U.S. Presidents and Foreign Policy Mistakes

U.S. PRESIDENTS AND FOREIGN POLICY MISTAKES

Stephen G. Walker

and Akan Malici

Stanford University Press

Stanford, California

©2011 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved.

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Walker, Stephen G., 1942– author.

U.S. presidents and foreign policy mistakes / Stephen G. Walker and Akan Malici.

pages cm

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-8047-7498-7 (cloth : alk. paper)—

ISBN 978-0-8047-7499-4 (pbk. : alk. paper)

1. United States—Foreign relations—Decision making. 2. National security—United States—Decision making. 3. Presidents—United States—Decision making. I. Malici, Akan, 1974– author. II. Title.

JZ1480.W33   2011

327.73—dc22          2011004620

Typeset by Westchester Book Composition in 10/15 Sabon

E-book ISBN: 978-0-8047-8069-8

Contents

Preface

PART I   THE ANATOMY OF FOREIGN POLICY MISTAKES

1   Mistakes as a Feature of Everyday Political Life

2   Foreign Policy Mistakes and the Exercise of Power

PART II   MISMANAGED THREATS

3   Fearing Losses Too Little: Deterrence Failures

4   Fearing Losses Too Much: False Alarm Failures

PART III   MISANMAGED OPPORTUNITIES

5   Seeking Gains Too Late: Reassurance Failures

6   Seeking Gains Too Soon: False Hope Failures

PART IV   MAXIMIZING RATIONALITY AND MINIMIZING MISTAKES

7   Foreign Policy Analysis: Maximizing Rationality

8   Foreign Policy Analysis: Minimizing Mistakes

PART V   FOREIGN POLICY MISTAKES IN COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS

9   Avoiding Foreign Policy Mistakes: Extension and Expansion

10   Foreign Policy Dynamics: The Middle East and South Asia Systems

11   Some Final Thoughts: Exploring the Rationality Frontier

Appendix

Notes

Bibliography

Index

Preface

IN THIS BOOK we undertake a critical examination of U.S. foreign policy by focusing on foreign policy mistakes made by U.S. presidents in the exercise of power. Our goals are to understand how mistakes occur and how to avoid or fix them. These goals have led us inevitably to consider why mistakes happen, a task that can be approached on a case-by-case basis or within the framework of a general theory of mistakes. Our approach is the latter one, which has led us to incorporate into our analysis insights from several theories of action and interaction in the academic literature on foreign policy and international relations. However, we envision our audience as broader than the academic community, extending into the ranks of both ordinary citizens and political leaders. It is tough to write for all three of these audiences, which bring different perspectives and degrees of interest to bear on our topic. Since the main thrust of our analysis is to provide both a map and a compass for avoiding foreign policy mistakes, therefore, we think it is appropriate here to provide similar guidance to the readers of this book who may want to find their way to some parts of our analysis and avoid other areas.

Parts I, II, and III of the book address questions that ordinary citizens and students are likely to raise about foreign policy mistakes: What are they? How many kinds are there? How do you tell one kind from another? What causes them? What are some examples of each kind of mistake in the history of U.S. foreign policy over the last 100 years or so up to the present? We answer these questions with a relatively simple classification scheme for distinguishing different kinds of foreign policy mistakes, based on ordinary usage of the word mistake, which differentiates between mistakes of omission and commission. We take this distinction and use it to identify mistakes regarding how to recognize and exercise social power in world politics. Then we show how various episodes in U.S. diplomatic and military history illustrate these different kinds of mistakes.

Parts IV and V of the book address questions that directly interest academic policy analysts and political leaders: How does one avoid foreign policy mistakes and fix them if they occur? What are optimum strategies for making foreign policy decisions? How and why do these strategies insure against mistakes and failures and raise the chances for successful outcomes? We answer these questions with the assistance of an array of theoretical and methodological tools, including game theory, role theory, exchange theory, social network theory, and signed graph theory. We also examine evidence from computer simulations by social scientists and philosophers and from extensive reviews of world politics compiled by historians and other social scientists. We use this information to construct a general argument on behalf of certain foreign policy strategies while being more critical of others. Instead of historical case studies, the analytical narratives in these chapters are told with tables and figures adorned by mathematical symbols and statistics.

We end the book with a summary of the whole argument and a list of ten precepts that attempt to capture its main elements. A casual reader may want to begin there and then select chapters of personal interest from this menu. We expect a more specialized reader will probably want to start at the beginning and follow the entire argument in detail. In our efforts to make this argument and to receive helpful feedback, we have presented aspects of it to audiences at Arizona State University, Baker University, Furman University, the University of Kansas, the University of Missouri, the University of North Texas, Texas Christian University, Zirve University (Turkey), Sabanci University (Turkey), and Trinity College (Dublin), and at annual meetings of the American Political Science Association and the International Studies Association.

We are grateful for the comments from colleagues in these venues and for the careful reviews of the entire manuscript by Yaacov Vertzberger and Patrick James. We are indebted as well to Steven Brams, Robert Axelrod, and Robert Jervis, whose collective scholarship on agent strategies and system effects in world politics informed and inspired much of the theoretical analysis in this book. Any errors that remain are our own. It is our pleasure to acknowledge the assistance and enthusiasm of Geoffrey Burn and Jessica Walsh at Stanford University Press, John Donohue at Westchester Book Services, and the institutional support from the School of Politics and Global Studies at Arizona State University and the Department of Political Science at Furman University.

We dedicate this book to our respective wives, Jacqueline Dierks-Walker and Johnna Malici, who have believed in the project and its authors throughout its gestation from notes scribbled on the back of an envelope outside a classroom in Dublin to publication as a book several years later.

U.S. PRESIDENTS AND FOREIGN POLICY MISTAKES

PART I

The Anatomy of Foreign Policy Mistakes

CHAPTER 1

Mistakes as a Feature of Everyday Political Life

INTRODUCTION

In the Apology, Plato recounts Socrates’ inquiry into human wisdom. The story begins with the journey of Socrates’ pupil, Chaerephon, to the Oracle in Delphi where he asks the question, Who is the wisest of all men? The Oracle responds, No one is wiser than Socrates. The pupil reports this to Socrates who, knowing that he himself is not wise, subsequently seeks out a politician reputed for his wisdom and aims to demonstrate the fallibility of the Oracle. To his disappointment, Socrates finds that the politician has no wisdom either, although the politician thinks of himself as wise. Socrates concludes, Well, although I do not suppose that either of us knows anything really beautiful and good, I am better off than he is—for he knows nothing, and thinks that he knows. I neither know nor think I know (Plato 1892, 21). In the end it is this recognition, Socrates’ self-awareness, that vindicates the Oracle.

Philosophers from Socrates through Michel de Montaigne, Baruch Spinoza, Immanuel Kant, and Isaiah Berlin remind us that true wisdom and full knowledge may be a utopian fantasy. They instead argue that uncertainty is an inescapable fact of human life. They stress that any action, however carefully undertaken, involves the risk of error and potentially disastrous consequences. Indeed, uncertainty may be one of only two certainties in life. The other is that humans will go on making statements and engaging in risky action even in a world of uncertainty. The obvious implication is the need to develop a calculus of action under the condition of uncertainty. The philosophers’ answer to this need is rather simple. The desired calculus is an ethic of humility and modesty.

The governance of a state requires more. In The Republic, Plato (2000, 191) likens this task to the command of a ship sailing an ocean of uncertainty:

Imagine . . . one ship and a state of affairs on board something like this. There’s the shipowner, larger and stronger than everyone in the ship, but deaf and rather short-sighted, with a knowledge of sailing to match his eyesight. The sailors are quarrelling among themselves over captaincy of the ship, each one thinking that he ought to be the captain, though he has never learned the skill, nor can he point to the person who taught him or a time when he was learning.

The combination of an ocean of relative uncertainty sailed by a ship of human beings with significantly limited powers of navigation is clearly a recipe for the inevitable making of mistakes. Indeed, in much of what humans set out to undertake, they are surrounded by uncertainty and bounded in skills or otherwise. Such is the human condition. Some of these human shortcomings are identified in contemporary terms by Robyn Dawes (1976), who describes how cognitive and motivated biases lead to limitations of the human mind in processing information from the environment without distortions (see also Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982; Bell, Raiffa, and Tversky 1988). These biases appear in the form of ideologies, self-convictions, emotions, memories, misperceptions, and other contingent elements of the human mind that make us apt to make mistakes. They affect ordinary people and, of course, also leaders as they steer the ship of state. The tragedy is that neither ordinary people nor state leaders are always aware of their biases or their mistakes, and the latter are only discovered with the benefit of hindsight.

An exchange in the aftermath of 9/11 and following the U.S. invasion of Iraq underlines the importance of the insights of Plato and Dawes. It has also served as the immediate catalyst for this book about foreign policy mistakes. In a news conference on April 13, 2004, President George W. Bush was asked to name his biggest mistake since 9/11 and what lessons he had learned since then. In his response Bush joked, I wish you’d have given me this written question ahead of time so I could plan for it. He then took a longer pause before adding, "I am sure something will pop into my head here in the midst of this press conference, with all the pressure of trying to come up with an answer, but it hadn’t [sic] yet." Ultimately, the president wandered in his meandering style from affirming his decisions to invade Afghanistan and Iraq to stating his unshaken belief that the former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction and would be inclined to put them to use. In the end, President Bush could not identify any mistakes he had made since 9/11.

One may wonder whether the president’s remarks were simply ingenuous, a reflection of his character, or an indication of a real puzzle that needs to be investigated. In this book we assume the third possibility, that foreign policy mistakes pose a real puzzle. One can be confident that presidential historians, political scientists, and commentators will judge President Bush to have made genuine mistakes. This assertion follows from recognizing that mistakes are unavoidable facts of daily life for citizens and politicians alike. This inescapable fact plagued the first U.S. president and every one of his successors, and will also befall every future president of the country. Given the ubiquity of this problem, we ask a series of fundamental questions in this book: What are foreign policy mistakes? How and why do they occur? What can be done to avoid them?

It may come as no surprise that scholars have focused on mistakes in the past. What distinguishes this book from some previous efforts is that our answers to these questions center on a single concept—that of power. Power has more than one meaning, including the manifestation of physical power in the form of force or energy in physics, the actual exercise of social power in the form of control by an agent over a patient in social systems, and the capacity of an agent to exercise either social or physical power in politics (McClelland 1966). The ambiguity in the meaning of power leads analysts to discount or qualify its use for explaining human behavior (Haas 1953; Claude 1962; Brams 1994, 121). Others emphasize that the exercise of power is at the core of human interactions and, specified properly, offers important insights into human behavior (Dahl 1957; French and Raven 1959; Bachrach and Baratz 1962; Emerson 1962, 1976; McClelland 1966; Lukes 1974; Baldwin 1979; Morgenthau 1985; Gelb 2009). We shall take the latter position and apply these conceptualizations of power at some length throughout this book to explain foreign policy mistakes.

At the core of our book is Vladimir Lenin’s famous question, kto-kovo? regarding the exercise of power, translated literally as who-whom? and understood as who (can destroy, control, utilize) whom? (Leites 1953, 27–29). Our general argument is that improper, inaccurate, or misinformed answers to this question specify and explain mistakes by the makers of policy. Conversely, we claim that correct answers can avoid mistakes and reduce policy failures. Although all politics requires policy makers to answer correctly Lenin’s question in order to avoid mistakes, our specific concern in this book is with U.S. presidents and foreign policy mistakes.

When presidents commit mistakes, they are costly regardless of whether they occur in the arena of domestic politics or international politics. Presidential mistakes in the domain of international politics, however, can be, and often are, more costly and deadly than in any other policy area. The U.S. wars in Korea and Vietnam, and the ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, are cases in point. Good judgment can avoid wars or win them while poor judgment can start wars or lose them (Renshon and Larson 2003, vii). International political history is full of disastrous decisions and avoidable mistakes by leaders who have put not only the country’s troops in harm’s way but also the safety and well-being of the entire nation.

The study of questions about foreign policy mistakes is perhaps more pressing than ever. The bipolar cold war order, with its rather well-defined rules, is passé for two decades. The events of 9/11 have introduced us to a world in which the ancient Chinese curse, may you live in interesting times, would seem to condemn us to a life of uncertainty, flux, and danger. Following 9/11 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, new challenges are emerging. U.S. relations with Syria and Iran are troublesome. Generally, the situation in the Middle East continues to deteriorate and could easily lead to another full-scale war with U.S. involvement. Also of concern are the tensions between nuclear powers Pakistan and India, which may compel the United States to get involved. Analysts also have imagined scenarios with heavy U.S. military engagement as a response to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by North Korea. The United States’ future may well depend on whether and how U.S. presidents make or avoid mistakes in the face of these and many other challenges.

In the remainder of this chapter we review the academic scholarship on mistakes. Our hope is that by the end of this exercise we will have established a general understanding of what foreign mistakes are and why they occur. While insights from past scholarship on foreign policy mistakes will help guide our inquiry, we hope in the next chapter to provide a more systematic, rigorous, and policy-relevant framework for foreign policy analysis and evaluation.

WHAT ARE FOREIGN POLICY MISTAKES?

It might at first seem unnecessary to define what constitutes a mistake. Indeed, it is tempting to simply borrow from Justice Potter Stewart’s assessment of pornography and accept that we will know a mistake when we see it. However, in a way this approach is too simple and, moreover, it is not true. If what counts (or should count) as a mistake is only in the eye of the beholder, then serious analysis may degenerate quickly into partisan debate and an inability or unwillingness to recognize a mistake—witness President Bush’s inability to name a single mistake and the partisan divide over his decision to invade Iraq on March 20, 2003. What we seek is a more objective standard from which one can judge mistakes more reliably.

According to the American Heritage Dictionary (1994, 534), the word mistake means an error or fault or a misconception or misunderstanding and comes from the old Norse mistaka, take in error. The same source (p. 288) defines error as derived from the Latin errare, wander, and offers three definitions: "1. An unintentional deviation from is [sic] what is correct, right, or true. 2. The condition of being incorrect or wrong. 3. Baseball. A defensive misplay. These definitions highlight important similarities and differences in mistakes. They share the common feature of wandering, that is, deviating from some standard of rectitude (error) or truth" (understanding), which implies a standard or context (e.g., a baseball game) in which to identify the nature of the deviation. Two different dimensions of mistakes are also implied: behavioral (misplay) and cognitive (misconception).

Underlying all of these features is the assumption that all mistakes are procedural (i.e., they are cognitive or behavioral phenomena that should not be confused with their consequences or outcomes). The importance of a given mistake in thought or action is often judged by its effects. If a baseball player makes a defensive misplay that costs his team a victory, it carries greater weight in human affairs. It is important to remember that although a procedural mistake may lead to a substantive failure, a causal connection is not always present. Sometimes failures occur despite the absence of mistakes, and even when mistakes occur, they do not necessarily affect the outcome. The occurrence of a misplay in baseball that yields an unearned run does not affect the outcome of the game when the score is already so lopsided in favor of one team that the outcome is not in doubt. It is also possible for mistakes to follow failure—a team that is behind may try too hard and make a misplay.

It is also important to realize that other causes besides mistakes influence success or failure in both sports and politics. It is wise as well to remember that sometimes there is a tension between avoiding mistakes and avoiding defeat. The well-known sportswriter Grantland Rice made the famous observation, It’s not whether you win or lose, but how you play the game. A lesser-known baseball manager, Leo (the Lip) Durocher, is also famous for his brash comment, Nice guys finish last. Together they remind us that in baseball the players are goal oriented and sometimes forget or ignore the rules of the game in order to achieve those goals. More generally, failures in everyday life come in two forms: mistakes are procedural failures whereas outcomes are substantive failures. And sometimes it is possible to achieve substantive successes at the price of procedural failures.

These insights apply to political life. When Germany attacked Poland in 1939, Hitler and Stalin divided Poland between them according to the terms of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact signed a couple of weeks before the outbreak of war. Although this agreement called for the two dictators to settle disputes between them without the use of force, Germany invaded the Soviet Union almost two years later and forced the Red Army out of its part of occupied Poland. This reversal of relationships between the two totalitarian regimes also brought Russia into World War II on the side of Britain and the exiled government of Poland in London. London Poles pressed immediately to learn more about the whereabouts and welfare of Polish prisoners of war captured earlier by Soviet forces in 1939 (Herz 1966).

Previous inquiries had yielded vague reports of their hasty evacuation from Poland far behind the lines into Russia ahead of the invading Nazi forces. When Nazi forces near Smolensk discovered the graves of these prisoners in 1943, the Soviet Union attempted to blame the Germans. However, forensic evidence at the site in the Katyn Forest pointed toward the Russians as their executioners in 1939 (Herz 1966, 45–46, 66–67). It was also a decision recognized as an error of some kind by Lavrenti Beria, the Soviet secret police chief, who reportedly declared to some Polish members of the London exile government as early as the spring of 1940 that a great mistake had been made with respect to the then-missing Polish prisoners of war (Herz 1966, 45).

What exactly was the Soviet mistake associated with this decision? At the time of their capture in 1939, the Soviet Union and Germany were fighting the Poles as a common foe. In addition to the moral mistake of violating the rules of international law for the treatment of prisoners of war (POWs), the Soviets were guided by Stalinist ideology that diagnosed the POWs as class enemies and potential counterrevolutionaries in territory that had been part of the old tsarist empire. The prisoners were reserve officers in the Polish army who occupied elite civilian positions in Polish society when they were not mobilized for active duty. When the Soviet Union executed these soldiers, they were also purging the potential leaders of an opposition movement to the partition of Poland between Russia and Germany (Herz 1966).

The great mistake of execution rather than imprisonment prevented the Soviet Union from repatriating these officers when the Soviet Union and Poland became de facto allies against Germany after the Nazis invaded Russia in June 1941. When the truth came out about their fate, it became an important local cause of the cold war’s beginnings between the United States and the Soviet Union following World War II. The Katyn Forest massacre alienated Russia from Poland’s exile government in London. In turn, this estrangement contributed significantly to a breakdown in the implementation of the Declaration on Poland signed by Russia, Britain, and the United States at the Yalta conference in 1945, which called for free elections and a democratic government in Poland. Ultimately, this failure was one of the issues that converted the two superpowers from peaceful partners to cold warriors following the end of World War II (Herz 1966, 76–112).

CONCEPTUALIZING FOREIGN POLICY MISTAKES

We infer from the distinctions made in ordinary language about the common invocation of a standard of truth or rectitude to identify different kinds of mistakes that the Soviet foreign policy mistake in this example falls into one or more of three general domains: (1) morality, in which a moral rule or law is violated; (2) intelligence, in which a cognitive judgment is blinded by ignorance, bias, or passion; and (3) policy, in which a prescription for behavior is costly and results in unanticipated and undesirable effects. A foreign policy mistake may involve all three domains insofar as a foreign policy decision is evaluated as (1) right or wrong, (2) informed or misinformed, and (3) effective or ineffective. The Soviet decision to execute Polish POWs and bury them in the Katyn Forest is a foreign policy decision that falls into all three domains. It was a violation of international law, based on a diagnostic judgment blinded by ignorance of the future and by communist ideology, which led to a prescription for a policy action that alienated future allies.

If we consider the Katyn Forest case more carefully, it suggests some other features of mistakes. Moral, intelligence, and policy errors may be mistakes of omission or commission (i.e., each kind of error may be an error in two opposite directions). Leaving moral mistakes aside and crossing these possibilities with the categories of diagnosis and prescription creates the general typology of mistakes in Figure 1.1. The Katyn Forest episode appears to fall under the Commission column as a case in which Soviet decision makers diagnosed the Polish POWs as a class enemy. This ideological diagnosis of the situation led them to prescribe the preemptive action of executing the POWs soon after their capture by Soviet troops in the fall of 1939. The Katyn Forest case appears to fit the Too Much/Too Soon pattern of commission associated in Figure 1.1 with more dogmatic decision makers.

Although the ideological filter of Stalinist ideology probably blinded the Soviets into misperceiving the situation and prescribing an erroneous preemptive response in this case, the lack of such a filter can lead to the opposite pattern of mistakes. Without such an organized belief system to guide diagnosis and prescription, a decision maker may detect too little relevant information and hesitate too late in responding to a situation. The result may be the Too Little/Too Late pattern of omission associated in Figure 1.1 with more pragmatic decision makers. Generally, decision makers can engage in mistakes of omission or commission regarding an opportunity or a threat. The former is a cooperative situation in which gains are likely, whereas the latter is a conflict situation in which losses are likely (Lebow and Stein 1987; Herrmann 1988). These different consequences are associated with possibilities for different kinds of substantive failures (outcomes), which follow from different kinds of procedural failures (mistakes).

One can distinguish among four types of substantive failures that may result from procedural failures, as shown in Figure 1.2. For threat situations there are deterrence failures and false alarm failures. A deterrence failure may be the result when a decision maker does not detect an existing threat of losses or else hesitates too long and thereby does not take action sufficient to deter the threat. A false alarm failure may be the result when a decision maker misperceives a threat of losses that does not exist or initiates action that creates a threat. For opportunity situations there are reassurance failures and false hope failures. A reassurance failure may be the result when a decision maker does not detect an existing opportunity for gains or else hesitates too long and thereby misses the opportunity for making gains. A false hope failure may be the result when a decision maker misperceives an opportunity for gains that does not exist or initiates action that does not increase gains.

Mistakes of omission (too little/too late) leading to substantive outcomes of deterrence failure or reassurance failure were common in British relations with Germany in the late 1930s (Taylor 1962). A deterrence failure occurred in 1938 when Britain’s keep Germany guessing strategy of hesitation failed to deter Germany’s occupation of the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia (Colvin 1971; Middlemas 1972). Belated British efforts to negotiate an alliance with Russia against Germany in 1939 resulted in a reassurance failure. Joseph Stalin elected instead to sign a nonaggression pact with Hitler after Britain had rebuffed Soviet offers of support the previous year against Germany during the Sudeten crisis (Colvin 1971). The disastrous consequences are well known. Finally, the Katyn Forest massacre was also based on the Soviet misperception of gains in cooperating with Germany in the removal of Poland from the map of Europe. A mistake of commission (too much/too soon) and a moral failure, it was also a false hope failure.

The taxonomies and the illustrative typologies of mistakes and examples presented so far are heuristics (i.e., suggestive ways of thinking about mistakes and cases). It rarely happens that actual empirical cases will neatly fit a particular cell of these typologies. Although reality is too complex and defies such rigorous categorization, typologies nevertheless fulfill two important functions. First, they allow a more systematic approach to the identification of foreign policy mistakes. Second, they provide an appropriate vocabulary for the understanding and analysis of foreign policy mistakes.

To sum up, foreign policy mistakes fall broadly into two general categories of omission and commission regarding either threats or opportunities. Each kind of mistake may occur at two different stages of the decision-making process: diagnosing a foreign policy situation or prescribing a foreign policy response. A third possibility is that a mistake occurs at both stages of the decision-making process. Having elaborated how foreign policy mistakes can be classified, what is missing is an explanation for why they occur. We find that this question is best answered by first examining in more detail the processes of diagnosis and prescription in making or avoiding foreign policy mistakes.

AVOIDING OR MAKING FOREIGN POLICY MISTAKES

Avoiding political mistakes ideally requires from the decision maker certain qualities and skills or, in the words of philosopher Isaiah Berlin (1996, 46), a capacity for integrating a vast amalgam of constantly changing, multicolored, evanescent, perpetually overlapping data. By integrating Berlin means "to see the data as elements in a single pattern, with their implications, to see them as symptoms of past and future possibilities, to see them pragmatically, that is in terms of what you or others can or will do to them, and what they can or will do to others or to you" (Ibid.; emphasis added). Berlin’s description of the necessary qualities of leadership reflects our understanding of mistakes as incorrect answers to Lenin’s Question. In the absence of these qualities, incorrect answers to the kto-kovo (who-whom) question become likely and result in mistakes.

We have already stated that identifying and assessing foreign policy mistakes requires a standard of truth or rectitude from which to make analytical judgments. A first approximation of such a standard is that mistakes manifest themselves as the pursuit of policy contrary to the self-interest of the decision maker or the interests of his constituency (Wriggins 1969; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). For such a mistake to qualify and be recognized as a public folly, it must meet two criteria. First, the policy undertaken must have been perceived as counterproductive in its own time, not merely by hindsight. Second, a feasible alternative course of action must have been available (Tuchman 1984, 5). The feasible alternative course of action must also be understood as a rational course of action (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992).

An emphasis on rationality leads to a formalization of our effort to conceptualize foreign policy mistakes. The rational actor model can be traced back to the work of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953) in the early 1940s. In their expected utility theory, decision makers engage in calculations about the outcomes that could result from the available choices as well as the chances of those outcomes occurring, and then choose the alternative that seems in some rough way to offer the best potential (Beach and Mitchell 1978, 441). Rational choice theorist Mancur Olson (1965, 65; emphasis added) explains that an individual’s actions are rational when her objectives are "pursued by means that are efficient and effective for achieving these objectives." This means that the evaluation of whether any particular action is rational or not must be considered not only in terms of the benefits, that is, whether the policy goals will be achieved, but also in terms of the cost that it would bring (Baldwin 2000).

In their classic work Politics, Economics, and Welfare, Dahl and Lindblom (1953, 38–39) explain why both aspects are important considerations in conceptualizing mistakes:

An action is rational to the extent that it is correctly designed to maximize goal achievement. . . . Given more than one goal (the usual human condition), an action is rational to the extent that it is correctly designed to maximize net goal achievement. . . . An action is correctly designed to maximize goal satisfaction to the extent that it is efficient, or in other words to the extent that goal satisfaction exceeds goal cost.

The need for comparative evaluation of both the costs and the benefits of policy alternatives in the decision-making process is also argued by Simon (1976, 179):

An administrative choice is incorrectly posed, then, when it is posed as a choice between possibility A, with low costs and small results, and possibility B, with high costs and large results. For A should be substituted a third possibility C, which would include A plus the alternative activities made possible by the cost difference between A and B. If this is done, the choice resolves itself into a comparison of the results obtainable by the application of fixed resources to the alternative activities B and C.

Applying the argument specifically to the area of foreign and security policy, Bueno de Mesquita (1981, 183) suggests a similar logic with respect to choosing between force and diplomacy as two alternatives of statecraft:

Leaders expecting a larger net gain through diplomacy than through war . . . should rationally elect to pursue their goals through diplomatic bargaining and negotiating. This is true even if the expected gross gain from war is larger than the gross gain from diplomacy, provided that the cost differential is large enough (as it frequently is) to make the net effect of diplomacy preferable to war.

The identification of opportunity costs as an important calculation also allows us to specify more precisely an important distinction made earlier in this chapter between procedural policy mistakes and substantive policy failures. Mistakes do not always produce failures, nor are mistakes always equivalent to policy failures. It is possible for a policy to realize its goals and still be a mistake, because of the costs of success. As we have suggested earlier, it may also be the case that a policy will not achieve its goals through no fault of the decision maker, because of the efforts of others to thwart their achievement. A policy may conversely achieve its goals because of the mistakes of others rather than one’s own efforts and skill (Baldwin 2000).

We contend that these rational actor calculations represent a standard of truth, and deviations from this standard constitute foreign policy mistakes. Two factors may contribute to deviations from this standard, and they are reflected in Isaiah Berlin’s quote above. The first factor is a miscalculation of what others can or will do to self. The second factor is a miscalculation of what self can or should do to others. In either case, a less-than-optimal calculation of cost–benefit ratios can cause potentially inaccurate or improper answers to Lenin’s kto-kovo question regarding power politics and subsequently to a mistaken decision.

If avoiding mistakes is equal to making rational decisions and making foreign policy mistakes is equal to making irrational choices, this conceptualization still begs the question: why do decision makers fail to engage in rational decision making? The decision-making literature identifies an abundance of factors that may cause deviations from a rational course of action. In the next section we provide an illustrative list of the kinds of such factors and show that explanations for foreign policy mistakes can be couched at different levels of analysis and different levels of generalization.