Soft Corruption: How Unethical Conduct Undermines Good Government and What To Do About It

Soft Corruption

Rivergate Regionals

Rivergate Regionals is a collection of books published by Rutgers University Press focusing on New Jersey and the surrounding area. Since its founding in 1936, Rutgers University Press has been devoted to serving the people of New Jersey and this collection solidifies that tradition. The books in the Rivergate Regionals Collection explore history, politics, nature and the environment, recreation, sports, health and medicine, and the arts. By incorporating the collection within the larger Rutgers University Press editorial program, the Rivergate Regionals Collection enhances our commitment to publishing the best books about our great state and the surrounding region.

Soft Corruption

How Unethical Conduct Undermines Good Government and What to Do About It

William E. Schluter

Rutgers University Press

New Brunswick, Camden, and Newark, New Jersey, and London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Schluter, William E., 1927– author.

Title: Soft corruption : how ethical misconduct undermines good government and what to do about it / William E. Schluter.

Description: New Jersey : Rutgers University Press, 2017. | Series: Rivergate regionals | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2016024606 | ISBN 9780813586175 (hardcover : alk. paper) | ISBN 9780813586182 (e-book (epub)) | ISBN 9780813586199 (e-book (web pdf))

Subjects: LCSH: Political corruption—New Jersey. | Misconduct in office—New Jersey. | Campaign funds—New Jersey. | Conflict of interests—New Jersey. | Patronage, Political—New Jersey. | Political culture—New Jersey. | New Jersy—Politics and government.

Classification: LCC JK3545 .S45 2017 | DDC 320.9749—dc23

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016024606

A British Cataloging-in-Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Copyright © 2017 by William E. Schluter

All rights reserved

No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the publisher. Please contact Rutgers University Press, 106 Somerset Street, New Brunswick, NJ 08901. The only exception to this prohibition is fair use as defined by U.S. copyright law.

www.rutgersuniversitypress.org

I dedicate this book and all that it stands for to Samuel A. Alito Sr. In the minds of most Americans, the name Sam Alito connects with the associate justice of the United States Supreme Court. But the Sam Alito I am honoring was his father, who served for many years in charge of New Jersey’s nonpartisan Office of Legislative Services and whose influence over the legislature from the 1960s until he retired in 1984 was pervasive and profound.

During this time and under his guidance, New Jersey earned the reputation as having one of the most effective and best-run legislatures in the country. In his position, Sam Alito and his staff researched and drafted all legislation for both the state senate and the general assembly. His abilities and expertise on New Jersey government matters made him an indispensable authority on the Trenton scene.

Sam Alito was more than just a straight arrow and solid researcher. He was a mentor, a total professional who would go the extra mile for any legislator who sought his help. He served as secretary on two of the legislative commissions on which I was appointed: Election Law Revision and County and Municipal Government. The Election Law Revision Commission, guided by its members and Mr. Alito, produced a landmark report in 1975 exposing the way that candidates and political parties were financed in New Jersey as well as how the electoral process was not always managed fairly.

This report and the work of the Commission inspired me to take up the banner of reform, which has been the backbone of my political career ever since. Sam Alito was a major influence, instilling in me the importance of justice, fairness, and integrity in the role of government service.

Contents

Preface

Acknowledgments

Chapter 1. Soft Corruption—The Problem

Chapter 2. Campaign Financing: How It Works

Chapter 3. Campaign Financing: The New Jersey Version

Chapter 4. Lobbying

Chapter 5. Conflict of Interest

Chapter 6. Patronage: Jobs, Contracts, Perks

Chapter 7. The Electoral Process

Chapter 8. Agenda for Reform

Chapter 9. How to Achieve Reform

Notes

Index

About the Author

Preface

Twenty years in the New Jersey legislature, and many more years of activity in local, county, and state politics, gave me a thorough understanding of how government in New Jersey works. And the picture has not been pretty.

This is not to say that all officials are miscreants and that all government activity is shady. Indeed, many go into public office for the right reasons: to serve fellow citizens faithfully, honestly, and efficiently; to try to make life better for everyone; and to carry out the American dream of government of the people, by the people, and for the people. Through the efforts of these well-intentioned officials, government has been able to implement policies to protect precious natural resources, help small businesses to create jobs, support home ownership, expand higher education opportunities, promote public health and safety, and advance other programs for the public good.

But there are lawmakers and public servants who are not so inspired, who spoil it for the rest by gaming the system to reap personal benefits and power. These are the public officials who engage in unethical conduct, activities that break no laws but fail to meet acceptable standards of morality. This is soft corruption.

The history of government is filled with accounts of the corrupting influence of political power. In the words of James Madison, The essence of government is power, and power, lodged as it must be in human hands, will ever be liable to abuse. Events in New Jersey have shown that not all government and political leaders are motivated by altruism and integrity. Rather, many succumb to accommodation, expediency, and then, subterfuge.

The various stories and episodes in this book have been taken from the public record going back fifty years. The ones that draw on my own experiences are limited to those that have special significance in explaining a certain event or activity, and will be so noted.

My commitment to government reform evolved over the years. It started in 1965 when I was picked as the Republican sacrificial lamb to run for state senate against a popular Democratic incumbent whose party dominated the district. I ran a bare-bones campaign, sharply criticizing my opponent who, as a lawyer/legislator, engaged in conflicts of interest (legal at the time) by representing private clients before state agencies. Although I was defeated by more than 22,000 votes, I did earn the endorsement of the Times of Trenton for my efforts at reform.

Later as a legislator, I was appointed to the Election Law Revision Commission, where my eyes were opened to two stark realities: the campaign contribution is a major force in determining government decisions, and the process of selecting candidates to make these decisions is too often manipulated in secret by backroom power brokers. These conclusions were borne out by the words of John Gardner, founder of Common Cause, who said in 1975: The two chief obstacles to responsive government are money and secrecy: the scandalous capacity of money to buy political outcomes, and the bad habit of doing the public’s business behind closed doors.

Despite recommendations made by the Election Law Revision Commission in its 1975 report, and by numerous good government groups over the years, almost no serious measures for reform have been adopted into law. Yes, there have been some minor changes, nibbling around the edges but leaving plenty of loopholes. The New Jersey legislature seems intent on maintaining the status quo so that the system will continue to produce for the benefit of those who manage it.

It was not long before I became seriously committed to all aspects of reform, focusing my attention on the many failings and shortcomings in government. The more blatant issues that cry out for reform as described in detail in this book include: senatorial courtesy, dual office-holding, influence peddling by lobbyists, patronage abuses, partisan redistricting, wheeling of campaign funds, and, above all, concentration of power by those who control political money. Taking a pro-reform position on these issues did not endear me to many of the leaders of my party or of the legislature. Although I was able to pass a significant campaign finance disclosure bill in my early years in office, other efforts at reform were not as successful. In fact, many of these efforts were not only rejected, but led to reprisals.

My career in the senate was done in by Republican members of the 2001 Apportionment Commission who, as reported in the press, were complicit in permitting my hometown to be switched from a safe Republican district to a heavily Democratic one that included the city of Trenton. Unwilling to withdraw completely from the political scene, I entered the race for governor in 2001 as an independent. This move gave me a platform to continue the campaign for reform—but I received only 1 percent of the popular vote.

Later, my service as chair of the Citizens Clean Election Commission and as a member of the State Ethics Commission continued to whet my appetite in the fight against unethical conduct. But even with all the bad government behavior taking place in New Jersey there was no public clamor for reform. The people seemed to consider ethical failings by public officials business as usual, and were convinced there was no prospect for change.

Something has to be done. I decided to continue my efforts to expose soft corruption by writing this book. My hope is that these stories will help raise the level of public outrage to the point where we see a genuine citizens’ uprising that forces change.

Given the present depth of public lethargy, this will be a difficult task. But our American values demand that we reverse the defects associated with soft corruption before they create further dysfunction and disarray in what should be a representative democracy.

Acknowledgments

I wish to acknowledge the help of numerous friends, family members, associates, and professionals who gave of their time and talents in the production of this book. The finished product would never have emerged in its present form without their assistance.

Although it is difficult—and perhaps unwise—to give greater credit to some contributors over others, I will single out one individual whose support and guidance have been absolutely essential: Richard L. McCormick, president emeritus of Rutgers University. Dick McCormick became interested in the book’s mission early when he learned that the subject matter was about New Jersey’s addiction to government corruption. This topic is a familiar one for McCormick, whose specialization in scholarly research and writing has been political corruption in this country as well as national reform initiatives. Dick McCormick spent countless hours reviewing and critiquing the manuscript drafts of this book. His wisdom and suggestions on this entire issue area have been invaluable, and I am eternally grateful to him.

Other individuals who have served as readers, consultants, and advisors include: George Amick, Jeff Brindle, Joe Donohue, Matt Friedman, Susan Henkel, Fred Herrmann, Judy Jengo, Kyle Keiderling, Peter Mazzei, Leslie Pell, Mary Pinney, Ingrid Reed, Bill Schluter Jr., Nan Thurston, and Andrew Tirpok.

Special recognition should go to Ross Holley, whose research and computer skills added much to the quality of the material in the book and to efficiencies in authoring it.

Of course the patience and understanding of my wife, Nancy Schluter, was crucial in providing the supportive environment so necessary for me to keep a clear focus and to persevere through the many frustrations that an author experiences.

The professional editing supplied in the early stages by Matt Reilly, Polly Kummel, and Diana Groden is respectfully acknowledged. Since January 2015 I have benefited from the editing services of Michael Meagher, whose knowledge of New Jersey government and editorial craftsmanship have strengthened the tenor and quality of the writing in this book.

Finally, my literary agent, Marie Galastro, has been an effective ally in guiding me through the maze of manuscript publication.

1

Soft Corruption—The Problem

A wealthy sculptor with family problems makes generous campaign contributions in the hope of influencing legislators to enact a law that will help him stop his daughter from receiving a share of the family inheritance. He nearly succeeds. A state legislator dips into his publicly funded office budget to pay the assistant editor of his district’s largest newspaper $2,000 for unspecified general services. The speaker of the state assembly invites lobbyists to contribute $1,500 to her reelection campaign in exchange for the opportunity to talk with her about your concerns and those of your clients. Employing an unwritten but tradition-honored practice, a senator single-handedly blocks the governor’s highly qualified nominee for commissioner of education from even coming up for a confirmation vote. A longtime legislator, defeated on Election Day, is handed a position at the state’s parole board, at more than double his legislative salary. He leaves the job a year later, as soon as the resulting 78 percent bump to his state pension takes effect. His response to critics: If anybody don’t like it, that’s too bad. Let them go spend thirty-three years in office.

Welcome to New Jersey, home of sandy beaches, bucolic small towns, entertainment legends, high-technology industries . . . and an unfortunate history of government corruption.

Most people associate government corruption with the spectacle of an elected official paraded before news cameras and reporters after being arrested or indicted in connection with crimes committed in public office. We shake our heads, utter a disparaging comment, and then just change the channel or turn the page, resigned to the notion that this is the way things are. A politician breaking the law has become so commonplace that it’s hardly news. Who cares? It happens all the time.

And certainly it happens far too often. Every November, we go to the polls and choose the people who will represent us in government. Later, we watch as they place their left hand on a Bible, raise their right hand, and swear to faithfully uphold the laws of the state. Then time passes, and some of those same hands wind up handcuffed together under a trench coat as the offender is led off to a jail cell.

In recent decades, New Jersey has earned a reputation for criminal corruption at all levels of government—the result of numerous cases that have been exposed and prosecuted.¹ But the political culture associated with such malfeasance also breeds another level of wrongdoing that should offend us all as members of a participatory democracy. It occurs when the people who hold public office figure out how to game the system in ways that enrich them and their cronies without breaking any laws. This is soft corruption: unethical transgressions carried out in the quest for political power or personal benefit, achieving results that work against the public interest; and it’s all legal. Most writers about corruption generally define it as political behavior that violates the norms of public office for private, selfish reasons.² That definition is fine, except that such behavior can be perfectly legal.

Soft corruption is much more pervasive in public office than most people realize. Consider just a handful of examples, which will be covered in greater detail later in this book:

• In 1989, four legislators who would soon occupy their party’s top-ranking seats in the assembly invited twenty high-powered lobbyists to a meeting, ostensibly to solicit their ideas regarding the upcoming election campaign. The real purpose: to shake them down for major campaign contributions from their clients. Those who failed to comply could lose any chance of having legislation favorable to their clients see the light of day.

• In 2011, the capable, respected executive director of the state commission charged with investigating violations of the conflict-of-interest law was pressured to resign, so that the governor’s office could replace her with someone of its own choosing.

• County clerks are responsible for deciding by lot which party’s candidates will be listed on the preferred first line of the general election ballot. By remarkable luck—or something more—the Republican county clerk in Hunterdon selected the GOP for Column A every year from 1999 to 2009. In heavily Democratic Essex County, the Democratic clerk drew his party for the first column thirteen times in a fourteen-year stretch—a streak broken only in the year that the county party was feuding with the Democratic governor.

• In 2002, the prominent head of a Newark congregation was appointed as state commerce secretary while retaining his pastorate. It was an unusual arrangement that would soon become untenable. At the same time that the church’s community development program, which he controlled, was actively seeking funding from nearby Jersey City for a housing development with the pastor directly lobbying council members, Jersey City was applying for grants from a state authority chaired by the very same man. Jersey City received funding from the state, and the project proposed by the pastor’s church got its approval and financing from Jersey City.

• In the city of Elizabeth, the school board acts as a political machine. Its nine members have accounted for the appointment of twenty relatives to jobs on the district payroll, and the board has leaned on teachers to purchase tickets to political fund-raisers—soliciting right on school property.

• When the police director of New Brunswick retired in 2010, he received more than $375,000 in unused vacation and sick time, along with a $115,000 annual pension from the police and firemen’s pension fund. Six months later, he took advantage of a provision of the fund and applied to be rehired. He soon was earning an annual salary of $120,000—while still collecting his $115,000 yearly pension for the exact same position.³

Soft corruption is found in the exploitation of such political and governmental activities as campaign finance, lobbying, patronage, and the electoral process, as well as potential conflicts of interest where a public official acts on government matters that provide personal rewards. Engaging in these processes is not, per se, engaging in soft corruption. They are necessary functions of government that can be performed honestly, fairly, and with integrity. Money has to be raised for political campaigns and can be done honorably; lobbying to represent and express the concerns of interest groups is a normal and desirable phenomenon in our system of self-government; patronage can involve filling government jobs with individuals who are fully qualified; the electoral process can be used to select competent candidates for public office in an open, fair, and transparent manner; and a lawmaker can decline to participate when confronted with a matter that may affect his or her private interest.

It is only when individuals manipulate government functions for reasons of greed, personal advancement, or political advantage that soft corruption occurs. When legislative leaders seek large campaign contributions from special interests that have a stake in pending legislative proposals with an unspoken quid pro quo, that’s soft corruption. When lobbyists conduct fund-raising events for legislative candidates, that’s soft corruption, too. Such practices, all of which pass legal muster, are unethical and work against the public interest. And no one should dismiss them by saying, That’s politics.

These examples of soft corruption are part of a political culture in which certain people behave as if the system exists to facilitate their personal gain, not to do the greatest good for the community. Soft corruption leads to the dysfunction we see today at the national and state levels of government, contributing to the public’s lack of confidence in how we the people are represented. Lawmakers who are part of this culture subvert the quality of public policy, thus adversely affecting traditional government responsibilities such as education, health care, transportation, and social services every time they make a decision for reasons other than an honest assessment of the public policy at stake.

A good explanation of the difference between soft and criminal corruption comes from George Washington Plunkitt, a leader of the Tammany Hall political machine of New York City more than one hundred years ago. Plunkitt made a distinction between dishonest graft and honest graft. The former is bribery, extortion, or other criminal acts used by a government official to gain an advantage or benefit. The latter occurs when the official uses inside information or the power of office to gain a personal benefit. To Plunkitt’s way of thinking, only a fool would engage in dishonest graft when there is plenty of honest graft—soft corruption—to go around.⁴ More recently, former New Jersey governor Brendan Byrne captured the distinction this way: If somebody wants a permit from a local government, and he goes to the mayor and gives him $10,000 cash in an envelope, he’s guilty of a crime. If he . . . handles it right and . . . makes a campaign contribution to the mayor’s campaign, which is perfectly legal, it gets him exactly the same result.⁵

The struggle against both forms of corruption has been a theme running through many periods of American history. One such period was in the late nineteenth century, when the railroads, utilities, and other corporate giants were able to tell many state legislatures how to vote on such matters as taxes, business charters, and the selection of U.S. senators (who were chosen by the legislatures back then). These commercial enterprises understood the power of states over corporations’ economic well-being and used their money to buy the support of state legislators and political bosses. Such blatant abuses were challenged by President Theodore Roosevelt’s trust-busting reforms—aided by the muckraking journalism of Lincoln Steffens, Ida Tarbell, and others—and to the Progressive movement at the beginning of the twentieth century. A leader of the Progressives, Robert M. La Follette of Wisconsin, realized that government corruption was facilitated by the ability of moneyed interests to put their people into elective office. At the time, candidates for government office were chosen by the bosses and then stood for election. La Follette championed the direct primary to emancipate the legislature from all subserviency to the corporations, reasoning that this reform would fumigate special interests from the internal workings of the political parties. Through La Follette’s efforts, Wisconsin approved the direct primary in 1904,⁶ and by 1915 all but three states had adopted this reform.⁷

More recently, in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal, public pressure, good-government groups like Common Cause (founded in 1970), and aggressive reporters who exposed unsavory practices prompted state and federal lawmakers to pass reforms designed to bring a higher level of ethics and integrity to government.⁸ Added stimulus came from advances in electronic data processing, which provided greater transparency in government and made concealing unethical deeds more difficult. Until that point, New Jersey law contained virtually no restrictions on campaign financing or on lobbying. Public officials did not have to make financial disclosures that would reveal conflicts between their public duties and their private business interests. And manipulating the primary ballot structure in the selection of candidates for office was standard operating procedure among political pros. After Watergate, New Jersey enacted laws regulating campaign financing and lobbying, and the conduct of public officials became subject to conflict-of-interest regulations. By the early 2000s, the state had guaranteed open public records and meetings and had partially curtailed pay-to-play practices that granted access only to those who contributed to political campaign coffers.

But ever-resourceful politicians and public officials have been able to carve out exceptions and loopholes in these reforms. Moreover, New Jersey has done little to ban dual office-holding, correct patronage excesses, and tackle the reasons for the lack of competition among those seeking elective office.

The most significant temptation to engage in soft corruption has been the increasing amount of money now on the political scene. The need to amass enormous campaign war chests places inordinate emphasis on fund-raising and, through it, creates opportunities for major donors to influence policy outcomes and obtain government benefits.

The most dramatic event associated with raising enormous amounts of campaign money was the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Citizens United on January 21, 2010. This decision removes any restrictions on political spending by corporations and unions, so long as the expenditures are made independently. In other words, corporations and unions are now treated the same as individuals and can give unlimited sums on behalf of or in opposition to an identified candidate or issue, providing these expenditures are not coordinated with a specific campaign. State and federal laws still impose restrictions on direct contributions to candidates and parties, such as limiting the amount, disclosing the donor, prohibiting corporate and union giving, and regulating pay to play.

Since Citizens United, special interests have poured vast amounts of money into election campaigns, primarily for federal office but increasingly on the state and local level as well. Clearly, results in these elections will mean that the political agendas of the winners will comport more with the interests of the corporate, union, and fat-cat donors than with the interests of Jane Q. Public. To the extent that Citizens United distorts our principles of representative democracy, this decision is an enabler of soft corruption.

Meanwhile, the volume of direct campaign contributions has also escalated. And these, when made in the context of the unspoken quid pro quo, are the more sinister examples of soft corruption. Laws requiring disclosure of the identities of the donors and recipients of campaign contributions have made it easy to see correlations between the interests providing the money and specific government actions. Examples of donors and the rewards they receive include law firms appointed as counsel to government bodies with high-value retainers, businesses that receive narrowly targeted tax breaks through legislation, labor unions that obtain sweetheart contracts, and developers who receive unwarranted permit approvals. Such arrangements lead cynics to say that the offer of a campaign contribution is a legal bribe, and the solicitation of a contribution is legal extortion. Pretty harsh words, but they all add up to soft corruption.

Countless thousands of public officials—unquestionably a substantial majority—are honorable and do not participate in soft corruption. Likewise, many direct campaign contributions are given to support a candidate or political party whose public policy objectives already match those of the donor and are not meant to influence a specific government outcome. The distinction must be made. Not all contributions are suspect. But contributions that do not pass the smell test—that lead to direct benefits to the donors through government actions that otherwise would not have been taken—are soft corruption at its worst.

In this book, I examine soft corruption in five areas of political and governmental activity: campaign financing, lobbying, conflicts of interest, patronage, and the electoral process. In order to get the sense of how soft corruption creeps into the functions of all levels of government in New Jersey, it is absolutely necessary to understand thoroughly how government operates in the state. Accordingly, I take great pains in the following chapters to explain the procedures and practices of political government activity in sufficient—and sometimes simplistic—detail for the reader to understand how the culture of ethical transgressions permeates the state, and why this problem has become so intractable.

1. Without question, campaign financing is the most dominant and all-encompassing of the five forms of soft corruption. It includes the process by which money is raised from donors and the ways in which that money is spent. It pertains to the funding of a particular campaign but also the formation of a political action committee, the spending by a political party, the transfer of dollars from one war chest to another, the funds spent to influence voters to vote yes or no on a public question, and much more. The other four areas of soft corruption all have a component of political money, thereby connecting them directly and indirectly to the campaign contribution.

2. Lobbying is advocacy to influence government decisions. Over the years, lobbying has become institutionalized, and today its practitioners are paid handsomely to achieve results for their clients.

Virtually all states regulate lobbyists by requiring them to register, identify their clients, and disclose how they spend their money. In many states, the law limits campaign contributions made by lobbyists. These regulations add to the transparency of the system and help to prevent outright buying of government decisions, but they do little to diminish the power of lobbyists over public officials. This power comes in two forms: the campaign money they raise and deliver to lawmakers whose support they are soliciting, and the electoral assistance from the lobbyist’s clients such as labor unions, business associations, developers, gun owners, farmers, and others. When lawmakers do the bidding of lobbyists against the best interests of their constituents and the general public, they are engaging in soft corruption.

As with campaign financing, not all lobbying is soft corruption. Active lobbying is undertaken in the public interest to protect the environment, enhance consumer protection, and advance good government. In fact, not all lobbying paid for by commercial interests solely benefits those interests. There can also be good outcomes from these lobbying efforts, such as the 2012 bond act for higher education capital construction, supported by New Jersey’s business and commerce associations.

3. Conflict of interest occurs when a public official is faced with taking action on a government matter that affects, or could affect, the personal and business interests of the official, members of the official’s family, or business associates. As a result, most states now have laws requiring elected and appointed officials to disclose their personal finances and have promulgated codes of ethics to prohibit specific practices that constitute conflicts of interest. Full and total disclosure is key to ending corruption in government. In the words of former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis: Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants. Alert reporters who reveal information on personal financial disclosure forms and campaign contribution records often help to expose ethics violations.

One important aspect in preventing and addressing conflicts of interest is the enforcement process. Too often members of ethics enforcement commissions are political appointees who are not enthusiastic advocates for strict enforcement. As a result, those agencies gloss over situations rife with conflict of interest and allow them to continue.

4. Patronage in its broader sense is more than government jobs. It also covers the perks, benefits, and favors doled out by government, including purchasing goods, hiring personnel, funding programs, granting pension benefits, and such lesser practices as the use of government cars. Patronage becomes soft corruption when officials award government jobs without competition to unqualified people or dispense benefits as political payoffs.

5. The electoral process is critically important in determining the quality and effectiveness of who governs. Obviously, campaign money is a major factor in deciding which side wins an election. But campaign money might be crucial in only a small percentage of New Jersey’s legislative districts. In the vast majority of elections there is little competition, because one party is dominant in so many districts. Races for seats in the New Jersey statehouse see little competition because of the strong political party influence over the redistricting process, which allows those who control the process to tilt the distribution of partisan voters to the advantage of their party.

Primary elections are crucial starting points for candidates to advance to elective office. But when strong party bosses control the selection of candidates, real competition is snuffed out. Many candidates who emerge from this process as elected officials owe their loyalty to the political machine and have little interest in taking independent or controversial stances that might be of greater benefit to their constituents. Manipulation of the candidate selection process by party insiders is a blatant example of soft corruption.

Among the many consequences of soft corruption, three are particularly troubling for states like New Jersey: higher-cost government, bad governmental decisions, and an apathetic public.

Soft Corruption Means Higher-Cost Government

Soft corruption practices in campaign finance, lobbying, conflict of interest, patronage, and electoral manipulation are interrelated; the political pros mix and match strategies in each of these areas to maximize their power and achieve their governmental objectives. And all of these practices contribute to higher-cost government.

Those who do business with government factor campaign contributions and lobbying expenses into the cost of services and products they provide and for which government pays. Despite enactment of pay-to-play measures that attempt to negate the quid pro quo connection between government contract awards and campaign contributions, resourceful vendors circumvent these laws. They donate directly to candidates and to PACs, which are exempt from pay-to-play regulation. And pay-to-play laws do not apply to contracting by most county and local government agencies.

Genuine competition in awarding vendor and professional service