brush to clear along the way; a work of this depth and breadth is bound to have a few briars and brambles still remaining in the path. But the Trinitarian trail, mapped out by Van Til, has now been extensively trod. Its end has not been reached, and we may want to sidestep it in places in order to mark off a better side-path, but wisdom points to the trail Dr. Bosserman has blazed as the best place to begin.

K. Scott Oliphint

Professor of Apologetics and Systematic Theology,

Westminster Theological Seminary

1. DF

4

,

121–22

.

Acknowledgments

This is based on a thesis originally submitted to the University of Bangor for the award of Doctor of Philosophy in 2011. Many individuals are deserving of thanks for aiding me to complete that initial project. I wish to thank first of all Dr. Keith Warrington, and especially Professor Julian Ward for their invaluable critique, guidance, and encouragement in the production of the present manuscript. I also thank my father and mother, Tom and Marilyn Bosserman, and sister and brother in-law, Noelle and Jon Baylor for their regular prayer, support, and interest in this project; my brother Dustin Bosserman for thoroughly editing this thesis and engaging its main ideas, despite his fundamental disagreement with Christian theism; and the many theologians who have contributed to Van Til scholarship—James N. Anderson, John M. Frame, K. Scott Oliphint, Vern S. Poythress, Ralph Allan Smith, and Lane G. Tipton—whose influence, although from a distance in the initial production of my thesis, is thoroughly reflected in this manuscript. A special thanks to K. Scott Oliphint, James Anderson, Ralph Alan Smith, and my examiner Daniel J. Hill for their willingness to read my manuscript, and to offer insights as to how I might modify and/or better develop my main arguments. Second only to the Lord Himself, the author is thankful to his children Nicea, Chalcedon, and Augustine, and most of all to his wife Heather Bosserman for the many sacrifices that they have made on account of this project, and their unceasing faith that the Lord would bring it to completion.

Introduction

Christian thinkers throughout the ages have felt the burden to guard and develop what often seem to be three competing ideals—the systematic harmony of Christian doctrine (Luke 24:44), the novelty of certain paradoxical doctrines (John 6:52–60), and the possibility of a robust Christian apologetic (Acts 17:31). All too often, however, brilliant theologians have hardily embraced two out of the three above-mentioned aims, only to be frustrated by the third. For example, those who have proven to be capable defenders and organizers of Christian theology have at times betrayed embarrassment about apparently contradictory doctrines such as the Trinity, the dual nature of Christ, the compatibility of divine sovereignty and human responsibility, etc. Among those who resist the temptation of heretical resolutions to such paradoxes, a common strategy is to settle with an unhappy compromise between an apologetic where the distinctive Christian doctrines play no significant role, and a class of supernatural mysteries that admit for no rational proof. Other theologians have reveled in the mysterious truths of Christianity and set them up as the centerpieces of the Christian system, but flatly disparaged the responsibility to produce a compelling defense of Christianity. And still a third group has taken advantage of theological paradoxes as apologetic tools that possess an inherent capacity to illuminate the absurdity of the human situation, but only so long as we resist the temptation to capture their essential significance as parts of a static system.

Against the backdrop of the historical tension between theological system, paradox, and apologetics, Dr. Cornelius Van Til stands out as anomalous, if only for the harmony between the three ideals that he aspired to engender. Although he spent the bulk of his career occupying the chair of apologetics at Westminster seminary, Van Til’s students have long recognized his profundity as a theologian and Christian philosopher. A military general devotes himself to assessing the strategic advantages of his own position and the weaknesses of his opponent’s. Likewise, Van Til was preoccupied both with the nature of the Reformed theological system, and the details of secular philosophies. Van Til’s novel conclusion was that certain theological paradoxes, such as the doctrine of the ontological Trinity are essential to the coherence of Christian theology, and to the potency and validity of a Christian apologetic. His proposed Copernican shift involved the claim that genuine knowledge must revolve around the Triune God—the ideal of unity in difference—and His revelation concerning the proper aims and boundaries of human comprehension. To be specific, Van Til held that nothing about reality can be known truly, except as it is understood as an expression of God’s eternal plan for the cosmos, and unless it is appreciated as accessible to the human mind through the mediation of the Triune God, the very archetype of harmony in difference. The proof for this Christian position turns on the impossibility of its pagan and secular alternatives, which cannot scale the enduring one-many problem of philosophy. So long as the unbeliever carries on as if his principles are able to govern facts; as if his intellect makes contact with reality; as if there is a proper and productive order for society, etc., he betrays his dependence on the Triune God. For, the history of philosophy has only confirmed man’s² incapacity to transcend himself, and directly confirm that reality is marked by (much less headed for more profound degrees of) the sort of harmony that is generally conducive to human life and reasoning. Only the God Who embodies perfect unity and difference in Himself, and exhaustively sustains the creation as His analogue can authoritatively instill, and further, justify human confidence about such matters. Although the Trinity is unmistakably paradoxical, renewed acquaintance with Him through the saving work of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit is the precondition of knowledge. Counterintuitive as it may be, genuine coherence in theology (and every realm of inquiry), a valid and compelling apologetic, and honor for Christian paradox can only be upheld if the three are allowed to qualify and interpenetrate one another.

If nothing else Van Til’s vigorous claims have caught the attention of other Christian thinkers. And yet, Van Til’s ambiguities, sparsely developed inferences, and wandering writing style have led many readers to applaud his spirit but to reject his more ostentatious claims. Still others simply deride his project as basically confused. Arguably, the basic difficulty with Van Til’s theological-apologetic is that the alleged harmony between systematic knowledge, apologetics, and paradox appears to devolve into a procedure of: (a) relying on the laws of logic when convenient (in apologetic critiques); (b) setting logic aside when inconvenient (with respect to Christian paradox); (c) somehow using the doctrine of the Trinity as a license, and the biblical Scriptures as a guide for when to carry out (a) or (b); and then (d) designating (a), (b), and (c) a systematic method. Supposing that such a representation were accurate, Van Til’s systematic reasoning would be nothing more than a haphazard procedure that fails to foster, and even militates against any sort of logical coherence. It would not at all be clear how or why the Christian apologist’s demand for logical consistency from his opponents, alongside his own insistence on the right to appeal to mystery could not be mimicked by advocates of any worldview. And, far from honoring the profundity of the doctrine of the Trinity and safeguarding Christian paradox, it would make the Trinity into a ground for breaking Christ’s command to treat others as we would hope to be treated (Matt 7:12).

Given not only how widespread, but also how grave the above interpretation of Van Til happens to be, the present author aims to inject clarity into the situation by identifying Van Til’s genuine triumphs and his relative failures, and then offering a rectification of the latter. In order to accomplish these ends the argument passes through four stages. The first part begins with a thoroughgoing examination of the three schools of thought which were the most influential on Van Til, namely Old Princeton Seminary (ch. 1), Old Amsterdam Seminary (ch. 2), and absolute idealist philosophy (ch. 3). Identification of the guiding presuppositions and collective aims of each school, as well as an explanation of their theological and philosophical terminology is essential to developing an accurate understanding of Van Til’s position. Even more pertinent is an understanding of how Van Til believed he was able to preserve the great theological and philosophical insights of his forbearers, while overcoming their latent tendencies toward rationalism and irrationalism. Thus, even at the stage of historical analysis, it is necessary to register Van Til’s main critiques of each school.

The second part contains a systematic statement of Van Til’s Trinitarian apologetic (ch. 4), epistemology (ch. 5 and 6), and theology (ch. 7). The chief insight offered by Van Til pertains to how the doctrine of the Trinity supplies a personalist solution to the ever-reoccurring one-many problem of philosophy. Properly speaking, the one-many problem pertains to how universals may overlap with historical particulars. But, in its broadest import, the one-many problem lies at the base of questions concerning how subjects may intelligibly relate to objects; governments and citizens may live together harmoniously; ethical norms may be relevant to diverse situations; etc. The Trinity solves the problem, not as a theoretical explanation for how universal principles and ideas control matters of fact, but as a personal Authority Who is a perfect harmony of unity and diversity in Himself, and thus uniquely qualified to guide man in developing an analogous harmony in his own life and thought. Apologetically, the Trinitarian perspective carries with it an illuminating diagnosis of sinful thinking as the self-defeating attempt to treat principles found in creation, rather than the Creator, as the ultimate sources of unity and/or diversity in reality. In terms of systematic theology, the doctrine of the Trinity proves to foster the sort of coherence between Christian doctrines after which unbelievers may only grope. And epistemologically, a Trinitarian theology implies a theory of knowledge where a given human perspective is true only if it reflects the mind of God, and justified only if that man’s mind has been reoriented to God through the saving work and revelation of Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit. The genius of Van Til’s position consists in the fact that the epistemology derived from the Triune God and His Word, requires a uniquely Christian interpretation of the laws of logic that renders Christian paradoxes true, and exposes non-Christian perspectives as genuine contradictions. Those who accept the biblical distinction between two fundamentally different sorts of beings—the Creator and his creation—ought to be keen to the fact that the laws of identity and contradiction do not apply to everything in the same fashion, such that all things are self-identical, and incompatible with certain other things, in the same way. The only course for determining, for example, whether perfect deity and perfect humanity may exist together in the single person of Christ is by discerning whether such a doctrine is possible or necessary within the boundaries of a concrete, systematic worldview. To be specific, Christian paradoxes are vindicated as true by virtue of the fact that (a) their supposedly conflicting elements or poles imply one another in a discernible fashion when set in the light of the Christian system; and (b) the paradox, in return, enhances the internal coherence of the Christian system. Nevertheless, these doctrines rightfully retain the epithet paradox because they never cease to challenge our day-to-day applications of certain concepts, and squarely conflict with the (widely accepted) logic that would exalt our mundane notions of identify and contradiction as standards by which we may judge God. Finally, all opposition to the Christian system and its mode of reasoning may be rejected as resting on a genuine self-contradiction, namely, that of attempting to level rational arguments against the Creator when one’s godless (Trinity-less) presuppositions undermine the very possibility of rational discourse.

Having provisionally vindicated the heart of Van Til’s system we return, in the third part, to the negative caricature of his position in order to discover its source, and in order to identify the extent of its validity (ch. 8). We validate the charge not only that Van Til’s better insights are obscured by his failure to develop their implications in a focused manner, but that the same oversights have actually had an adverse effect on the feasibility of his fundamental claims. Chiefly, Van Til fails to employ his own logic of implication to the extent of proving that the oneness and threeness, as opposed to mere many-ness of God mutually imply one another, and are equally indispensable to the harmony of created reality. As a result, an arbitrary element appears to infiltrate the heart of the Christian system in such a way that it is difficult to distinguish it from the irrationalism of those secular systems of thought that Van Til critiques so relentlessly. Furthermore, despite the brilliant developments supplied by several schools of thought that were inspired by, or preoccupied with similar concerns as Van Til, each one falls short of clarifying and expounding his concept of a Christian logic of implication, much less drawing out the import of a specifically Trinitarian worldview.

Finally, in the fourth part the present author offers his own positive exposition of the Christian system according to a refined application of Van Til’s method of implication. A detailed application of this method brings to light the manner in which (a) the poles of Christian paradoxes logically imply one another, and the Christian system as a whole; (b) non-Christian paradoxes and systems of thought represent genuinely self-defeating contradictions; and (c) how the above-mentioned procedure is the exclusive property of Trinitarian Christianity. The Trinity is the first among the Christian paradoxes that are vindicated in the manner described (ch. 9). The argument turns on the scriptural-covenantal observation that God’s self-definition need not only exist through personal distinctions (so that God is multi-personal), but that every personal distinction in the Godhead must be facilitated by, and appear within the overarching context of a third, and only a third person. For, if the number of divine persons were decreased to two, then the relationship between those two persons would have to appear within an impersonalist void, since there is no third, divine and personal context to be found. If the number of divine persons were multiplied beyond three, then the relationship between any two divine persons would have to be facilitated by an additional group of divine persons (which is not, properly speaking, a person). Each individual person of the Trinity would fail to comprehend the entire divine life in and by Himself, and that which comprehended the whole of the Godhead and his self-relationship would not be a person, but an impersonal dynamic. Hence, in the Christian system, where God is a personal Absolute, it can be concluded that the oneness and threeness of God mutually necessitate one another. Utilizing a similar methodology, the apparently conflicting poles of eight additional paradoxes of the Reformed faith are proven to imply one another, and once combined, to form a coherent system together. These paradoxes include, (1) the order and equality of divine persons; (2) the simplicity and multiplicity of the divine attributes; (3) divine immutability and temporal creation; (4) the finitude and complexity of creation; (5) the analogical and objective character of human knowledge; (6) the sovereignty of God and the freedom of man; (7) the original goodness of man and his capacity for sin; and (8) the sinlessness and genuine humanity of Jesus Christ (ch. 10–12). Finally, the argument supports the Van Tillian emphases that have been cultivated by the schools of thought described in Part III.

At the conclusion of our study we obtain a robust Trinitarian worldview the likes of which has seldom been seen. Apologists throughout the ages have offered proofs for the existence of God. A few among them have aimed at proving that God must be Triune. An even smaller group of Van Tillian presuppositionalists have argued that a personal God, who is fundamentally one and many, is the precondition of all rational discourse, and the primary object of a transcendental proof. But, the present volume is unique in its aim to demonstrate that only the specifically tri-personal God, who has reconciled men to himself in the work of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, can be regarded as the transcendental condition of intelligible existence. Indeed, the development of a coherent theology, of a definitive apologetic, and of a logic that consistently embraces theological paradox and excludes contradictions is proven to hinge on acknowledging the Triune God from the outset, and allowing Him to set all things in their proper light.

2. In agreement with a handful of contemporary Christian and secular philosophers, the present author is convinced that when referring to persons without regard for their sex, it is preferable to use masculine nouns and pronouns rather than feminine nouns and pronouns, or both together. Cf. Bonjour and Sosa, Epistemic Justification,

11

n.

5

; Frame, The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God, xvi–xvii.

Abbreviations

C67 The Confession of 1967: Its Theological Background and Ecumenical Significance

CA Christian Apologetics

CB Christianity and Barthianism

CFC The Case for Calvinism

CG Common Grace and the Gospel

CC Christianity in Conflict

CI Christianity and Idealism

CIM Christianity in Modern Theology

CJ Christ and the Jews

CTE Christian Theistic Ethics (In Defense of the Faith, Vol. 3)

CTEV Christian Theistic Evidences (In Defense of the Faith, Vol. 6)

CTK A Christian Theory of Knowledge

DF3 The Defense of the Faith, 3rd ed.

DF4 The Defense of the Faith, 4th ed.

FCE Foundations of Christian Education: An Address to Christian Teachers

GD The Great Debate Today

GH The God of Hope: Sermons and Addresses

IST An Introduction to Systematic Theology (In Defense of the Faith, Vol. 5)

JA Jerusalem and Athens

NH The New Hermeneutic

NM The New Modernism

PA Paul at Athens

PDS The Protestant Doctrine of Scripture (In Defense of the Faith, Vol. 1)

PR Psychology of Religion (In Defense of the Faith, Vol. 4)

RP The Reformed Pastor and Modern Thought

SCE A Survey of Christian Epistemology (In Defense of the Faith, Vol. 2)

SG Sovereignty of Grace: An Appraisal of G. C. Berkouwer’s View of Dordt

TJD The Theology of James Daane

WI Why I Believe in God

WCV The Works of Cornelius Van Til (CD-Rom, version 1.0)

WTJ Westminster Theological Journal

Part I

The Origins of Van Til’s Theological Apologetic

In itself, the task of identifying those schools of thought which inspired Cornelius Van Til’s apologetic system is hardly a difficult or even a novel endeavor. Several Van Til students and expositors have made such identifications,¹ and their accounts differ hardly at all from the one Van Til himself gave on multiple occasions. As it stands, there is no doubt that Van Til was indebted to (1) Old Princeton Seminary and to (2) the Free University of Amsterdam for shaping and solidifying his Reformed theological commitments.² And, many of his epistemological insights were positively or negatively inspired by (3) absolute and personal idealist philosophers.³ When boiled down to their lowest common denominators a most unusual combination appears, with Calvin as the most significant theological influence, and Hegel as the underlying philosophical influence on Van Til.

Accompanying the well-established account of the origins of Van Til’s position, is the regular interpretation of Van Til’s own project as an attempt to reform Christian apologetics, by combining and morphing certain theological, epistemological, and apologetic insights taken from each of the above-mentioned schools. First, Old Princeton stood upon Calvin’s doctrines of natural revelation and man’s innate sense of deity, as they constructed a robust apologetic for the Christian Faith. Second, Amsterdam, on the other hand, emphasized Calvin’s doctrine of total depravity, and developed the view that unregenerate reasoning must be antithetical to Christian thinking at virtually every point, with the result that it is largely futile to attempt to develop a Christian apologetic. And third, British-American idealism championed the Hegelian doctrine that a single all-encompassing system, dubbed the Absolute is the precondition for all rational discourse. On their view, even those philosophers who doubt, deny, or fall short of a vision of the Absolute, can be proven to unwittingly rely upon it. In this way, opposing philosophies are disproven by way of a transcendental⁴ argument to the effect that they presuppose the sort of all-encompassing rational system which they claim to deny. When all three basic convictions are combined and allowed to qualify one another, they form an apologetic that is uniquely consistent with the essence of Reformed theology. The Christian apologist must presuppose the truth of the Reformed theological system solely on the authority of the Triune God. He must reject any positive demonstration that might appeal to illusive neutral premises shared by believers and unbelievers alike. And yet, the apologist may escape the pitfalls of fideism by demonstrating that non-Christians must, in the development and articulation of their views unwittingly presuppose many things (the reliability of his senses, the possibility of predication, etc.) which only the Triune God of Scripture can account for. Hence, the Christian system of truth can be established by way of an indirect proof along the lines developed by absolute idealists.

Given the above-mentioned consensus, a fresh inquiry into the origins and implications of Van Til’s theological-apologetic system may appear superfluous. However, the general accuracy of the established account does not negate the fact that it often overlooks one of the most interesting and complicated features of Van Til’s project. For, in addition to identifying an apologetic method that is worthy of the Christian system of truth, Van Til was equally committed to developing a position that thrived on the distinctive paradoxes of the Christian Faith. Hence, a thorough analysis of Van Til’s appropriation of Princeton, Amsterdam, and absolute idealist philosophy must take into account not only their beliefs about Christian theology and apologetics, but also their distinctive beliefs about paradox. As it stands, even a meager acquaintance with the three schools in view shows that paradox figures quite centrally. As thoroughly orthodox bastions of Reformed theology, Princeton and Amsterdam were zealous to defend theological mysteries such as the Trinity, the Incarnation, the compatibility of divine sovereignty and human responsibility, etc. And if Hegel’s philosophy is commonly known for anything, it is for its highly paradoxical inferences, and mysterious doctrine of the absolute. However, what critics have questioned in their own way is whether any one of these three schools succeeded in developing a coherent combination of system, apologetics, and paradox.

It is the present author’s contention that the genius of Van Til’s project can best be understood as an attempt to overcome the conflict between apologetics, system, and paradox in the three above-mentioned schools by qualifying their chief doctrines with insights taken from the other two. Hence, the argument below is marked by three fivefold investigations of each school’s system of thought, apologetic method, and notion of paradox, as well as Van Til’s positive appropriation, and negative critique of each. Surely the prima facie enigma of Van Til’s positive project is how he could hope to render the ideals of theological system and rational proof consistent with paradoxes that are by definition apparently contradictory, and inconsistent in themselves. Given, however, that Part I must focus on how Van Til took issue in various ways with each school, it contains a greater discussion of his critiques than of his positive insights. In fact, the reader will find a running, and relatively chronological critique of Western philosophy that extends through Van Til’s negative assessment of each school. And yet, statements of Van Til’s positive system are unavoidable since his transcendental critiques of unbelieving and less consistently Christian systems presuppose the Christian system in a more pure form.

Although this anticipatory summary simplifies matters somewhat, the critiques yet to be leveled against each individual school can be divided into two different sorts: those which turn on the school’s own inconsistency; and those which are inspired by the other two camps (see fig. 1). Princeton for example is inconsistent for (1) embracing God’s status as the sovereign governor of history, but denying that he is necessarily the governing premise of healthy reasoning. If they had ingested Amsterdam’s insight that (2) a non-Christian use of logic must undermine Christian paradox, and the absolute idealist demonstration that (3) common sense shrouds the truth, they would have been well on their way to understanding that a sovereign Trinity must also be the presupposition of all rational discourse. Amsterdam on the other hand correctly holds to an antithesis between Christian and non-Christian thought, but (5) inconsistently so. For, it is precisely because Christian thought differs so radically from that of unbelievers that it alone is self-consistent. (Exposition of this sweeping claim must be left for its proper place.⁵) Had they taken seriously Princeton’s critique that (4) fideism is characteristic of non-Christian worldviews, and (6) the absolute idealist insight that an absolute Trinity must function as the self-consistent context and ground of every inconsistent belief system, they would have come very close to the sort of theological-apologetic proposed by Van Til. And finally, the absolute idealist school was (9) inconsistently transcendental in their methodology. Although they were able to effectively expose the self-defeating character of prior systems of philosophy, they really had no self-consistent doctrine of the Absolute which they could set forth as the precondition of intelligibility. Had the absolute idealists begun their labors with (8) an orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, and had they (7) denied that the temporal universe is essential to the self-development of the eternal God, then, in addition to embracing Christian orthodoxy, they would have been ripe to develop an absolutely compelling apologetic.

1. Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic,

596

–

612

; Frame, Van Til,

19

–

37

; Muether, Van Til,

21

–

63

; MacLeod, Amsterdam, Old Princeton, and Cornelius Van Til,

261–82

; McConnel, The Influence of Idealism,

557

–

88

.

2. DF

4

,

345–82

; SCE;

198–99

; IST,

21

–

61

; CG,

14

–

64

.

3. Borrowing a phrase directly from the British idealist. Bernard Bosanquet, Van Til declares that a method of implication is that which a Christian would be naturally bound to use. SCE,

6

–