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    Khe Sanh 1967–68: Marines battle for Vietnam’s vital hilltop base
    Khe Sanh 1967–68: Marines battle for Vietnam’s vital hilltop base
    Khe Sanh 1967–68: Marines battle for Vietnam’s vital hilltop base
    Ebook217 pages2 hours

    Khe Sanh 1967–68: Marines battle for Vietnam’s vital hilltop base

    By Gordon L. Rottman and Peter Dennis

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    About this ebook

    A concise, focused volume on the NVA's fight for a strategically important military base.

    Khe Sanh was a small village in northwest South Vietnam that sat astride key North Vietnamese infiltration routes. In September 1966 a Marine battalion deployed into the area. Action gradually increased as the NVA attempted to destroy Free World Forces bases, and the siege of Khe Sanh proper began in October 1967. The bitter fight lasted into July 1968 when, with the changing strategic and tactical situation, the base was finally closed.

    This book details the siege and explains how, although the NVA successfully overran a Special Forces camp nearby, it was unable to drive US forces from Khe Sanh.
    LanguageEnglish
    PublisherBloomsbury Publishing
    Release dateSep 20, 2012
    ISBN9781782004615
    Khe Sanh 1967–68: Marines battle for Vietnam’s vital hilltop base
    Author

    Gordon L. Rottman

    Gordon L. Rottman entered the US Army in 1967, volunteered for Special Forces and completed training as a weapons specialist. He served in the 5th Special Forces Group in Vietnam in 1969–70 and subsequently in airborne infantry, long-range patrol and intelligence assignments before retiring after 26 years. He was a Special Operations Forces scenario writer at the Joint Readiness Training Center for 12 years and is now a freelance writer, living in Texas.

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      Book preview

      Khe Sanh 1967–68 - Gordon L. Rottman

      ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN

      The campaign on the Khe Sanh plateau spanned a period of over a year and was essentially a series of interconnected battles. None of the battles was strategically decisive, but they attracted a great deal of attention as the media focused on this small, remote plateau and drew endless comparisons with the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu 12 years earlier. The press repeatedly predicted the defeat of the Marines throughout the 77-day siege of Khe Sanh Combat Base (KSCB), but the Marines took a somewhat different view – to them it was the so-called siege.

      Khe Sanh was a small village in the extreme northwest of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). It was located in Quang Tri, the northernmost province of South Vietnam whose northern border ran along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating South Vietnam from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam). This area was remote, sparsely populated, and a focal point of the war effort in 1968. North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces were infiltrating the south in ever greater numbers, escalating the war and raising the stakes.

      A string of US Marine Corps and Vietnamese combat bases had been established south of the DMZ to protect the population centers and the lines of communication along the coast. The Marine forces were part of III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), which was responsible for over 81,000 troops in January 1968. Also in the northern portion of South Vietnam was the Army of the Republic of Vietnam’s (ARVN) I Corps Tactical Zone (I CTZ). Most of the ARVN forces were concentrated on the populous coastal plain, with some deployed in the hills that stretched inland. Only a small base at Khe Sanh secured the westernmost sector, some 30 kilometers (19 miles) of rugged country stretching from the Marine combat bases at the Rockpile and Ca Lu to the Laotian border. Khe Sanh had only one line of communication, National Route 9 (QL9 – Quoc Lo 9) running east–west between Quang Tri Province and Laos. This National Route consisted in reality of a one-lane dirt road that crossed scores of streams along its route and as a result was all too easily cut by the enemy. The hills and forests that characterized northwest Quang Tri Province concealed enemy movements and the many bridges were vulnerable in the extreme and easy to destroy, with few alternative routes available through the deep gorges. To exacerbate the situation, the weather conditions predominantly favored the enemy.

      The North Vietnamese were taking advantage of the porous nature of the US/ARVN defenses in this remote area to infiltrate large numbers of troops and supplies into South Vietnam through Laos via the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The Trail was actually a network of roads and pathways running from North Vietnam south through Laos and Cambodia into the Republic of Vietnam. The heavily wooded and hilly terrain, sparse population, weak Free World forces, and natural infiltration routes put the NVA in a very strong position in this region.

      Khe Sanh Combat Base viewed from the east looking the length of the runway. The outer perimeter at the photograph’s bottom is the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion’s line. Behind it and curving back to the left is the Marines’ Gray Sector. The Blue Sector parallels the right edge. The dark area off the right end of the road running toward the bottom of the photograph from the parking area and adjacent to the runway is ASP No. 1 (ammo dump). The FOB-3 compound is in the upper left.

      The battle for Khe Sanh is often depicted as purely a Marine Corps operation, but the reality was very different. US Army forces, including the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), were assigned to the defense of the KSCB alongside Marine units and were also heavily committed to relief and support operations in the area. US Army Special Forces and ARVN units were also involved and US Air Force, Marine Corps, US Navy and Vietnamese Air Force aircraft were heavily committed in the close air support, bombing, reconnaissance, resupply, and medical evacuation (medevac) roles.

      What about Dien Bien Phu?

      Throughout the Khe Sanh campaign the media maintained insistent and dogmatic comparisons of Khe Sanh with the disastrous French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, with almost constant predictions that the Marine base would fall at any moment. Almost 40 percent of the stories filed in February and March 1968 dealt with Khe Sanh. While there are undoubted similarities between the two battles, a rational assessment, even without the advantages of hindsight, should have demonstrated that both tactically and strategically the two situations bore little comparison. It is clear that, as with the French at Dien Bien Phu, the US held a fortified position centered on an airfield in a remote valley, surrounded by mountainous terrain deep inside hostile territory. The Free World troops, like the French, were cut off from overland communications and relied solely on aerial resupply, making heavy demands of available air assets. Effective close air support was critical in both instances, with the enemy deployed on hills overlooking the strongholds and freely able to fire artillery into them – artillery duels were almost constant in both cases. On both occasions the defending forces lost exposed outlying positions: Strongpoint Gabrielle in the case of Dien Bien Phu, and Khe Sanh village and Lang Vei Special Forces Camp outside Khe Sanh Combat Base. The weather also played a major part in both operations. While the similarities were real and too obvious for the media to resist drawing comparisons, at the level of military operations, they were largely superficial.

      The French base at Dien Bien Phu had been much more remote from its supporting base, some 200 kilometers distant. Khe Sanh was only 45km from its support base, barely a 20-minute helicopter flight. At Dien Bien Phu the French position had been dominated by enemy-controlled hills completely surrounding the base, with much of the Viet Minh artillery within 3–5km. At Khe Sanh the Marines occupied the key hills dominating the base to a distance of as much as 7km, forcing the NVA to deploy their artillery between 9 and 13km away, although mortars were able to move in closer. Despite possessing artillery that was lighter and of shorter range than that at Khe Sanh, the Viet Minh had more than 200 pieces of artillery, including mortars, at Dien Bien Phu; this was many more than the NVA had at its disposal around Khe Sanh. The Marines at the Combat Base had some 30 tubes at their disposal and were additionally supported by four batteries of 175mm guns further east. The French at Dien Bien Phu had no external artillery support, and of their 48 artillery pieces half were short-ranged heavy mortars, and some were lost in the first days. With the exception of the four hill positions to the north, Khe Sanh was concentrated in a 400–600 by 2,300 meter area, while the French positions at Dien Bien Phu sprawled across a 2,600 by 3,000 meter area with three large outlying strongpoints. Khe Sanh’s smaller size allowed it to be defended by a much smaller force. Dien Bien Phu was densely packed with troops and proved difficult to defend. Just 6,680 troops defended Khe Sanh, six battalions counting Forward Operations Base 3 (FOB-3) and the tiny Ranger battalion, of which three were defending the hill outposts. Dien Bien Phu held 16,500 troops, 19 infantry battalions (including later parachute-delivered reinforcements), making supply extremely difficult.

      Many feared that Khe Sanh would be a repeat of Dien Bien Phu. Here victorious Viet Minh raise their flag over the French former command post in Strongpoint Claudine, May 8, 1954.

      The French needed 150 tons of aerial resupply per day requiring 80 transport aircraft sorties. On average they delivered 117–123 tons, of which 100 were usable. They had only 75 combat aircraft and 100 transports and reconnaissance aircraft available, and the French C-47s had a payload of only 4 tons, while US C-130Es and C-123Ks carried 13 and 5 tons respectively. When the French fought at Dien Bien Phu there were 54 helicopters in all of French Indochina; the US had over 3,300 in 1967–68. A total of 9,109 Marine helicopter sorties transported 14,562 passengers and 4,661 tons of cargo to Khe Sanh, while Air Force transports delivered over 14,000 tons of cargo. The French conducted around 10,400 aircraft sorties of all types to support the 167-day siege; the US sometimes exceeded 2,500 sorties a day across South Vietnam. The French required 34,000 tons of engineering materials to completely fortify Dien Bien Phu, but the garrison received only 4,000 tons. The French were hard-pressed to maintain three days’ ammunition and rations, but while there were occasional shortages at Khe Sanh, a 30-day supply was maintained. The US dropped almost as much tonnage of bombs (114,810 tons) at Khe Sanh in three months as B-29s rained on Japan during 1945. Helicopter support was essential as this was the only way the hill outposts could be supplied, replacements delivered, and casualties evacuated. French aircraft losses included 48 shot down, 14 destroyed on the ground, and 167 damaged. The US losses amounted to four transports shot down and 23 Marine fixed-wing aircraft and 123 helicopters damaged, mostly superficially. Fewer than three dozen helicopters were lost and very few attack aircraft were damaged. It proved impossible to evacuate most of the wounded from Dien Bien Phu. The US evacuated 2,000 seriously wounded from Khe Sanh and fewer than 300 lightly wounded were returned to duty.

      The media’s Dien Bien Phu Syndrome regarding Khe Sanh often dwelled on the NVA tying down 6,680 Marines. Granted, Khe Sanh required extensive air support, but this did not markedly degrade the air support necessary to defeat the Tet Offensive occurring at the same time. The media’s standpoint also failed to acknowledge that four, and later five, NVA divisions were being tied down by 6,680 Marines, troops that could have been used elsewhere to support the Tet Offensive. The NVA siege required massive logistical resources and sucked in a great deal of manpower, including transport and rear-area service troops. The amount of ammunition they expended on Khe Sanh could have been used against the many Free World combat bases along the DMZ and against populated areas.

      Another factor that must be considered is that the defenders of Dien Bien Phu knew within three weeks of the beginning

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