Capturing Jonathan Pollard: How One of the Most Notorious Spies in American History Was Brought to Justice

CAPTURING JONATHAN

POLLARD

CAPTURING JONATHAN

POLLARD

How One of the

Most Notorious Spies

in American History Was

Brought to Justice

RONALD J. OLIVE

SPECIAL AGENT, NCIS (RET.)

The latest edition of this work has been brought to publication with the generous assistance of Marguerite and Gerry Lenfest.

Naval Institute Press

291 Wood Road

Annapolis, MD 21402

© 2006 by Ronald J. Olive

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

First Naval Institute Press paperback edition 2009.

ISBN 978-1-61251-454-3 (eBook)

The Library of Congress has cataloged the hardcover edition as follows:

Olive, Ronald J.

Capturing Jonathan Pollard : how one of the most notorious spies in American history was brought to justice / Ronald J. Olive.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Pollard, Jonathan Jay, 1954– 2. Spies—Israel—Biography. 3. Spies—United States—Biography. 4. Espionage, Israeli—United States—History—20th century. I. Title.

UB271.I82O45 2006

364.1’31—dc22

2006015639

Print editions meet the requirements of ANSI/NISO z39.48-1992 (Permanence of Paper).

87654321

Jacket and chapter opening images include unclassified surveillance photos extracted from the NIS evidence video of 15 and 18 November 1985. —PETER BURCHERT

To my wife, Gail,

my best friend and the most loving person

I have ever met and for

my dear mother and father and

our entire family.

CONTENTS

Preface

List of Acronyms

1A Dream Come True

2Pollard Launches His Career

3The Double-Agent Ruse

4Pollard’s Battle with the Navy

5Red Flags

6The Israeli Connection

7The Point of No Return

8A Thief in the Night

9The Fall Guy

10The Ten-Year Plan

11Tall Tales

12A Secret Tip

13The Wheel Begins to Turn

14The Beginning of the End

15A Twist of Fate

16Pollard Balks

17The Confession

18A Fatal Blunder

19A Spy Left Out in the Cold

20Unrepentant

21No Time to Lose

22Operation Foul Play

23Israel Confronted

24Guilty

25The Damage

26The Sentencing

27The Aftermath

28More Sinned against than Sinning?

Epilogue

Appendix

Acknowledgments

Notes

Index

PREFACE

Over the course of eighteen months, between June 1984 and November 1985, Jonathan Jay Pollard, an intelligence analyst working in the U.S. Naval Investigative Service’s Anti-Terrorist Alert Center (ATAC), illegally took highly sensitive national security secrets from almost every major intelligence-gathering agency in the United States for the purpose of providing them to a foreign government. What he took, and subsequently sold to Israel—more than one million pages of classified material—would fill a six-by-ten-foot room with the stacks rising six feet high. No other spy in the history of the United States has sold so highly classified documents, in such a short period of time, as Jonathan Jay Pollard. Tragically, long before he started spying, the Navy had many opportunities to fire him but didn’t. As a result, his espionage activity did irreparable damage to the national defense of the United States.

I was the assistant special agent in charge of foreign counterintelligence at the Naval Investigative Service’s Washington, D.C., field office when the Pollard case broke wide open in November 1985. The account that follows tells the inside story of Jonathan Pollard, untold until now, and held closely by the government for the past twenty years. I interrogated Pollard and garnered the confession that helped lead to his arrest and subsequent conviction and life sentence.

Since 4 March 1987, controversy has swirled around the life sentence Pollard received. A handful of books and thousands of articles have been written, the majority of which denounce his sentence as unjust. What the public doesn’t realize is that Pollard was a master of deceit and manipulation who repeatedly beat the system. Nor does the public realize the extent of the damage he inflicted.

Because his case never went to trial, and so much of the information surrounding it is still classified, over the years many unanswered questions have arisen. Uncertainty has fueled speculation, rumor, and lies, all fanned by the far-fetched stories Pollard himself makes up in his prison cell.

My goal in the following pages is to set the record straight. What bizarre behavior did Pollard exhibit that might have served as a red flag for espionage? How did security break down? What mistaken assumptions and leadership failures enabled him to continue ransacking America’s defense intelligence? How was he really caught, and what went on inside the investigation? What did Pollard confess to immediately following his arrest and in debriefing sessions following his guilty plea? What other countries was he illegally involved with before and during his spying activities with Israel? What are the significant events of his life, while in prison, that keep him in the media today? What role did the so-called Weinberger memorandum play in Pollard’s sentencing? These questions and many more will be answered for the first time.

The true Pollard story is a textbook case of a disastrous counterintelligence failure. To this day, it haunts the people who held top management positions in the Department of the Navy when Pollard was active there. But out of tragedy come lessons. In addition to presenting a behind-the-scenes account, my hope is to provide vital insight into how Pollard’s espionage activities could have been prevented. I will consider my effort in writing this book worthwhile if it raises awareness about the need for vigilance on the part of those entrusted with protecting the national defense secrets of the United States.

It was after five years in the U.S. Marine Corps and eight years in city law enforcement—working undercover operations and then working on organized crime in the intelligence unit—that I joined the Naval Investigative Service (NIS) as a civilian special agent. (Although in the mid-1980s, during the Pollard investigation, the NIS was renamed the Naval Security and Investigative Command [and today is known as the Naval Criminal Investigative Service], to prevent confusion I will stick to the acronym NIS throughout this book.)

After joining the NIS, I was assigned to the naval base in Charleston, South Carolina. I found myself increasingly interested in the world of counterintelligence and counterespionage operations many times called double-agent operations. Foreign governments committing or attempting to commit espionage against the United States have always been a major problem. Double-agent operations are conducted and designated to identify hostile agents recruiting military personnel or civilians and/or handling walk-in, wanna-be spies; take up the hostile foreign country’s personnel time by providing them with a supposed provocateur, who pretends to be a legitimate spy; and identify what are called essential elements of information that every hostile country targeting the United States is trying to acquire through volunteers or recruiting American spies and other means. Following some training I took my first stab at recruiting a double agent. His name was William Tanner, a civilian engineer working on submarine communications at the Naval Electronics Engineering Command in Charleston. Tanner convinced an East German intelligence officer that he was a spy who was willing to sell his nation’s secrets for money. The officer, Alfred Zehe, was arrested, and a subsequent trial in Boston culminated in his incarceration. He was later released in the largest spy swap in history.

In 1981, three years before Pollard met his Israeli spy handlers, I was assigned to the NIS field office in Naples, Italy, to work criminal cases. From this base I worked counter-narcotic operations during several U.S. Navy ship port calls. Both the NIS confidential source and the host country’s police source would attempt to buy narcotics from drug dealers, and the local or federal police would make the arrest. I had the opportunity to go to Israel with Special Agent Steve Einsel to work one of these operations, and while there we took the time to sightsee, traveling to the border at the Golan Heights, visiting Bethlehem and the Garden of Olives, and eating lunch in the community kitchen of a kibbutz on Israel’s remote northern border. It was the trip of a lifetime. Little did I know there would come a time when I would draw on my experiences in Israel to coax a confession from a person who would become one of the most notorious spies in U.S. history.

Eventually, back in Naples, I was assigned as the squad leader for foreign counterintelligence. My squad and I recruited and trained a double agent for an operation we initiated against the Soviet Intourist Bureau in Rome. Operation Sackett Land was launched some two years before Pollard’s arrest. Ultimately this operation would lead to the defection of a Soviet KGB officer to the United States. The information he provided to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) about American spies working for the Soviets was invaluable. In an incredible twist of fate, what he told them indirectly caused Jonathan Pollard’s wife to panic while trying to dispose of Pollard’s stacks of classified information. This set off a chain of events that led to the arrest of both husband and wife.

The information presented in the pages that follow is an accumulation of facts taken strictly from unclassified sources: extensive personal interviews with NIS and FBI agents and navy brass who were personally involved with the Pollard case; public court records; unclassified reports of the navy judge advocate general (JAG) administrative investigation; NIS reports; debriefing reports following Pollard’s guilty plea, all retrieved under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA); and my personal recollections of Pollard before and during the investigation. The information contained in this book was submitted to the Department of the Navy’s Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Information and Personnel Security Section, for a pre-publication security review. The content was authorized for public release and officially stamped on 15 June 2005 indicating there were No security objections to open publication.

In writing this book, my goal is not to demonize Israel and its intelligence agents, regardless of the strain in diplomatic relations the Pollard case caused between that country and the United States. This is a sad story of how a close ally made a terrible mistake and was caught. Nor is my goal to demonize Pollard. I have tried to present the information about this highly publicized spy without bias, based on the facts of the case. I hold no personal grudge against him. He continues to fight for his freedom with great determination and wide exposure, and that is his right. But the fact remains that he lost his way because of a misguided notion that it was okay to sell his nation’s secrets. He took the law into his own hands to help an ally, believing that, when the time came, Israel would save him from capture. This was a fatal miscalculation. When it was too late, he found no one to turn to, and in a panicked last-minute decision, made in the heart of the U.S. capital, he drove through the gates of the Israeli embassy only to discover it offered no asylum.

ACRONYMS

CAPTURING JONATHAN

POLLARD

Chapter 1

A DREAM COME TRUE

In early June 1984, a bespectacled nearly thirty-year-old man with a dimpled chin, chubby cheeks, and wavy, receding hair left his modest apartment in Washington, D.C., and walked two blocks to the fashionable Hilton Hotel, spread across seven manicured acres at 1919 Connecticut Avenue. In the lobby, a sumptuous space lit up by a massive crystal chandelier, he glanced around and located the person he had come to meet for lunch, a stranger to him until now. After a quick consultation, the two decided to eat in the Hilton’s refurbished coffee shop, at a corner table where no one would overhear their conversation.

Hilton Hotel, Washington, D.C. —SHANNON OLIVE

It was a watershed moment in the life of this man—the first step in the culmination of a lifelong dream. For the guardians of America’s national security, it was a disaster in the making. Jonathan Jay Pollard, a naval intelligence analyst, had recently been temporarily assigned to the ATAC, a newly established division of the NIS. As a watch stander, he was responsible for answering phones, interpreting classified information about potential terrorist activity, and writing draft reports for review before they were disseminated to the fleet. His position gave him access to the most highly classified material the defense intelligence community possessed.

His lunch partner, Israeli air force colonel Aviem Sella, was a striking, articulate man with a slightly pointed chin and a lean, trim build. A famed fighter jock and an Israeli national hero, he was the exact opposite of the bookish, baby-faced Pollard, who had been a social outcast for much of his life. Some said that Pollard was a wise guy and a troublemaker, a flamboyant, loose-lipped person who invited insults and basked in attention, whether positive or negative. The analyst claimed he was harassed because he was Jewish. Whatever the case, he had spent much of his life on the sidelines, and like many a sidelined youth, over the years he developed an active fantasy life. During his undergraduate years at Stanford University he told a lot of far-fetched tales, most notably, bragging to acquaintances about working for the Israeli foreign-intelligence agency Mossad and being a colonel in an elite Israeli army outfit. He dreamed of someday becoming a real spy. Now, after years of longing for it, his opportunity had arrived.

In the annals of spy lore, the encounter at the Hilton would have been laughable had it not led to such a disastrous result. Both the analyst and the air force colonel were wet behind the ears. Though, in the past, Pollard had tried to pass classified information off to various people, his attempts had been bungled. Despite all the big talk about working for Mossad, there is no indication that up to this point he had ever given someone classified information for money. As for Sella, he was a pilot and a student, not an intelligence operative. Currently he was attending New York University, working on his doctorate in computer science and raising money for Israeli bonds by lecturing about his combat missions. Sella was an excellent speaker, well known throughout the New York Jewish community for the riveting accounts he gave of his legendary exploits. But he knew little about the art of recruiting a spy.

When the two men met for lunch, both were nervous. Colonel Sella didn’t know what to expect from the figure sitting across the table from him. Sure, someone had sung Pollard’s praises, saying that he was a brilliant man and an ardent Zionist, but the person who made this claim was just a passing acquaintance. Was the colonel doing the right thing? Sella made up his mind not to say much of anything other than impressing the analyst with his background. He would just listen to what Pollard had to say and report it to his superior at the Israeli consulate in New York City, Yosef Yagur.

Although Pollard had his own reasons for being cautious, by nature he was less inclined to hold back. No sooner had they met than he pegged his lunch companion as the Chuck Yeager type, and his nerves began to settle. Before long, Sella was telling Pollard that he had shot down Soviet-piloted MiG aircraft over the Suez in 1969, and Pollard was addressing Sella as Avi. Anyone with Russian blood on his hands is all right with me, Pollard thought, and he began giving Sella a detailed description of the high-level access he had working for the ATAC.¹

Israeli Air Force Colonel Aviem Sella. AP/WWP

Pollard cited specific examples of what he could get his hands on, including documents classified TS for top secret and SCI for sensitive compartmented information, the U.S. government’s highest classification level.² He had access to classified materials housed at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the CIA, the National Security Agency (NSA), the Naval Intelligence Command (NIC), the Naval Intelligence Support Center (NISC), and the National Photographic Interpretations Center (NPIC), among others, and he knew how to exploit security chasms.³ The analyst was blunt: he wanted to work as an undercover agent for Israel. His ultimate goal, he admitted, was to immigrate to Israel, but for now he was willing to stick with his job and exploit holes in the U.S. intelligence system on behalf of the Jewish homeland.

Sella was stunned. What this fellow was telling him was so incredible and so bold that, thinking it must be a setup, the Israeli glanced around the room to see if anyone was watching. I can’t believe that security is so lax in the U.S. government, he said with a skeptical look.

Pollard, a nonstop talker, kept chattering away about his access, claiming that he could get signal intelligence in addition to technical information. His manner was so convincing that Sella in turn began to relax. No one could be this bold and sincere at the same time. Pollard must be telling the truth.

The colonel had already been authorized by Yagur to set up another meeting as well as a clandestine communications plan, but only if he believed Pollard to be sincere. By now, Sella was sold. This was a golden opportunity, one that he couldn’t let slip through his fingers.

Leaning forward on his elbows, Sella said they were going to set up a communications link using pay phones near Pollard’s apartment. The analyst should locate several phones and write down their numbers. Not wasting a second, Pollard catapulted out of his seat and told his companion to wait right there, he would be back soon. About twenty minutes later, he returned to the coffee shop with the numbers scribbled on a piece of paper and handed it over. Sella assigned each phone number a one-letter code from the Hebrew alphabet.⁴

The plan was that the colonel would ring Pollard up at his residence at a specific time and give him the code letter that corresponded to a given pay phone. As soon as Pollard heard the Hebrew letter, he was to hang up, go to the appropriate phone, and wait for Sella to call with further instructions.

The colonel told him to bring to their next meeting anything he could get his hands on about Saudi Arabia and Soviet air defense systems. He needed several samples of the types of classified material to which Pollard had access. Then Sella began pushing the button to test his companion. In June 1981 the colonel had led a raid on a nuclear reactor facility in Tuwaitha, Iraq. He had been only verbally briefed following the mission and was dying to see the damage inflicted. Could Pollard produce satellite photos of the outcome?⁵ Sella figured that if there were any such photographs being held by the United States, they were probably coded top secret. That would be a good test of Pollard’s claims.

When lunch was finished, the two men parted ways with a warm handshake. Sella promised he would soon be in touch.

If the meeting had started with nervousness on both sides, it ended with joint elation. The colonel was under the impression that he would be Pollard’s operational case officer. This was far different from downing Soviet MiGs, but it was thrilling just the same. As for Pollard, he was in his glory. Although the issue of pay had not been mentioned, for years he had been dreaming about espionage, and now here he was, exiting the Hilton with a secret code already established, an Israeli war hero as his handler, and a virtual warehouse of highly sensitive defense material to disclose. And this was only his first meeting. . . .

Barely keeping his joy in check, he hurried home. Pollard had a girlfriend, Anne Henderson, with whom he shared everything. Before his encounter with Sella he had told her about it, saying this was his big chance to help Israel, and she had encouraged him to go forward with the meeting. Now, as soon as he walked through the door of his apartment, he spilled everything to Anne. His dream was coming true. Not only was he about to become a spy for Israel but also, he was convinced—though no promises had been made—Israel was going to pay him. He and Anne were on their way to a better life.

Insider betrayal is the most dangerous threat to our national security and national economy.

RON OLIVE

Special Agent, NCIS

Chapter 2

POLLARD LAUNCHES HIS CAREER

Jonathan Jay Pollard was born 7 August 1954, in Galveston, Texas, the youngest of three siblings in a close-knit, accomplished Jewish family whose patriarch, Dr. Morris Pollard, was a well-known research microbiologist. Before Jonathan reached his eighth birthday, Morris was offered a prestigious position as head of the Lobund Laboratory at Notre Dame University, and the family relocated to South Bend, Indiana.

A slender child with an inquisitive mind, Jonathan consumed books. He had a dimpled chin, thick brown hair always neatly combed from left to right, and full cheeks that were partially covered by owlish black-framed eyeglasses. Considered a sissy, he was an easy target at school. Bullies taunted him, chased him home, picked fights with him. As a result of the constant turmoil, his family decided to enroll Jonathan in a private Jewish school. There he flourished, playing the cello and reading every book he could lay his hands on.

His father traveled overseas extensively and often took the family along. While Jonathan was still in his early teens, they went to Germany and visited the concentration camp at Dachau. The experience shocked him, kindling a deep, enduring loyalty to Israel and the Jewish people. In 1970 Jonathan was accepted into the summer science school at the world-renowned Weizmann Institute in Israel. It was the most exhilarating time of his life, despite the trouble he had getting along with other students. One of his instructors alleged he was a troublemaker.

After finishing high school with honors, Pollard attended Stanford University, where he started using drugs and bragging about working as a secret agent for Mossad. Some of his classmates wrote him off as a kook, but others believed his crazy stories.

Naval Intelligence Support Center —NIS PHOTO

Pollard graduated with a degree in political science and was accepted into the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in Boston. After attending Fletcher for two years, he failed to complete final papers in several courses and dropped out. This didn’t matter to Pollard. The young man, whose only exposure to espionage at this point was likely to have been a John Le Carré novel or a James Bond movie, was eager to jump-start his career as a secret agent.

While looking for a job, Pollard came across an opening for a graduate fellowship with the CIA, headquartered in Langley, Virginia. The CIA called Pollard for an interview. At the time, the CIA was one of the few government agencies that required a polygraph examination of prospective employees. The polygraph questions were designed to uncover any circumstances that might make an employee susceptible to compromise or blackmail.

Pollard easily skated through the security questions. No, he had never had access to classified information. Yes, he had used Thai sticks and hashish one time, and had smoked marijuana—not on just a few occasions, but about six hundred times, between July 1974 and March 1978.¹ Needless to say, he was turned down for the job.

During the summer of 1979 Congress approved a grant for the navy to hire thirty intelligence analysts. Pollard applied for a position with the Navy Field Operational Intelligence Office (NFOIO) located in Suitland, Maryland, which was part of the NISC. Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, U.S. Navy (Ret.), who was a captain at the time, informed me that he hired Pollard in September of that year as an intelligence research specialist to work on Soviet issues. Pollard, like most young analysts hired right out of college, had to be trained from the ground up.

His position required a security clearance for top secret (TS) and sensitive compartmented information (SCI) classifications. SCI clearances, which allow access to some of the United States’ most closely guarded defense secrets, are given only to military and civilian personnel with a need to know for their specific area of concentration. Pollard also had to undergo a special background investigation ensuring that he was trustworthy and stable enough to handle such highly sensitive information.

In those days the Defense Investigative Service, or DIS (now called the Defense Security Service), had the responsibility of conducting background investigations for personnel requiring special clearances. Background investigations took an enormous amount of time, and by mid-November 1979, the DIS wasn’t close to finishing Pollard’s. His first assignment was to get a feel for how the Soviets were thinking by studying Soviet history, culture, and publications. He spent a lot of time at the Library of Congress conducting research while waiting for the clearance to come through. At the end of the month, Pollard was granted an interim TS clearance after a national agency check revealed no criminal background and no incriminating information from any of the agencies consulted, including the CIA, the FBI’s National Crime Information Center and identification fingerprint division, and the Department of State’s passport office.

On 7 December the navy special security officer who authorized SCI clearances provided Pollard’s command with an interim waiver giving him temporary access to SCI as well. It is common practice to issue waivers; without them, commands could not immediately place hired personnel in the specific sensitive jobs they were initially hired for. In essence, however, this creates a Catch 22 situation. The waiver would expire in August 1980, at which point, Pollard hoped, the background investigation would be complete. Immediately after being indoctrinated into several SCI programs, he was assigned as a watch stander in the Naval Ocean Surveillance Information Center (NOSIC), a component of the NFOIO.²

At one point during the background investigation, the DIS asked the CIA for any information it might have on Pollard. The CIA claimed—mistakenly, it turns out—that Pollard’s right to privacy prevented it from releasing information on him.³ Thus the DIS never learned that Pollard’s application for a position with the CIA had been outright rejected.

This job was his first exposure to extremely sensitive national security information. With it, Pollard entered the rarefied world of which he had only dreamed as a child, a world where he could physically lay his hands on defense secrets that just a select few in the United States, the most powerful nation on earth, ever had the occasion to share.

Admiral Brooks remembered Pollard at this time as being an impressive, smart, knowledgeable young man. Nothing had showed up in the background investigation that caused concern about his employment. The CIA, Brooks lamented, didn’t tell the navy they had kicked him out.⁴

At the time, Mr. Richard Haver was technical director of the NFOIO and the special assistant to then-Captain Brooks. Haver was the first person at the center to sense that Pollard was a potential danger.

One afternoon in the late fall of 1979, Pollard approached Haver outside the NFOIO and informed him that he had contacts with the South African government. He expressed concern that the navy was having problems keeping track of merchant vessels and