Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict

WHY CIVIL RESISTANCE WORKS

COLUMBIA STUDIES IN TERRORISM AND IRREGULAR WARFARE

COLUMBIA STUDIES IN TERRORISM AND IRREGULAR WARFARE

Bruce Hoffman, Series Editor

This series seeks to fill a conspicuous gap in the burgeoning literature on terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and insurgency. The series adheres to the highest standards of scholarship and discourse and publishes books that elucidate the strategy, operations, means, motivations, and effects posed by terrorist, guerrilla, and insurgent organizations and movements. It thereby provides a solid and increasingly expanding foundation of knowledge on these subjects for students, established scholars, and informed reading audiences alike.

AMI PEDAHZUR, THE ISRAELI SECRET SERVICES AND THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISM

AMI PEDAHZUR AND A RIE PERLIGER, JEWISH TERRORISM IN ISRAEL

LORENZO VIDINO, THE NEW MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN THE WEST

WHY CIVIL RESISTANCE WORKS THE STRATEGIC LOGIC OF NONVIOLENT CONFLICT

ERICA CHENOWETH & MARIA J. STEPHAN

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS NEW YORK

The views expressed in this book

do not represent those of the United States Government.

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E-ISBN 978-0-231-52748-4

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Chenoweth, Erica, 1980–

Why civil resistance works : the strategic logic of nonviolent conflict / Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan.

p. cm. — (Columbia studies in terrorism and irregular warfare)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-231-15682-0 (cloth : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-231-52748-4 (electronic)

1. Civil disobedience. 2. Nonviolence. I. Stephan, Maria J. II. Title. III. Series.

JC328.3.C474   2011

303.6'1—dc222010037567

A Columbia University Press E-book.

CUP would be pleased to hear about your reading experience with this e-book at [email protected].

References to Internet Web sites (URLs) were accurate at the time of writing. Neither the author nor Columbia University Press is responsible for URLs that may have expired or changed since the manuscript was prepared.

COVER & INTERIOR DESIGN BY MARTIN N. HINZE

FOR MY FAMILY

—E. C.

TO MY PARENTS AND BROTHER

—M. J. S.

CONTENTS

ILLUSTRATIONS

TABLES

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

IT IS IMPOSSIBLE to recollect all the people from whom I received inspiration, assistance, and unwavering support while re-searching and writing this book. But I wish to recognize a few, with additional thanks to those not mentioned here.

First are my colleagues at the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict—Peter Ackerman, Jack DuVall, Hardy Merriman, Althea Middleton-Detzner, Maciej Bartkowski, Daryn Cambridge, and Vanessa Ortiz—all of whom have believed in and supported this project from the very start. They introduced me to the topic and to Maria, and I gratefully acknowledge the financial support that made the study possible. I also thank Stephen Zunes, Doug Bond, Cynthia Boaz, and Kurt Schock for their comments on the research.

The cohort of scholars I met during two years at the Belfer Center at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government helped the project take off. To Ivan Arreguín-Toft, Boaz Atzili, Kristin Bakke, Emma Belcher, Nik Biziouras, Tom Bielefeld, Jonathan Caverley, Fotini Christia, David Cunningham, Kathleen Cunningham, Erik Dahl, Alexander Downes, Ehud Eiran, Emily Greble, Kelly Greenhill, Mike Horowitz, Matthew Kocher, Sarah Kreps, Matthew Kroenig, Adria Lawrence, Jason Lyall, Steve Miller, Assaf Moghadam, Jonathan Monten, Harris Mylonas, Wendy Pearlman, Phil Potter, Scott Radnitz, Elizabeth Saunders, John Schuessler, Tammy Smith, Monica Toft, and Stephen Walt: your brilliance continues to awe and humble me.

Matthew Fuhrmann gave up four days of his vacation during July 2009 to fly across the country and help me resolve seemingly intractable problems from data structure to simultaneous equations. I can only hope to emulate his selflessness and clarity of mind as my career progresses.

I also appreciatively acknowledge the continued support of colleagues at the University of Colorado. Colin Dueck, Steve Chan, David Leblang, and Jennifer Fitzgerald are excellent mentors. Special thanks go to Susan Clarke. Everyone lucky enough to know Susan is familiar with her dedication to mentoring young scholars and the enthusiasm with which she challenges us intellectually while simultaneously advocating for us professionally. My classmates at the University of Colorado have also proved to be some of my most valued colleagues. I owe Jessica Teets, Orion Lewis, Michael Touchton, Helga Sverrisdóttír, and Marilyn Averill a great debt for helping me mature intellectually, and I look forward to our continued collaborations. Thanks also to my earlier mentors at the University of Dayton, including Margaret Karns, David Ahern, Jaro Bilocerkowycz, Gerald Kerns, and Mark Ensalaco.

The Institute of International Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, provided me with a scholarly home away from home from 2007 to 2009. I am especially indebted to Ned Walker, Regine Spector, and Brent Durbin, who provided useful feedback at various stages of the project.

I also thank my colleagues at Wesleyan University. Don Moon has been a relentless advocate of the project, and a fellowship at Wesleyan’s Center for the Humanities, under the headship of Jill Morawski, provided me with useful feedback and time to complete the manuscript. I also thank my colleagues in the Government Department for their friendship and support, especially Mary Alice Haddad, Peter Rutland, Mike Nelson, Erika Fowler, and Doug Foyle for commenting on various versions of the manuscript. I am indebted to several terrific students, especially Jeremy Berkowitz for helping with data collection and Nicholas Quah for his assistance in proofreading the manuscript. Elizabeth Wells, at American University, provided research assistance during the early stages of data collection.

We benefited from outstanding feedback from seminar and panel participants at Georgetown, Rutgers, Yale, Harvard, Wesleyan, the University of Dayton, the United States Institute of Peace, and King’s College, as well as at meetings of the International Studies Association, the American Political Science Association, and the World International Studies Committee.

Our editor at Columbia University Press, Anne Routon, has been extremely helpful throughout the preparation of the manuscript, as has her assistant Alison Alexanian. We thank them both for their responsiveness and guidance and for securing top-notch reviews that helped us to improve the manuscript. We also thank Mike Ashby for his stellar copyediting.

My family’s generosity is what has made everything possible. All the Chenoweths and Abels have inspired and encouraged me throughout my life and career. My parents, Richard and Marianne, have been my most persistent advocates, and even read and commented on draft chapters. My sister Andrea and her fiancé Phil are terrific friends and brilliant communicators; I thank them for their support and inspiration. I also thank my brother, Christopher, and his wife, Miranda. In the past year, Christopher and Miranda have blessed us all with William, my only nephew, whose few months on this earth have made me even more dedicated to helping to end violent conflict wherever it is unnecessary. I also thank the Petty family—Kathy, Linda, Mattie Jean, and Warren—as well as Tyler, Elizabeth, Stephanie, and Adam for supporting me through various stages of this project. I owe a debt I can never fully repay to Kathe, Angi, Joyanna, Melody, Kathy, George, Tommy, Scott, Rachel, Vic, Marc, Nadia, and Gelong Tashi for all that they have given to me. And finally, there is Allison. The daily joys of sharing our lives together have kept me afloat through this and many other endeavors. I thank her for her wisdom, patience, kindness, humor, and enduring eagerness for adventure.

ERICA CHENOWETH

OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA

I did not expect to write a book on people power with a domestic terrorism expert who takes delight in running regression analyses! But after our chance meeting at Colorado College four summers ago, Erica and I realized that we needed to bring together our respective expertise to produce this book. And it has been a great ride together. I would like to thank first my mentors from the Fletcher School, including Richard Shultz, Eileen Babbitt, and Hurst Hannum for supporting my initial foray into the study of civil resistance. Professor Shultz and Steve Miller, from Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, recognized the weighty international security implications of popular struggles involving different weapons and enthusiastically encouraged me to pursue this line of research.

Dr. Peter Ackerman, one of the world’s leading experts on strategic nonviolent action, became my Fletcher dissertation adviser, mentor, and friend. Peter understood, when writing his own doctoral dissertation four decades ago with Gene Sharp, a pioneer in the field of nonviolent action to whom we all owe a great debt of gratitude, that eventually the academy would catch on to the remarkable albeit underappreciated track record of popular nonviolent struggles around the world. As the founding chair of the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict (ICNC), Peter, along with his partner, Jack DuVall, have shepherded the global expansion of knowledge and practical know-how about the waging of nonviolent struggle. During my tenure at the ICNC I had the opportunity to interact with some remarkable and courageous nonviolent activists from all over the world. Their determination, bravery, and will to win using nonviolent methods have been a source of profound inspiration for me.

I thank Peter and Jack, along with the incredibly dedicated people at the ICNC and at Rockport Capital, including Hardy Merriman, Shaazka Beyerle, Vanessa Ortiz, Berel Rodal, Althea Middleton-Detzner, Nicola Barrach, Maciej Bartkowski, Jake Fitzpatrick, Daryn Cambridge, Suravi Bhandari, Deena Patriarca, Ciel Lagumen, and Kristen Kopko for their hard work, support, and friendship. Hardy Merriman, in particular, has been an editing rock star. The ICNC’s diverse team of academic advisers, including Stephen Zunes, Kurt Schock, John Gould, Mary Elizabeth King, Larry Diamond, Doug McAdam, Les Kurtz, Cyndi Boaz, Janet Cherry, Howard Barrell, Roddy Brett, Kevin Clements, Barry Gan, Scott O’Bryan, Lee Smithey, Victoria Tin-bor Hui, Brian Martin, Senthil Ram, April Carter, and Howard Clark have provided Erica and me with good advice and prompt and thoughtful feedback on earlier iterations of this work. Mubarak Awad and Michael Beer, from Nonviolence International, have also been great supporters over the years. Through their own interdisciplinary work, the aforementioned scholars and scholar-practitioners have made significant strides to advance the study and practice of civil resistance.

Some of my most enjoyable and amusing moments at the ICNC were spent in the company of the Serbs—the young guns who formed Otpor and helped mobilize the Serbian population to nonviolently oust the butcher of the Balkans in 2000. Srdja Popovic, Ivan Marovic, Slobo Djinovic, and Andrej Milojevic went on to found the Center for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies, a Belgrade-based NGO that trains nonviolent activists throughout the world. May they continue to grow a global cadre of nonviolent conflict veterans and help transfer skills and hope to a new generation of civic leaders.

Ambassador Mark Palmer, who has been a great mentor of mine, showed me a different side of the U.S. State Department and encouraged me to be a friend of nonviolent-change agents from within the U.S. government. Through his work with the Council for a Community of Democracies, Mark is helping institutionalize global solidarity with those who are fighting against huge odds to defend basic rights and freedoms. I greatly admire Mark and hope to follow in his footsteps.

I would also like to extend thanks to my Pol-Mil colleagues at the U.S. embassy in Kabul, particularly the Civ-Mil Plans and Assessments team. Phil Kosnett, JoAnne Wagner, Melanie Anderton, Jen Munro, Emilie Lemke, and Tammy Rutledge have listened to me expound on the virtues of civic mobilization while supporting my efforts to engage with Afghan civil society and speak publicly about civil resistance in Afghanistan. I hope that organized civic action led by Afghans will help transform this war-torn society and lead it to a more peaceful future.

Finally, I would like to thank my parents, Marianne and Phil, and my brother Peter, whose love, encouragement, and insistence that I maintain a sense of perspective (and humor) while working on this book helped see me through. A girl could not ask for a more supportive and caring family. I am also grateful for the friendships of those in Vermont who continue to serve as my prayer warriors. They know who they are.

MARIA J. STEPHAN

KABUL, AFGHANISTAN

PART ONE

Why Civil Resistance Works

CHAPTER ONE THE SUCCESS OF NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE CAMPAIGNS

Nonviolence is fine as long as it works.

MALCOLM X

IN NOVEMBER 1975, Indonesian president Suharto ordered a full-scale invasion of East Timor, claiming that the left-leaning nationalist group that had declared independence for East Timor a month earlier, the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin), was a communist threat to the region. Fretilin’s armed wing, the Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste (Falintil), led the early resistance to Indonesian occupation forces in the form of conventional and guerrilla warfare. Using weapons left behind by Portuguese troops,¹ Falintil forces waged armed struggle from East Timor’s mountainous jungle region. But Falintil would not win the day. Despite some early successes, by 1980 Indonesia’s brutal counterinsurgency campaign had decimated the armed resistance along with nearly one third of the East Timorese population.²

Yet nearly two decades later, a nonviolent resistance movement helped to successfully remove Indonesian troops from East Timor and win independence for the annexed territory. The Clandestine Front, an organization originally envisaged as a support network for the armed movement, eventually reversed roles and became the driving force behind the nonviolent, pro-independence resistance. Beginning in 1988, the Clandestine Front, which grew out of an East Timorese youth movement, developed a large decentralized network of activists, who planned and executed various nonviolent campaigns inside East Timor, in Indonesia, and internationally. These included protests timed to the visits of diplomats and dignitaries, sit-ins inside foreign embassies, and international solidarity efforts that reinforced Timorese-led nonviolent activism.

The Indonesian regime repressed this movement, following its standard approach to violent and nonviolent challengers from within. But this repression backfired. Following the deaths of more than two hundred East Timorese nonviolent protestors at the hands of Indonesian troops in Dili in November 1991, the pro-independence campaign experienced a major turning point. The massacre, which was captured on film by a British cameraman, was quickly broadcast around the world, causing international outrage and prompting the East Timorese to rethink their strategy (Kohen 1999; Martin, Varney, and Vickers 2001). Intensifying nonviolent protests and moving the resistance into Indonesia proper became major components of the new strategy.

Suharto was ousted in 1998 after an economic crisis and mass popular uprising, and Indonesia’s new leader, B. J. Habibie, quickly pushed through a series of political and economic reforms designed to restore stability and international credibility to the country. There was tremendous international pressure on Habibie to resolve the East Timor issue, which had become a diplomatic embarrassment, not to mention a huge drain on Indonesia’s budget. During a 1999 referendum, almost 80 percent of East Timorese voters opted for independence. Following the referendum, Indonesianbacked militias launched a scorched-earth campaign that led to mass destruction and displacement. On September 14, 2000, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to authorize an Australian-led international force for East Timor.³

The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor oversaw a two-year transition period before East Timor became the world’s newest independent state in May 2002 (Martin 2000). Although a small number of Falintil guerrillas (whose targets had been strictly military) kept their weapons until the very end, it was not their violent resistance that liberated the territory from Indonesian occupation. As one Clandestine Front member explained, The Falintil was an important symbol of resistance and their presence in the mountains helped boost morale, but nonviolent struggle ultimately allowed us to achieve victory. The whole population fought for independence, even Indonesians, and this was decisive.⁴

Similarly, in the Philippines in the late 1970s, several revolutionary guerrilla groups were steadily gaining strength. The Communist Party of the Philippines and its New People’s Army (NPA) were inspired by Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideologies and pursued armed revolution to gain power. State-sponsored military attacks on the NPA dispersed the guerrilla resistance until the NPA encompassed all regions of the country. The Philippine government launched a concerted counterinsurgency effort, and the NPA was never able to achieve power.

In the early 1980s, however, members of the opposition began to pursue a different strategy. In 1985 the reformist opposition united under the banner of UNIDO (United Nationalist Democratic Organization) with Cory Aquino as its presidential candidate. In the period leading up to the elections, Aquino urged nonviolent discipline, making clear that violent attacks against opponents would not be tolerated. Church leaders, similarly, insisted on discipline, while the National Citizens’ Movement for Free Elections trained half a million volunteers to monitor elections.

When Marcos declared himself the winner of the 1986 elections despite the counterclaims of election monitors, Cory Aquino led a rally of 2 million Filipinos, proclaiming victory for herself and the people. The day after Marcos’s inauguration, Filipinos participated in a general strike, a boycott of the state media, a massive run on state-controlled banks, a boycott of crony businesses, and other nonviolent activities.

A dissident faction of the military signaled that it favored the opposition in this matter, encouraging the opposition to form a parallel government on February 25 with Aquino at its head. Masses of unarmed Filipino civilians, including nuns and priests, surrounded the barracks where the rebel soldiers were holed up, forming a buffer between those soldiers and those who remained loyal to Marcos. President Ronald Reagan’s administration had grown weary of Marcos and signaled support for the opposition movement. That evening, U.S. military helicopters transported Marcos and his family to Hawaii, where they remained in exile. Although the Philippines has experienced a difficult transition to democracy, the nonviolent campaign successfully removed the Marcos dictatorship. Where violent insurgency had failed only a few years earlier, the People Power movement succeeded.

THE PUZZLE

The preceding narratives reflect both specific and general empirical puzzles. Specifically, we ask why nonviolent resistance has succeeded in some cases where violent resistance had failed in the same states, like the violent and nonviolent pro-independence campaigns in East Timor and regime-change campaigns in the Philippines. We can further ask why nonviolent resistance in some states fails during one period (such as the 1950s Defiance Campaign by antiapartheid activists in South Africa) and then succeeds decades later (such as the antiapartheid struggle in the early 1990s).

These two specific questions underline a more general inquiry, which is the focus of this book. We seek to explain two related phenomena: why nonviolent resistance often succeeds relative to violent resistance, and under what conditions, nonviolent resistance succeeds or fails.⁵

Indeed, debates about the strategic logic of different methods of traditional and nontraditional warfare have recently become popular among security studies scholars (Abrahms 2006; Arreguín-Toft 2005; Byman and Waxman 1999, 2000; Dashti-Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff 1997; Drury 1998; Horowitz and Reiter 2001; Lyall and Wilson 2009; Merom 2003; Pape 1996, 1997, 2005; Stoker 2007). Implicit in many of these assessments, however, is an assumption that the most forceful, effective means of waging political struggle entails the threat or use of violence. For instance, a prevailing view among political scientists is that opposition movements select terrorism and violent insurgency strategies because such means are more effective than nonviolent strategies at achieving policy goals (Abrahms 2006, 77; Pape 2005). Often violence is viewed as a last resort, or a necessary evil in light of desperate circumstances. Other scholarship focuses on the effectiveness of military power, without comparing it with alternative forms of power (Brooks 2003; Brooks and Stanley 2007; Desch 2008; Johnson and Tierney 2006).

Despite these assumptions, in recent years organized civilian populations have successfully used nonviolent resistance methods, including boycotts, strikes, protests, and organized noncooperation to exact political concessions and challenge entrenched power. To name a few, sustained and systematic nonviolent sanctions have removed autocratic regimes from power in Serbia (2000), Madagascar (2002), Georgia (2003), and Ukraine (2004–2005), after rigged elections; ended a foreign occupation in Lebanon (2005); and forced Nepal’s monarch to make major constitutional concessions (2006). In the first two months of 2011, popular nonviolent uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt removed decades-old regimes from power. As this book goes to press, the prospect of people power transforming the Middle East remains strong.

In our Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) data set, we analyze 323 violent and nonviolent resistance campaigns between 1900 and 2006.⁶ Among them are over one hundred major nonviolent campaigns since 1900, whose frequency has increased over time. In addition to their growing frequency, the success rates of nonviolent campaigns have increased. How does this compare with violent insurgencies? One might assume that the success rates may have increased among both nonviolent and violent insurgencies. But in our data, we find the opposite: although they persist, the success rates of violent insurgencies have declined.

The most striking finding is that between 1900 and 2006, nonviolent resistance campaigns were nearly twice as likely to achieve full or partial success as their violent counterparts. As we discuss in chapter 3, the effects of resistance type on the probability of campaign success are robust even when we take into account potential confounding factors, such as target regime type, repression, and target regime capabilities.⁷

The results begin to differ only when we consider the objectives of the resistance campaigns themselves. Among the 323 campaigns, in the case of antiregime resistance campaigns, the use of a nonviolent strategy has greatly enhanced the likelihood of success. Among campaigns with territorial objectives, like antioccupation or self-determination, nonviolent campaigns also have a slight advantage. Among the few cases of major resistance that do not fall into either category (antiapartheid campaigns, for instance), nonviolent resistance has had the monopoly on success.

The only exception is that nonviolent resistance leads to successful secession less often than violent insurgency. Although no nonviolent secession campaigns have succeeded, only four of the forty-one violent secession campaigns have done so (less than 10 percent), also an unimpressive figure. The implication is that campaigns seeking secession are highly unlikely to succeed regardless of whether they employ nonviolent or violent tactics. We explore various factors that could influence these results in chapter 3. It is evident, however, that especially among campaigns seeking regime change or liberation from foreign occupation, nonviolent resistance has been strategically superior. The success of these nonviolent campaigns—especially in light of the enduring violent insurgencies occurring in many of the same countries—begs systematic exploration.

FIGURE 1.1 FREQUENCY OF NONVIOLENT AND VIOLENT CAMPAIGN END YEARS

FIGURE 1.2 NUMBER OF NONVIOLENT CAMPAIGNS AND PERCENTAGE OF SUCCESSES, 1940–2006

FIGURE 1.3 SUCCESS RATES BY DECADE, 1940–2006

FIGURE 1.4 RATES OF SUCCESS, PARTIAL SUCCESS, AND FAILURE

FIGURE 1.5 SUCCESS RATES BY CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVE

This book investigates the reasons why—in spite of conventional wisdom to the contrary—civil resistance campaigns have been so effective compared with their violent counterparts. We also consider the reasons why some nonviolent campaigns have failed to achieve their stated aims, and the reasons why violent insurgencies sometimes succeed.

THE ARGUMENT

Our central contention is that nonviolent campaigns have a participation advantage over violent insurgencies, which is an important factor in determining campaign outcomes. The moral, physical, informational, and commitment barriers to participation are much lower for nonviolent resistance than for violent insurgency. Higher levels of participation contribute to a number of mechanisms necessary for success, including enhanced resilience, higher probabilities of tactical innovation, expanded civic disruption (thereby raising the costs to the regime of maintaining the status quo), and loyalty shifts involving the opponent’s erstwhile supporters, including members of the security forces. Mobilization among local supporters is a more reliable source of power than the support of external allies, which many violent campaigns must obtain to compensate for their lack of participants.

Moreover, we find that the transitions that occur in the wake of successful nonviolent resistance movements create much more durable and internally peaceful democracies than transitions provoked by violent insurgencies. On the whole, nonviolent resistance campaigns are more effective in getting results and, once they have succeeded, more likely to establish democratic regimes with a lower probability of a relapse into civil war.

Nestling our argument between literatures on asymmetrical warfare, contentious politics, and strategic nonviolent action, we explain the relative effectiveness of nonviolent resistance in the following way: nonviolent campaigns facilitate the active participation of many more people than violent campaigns, thereby broadening the base of resistance and raising the costs to opponents of maintaining the status quo. The mass civilian participation in a nonviolent campaign is more likely to backfire in the face of repression, encourage loyalty shifts among regime supporters, and provide resistance leaders with a more diverse menu of tactical and strategic choices. To regime elites, those engaged in civil resistance are more likely to appear as credible negotiating partners than are violent insurgents, thereby increasing the chance of winning concessions.

However, we also know that resistance campaigns are not guaranteed to succeed simply because they are nonviolent. One in four nonviolent campaigns since 1900 was a total failure. In short, we argue that nonviolent campaigns fail to achieve their objectives when they are unable to overcome the challenge of participation, when they fail to recruit a robust, diverse, and broad-based membership that can erode the power base of the adversary and maintain resilience in the face of repression.

Moreover, more than one in four violent campaigns has succeeded. We briefly investigate the question of why violent campaigns sometimes succeed. Whereas the success of nonviolent campaigns tends to rely more heavily on local factors, violent insurgencies tend to succeed when they achieve external support or when they feature a central characteristic of successful nonviolent campaigns, which is mass popular support. The presence of an external sponsor combined with a weak or predatory regime adversary may enhance the credibility of violent insurgencies, which may threaten the opponent regime. The credibility gained through external support may also increase the appeal to potential recruits, thereby allowing insurgencies to mobilize more participants against the opponent. International support is, however, a double-edged sword. Foreign-state sponsors can be fickle and unreliable allies, and state sponsorship can produce a lack of discipline among insurgents and exacerbate free rider problems (Bob 2005; Byman 2005).

THE EVIDENCE

We bring to bear several different types of evidence to support our argument, including statistical evidence from the NAVCO data set and qualitative evidence from four case studies: Iran, the Palestinian Territories, Burma, and the Philippines.

It is appropriate here to briefly define the terms to which we will consistently refer in this book. First, we should distinguish violent and nonviolent tactics. As noted earlier, there are some difficulties with labeling one campaign as violent and another as nonviolent. In many cases, both nonviolent and violent campaigns exist simultaneously among competing groups. Often those who employ violence in mass movements are members of fringe groups who are acting independently, or in defiance of, the central leadership; or they are agents provocateurs used by the adversary to provoke the unarmed resistance to adopt violence (Zunes 1994). Alternatively, often some groups use both nonviolent and violent methods of resistance over the course of their existence, as with the ANC in South Africa. Characterizing a campaign as violent or nonviolent simplifies a complex constellation of resistance methods.

It is nevertheless possible to characterize a campaign as principally nonviolent based on the primacy of nonviolent resistance methods and the nature of the participation in that form of resistance. Sharp defines nonviolent resistance as a technique of socio-political action for applying power in a conflict without the use of violence (1999, 567). The term resistance implies that the campaigns of interest are noninstitutional and generally confrontational in nature. In other words, these groups are using tactics that are outside the conventional political process (voting, interest-group organizing, or lobbying). Although institutional methods of political action often accompany nonviolent struggles, writes sociologist Kurt Schock, nonviolent action