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The Dynamics Of Doctrine: The Changes In German Tactical Doctrine During The First World War [Illustrated Edition]
The Dynamics Of Doctrine: The Changes In German Tactical Doctrine During The First World War [Illustrated Edition]
The Dynamics Of Doctrine: The Changes In German Tactical Doctrine During The First World War [Illustrated Edition]
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The Dynamics Of Doctrine: The Changes In German Tactical Doctrine During The First World War [Illustrated Edition]

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[Includes 4 maps and 3 figures]
This latest Leavenworth Paper is a case study in the wartime evolution of tactical doctrine. Previous publications of the Combat Studies Institute have examined the peacetime development of doctrine and have increased our knowledge of how doctrine has been applied. With the publication of Captain Lupfer’s study, “The Dynamics of Doctrine,” the Combat Studies Institute adds another dimension to the history of the processes of doctrinal change.

Besides providing a summary of German infantry tactics of the First World War, this study offers insights into the crucial role of leadership in facilitating doctrinal change during battle. It once again reminds us that success in war demands extensive and vigorous training calculated to insure that field commanders understand and apply sound tactical Principles as guidelines for action and not as a substitute for good judgment. It points out the need for a timely effort in collecting and evaluating doctrinal lessons from battlefield experience.

Finally, this study reminds us of yet another fundamental lesson from the past-that tendencies toward accepting the battlefield as a routine can be a deadly error. Altering previously accepted tactics in the middle of a struggle, as the author points out, is a very urgent and serious matter. As members of the Profession of Arms, we must be sensitive to the demands of change, visionary in our examination of their implications, and creative in our adaptation of combat organizations, tactics, and techniques.
LanguageEnglish
PublisherLucknow Books
Release dateNov 6, 2015
ISBN9781786250193
The Dynamics Of Doctrine: The Changes In German Tactical Doctrine During The First World War [Illustrated Edition]

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    The Dynamics Of Doctrine - Captain Timothy Lupfer

    This edition is published by PICKLE PARTNERS PUBLISHING—www.picklepartnerspublishing.com

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    Text originally published in 1981 under the same title.

    © Pickle Partners Publishing 2014, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.

    Publisher’s Note

    Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

    We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

    Leavenworth Papers

    The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War

    by Timothy T. Lupfer

    Combat Studies Institute

    U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

    Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

    TABLE OF CONTENTS

    Contents

    TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

    FOREWORD 5

    Illustrations 6

    MAPS 6

    FIGURES 6

    Introduction 7

    The Elastic Defense-in-Depth 9

    Prelude: The German Defense, 1914-16 9

    German Response to the Somme 13

    Genesis of the Elastic Defense-in-Depth 19

    Enforcement and Application 29

    The Battles of 1917 37

    The Offensive Tactics of 1918 43

    The Offensive Doctrine 47

    The Attack Organization 49

    Preparation for the Offensive 53

    The Offensive 56

    Tentative Generalizations 61

    Appendix 1. Table of German General Officer Ranks 66

    Appendix 2. Promotions of Key German Officers 67

    REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 68

    Bibliography 69

    Documents 69

    Other Works 69

    THE AUTHOR 72

    COMBAT STUDIES INSTITUTE 73

    Mission 73

    FOREWORD

    This latest Leavenworth Paper is a case study in the wartime evolution of tactical doctrine. Previous publications of the Combat Studies Institute have examined the peacetime development of doctrine and have increased our knowledge of how doctrine has been applied. With the publication of Captain Lupfer’s study, The Dynamics of Doctrine, the Combat Studies Institute adds another dimension to the history of the processes of doctrinal change.

    Besides providing a summary of German infantry tactics of the First World War, this study offers insights into the crucial role of leadership in facilitating doctrinal change during battle. It once again reminds us that success in war demands extensive and vigorous training calculated to insure that field commanders understand and apply sound tactical Principles as guidelines for action and not as a substitute for good judgment. It points out the need for a timely effort in collecting and evaluating doctrinal lessons from battlefield experience.

    Finally, this study reminds us of yet another fundamental lesson from the past-that tendencies toward accepting the battlefield as a routine can be a deadly error. Altering previously accepted tactics in the middle of a struggle, as the author points out, is a very urgent and serious matter. As members of the Profession of Arms, we must be sensitive to the demands of change, visionary in our examination of their implications, and creative in our adaptation of combat organizations, tactics, and techniques.

    Illustrations

    MAPS

    1. The Stabilized Front, 1915-16

    2. Western Front, 1917

    3. Reims and Arras, 1917

    4. Western Front, 1918

    FIGURES

    1. German zones in elastic defense-in-depth

    2. German division organization

    3. Infantry division in German elastic defense-in-depth

    Introduction

    Bullets quickly write new tactics. — Wilhelm Balck{1}

    Although the immediate events of the summer of 1914 which led to the First World War surprised Europe; the possibility of a general European conflict had been anticipated by governments and the military. Despite this anticipation, confusion characterized the conduct of the war, from beginning to end. No belligerent had prepared adequately for the actual conditions and demands of this long war. The confusion was particularly apparent in the realm of tactics on the western front. Pre-war tactical doctrine had become inappropriate by December 1914. On all sides expedient modifications soon competed with the pre-war doctrine.

    Military doctrine is guidance for conduct of battle approved by the highest military authority. In the Imperial German Army on the western front, the Army High Command (die Oberste Heeresleitung, hereafter called OHL) changed tactical doctrine significantly on two occasions. In the winter of 1916-17 OHL adopted a new defensive doctrine which described an elastic defense-in-depth in response to the Allied offensive tactics during 1916 (especially those the British employed at the Somme) and in anticipation of the continuation of similar attacks in the spring of 1917. This change is the subject of chapter 1. In the winter of 1917-18, OHL developed a new offensive tactical doctrine in hopes of achieving a decisive victory on the western front with their offensives planned for the spring of 1918. This change is the subject of chapter 2.

    As the famous tactician, Wilhelm Balck,{2} noted, altering tactical procedures in the middle of such a desperate struggle was a very serious undertaking, especially for the German Army.{3} To alter the deeply ingrained habits in an army famous for its thorough peacetime training was difficult, especially when the confusion of the war made the accuracy of any change uncertain.

    The Germans did not win the First World War and their strategic conduct of the war was often flawed. Yet, much value can be derived from. Their development of tactical doctrine, for the Germans developed and applied new tactical doctrine impressively in 1917 and 1918. Their tactical changes were systematic and thorough, for these changes in doctrine directly effected subsequent battlefield success. The analysis of the doctrinal changes cannot be restricted to examining changes to regulations because doctrine that influences nothing beyond the printing press is stillborn.

    German successes in World War I demonstrated a thorough process:

    Perception of a need for change

    Solicitation of ideas, especially from the battlefield units

    Definition of the change

    Dissemination of the change

    Enforcement throughout the army

    Modification of organization and equipment to accommodate the change

    Thorough training

    Evaluation of effectiveness

    Subsequent refinement

    This outline describes the manner by which the German Army succeeded in changing and implementing tactical doctrine during war. The process is not rigidly sequential; it is a dynamic process that requires great intellectual ability and strong character from tacticians who desire to make successful changes.

    Many characteristics ascribed to the German military have too often sufficed for explanations of German military success. Glib expressions such as great organization or a knack for war do little justice to the men who brought success to German arms and, more importantly, offer little guidance for anyone who desires to achieve similar success.

    In the examination of the German process of tactical change, several important personalities emerge. Their memoirs certainly must be used with caution, hut I have quoted extensively from participants in this paper, in part to convey the essential interest in tactics among the participants. Their interest in tactics is instructive, for not all military leaders possess a continuing interest in tactics.

    I do not intend to portray all German tactical efforts as inherently brilliant. The Germans usually achieved a relative advantage over the Allies with respect to tactical change. Tentative generalizations about the reasons for this German success and about the limitations of doctrine itself in wartime are described in chapter 3. These conclusions can only be tentative, for the uncertainties of war extend to its analysis.

    Timothy T. Lupfer

    Department of History

    United States Military Academy

    West Point, New York

    The Elastic Defense-in-Depth

    Prelude: The German Defense, 1914-16

    The German Army of 1914 was not well disposed to the defensive form of war. The most recent major European conflict, the France-Prussian War of 1870-71, had demonstrated the importance of thorough pre-war organization, rapid mobilization, and aggressive strategic movement. In tactics, the German Army of 1914 strongly emphasized the attack. Crown Prince Wilhelm,

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