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    Panzer Divisions: The Eastern Front 1941–43
    Panzer Divisions: The Eastern Front 1941–43
    Panzer Divisions: The Eastern Front 1941–43
    Ebook276 pages2 hours

    Panzer Divisions: The Eastern Front 1941–43

    By Pier Paolo Battistelli

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    About this ebook

    On 22 June 1941 Germany attacked the Soviet Union and her Panzer divisions were to play a major role in this titanic struggle.

    Although overwhelmed by Soviet numbers, the superior skill and capability of the German Panzer divisions meant that in three months the Germans had advanced deep into Soviet territory. However, after these initial successes the German offensive began to falter, culminating in the disastrous defeat at Kursk.

    This book describes the organisational history of the Panzer divisions, from the early successes of 1941 through to the introduction of revised Blitzkrieg tactics as the war progressed.
    LanguageEnglish
    PublisherBloomsbury Publishing
    Release dateJan 20, 2013
    ISBN9781472800022
    Panzer Divisions: The Eastern Front 1941–43
    Author

    Pier Paolo Battistelli

    Pier Paolo Battistelli earned his PhD in military history at the University of Padua. A scholar of German and Italian politics and strategy throughout World War II, he works both in Italy and abroad writing titles and essays on military history subjects. He is a contributor to the Italian Army Historical Office and has written numerous books for Osprey.

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      Book preview

      Panzer Divisions - Pier Paolo Battistelli

      identification

      Introduction

      Blitzkrieg unleashed on the Eastern Front: Panzer Regiment 35 from 4. Panzer Division deploys to attack the town of Sluzk, 26 June 1941. In the foreground stands an SdKfz 253 artillery observation vehicle.

      On 22 June 1941, when Operation Barbarossa was unleashed, there was no longer any doubt; the Panzerwaffe, the German armoured branch, was the new, decisive instrument of modern land warfare – and it would be the tool that Germany would use to overcome her enemies. In the wake of the fall of France and the German victory in the West in June 1940, Hitler ordered the doubling of the number of Panzer and motorized infantry divisions, seeking a new, larger and better-mechanized army. The months before Barbarossa clearly shown how correct his desire had been; in April the German Army, spearheaded by its Panzer Divisions, quickly conquered both Yugoslavia and Greece, while in North Africa, Rommel’s Panzers reconquered all of the territory – except Tobruk – that the Italians had lost the previous winter. In the first weeks of Barbarossa, it appeared that the war on the Eastern Front was going to follow the same pattern as the Panzer Divisions, spearheading the German forces, drove deep into Soviet territory, encircling large numbers of Red Army units. The extent of these initial successes was such that in early July 1941 an overconfident General Franz Halder, chief of staff of the German Army, wrote in his diary that the war against the Soviet Union had been won. Events would prove that Halder was quite wrong.

      Two years later, having survived two massive defeats, the German Army once again stood ready to attack on the Eastern Front, led by its Panzer Divisions. This time, however, the setting was completely different; the main purpose of this new offensive was to regain the initiative and, unlike the two previous summers, no one was thinking any longer of blitzkrieg. The eventual failure of this 1943 attack (Operation Zitadelle) – which was doomed even before it began – simply marked the end of a long process that had started with Barbarossa. It was a process that saw the Panzer Divisions – as well as modern, mechanized land warfare – endure a series of changes that shaped land warfare in the years to come.

      The German successes of 1939–40 had demonstrated that blitzkrieg was possible, yet in 1941 it took fewer than six months to discover that it would not always be so – and the lesson was learned the hard way. Not only would the Soviet Union remain undefeated by blitzkrieg, but when the Red Army struck back, the German Army barely managed to escape disaster. Panzer Divisions suffered such severe losses that what was left of them was nothing more than a mere shadow of the once-triumphant Panzerwaffe. In the wake of this, a reorganization took place, and a new offensive was unleashed. However, there was little resemblance now to the blitzkrieg-style warfare of the previous years. Again, in winter 1942/43, the German Army suffered a further major defeat, which the Panzer Divisions were unable to prevent. In early 1943, yet another reorganization took place, and a new offensive was planned. By this time, however, the Panzer Divisions’ methods of waging war had been significantly altered. In the light of the failure of Zitadelle, the Panzer Divisions appeared a distant shadow of that new, decisive instrument of warfare they had been deemed only three years earlier.

      Combat mission

      Successfully adapted and tested in the field during the 1940 campaign, the German principles of war provided the basis of the planning of Barbarossa. The plan envisaged an in-depth penetration by the Panzergruppe, which was tasked with surrounding and encircling enemy forces, which would then be mopped up by German infantry units. This annihilation of enemy forces was sought by targetting a main Schwerpunkt (‘centre of gravity’), which would destroy the bulk of Red Army units in the area and split the front in two. Two separate German advances to the north and the south of the main advance were to play only a secondary role until they could be given greater support in the advance to their objectives – Leningrad and the Dniepr River. Since the annihilation of enemy forces was more critical than the seizure of specific targets, no objectives were fixed, save for the seizure of Moscow, which was to mark the last stage of the campaign.

      Like the 1940 campaign in the West, Barbarossa required the enemy to deploy the bulk of his forces forwards, thus allowing for his encirclement and destruction – a distinct possibility given the poor condition the Red Army found itself in, lacking leadership at every echelon. The speed of advance was essential to the success of blitzkrieg, in order to prevent the Red Army from establishing a firm defensive line. A speedy conclusion to the campaign (which, according to German planners, would be within four to five months) was also desirable, bringing victory before the Soviet Union could fully mobilize its men and resources – a process that the Germans estimated would take a year. While the plan for Barbarossa was based on the same premises as the 1940 campaigns – though adapted to a completely different environment – namely the use of speed, manoeuvre and in-depth penetration with the aim of encircling and annihilating the enemy – the operational plan did not, and could not, match that of the ‘sickle cut’ of 1940.

      A group of Soviet prisoners is escorted back to a collection point by an SdKfz 251 during the German offensive of summer 1942. The German officer shielding his eyes from the sun is the Knight’s Cross winner Oberst Maximilian von Edersheim, then commanding Panzergrenadier Regiment 26.

      The reality of blitzkrieg – an obsolete PzKpfw 38 (t) tank meets a horse-drawn carriage in the early stages of Operation Barbarossa. In June 1941 the German Army had only 30 fully motorized divisions out of a total of 200.

      The first weeks of Barbarossa saw the Panzers make rapid advances and Soviet forces taking heavy losses, outshining the German achievements of 1940. However, problems soon surfaced. The lack of a suitable road network slowed down the German follow-up infantry and supplies, with the result that the Panzers failed to complete the encirclement of the enemy. The infantry took longer than expected to mop up enemy forces and the Panzer Divisions became worn out; to compound matters, the Soviet mobilization came sooner than expected. Autumn, with its unfavourable climate, soon bogged down Operation Taifun, the German assault on Moscow. Time and space – two unforeseen factors – took their toll, and eventually the Soviet counter-offensive of December 1941 brought the German Army and the Panzerwaffe face to face with their first defeat, which was to have dire consequences for the Germans.

      The German offensive launched in 1942 (aimed not only at the destruction of enemy forces but also at the seizure of the Soviet oil sources) was based on different premises to the previous year. Since the Panzer Divisions had lost much of their edge and now lacked both flexibility and ‘penetrating power’, Hitler ordered them to closely cooperate with the infantry to avoid gaps in their encirclements. The Panzer Divisions were intermingled with infantry and were dispersed over a wide area, following the decision to split the offensive in two. Moreover, the Soviet withdrawal that followed the beginning of the new offensive completely thwarted any chance of waging blitzkrieg warfare again. As the battles around Kharkov of 1942 and 1943 showed, the Germans were now capable of outmanoeuvring the Red Army only when allowed to do so. Facing its own shortcomings and the growing capabilities of the enemy, the notion of blitzkrieg died; firepower prevailed over speed and manoeuvrability, with the result being that Operation Zitadelle would be based on a concept which would have been inconceivable a year earlier: attacking the enemy where it was strongest. Mechanized warfare had entered a new era.

      Doctrine and training

      Germany’s victorious 1940 campaign shaped its armoured warfare doctrine, helping to further refine the tactics of the Panzerwaffe. First, experience gained in difficult terrain such as the wetlands around Dunkerque had shown that the Panzer Divisions needed more infantry and a better balance between armour, infantry and support weapons. This was also demonstrated by the experiences of the ‘four tank battalion’ brigades, which proved too cumbersome to manoeuvre efficiently. The subsequent reorganization of these units into a single Panzer Regiment was another step forward in German doctrine, which conceived of such a division as an all-arms, balanced unit capable of carrying out every kind of mission by itself. Yet, true to the concept of concentrating their forces, the Germans stressed that the best way in which the Panzer Divisions could be employed was within the Panzerkorps (armoured corps), itself part of the Panzergruppe (armoured army).

      Shortly after the conclusion of the 1940 campaign, commanders at every level were requested to submit detailed reports about their own experiences in the field. These were used to improve the 1938 technical manual, which was reissued on 3 December 1940 under the title Directives for Command and Employment of a Panzer Division (Heeres-Dienstvorschrift g 66). It was reprinted in 1942 without further changes, and its guidelines remained unaltered until the end of the war. It stated that the main task of the Panzer Division was to seek decision on the battlefield. A Panzer Division was required to attack every kind of enemy position and to exploit the success using either in-depth penetration behind enemy lines or attacking an enemy’s rear positions, and pursuing any enemy remnants. Attack was the only combat method suited to the Panzer Divisions; even in defence they were to counter-attack enemy breakthroughs. Only when facing fixed or fortified defence lines were the Panzer Divisions to give way to the infantry, not only to avoid severe losses but also to avoid eschewing the decisive advantage of their speed and manoeuvrability.

      Those dual advantages were the decisive factors in a Panzer Division attack. Tanks no longer ruled the battlefield alone, although they were still the decisive weapon that required concentration – nothing less than a Panzer Abteilung was to be used. Attacking only with tanks meant attacking into a void, while combined arms warfare was the best solution. This required close cooperation between tanks, infantry, artillery and other support units such as engineers and anti-tank units. The classic attack saw Panzer units breaking through and conquering the area with the aid of engineers (who opened the path of advance across obstacles, mines in particular) and supported by artillery fire. Meanwhile, infantry secured the area, mopping up the enemy and defending the flanks. There were several ways in which the Panzers and infantry could

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