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    Five Dialogues (Translated by Benjamin Jowett)
    Five Dialogues (Translated by Benjamin Jowett)
    Five Dialogues (Translated by Benjamin Jowett)
    Ebook339 pages7 hours

    Five Dialogues (Translated by Benjamin Jowett)

    By Plato

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    The ancient Greek philosopher Plato was born around 425 BC to an aristocratic family. He was the most famous student of Socrates and would eventually go on to form his own school, the Academy. Plato’s dialogues are among the most popular of all writings from classical antiquity. Plato wrote his dialogues to record the wisdom that Socrates had imparted to his students. Plato’s works “Euthyphro,” “Apology,” “Crito,” “Meno,” and “Phaedo” are featured in this collection. These dialogues feature Socrates speaking with a student or friend about the philosophical concerns of laws, the virtue of mankind, the purpose of the gods, and death. Each dialogue searches through different facets of philosophy and makes the reader question their own personal beliefs and morals. While there is no underlying storyline, the dialogues follow important moments in Socrates’ life, from his trial to his death. Socrates was charged by the government for not believing in the Greek gods and was eventually put to death by having to drink poison. Plato’s works strove to record and safeguard his teacher’s wisdom for future generations to discover. This edition follows the highly regarded translations of Benjamin Jowett along with his introductions and also includes a biographical afterword.
    LanguageEnglish
    PublisherDigireads.com Publishing
    Release dateJun 1, 2015
    ISBN9781420951639
    Five Dialogues (Translated by Benjamin Jowett)
    Author

    Plato

    "Every heart sings a song, incomplete, until another heart whispers back. Those who wish to sing always find a song. At the touch of a lover, everyone becomes a poet.""Wise men speak because they have something to say; fools because they have to say something.""We can easily forgive a child who is afraid of the dark; the real tragedy of life is when men are afraid of the light.""Only the dead have seen the end of war."Plato

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    Reviews for Five Dialogues (Translated by Benjamin Jowett)

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    • 4/5
      Brilliant stuff.
    • 5/5
      Every educated person should read these brief dialogs because they are the closest thing to an underpinning of Western philosophy.
    • 3/5
      Apology, Phaedo, cool, more for historical purposes than any of their philosophical points. I don't think I like the Socratic method.
    • 3/5
      Dialogues taken from around the time of Socrates' death. I picked up this book wanting to understand more about the thinking of Socrates and the progressions of logical thought. My only previous introduction to "the Socratic Method" was from pop culture references and its abysmal application in public education.Apology, Crito and Phaedo all center upon Socrates' trial, personal philosophy and final conversation (respectively) and, while interesting from an academic point of view, I did not find them very helpful with regard to understanding the manner in which Socrates' plied his trade.Euthyphro and Meno, on the other hand, were remarkable for my understanding.In Euthyphro, Socrates attacks the question of the meaning of virtue when a young man decides to sue his father for the (supposedly) wrongful death of one slave that had killed another. In Meno, Socrates again tries to grasp an underlying meaning to the word, this time with a focus as to the nature of virtue, and whether or not it is a kind of knowledge that can be taught or it is ingrained in the "soul" of a man. While, in Meno, the conversation detours into a discussion of the soul and Socrates' personal belief that knowledge is eternal and "recollected" by the individual rather than learned or discovered, the characterization of knowledge, education and definition were extremely interesting.G. M. A. Grube's translations are at once simple and elegant prose which made for both enjoyable reading and clear understanding of the text. While the particular dialogues were not necessarily the best ones to cut my teeth on for my particular learning project, I would definitely recommend this collection for any one wanting more of the Man behind the Method.
    • 4/5
      This was recommended to me by the single most coolest stranger I have ever spent a few hours trapped on a plane with. It is by Plato (boo) but purports to be accounts of philosophical conversations Socrates had. I really enjoyed the first two (Euthyphro and Apologia) which dealt with issues of justice, the second of which is theoretically the speech Socrates gave in his defense while he was on trial. The last three were philosophical and scientific train wrecks.These last three, based on my limited exposure in college, feel very Plato to me. They range in topic from the nature of learning to the human soul and a truly Seussical argument that the quality of the thing comes not from its quantifiable attributes, but from it's relationship with Plato's beloved ideals or, as he called them, "Forms". These Forms are not anything we can see, or even really describe. They are simply the most pure form of a given ideal or attribute. Plato was really hung up on the ideal that the world as we see it is just a shitty copy of the ideals. I can't imagine he was much fun to hang out with. He also seems from this book to have desperately needed a lay as he was far too zealous in his claims that celibacy was absolutely necessary for the soul to prosper after death. I think it's a pretty simple case of sour grapes myself, but I digress.As I said, the topics in these last three are rangy, but they do share a commonality. They are all patent balderdash. Seriously. I don't think Plato (or Socrates if you're willing to accept that) even knew what a logical fallacy was. I wrote many irreverent notes in my margins (some about Plato's mother) as my irritation grew. So what was the problem? Honestly, it's roughly the same one I had with Lee's Strobel's [Case for Christ]. It starts with a premise for which there is no evidence but that the author dearly wants to be true, almost certainly for the comfort it provides him. In this case it is that the soul is immortal and that once it is freed from the body it is granted clear sight and infinite knowledge. And like Lee Strobel the rest of Plato/Socrates' claims are dependent their audience accepting this first unsupportable claim. The similarity doesn't end there. Each dialogue is presented as if it is a serious philosophical debate, but by the last three hardly any of the participants speak at all except to periodically tell Socrates how great he is and how right whatever nonsense he's just said is. You could rename this section of the book "Socrates and the Sycophants". It's very similar to the investigation that isn't really an investigation undertaken by Strobel, though Plato/Socrates is probably guiltier of far more self-satisfied moronic brain-wanking than Strobel ever could be. All in all I enjoyed the book. The first two dialogues I genuinely enjoyed and the last three I enjoyed bitching about. This I found worthy as I do love to hate Plato and had felt ill prepared to do so before and wasn't about to read [The Republic]. Oh, and at the end Socrates drinks hemlock and dies. It isn't as dramatic as it sounds though.Excerpt from Phaedo:...if someone tells me a thing is beautiful because it has a bright colour or shape or any such thing, I ignore these other reasons--for all these confuse me--but I simply, naively and perhaps foolishly cling to this, that nothing else makes it beautiful other than the presence of, or the sharing in, or however you may describe its relationship to that Beautiful we mentioned, for I will not insist on the precise nature of the relationship, but that all beautiful things are beautiful by the Beautiful. That, I think, is the safe answer for me or anyone else to give, namely, that it is through the Beauty that beautiful things are made beautiful...
    • 2/5
      really not that excited by Plato - what can I say ?
    • 5/5
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    • 4/5
      Five Dialogues: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno, Phaedo. Plato, translated by G.M.A. Gruber. 1981. This was the first reading selection for the new book club. I hadn’t read Plato since Dr. Lott’s class in world literature at Montevallo, so reading it was tough, although the more I read the easier it became. After the discussion I want to go back and re-read it! What struck me was the similarities of the ethical concerns in these with Judo-Christian thought.

    Book preview

    Five Dialogues (Translated by Benjamin Jowett) - Plato

    cover.jpg

    FIVE DIALOGUES

    (Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno, and Phaedo)

    By PLATO

    Translated by BENJAMIN JOWETT

    Five Dialogues (Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno, and Phaedo)

    By Plato

    Translated by Benjamin Jowett

    Print ISBN 13: 978-1-4209-5162-2

    eBook ISBN 13: 978-1-4209-5163-9

    This edition copyright © 2015. Digireads.com Publishing.

    All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying, recording, or other electronic or mechanical methods, without the prior written permission of the publisher, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical reviews and certain other noncommercial uses permitted by copyright law.

    Cover Image: A detail of The Death of Socrates by Jacques-Louis David, c. 1787.

    Please visit www.digireads.com

    CONTENTS

    Euthyphro

    INTRODUCTION

    EUTHYPHRO

    Apology

    INTRODUCTION

    APOLOGY

    Crito

    INTRODUCTION

    CRITO

    Meno

    INTRODUCTION

    ON THE IDEAS OF PLATO

    MENO

    Phaedo

    INTRODUCTION

    PHAEDO

    Euthyphro

    INTRODUCTION

    In the Meno, Anytus had parted from Socrates with the significant words: ‘That in any city, and particularly in the city of Athens, it is easier to do men harm than to do them good;’ and Socrates was anticipating another opportunity of talking with him. In the Euthyphro, Socrates is awaiting his trial for impiety. But before the trial begins, Plato would like to put the world on their trial, and convince them of ignorance in that very matter touching which Socrates is accused. An incident which may perhaps really have occurred in the family of Euthyphro, a learned Athenian diviner and soothsayer, furnishes the occasion of the discussion.

    This Euthyphro and Socrates are represented as meeting in the porch of the King Archon. (Compare Theaet.) Both have legal business in hand. Socrates is defendant in a suit for impiety which Meletus has brought against him (it is remarked by the way that he is not a likely man himself to have brought a suit against another); and Euthyphro too is plaintiff in an action for murder, which he has brought against his own father. The latter has originated in the following manner:—A poor dependant of the family had slain one of their domestic slaves in Naxos. The guilty person was bound and thrown into a ditch by the command of Euthyphro’s father, who sent to the interpreters of religion at Athens to ask what should be done with him. Before the messenger came back the criminal had died from hunger and exposure.

    This is the origin of the charge of murder which Euthyphro brings against his father. Socrates is confident that before he could have undertaken the responsibility of such a prosecution, he must have been perfectly informed of the nature of piety and impiety; and as he is going to be tried for impiety himself, he thinks that he cannot do better than learn of Euthyphro (who will be admitted by everybody, including the judges, to be an unimpeachable authority) what piety is, and what is impiety. What then is piety?

    Euthyphro, who, in the abundance of his knowledge, is very willing to undertake all the responsibility, replies: That piety is doing as I do, prosecuting your father (if he is guilty) on a charge of murder; doing as the gods do—as Zeus did to Cronos, and Cronos to Uranus.

    Socrates has a dislike to these tales of mythology, and he fancies that this dislike of his may be the reason why he is charged with impiety. ‘Are they really true?’ ‘Yes, they are;’ and Euthyphro will gladly tell Socrates some more of them. But Socrates would like first of all to have a more satisfactory answer to the question, ‘What is piety?’ ‘Doing as I do, charging a father with murder,’ may be a single instance of piety, but can hardly be regarded as a general definition.

    Euthyphro replies, that ‘Piety is what is dear to the gods, and impiety is what is not dear to them.’ But may there not be differences of opinion, as among men, so also among the gods? Especially, about good and evil, which have no fixed rule; and these are precisely the sort of differences which give rise to quarrels. And therefore what may be dear to one god may not be dear to another, and the same action may be both pious and impious; e.g. your chastisement of your father, Euthyphro, may be dear or pleasing to Zeus (who inflicted a similar chastisement on his own father), but not equally pleasing to Cronos or Uranus (who suffered at the hands of their sons).

    Euthyphro answers that there is no difference of opinion, either among gods or men, as to the propriety of punishing a murderer. Yes, rejoins Socrates, when they know him to be a murderer; but you are assuming the point at issue. If all the circumstances of the case are considered, are you able to show that your father was guilty of murder, or that all the gods are agreed in approving of our prosecution of him? And must you not allow that what is hated by one god may be liked by another? Waiving this last, however, Socrates proposes to amend the definition, and say that ‘what all the gods love is pious, and what they all hate is impious.’ To this Euthyphro agrees.

    Socrates proceeds to analyze the new form of the definition. He shows that in other cases the act precedes the state; e.g. the act of being carried, loved, etc. precedes the state of being carried, loved, etc., and therefore that which is dear to the gods is dear to the gods because it is first loved of them, not loved of them because it is dear to them. But the pious or holy is loved by the gods because it is pious or holy, which is equivalent to saying, that it is loved by them because it is dear to them. Here then appears to be a contradiction,—Euthyphro has been giving an attribute or accident of piety only, and not the essence. Euthyphro acknowledges himself that his explanations seem to walk away or go round in a circle, like the moving figures of Daedalus, the ancestor of Socrates, who has communicated his art to his descendants.

    Socrates, who is desirous of stimulating the indolent intelligence of Euthyphro, raises the question in another manner: ‘Is all the pious just?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘Is all the just pious?’ ‘No.’ ‘Then what part of justice is piety?’ Euthyphro replies that piety is that part of justice which ‘attends’ to the gods, as there is another part of justice which ‘attends’ to men. But what is the meaning of ‘attending’ to the gods? The word ‘attending,’ when applied to dogs, horses, and men, implies that in some way they are made better. But how do pious or holy acts make the gods any better? Euthyphro explains that he means by pious acts, acts of service or ministration. Yes; but the ministrations of the husbandman, the physician, and the builder have an end. To what end do we serve the gods, and what do we help them to accomplish? Euthyphro replies, that all these difficult questions cannot be resolved in a short time; and he would rather say simply that piety is knowing how to please the gods in word and deed, by prayers and sacrifices. In other words, says Socrates, piety is ‘a science of asking and giving’—asking what we want and giving what they want; in short, a mode of doing business between gods and men. But although they are the givers of all good, how can we give them any good in return? ‘Nay, but we give them honour.’ Then we give them not what is beneficial, but what is pleasing or dear to them; and this is the point which has been already disproved.

    Socrates, although weary of the subterfuges and evasions of Euthyphro, remains unshaken in his conviction that he must know the nature of piety, or he would never have prosecuted his old father. He is still hoping that he will condescend to instruct him. But Euthyphro is in a hurry and cannot stay. And Socrates’ last hope of knowing the nature of piety before he is prosecuted for impiety has disappeared. As in the Euthydemus the irony is carried on to the end.

    The Euthyphro is manifestly designed to contrast the real nature of piety and impiety with the popular conceptions of them. But when the popular conceptions of them have been overthrown, Socrates does not offer any definition of his own: as in the Laches and Lysis, he prepares the way for an answer to the question which he has raised; but true to his own character, refuses to answer himself.

    Euthyphro is a religionist, and is elsewhere spoken of, if he be the same person, as the author of a philosophy of names, by whose ‘prancing steeds’ Socrates in the Cratylus is carried away. He has the conceit and self-confidence of a Sophist; no doubt that he is right in prosecuting his father has ever entered into his mind. Like a Sophist too, he is incapable either of framing a general definition or of following the course of an argument. His wrong-headedness, one-sidedness, narrowness, positiveness, are characteristic of his priestly office. His failure to apprehend an argument may be compared to a similar defect which is observable in the rhapsode Ion. But he is not a bad man, and he is friendly to Socrates, whose familiar sign he recognizes with interest. Though unable to follow him he is very willing to be led by him, and eagerly catches at any suggestion which saves him from the trouble of thinking. Moreover he is the enemy of Meletus, who, as he says, is availing himself of the popular dislike to innovations in religion in order to injure Socrates; at the same time he is amusingly confident that he has weapons in his own armoury which would be more than a match for him. He is quite sincere in his prosecution of his father, who has accidentally been guilty of homicide, and is not wholly free from blame. To purge away the crime appears to him in the light of a duty, whoever may be the criminal.

    Thus begins the contrast between the religion of the letter, or of the narrow and unenlightened conscience, and the higher notion of religion which Socrates vainly endeavours to elicit from him. ‘Piety is doing as I do’ is the idea of religion which first occurs to him, and to many others who do not say what they think with equal frankness. For men are not easily persuaded that any other religion is better than their own; or that other nations, e.g. the Greeks in the time of Socrates, were equally serious in their religious beliefs and difficulties. The chief difference between us and them is, that they were slowly learning what we are in process of forgetting. Greek mythology hardly admitted of the distinction between accidental homicide and murder: that the pollution of blood was the same in both cases is also the feeling of the Athenian diviner. He had not as yet learned the lesson, which philosophy was teaching, that Homer and Hesiod, if not banished from the state, or whipped out of the assembly, as Heraclitus more rudely proposed, at any rate were not to be appealed to as authorities in religion; and he is ready to defend his conduct by the examples of the gods. These are the very tales which Socrates cannot abide; and his dislike of them, as he suspects, has branded him with the reputation of impiety. Here is one answer to the question, ‘Why Socrates was put to death,’ suggested by the way. Another is conveyed in the words, ‘The Athenians do not care about any man being thought wise until he begins to make other men wise; and then for some reason or other they are angry:’ which may be said to be the rule of popular toleration in most other countries, and not at Athens only. In the course of the argument Socrates remarks that the controversial nature of morals and religion arises out of the difficulty of verifying them. There is no measure or standard to which they can be referred.

    The next definition, ‘Piety is that which is loved of the gods,’ is shipwrecked on a refined distinction between the state and the act, corresponding respectively to the adjective (philon) and the participle (philoumenon), or rather perhaps to the participle and the verb (philoumenon and phileitai). The act is prior to the state (as in Aristotle the energeia precedes the dunamis); and the state of being loved is preceded by the act of being loved. But piety or holiness is preceded by the act of being pious, not by the act of being loved; and therefore piety and the state of being loved are different. Through such subtleties of dialectic Socrates is working his way into a deeper region of thought and feeling. He means to say that the words ‘loved of the gods’ express an attribute only, and not the essence of piety.

    Then follows the third and last definition, ‘Piety is a part of justice.’ Thus far Socrates has proceeded in placing religion on a moral foundation. He is seeking to realize the harmony of religion and morality, which the great poets Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Pindar had unconsciously anticipated, and which is the universal want of all men. To this the soothsayer adds the ceremonial element, ‘attending upon the gods.’ When further interrogated by Socrates as to the nature of this ‘attention to the gods,’ he replies, that piety is an affair of business, a science of giving and asking, and the like. Socrates points out the anthropomorphism of these notions, (compare Symp.; Republic; Politicus.) But when we expect him to go on and show that the true service of the gods is the service of the spirit and the co-operation with them in all things true and good, he stops short; this was a lesson which the soothsayer could not have been made to understand, and which every one must learn for himself.

    There seem to be altogether three aims or interests in this little Dialogue: (1) the dialectical development of the idea of piety; (2) the antithesis of true and false religion, which is carried to a certain extent only; (3) the defence of Socrates.

    The subtle connection with the Apology and the Crito; the holding back of the conclusion, as in the Charmides, Lysis, Laches, Protagoras, and other Dialogues; the deep insight into the religious world; the dramatic power and play of the two characters; the inimitable irony, are reasons for believing that the Euthyphro is a genuine Platonic writing. The spirit in which the popular representations of mythology are denounced recalls Republic II. The virtue of piety has been already mentioned as one of five in the Protagoras, but is not reckoned among the four cardinal virtues of Republic IV. The figure of Daedalus has occurred in the Meno; that of Proteus in the Euthydemus and Io. The kingly science has already appeared in the Euthydemus, and will reappear in the Republic and Statesman. But neither from these nor any other indications of similarity or difference, and still less from arguments respecting the suitableness of this little work to aid Socrates at the time of his trial or the reverse, can any evidence of the date be obtained.

    EUTHYPHRO

    PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, Euthyphro.

    SCENE: The Porch of the King Archon.

    EUTHYPHRO: Why have you left the Lyceum, Socrates? and what are you doing in the Porch of the King Archon? Surely you cannot be concerned in a suit before the King, like myself?

    SOCRATES: Not in a suit, Euthyphro; impeachment is the word which the Athenians use.

    EUTHYPHRO: What! I suppose that some one has been prosecuting you, for I cannot believe that you are the prosecutor of another.

    SOCRATES: Certainly not.

    EUTHYPHRO: Then some one else has been prosecuting you?

    SOCRATES: Yes.

    EUTHYPHRO: And who is he?

    SOCRATES: A young man who is little known, Euthyphro; and I hardly know him: his name is Meletus, and he is of the deme of Pitthis. Perhaps you may remember his appearance; he has a beak, and long straight hair, and a beard which is ill grown.

    EUTHYPHRO: No, I do not remember him, Socrates. But what is the charge which he brings against you?

    SOCRATES: What is the charge? Well, a very serious charge, which shows a good deal of character in the young man, and for which he is certainly not to be despised. He says he knows how the youth are corrupted and who are their corruptors. I fancy that he must be a wise man, and seeing that I am the reverse of a wise man, he has found me out, and is going to accuse me of corrupting his young friends. And of this our mother the state is to be the judge. Of all our political men he is the only one who seems to me to begin in the right way, with the cultivation of virtue in youth; like a good husbandman, he makes the young shoots his first care, and clears away us who are the destroyers of them. This is only the first step; he will afterwards attend to the elder branches; and if he goes on as he has begun, he will be a very great public benefactor.

    EUTHYPHRO: I hope that he may; but I rather fear, Socrates, that the opposite will turn out to be the truth. My opinion is that in attacking you he is simply aiming a blow at the foundation of the state. But in what way does he say that you corrupt the young?

    SOCRATES: He brings a wonderful accusation against me, which at first hearing excites surprise: he says that I am a poet or maker of gods, and that I invent new gods and deny the existence of old ones; this is the ground of his indictment.

    EUTHYPHRO: I understand, Socrates; he means to attack you about the familiar sign which occasionally, as you say, comes to you. He thinks that you are a neologian, and he is going to have you up before the court for this. He knows that such a charge is readily received by the world, as I myself know too well; for when I speak in the assembly about divine things, and foretell the future to them, they laugh at me and think me a madman. Yet every word that I say is true. But they are jealous of us all; and we must be brave and go at them.

    SOCRATES: Their laughter, friend Euthyphro, is not a matter of much consequence. For a man may be thought wise; but the Athenians, I suspect, do not much trouble themselves about him until he begins to impart his wisdom to others, and then for some reason or other, perhaps, as you say, from jealousy, they are angry.

    EUTHYPHRO: I am never likely to try their temper in this way.

    SOCRATES: I dare say not, for you are reserved in your behaviour, and seldom impart your wisdom. But I have a benevolent habit of pouring out myself to everybody, and would even pay for a listener, and I am afraid that the Athenians may think me too talkative. Now if, as I was saying, they would only laugh at me, as you say that they laugh at you, the time might pass gaily enough in the court; but perhaps they may be in earnest, and then what the end will be you soothsayers only can predict.

    EUTHYPHRO: I dare say that the affair will end in nothing, Socrates, and that you will win your cause; and I think that I shall win my own.

    SOCRATES: And what is your suit, Euthyphro? are you the pursuer or the defendant?

    EUTHYPHRO: I am the pursuer.

    SOCRATES: Of whom?

    EUTHYPHRO: You will think me mad when I tell you.

    SOCRATES: Why, has the fugitive wings?

    EUTHYPHRO: Nay, he is not very volatile at his time of life.

    SOCRATES: Who is he?

    EUTHYPHRO: My father.

    SOCRATES: Your father! my good man?

    EUTHYPHRO: Yes.

    SOCRATES: And of what is he accused?

    EUTHYPHRO: Of murder, Socrates.

    SOCRATES: By the powers, Euthyphro! how little does the common herd know of the nature of right and truth. A man must be an extraordinary man, and have made great strides in wisdom, before he could have seen his way to bring such an action.

    EUTHYPHRO: Indeed, Socrates, he must.

    SOCRATES: I suppose that the man whom your father murdered was one of your relatives—clearly he was; for if he had been a stranger you would never have thought of prosecuting him.

    EUTHYPHRO: I am amused, Socrates, at your making a distinction between one who is a relation and one who is not a relation; for surely the pollution is the same in either case, if you knowingly associate with the murderer when you ought to clear yourself and him by proceeding against him. The real question is whether the murdered man has been justly slain. If justly, then your duty is to let the matter alone; but if unjustly, then even if the murderer lives under the same roof with you and eats at the same table, proceed against him. Now the man who is dead was a poor dependant of mine who worked for us as a field labourer on our farm in Naxos, and one day in a fit of drunken passion he got into a quarrel with one of our domestic servants and slew him. My father bound him hand and foot and threw him into a ditch, and then sent to Athens to ask of a diviner what he should do with him. Meanwhile he never attended to him and took no care about him, for he regarded him as a murderer; and thought that no great harm would be done even if he did die. Now this was just what happened. For such was the effect of cold and hunger and chains upon him, that before the messenger returned from the diviner, he was dead. And my father and family are angry with me for taking the part of the murderer and prosecuting my father. They say that he did not kill him, and that if he did, the dead man was but a murderer, and I ought not to take any notice, for that a son is impious who prosecutes a father. Which shows, Socrates, how little they know what the gods think about piety and impiety.

    SOCRATES: Good heavens, Euthyphro! and is your knowledge of religion and of things pious and impious so very exact, that, supposing the circumstances to be as you state them, you are not afraid lest you too may be doing an impious thing in bringing an action against your father?

    EUTHYPHRO: The best of Euthyphro, and that which distinguishes him, Socrates, from other men, is his exact knowledge of all such matters. What should I be good for without it?

    SOCRATES: Rare friend! I think that I cannot do better than be your disciple. Then before the trial with Meletus comes on I shall challenge him, and say that I have always had a great interest in religious questions, and now, as he charges me with rash imaginations and innovations in religion, I have become your disciple. You, Meletus, as I shall say to him, acknowledge Euthyphro to be a great theologian, and sound in his opinions; and if you approve of him you ought to approve of me, and not have me into court; but if you disapprove, you should begin by indicting him who is my teacher, and who will be the ruin, not of the young, but of the old; that is to say, of myself whom he instructs, and of his old father whom he admonishes and chastises. And if Meletus refuses to listen to me, but will go on, and will not shift the indictment from me to you, I cannot do better than repeat this challenge in the court.

    EUTHYPHRO: Yes, indeed, Socrates; and if he attempts to indict me I am mistaken if I do not find a flaw in him; the court shall have a great deal more to say to him than to me.

    SOCRATES: And I, my dear friend, knowing this, am desirous of becoming your disciple. For I observe that no one appears to notice you—not even this Meletus; but his sharp eyes have found me out at once, and he has indicted me for impiety. And therefore, I adjure you to tell me the nature of piety and impiety, which you said that you knew so well, and of murder, and of other offences against the gods. What are they? Is not piety in every action always the same? and impiety, again—is it not always the opposite of piety, and also the same with itself, having, as impiety, one notion which includes whatever is impious?

    EUTHYPHRO: To be sure, Socrates.

    SOCRATES: And what is piety, and what is impiety?

    EUTHYPHRO: Piety is doing as I am doing; that is to say, prosecuting any one who is guilty of murder, sacrilege, or of any similar crime—whether he be your father or mother, or whoever he may be—that makes no difference; and not to prosecute them is impiety. And please to consider, Socrates, what a notable proof I will give you of the truth of my words, a proof which I have already given to others:—of the principle, I mean, that the impious, whoever he may be, ought not to go unpunished. For do not men regard Zeus as the best and most righteous of the gods?—and yet they admit that he bound his father (Cronos) because he wickedly devoured his sons, and that he too had punished his own father (Uranus) for a similar reason, in a nameless manner. And yet when I proceed against my father, they are angry with me. So inconsistent are they in their way of talking when the gods are concerned, and when I am concerned.

    SOCRATES: May not this be the reason, Euthyphro, why I am charged with impiety—that I cannot away with these stories about the gods? and therefore I suppose that people think me wrong. But, as you who are well informed about them approve of them, I cannot do better than assent to your superior wisdom. What else can I say, confessing as I do, that I know nothing about them? Tell me, for the love of Zeus, whether you really believe that they are true.

    EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates; and things more wonderful still, of which the world is in ignorance.

    SOCRATES: And do you really believe that the gods fought with one another, and had dire quarrels, battles, and the like, as the poets say, and as you may see represented in the works of great artists? The temples are full of them; and notably the robe of Athene, which is carried up to the Acropolis at the great Panathenaea, is embroidered with them. Are all these tales of the gods true, Euthyphro?

    EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates; and, as I was saying, I can tell you, if you would like to hear them, many other things about the gods which would quite amaze you.

    SOCRATES: I dare say; and you shall tell me them at some other time when I have leisure. But just at present I would rather hear from you a more precise answer, which you have not as yet given, my friend, to the question, What is ‘piety’? When asked, you only replied, Doing as you do, charging your father with murder.

    EUTHYPHRO: And what I said was true, Socrates.

    SOCRATES: No doubt, Euthyphro; but you would admit that there are many other pious acts?

    EUTHYPHRO: There are.

    SOCRATES: Remember that I did not ask you to give me two or three examples of piety, but to explain the general idea which makes all pious things to be pious. Do you not recollect that there was one idea which made the impious impious, and the pious pious?

    EUTHYPHRO: I remember.

    SOCRATES: Tell me what is the nature of this idea, and then I shall have a standard to which I may look, and by which I may measure actions, whether yours or those of any one else, and then I shall be able to say that such and such an action is pious, such another impious.

    EUTHYPHRO: I will tell you, if you like.

    SOCRATES: I should very much like.

    EUTHYPHRO: Piety, then, is that which is dear to the gods, and impiety is that which is not dear to them.

    SOCRATES: Very good, Euthyphro; you have now given me the sort of answer which I wanted. But whether what you say is true or not I cannot as yet tell, although I make

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