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How The North Vietnamese Won The War: Operational Art Bends But Does Not Break In Response To Asymmetry
How The North Vietnamese Won The War: Operational Art Bends But Does Not Break In Response To Asymmetry
How The North Vietnamese Won The War: Operational Art Bends But Does Not Break In Response To Asymmetry
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How The North Vietnamese Won The War: Operational Art Bends But Does Not Break In Response To Asymmetry

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This monograph analyzes the effectiveness of operational campaign design against an asymmetrical threat during the 1968 Tet Offensive. The focus is on conceptual elements of campaign design that are derived from theory, which incorporate the particulars of military history to the general truth of warfare. Effective campaign execution is dependent, in part, on effective campaign design that set of theoretical and doctrinal precepts that define the concerns of the operational planner. The monograph identifies lessons learned from this period that are applicable to current U.S. Joint and Army doctrine as well as lessons for planners and executors of U.S. military action under the American system of civilian control of the military.

First, the monograph demonstrated the complex nature of asymmetric warfare. Finding and creating vulnerabilities and attacking those vulnerabilities with inherent strengths is the key to asymmetric warfare. Secondly, the monograph discussed the elements of campaign design that are derived from theory, which incorporate the particulars of military history to the general truth of warfare. Some of the more common conceptual actions are to understand the type and scope of conflict, define the enemy and friendly center of gravity, identify possible culminating points, select lines of operation, determine decisive points, and understanding the dangers of paralysis commonly known as cyber shock. The third section identifies the strategy and identifies particular military objectives identified by the North Vietnamese.
LanguageEnglish
Release dateNov 6, 2015
ISBN9781786252852
How The North Vietnamese Won The War: Operational Art Bends But Does Not Break In Response To Asymmetry

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    How The North Vietnamese Won The War - Major Dale S. Ringler

    This edition is published by PICKLE PARTNERS PUBLISHING—www.picklepartnerspublishing.com

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    Text originally published in 2001 under the same title.

    © Pickle Partners Publishing 2015, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.

    Publisher’s Note

    Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

    We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

    HOW THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WON THE WAR: OPERATIONAL ART BENDS BUT DOES NOT BREAK IN RESPONSE TO ASYMMETRY

    by

    MAJOR DALE S. RINGLER

    Infantry

    TABLE OF CONTENTS

    Contents

    TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

    ABSTRACT 5

    INTRODUCTION 6

    SECTION 1—ASYMMETRIC WARFARE 8

    SECTION II—THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF OPERATIONAL ART 12

    SECTION III—1968 TET OFFENSIVE 18

    Overall Strategy 18

    Planning the Campaign 22

    SECTION IV—ASSESSMENT 27

    Lessons For Future U.S. Initial Campaigns 36

    SECTION V—CONCLUSION 38

    REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 39

    BIBLIOGRAPHY 40

    Books 40

    Government Publications and Studies 41

    Articles 42

    Monographs 43

    Unpublished Sources 44

    Speeches 44

    ABSTRACT

    This monograph analyzes the effectiveness of operational campaign design against an asymmetrical threat during the 1968 Tet Offensive. The focus is on conceptual elements of campaign design that are derived from theory, which incorporate the particulars of military history to the general truth of warfare. Effective campaign execution is dependent, in part, on effective campaign design that set of theoretical and doctrinal precepts that define the concerns of the operational planner. The monograph identifies lessons learned from this period that are applicable to current U.S. Joint and Army doctrine as well as lessons for planners and executors of U.S. military action under the American system of civilian control of the military.

    First, the monograph demonstrated the complex nature of asymmetric warfare. Finding and creating vulnerabilities and attacking those vulnerabilities with inherent strengths is the key to asymmetric warfare. Secondly, the monograph discussed the elements of campaign design that are derived from theory, which incorporate the particulars of military history to the general truth of warfare. Some of the more common conceptual actions are to understand the type and scope of conflict, define the enemy and friendly center of gravity, identify possible culminating points, select lines of operation, determine decisive points, and understanding the dangers of paralysis commonly known as cyber shock. The third section identifies the strategy and identifies particular military objectives identified by the North Vietnamese.

    The monograph offered three different assessments. The first assessment was how the U.S. was an asymmetric threat to the PAVN and Vietcong. This assessment was based of strategic asymmetry using the forms of asymmetry that are method, will, and patience. The method that both opponents selected to fight the war is what caused the U.S. to be asymmetric to the PAVN and Vietcong. The second assessment was an assessment of the Tet Offensive to see if it contained some of the essential elements of campaign design. The Tet Offensive did contain some of the more common conceptual actions which were to define the center of gravity, determine decisive points, select lines of operation, and understanding the dangers of paralysis commonly known as cyber shock. The third assessment was of the effectiveness and efficiency of the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) planning and execution using Naveh’s criteria. The North Vietnamese’s plan responded positively to the following criteria: first, it reflected the cognitive tension, transpiring from the polarization between the general orientation towards the strategic aim and the adherence to the tactical missions. Secondly, the planned action was synergetic.

    The monograph concludes that an organization needs to stop viewing and presenting asymmetry as a negative thing. Organizations need to exploit asymmetries by creating their own asymmetries depending on the enemy’s posture and situation. They need to design and coordinate operations and campaigns of strategic significance with a view of attaining a single strategic aim.

    INTRODUCTION

    An outstanding success of our party consists in its making a correct appraisal of the correlation of forces between ourselves and the enemy, perceiving the emergence of historic opportunity and taking the strategic decision to liberate the South and completely defeat the U.S. neocolonialist war of aggression. Moreover, our Party closely followed the dialectical development of the correlation forces between ourselves and the enemy throughout the offensive, actively created and seized favorable opportunities and launched a daring, determined and well-timed offensive to achieve victory within the shortest possible time.—General Vo Nguyen Giap, 1975{1}

    This passage taken from Giap’s analysis of the Vietnamese victory, is presented not to duplicate the Vietnamese victory or their strategy, tactics, or doctrine, but rather, to apply the same kind of creative, revolutionary and military art to future conditions, which may face U.S. forces. This may be accomplished by analyzing a historical case study of campaign design, which is an integral and critical aspect of operational art. Operational

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