Confederate Staff Work At Chickamauga: An Analysis Of The Staff Of The Army Of Tennessee

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Text originally published in 1992 under the same title.

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Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

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CONFEDERATE STAFF WORK AT CHICKAMAUGA: AN ANALYSIS OF THE STAFF OF THE ARMY OF TENNESSEE

By

Major Robert L. Johnson, USA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

ABSTRACT 5

INTRODUCTION 6

CHAPTER ONE — CAMPAIGN FOR THE HEARTLAND 8

PART I: PRELUDE 8

PART II: THE CHICKAMAUGA CAMPAIGN: MANEUVER AND BATTLE 15

CHAPTER TWO — STAFF ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS 27

PART I: ANTECEDENTS IN THE U.S. ARMY 27

PART II: THE CONFEDERATE STAFF SYSTEM 31

PART III: THE CHIEF OF STAFF 36

CHAPTER THREE — THE ARMY OF TENNESSEE STAFF 40

PART I: FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION 40

PART II: LOWER LEVEL STAFFS 45

PART III: STAFF PERSONNEL 51

PART IV: ORGANIZATIONAL STABILITY 54

CHAPTER FOUR — STAFF PERFORMANCE AT CHICKAMAUGA 55

PART I: EVALUATING STAFF PERFORMANCE 55

PART II: LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMY 56

PART III: COMMUNICATING THE COMMANDER’S INTENT 60

PART IV: SEEING THE BATTLEFIELD 64

CHAPTER FIVE — CONCLUSIONS 69

APPENDIX 1 — ARMY OF TENNESSEE ORDER OF BATTLE 72

APPENDIX 2 — SURVEY OF STAFF OFFICERS 73

NOTE ON METHODOLOGY 74

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 76

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 77

Books: 77

Periodicals: 78

Government Documents: 78

Unpublished Materials: 79

ABSTRACT

One of the critical variables in the successful completion of a military campaign is the functioning of an army’s command and control system. In the American Civil War, a commander’s primary command and control tool was his staff.

Large Civil War armies like the Army of Tennessee required significant numbers of staff personnel. Staffs existed at each level of command from regiment through the army level. Staff officers had responsibility in three broad areas: personnel and logistical support to the army, military administration, and command and control.

This thesis analyzes the roles, functional organization, and performance of the staff of the Army of Tennessee and its subordinate corps during the Chickamauga campaign, 16 August-22 September 1863. Primary sources for staff personnel include the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, and the Compiled Service Records of staff officers. Staff performance is evaluated in terms of doctrine and practices as embodied in regulations and military literature of the day.

This thesis concludes that, while staff performance was adequate in administration and logistical support, the performance of the command and control system was inadequate. The staff’s failure in this area had a significant negative impact on the performance of the army as a whole.

INTRODUCTION

On assuming this command, General Washington found an heterogeneous and undisciplined force which, on the call of the Massachusetts committee of safety on the morning after the affair at Lexington and Concord, had assembled at Cambridge in a motley host of full 20,000 men, and immediately took measures to bring order out of confusion. Joseph Reed, of Philadelphia was chosen by him for the important post of Secretary to the Commander in Chief. Horatio Gates was appointed Adjutant-General, Thomas Mifflin, Quartermaster-General, and Joseph Trumbull, Commissary-General.{1} — Corbin and Thian

Military forces in the United States have depended on good staff work since the days of the Revolution. The staff of the Army, and those of its field forces and their subordinate organizations, have grown in importance since then. During the Civil War, a Good staff was a commander’s only command and control system. While telegraphy introduced modern communications into the command and control system at the national level, it remained irrelevant on the battlefield, and largely so in the maneuvers by which commanders sought to bring their opponents to that battlefield. Signal flags were often impracticable as a communications system. Therefore, his staff was often the commander’s only available communications system.

A modern view of the purpose of a command and control system is to implement the commander’s will in pursuit of the unit’s objectives.{2} This purpose has not changed since the early development of military staffs. The staff connects the commander with his subordinate leaders, and through them with the soldiers he leads. It provides him with a means of gathering information about his own and the enemy’s dispositions, forces, and capabilities. It informs him as well about the physical environment of his theater of operations. He can then exercise his judgement and develop his own vision of the proper means to achieve his mission. His staff then helps him in translating that vision into plans of operations, communicating those plans to his subordinates, and supervising the execution of the operation.

This thesis will examine the staff of the Confederate Army of Tennessee to assess the effect of their performance on a major campaign. The campaign examined is the Chickamauga campaign from 16 August to 22 September 1863.

The thesis will examine the performance of General Braxton Bragg’s army staff, as well as those of his subordinate corps commanders. During this campaign, General Bragg commanded the Army of Tennessee, the Confederacy’s major western army. Time and technological improvements have changed staff roles and relationships since the Civil War. However, the essential functions of a staff remain unchanged.

Large Civil War armies (when reinforced for this campaign, the Army of Tennessee had a strength of about 70,000{3}) required a significant staff. Such a staff must do three things. First, it must help the commander see the battlefield. It does this by informing the commander on the status and capabilities of his own army; the dispositions, capabilities and intentions of the opposing force; and the nature and limitations of the terrain. Second, it must assist the commander in developing and transmitting orders and plans to allow the accomplishment of the army’s mission. Third, it must monitor subordinate units in the execution of their missions, acting as the commander’s ‘directed telescope. ‘ In addition to these operational imperatives, a staff must accomplish the routine administration and logistical support of the army. It must coordinate with higher and lower commanders and their staffs, executing the commander’s guidance to achieve his intended purpose.

Both the Union and Confederate armies entered the Civil War with underdeveloped staff systems and an inadequate pool of professional staff personnel. Both drew upon the developing staff experience of the U.S. Army. In this experience, the term ‘staff officer’ was often synonymous with departmental administrator. In an army that consciously looked to European armies for guidance, surprisingly little note was taken of European staff development. The Delafield Commission (Majors Delafield and Mordecai, and Captain George B. McClellan) spent two years in Europe (1855-1857) examining military developments in the major powers. Their report, The Art of War in Europe, focused on fortifications, weapons, and military gadgetry. It missed the significant developments in European staff systems, especially those of Prussia.{4} The staff system that developed in America was adequate for an army of small postings and Indian warfare. Both the Union and Confederate armies wrestled with the problem of transforming their staff systems into something that could handle the problems of mass armies.

This thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter One outlines the events of .the Chickamauga campaign and the Battle of Chickamauga. Its focus is on the operational objectives and decisions made by the army commander. Chapter Two discusses the Confederate Army staff system: its antecedents in the U.S. Army, how the Confederate War Department and staff departments were organized, and how this organization was mirrored in the field armies. Chapter Three examines the staff organization of the Army of Tennessee and its subordinate corps: their organization, functional relationships, and personnel. Chapter Four evaluates the performance of the Army of Tennessee’s staff during the Chickamauga campaign and battle. Chapter Five assesses the effect that the staff’s performance had on the outcome of the battle, and examines relevant lessons for today.

CHAPTER ONE — CAMPAIGN