Research Design for Social Work and the Human Services

Research Design for Social Work and the Human Services

Research Design for Social Work and the Human Services

SECOND EDITION

JEANE W. ANASTAS

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

NEW YORK

Columbia University Press

Publishers Since 1893

New York   Chichester, West Sussex

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Copyright © 1999 by Columbia University Press

All rights reserved

E-ISBN 978-0-231-52928-0

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Anastas, Jeane W.

Research design for social work and the human services / by Jeane W. Anastas.—2nd ed.

     p. cm.

Rev. ed. of : Research design for social work and the human services / Jeane W. Anastas and Marian L. MacDonald. c1994.

Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index.

ISBN 0-231-11890-2 (cloth : alk. paper)

1. Social service—Research. 2. Human services—Research.

I. Title.

HV40.A7423 1999

361’.0072—dc21

99-38959

Some of the material in this volume is reprinted by permission of holders of copyright and publication rights. See page xvi for acknowledgments.

A Columbia University Press E-book.

CUP would be pleased to hear about your reading experience with this e-book at [email protected].

Contents

Preface to the Second Edition

Since the publication of this book, interest in many of the issues it set out to address has grown substantially. Since it went to press in 1993, there has been an explosion of writing about the uses of qualitative research and evaluation in social work and the helping professions. This literature has indeed been advancing us in our sophistication in both doing and evaluating this kind of inquiry (see, for example, Denzin & Lincoln 1994; Drisko 1997; Gilgun, Daly, & Handel 1992; Morse & Field 1995; Padgett 1998; Reissman 1994; Sherman & Reid 1994). One major reason for the revision of the book is to incorporate this new work into an enriched discussion of flexible method research.

Even case studies, one of the oldest forms of inquiry in the helping professions, have been gaining renewed respect (Gilgun 1994). One way in which the discussion of flexible method research has been enriched in this edition is through the inclusion of an entirely new chapter on traditional case studies (chapter 4). This content parallels in some ways the existing chapter on the application of fixed methods of research to cases in chapter 8 on single-system designs. It may be that in future editions it will be possible to further differentiate among kinds and styles of flexible method, or qualitative, research in useful ways, resulting in more chapters on these design types.

Very recently, realism, the epistemological framework advanced in this book, has been explored and endorsed by other writers in social work and related fields (Kazi 1998; Pawson & Tilley 1997). Further reading of my own in the philosophy of science has only strengthened my conviction about the usefulness of this position as an inclusive yet thoroughly scientific standpoint from which to conduct practice-relevant research (Anastas 1998; Klee 1997; Orange 1995; Papineau 1996). These developments confirm the importance of continuing to strengthen and further develop our understanding of these important and emerging epistemological ideas.

Similarly, since 1993, attention to the analysis of science as it relates to groups that have traditionally been oppressed and/or excluded—in society and in social science—has continued (see, for example, Harding 1998; Hess 1995; LeVay 1996; Swigonski 1994). This edition both retains and tries to build on the inclusion and analysis of diversity issues in research.

In addition, because of the passage of time, all of the exemplars used in the 1993 edition were reviewed in the preparation of this one. Some of them were retained because they were judged to be classic enough that time has not altered their relevance. Others were replaced with more recently published works. Feedback from readers of the first edition has uniformly endorsed the inclusion of full-length studies as exemplars in the book because they bring the research design principles discussed to life so effectively. Updated exemplars should make them even more helpful and readable.

Finally, learning about research can seem like learning a new language. Users of the first edition of the book correctly observed that it could be improved by adding a glossary, which has been done as an appendix in this new edition. Readers are encouraged to make reference to it whenever they encounter a term in the text that seems unfamiliar or unclear.

The need for high-quality research in social work and the other helping professions has not diminished. The capacity of social workers and other human service professionals to generate practice-relevant research is growing. If this book can aid and inspire more people to get involved in learning about and doing research, its most important goal will have been achieved.

Preface to the First Edition

This book was originally a self-help enterprise: to produce a better text than those then available for teaching a research methods course. Three of us began the work together. We thought we already knew about doing research, and that our planned book would result mostly from a process of summary and distillation. But several years later, we find that the journey has led us into new terrain, to a new understanding, and a new way to talk about research design.

Much of what the reader knowledgeable about research will find here will seem familiar, although the way it is described and the terms that are used may be novel. Some of what such a reader will find here may seem quite unfamiliar, but we hope our approach may open up for such a reader new avenues of appreciation for a wider range of research methods and designs. For those new to research, the book endeavors to make the content accessible, to present the current controversies in the field, and to convey excitement about research as a professional enterprise.

This textbook has many goals. One of them is to present science and research from an epistemological position that can embrace a range of models of inquiry. Instead of adopting the heuristic perspective (Heineman Pieper 1985, 1989; Tyson 1992, 1995), which might best be described as a standpoint rather than as an epistemology, we embrace fallibilistic realism (Manicas & Secord 1983), described in chapter 1, as our epistemological framework. This perspective is one from which both what have been termed qualitative or naturalistic methods and traditional quantitative methods can be valued, learned, and taught. We use the terms flexible and fixed methods to differentiate these two general styles of doing research.

Our goal has been to treat both flexible and fixed methods even-handedly. But because fixed or quantitative methods have been the dominant paradigm in social science and social work research in this century, the types of research included in this tradition and the methods associated with them have been more thoroughly elaborated to date. Consequently, more space in the book is devoted to fixed methods. It is our hope and expectation that in the future this imbalance may change as flexible methods of research are more often used and more fully explicated.

Another goal of this book has been to integrate content on women and people of color into the text. This integration has been achieved both through the examples of research we have provided and through our attempt to understand how racism, sexism, heterosexism, and other forms of bias may affect the conceptualization and conduct of research. The basic perspective taken on research in this book has been shaped to some degree by the critiques of sexism and racism endemic in the traditional institutions and methods of the scientific enterprise itself. This effort at integration will no doubt be found to be incomplete, and readers may find much to criticize in this regard. Nevertheless, the book takes the position that in the context of a racist, sexist, and heterosexist society, few aspects of research methods are so completely technical that they should not be subject to such an analysis. The point is not whether or not a given method or study has been critiqued correctly; the point is that such analysis as an activity is the responsibility of every researcher and research consumer who claims to be concerned with social justice and professional service, just as it is in practice.

A final novel feature of this text is the inclusion of a few selected studies within the text itself as examples of the types of research being described, both flexible and fixed in method. They have been reproduced whole rather than excerpted, which is more common, to give students experience in reading complete studies—as they must learn to do as professionals—and in order that each work can be viewed in context and independently evaluated by our readers. While this makes the book seem long, these examples are referred to repeatedly throughout the text, whether the topic is research design as a whole, a sampling strategy, a specific method of data collection, or a method of data analysis. Most but not all of the studies are from social work literature. The inclusion of the studies is designed to permit teaching from what might be termed a case study method.

To choose examples, however, is always risky: no perfect study or report of a study is ever found. Each of these examples was chosen for a variety of reasons, but in the end the choices were to some extent arbitrary. Thus, no selected study should be seen either as an incomparable ideal or solely as an object to use in showing off a capacity to uncover flaws in others’ methods or assertions. Instead, we hope that each article will serve as a springboard for learning and analysis that authors and readers will share as examples of what goes into a piece of research.

Because this book attempts to integrate discussion of a range of research methods into a single epistemological framework, the language used to discuss research design differs from what is usually encountered in books and courses about research. While different terminology always presents a challenge to readers, traditional terminology has only been altered when it seemed necessary to do so in order to represent a concept more accurately. However, as work proceeded, this necessity arose much more than anticipated.

For example, the term flexible method research is used in this book in preference to others: qualitative research confounds the form of the data with the method, while naturalistic research implies an epistemological position that is quite different from and more limited than the framework of realism provides. The term flexible, in addition to being descriptive of an important feature of the method, provides a useful contrast to the generic term, fixed, used to characterize a range of contrasting methods. The term quantitative is similarly rejected because it confounds the form of the data or of the analysis with the general method: narrative data can in fact be analyzed in a fixed or quantitative way or in a flexible manner. "Relational research is used in preference to the term correlational research, again because the term correlational" connotes one type of statistical analysis when more than one can be used; only advanced students of statistics understand that tests of group difference and correlational measures in fact have the same derivation mathematically. The hope is that the new language adopted, once learned, may prove clarifying for the reader as it has done for the writers.

The book, then, has some lofty goals. The first and most important is to provide an overview of scientific methods as they are used in social work to advance knowledge and improve practice. It is designed for use in research methods courses, especially those taught at the master’s and doctoral levels of study. There is nothing contained in this text to preclude its use at an undergraduate level; however, the experience that has shaped the work has been teaching at the graduate level in social work.

As noted earlier, the book has incorporated content both on what have traditionally been termed qualitative methods, which are called flexible methods, and on quantitative ones, which are called fixed methods. This inclusion is evident both in the series of chapters on general types of research, in which flexible methods are discussed at length in a chapter of their own, and in the series of chapters on ethics, sampling, the various data collection methods, and use of the computer, each of which contains content relevant to both fixed and flexible method research. Finally, the section on data analysis also contains a separate chapter on the analysis of narrative or unstructured data.

This book, in addition to serving as a classroom text, can also function as a handbook to guide the student or graduate professional in the conduct of research of many kinds. Most chapters, therefore, contain both conceptual material to organize the topic being discussed and quite concrete information designed to provide a how-to for the professional researcher. The how-to features should also prove useful to students doing group or individual research projects, including thesis and dissertation work.

The first part of the book contains an orientation to scientific inquiry and the epistemological basis for it. The standpoint adopted, fallibilistic realism (Manicas & Secord 1983), might be termed postpositivist (Fraser, Taylor, Jackson, & O’Jack 1991), but it provides a basis for both traditional and more naturalistic models of inquiry. The risk of embracing differing points of view is that it is possible to satisfy no one; it should be acknowledged that, in particular, those who subscribe wholeheartedly either to a constructivist framework on the one hand, or to a logical positivist one on the other, are unlikely to feel comfortable with the position we have taken. However, the framework offered will be satisfying and useful to the majority of social workers and other human service professionals who in fact have respect for a variety of methods of research. This first part also includes a chapter on problem formulation, on how research questions are framed and developed, a topic critical to the research process that is less often addressed than the other stages of the research process that derive from it. Chapter 2 also addresses the critical role that theory and knowledge, induction and deduction, and biases of several kinds may play in the shaping of a research study.

Part II covers the major types of designs used in social work research. Chapter 3 covers flexible method research in all its variety. Unlike the situation with fixed methods, which have dominated texts in the field for so long, it is not yet possible to articulate a clear typology of flexible methods of research.¹ Fixed methods, however, have been divided into descriptive, relational, and experimental designs, treated in chapters 5, 6, and 7, respectively. The category of relational research is original with us and is used to connote all of those forms of research investigating relationships among variables but in which variables are not experimentally manipulated. Some of what are usually termed quasi-experimental designs are thus discussed as relational studies and some as experiments. Chapter 8, the last chapter in part II, discusses single-subject designs as a fixed method of research.

Part II addresses general issues in the research process. Each chapter includes material on both fixed and flexible methods. Ethics in research are discussed first, in chapter 9, for they must guide each part of the research process as well as the conduct of the study as a whole. Sampling is explained in chapter 10. Principles of data collection, including the often taken-for-granted topic of the context of the research, is the topic of chapter 11.

Part IV is devoted to discussion of specific methods of data collection. Observation, interviewing, and designing questionnaires are discussed in chapters 12, 13, and 14, respectively. The chapters on observation and interviewing both incorporate material on gathering unstructured as well as structured data as these are the data collection methods most commonly used in flexible method research. These chapters and the one on questionnaires emphasize developing ways of gathering data for a study. Chapter 15, on selecting available measures, concludes part IV.

Part V, on analyzing data and disseminating the results of research, completes the review of the research process. Data analysis is divided into chapters on the content analysis of narrative data (chapter 16) and on descriptive (chapter 17) and inferential (chapter 18) statistics. A colleague, James Drisko, has contributed a chapter on using the computer for working with both qualitative and quantitative data (chapter 14). The essential step of disseminating research findings is often overlooked, so the book ends with chapter 20 on writing research reports.

When this book was begun, the idea was simply that it would improve somewhat upon the texts on research methods then available in social work and the human services. As the discussion, refinement, and articulation of ideas proceeded, however, it became evident that it was necessary to move into new intellectual territory in ways that were not originally anticipated. This journey has sometimes been a fearful but always an interesting one, and the reader, whether student, teacher, or practitioner, is invited to travel along. Readers may not always agree with the positions taken in this book, However, where we are now in the helping professions in our thinking about research will only be a way station in the rapidly evolving discourse about doing science in social work and the other human service professions.

1.  While the revised edition in fact adds traditional case studies to the section on flexible method research, the basic situation described remains the same as of this writing.

Acknowledgments

This book began as a three-person project. The early involvement of Carolyn Jacobs of the Smith College School for Social Work as a fellow teacher, coauthor, and colleague made the task initially seem possible. Although she withdrew from the project early on, Carolyn’s initial ideas helped shape the book in essential ways, and her participation in early discussions about its content was indispensable in getting the project off to a good start. In addition, Margaret H. Whalen, who contributed a chapter to the first edition, provided informal but very welcome encouragement to the project as a whole.

Marian MacDonald, my coauthor for the first edition of this book, was essential to its very existence. As teaching colleagues, we struggled together to do a better job of giving students what they needed. Marian has the courage of her intellectual convictions, which often helped propel us forward onto new ground. Unfortunately as time went on, her other professional and personal commitments did not allow her to continue to work on the book. Her essential early contributions are appropriately recognized in her coauthorship of the first edition. Also, I want to warmly thank my colleague, Jim Drisko, for his willingness to rewrite the chapter on computer uses in research for this edition. His degree of expertise in both qualitative and quantitative data analysis is quite unusual and has enriched this edition of the book immeasurably. However, despite the essential contributions of these colleagues, as the one who has sustained authorship of the book for over a decade at this point, the primary responsibility for it, including its flaws, must rest with me.

There are also several other sources of support that I have enjoyed and that deserve public acknowledgement. A Brown Foundation Award from the Smith College School for Social Work’s Clinical Research Institute supported me in part in writing the first edition of this text. I also want to thank the Smith College School for Social Work and its dean at the time, Ann Hartman, for a generous sabbatical leave that enabled me to finish that work. I also want to thank the Wellesley College Center for Research on Women for the nurturing working environment provided to me as a Visiting Scholar during the 1992–93 academic year. These supports were crucial for the revision and completion of the first edition.

There were many individuals who contributed in other ways to this work at different times. Colleagues Joyce Everett, James Drisko, and Roger Miller read and commented on parts of the first manuscript, providing very helpful feedback. Other members of the permanent and adjunct faculty of the Smith College School for Social Work continue to provide generous and insightful feedback. I would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers of the original prospectus and the completed first edition for their helpful comments. I also thank Sherri Ettinger who has generously assisted in the preparation of the glossary for this revised edition.

Many students have now read various chapters in draft and have used the book in their courses over the years. As they are its most important audience, their feedback has been and continues to be extraordinarily helpful. Their responses to the material as it has evolved have been very encouraging. Only those who teach can truly appreciate how generously students in fact continuously educate their teachers. I learn from and am inspired by my students on a daily basis. In the end, of course, despite all of these generous attempts to help, responsibility for the content of this work, rests entirely with its author.

Originally Margaret Zusky, then a Senior Editor with Lexington Books, provided unwavering moral and material support to us throughout what was a very long process of completing the first edition. Her patience and her confidence in us and in this book were essential to its completion. Since then, the book has become the property of Columbia University Press. In particular, Senior Executive Editor John Michel has been an invaluable, patient, and effective supporter of this work. Thank you, John, for helping to find this book a new home and for facilitating its much-needed revision and republication.

Finally, the encouragement and forbearance of friends and family members is essential to anyone who engages in the long, absorbing, and solitary work of writing a book. To Benjamin, Rhea, and Jonathan Anastas: thank you for the support and inspiration you have all provided. Finally, for all the times during the past many years that you did without companionship, put up with preoccupation, put a much-needed meal on the table, and, most importantly, expressed unfailing encouragement and affection—thank you, Jan.

About the Author

Jeane W. Anastas is currently Professor and Associate Dean at the Shirley M. Ehrenkranz School of Social Work at New York University. She earned her baccalaureate degree in social work at the Metropolitan College, Boston University (1976), her M.S.W. with a major in research at the Boston College Graduate School of Social Work (1978), and her Ph.D. at the Heller School, Brandeis University (1982). She joined the Smith College School for Social Work faculty in 1983 as chair of the research sequence, a position she held until 1994. She then served as cochair of the school’s doctoral program until 1999. From 1978 through 1982 she taught research methods and statistics on an adjunct basis at Boston University, first at the School of Social Work and later at Metropolitan College in the sociology department. She then served on the faculty of the Simmons College School of Social Work from 1980 through 1983. She also directed the Clinical Research Institute at the Smith College School for Social Work.

In addition to over 20 years’ experience in teaching research to social workers, Anastas has considerable experience in conducting research in social agencies and in the community. She was the evaluator for a federally funded program serving pregnant teenagers and for a federally funded day-treatment program serving pregnant and postpartum substance-abusing women and their children in western Massachusetts. She has also consulted to national, state, and local-level research projects in the areas of eldercare, the epidemiology of childhood emotional and behavioral problems, and mental health services for children.

Anastas has been active at state and local levels in the National Association of Social Workers, including serving for some years on its National Committee on Women’s Issues. She has been appointed to the editorial board of Affilia: The Journal of Women in Social Work and is a consulting editor for the Journal of Orthopsychiatry. She has published in the areas of teaching research in social work, teen pregnancy, eldercare, substance abuse services, and gay/lesbian issues. Her most recent book, with coauthor George A. Appleby, is Not Just a Passing Phase: Social Work with Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual People.

Grateful acknowledgment is made for permission to reprint the following:

The chapter 3 Exemplar, The continuing significance of race: Antiblack discrimination in public places, by Joe R. Feagin, was first published in the American Sociological Review 56(1991): 101–116. Reprinted with permission from the American Sociological Association.

The chapter 4 Exemplar, A family case study: An examination of the underclass debate, by Robin L. Jarrett, was first published in Qualitative Methods in Family Research, edited by Jane F. Gilgun, Kerry Daly, and Gerald Handel. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1992. Reprinted with permission of Sage Publications.

The chapter 5 Exemplar, The use of self-disclosure by professional social workers, by Sandra C. Anderson and Deborah L. Mandell, was first published in Families in Society 70(5) (1989): 259–267. Reprinted with permission from Families in Society.

The chapter 6 Exemplar, Biculturalism and subjective mental health among Cuban Americans, by Manuel R. Gomez, was first published in the Social Service Review 64(3) (1990): 375–389. Reprinted with permission from the University of Chicago Press.

The chapter 7 Exemplar, Preventing HIV/AIDS in drug-abusing incarcerated women through skills building and social support enchancement: Preliminary outcomes, by Nabila El-Bassel, André Ivanoff, Robert F. Schilling, Louisa Gilbert, Debra Borne, and Duan-Rung Chen, was first published in Social Work Research 19(3) (1995). Reprinted with permission from Social Work Research.

The chapter 8 Exemplar, Empirical support for the effectiveness of respite care in reducing caregiver burden: A single-case analysis, by Cheryl A. Richey and Vanessa G. Hodges, was first published in Research on Social Work Practice 2(2) (1992): 143–160. Reprinted with permission from Research on Social Work Practice.

Figure 17.7 was first published in Who We Are: A Second Look, by M. Gibelson and P. H. Schervish. Washington, D.C.: NASW Press, 1997. Copyright © 1997 by the National Association of Social Workers, Inc. Reprinted by permission of the National Association of Social Workers, Inc.

Figure 9.2 copyright © 1992 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted with permission from the American Psychological Association.

Figure 19.3 from SPSS for Windows, Rel. 8.0.0. 1997. Chicago: SPSS Inc. Used by permission of SPSS Inc. Selected passages in chapter 9 are from the National Association of Social Workers’ 1997 Code of Ethics. Copyright © 1996 by the National Association of Social Workers, Inc. Reprinted by permission of the National Association of Social Workers, Inc.

Part I

Research Design in Context

The context of any research design is set in two fundamental ways: by its guiding assumptions about how knowledge is developed and what constitutes useful knowledge and by how its methods are joined to a specific content area through the statement of a study question. Social work, the other human service professions, and the social sciences are all in the midst of a lively debate about epistemology, about how useful knowledge is generated. The epistemological framework used in this text is explained in chapter 1, which is essential reading for use of any part of this text. Chapter 1 also provides a brief introduction to the basic types of research designs most commonly used in social work and human services research, each of which is more fully described in the chapters that make up part II. Chapter 2 describes how to develop a plan for any specific type of research by identifying a content area in need of further study and linking it to a research design through the formal statement of a research question. Ways to reduce common sources of bias in research design are also discussed.

1

The Nature of Science in the Helping Professions

… scientific rationality certainly is not as monolithic or deterministic as many think…. It has been versatile and flexible enough throughout its history to permit constant reinterpretation of what should count as legitimate objects and processes of scientific research; it is itself shaped by cultural transformations and must struggle within them….

(Harding 1991:3)

All research expresses some position about effective ways of developing knowledge. The subject of how best to advance knowledge for practice in social work and the human services has been the subject of intense, sustained argument over the past half century. This is an exciting time for research in social work and the human services because the debate has now gone on long enough to clarify the differences in points of view on the issue, to identify areas of agreement and disagreement, and to support new efforts at synthesis. In order to read and properly understand a researcher’s work or to conduct research yourself, you must be able to identify the assumptions that guide it and understand the strengths and limitations of any model of research or any particular research design. A major aim of this book is to describe new ways to understand research that offer social work and the other helping professions a framework that embraces a variety of research methods previously seen as competing models.

The social work and human service professions have always had an ambivalent relationship with research. This ambivalence does not connote lukewarm but conflicted feelings, both strongly positive attitudes and quite negative ones. As a relatively young profession, social work has often sought to strengthen its knowledge base and its claims to legitimacy among competing professions through research. On the other hand, the profession has also asserted the importance of other sources of legitimacy for its methods and its goals, such as its mission of service, its sanction from the community, and its value base. In this stance, it is not unlike other clinical disciplines and helping professions. For example, medicine is a profession that flourished in some forms long before there was much scientific knowledge available on which to base its practice and in which conflicts between the injunction to serve the individual patient and the scientific imperative still frequently arise.

Unlike medicine, social work as a profession was born and has developed in an era in which science and technology have been dominant forces in Western culture. However, early in its history social work defined itself as different from sociology and the other social sciences in part because practice rather than scientific investigation was the primary interest of the profession (Zimbalist 1977). Social work deals with the whole person in context, with the interface of the person and the social environment, and with interventions designed to resolve individual, interpersonal, and social problems. It thus encompasses knowledge and fields of practice in which multiple factors and influences are routinely at work and in which the social and behavioral sciences currently offer probabilistic knowledge at best. Thus the drive to achieve a more exact science of social work has not been easily reconciled with the recognition of the primacy of practice goals on the one hand and the complexities of the problems addressed and the interventions used on the other.

One recent effect of this tension has been an intense debate within the profession about the nature of the scientific method itself and about the models of inquiry best suited for the development of knowledge for and about practice. Some have argued that if science and practice have been hard to reconcile, the profession should restrict its models of practice to methods that lend themselves to study using common and well-recognized research modes (Hudson 1978). In this paradigm, the experiment becomes the ideal model of research that other kinds of studies seek to approximate, and quantitative techniques predominate. Stemming from a logical positivist philosophy, the assumption is of a reality out there that can be similarly known by objective observers without contamination of the thing observed. The goal of investigation is to uncover the invariant regularities or laws of relationships among phenomena, which act on each other in repeatable, predictable ways. Much of the teaching of research in social work and in the social sciences in America today reflects this point of view (Fraser, Taylor, Jackson, & O’Jack 1991; Reamer 1993; Thyer 1993). In fact it is of interest to philosophers of science that this view has persisted as long as it has in the social sciences (Klee 1997).

In the past two decades, however, an argument has been made for constructivism as an epistemology and for the use of naturalistic and interpretive methods of inquiry in social work (Heineman 1981; Imre 1984; Riessman 1994; Ruckdeschel 1985). This argument has been based both on a critique of the failure of traditional methods to gain acceptance by practitioners and prove relevant to the practice situation and on an argument for a more relativistic view of reality and the process of knowing. What is available and relevant for study, it is argued, are the meanings, the constructions, that people, researchers and researched, place on events. According to this view, these meanings can best be uncovered and conveyed through flexible methods of inquiry, using unstructured observational or verbal data, and by acknowledging the investigator’s involvement and participation in shaping the data obtained. Thus the cases for and against various models of research have largely been made on epistemological grounds, by examining the assumptions about how we know what we know that underlie the various approaches to research.

This debate in social work and other human service professions simply echoes that occurring in all of the social sciences. In social work, as in other disciplines, the discussion has tended to produce polarized positions that favor one model of research while dismissing the utility of others. However, in reality, social workers who do research and social workers who read research over a lifetime often use and value research that arises from very different methods, finding research results of many kinds to be persuasive and useful. Given this reality, this book explores how such seemingly irreconcilable epistemological positions can both be embraced.

Gradually, a third position seems to be emerging in social work: what Fraser et al. have termed a many ways perspective (Fraser, Taylor, Jackson, & O’Jack 1991). In various ways, the argument has been made that there are many ways of knowing (Hartman 1990) that may be useful to the profession at different times and in different contexts (Heineman Pieper 1989; Piele 1988; Reid 1994; Tyson 1992). The heuristic approach (Heineman Pieper 1985, 1989; Tyson 1992, 1995) connotes a strategy whose goal is utility rather than certainty (Heineman Pieper 1989:11), essentially a pragmatic view. There are several tenets of the heuristic approach as explicated by Heineman Pieper: facts and theories are not distinct; no facts, methods of investigation, or forms of data are privileged; causality is itself a heuristic that cannot be determined from data alone; and the researcher cannot be viewed as invisible in the conduct or results of the research. In this paradigm, objectivity is understood as a species of report in which there is agreement among researchers, which could result from a common bias as well as from truth (Heineman Pieper 1989:17). From this perspective, the heuristic researcher practices bias regulation through bias recognition rather than through the denial of bias (Heineman Pieper 1989:18), just as the practitioner does. However, unlike in constructivist approaches, the heuristic approach does take the position that there is a mind-independent reality to be known (Tyson 1992).

This perspective is the one that best describes the scientific enterprise as many researchers understand it, although Heineman Pieper (1989) extends her definition of research beyond boundaries that most would recognize. In this text the definition of research is limited to empirical methods of knowing, including only those forms of the exercise of professional judgement that make explicit reference to some kind of observational activity addressing aspects of a mind-independent reality. It is within this emergent perspective that this text is located, but the perspective taken is identified for what it is: in the philosophical tradition of realism.

The other stream of argument that has affected the current ferment about research philosophies and methods in social work is, at bottom, political. Feminists (Davis 1986; Collins 1991; Swigonski 1994), antiracists (Akbar 1991; Bowman 1991; Hess 1995) and other critical theorists have pointed out that the claim of legitimacy for knowledge is at least in part a political one and that the methods and products of science are not apolitical or value-free. Science as an enterprise will tend to serve the needs of some people in society more than the needs of others. Practically speaking, the tools of traditional research as they are now used demonstrably do not serve well women and people of color (McMahon & Allen-Meares 1992). The debate about research methods, then, even when not explicitly addressing political issues, often takes on the tinge of an establishment versus anti-establishment contest.

In particular, the view of research and scientific methods taken in this book owes a great deal to feminist analysis and critiques of science as a social institution. There are, of course, many feminisms and many feminist critiques of science. The position taken here is similar to that of Sandra Harding (1991) who states several assumptions: science is politics by other means, and it also generates reliable information about the empirical world (p. 10); science contains both [politically] progressive and regressive tendencies (p. 10), and the challenge is how to advance the progressive and inhibit the regressive ones (p. 11) in any research situation; the observer and the observed are in the same causal scientific plane (p. 11); and it is necessary to decenter white, middle-class, heterosexual, Western thought and experiences in scientific and professional enterprises (p. 13). This last assumption may be the most difficult to work with, both because of the identities and experiences any author may participate (and not participate) in and because these problems are currently underrecognized and underanalyzed in social work research (Hill 1980; Jacobs & Bowles 1988; McMahon & Allen-Meares 1992). The general approach the book takes to science and the generation of knowledge for social work and the human services is an inclusive one in part because it acknowledges the need for multiple and particularly for underrepresented points of view and ways of knowing to be heard and legitimated.

Why Be Scientific?

Given the difficulty that social work has had in developing a tradition of doing science within the profession, why is research still considered such an important issue in social work, social work education, and in the human services in general? With current efforts to limit health care costs and public spending for human services, the helping professions, including social work, and those who manage and control the delivery of health and mental health care rely increasingly on what is termed outcomes research in choosing the treatments and services to provide and to pay for. Similarly, Congress is demanding that the federal agencies that fund innovative demonstration programs to address social problems, such as teen pregnancy and substance abuse, also produce research results to show which kinds of programs can produce the specific outcomes desired. Public scrutiny of federal medical research in such controversial areas as HIV disease and cancer has led to questioning about what problems draw funding when and about how protocols of study do or do not serve those who have the problem and those who participate in the research. Accountability for practice and for program design are major challenges for the helping professions. In the face of these complex problems and of finite resources to fund services, research is seen as a useful tool for helping policy makers and practitioners make hard choices. This argument for research and its usefulness is essentially a pragmatic one.

In addition to these practical problems, the ferment in other fields about epistemology and how scientific knowledge is and should be generated has affected social work as well, as has already been mentioned. This debate has opened up new possibilities for research both for individual practitioners and for program evaluators. But with new and expanded boundaries has come the need for greater clarity about the nature of research and science itself. What constitutes science as opposed to other ways of generating knowledge? And just exactly what do we mean when we speak of research?

In this book the terms science and research mean the enterprise of learning about the natural, psychological, or social world systematically and reflexively, both by using some kind of focussed observation of that world and by applying some system of conceptualization for organizing and attributing meaning to those observations either before or after the fact. In addition, all activities called scientific are undertaken in a spirit of skepticism, that is, by subjecting both the ideas received in framing the research and the ideas generated from it to questioning, to a search for alternative explanations, and to scrutiny by others in the field. Systematic investigation means that learning and observations are undertaken according to a plan and in a focussed way, guided by a specific question or hypothesis. Reflexiveness means self-observation and that both the process and the results of research are studied and examined in the spirit of skepticism.

But why should society turn to research to answer tough questions? Why should a profession be able to lay a claim to legitimacy for its activities by invoking science? One answer lies in the fact that scientific investigation seems to have evolved over the years as an important corrective to common errors of thinking that human beings are prone to. The psychologist Thomas Gilovich (1991) drew on research in social and cognitive psychology to explain why the scientific method can be so helpful. As he states:

Many of these imperfections in our cognitive and inferential tools might never surface under ideal conditions … but the world … presents us with messy data that are random, incomplete, unrepresentative, ambiguous, inconsistent, unpalatable, or secondhand…. [I]t is often our flawed attempts to cope with precisely these difficulties that lay bare our inferential shortcomings and produce the facts we know that just ain’t so (Gilovich 1991:3).

In his book, Gilovich uses examples and findings from numerous studies of how people think and what influences thinking to develop his arguments, which will be summarized here.

First of all, Gilovich observes that people prefer to see order rather than disorder in things and will tend to impose or invent order where it does not exist, including when phenomena are really random. For example, a clustering illusion (p. 16) creates streaks out of random variation in numbers, and a tendency to overvalue similarities and to expect representativeness even in small samples of events contributes as well. One thing science, especially social science, can contribute, then, is a true understanding of randomness, as well as an understanding of such statistical principles as regression to the mean. This knowledge can be an important safeguard against overinterpreting observations (Paulos 1988; Bernstein 1996). However, the cost of this knowledge is that we are forced to acknowledge those areas, which are many, in which our understanding and our ability to explain or to predict are in fact minimal or nonexistent.

Gilovich (1991) also points out that humans seem to have a tendency to attend selectively to information that confirms a belief in preference to information that may disconfirm it. This tendency, of course, is the reverse of the stance demanded by the scientific method—skepticism—and may explain why skepticism is so central in research. The fact that only partial data are available may be overlooked, and data inconsistent with our preexisting ideas may be more closely scrutinized in an attempt to discount them than data consistent with them. In fact, Gilovich (1991) gives many illustrations of how confirmatory events are remembered much more clearly than nonconfirmatory ones, a tendency that is much reduced with focussed observation, as the scientific method demands.

While most of these tendencies seem to arise from how the brain itself works in processing information, there are many motivational and social contributors to erroneous beliefs that Gilovich (1991) also outlines. These factors include the endowment effect, or the tendency to overvalue whatever is already our own, including our ideas and beliefs. They also include the inaccuracies that are part and parcel of secondhand information (p. 111) but that come into play whenever one relies on received information or the word of experts in preference to firsthand knowledge. They also include the exaggerated impressions of support for our own ideas as they are generated in ordinary social and even in professional interactions. Here again, the rules of the scientific method are explicitly different from those of ordinary interactions and everyday learning, emphasizing instead consideration of alternative ideas and explanations, reliance on direct observation and original investigation, and the subjecting of ideas to dissemination and critique. All of these characteristics of the scientific method in general, then, seem designed specifically to overcome the flaws that exist in ordinary human thinking.

In fact, Gilovich (1991) asserts that training in the probabilistic sciences, such as the social sciences, may be more effective than in the deterministic sciences, such as physics and chemistry, for developing skills in reasoning and in the accurate weighing of evidence in everyday life. As in science, the social worker or human service professional must be a skillful observer, weighing evidence and interpreting it even while confronted with its limits and with the necessity of tolerating ambiguity and uncertainty when making decisions. Social work and the human services, in which one regularly encounters complex phenomena and incomplete or ambiguous data, are thus excellent training grounds for developing the habits of mind necessary to overcome the natural tendencies in thinking that can lead to drawing false and unwarranted conclusions. Understanding research and scientific thinking helps to develop these habits of mind.

Ways of Knowing

However valuable the scientific method may be, it is not the only valuable route to knowledge. In fact, there are many alternate routes to knowledge. The philosopher Charles Peirce (pronounced purse) (1934), who might best be described as a pragmatist, identified five ways of knowing, or methods commonly used to generate new information. The first is appeal to authority. This method involves believing that a statement is true on the grounds of its having been asserted by someone held in respect, such as an authority figure. Examples of accepting statements as true on this ground are abundant, including the great success of advertising campaigns based on endorsements by successful sports figures or other entertainers or, in the professional realm, by invoking the names of key scholars or historical figures when making an argument.

There is a reverse side to the appeal to authority method of knowing. Just as a statement can be believed because of who said it, a statement can be disbelieved on the same grounds. The familiar phrase consider the source refers to what is called an ad hominem (literally, against the man) argument. In this case, an assertion may be disbelieved on the grounds of disliking or not respecting the person who made it. In the case of both types of appeal to authority, the value of a statement is determined by the source rather than the content of the statement. It is hard to imagine how the nurturance and early education of children could be accomplished in the absence of this method of knowing where the respected, unquestioned truth source for the child is the parent.

The second method of knowing Peirce termed the method of tenacity. As is implied by the term tenacity, which means persistence in maintaining or adhering to an idea, statements held to be true on these grounds are ones heard believed because they are repeated by others over and over again. A person who rode on a bus and came to believe that it was going to rain the next day because he or she overheard six or seven separate conversations in which one of the parties commented that tomorrow it was supposed to rain would be accepting that weather forecast on the grounds of the method of tenacity. Much of the knowledge believed on these grounds is labeled common sense; it is knowledge held in common, knowledge everyone knows (meaning believes) and therefore asserts to be true.

Skeptical readers might find themselves asserting at this point that these first two methods of knowing have no real value. After all, everyone can recite instances where statements made to them by authority figures turned out to be wrong. And one has only to remember that at one time everyone except Copernicus believed that the sun revolved around the earth to realize that just because an assertion is generally believed (i.e., is a common, or shared, view) does not mean that it is really true. While these methods of knowing are not infallible, they still have value and are commonly used, and it is important to recognize them for what they are. Even within science, at times these methods of knowing come into play as well.

Logic, or rationalism, is the third method of knowing described by Peirce. This method is fairly formal and follows standardized rules of logic. It involves beginning with an accepted statement linking a general antecedent and a general consequent, a statement conceded to be true. This initial statement is called the major premise. An example might be All female birds lay eggs. To use logic as a method of knowing, this major premise must be followed by a minor premise. A minor premise is again a statement conceded to be true, in which a particular case is identified as an instance of the antecedent in the major premise. An example might be Pretty is a female bird.

Logic dictates that if the major and minor premises are both true, then their pairing implies a necessarily true conclusion: If All female birds lay eggs and Pretty is a female bird, then Pretty, as a female bird, must lay eggs. Reasoning to a clearly implied conclusion from a previously known major and minor premise is how new knowledge, that is, the conclusion, is rationally derived using logic.

There is a mistake that is often made by those believing they are using the method of logic. This mistake is called reasoning from the consequent, and it involves drawing an incorrect conclusion from a true major premise and a true minor premise. The error comes in pairing a major premise with a minor premise that makes an assertion about the major premise’s consequent rather than its antecedent. In the preceding example, such an error would involve pairing the original major premise All female birds lay eggs with a different minor premise involving the major premise’s consequent, for example, Pretty lays eggs. It might seem tempting to conclude that since all female birds lay eggs and since Pretty lays eggs, Pretty is a female bird. However, since there is no claim in the major premise that only female birds lay eggs, it is entirely possible, given the information at hand, that Pretty is an alligator.

Instances of reasoning from the consequent, as shall become clear, are not uncommon. There are many occasions when we wish to investigate effects, or consequents, in an effort to identify their putative causes. But drawing conclusions by reasoning from the consequent, however appealing, is not defensible on logical grounds. For example, if the major premise that all adults who were sexually abused as children have eating disorders were known to be true, it would still not be tenable to conclude that a particular adult with an eating disorder had been sexually abused as a child.

The fourth method of knowing is perhaps least understood. This method, intuition, is often illustrated in the history of science with the following story. The great thinker Archimedes was approached by the king of his day for help with an economic dilemma. The king had commissioned a tradesman to make him a crown of pure gold, but when the work was completed, the king suspected the tradesman of deceiving him. The king had a feeling that he was being charged for the crown as if it had been made of pure gold when, in fact, it was made of less pure (and therefore less costly) metal. The king asked Archimedes to counsel him on whether the crown was, as the tradesman claimed, pure gold so that the full debt was owed, or whether the crown was made of a gold alloy, so that punishment for the tradesman was in order.

Archimedes was at first stumped. He could not test the crown’s substance using the accepted method, because that method involved melting the metal to see if it was pure. To use that method, then, would destroy the crown itself. If it did turn out to be pure gold, the king would have the satisfaction of knowing the tradesman was honest, but he would then have to pay the full bill for a crown he would no longer have.

As the story goes, Archimedes kept puzzling about the problem while performing his daily activities. And the solution occurred to him, finally, while he was beginning to take a bath. When entering the tub, he noticed that the water level rose on the side of the tub as he immersed his body; and as he got up from the tub, the water level on the side of the tub fell. He supposedly shouted in great joy Eureka (which means in Greek I have it!): He had discovered the property of the displacement of mass.

What Archimedes realized, or intuited, in that moment was that any object having a certain volume and weight would displace precisely that volume of water whatever its shape, which is the concept of specific mass. Each metal (or substance) has its own specific mass, and no two metals are exactly alike. He could therefore test whether the crown was pure gold by weighing it and then comparing the amount of water it displaced to the amount of water displaced by a block of metal having the same weight but known to be pure gold. If the crown displaced a different amount of water than the block of gold, that would prove that it was made of an alloy; if the displacement were the same, the crown would be proven to be pure gold.

The solution to the puzzle facing Archimedes, according to legend, came to him in a flash. This sudden insight, when it occurs, is known as deriving knowledge through intuition. It is perhaps the most poorly understood of Peirce’s methods of knowing because it rests on feeling, and in modern Western culture, thought and feeling are not often comfortably paired. Archimedes’ insight about a method to solve a problem connected what he knew about the properties of metals with the observation of the effects of his body on the bath water. The rest of the story, the exercise in demonstration, the experiment to determine the composition of the crown itself, belongs to a different method of knowing: the scientific method.

Peirce’s final method of knowing is the scientific method. Stated most broadly, this method is empirical and involves conducting self-critical, systematic observation under described circumstances. Empiricism means that the method ultimately rests on experiential information derived through observation using the senses (sight, sound, touch, taste, or smell). Notice that much of the emphasis in this definition of the scientific method is on making explicit the nature of the observations made, the circumstances in which they were made, and the role taken by the observer in making them. Also notice that the definition does not specify anything about the nature of the observations, circumstances, or roles themselves; one kind of observation is not inherently any more scientific or unscientific than another.

The scientific method is also characterized by an attitude of skepticism or disbelief. It includes subjecting ideas, intuitions, or hunches to the possibility of disconfirmation when examined in the light of logic or of empirical evidence. It also includes subjecting the observations made and the interpretations and conclusions drawn from them first to self-scrutiny by the maker of the observations and then to scrutiny by others who are also experts on the matter under study. One of the reasons for the emphasis on describing scientific observations and methods carefully is in fact to permit such scrutiny by others. Only ideas and evidence about which there is some consensus among knowledgeable observers become part of that body of knowledge called scientific.

In the social sciences and human services, there are two major forms of inquiry, with subtypes, which qualify as instances of using the scientific method, termed in this book fixed method and flexible method research. These forms of inquiry will be introduced later in this chapter and then described in detail by subtype in the section of the book on research designs. Although each has its distinctive features, what they have in common, which is a foundation in empiricism and in skepticism, is much more important than what differentiates them.

Scientific Knowledge and Other Ways of Knowing

As Peirce’s work points out, then, science is not the only route to knowledge. Alternative, equally useful methods are also available. To refuse to make use of these other methods is unnecessarily constraining. It places too great a burden on the scientific method (namely, to be the only true source of knowledge) and prohibits building and evaluating belief systems using multiple, converging methods.

It is very reassuring when two or more ways of knowing converge on the same truth. For example, high school students are often told by their teachers, their parents, and their peers that their futures will be brighter if they go to college. If these students read a research study reporting that 1991 college graduates earned on average $5.97 per hour more than students only finishing high school (Uchitelle 1992), they will have three reasons to believe they should if possible continue their studies: appeal to authority (statements made by their parents and teachers), the method of tenacity (repeated statements made by others), and the scientific method (the article reporting on findings about education and earnings derived through systematic observation).

It is reassuring when two or more methods of knowing converge on the same conclusion, and it is disquieting and often confusing when they don’t. Divergence in conclusions, however, is not at all uncommon. Consider the rising and setting of the sun as a child might view it. The direct evidence of one’s senses is that the sun travels across the sky, and for many years it was in fact believed that the earth was at the center of the universe and that the sun and stars traveled around it. When an alternate view was proposed, the one now considered scientific—that in fact the earth travels in an orbit around the sun—there was tremendous controversy, religious and civil, about it. A new theory or model of the solar system was introduced that explained the apparent motion of the sun through the sky in a different way, as a product of the motion of the earth. Only in this century with the advent of space travel have humans had direct sensory evidence of the earth as