Discover millions of ebooks, audiobooks, and so much more with a free trial

From $11.99/month after trial. Cancel anytime.

The Marshall Islands 1944: Operation Flintlock, the capture of Kwajalein and Eniwetok
The Marshall Islands 1944: Operation Flintlock, the capture of Kwajalein and Eniwetok
The Marshall Islands 1944: Operation Flintlock, the capture of Kwajalein and Eniwetok
Ebook207 pages1 hour

The Marshall Islands 1944: Operation Flintlock, the capture of Kwajalein and Eniwetok

Rating: 1 out of 5 stars

1/5

()

Read preview

About this ebook

A highly illustrated account of the Pacific operation that was, at the time, the longest shore-to-shore amphibious assault in history.

Following the capture of Tarawa in November 1943, American eyes turned to the Marshall Islands. These were the next vital stepping-stone across the Pacific towards Japan, and would bring the islands of Guam and Saipan within the reach of US forces. In their first amphibious attack, the new 4th Marine Division landed on Roi and Namur islands on 1 February 1944, while US 7th Division landed on Kwajalein.

In this compact, detailed volume, Gordon L Rottman demonstrates that the lessons of the bloody fighting on Tarawa had been well learned and the successful attack on the Marshalls set the pattern for future amphibious operations in the Pacific War.
LanguageEnglish
Release dateJan 20, 2013
ISBN9781472800145
The Marshall Islands 1944: Operation Flintlock, the capture of Kwajalein and Eniwetok
Author

Gordon L. Rottman

Gordon L. Rottman entered the US Army in 1967, volunteered for Special Force and completed training as a weapons specialist. He served in the 5th Special Forces Group in Vietnam in 1969–70 and subsequently in airborne infantry, long-range patrol and intelligence assignments until retiring after 26 years. He was a Special Operations Forces scenario writer at the Joint Readiness Training Center for 12 years. He has written 130 military history books and a number of Western and young adult action adventure novels.

Read more from Gordon L. Rottman

Related to The Marshall Islands 1944

Titles in the series (100)

View More

Related ebooks

Wars & Military For You

View More

Related articles

Reviews for The Marshall Islands 1944

Rating: 1 out of 5 stars
1/5

1 rating0 reviews

What did you think?

Tap to rate

Review must be at least 10 words

    Book preview

    The Marshall Islands 1944 - Gordon L. Rottman

    Campaign • 146

    The Marshall Islands 1944

    Operation Flintlock, the capture of Kwajalein and Eniwetok

    Gordon L Rottman • Illustrated by Howard Gerrard

    Series editor Lee Johnson • Consultant editor David G Chandler

    CONTENTS

    INTRODUCTION

    The Marshall Islands

    CHRONOLOGY

    OPPOSING PLANS

    The American Plan – Operations Flintlock and Catchpole

    The Japanese Plan – Z Operation

    OPPOSING COMMANDERS

    American Commanders • Japanese Commanders

    OPPOSING FORCES

    American Forces • Japanese Forces

    OPERATION FLINTLOCK

    Roi-Namur assault • Roi Island, D+1 (1 February) • Namur Island,

    1–2 February 1944 (D+1–D+2) • Kwajalein assault • Kwajalein Island, D+1,

    1 February 1944 • Kwajalein Island 2–4 February (D+2–D+4) • Eniwetok assault

    Engebi Island, 18–19 February (D+1–D+2) • Eniwetok Island, 19–21 February

    (D+2–D+4) • Parry Island, 22–23 February (D+5–D+6)

    AFTERMATH

    ORDERS OF BATTLE

    THE BATTLEFIELD TODAY

    BIBLIOGRAPHY

    INTRODUCTION

    The seizure of the Marshall Islands in the Central Pacific had long been recognized as a necessity in a war with Japan. As far back as 1921, Marine Major E.H. Pete Ellis had formatted a hypothetical plan to seize four Marshall’s atolls to serve as staging bases for further naval operations against Japan. Ellis died under mysterious circumstances in the Japanese-controlled Palau Islands in 1923.

    In May 1943 the Trident, or Washington, Conference determined the war’s course and reexamined earlier decisions. In regards to the war with Japan, two thrusts would converge on the Home Islands. The main effort would be in the Central Pacific by Admiral Chester Nimitz’s Pacific Fleet, with General Douglas MacArthur conducting a secondary effort in the Southwest Pacific through New Guinea and the Philippines. MacArthur argued for a concentration of effort in the Southwest Pacific, but it was felt the Japanese would mass their forces to meet one thrust. The Central Pacific route was more direct and required fewer troops. The Japanese would be unable to deploy as many troops and aircraft on the small widely scattered islands as they could in New Guinea and the Philippines. The Gilberts and Marshalls were earmarked to be seized.

    US Fifth Fleet seized the Gilberts after the bloody November 1943 battles for Tarawa and Makin. Meanwhile, US and Australian forces were advancing in New Guinea. A major issue was to decide which atolls in the Marshalls would be seized. The Japanese had bases on six atolls plus Kusaie and Wake Islands. On 1 September 1943, Eniwetok Atoll (the northernmost), Kusaie Island (westernmost), and Wake Island (far to the northeast, but under control of the Japanese Marshalls forces) had been selected as targets to be taken. At this time the new 4th Marine Division (MarDiv), 7th Infantry Division (InfDiv), and the separate 22nd Marines were designated to execute Operation Flintlock (originally Bankrate) under the command of the Marine V Amphibious Corps (VAC). However, Admiral Nimitz proposed Kwajalein (the main base near the Marshalls’ geographic center), Maloelap, and Wotje (the latter two being closer to Pearl Harbor) as alternatives. These three atolls held 65 per cent of the air bases in the Marshalls and the other bases could be neutralized without necessarily being physically occupied. The target date was 1 January 1944. The date for the seizure of Eniwetok by 27th InfDiv was tentatively set as 1 May, however, when it became clear that the atoll was lightly defended, the assault was rescheduled for 1 March.

    A pre-bombardment view of Namur Island. This is the Yokohama Pier on the island’s south-central coast, the lagoon side. The pier would serve as a boundary between the two landing beaches and the two assault battalions. In the upper left corner can be seen the concrete causeway connecting Namur to Roi.

    By the time of the invasion Namur’s appearance had been transformed by extremely heavy naval and aerial bombardment. This view is looking south across the island into the lagoon. While devastating the island’s facilities, the bombardment created obstacles to movement because of the downed trees, wreckage, and craters. It also provided hiding places for the defenders. The torpedo warehouse’s crater can be seen below the V of the three large concrete structures near the left edge.

    Initial planning was conducted prior to the Tarawa assault but lessons from this operation were subsequently incorporated. Earlier amphibious landings had been mostly conducted against large hilly and forested islands against limited or no resistance. The lessons learned in the Tarawa assault, a small atoll island ringed with strong defenses, were critical: particularly those pertaining to using amphibian tractors to attack across broad coral reefs. This was the first assault in which amphibian tractors (amtrac, landing vehicle, tracked – LVT) were employed to deliver assault troops. They were previously used as cargo carriers. Other lessons were also learned, especially with regard to naval gunfire and aerial bombardment. Based on the experiences at Tarawa, it was realized the forces available for Flintlock might not be able to secure the proposed objectives. Operational planning was reevaluated, changes made, and less ambitious objectives assigned. On 7 December, Kwajalein became the primary objective and D-Day was set for 17 January. The revised plan, designated Flintlock II, was issued on 20 December. Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, Commander, Central Pacific Forces and Fifth Fleet, expressed concerns that Kwajalein was located deep within the Japanese defenses, preferring Wotje and Maloelap to be secured first. Nimitz soon recommended the target date be changed to 31 January. The Joint Chiefs of Staff insisted the operation commence in January, but the landing forces could not be ready by the original 17 January date. Admiral Spruance, still concerned about bypassing the outer bases, requested that Majuro Atoll to the east be secured. It was either lightly or undefended and would provide airfields to protect Kwajalein from Japanese forces on Jaluit, Maloelap, Wotje, and Mille. It would also serve as a fleet anchorage. The 106th Infantry was assigned to the operation and a reinforced battalion tasked to secure Majuro. A further delay was requested, to 10 February, to allow the divisions to fill equipment shortages and permit the 4th MarDiv to conduct a full rehearsal. This request was denied.

    The other bases were to be neutralized by air and naval bombardment through the campaign. Eniwetok in the extreme northeast of the Marshalls would receive particular attention, as it was key to the aerial supply route from Japan. It would be seized later in the operation to block this flow. Once the objectives were secured they would be developed to provide staging and supporting bases for the Western Pacific drive. The bypassed islands would continue to be neutralized from the new American bases established on the captured atolls.

    THE MARSHALL ISLANDS

    A Japanese expeditionary force took control of the German possessions of the Marshall, Caroline, and Mariana Islands in 1914. In 1920 Japan was granted a mandate by the League of Nations to govern the islands, effective 1922. To garrison and defend the Japanese Mandated Territories, or simply the Japanese Mandate, the South Seas Defense Force was formed. The civilian-run South Seas Bureau, operating under the Ministry of Overseas Affairs, was headquartered on Koror in the Palau Islands, Western Carolines.

    By the late 1930s, Japanese settlers outnumbered the native Micro-nesians, or Kanakas, as they developed the islands economically. After serving the required two-year notice, Japan withdrew from the League of Nations in 1935 and the Mandate became a closed territory with entry by Westerners restricted. Japan was accused of illegally fortifying the islands, but was under no legal obligation not to do so.

    In November 1939, Japan activated the 4th Fleet to defend the Mandate with amphibious and light forces. Each of the three main island groups was provided with an independent defense system centered on Jaluit, Truk (pronounced Chuck), and Saipan. The defense strategy was to marshal, service, and supply 4th Fleet air and naval forces as they launched raids and small-scale operations out of range of enemy bases and reconnaissance aircraft.

    Enjoying the preview?
    Page 1 of 1