Life in the Spirit: Trinitarian Grammar and Pneumatic Community in Hegel and Augustine

LIFE IN THE SPIRIT

THRESHOLDS IN PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY

Jeffrey Bloechl and Kevin Hart, series editors

Philosophy is provoked and enriched by the claims of faith in a revealed God. Theology is stimulated by its contact with the philosophy that proposes to investigate the full range of human experience. At the threshold where they meet, there inevitably arises a discipline of reciprocal interrogation and the promise of mutual enhancement. The works in this series contribute to that discipline and that promise.

LIFE in the SPIRIT

TRINITARIAN GRAMMAR

AND PNEUMATIC COMMUNITY

IN HEGEL AND AUGUSTINE

DOUGLAS FINN

University of Notre Dame Press

Notre Dame, Indiana

Copyright © 2016 by University of Notre Dame

Notre Dame, Indiana 46556

undpress.nd.edu

All Rights Reserved

Manufactured in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Finn, Douglas Edward.

Life in the spirit : Trinitarian grammar and pneumatic community in Hegel and Augustine / Douglas Finn.

pages cm. — (Thresholds in philosophy and theology)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-268-02895-4 (pbk. : alk. paper) — ISBN 0-268-02895-8 (pbk. : alk. paper) ISBN 978-0-268-07062-5 (ePub)

1. Trinity—History of doctrines. 2. Augustine, Saint, Bishop of Hippo. 3. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770–1831. 4. Holy Spirit. I. Title.

BT111.3.F535 2015

231'.0440922—dc23

2015031815

∞ The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Council on Library Resources.

This e-Book was converted from the original source file by a third-party vendor. Readers who notice any formatting, textual, or readability issues are encouraged to contact the publisher at [email protected]

CONTENTS

Abbreviations

Acknowledgments

Introduction

PART I. WORD AND SPIRIT

Chapter 1. The Logic of Christ: Hegel’s Christology

Chapter 2. The Rhetoric of Christ: Augustine’s Christology

PART II. PENTECOST

Chapter 3. Hegel’s Language of Spirit and Its Social Realization

Chapter 4. Augustine: The Holy Spirit and the Transformation of Language

PART III. CHURCH

Chapter 5. Hegel’s Spiritual Community

Chapter 6. Augustine and a Catholic Church with Soul?

Conclusion

Notes

Bibliography

Index

ABBREVIATIONS

Because of the comparative nature and broad intended audience of this work, I have as a rule cited only English translations of Hegel’s and Augustine’s texts. Where the German or Latin made a difference to my exposition, I have included a reference to the original­­language edition used.

In the text and notes I have abbreviated the titles of Augustine’s works according to the standards set forth in Allan Fitzgerald, ed., Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclope-dia (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999), xxxv–xlii. Abbre-viations of the series’ titles from which I draw Augustine’s works in either the original language or English translation are as fol-lows:

BA Bibliothèque augustinienne. Oeuvres de Saint Augustin. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1949–.

CCL Corpus Christianorum. Series Latina. Turnhout: Brepols, 1953–.

CSEL Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum. Vienna: Tempsky, 1865–.

FC The Fathers of the Church. Edited by R. J. Deferrari. Washington, DC: Catholic University Press, 1947–.

PL Patrologia Cursus Completus. Series Latina. Ed-ited by J.-P. Migne. Paris: 1844–64.

WSA The Works of St. Augustine: A Transla-tion for the 21st Century. Edited by J. E. Rotelle. New York: New City Press, 1990–.

Abbreviations of Hegel’s works and the English transla-tions used are as follows:

Aes. Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art . Translated by T. M. Knox. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.

Enc. Logic (Part I of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences ).Translated by William Wal-lace. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975. = Logic

The Philosophy of Nature (Part II of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences). Translated by A. V. Miller. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970. = Nature

Philosophy of Mind (Part III of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences). Translated by William Wallace. Zusätze from Boumann’s 1845 edition translated by A. V. Miller. Oxford: Clarendon, 1971. = Mind

ETW Early Theological Writings . Translated by T. M. Knox. With an Introduction and Fragments translated by Richard Kroner. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948. Includes The Spirit of Chris-tianity and Its Fate , 182–301.

LHP Lectures on the History of Philosophy: The Lec-tures of 1825–26 . Edited by Robert F. Brown. Translated by R. F. Brown and J. M. Stewart. Berke-ley: University of California Press, 1990.

LPH The Philosophy of History . Translated by J. Sibree. New York: Dover Publications, 1956.

LPR Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion . Ed-ited by Peter C. Hodgson. Translated by R. F. Brown, P. C. Hodgson, and J. M. Stewart. 3 vols. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984–87.

PR Elements of the Philosophy of Right . Edited by Allen W. Wood. Translated by H. B. Nisbet. Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

PS Phenomenology of Spirit . Translated by A. V. Miller. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977.

Reason Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction . Translated by H. B. Nisbet. Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.

Science Hegel’s Science of Logic . Translated by A. V. Miller.

of Logic London: Allen & Unwin, 1969.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My family tells me that this project has taken much too long. It certainly would have taken much longer without the help of many people along the way. I owe immense gratitude to my teachers at Notre Dame: Cyril O’Regan, who first suggested the topic and offered invaluable critique and encouragement throughout the work’s composition; John Cavadini, whose influence upon my reading of Augustine should be unmistakable; and Lawrence Cunningham, who always asked helpful questions and reminded those of us who spoke perhaps too boldly that Augustine himself died praying the psalms of lament.

The Kaneb Institute for Teaching and Learning at the University of Notre Dame provided funding and institutional support for my stay at Brown University during the 2010–11 academic year. I am grateful to the Religious Studies Department at Brown and the students in the Religion and Critical Thought area for graciously welcoming me. Special thanks are due my host and mentor at Brown, Thomas Lewis, for all he taught me about Hegel and about teaching.

My friend Andrew Hofer, O.P., has been amazingly helpful with his suggestions for improvement. More significantly, my life would have been greatly impoverished were it not for his friendship. Niki Clements, Jon Sozek, Fannie Bialek, David Lê, and Jessica Wrobleski read early drafts of several chapters, and I am grateful for their feedback. The two anonymous readers at the University of Notre Dame Press offered great encouragement and very useful suggestions for improvement. Finally, Stephen Little and Jeff Bloechl were instrumental in ushering the manuscript through the publishing process. I offer many thanks to all the above. Any flaws that remain in this work are my own.

A few personal notes are also in order. I am glad that my silly dog Clement insisted, quite tenaciously at times, on breaking up the writing with walks and games of fetch. My other dear friend, Augustine Marie Reisenauer, O.P., has offered constant counsel and a listening ear over the years, and I am thankful for his presence in my life. Last and most importantly, I want to express in some meager way my virtually inexpressible feelings of gratitude to my parents, Gary and Joan Finn, for all their love, wisdom, and support. My father is the most generous and loving person I know, and I am ever thankful for the wise lessons he has imparted to me. My mother is loving, patient, sensitive, and wise. Her talents as a mother and grandmother are awe-­inspiring. It is to my parents that I dedicate this work.

INTRODUCTION

Stories told about the Holy Spirit are not always happy ones. For some it is a story of loss. They lament the vanishing of a prelap­sarian pneumatological tradition, of the richness of spiritual experience that the early Christians had and that found expression in the biblical texts of Luke, Paul, and John. But precisely because the teaching on the Holy Spirit, unlike that of the Father or Son, proved so exclusively reliant upon biblical language and hence resistant to philosophical translation, it was, contends the influential church historian Adolf von Harnack, an embarrassing doctrine for an early church bent on making its theology comprehensible to the Greek mind.¹ Consequently, in von Harnack’s view, the doctrine of the Holy Spirit never really found a home, variously subsumed as it was into Christology, ecclesiology, and sacramental theology.²

A common villain in such accounts of pneumatic decline is Saint Augustine. Of all the church fathers, he is viewed as having most effectively integrated the Holy Spirit into a philosophical doctrine of the Trinity to calamitous effect. His claim that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son (filioque) and his search for insight into God’s triune nature through an inward investigation into the human mind—an investigation in which Augustine describes the Holy Spirit as the bond of love between the Father and the Son—have led interpreters to pin blame upon him for an overly intellectualizing, quasi-­modalistic tendency in subsequent Western Trinitarian theology. This tendency, it is claimed, subordinates the Holy Spirit to Christ, resulting in pneumatic depersonalization and functionalization. Doctrinal domestication then enabled the church to increasingly usurp control of the Spirit by confining the Spirit’s operation to the sacraments and a narrowly construed understanding of tradition. Neglect of the Holy Spirit in theology thus meant a real loss to Christian life. The Spirit’s wings had been clipped, and Christians were thereby robbed of their freedom.

Another narrative of Spirit is animated not by nostalgia for some lost golden age, but by growth toward a more glorious end. This story has its telos in Hegel’s philosophy, where Geist, or Spirit, is the governing concept.³ To be sure, the Hegelian narrative is also, in a way, one of retrieval. In the fragmentary wake of the Enlightenment critique of religion, when the Christian doctrine of the Trinity was put under the knife for its lack of rational coherence and Pietist Lutherans were retreating from doctrinal substance to the safe harbor of Jesus’ immediate presence in the heart, Hegel set for himself the grand task of unification and reconciliation. This he attempted to do by reconstructing the Trinity according to his concept of Spirit. Spirit for Hegel is all-­encompassing, uniting God and the world, divinity and humanity in a dynamic rational movement of becoming. It is a movement of broad ethical and social import that seeks to take account of the autonomy of reason, the inclinations of the heart, and their changing historical, social, and religious contexts. Spirit is the movement of reason through history toward the achievement of self-­conscious freedom in the world.

Consequently, while Hegel viewed his project as a critical retrieval of the truth of Trinitarian doctrine, it was not a retrieval of that truth in either its biblical or traditional doctrinal formulations. In their finite representational form, these Trinitarian articulations remained inadequate to their infinite content. Rather, Hegel assigned those insufficient forms a penultimate historical position in his narrative of divine becoming, an assignment he could make only, of course, from a historical standpoint in which the earlier forms had been sublated and the truth was now manifest in a form commensurate to itself: absolute Spirit.

Against the background of these divergent narratives, this work will tell a different story about the Holy Spirit, one that brings Augustine and Hegel together in a mutually illuminating way. In this story, Augustine contributes not to pneumatology’s decline, but rather to its enrichment. At the same time, in this story the expository enrichment Augustine offers is not continuous with, much less progressing toward, a later pneumatic fulfillment in Hegel’s philosophy of Spirit. Whereas Hegel, in accordance with his logical pneumatic paradigm, judges the biblical and theo­logi­cal tradition to be inadequate, Augustine will step forward as a voice from the tradition whose biblically grounded pneumatology emerges not in terms of logic and rational necessity, but rather in terms of a rhetorical paradigm that operates according to the standards of fittingness and harmony. The Augustinian paradigm is in fact more adequate to the Christian belief that God has revealed his love for the world through Jesus Christ. And it is more existentially persuasive in individual and communal human experience.

The greatest impediment to this comparative project, however, is that, in his historical treatment of the tradition, Hegel never addresses Augustine directly. In fact, he hardly ever mentions Augustine at all.⁴ All the same, there is historical warrant for bringing the two thinkers together around the theme of the Holy Spirit, for what history did not bring together directly, the writing of history immediately after Hegel soon would.

Between 1841 and 1843, the German theologian, scripture scholar, and historian of doctrine Ferdinand Christian Baur published a three-­volume work entitled Die christliche Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit und Menschwerdung Gottes in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung.⁵ Baur there devotes some sixty pages to Augustine’s De Trinitate and its significance in the development of Trinitarian doctrine. At this point in his career, Baur’s work was undeniably governed by the conceptual dynamics of Hegelian Geist. He sought to trace the dialectical movement of reason through history. To think historically, according to Baur, is to think through and along with eternal Spirit, whose work is history.⁶ More specifically, to trace the historical development of the doctrines of the Trinity and the incarnation is to think through the essential developmental moments of the uniquely Christian concept of God.⁷

In Baur’s work, Augustine occupies an intermediate position within a historical movement culminating in Hegel’s reformulation of Trinitarian doctrine. Within this developmental scheme, Baur thinks that Augustine makes two advances over earlier Trini­tarian theology. First, in response to the potentially subordinationist implications of earlier Trinitarian doctrine, Augustine finds a more adequate conception of the equality between the three persons than any Greek father besides Athanasius.⁸ Second, in an effort to avoid a dualism of infinite and finite, which Baur thinks lies at the heart of Arian subordinationism, Augustine attempts to come closer to the objective Trinity by means of analogies derived from observation of the human subject.⁹

Praise of Augustine’s contribution to the development of Trini­tarian doctrine, however, does not prevent Baur from detecting more fundamental difficulties. First, Baur claims to uncover logical problems inherent to Augustine’s Trinitarian grammar. To ward off Arianism, Baur thinks, Augustine denies any substantial difference between the Trinitarian persons and attempts instead to explain the distinction between persons according to the mediating concept of relative distinction.¹⁰ However, the relative distinctions Augustine cites appear arbitrary and inessential to Baur and are in his view accompanied by too much emphasis upon the unity of the divine persons. Because Augustine takes the notion of person as given, rather than deducing it necessarily from the concept of God,¹¹ Augustine cannot explain the distinction between divine persons who are nevertheless equal in substance. Consequently, personal distinction remains, alongside the substantial unity of the divine—a logical contradiction for human Verstand. Baur implies a Hegelian solution to the dilemma. Both the Father and the Son ought to be understood as subjects of a necessary movement of double kenosis issuing in the self-­conscious unity of Spirit. In that way the distinctions between Father, Son, and Spirit are essential and yet formative of one divine person.¹² Through a Hegelian reformulation, Augustine’s Trinitarian grammar becomes rational and personal.

Second, Baur finds that Augustine’s subjective turn as the means to objective knowledge of the divine betrays a similar mix of progress and stasis. On the one hand, Baur thinks that, by identifying the image of God with the mind remembering, understanding, and loving itself remembering, understanding, and loving God, Augustine has found the divine content adequate to the form of thought.¹³ On the other hand, Baur argues that Augustine impedes his own speculative progress by insisting upon a difference between the human and divine minds. There is thus no way for Augustine to proceed from the analogy of the human mind to the doctrine of the triune God. Yet if reason is one and the essence of the human being is rational, then the deepest core of the human being ought to reveal the very essence of God. In this way, Baur claims, the human person as imago Dei would become one with that which he or she images, with God himself.¹⁴ But Augustine never identifies the essence of the human being with Geist. He does not determine the moments of the mind in a speculative way, as moments of self-­actualizing absolute Spirit. Rather, Baur claims, he simply borrows them from empirical psychology.¹⁵

Baur’s assessment of Augustine’s Trinitarian theology as well as his suggestion that the latter be reformulated according to a logical paradigm à la Hegel would appear to foreclose any conversation between the two thinkers. Hegel’s teleological Trinitarian grammar simply functions too imperiously. Yet if we focus the discussion in terms of spirit, perhaps a space for dialogue starts to open. Because the apparent inadequacy of Augustine’s Trinitarian grammar and its image in the human mind originates, in Baur’s view, from his ­in­ability to conceive a rational, spiritual unity between the finite and infinite, the entire problem could be cast as fundamentally pneumatological.¹⁶ Through an analysis of the Holy Spirit, the contrast between Augustine’s rhetorical and Hegel’s logical paradigms can emerge and point toward their broader Trinitarian implications.

This possibility for pneumatological dialogue and its broader Trinitarian significance is evident even in explicitly christological texts. From his Hegelian perspective, Baur finds Augustine’s Christology problematic, inasmuch as Christ’s birth by the Holy Spirit (Mt 1.18; Lk 1.35) manifests for Augustine the operation of grace in the assumption of Christ’s human nature into personal unity with the divine Logos. On Baur’s view, the introduction of grace into incarnational doctrine puts an end to all christological speculation,¹⁷ because it impedes a rational, and hence truly spiritual, explanation for the identity of the divine and human in Christ. Yet, as we will see below, the pneumatic operation of grace, when considered in terms of Augustine’s image of oral discourse for the incarnation, could also be viewed as witnessing to God’s free expression of love toward humankind in Jesus Christ.

A specifically pneumatological plane upon which Baur offers a means of framing a dialogue between Hegel and Augustine comes to the fore in one of his footnotes,¹⁸ where he examines Augustine’s De civitate Dei 11.24. In that passage Augustine asks whether the Holy Spirit can be considered the goodness of both the Father and the Son. By establishing that the Holy Spirit is the holiness of both the Father and the Son, and that divine holiness is identical to divine goodness, Augustine discovers a warrant for calling the Holy Spirit God’s goodness and for finding a trace of the Trinity in creation. The created world derives from the Father, is made through the Word, and in the Holy Spirit is declared to conform to the goodness according to which it was created. Baur thinks that Augustine here stumbles upon a genuinely spiritual truth, that God, in himself absolute goodness, creates the world in the Son, and recognizes his unity with that world in the Spirit.¹⁹

Augustine then relates the community of believers, the Holy City, to the Trinitarian properties he has just detected in God’s creative work: God is that City’s origin, enlightenment, and joy (frui Deo); God is its existence, its vision, its love.²⁰ Here Baur’s reading is telling: in Augustine’s pneumatic frui Deo he sees the truth content of Geist: God self-­consciously and concretely realized in the pneumatic community.²¹ Nonetheless, for Augustine this truth content remains at odds with the form in which it is expressed. Love cannot be attributed arbitrarily to the Holy Spirit, but must be derived necessarily from the concept of God.²² And Baur insists that the concept of God as triune is known through the investigation of thought on the condition that one not sunder the unity of reason, the radical identity of the human and divine minds qua rational. Ultimately, according to Baur, the separation of finite and infinite Spirit leaves Augustine standing still.²³

Baur’s Hegelian reading of Augustine helps set the stage for our project in several ways. It offers not only historical warrant for a Trinitarian comparison between Hegel and Augustine, but also gets that conversation going. However, the way Baur frames the conversation in terms of a teleological narrative assesses Augustine’s strengths and weaknesses according to Hegel’s logico-­historical paradigm of Spirit. From Augustine’s end the conversation is closed insofar as his Trinitarian theology is ultimately sublated in Hegel’s philosophy. Yet, in spite of the closure intrinsic to Baur’s critique, we have also seen an opening for discussion, one that points us in a pneumatological direction. We can now orient that conversation further around the theme of language.

Baur suggests that Augustine’s theological language is incompatible with the truth it contains. By continuing to use biblical language for God, language simply given through divine revelation, Augustine is not conscious of the spiritual truth that the post-­Hegelian Baur finds latent in Augustine’s Trinitarian thought. Absent from Augustine’s mind was the category and logical grammar of Spirit, which in uniting form and content, subject and object, thought and being in a dynamic process of divine self-­actualization would have enabled him to grasp and explain, rather than merely assert, God’s Trinitarian essence.²⁴ In so doing Augustine would have become conscious of himself as part of the dynamic divine process. Theological language would be one with its object, and the human being, as imago Dei, would be one with the God he or she images.

But there is another way to look at the situation. In the face of this Hegelian critique, Augustine’s use of biblical language might actually offer a rich and dynamic theology of the Holy Spirit and the Trinity. Hegel claims that his Trinitarian articulation contains biblical and biblically grounded doctrinal language as rationally sublated. But a comparison between his pneumatology and that of Augustine highlights such a lack of narrative correspondence between them and such a general neglect of biblical and traditional Trinitarian language on Hegel’s part that it becomes hard to see Hegel as in theological continuity with the biblical and doctrinal tradition. Moreover, Hegel’s contraction of pneumatological and Trinitarian language to a dynamic of philosophical rationality issues ultimately in an eschatological closure that, in aiming to secure a freedom from all external authorities, can be interpreted as thereby constricting Christian freedom, defined here as the freedom from idolatrous masters, including oneself, in order to have the freedom for the love of God and neighbor.

The nature of such a critique of Hegel raises the question of what type of comparison will follow. Perhaps it is easiest to state first what this work is not. It is neither a purely philosophical comparison adjudicated by the criteria of reason alone, nor a merely descriptive historical inquiry into the transmission and reception of ideas. Where the latter is concerned we will, to be sure, pay attention to historical influences upon both thinkers for the purposes of ensuring a precise interpretation of their thought and a fair evaluation of their claims. The best reading of Hegel, in fact, may be a religious and theological one.²⁵ The issue turns on what kind of religious thinker Hegel is. Some Christian thinkers have tried to appropriate Hegelian categories in whole or in part as a means of re-­articulating Trinitarian theology,²⁶ but such appropriation may be founded upon an uncritical acceptance of Hegel’s claim to stand in line with and to complete the longer theological tradition. Indeed, the appropriation of Hegel may in fact set one in a completely different line of theological thought and entail, implicitly or explicitly, a critique and possible rejection of the very doctrinal tradition to which one is attempting to contribute.

IF THIS THEOLOGICAL assessment of Hegel’s Trinitarian paradigm is to succeed, however, Hegel cannot be permitted to set the terms of the discussion. Otherwise we end up with a teleological narrative like Baur’s that assimilates and supersedes Augustine in Hegel’s philosophy of Spirit. This is in many ways the problem posed by contemporary Trinitarian theologies that have adopted Hegelian conceptual dynamics. Their attendant reading of the preceding tradition becomes so conditioned by Hegel’s appropriation and reconstruction of traditional Christian doctrines and his all-­consuming teleological thrust that they are unable to gain an outside perspective from which to assess Hegel’s theological adequacy vis-­à-­vis that same tradition.

Consequently, our analysis of Hegel will be organized thematically around more traditional christological, pneumatological, and ecclesiological categories, such that we can better assess how the teleological force of Hegel’s spiritual paradigm subverts and transforms those categories into something completely different. For our purposes this is a necessary means of analysis, yet one not unfair to Hegel. Hegel takes up these various doctrines at one place or another in his mature system, and where we supplement our investigation with material from his earlier texts, in particular from The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate, we will do so only if that material is consistent with his mature position. And, in fact, as we have begun to see in Baur’s Hegelian reading of Augustine, to frame the discussion in theological terms makes possible a very rich comparison by offering a more comprehensive sense of Augustine’s Trinitarian narrative and its integral relation to his practical concerns with soteriology, ethics, ecclesiology, and history. These are themes which Hegel, in his effort to unite the theoretical and the practical, also treats at length. Our purpose, then, is to assess Hegel’s theological adequacy vis-­à-­vis the longer tradition of Trini­tarian theology, and how Augustine, as one representative of the tradition, might respond to the critique of it that is intrinsic to Hegel’s Trinitarian thought.

It is conceivable, then, that other figures like Thomas Aquinas or Martin Luther could just as well have been used as theological interlocutors. Nonetheless, in addition to Augustine’s foundational influence on the Western theological tradition, including Aquinas and Luther, several other reasons recommend him as Hegel’s conversation partner. Not the least of these is Hegel’s own general avoidance of Augustine in his works, especially when viewed in light of the fact that such avoidance has not stopped scholars after Hegel from bringing them together in a variety of ways, typically around (1) the question of the self and self-­consciousness, especially as a means of knowing the triune God, and (2) the meaning of history and human institutions, as the context in which humans seek to know God.²⁷

If in our comparison Augustine’s doctrine of the Holy Spirit is to be permitted to emerge in its true richness, however, he must be freed of the interpretive shackles that have led to his villainization by twentieth-­century theological commentators. That negative assessment can be understood only against the backdrop of ­Hegelianism and the reaction of neo-­scholasticism against it. Our effort to liberate Augustine from oppressive hermeneutic lenses thus gives further impetus to the project, inasmuch as Hegelian dynamics have colored the way Augustine’s Trinitarian theology has been read. Hence this comparison is of value to historically oriented Augustinian studies as well. Indeed, the patristic scholar Lewis Ayres, in the conclusion to his 2004 work on fourth-­century Trinitarian theology, gestures toward Hegel’s influence upon twentieth-­century theology and its interpretation of early Christian Trini­tarian theology.²⁸

The question Ayres raises proves apt when one considers the history of Augustinian scholarship from Baur onward.²⁹ Baur and the Augsburg Benedictine abbot Theodor Gangauf, who published the first major monograph on Augustine’s De Trinitate in 1865, were major exponents of what one could call the Idealist interpretation of Augustine’s Trinitarian theology.³⁰ In general, the Idealist interpretation argued that Augustine’s De Trinitate conceives of the Trinity as divine self-­consciousness. This reading—which in Gangauf’s case moves necessarily from the structure of finite human self-­consciousness to that of absolute divine self-­consciousness—subsequently informed a narrative of the history of philosophy told by such scholars as Dilthey, Windelband, and Charles Taylor.³¹ In one form or another, they all recount a story—still prevalent today—of Augustine’s influence upon modern theories of subjectivity set forth by the likes of Descartes and Hegel.³²

Hegel continued to influence interpretation of Augustine nega­tively through the neoscholastic reaction against modern thought, especially against the integration of German Idealism into theology.³³ Neoscholastics viewed Augustine and his De Trinitate as the precursor not to Descartes and Hegel, but rather to Thomas Aquinas and the theological treatise De Deo trino.³⁴ In this line of interpretation, Michael Schmaus was especially influential. Schmaus assumed that Augustine begins with the unity of God rather than with the revelation of the Trinitarian persons in salvation history. Like the Idealists, then, he focused on Augustine’s investigation into the human mind. But unlike the Idealists, he adhered to the neoscholastic limitation of human reason, with the result that Augustine’s description of the human mind becomes merely a set of psychological observations that serve as an analogy for the Trinity. On both the Idealist and neoscholastic readings, Augustine’s Trinity is interpreted as divine self-­consciousness. For the neoscholastics, though, this insight is achieved analogically rather than by rational necessity.³⁵

The Augustine cast from a neoscholastic mold seems to have been the object of much of the critique leveled at him by twentieth-­century systematic theologians. In this regard Colin Gunton is typical. He contends that the disjunct in Augustine’s Trinitarian thought between discussion of God in se and divine action outward in world history can be attributed in part to Augustine’s neglect of the Holy Spirit’s role in salvation history. The result, Gunton thinks, is the sundering of the dogmatic treatise De Deo uno from De Deo trino,³⁶ a separation likewise decried by Rahner as contributing to the loss of any sense of the Trinity’s significance in Christian life.³⁷ Gunton fears the erosion of a distinctively Trinitarian-­shaped Christian life on account of Augustine’s model of love for the Holy Spirit. The characterization of the Holy Spirit as the bond of love between the Father and Son is, in Gunton’s view, too intellectual and, because conceived primarily as self-­love, individualistic. Any operation the Holy Spirit has in the world is reduced to the immanent epistemological level. So, Gunton thinks, the biblical witness to the Spirit’s unique eschatological work—transcendent, liberating, community forming—is lost.³⁸

Yet, precisely by liberating Augustine from his Hegelian and neoscholastic fetters, we can show the richness of his biblically grounded pneumatology in all its critical, emancipatory, and social import, and in that way help put Guntonesque criticisms to rest. That goal therefore affects our selection of primary Augustinian texts. I will use several of Augustine’s well-­known works of theology: De Trinitate, De doctrina Christiana, and De civitate Dei. With regard to the De Trinitate, I will treat both the ontological-­immanent and economic aspects of Augustine’s Trinitarian theology, insofar as they mutually inform each other—that is, insofar as he thinks human beings come to know and love the triune God through God’s self-­revelation in the world.

For this reason, it is imperative that we draw also from De doctrina Christiana and De civitate Dei. In these works Augustine reflects extensively not only on what God has done in history, but also on the degree to which one can say how and why he has spoken and acted thus. The former text is important because there Augustine sets forth his theory of signs and how it relates to revelation—God’s speaking in the world through the incarnation and the words of scripture—and to the way in which humans then speak about divine self-­manifestation. In other words, Augustine there explores the creative tension between divine and human language. Moreover, he concludes in doc. Chr. that it is love of God and neighbor that imbues that tension with its creativity, a creativity aimed at building up the Christian community.

The ethical-­social dynamic of language points us toward civ. Dei, where we gain insight into Augustine’s thinking on the role of the Christian church in history and society. Because for Augustine it is through the very reading and teaching of scripture that the church is conformed to God’s Word and called to be a sacramental witness to the world, we need to consider not only what Augustine theorizes about the character of divine revelation in scripture, but also some of the texts in which he himself interprets scripture and thereby seeks to bring it to bear upon the life of the Christian community. Accordingly, we will also draw from his In Johannis evangelium tractatus, Enarrationes in Psalmos, and various pneumatologically relevant homilies.

Our selection of Hegelian texts is guided by similar pneumatological topics, in particular those of language and love. This decision is not, I think, a brute imposition of Augustinian themes onto Hegel, but rather a helpful lens through which to view development within Hegel’s thought and how it differs from Augustine’s Trinitarian theology. We will look at Hegel’s early theological works, in particular The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate, where he attempts to discover the ground of freedom, the unity of God and the world, in a concept of love. In that early work the love proclaimed by Jesus proves inadequate because it leads Jesus and his followers to withdraw from the world in order to maintain their purity. Freedom in the world proves elusive. Nevertheless, Hegel’s pursuit of unity and freedom through love is not fruitless, insofar as the dialectical movement of his mature system is already adumbrated in the painful juxtaposition of opposites that love entails. When we turn our attention to the christologically and pneumatologically relevant sections of Hegel’s mature works, including The Phenomenology of Spirit, the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, Aesthetics, and the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, we can observe how, although he does not discard the Christian theologoumenon of love altogether, he does subordinate it to the dialectical movement of reason (Vernunft), which he thinks possesses an explanatory­capacity that love does not, and which thus makes rational sense of the otherwise arbitrary divine acts of creation and incarnation.

In this way the movement of reason relates to language. Hegel readily employs the image of oral language and the ephemeral nature of the spoken word to illustrate the dynamism he attrib­utes to Spirit. He uses the dynamics of oral speech to establish the grammar of an all-­inclusive Trinitarian narrative containing the intradivine sphere and the world. For him language is not simply a metaphor. Hegelian thought could thus justifiably be interpreted as logos philosophy, as a quest to uncover the reason unifying all of reality.³⁹ But Hegel exploits the multifarious meanings of logos—variously word, speech, or reason—to indicate, on the one hand, the essential ephemerality of the Trinitarian moment of the Son, in which he includes God’s creation of and reconciliation with the world, and, on the other, the sublation of the Son in the fullness of Spirit. In this respect, Hegel’s Trinitarian understandings of language and love have practical ramifications. Just as the transient word, the kenotic love manifest on the cross, issues in the fullness of spiritual presence in the world, so too for Hegel does the church eventually pass away into society. Accordingly, we will explore the ethical, social, and historical implications of this condition of pneumatic fulfillment—and how they differ from Augustine—in Hegel’s mature works mentioned above as well as in his The Phi­loso­phy of History and the Elements of the Philosophy of Right.

The expressive and communal dynamics of the pneumato­logical themes informing the selection of primary sources also help us structure our investigation. Part I explores how each thinker understands God to speak through the incarnation of the eternal Word. In that regard it contrasts Hegel’s logic of Christ to Augustine’s rhetoric of Christ. Part II falls under the heading of Pentecost broadly conceived. It explores how each thinker understands the human response to the divine Word through the agency of the Holy Spirit. The major question is whether the Spirit, in Hegel’s and Augustine’s respective Trinitarian narratives, carries forth the message of humility and love spoken in the incarnation, and if so, how. Finally, Part III turns to the types of human community made possible, according to each thinker, by God’s entry into language. We will ask after the broader sacramental function of the church in each thinker’s work, that is, how through itself and the concrete modes of communication by which it is built up the church witnesses to divine love.

In this way this comparison can contribute to (a) a better understanding of the religious commitments and implications of the Hegelian philosophy of Spirit and (b) a better grasp and stronger appreciation of Augustine’s Trinitarian theology, especially the richness of his pneumatology; and in so doing, (c) it can help awaken among those Christian thinkers who would criticize or overlook the Trinitarian thought of the patristic period an awareness of the latter’s potential strengths. The premodern, perhaps rather obscure doctrine of the Holy Spirit is vital to comprehending not only Augustine’s concept of God, but also his vision of the Christian community and its relationship to broader human society. That vision is one that, in perhaps surprising contrast to Hegel’s modern paradigm of Geist, strongly affirms the depth and breadth of ensouled and embodied human experience by giving voice to ­people in their joy and suffering. What is more, it is a vision whereby those experiences of joy and lamentation are not only affirmed but transfigured through the gift of the Holy Spirit, the love of God and neighbor.

PART I

WORD AND SPIRIT

Following the Gospel of John, both Hegel and Augustine develop theologies of Christ as the divine Logos, or Word of God. Both, moreover, exposit their theology of the Word by employing an image of the spoken word. However, variance in the extent to which each thinks the image is applicable across the broader narrative of the Logos results in very different christological paradigms, paradigms which I label Hegel’s logic of Christ, on the one hand, and Augustine’s rhetoric of Christ, on the other. These paradigms entail different understandings of the relationship between God and the world and between Christ and the Holy Spirit as each Trinitarian person reveals the character of divine love in the world. They bear upon how each thinker conceives of God’s speaking and acting in the world and the way in which human beings are called to respond to God’s Word, to model themselves individually and communally upon Christ through the inspiration of the Spirit.

By logic I mean that Hegel’s Logos speculation links the two basic meanings of the Greek word—reason and speech—in an attempt to discover and explain the meaning of the whole of reality. Hegel employs the image of the transient oral word—spoken only to fade away instantly—to illustrate the mediating and mediated character of the incarnate Word of God, that is, to show on the cross the reality of the opposition between God and the world but also how that opposition has been definitively overcome. Indeed, to show just how seriously God takes the world, Hegel applies the image of oral speech not only to God’s operations ad extra, but to the inner Trinitarian sphere as well. In this way there is structural continuity and rational transparency between the divine essence and God’s work in the world. On Hegel’s account, these dynamics of orality are developmental and oriented upward; hence God’s action in history is not merely consistent with his divine essence, but in fact defines who he is as God, the God who is love.

Both historically in Hegel’s development and systematically in his philosophy, however, the dynamism of his Logos speculation moves beyond love in a way that possibly vitiates the seriousness with which he had tried to infuse it. In his historical development, Hegel gradually supplants an early, yet formative concept of love with that of reason.¹ By the time he arrives at his mature system, he has come to view love as limited by its residual sensuousness and inability to explain the connections between its ostensibly contradictory moments. Systematically too, then, Hegel’s dynamic logic strives to sublate the representational form of the Christian religion and advance toward a conceptual mode of expression commensurate to its truth content. Religion, accordingly, gives way to absolute knowledge or philosophy, where form and content, subject and object, God and the world are united in self-­conscious freedom. Trinitarianly speaking, the objective Logos of Christ, including the creation and salvation of the world, knows itself as but a passing moment in the rational process or history of divine becoming, of the triune God as absolute Logos, that is, as absolute Spirit.

These features of Hegel’s Christology—namely, its teleologically philosophical and pneumatological inflection—affect the manner in which we can compare it to Augustine’s understanding of Christ. The latter I label a rhetorical Christology, inasmuch as Augustine also uses oral linguistic imagery, but only for the incarnation. Thus, in contrast to Hegel, there is in Augustine’s use of Logos imagery a distinction between the eternal, inner-­Trinitarian Word and the incarnate Word spoken in the world. Whereas Hegel seeks to bridge that gap by integrating the dynamism of the spoken word into an all-­encompassing concept of reason, Augustine’s use of the rhetorical motif is intended to underscore the difference between God and the world, not their rational identity. Augustine frames the incarnation of the eternal Word in terms of fittingness—God speaks fittingly to the problem of sin and death that humans have caused. In this way God’s incarnate Word is for Augustine a Word of freedom and love.

Thus, Part I attempts to illustrate this difference between Hegel’s logical and Augustine’s rhetorical christological paradigms by tracing how they play out across the span of Christ’s life and death. The use of such a method, however, brings with it a difficulty that must be explained on material and formal levels. There is a material disparity between the two thinkers’ treatments of the historical events in Jesus’ life. Hegel, in spite of his attempt to take history seriously through his dynamic logic of becoming, is driven by that same logic, where the historical Christ is concerned, to focus primarily, if not exclusively, upon the definitive moment of negativity within the history of God—Christ’s crucifixion—and, moreover, to find in that negativity a dynamism that necessarily moves beyond Christ to the spiritual community. Contrariwise, Augustine, who has