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    Racial Realignment: The Transformation of American Liberalism, 1932–1965
    Racial Realignment: The Transformation of American Liberalism, 1932–1965
    Racial Realignment: The Transformation of American Liberalism, 1932–1965
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    Racial Realignment: The Transformation of American Liberalism, 1932–1965

    By Eric Schickler

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    Few transformations in American politics have been as important as the integration of African Americans into the Democratic Party and the Republican embrace of racial policy conservatism. The story of this partisan realignment on race is often told as one in which political elites—such as Lyndon Johnson and Barry Goldwater—set in motion a dramatic and sudden reshuffling of party positioning on racial issues during the 1960s. Racial Realignment instead argues that top party leaders were actually among the last to move, and that their choices were dictated by changes that had already occurred beneath them. Drawing upon rich data sources and original historical research, Eric Schickler shows that the two parties' transformation on civil rights took place gradually over decades.

    Schickler reveals that Democratic partisanship, economic liberalism, and support for civil rights had crystallized in public opinion, state parties, and Congress by the mid-1940s. This trend was propelled forward by the incorporation of African Americans and the pro-civil-rights Congress of Industrial Organizations into the Democratic coalition. Meanwhile, Republican partisanship became aligned with economic and racial conservatism. Scrambling to maintain existing power bases, national party elites refused to acknowledge these changes for as long as they could, but the civil rights movement finally forced them to choose where their respective parties would stand.

    Presenting original ideas about political change, Racial Realignment sheds new light on twentieth and twenty-first century racial politics.

    LanguageEnglish
    PublisherPrinceton University Press
    Release dateApr 26, 2016
    ISBN9781400880973
    Racial Realignment: The Transformation of American Liberalism, 1932–1965

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      Racial Realignment - Eric Schickler

      RACIAL REALIGNMENT

      PRINCETON STUDIES IN AMERICAN POLITICS: HISTORICAL, INTERNATIONAL, AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES

      IRA KATZNELSON, ERIC SCHICKLER, MARTIN SHEFTER, AND THEDA SKOCPOL, SERIES EDITORS

      A list of titles in this series appears at the back of the book

      RACIAL REALIGNMENT

      THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM, 1932–1965

      Eric Schickler

      PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

      PRINCETON AND OXFORD

      Copyright © 2016 by Princeton University Press

      Published by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540

      In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, 6 Oxford Street, Woodstock, Oxfordshire OX20 1TW

      press.princeton.edu

      All Rights Reserved

      ISBN 978-0-691-15387-2

      ISBN (pbk.) 978-0-691-15388-9

      British Library Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available

      This book has been composed in Sabon

      Printed on acid-free paper. ∞

      Printed in the United States of America

      1  3  5  7  9  10  8  6  4  2

      Contents

      Illustrations

      FIGURES

      TABLE

      Acknowledgments

      THIS BOOK WOULD not have come together without the help of many colleagues, both at Berkeley and across the country.

      The project depended on several major, collaborative data collection efforts. Brian Feinstein, who started out as a research assistant but soon became a coauthor, played a pivotal role in putting together the collection of state party platforms that launched the project (see Feinstein and Schickler, Platforms and Partners: The Civil Rights Realignment Reconsidered, Studies in American Political Development, 2008). This database serves as one of the foundations for chapter 7. Kathryn Pearson’s discovery of discharge petitions in the National Archives provided a second, invaluable data source, which Pearson, Feinstein, and I drew on in an article revisiting the congressional side of the civil rights realignment (Shifting Partisan Coalitions: Support for Civil Rights in Congress, 1933–1972, Journal of Politics, 2010). The analysis in chapter 8 relies heavily on this database. A third critical data source is a compendium of hundreds of public opinion polls from the 1930s and 1940s. The National Science Foundation has funded a decade-long collaboration with Adam Berinsky, which has involved cleaning, recoding, and devising weights for these early surveys (NSF Political Science Program Grants SES-0550431 and SES-1155143). A team of collaborators and research assistants brought these data to fruition, which serves as the basis for chapters 5 and 6.

      Special thanks are due to Ira Katznelson, who was the first to suggest that the initial research on the civil rights realignment at the state and congressional levels could serve as the basis for a book that might make a broader contribution to the study of political change. Throughout the process, Katznelson was a source of insight and advice, commenting on both individual papers and the manuscript as a whole. Robert Mickey, David Mayhew, Richard Valelly, and Anthony Chen each also deserve special acknowledgment for offering terrific comments both as I first launched the book project and several years later as I completed the manuscript.

      As the project developed, I received useful comments and feedback from numerous colleagues, including Richard Bensel, David Karol, Frances Lee, Paul Pierson, Paul Sniderman, John Zaller, Kathleen Bawn, Christopher Baylor, Richard Beth, Dan Carpenter, Ted Carmines, Jack Citrin, Chris Deering, Erik Engstrom, Kathleen Frydl, Paul Frymer, Sean Gailmard, Alan Gerber, John Gerring, Don Green, John Griffin, Rodney Hero, Jeff Jenkins, Samuel Kernell, Thad Kousser, John Lapinski, Taeku Lee, Gabe Lenz, Robert Lieberman, Nolan McCarty, Suzanne Mettler, Sid Milkis, Hans Noel, Kevin Quinn, Jas Sekhon, Daniel Schlozman, Merrill Shanks, Robert Shapiro, John Sides, Theda Skocpol, Laura Stoker, Vanessa Tyson, Robert Van Houweling, Lynn Vavreck, Dorian Warren, Greg Wawro, and Vesla Weaver. I thank Thomas Ogorzalek, John Lapinski, Scott Adler, and John Wilkerson for generously sharing their congressional data.

      Several current and former graduate students also played a critical role in the project. Devin Caughey made major contributions as a research assistant and as a collaborator on several related projects. Devin’s innovative method for estimating the dynamics of state- and group-level opinion provided a key resource for the analyses in chapters 5 and 6. In addition to providing sterling research assistance, Ruth Bloch Rubin generously shared several critical finds from her dissertation research in the archives of southern members of Congress. Emily Hertz deserves special thanks for her superb work as a research assistant and as a commenter on each chapter of the manuscript; Hertz’s contributions in helping me think through the structure of the argument and presentation in each chapter constituted the kind of wise feedback one expects from a senior colleague rather than a second-year Ph.D. student.

      I also benefited from excellent research assistance from Sara Chatfield, Michael Dougal, Jake Grumbach, Peter Hanson, Erin Hartman, John Henderson, Adrienne Hosek, Tony Huynh, Morris Levy, Mark Oleszek, Eleanor Powell, Arman Rezaee, Adam Silver, Alex Theodoridis, Joseph Warren, Nicole Fox Wilcoxon, and Ian Yohai. Berkeley undergraduates Mariam Azhar, Sean Diament, Lena Ghamrawi, Deepa Kollipara, and Raquel Pelke also provided important research help.

      I am grateful to Eric Crahan at Princeton University Press for his guidance and his encouragement of the project throughout the process. I also thank Chuck Myers, who was the editor at Princeton when I first framed the initial book prospectus for an advance contract.

      Finally, my deepest gratitude goes to Terri Bimes, Sam Schickler, and Lea Schickler, for their unending love and support. It is to them that this book is dedicated (though I suspect Lea and Sam would not forgive me if I did not mention Wilbur’s name as well).

      RACIAL REALIGNMENT

      CHAPTER 1

      Introduction

      TODAY POLITICAL OBSERVERS take for granted the idea that Democratic partisanship, economic liberalism, and racial liberalism cohere under a common programmatic banner, just as Republican partisanship is associated with economic conservatism and greater resistance to government programs to redress problems of racial inequality. But the emergence of these linkages is a relatively recent phenomenon. Prior to the 1930s Republican elites provided greater (if often only tepid) support for civil rights than did their Democratic counterparts. By the mid-1960s, however, Democratic partisanship and economic liberalism were clearly identified with civil rights support and Republican conservatism had become identified with greater opposition to governmental action to redress racial inequalities. This book aims to explain the dynamics of this momentous transformation.

      The partisan transformation on race is often depicted as an elite-led, center-driven shift that occurred in the 1960s, breaking apart the New Deal coalition that had dominated American politics for more than a generation. By contrast, I show that the realignment began with mass and midlevel party actors, that it was rooted in state and local politics rather than in Washington, DC, and that much of the important work was complete by the mid-1940s. In doing so, I aim to provide a new way of thinking about the nature of the New Deal coalition and of the political significance of New Deal liberalism more generally. This account also has important implications for theories of political parties and of political change in the United States. Thus the civil rights realignment is important both in its own right and as a window into the workings of the American political system more broadly.

      THE CONVENTIONAL VIEW OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS REALIGNMENT

      Although scholars have studied the civil rights realignment from a wide variety of angles, three related claims have shaped the prevailing understanding of its dynamics. The first claim is that national party elites played the decisive role in driving the change in each party’s stance. Edward Carmines and James Stimson’s pathbreaking study, Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics, put forward the argument that the two parties took similar positions straddling (and often avoiding) civil rights in the 1940s and 1950s, with Republicans if anything a bit to the left of their Democratic counterparts.¹ The critical break point arrived when Lyndon Johnson and Barry Goldwater took sharply different stands on the Civil Rights Act of 1964. As Thomas Edsall and Mary Edsall put it, Goldwater … publicly defined the Republican Party as anti–civil rights with his opposition to the Civil Rights Act of 1964.… Johnson, conversely, firmly established the commitment of the Democratic Party to civil rights.² Once national party leaders made this dramatic break, party activists followed their lead, polarizing on civil rights policy, and the mass public gradually followed along.³ Indeed, the civil rights case is often taken as a leading example of the idea that public opinion generally follows cues from national party elites, with mass partisans polarizing on issues when these elites provide clear, distinct cues.⁴

      This reshuffling of party coalitions launched the post–New Deal party system in which Democrats were identified with African Americans and racial liberalism, while Republicans were associated with racial conservatism.⁵ Lyndon Johnson’s often-cited observation after he signed the Civil Rights Act that we have delivered the South to the Republican Party for your lifetime and mine nicely set the stage for the view that elite choice at a critical moment drove the racial realignment.⁶

      Second, national political actors take center stage in this story, in part because federalism is understood to be a key blockage preventing action on civil rights. Federalism gave southerners secure control of law enforcement and the means of coercion in their region while allowing southern elites to appeal to the rhetoric of states’ rights to justify their discriminatory policies. Federalism also meant that state party competition often focused on local issues, with the result that many northern state Democratic parties consisted of inward-looking political machines with little commitment to programmatic liberalism.⁷ Change had to come from the top down because only nationally oriented political actors had the capacity and (eventually) the will to move policy on racial issues. The civil rights movement figures into this story as an important source of pressure on these national political elites, but the crucial step was to persuade top party leaders based in Washington that they needed to act.

      Third, leading accounts of the civil rights realignment date the partisan transformation to the 1960s. This focus on the 1960s as a critical juncture is not confined to works that embrace the elite-led view of the realignment. For example, Doug McAdam and Karina Kloos’s Deeply Divided: Racial Politics and Social Movements in Post-War America does an excellent job of tracing the creative role of the civil rights movement in generating the partisan landscape that has dominated American politics for the past fifty years. Yet they too accept the idea that the 1960s constitute the critical moment for the realignment, arguing that the GOP was, in the aggregate, far and away more progressive on civil rights issues than the Democrats at the start of the decade. A seismic shift occurred during a fairly short span of time in the early to mid-’60s when the civil rights movement and segregationist countermovement decisively altered the partisan geography of the United States and in the process pushed the national Democratic and Republican parties sharply to the left and right respectively.⁸

      In sum, the conventional account treats the civil rights realignment as the disruption of one stable partisan alignment—rooted in the avoidance of racial issues—and its replacement by another alignment in which race played a defining role. The critical decisions driving this process occurred in the 1960s as national party elites grappled with the question of how to respond to pressure from civil rights activists and their opponents. The choices made at the center then reverberated throughout the political system, gradually remaking both parties at the mass and middle levels.

      THE CIVIL RIGHTS REALIGNMENT: CONSTITUENCIES, LOCALLY ROOTED POLITICIANS, AND TIMING

      In contrast to the conventional account, this book argues that the partisan realignment on civil rights was rooted in changes in the New Deal coalition that emerged in the mid- to late 1930s, not the 1960s. Rather than realignment starting in Washington and diffusing out and down, state parties and locally oriented rank-and-file members of Congress provided a key mechanism for pro–civil rights forces—which first entered the New Deal coalition in the 1930s—to capture the Democratic Party from below. Far from spearheading the realignment, national party elites—that is, the leaders of political institutions of national scope, such as the president, top congressional leaders, and national party chairmen—feared the disruptive potential of civil rights issues for their respective partisan coalitions. As a result, these national leaders generally sought to straddle the civil rights divide and were actually among the last to move.

      Constituency-Level Changes

      Changes in the constituency base of the Democratic Party that took place in the 1930s set in motion the partisan realignment on race. While the New Deal’s economic programs originally drew African Americans and Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) unions to the Democratic Party, their entry into the party coalition—and the reaction that entry provoked from southern Democrats—established important linkages between civil rights liberalism and New Deal liberalism that reverberated through the midlevels of the party and eventually forced the hand of top national leaders.

      African Americans had voted Republican for decades but received little in return for their loyalty. By contrast, even as core features of the New Deal accommodated racial discrimination, Roosevelt’s program offered real benefits to many northern African Americans, particularly when compared with the Hoover administration’s dismal record. Recognizing these gains, African Americans voted decisively for Roosevelt in 1936 and stuck with the president for the remainder of his term. The emergence of African Americans as a potentially important source of votes for northern Democrats gave at least some rank-and-file Democratic politicians an incentive to show concern for civil rights.⁹

      While the number of northern states and congressional districts with a substantial African American population in the 1930s and early 1940s was modest, the meteoric rise of the CIO gave African Americans an important ally within the Democratic coalition. Before the formation of the CIO in 1935, the American Federation of Labor (AFL)–dominated labor movement had a poor record on civil rights. But from early on, the CIO stood out among white-led organizations in its support for civil rights. Even as rank-and-file union workers often shared in the racial prejudice that was prevalent in their communities, the union’s leaders and organizers made racial equality a key facet of their program. This support was rooted both in the union’s internal organizing imperatives and in its broader programmatic vision. The CIO’s leaders and organizers believed that African American support was crucial for the union’s prospects in industrial workplaces in which replacement workers were a constant threat. At the same time, many of these same union officials had roots in left-wing political movements committed to the idea that racial divisions undermined the class consciousness required to fight economic exploitation. These interests and beliefs led the CIO to fuse concerns about class and race, arguing that the cause of economic justice required an encompassing labor movement willing to use governmental power to tackle the mutually reinforcing problems of economic and racial inequality.

      This fusion was especially important as observers on all sides quickly recognized that the CIO had developed into the central mobilization instrument outside the Democratic Party itself on behalf of liberalism. The CIO became the leading symbol—both for supporters and for opponents—of the most ambitious strands of New Deal liberalism in the United States, urging congressional Democrats and the executive branch to move to the left across a range of policies.¹⁰ The CIO’s outspoken civil rights advocacy meant that the group most associated with an expansive reading of the New Deal’s goals was also associated with the civil rights cause.

      These two constituency shifts provoked a furious reaction among southern Democrats, which had equally important implications for the future of New Deal liberalism. Southern Democrats had provided critical backing for the first and second New Deal.¹¹ But many southern politicians viewed African Americans’ incorporation into both the Democratic Party and the labor movement as an existential threat to the racially oppressive southern way of life.¹² Southern Democrats were soon the most consequential opponents of labor-sponsored expansions of the New Deal, cooperating with Republicans to push investigations and legislation that sought to undermine organized labor, and along with it, the liberal agenda more generally. Southern Democrats’ fierce opposition both to the CIO and to civil rights meant that African Americans were no longer isolated claimants: their political enemies were increasingly identified as a crucial enemy of liberal advances, not just on civil rights but across a range of policy domains, including especially labor policy.

      These changes gradually reshaped the meaning of New Deal liberalism. A new political alignment took shape in which the supporters of an ambitious reading of the New Deal’s promise—CIO unions and African Americans, along with Jews and urban liberals more generally—found themselves opposed by southern Democrats who viewed both the CIO and African Americans as mortal threats. This alignment reached all the way down to the mass level of the parties, as economically liberal white northern Democrats were substantially more likely to back key civil rights initiatives by about 1940 than were economically conservative Republicans. The mass- and group-level developments had important implications for politicians: for Republicans to make civil rights their issue, they would have had to overcome the skepticism of their own economically conservative core partisans. For northern Democrats to skirt the issue, they would have had to ignore the views of their own core partisans—economic liberals and the growing number of African American Democrats.

      Federalism and Geographical Decentralization

      Northern state parties and rank-and-file members of Congress responded to these new constituency dynamics long before national party elites did.¹³ Traditionally, liberals have interpreted the history of civil rights as the classic example of why one should be suspicious of states’ rights and local politics. This analysis suggests that may be too hasty. While federalism and geographic representation certainly facilitated the development of the Jim Crow South, they also helped to precipitate its downfall. Locally rooted politicians played a crucial role as intermediaries between constituency-based pressures and elite decision-making arenas in the civil rights realignment.¹⁴

      The nationally oriented party leaders who had the greatest stake in maintaining the Democrats’ North-South coalition were generally slow to respond when advocates attempted to graft civil rights onto New Deal liberalism. But the independent power base of state and local parties and the election of House members through separate geographic districts channeled constituency pressure for civil rights, without requiring an immediate showdown with national party leaders. Even as many national political elites sought to avoid the civil rights issue, movement activists could appeal to rank-and-file members of Congress, mayors and other local officials, and state and local parties, each of which had its own, partly independent power base and constituency. These locally rooted politicians then contributed to civil rights activists’ efforts to raise the salience of the issue.¹⁵

      Specifically, Democratic partisanship and economic liberalism became associated with civil rights support among northern members of the House of Representatives starting in the late 1930s. By the end of World War II a substantial gap in civil rights support separated northern Democrats and economic liberals from northern Republicans and economic conservatives. Northern state Democratic parties displayed a similar pattern, adopting platforms and pursuing policies that were to the left of their GOP counterparts on civil rights by the mid-1940s, with the gap increasing gradually in the ensuing years. These midlevel party actors proved far more responsive to pressure to support civil rights than did most top national elites, who were preoccupied with holding together the increasingly precarious North-South coalition forged by Roosevelt.¹⁶

      Federalism and the decentralized system of electing members of Congress thus provided key institutional mechanisms to facilitate the gradual incorporation of civil rights into the mainstream of the Democratic Party, undermining the implicit deal among national political leaders that had been a key foundation of the party for decades. Much like abolitionism in the 1830s–1840s and the currency issue in the 1870s–1880s, efforts by national party leaders to block a new issue ultimately failed and party lines were reshuffled.¹⁷ Congress and state parties emerge from this case as potential vehicles for new interests to gain access; localism and geographic-based districts are often seen as bastions of conservatism, but in this case they provided institutional footholds for civil rights liberals.

      Midlevel party actors also played an important role in the GOP’s transformation on race. Growing southern Democratic disaffection with New Deal liberalism stirred Republican hopes of a realignment more than two decades before Barry Goldwater entered the political scene. The appeals to states’ rights and limited government that became a staple of conservative Republican attacks on the New Deal in the 1930s were well suited to wooing southern Democrats worried about the threat posed by the CIO’s brand of liberalism. But the moderate leaders atop the national GOP were wary of the implications of a wholesale alliance with southern conservatives. As a result, Republican presidential candidates generally sought to sidestep civil rights in the 1940s and 1950s.

      Developments below the top leadership, however, gradually tilted the balance within the GOP in favor of racial conservatives during the 1940s and 1950s. Rank-and-file northern Republicans in Congress—facing little or no constituency pressure to back civil rights—drifted away from their earlier advocacy of civil rights legislation and even made common cause with southerners in fighting strong fair-employment practices legislation in the 1940s. At the state level, President Dwight Eisenhower’s party-building efforts in the South—which aimed to create a suburban, moderate organization in his image—ironically created a new power base for his conservative rivals within the party. The Goldwater movement had deep roots in these earlier shifts within the party, which opened a pathway for racial conservatives to gain the upper hand and bring to fruition the long-standing conservative goal of drawing disaffected southern Democrats into the GOP.

      For both Democrats and Republicans, the ability of state party organizations and rank-and-file members of Congress to adopt their own positions provided a mechanism for the parties’ existing and new coalition partners and ideological allies to gain a power base at the local level in advance of capturing the national party as a whole. The leaders of social movements and their interest group allies need not first win over national party leaders in order to transform party politics. Rather, at least in the case of civil rights, a series of victories at the state level paved the way for a national realignment. The federal nature of American parties and, relatedly, the existence of important offices controlled by lower-level units thus emerge as key elements in the civil rights realignment.¹⁸

      Timing

      Rather than viewing the 1960s as the critical moment in the partisan realignment on race, I argue that much of the political work involved in bringing racial liberalism into the Democratic program was undertaken decades earlier. Efforts by the CIO, African American activists, and other urban liberals starting in the mid- to late 1930s had remade the Democratic Party, so that economic liberalism, Democratic partisanship, and support for civil rights were connected at both the mass and midlevels of the party throughout the North by the mid-1940s.

      But winning over northern state parties and members of Congress was not itself sufficient to transform national alignments. A complete takeover of the national Democratic Party required overcoming the resistance not just of southern party leaders but also of the nationally oriented officials atop the party structure. With a few exceptions, top party leaders struggled mightily to tamp down the pressure to take a clear stand on civil rights. From 1944 to 1956, rank-and-file Democratic activists and convention delegates had been to the left of national leaders on civil rights, yet party elites generally succeeded in avoiding adoption of a platform or nomination of a presidential candidate that would alienate southern conservatives.

      But civil rights movement activists—often acting in tandem with midlevel party actors—worked to force the issue to the top of the political agenda, eventually requiring leaders to take sides. Crucially, by the time the issue came to occupy center stage nationally, the liberals enjoyed a clear majority within the national party, while southern conservatives had become an isolated minority.

      Long before Lyndon Johnson and Barry Goldwater took their opposing positions on civil rights, their parties had been remade beneath them. Below the surface a series of developments dating back to the 1930s and 1940s had transformed both parties so that the intraparty pressures in favor of an embrace of racial liberalism were much stronger on the Democratic side, while Republicans increasingly were pushed toward racial conservatism and a concomitant alliance with southern civil rights foes. African Americans and their allies in the CIO had done much of the work in bringing together New Deal liberalism and racial liberalism in the late 1930s and the 1940s. The civil rights movement of the late 1950s and the 1960s provided the catalyst to fulfill the promise of these earlier developments within the parties.

      IMPLICATIONS

      This reexamination of the civil rights realignment leads to a revised understanding of the New Deal coalition and of New Deal liberalism, which in turn suggests the need to revisit how we think about political parties as institutions. The civil rights case also underscores the ways in which major political transformations can result from the intersection of multiple, partly independent historical trajectories. This understanding of political change puts a premium on a methodological approach that integrates historical and behavioral evidence and draws on diverse data sources for leverage.

      Splitting at the Seams: Race, Section, and the New Deal Coalition

      The New Deal coalition is often depicted as reflecting a stable bargain in which northern Democrats agreed to avoid addressing civil rights policy in return for southern Democrats’ cooperation in building the New Deal welfare state.¹⁹ Such policy decisions as the exclusion of domestic and agricultural labor from the Social Security system have been interpreted as symbolizing a broader détente, facilitated by most northern Democrats’ lack of commitment to civil rights.²⁰ Franklin Roosevelt’s refusal to push even for antilynching legislation, for fear of alienating southern Democrats whose votes he needed for his legislative priorities, underscores the extent to which an agreement to ignore civil rights demands seems to have underwritten the New Deal coalition.²¹ Although some revisionist accounts have pointed to behind-the-scenes Roosevelt maneuvers to promote racial equality, scholars have generally emphasized the timidity with which the New Deal addressed the problems facing African Americans.²²

      From this standpoint, the pursuit of social democracy in the United States was divorced from the cause of racial equality owing to the peculiar nature of the New Deal coalition. Southern Democrats’ pivotal position in Roosevelt’s coalition sharply limited the reach of liberal aspirations.²³ It was only in the 1960s, with Johnson’s embrace of civil rights, that racial liberalism was brought into the social democratic program. This linkage, however, created a backlash that weakened the cause of economic justice by empowering conservatives who were now able to use appeals to racial resentment to build a new Republican majority.²⁴

      Rather than viewing the New Deal coalition as a stable equilibrium that was brought down by the disruptions of the 1960s, however, I argue that important actors within the Democratic Party were working to undermine the supposed bargain between northern liberals and southern racists starting in the late 1930s. Soon after the entry of the CIO and African Americans into the Democratic coalition in 1936, southern Democrats began to cooperate with Republicans to force antilabor investigations and bills onto the agenda that challenged one key pillar of the national Democratic coalition.²⁵ Meanwhile, northern Democrats were working to force civil rights bills onto the legislative agenda, thus threatening a second key pillar of that coalition.

      In this sense, the New Deal coalition was being torn apart from within by about 1940: while most nationally oriented party leaders preferred to keep both issues off the agenda, southern members of Congress worked aggressively to exacerbate the party’s split on labor policy, and northern members pushed civil rights policies that were anathema to their southern colleagues. The version of New Deal liberalism that CIO unions and other urban liberals articulated in the late 1930s—and that was incorporated into the commitments of rank-and-file northern members of Congress and state parties—was unacceptable to the southern wing of the party, and the southerners responded to this threat by seeking to weaken the same labor unions that were essential to electing northern Democrats.

      Against the claim that racial liberalism was a belated 1960s addition to economic liberalism, this account suggests that New Deal liberalism—as articulated and developed by its firmest supporters starting in the late 1930s—had racially inclusive elements that ran counter to the well-documented exclusionary aspects of Roosevelt’s program. The CIO and its allies fused class and race in an alignment that was forged amid the vast social and ideological turmoil of the 1930s and early 1940s. Most top party leaders resisted this fusion, but its impact nonetheless was evident in the behavior of rank-and-file members of Congress and state parties. It also was reflected in the southern shift away from the New Deal, and in conservative Republican efforts to demonstrate that their party’s antistatism made it the natural home for disaffected southern Democrats. Modern liberalism and conservatism had their roots in these early battles over the future of the New Deal.²⁶

      The Civil Rights Realignment and Party Theory

      The civil rights realignment also speaks directly to recent theories of political parties. In an important series of studies, John Zaller, Kathleen Bawn, and their collaborators have developed a theory of parties as coalitions of intense policy demanders managed by politicians.²⁷ These intense policy demanders—composed primarily of interest groups and activists—negotiate with one another to forge a long coalition to nominate candidates committed to their program. In this view, the candidate nomination process is the key to ensuring that a party’s officeholders adhere to a common program: with only minor local variation, [the] policy-demanding groups that form the core of a political party espouse the positions for which their national party stands and require that candidates do so too. As a result, any candidate who relies on local activists for support is likely to be a credible representative of the national party standard.²⁸ Ideologies reflect the coalitional bargains struck by these diverse policy demanders and do not necessarily have any intrinsic internal logic. After many elections, these party programs become accepted as natural manifestations of competing worldviews: a ‘conservative’ one … and a ‘liberal’ one.²⁹

      Several aspects of the civil rights case nicely fit this understanding of parties. The role of African American voters and the CIO in pushing the Democratic Party to support civil rights exemplifies how group pressure can shape party positions. Similarly, the opposition of one of the GOP’s core constituents, the business community, no doubt influenced Republican skepticism toward fair employment legislation.³⁰

      But other elements of the civil rights case suggest that parties are not simply coalitions of intense policy demanders managed by politicians. The federal nature of American parties means that one cannot take for granted that the party is a single coherent entity with the same meaning across regions. The dueling northern and southern wings of the Democratic Party each had a concrete, independent electoral and institutional base that enabled its members to nominate candidates who viewed defeating the other wing of the party as a top priority. The Democratic Party that nominated the racist labor-baiter Howard Smith to represent Virginia from 1931 to 1966 is hardly the same institution (or set of policy demanders) that brought Emanuel Celler, a Jewish prolabor, pro–civil rights Democrat from Brooklyn, to Congress over these same decades.³¹ Yet they each occupied important positions of influence in Congress, with Smith the longtime chair of the Rules Committee and Celler leading the Judiciary Committee.

      While it is true that presidential candidates and top congressional leaders sought to be acceptable to both northern liberals and southern conservatives, their leadership hardly reflected a long-term bargain that all sides of the party embraced. Smith and Celler may have each agreed to vote for the same presidential candidate and the same candidate for Speaker of the House of Representatives, but they each ultimately hoped to weaken and defeat the other wing of the party, not to coexist with it. The two regionally based camps pursued policy agendas that were deeply opposed to each other. In attacking labor unions, southern conservatives were seeking to undermine a key source of northern Democrats’ support; in promoting civil rights legislation and labor rights, northern liberals threatened the core interests of many southern Democrats. Although presidential candidates and other nationally oriented elites sought to act as party managers, keeping the various elements of the coalition in sync, many other powerful actors within the party maneuvered to disrupt the electoral foundations essential to their regional rivals.³²

      While the divisions among Republicans in the 1940s–1950s were less stark than among Democrats of the era, the conservative Taft wing—with its base primarily in the Midwest—saw the potential incorporation of southern Democrats as a way to consolidate conservative control of the party. From the perspective of the northeastern moderate wing, however, this strategy threatened not just its influence within the party but its very survival. Chapter 10 will show that national party leaders’ ability to manage the tension between these competing sectionally based interests was limited and that their efforts ultimately failed.

      These cases, in which the groups composing a party coalition view one another as adversaries, is a far cry from today’s more unified national parties.³³ The contemporary Democratic and Republican parties each nominate candidates who can reasonably be said to reflect a common national brand that resonates with voters and that reflects bargains struck by groups inside the party coalition. But this outcome is a historical product and not an inevitable feature of American parties. Such forces as the nationalization of fund-raising networks and of the media landscape, for example, may generate greater pressure to conform to a single national brand.³⁴ But this pressure has been a variable, not a constant.

      There is no single, overriding logic of party politics; instead, parties, like other political institutions, are historical composites shaped by multiple logics.³⁵ The need to nominate a single candidate for president—along with nationally oriented media coverage and fundraising—introduces an incentive for the groups associated with a party to coordinate on a common strategy and program. But at times groups with sharply opposed interests may end up in the same party coalition. Southern Democrats had been core members of the Democratic Party since its formation in the nineteenth century. The passage of the Wagner Act, which provided expansive collective bargaining rights for workers, brought labor unions into the Democratic coalition.³⁶ While a few prescient southerners anticipated the threat presented by early New Deal labor policies, most did not foresee the danger posed by incorporating unions into the New Deal coalition until after the rise of the CIO.³⁷ Southern Democrats and CIO unions entered the party for different reasons and at very different historical moments; once they became important players inside the party, each could draw on an independent institutional base to prosecute their battle for control over its future.

      Once one sees that parties may at times encompass deep conflicts, privileging any single type of actor as the party becomes problematic. The opposing players will have an incentive to draw on whatever resources are available and to work through a range of power bases—including support from ordinary voters and activists, organized groups, midlevel party officials, and top party leaders. The civil rights case underscores the importance of each of these actors in shaping the partisan transformation. To say that the groups called the shots on their own, or that party leaders successfully managed the groups’ demands, or that any other single set of actors defined the parties’ position obscures much of the important action, which consisted of the interactions—and battles—across these layers.

      In addition to the potential for incoherence introduced by the independent electoral base of state and local parties, the civil rights case also suggests a further limitation of the parties-as-policy-demanders perspective: there does seem to have been a broad, ideological dynamic concerning what goes with what that was evident to the actors on the ground early in the realignment process. The entry of the CIO and African Americans into the Democratic Party was widely understood to create a sharp cleavage between the southern wing, which had long been the backbone of the Democratic Party, and this newly ascendant liberal (as it was called) wing. This was not simply a dispute between narrow policy demanders: the CIO’s drive to remake American political and social institutions represented a threat to the entire southern political economy.³⁸

      Meanwhile, as Republicans increasingly positioned themselves in opposition to the New Deal on states’ rights grounds in the mid- to late 1930s, many political actors—including elected officials, intellectuals, and group leaders—saw the basis for an alliance with disaffected southern conservatives.³⁹ It took several decades to bring that alliance to fruition; it developed gradually, first as congressional Republicans worked with their southern counterparts to sponsor antilabor legislation and investigations and then broadening out to other issues and institutional venues, such as state party organizations and eventually national party conventions.⁴⁰

      Strikingly, even ordinary voters appear to have recognized the connections across issues at this early stage. As noted above, economically liberal northern Democrats were especially likely to take the pro–civil rights (and thus antisouthern) view, while economically conservative northern Republicans were especially likely to be skeptical of civil rights. This conservative skepticism was not confined to fair employment legislation, where business organizations’ opposition created a coalitional reason for Republicans to oppose civil rights. Indeed, as shown in chapter 5, economically conservative Republican voters provided substantially less support for antilynching legislation than did economically liberal Democrats as early as December 1937. Republican members of Congress also distanced themselves from their earlier civil rights advocacy, not just on fair employment policy but even on issues such as antilynching legislation and the poll tax (see chapter 8). The rise of the CIO, the entry of African Americans into the Democratic coalition, and the growing disaffection of southern conservative Democrats together started to forge a new ideological cleavage that cross-cut the old party lines and constrained the opportunities for both groups and party officials to manage coalitional alignments. The grassroots African American–led civil rights movement repeatedly worked to elevate the prominence of civil rights issues, sharpening this cleavage. As a result of these efforts and battles, liberals from various backgrounds and interests came to identify civil rights as a key element of liberalism, essential both for what it directly represented and for what it said about the place of conservative southerners in the future of the Democratic coalition.

      In sum, the civil rights case points both to strengths and to limitations of conceiving of parties as coalitions of intense policy demanders. There is no doubt that group interests and conflicts played a critical role in shaping the development of the parties’ positions on civil rights. At the same time, however, the civil rights realignment underscores the extent to which parties encompass conflicting logics and interests. Rather than a coherent brand managed by party leaders, the Democratic Party was at war with itself for decades. Federalism and geographic-based representation, in particular, provided enduring power bases for the contending sides to prosecute their battle for control. Furthermore, the sides in this battle had a clear ideological logic; the political economic vision promoted by the CIO was anathema to the interests of southern Democrats along several dimensions, and southern conservatives, in turn, viewed their survival as dependent on weakening the industrial labor movement. An ideological cleavage in which southern Democrats were identified as a crucial enemy of liberal advances across a range of issues—including civil rights—emerged as a product of wide-ranging intense policy battles on the ground in the late 1930s and early 1940s, rather than as a product of some sort of coalitional bargain within the Democratic Party.⁴¹

      Multiple, Intersecting Trajectories and the Realignment

      The civil rights realignment exemplifies how political transformations can emerge from the intersection of multiple, initially separate political trajectories. As Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek demonstrate, political development is often driven by the tensions between political institutions that had their origins in different time periods and that thus incorporated contradictory logics or purposes.⁴² A focus on a single institution or political interest is unlikely to help understand major political transformations when much of the action occurs at the intersection of multiple institutions and political processes.

      Along the first trajectory in the civil rights case, the party system was reshaped starting in the 1930s with little direct regard for civil rights politics, as the Democrats embraced New Deal liberalism and new coalition partners in response to the Depression, and Republicans countered with a turn to antistatism. The CIO unionists, African Americans, Jews, and other urban liberals who joined the ranks of the Democratic Party in the 1930s did so because of the Depression and the New Deal’s economic programs. With few exceptions, they were not responding to explicit civil rights appeals coming from the Democrats.⁴³ That is, few if any voters became Democrats in the 1930s because of civil rights, nor is it likely that being a Democrat directly led many voters to become pro–civil rights. But the presence of these voters in the New Deal coalition had crucial implications for how the Democratic Party would respond as civil rights reached the top of the national agenda.

      Meanwhile, along a second political trajectory, the long civil rights movement played a critical role in using protest, litigation, and legislative strategies to force civil rights onto the national agenda.⁴⁴ A key initial step occurred during the mobilization for entry into World War II, when A. Philip Randolph’s March on Washington Movement pressured Roosevelt into creating a temporary Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC) to prevent racial discrimination in defense industries. Although the CIO and other urban liberals had expressed support for civil rights before the FEPC’s creation, the intense movement-initiated battles over permanent fair employment legislation in the early to mid-1940s raised the political visibility of racial issues, encouraging liberal leaders and groups to give civil rights a more prominent place in their program. By the end of the war, support for civil rights had become a key marker of one’s identity as a liberal.

      After the war the violent reaction to a major movement-initiated voter registration drive in the South led to Harry Truman’s creation of the President’s Committee on Civil Rights. The

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