How The North Vietnamese Won The War: Operational Art Bends But Does Not Break In Response To Asymmetry
()
About this ebook
First, the monograph demonstrated the complex nature of asymmetric warfare. Finding and creating vulnerabilities and attacking those vulnerabilities with inherent strengths is the key to asymmetric warfare. Secondly, the monograph discussed the elements of campaign design that are derived from theory, which incorporate the particulars of military history to the general truth of warfare. Some of the more common conceptual actions are to understand the type and scope of conflict, define the enemy and friendly center of gravity, identify possible culminating points, select lines of operation, determine decisive points, and understanding the dangers of paralysis commonly known as cyber shock. The third section identifies the strategy and identifies particular military objectives identified by the North Vietnamese.
Major Dale S. Ringler
See Book Description
Related to How The North Vietnamese Won The War
Related ebooks
Operational Encirclement: Quick Decisive Victory Or A Bridge Too Far? Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsBiggest Stick: The Employment Of Artillery Units In Counterinsurgency Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsProvide by Parachute: Airdrop In Vietnam, 1954-1972 Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsOperational Encirclements: Can The United States Military Decisively Follow Through? Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsDefensive Culmination - When Does The Tactical Commander Counterattack? Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5After The Blitzkrieg: The German Army’s Transition To Defeat In The East Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsOperational Art In The Sioux War Of 1876 Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsCoalition Management and Escalation Control in a Multinuclear World Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsFall Gelb And The German Blitzkrieg Of 1940: Operational Art Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsOperational Principles: The Operational Art Of Erwin Rommel And Bernard Montgomery Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsThe Dynamics Of Doctrine: The Changes In German Tactical Doctrine During The First World War [Illustrated Edition] Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsThe Fundamentals Of Soviet 'Razvedka' (Intelligence/Reconnaissance) Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsThe British Experience In Iraq, 2007: A Perspective On The Utility Of Force Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsVietnam Studies - Field Artillery, 1954-1973 [Illustrated Edition] Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Ia Drang Campaign 1965: A Successful Operational Campaign Or Mere Tactical Failure? Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsCoalition Tactics On The Napoleonic Battlefield And Their Influence On Unity Of Effort Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsOperational Logic And Identifying Soviet Operational Centers Of Gravity During Operation Barbarossa, 1941 Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsElements Of Operational Design In The Planning For The Marianas Campaign In 1944 Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsGeneral Logistics Paradigm: A Study Of The Logistics Of Alexander, Napoleon, And Sherman Rating: 3 out of 5 stars3/5Vietnam Studies - The Development And Training Of The South Vietnamese Army, 1950-1972 [Illustrated Edition] Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsSoviet Defense Against Operation Barbarossa: A Possible Model For Future Soviet Defensive Doctrine Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsCombined Action Platoons In The Vietnam War:: A Unique Counterinsurgency Capability For The Contemporary Operating Environment Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsAnti-Access Warfare: Countering A2/AD Strategies Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Cavalry Operations In Support Of Low Intensity Conflict Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsThe Operational Commander’s Role In Planning And Executing A Successful Campaign Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsOn Tactics: A Theory of Victory in Battle Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Concepts Of Information Warfare In Practice:: General George S. Patton And The Third Army Information Service, Aug.-Dec., 1944 Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsSoviet Actions In Afghanistan And Initiative At The Tactical Level: Are There Implications For The US Army? Rating: 3 out of 5 stars3/5Operational And Strategic Lessons Of The War In Afghanistan, 1979-1990 Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratings
Wars & Military For You
The Art of War Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Masters of the Air: America's Bomber Boys Who Fought the Air War Against Nazi Germany Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Killing the SS: The Hunt for the Worst War Criminals in History Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5How to Hide an Empire: A History of the Greater United States Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Resistance: The Warsaw Ghetto Uprising Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Happiest Man on Earth: The Beautiful Life of an Auschwitz Survivor Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5Sun Tzu's The Art of War: Bilingual Edition Complete Chinese and English Text Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Art of War: The Definitive Interpretation of Sun Tzu's Classic Book of Strategy Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Art of War & Other Classics of Eastern Philosophy Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Last Kingdom Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The History of the Peloponnesian War: With linked Table of Contents Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Wager Disaster: Mayem, Mutiny and Murder in the South Seas Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Blitzed: Drugs in the Third Reich Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The God Delusion Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Mysterious Case of Rudolf Diesel: Genius, Power, and Deception on the Eve of World War I Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5A Daily Creativity Journal Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Forgotten Highlander: An Incredible WWII Story of Survival in the Pacific Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Band of Brothers: E Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne from Normandy to Hitler's Eagle's Nest Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5Doctors From Hell: The Horrific Account of Nazi Experiments on Humans Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Nuclear War: A Scenario Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Twilight of the Shadow Government: How Transparency Will Kill the Deep State Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsThe Making of the Atomic Bomb Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5The Faithful Spy: Dietrich Bonhoeffer and the Plot to Kill Hitler Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Shogun: The Life of Tokugawa Ieyasu Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratings
Reviews for How The North Vietnamese Won The War
0 ratings0 reviews
Book preview
How The North Vietnamese Won The War - Major Dale S. Ringler
This edition is published by PICKLE PARTNERS PUBLISHING—www.picklepartnerspublishing.com
To join our mailing list for new titles or for issues with our books – [email protected]
Or on Facebook
Text originally published in 2001 under the same title.
© Pickle Partners Publishing 2015, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.
Publisher’s Note
Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.
We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.
HOW THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WON THE WAR: OPERATIONAL ART BENDS BUT DOES NOT BREAK IN RESPONSE TO ASYMMETRY
by
MAJOR DALE S. RINGLER
Infantry
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS 4
ABSTRACT 5
INTRODUCTION 6
SECTION 1—ASYMMETRIC WARFARE 8
SECTION II—THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF OPERATIONAL ART 12
SECTION III—1968 TET OFFENSIVE 18
Overall Strategy 18
Planning the Campaign 22
SECTION IV—ASSESSMENT 27
Lessons For Future U.S. Initial Campaigns 36
SECTION V—CONCLUSION 38
REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 39
BIBLIOGRAPHY 40
Books 40
Government Publications and Studies 41
Articles 42
Monographs 43
Unpublished Sources 44
Speeches 44
ABSTRACT
This monograph analyzes the effectiveness of operational campaign design against an asymmetrical threat during the 1968 Tet Offensive. The focus is on conceptual elements of campaign design that are derived from theory, which incorporate the particulars of military history to the general truth of warfare. Effective campaign execution is dependent, in part, on effective campaign design that set of theoretical and doctrinal precepts that define the concerns of the operational planner. The monograph identifies lessons learned from this period that are applicable to current U.S. Joint and Army doctrine as well as lessons for planners and executors of U.S. military action under the American system of civilian control of the military.
First, the monograph demonstrated the complex nature of asymmetric warfare. Finding and creating vulnerabilities and attacking those vulnerabilities with inherent strengths is the key to asymmetric warfare. Secondly, the monograph discussed the elements of campaign design that are derived from theory, which incorporate the particulars of military history to the general truth of warfare. Some of the more common conceptual actions are to understand the type and scope of conflict, define the enemy and friendly center of gravity, identify possible culminating points, select lines of operation, determine decisive points, and understanding the dangers of paralysis commonly known as cyber shock. The third section identifies the strategy and identifies particular military objectives identified by the North Vietnamese.
The monograph offered three different assessments. The first assessment was how the U.S. was an asymmetric threat to the PAVN and Vietcong. This assessment was based of strategic asymmetry using the forms of asymmetry that are method, will, and patience. The method that both opponents selected to fight the war is what caused the U.S. to be asymmetric to the PAVN and Vietcong. The second assessment was an assessment of the Tet Offensive to see if it contained some of the essential elements of campaign design. The Tet Offensive did contain some of the more common conceptual actions which were to define the center of gravity, determine decisive points, select lines of operation, and understanding the dangers of paralysis commonly known as cyber shock. The third assessment was of the effectiveness and efficiency of the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) planning and execution using Naveh’s criteria. The North Vietnamese’s plan responded positively to the following criteria: first, it reflected the cognitive tension, transpiring from the polarization between the general orientation towards the strategic aim and the adherence to the tactical missions. Secondly, the planned action was synergetic.
The monograph concludes that an organization needs to stop viewing and presenting asymmetry as a negative thing. Organizations need to exploit asymmetries by creating their own asymmetries depending on the enemy’s posture and situation. They need to design and coordinate operations and campaigns of strategic significance with a view of attaining a single strategic aim.
INTRODUCTION
An outstanding success of our party consists in its making a correct appraisal of the correlation of forces between ourselves and the enemy, perceiving the emergence of historic opportunity and taking the strategic decision to liberate the South and completely defeat the U.S. neocolonialist war of aggression. Moreover, our Party closely followed the dialectical development of the correlation forces between ourselves and the enemy throughout the offensive, actively created and seized favorable opportunities and launched a daring, determined and well-timed offensive to achieve victory within the shortest possible time.
—General Vo Nguyen Giap, 1975{1}
This passage taken from Giap’s analysis of the Vietnamese victory, is presented not to duplicate the Vietnamese victory or their strategy, tactics, or doctrine, but rather, to apply the same kind of creative, revolutionary and military art to future conditions, which may face U.S. forces. This may be accomplished by analyzing a historical case study of campaign design, which is an integral and critical aspect of operational art. Operational