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The German Soldier in World War II
The German Soldier in World War II
The German Soldier in World War II
Ebook384 pages43 minutes

The German Soldier in World War II

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A visual history of the German soldier on the Eastern Front of World War II.
LanguageEnglish
Release dateSep 15, 2014
ISBN9780811760744
The German Soldier in World War II

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    The German Soldier in World War II - Michael Olive

    Acknowledgments

    INTRODUCTION

    By late 1942 the German armed forces had brought about an unparalleled sequence of victories, and Germany dominated Europe.

    On 1 September 1939, Poland was attacked by 1.5 million soldiers in fifteen armored and motorized divisions, comprising 3,600 armored vehicles, and thirty-seven infantry divisions, supported by 6,000 artillery pieces and 1,900 aircraft. The Polish army was considered the strongest army in Europe after those of France and the Soviet Union. It comprised 1.3 million men in thirty-seven infantry divisions, eleven cavalry brigades, and one armored brigade, with 750 armored vehicles, 4,000 artillery pieces, and 900 aircraft.

    Incredibly, only three weeks into the campaign the main Polish armies were shattered, despite their courageous defense. Warsaw surrendered on 29 September, and by 6 October, the campaign was over. In just over a month, the Wehrmacht had defeated what was generally thought to be a formidable opponent. German casualties were 14,400 dead and missing and 3,000 wounded. Polish casualties were 70,000 killed in action, an unknown number of missing, and over 700,000 prisoners.

    Immediately after the Polish campaign, the OKH¹. initiated an inquiry into the effectiveness of the army in its first large-scale combat operation since the end of World War I. Although the campaign could be considered an outstanding success, the higher command had serious reservations. German officers were not reticent in truthfully pointing out any deficiencies in their units.

    Although the Polish campaign confirmed the effectiveness of the tactics employed, there was considerable room for improvement. Some important general principles were re-emphasized: At all levels, effective leadership must be from the front; accurate and concise reports needed to be forwarded as commanders tended to exaggerate losses, terrain difficulties, and enemy strength; finally, troops were not adequately prepared for reconnaissance and security duties.

    In addition, cooperation between the infantry and artillery was in many cases poor, as was the coordination of infantry and panzers. In heavy terrain and night fighting, the infantry did not meet the standards required. In many cases officers were far too cautious and failed to take advantage of immediate opportunities.

    Of particular concern was the performance of reservists, as they were not able to undertake the extended marches required and lacked the training and unit cohesion to carry out the prescribed elastic defensive tactics. Strenuous efforts were made to increase training in order to bring the reserve divisions up to regular army levels of performance.

    These lessons and numerous others were applied to the training programs in order to ready the army for the campaign in the West. It was the willingness for considered self-criticism that constituted one of the major factors that enabled the German Army to perform at such high levels during the war.

    Unfortunately, requests from the commanders of regular infantry units for more motorization, armored vehicles, and armored artillery vehicles could not be fulfilled. Because of a lack of production capacity, these scarce assets were largely allocated to the armored, mechanized, and motorized formations. Therefore, the infantry divisions were forced to rely on horse-drawn transport for supplies and moving artillery.

    The hard lessons of the Polish campaign were successfully applied to the campaign in the West. Norway and Denmark were invaded on 9 April without warning. Denmark was immediately overrun and all the initial German objectives were secured quickly. The Norwegian campaign continued until 9 June when Allied forces evacuated Narvik due to the impending collapse in France.

    France and the Low Countries were attacked on 10 May, and when on 20 May Guderian’s panzers reached the Channel, the Battle of France was effectively over. The influence of the German infantry on the battle has been largely overlooked, with the focus on the panzer divisions and the Luftwaffe. In fact, it was the hard-marching infantry divisions that rapidly followed up on the advances of the armored units, providing flank protection and allowing the French and Allied forces no respite. Of the 141 German divisions employed in the attack, only 10 were armored, with the majority consisting of non-motorized infantry divisions.

    The campaign in the West was a stunning victory that surprised even the Germans. The static slaughter of World War I was avoided and an old enemy utterly defeated in a scant six weeks. After suffering casualties in the millions in the previous conflict, the German army sustained losses of 28,225 killed, 116,592 wounded, and 13,595 missing.

    Next it was the turn of Yugoslavia and Greece to succumb after being invaded on 6 April 1941. Yugoslavia surrendered unconditionally on 17 April and Greece on the twenty-eighth. Crete was taken in a very costly airborne assault that commenced on 20 May and concluded with the surrender of 18,000 mainly Commonwealth troops on 31 May.

    In order to come to the rescue of his Italian ally, a small force commanded by General Erwin Rommel was sent to North Africa on 12 February 1941. On 24 March, Rommel went on the offensive with one panzer and two Italian divisions, steadily driving the British and Commonwealth forces back.

    On 22 June 1941, over 3 million men comprising 17 armored

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