The Roots of Evil

Preface

Evil is a permanent threat to human well-being. In religious, ideological, racial, and ethnic conflicts, in unjust wars, terrorist attacks, violent crime, and the drug trade innocent people are murdered, tortured, and mutilated. All over the world cruelty, greed, prejudice, and fanaticism ruin the lives of countless victims. Outrage provokes outrage. Millions nurture seething hatred of real or imagined enemies. Forces of barbarism continually break through the superficial layer of order and threaten the security of a substantial segment of humanity. The aim of this book is to explain why people act in these ways.

As I understand it, evil is a moral problem, perhaps the most basic and most serious moral problem. I know, of course, that evil is also a political and a theological problem, but I think that its moral aspect is deeper. For evil is an attack on the fundamental conditions of human well-being, conditions that must be met before we can carry on our usual, messy political activities and theological speculations. Furthermore, evil has to be discussed in concrete terms rather than in bloodless abstractions. We have to have before us actual cases of evil about which we can agree even if we disagree about political and religious matters.

The threat of evil was forcibly driven home to Americans by the 9/11 attack. Understanding its causes and finding the appropriate response to it became urgent. I very much regret to have to say that neither the understanding we have so far reached nor the response we have made is adequate. This is not surprising since perfectly justified outrage, insecurity, and sympathy for the victims and their families have stood in the way of arriving at a dispassionate and reliable judgment. Forming such a judgment requires stepping back from the events and viewing them from a calmer perspective.

We must recognize that this recent episode of the mass murder of innocents is not an unprecedented event but part of a historical pattern. The acts that make up this pattern are evil, not just bad, because they threaten the very conditions of civilized life. They are not trivial transgressions in which one person harms another, but acts that reveal a savage, destructive, life-denying tendency in their perpetrators. Acts expressing this tendency must be opposed, but that can be done successfully only if we understand their causes. And that is what must be done if we are to protect civilized life and cope with evil.

Evil acts are done by human beings, and it is within them that their causes must be sought. Social conditions can encourage or discourage evil acts, but they cannot be sufficient to explain them. Only some of those who live under the same social conditions become evildoers, and the same evil acts are done under very different social conditions. Attributing evil to injustice, poverty, or a noxious ideology is thus to misunderstand it. For the deeper and prior question is why these adverse social conditions exist. And the answer must be that they exist because of the evil tendencies of those who create and maintain them. It is evil that explains adverse social conditions rather than the other way around.

If the roots of evil are psychological, not social, then changing social conditions cannot do more than close off a particular expression of evil. Unless the psychological causes are themselves changed, other ways of expressing evil will undoubtedly be found, since its particular expressions are incidental to the underlying motivation. The improvement of social conditions, of course, may make life better, but if the psychological causes remain unaffected, the improvement can be only temporary.

It is hard to accept that the causes of evil are in us, not outside us, that in doing evil we express a deep part of our nature. Accepting this is hard because it painfully destroys our optimistic expectations, illusions, and hopes. It will, for this reason, be resisted. In my view, it is nevertheless vitally important to leave optimism about evil behind no matter how painful that may be. The resistance to doing so is the resistance of naiveté to realism. In times more fortunate than ours, there may be no need to drive home the shattering lessons of history. But here and now there is such a need because evil is prevalent in contemporary life and we cannot successfully cope with the very serious threat it presents unless we are realistic. My hope is that what follows is a realistic view.

This is my second book on evil. The first was Facing Evil(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). During the fifteen-odd years between then and now I have not been able to stop thinking about evil. The state of the world and my reflections on its past, present, and future made that impossible. I continue to hold the views I argued for in the first book, but I have become dissatisfied with the reasons I gave in support of them. I have come to realize that my understanding of evil needed revision; whether it can be reasonable to do evil had to be discussed in much greater depth; and most important, it was necessary to do what I have not done, namely, try to explain why people become evildoers. I have come to realize also that making these improvements requires a new way of approaching the old topic. The present book is the result. Although it is completely independent of Facing Evil, I hope it strengthens the reasons for my old views.

I have selected six concrete cases of undeniable and horrendous evil for detailed discussion. My selection was based on three criteria. First, the relevant facts had to be readily available and undisputed. Second, the facts had to be recognized by reasonable people of all moral, religious, or political views as constituting uncontroversial examples of evil. Third, there had to be a reliable record of how the evildoers themselves regarded the relevant facts and what reason they gave for their evil actions. The cases that meet these criteria cannot be contemporary because the immediacy of contemporary events makes the facts and their evaluation a systematically contested partisan issue and because reliable records of the thoughts and reasons of the evildoers are not available. It is good to have some distance between us and the cases themselves so that our judgment will not be clouded by more passion than is unavoidable.

Some passion, however, there is bound to be because, by their very nature, these cases are filled with blood and gore. I make no apology for beginning with them. I want to explain, however, that the reason for doing so is not sensationalism but the need to hold vividly in our minds what we are talking about when we are talking about evil.

The book is written for literate people who are worried about the prevalence of evil and realize that understanding its sources is necessary for coping with it. I write as a philosopher, but not as a technical one. I regret that the subject has become an involuted academic specialty in which experts discuss arcane questions in jargon-ridden language accessi-ble only to other experts. Philosophers ought to have something significant and generally understandable to say about perennial questions facing humanity, and that is what I try to do here about the moral problem of evil.

My approach to these questions is currently unfashionable and not held in high esteem by many philosophers. I am especially indebted, therefore, to Roger Haydon, my editor at Cornell University Press, for his willingness to keep publishing my work. I am grateful for his sympathy and open-mindedness, as well as for the shining example of fairness and conscientiousness he sets.

In chapter 14 I use a few slightly revised paragraphs from my book The Illusions of Egalitarianism(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), chapter 5.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: The Problem and the Approach

Evil facts…are a genuine portion of reality; and they may after all be the best key to life’s significance and possibly the only openers of our eyes to the deepest levels of truth.

—WILLIAM JAMES, Varieties of Religious Experience

1.1 What Is Evil?

Evil has an ominous connotation that goes beyond badness. It is perhaps the most severe succinct condemnation our moral vocabulary affords, so it should not be used casually and the conditions of its justified ascription should be made clear. Evil involves serious harm that causes fatal or lasting physical injury, as do, for instance, murder, torture, and mutilation. Serious harm need not be physical. But since judging the seriousness of nonphysical harm, such as loss of honor, happiness, or love, involves complex questions, I shall concentrate on simple cases of physical harm whose seriousness is as obvious as it is of losing life, limb, or eye-sight, or suffering prolonged excruciating pain. Serious harm may be caused by natural disasters, animals, or viruses; and human beings may cause serious harm to the fauna or the flora. Nevertheless, evil has primarily to do with serious harm caused by human beings to other human beings. This may be excusable on moral grounds as self-defense, deserved punishment, necessary for averting worse harm, or as resulting from nonculpable ignorance, unavoidable accident, or unforeseeable contingencies. Part of what makes human actions evil, then, is that they cause serious harm and lack excuse.

The harm involved in evil actions is not just serious but also excessive. This is part of the reason why such actions are worse than morally bad. To rob someone at gunpoint is morally bad, but after having gotten the money, to torture, mutilate, and then murder the victim is evil. Evildoers cause more serious harm than is needed for achieving their ends. They are not just unscrupulous in their choice of means, but motivated by malevolence to gratuitous excesses. They treat their victims with ill will, rage, or hatred. This may be shown by the sheer quantity of the harm they do, as in the murder of thousands of innocent victims, or by the quality of their actions, such as torturing children. Evil actions go beyond breaking some ordinary moral rule; they show contempt for and flaunt fundamental moral prohibitions.

The evil of an action, therefore, consists in the combination of three components: the malevolent motivation of evildoers; the serious, excessive harm caused by their actions; and the lack of morally acceptable excuse for the actions.¹ Each of these components is necessary, and they are jointly sufficient for condemning an action as evil. An action may cause serious, excessive harm and not be evil if, for instance, it is accidental, coerced, or morally justified. Nor is malevolent motivation enough to make an action evil because as a result of unexpected circumstances—the bomb failed to explode, the gun misfired—the action may fail to cause any harm. Furthermore, an action prompted by malevolent motivation and causing serious, excessive harm may still not be evil if it is morally excusable by being, for example, justified punishment or necessary for avoiding even greater harm. The justified ascription of evil to an action requires, therefore, motive, consequence, and lack of excuse.

Each of these components allows for degrees: malevolent motives may range from short-term blind rage to a lifelong hatred of humanity; serious, excessive harm may involve the torture and murder of one innocent victim or doing the same to thousands; and a morally inexcusable action may fall anywhere on a continuum from culpable ignorance or weakness to deliberately and knowingly doing evil for its own sake. The justified ascription of evil to actions, therefore, allows for a distinction between levels of evil. People can be said to be evildoers if they habitually perform evil actions, and they can be greater or lesser evildoers depending on the level of evil they do. And institutions, societies, and other collectives are evil derivatively twice over if they lead their participants to cause various degrees of evil.

Evil actions violate their victims’ physical security and thus transgress fundamental moral prohibitions that protect minimum conditions of human well-being. One essential task of morality is to safeguard these conditions. Evildoers or their defenders sometimes attempt to excuse evil actions by appealing to religious, political, aesthetic, scientific, or prudential considerations. Such excuses are morally unacceptable because the malevolent motivation and the excessive harm of evil actions go far beyond what is needed to pursue any reasonable nonmoral aim. Fundamental moral prohibitions are nevertheless routinely violated by evildoers. The reason for condemning such people and actions as evil, then, is the moral commitment to human well-being. It is a lamentable fact of life that undeniable cases of evil abound. Those in doubt have only to watch the news or read the newspapers or consult the books that catalog some of the atrocities of the past century.² Nor is it deniable that most of this evil is caused by human beings. The problem is to explain why they cause it.

1.2 Approaches to Explanation

There is no shortage of attempts to provide an explanation. My reason for adding to their number is that the most influential previous ones—those inspired by the religious and the Enlightenment world views—try to explain evil by explaining it away. They deny what the epigraph rightly asserts, namely, that evil facts…are a genuine portion of reality. Both begin with a world view and then try to fit evil into it. But evil does not fit, and that is why they try to explain it away. A detailed discussion of these explanations and their shortcomings will follow, but a brief indication of what they are is needed here to contrast my approach with theirs.

A dominant tendency in the religious world view is to assume that a morally good order permeates the scheme of things and human lives go well to the extent to which they conform to it. The problem of evil, then, becomes the problem of explaining the failure to conform. There are various religious explanations, but most of them assume that the failure results from the misuse of the evildoers’ reason or will. Evil is thus seen as a defect in evildoers rather than in the scheme of things. This explanation faces two difficulties its defenders have not succeeded in overcoming despite many centuries of trying. One is to justify the belief that although experience and history provide abundant contrary evidence, there is a morally good order in the scheme of things. The other is that since human beings are part of the scheme of things, any defect in evildoers is a defect in the scheme of things. The very existence of evil thus constitutes a reason against believing in a morally good order.

A central thread in the Enlightenment world view is the belief that human beings are basically good and their well-being depends on living according to reason. The more reasonable lives are, the better they are supposed to become. The problem of evil is thus the problem of explaining our failure to be more reasonable when it is in our interest to be so. The explanation is that external influences, usually in the form of bad political arrangements, corrupt our basic goodness. Evil is thus explained as the result of interference with our basic goodness. But what reason is there for supposing that human beings are basically good? There obviously are many bad human propensities, and they often overwhelm the good ones. Why suppose that good ones are basic and bad ones are not? Furthermore, if the corruption of our supposed basic goodness is the result of bad political arrangements, it needs to be explained how these arrangements become bad. They are made and maintained by human beings. If they are bad, it is because those who make and maintain them are bad. The ubiquity of bad political arrangements is thus a reason for doubting basic human goodness, not an explanation of evil.

These two approaches differ in many ways, but they share the assumption that the good is basic and evil is derivative because it is some kind of interference with the good. The explanation they seek, therefore, is of the nature and cause of the interference. In my view, this is to seek the explanation of evil in the wrong place because the assumption underlying the search is mistaken. I shall argue that there is no convincing reason for supposing that the good is basic and evil is derivative and there is no more reason to think that evil is interference with the good than that good is interference with evil.

1.3 Toward an Adequate Explanation

A first approximation of the explanation I shall defend emerges against the background of another questionable assumption on which previous explanations rest. Most of the explanations given in the framework of the religious or the Enlightenment world view assume that evil has a single cause. Evil, however, has many causes: various human propensities; outside influences on their development; and a multiplicity of circumstances in which we live and to which we must respond. Because these causes vary with person, time, and place, an attempt to find the cause of evil is doomed. There is no explanation that fits all or even most cases of evil. Weakness of will, ignorance of the good, defective reasoning, human destructiveness, bad political arrangements, excessive self-love, immoderate pleasure-seeking, revenge, greed, boredom, enjoyment, perversity, provocation, stupidity, fear, callousness, indoctrination, self-deception, negligence, and so forth may all explain some cases of evil. None, however, explains all or even most cases. This is not because the right explanation has not been found, but because the search for it is misguided.

Some who have given serious thought to evil have concluded from the failure of single explanations that evil is ultimately incomprehensible. Kant was neither the first nor the last in believing that the rational origin of…the propensity to evil remains inscrutable to us.³ This leads to the desperate measure of abandoning the attempt to cope with evil. For if evil is inscrutable, then we are helpless in trying to prevent it. The realization that evil has many causes, however, will lead one to expect the failure of attempts to find its single cause and to seek a better explanation rather than pronounce it a mystery. The best argument against the incomprehensibility of evil is to provide the supposedly impossible explanation. And that is what I shall attempt to do.

This explanation does not share the assumption of the religious world view that a morally good order permeates the scheme of things. The alternative is not that the order is bad, but that there is no moral order in the scheme of things; there are only impersonal, unmotivated, purposeless, natural processes. If the scheme of things were to have a point of view, then from that point of view human well-being would not matter at all. Not because something else would matter more, but because nothing would matter. Things can matter only to fairly complex sentient beings, and the scheme of things is an abstract idea, not a sentient being. Human well-being certainly matters to us. That, however, should not lead to the age-old religious mistake of projecting human concerns onto the scheme of things. Good and evil are human values, human ways of judging whether our well-being is favorably or unfavorably affected. From the human point of view, natural processes, including our own actions, may be good, evil, mixed, or indifferent. Our judgments about whether they are one or the other can be objectively true or false because we can be right or wrong about how some natural process affects our well-being. But the effects we find good or bad are equally natural, and neither is more basic than the other.

The alternative to the religious view, then, is that the scheme of things is the context in which human life must be lived, but that scheme is nonmoral. It is, therefore, unreasonable to have any moral attitude toward or moral expectation from it. It is not for or against human well-being because it is incapable of being for or against anything. Natural processes, of course, affect human well-being, but that is a consequence of the intersection of undirected causal chains, not of design. Human life, unlike the scheme of things, is value-laden. It is the repository of possibilities and limits with which we all start out and which have important effects on our well-being. But their effects, although important, are not decisive because there is a gap between what we must and can do. We cannot transgress our limits, yet we can often decide which among several possibilities we should try to realize. There are many ways of making such decisions, and reason is one of them.

The assumption of the Enlightenment world view is that human beings are basically good and if we use reason to make such decisions, we shall decide in favor of possibilities that contribute to human well-being. This is not so much wrong as superficial and half-true. It fails to recognize that we also have other propensities, such as aggression, fear, envy, and ambition. They are no less basic than reason, and they often prompt evil actions. The explanation I favor, unlike the Enlightenment one, recognizes that acting in accordance with our propensities may lead to either good or evil, so it rejects the view that human beings are basically good.

A dominant tendency in the Enlightenment world view is to explain evil as a failure of reason. This assumes that reason requires us to pursue our well-being and prohibits evil actions because they are detrimental to it. Evildoers are supposed to fail to see this as a result of some external interference with the development or the exercise of their reasoning capacity. Coping with evil depends on removing the interference so that people can reason without impediments. And then, it is supposed, they will promote human well-being and refrain from jeopardizing it.

This may well be called the Enlightenment faith because it continues to be held in the face of overwhelming evidence against it. Its reference to our well-being is crucially ambiguous. It may mean the well-being of individual human beings or the well-being of human beings collectively. It matters which is meant because individual well-being often conflicts with collective well-being, and there are reasons for favoring both. Individuals may be perfectly reasonable in resolving such conflicts in favor of their own or their loved ones’ well-being, even if it damages collective well-being. As we shall see later in some detail, evildoers often have reasons for their actions and they need not be handicapped in reasoning. It has been well said that if you are committed to secular ethics, it really does seem that all the king’s horses and all the king’s men couldn’t put reason and ethics together again in a way that shows individual wickedness to be necessarily irrational.⁴ The supposition that people who reason well will promote collective well-being and those who do not must be unreasonable is wishful thinking that sustains hope at the cost of denying plain facts of human psychology. Explaining evil depends on recognizing that self-interest and the conditions of human life often make evil actions reasonable. The key to coping with it is to provide stronger reasons against doing evil than there are reasons for doing it.

Another significant difference between explanations derived from the religious or the Enlightenment world view and the one I favor concerns responsibility. All agree that evildoers should be held responsible for the evil they do, unless excused. The problem is to specify the excusing conditions. It is widely held that evildoers should be held responsible only for their intentional actions. I disagree. Evildoers may be rightly held responsible for unintentional actions if they lack knowledge they ought to have, act out of habits they ought not to have developed, or follow conventions they ought to have rejected. Responsibility depends not only on the motivation of evildoers, but also on whether they have the motivation they ought to have, on the prevailing moral sensibility that forms part of the context of their actions, and on the foreseeable consequences of their actions. This has important implications for how we explain and try to cope with evil.

The problem of evil is deep because human well-being depends on coping with it, but basic human propensities both cause evil and corrupt attempts to cope with it. Our basic good and evil propensities thus perpetually motivate us to follow incompatible courses of action. Sometimes one prevails, sometimes the other. Contrary to the religious world view, we have no reason to rely on resources external to humanity. And contrary to the Enlightenment world view, reason may favor not just good but also evil actions, depending on our characters and circumstances. Characters and circumstances can be changed, of course, but changing them guarantees nothing. For the effort to change them is as liable to corruption by evil propensities as the conditions were that we try to change. Furthermore, since our evil propensities are as basic as the good ones, if we succeed in preventing their expression in one way, they may just be expressed in some other way. This is why evil is a permanent adversity and coping with it is formidably difficult. An initial characterization of my approach, then, is that it combines the following claims: evil has many causes; the scheme of things is nonmoral; we have basic propensities for both good and evil actions, and thus we are ambivalent toward good and evil; evil actions may be reasonable; and evildoers may be held responsible for both intentionally and unintentionally evil actions.

1.4 The Approach

My aim is to provide a causal explanation of why evildoers do evil. There are excellent recent works giving historical accounts of past explanations,⁵ but they are relevant to my aim only insofar as they contribute to the right explanation or illustrate mistakes. The facts I appeal to are psychological propensities familiar to normally intelligent people, not the fruits of research or deep reflection. Common knowledge of them makes it possible for novelists, playwrights, biographers, and historians to write about the character, motivation, and actions of people at places and times other than their own and feel confident about being understood. I have in mind such propensities as desiring a meaningful life, needing to be loved, having conflicting motives, deceiving oneself, wanting to appear other than one is, being ignorant of some of one’s motives, resenting injustice, embellishing the past, fearing the unknown, minding defeat, caring about the opinion of others, and so forth. These propensities are commonplaces of human psychology, but they also have moral significance. They may be thought of as basic elements of moral psychology. It is to them that I shall appeal in order to explain the causes of evil actions. The most significant fact about evil, however, is not psychological but the serious physical harm it causes to innocent people. Evil matters because of the loss and suffering of its victims. This should be kept in mind throughout the book, even though much of the discussion will focus on psychological propensities that motivate evildoers. The reason for seeking an explanation of evil is to make it less widespread, but its causes will be found partly in the moral psychology of evildoers.

The argument has two parts. Part One comprises chapters 2–7, each being a detailed consideration of a concrete, indubitable, and conspicuous case of evil, and chapter 8, which draws tentative conclusions derived from these cases and formulates conditions an adequate explanation must meet. Part Two consists of chapters 9–14. The first three show that explanations of evil inspired by the religious or the Enlightenment world view are inadequate partly because they cannot account for all the cases discussed in Part One. Yet each of these explanations contributes some components to what I shall offer as a better explanation. The next three chapters provide this better explanation. It accounts for all the cases in Part One, incorporates the salvageable components of the inadequate explanations, identifies causes of evil, shows the conditions under which evildoers should be held responsible, and indicates what should be done to cope with evil. Finally, chapter 15 is a brief summary of the conclusions reached in the preceding chapters.

Part One

FORMS OF EVIL

CHAPTER 2

The Sleep of Reason

The sleep of reason brings forth monsters.

—FRANCISCO GOYA, Caprichos inscription

2.1 Crusade against the Cathars

The Cathars lived in Languedoc in southern France during the decades before and after A.D. 1200. They formed a religious sect based on the belief that there was a radical difference between the spiritual and material worlds. The spiritual world was created and ruled by God, and it was good. The material world was created and ruled by the Demiurge, and it was evil. In human beings, these two worlds met. The soul was potentially good because God implanted in it consciousness of the good. But the body and all its functions were evil, as a result of being the creation of the Demiurge, who made human beings in his own likeness. They believed that salvation depended on renouncing material possessions and on living as much as one could a spiritual life. The Cathars realized that such a life was demanding and difficult. Those who had committed themselves to it were called Perfects. They were celibate, vegetarian, propertyless, and ascetic. Most Cathars were sympathizers, not Perfects, because although they accepted the truth of the beliefs, they did not act on them consistently. Nevertheless, Cathars were noted for the simplicity of their lives and the honesty and kindness of their dealings with everyone. The name, Cathar, derived from the Greek katharoi, meaning the pure ones.¹

The implications of Cathar beliefs were profoundly at odds with the prevailing Christian orthodoxy. Cathars were committed to denying that God created everything and was omnipotent, for the material world was created by the Demiurge, and God had no power over it. Nor could Jesus be the son of God because he had a body, which was evil, and God could not be evil. Moreover, since everything in the material world was evil, so was the church, its hierarchy, its practices; as well as sex and procreation, wealth, power, war, social status, and so on.

Most of the Cathars were simple, unreflective, illiterate, and scrabbling hard to make a living. They just happened to be influenced by the preaching and example of a wandering Perfect, and they were unaware of the unorthodox implications of their beliefs. It is doubtful that many of the Perfects themselves fully realized these implications. The more articulate ones saw themselves as rejecting the worldliness and corruption of many priests and thus upholding the true spirit of Christianity. They certainly did not want to change the world since they believed it to be irremediably evil. They had no theological or political interests. They sought salvation for themselves and others by living in preparation of a better life in the spiritual world.

The ecclesiastical authorities, first in Languedoc and later in Rome, were fully aware, however, that the Cathar creed was at odds with their most basic beliefs. They saw the Cathars as subverting the very foundation of Christianity. It also worried them that the Cathars were quite popular in Languedoc because people found the Perfects admirable and they could not but compare them favorably with priests and bishops whose manner of living deviated far more from the Christian ideal than the Perfects’ own.

The church, therefore, was moved to take action. At first, local priests preached against the Cathars and emphasized their denial of the faith. But this was not effective. The Cathars then were maligned by lies, according to which they were Devil-worshipers who believed that Satan was the creator and ruler of heaven and earth; repudiated sexual restraint; denied that the Perfects could sin and thus encouraged them to do whatever they pleased; and derived their name from the Latin catus, meaning cat, which is the form in which Lucifer appears to them and whom they adore by kissing the cat’s anus.² When even these absurd lies failed to put a dent in the Cathars’ popularity, the pope—Innocent III—stepped in and declared Catharism to be a heresy.

This was an extremely serious matter with fatal consequences. Far graver than the unbeliever was the case of the heretic, who accepted the same revelation as his orthodox neighbour but gave it a different interpretation, distorting and corrupting it, leading men away from their salvation. Heresy was a spreading poison and a community which tolerated it invited God to withdraw his protection (AC 41). As Aquinas put the point: Heresy is a sin which merits not only excommunication but also death, for it is worse to corrupt the Faith which is the life of the soul than to issue counterfeit coins which minister to the secular life. Since counterfeiters are justly killed by princes as enemies to the common good, so heretics deserve the same punishment.³ The pope’s declaration thus doomed the Cathars.

A powerful ecclesiastical machinery was set in motion to extirpate Catharism. It eventually produced the Albigensian Crusade, named after the town of Albi, where many Cathars lived. The stage was set for one of the most deplorable episodes in the history of Christianity. No one doubts…the homicidal passions at work during the Albigensian Crusade. Even in an era commonly considered barbarous…the campaign against the Cathars and their supporters stands out for its stark cruelty (PH 6). A very fair-minded medievalist says that those who bore authority in the church…were responsible for some terrible acts of violence and cruelty, among which the Albigensian Crusade holds a position of peculiar horror (WSC 19). It was one of the most savage of all medieval wars. Faith ultimately prevailed, as Innocent III had predicted, but the consequences of the Albigensian Crusade went far beyond its aims (AC 16). Among these consequences were that "the eleventh and twelfth centuries saw what has turned out to be a permanent change in Western society. Persecution became habitual. That is to say not simply that individuals were subject to violence, but that deliberate and socially sanctioned violence began to be directed, through established governmental, judicial