Intellectual Philosophy

INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY,

FOR SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES;

CONTAINING AN OUTLINE OF THE SCIENCE, WITH AN ABSTRACT OF ITS HISTORY.

BY J. T. CHAMPLIN, D.D.,

PRESIDENT OF WATERVILLE COLLEGE.

Copyright

PREFACE.

THIS treatise is called a TEXT-BOOK, because it has been purposely thrown into the form adapted to the class-room, rather than that adapted to general reading; and to intimate, at the same time, that it is offered to the public, not so much as a new contribution to the matter of the science, as to its form. However, it will probably be found about as original as the other treatises on the subject, which have appeared since the principles of the science have been so fully developed.

To ignore what has been done by others, on a subject which has attracted the attention and engrossed the thoughts of the most gifted of our race for thousands of years, is simply proof of folly, not of originality. A book on such a subject as this, to be up with the times, must embrace the best views of previous investigators. Could I promise this with regard to the present treatise, I should deem it a much better commendation than any pretence to unusual originality. As it is, I can only say, that I have endeavored to make myself acquainted with the views of the best thinkers on the subject, and have not hesitated to adopt them when I could present no better of my own. I wish particularly to acknowledge my indebtedness to Sir W. Hamilton, to whom I am under obligations far beyond what is implied in the number of direct quotations from his works, and to whom I might have been under still greater obligations, had not this treatise been virtually completed before the publication of his excellent Lectures on Metaphysics.

What is here presented is confessedly but an outline; and, as a text-book, it should be only such. Whether we consider the wants of the pupil or those of the teacher, a text-book should be brief; it should contain only the fundamental facts and principles of the science to which it is devoted. The field of science is so extended, that only the most commanding and essential features can be surveyed in a general course of education. Where there is so much that is important, the mind of the pupil should not be encumbered with what is unessential. Something should be left to be supplied by the teacher, and something to be learned by after study. An outline is all that ought to be committed to memory by the pupil, and all that is required by the teacher, as a nucleus around which to gather supplementary and illustrative matter. If the present treatise shall be found adequate to such a purpose, it will fully meet the expectations of the author.

The brief abstract of the history of philosophy, subjoined in an appendix, it is hoped will not be wholly devoid of use. It may at least stimulate the curiosity of the student to know something more of a subject so rich and varied. Both the philosophic aptitude and a correct view of philosophy are best acquired by viewing the subject on many sides, as it has presented itself to different speculators, in different ages and various parts of the world. The abstract contains, of course, but the merest hint of the views of the different philosophers and schools; but I have studied to convey in these hints the leading idea and distinguishing character of each system. Aiming at a mere abstract of the history, I have not always felt bound to consult the original works of the authors, but for the most part have been content to follow such competent guides as Ritter, Tennemann, Stewart, Morrell, Schwegler, Chalybäus, Lewes, Archer Butler, and Hamilton.

CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION.

Mind and Matter

CHAPTER I.

OF MIND IN GENERAL.

SECTION I.

Different Designations of the General Knowing Principle

SECTION II.

Intelligence Distinguished from other Mental Phenomena

CHAPTER II.

CONSCIOUSNESS.

SECTION I.

Nature of Consciousness

SECTION II.

Facts of Consciousness

SECTION III.

Truths of Consciousness

SECTION IV.

Trustworthiness of Consciousness

SECTION V.

Concentration of Consciousness (Attention and Reflection)

CHAPTER III.

PERCEPTION.

SECTION I.

Theories of Perception

SECTION II.

What we Perceive

SECTION III.

How we Perceive

SECTION IV.

Perception by the Different Senses

SECTION V.

Importance of the Senses

CHAPTER IV.

MEMORY.

SECTION I.

Memory and Recollection

SECTION II.

What we Remember

SECTION III.

How we Remember

SECTION IV.

Laws of Memory (Association of Ideas)

SECTION V.

Associative and Logical Thought

SECTION VI.

Importance of Memory

CHAPTER V.

IMAGINATION.

SECTION I.

Nature of Imagination

SECTION II.

Uses of the Imagination

SECTION III.

Training of the Imagination

CHAPTER VI.

CONCEPTION.

SECTION I.

Nature of Conception

SECTION II.

Formation of Concepts

SECTION III.

Kinds of Concepts

SECTION IV.

Theories of Conception

SECTION V.

Importance of Conception

CHAPTER VII.

JUDGEMENT

SECTION I.

Nature of Judgment

SECTION II.

Kinds of Judgments

CHAPTER VIII.

REASONING.

SECTION I.

Nature of Reasoning

SECTION II.

Kinds of Reasoning

SECTION III.

First Principles of Reasoning

SECTION IV.

Improvement of the Reasoning Powers

APPENDIX.

Abstract of the History of Philosophy

INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY.

INTRODUCTION.

MIND AND MATTER.

1. The body in one sense a part of self.—That which each one calls himself embraces more or less in different cases. Considering man as a purely reflective being self includes only the mind; but considering him as a sensitive and active being, it includes the body as well as the mind, since sensation is manifested in the body and action transmitted through it. Though the body is but the special instrument and medium of the mind in communicating with exterior objects, yet, as a portion of matter specially organized and appropriated for that purpose, it becomes so animated and pervaded by the spirit, as to seem a part of self. It is not, however, the whole body of whose affections we are conscious, but only the nerves of sensation. But these are so largely distributed through the body, and especially over its surfaces, that nearly all the external acts and internal processes and functions of life affect them.

2. The body a part of the human personality.—As, then, the body is animated by the spirit, the spirit being directly conscious of the affections of the body, while it has no direct consciousness of the affections of any other form of matter, the body is properly considered, in the most comprehensive sense of the term, as a part of the human personality, though always to be discriminated in thought from the real interior, conscious personality, or self. Indeed, the mind first becomes conscious of itself through the various affections which the body suffers. It is first awakened to consciousness by the impressions made upon our bodily organs from without.

3. The body the special sphere of the mind.—The body is thus the special sphere of the mind; it is the microcosm of the human spirit, as the universe is the macrocosm of the Divine Spirit. The mind does not, in any proper sense, leave the body in the present life. Even in the most discursive thought, it rather draws in, or mimics in its own chambers, what is without, than goes out to it. But intimately associated as mind and matter are in the human being, they are broadly distinguished from each other by the qualities or modes under which they manifest themselves, and by which alone they are known to human intelligence.

4. Properties of matter and mind respectively.—The body, like other forms of matter, is known to us only under the various qualities involved in the general notions of Extension and Resistance. It is composed of the same elements as other material objects, only differently compounded and arranged, and presents no higher claim to the possession of intelligence, than the rocks and other earthy substances around us. It is as impossible to conceive that the body thinks, as that these do. The mind, on the contrary, is known to us under an entirely different character. It is not regarded as possessing any of the properties of matter, and hence is said to be immaterial. It manifests itself wholly by its properties, or rather, energies, of knowing, willing, and feeling.

5. How far the lower phenomena of life depend on mind.—How far the lower elements of life in man, such as the involuntary motions, and the wonderful processes of circulation and appropriation ever going on in the human system—processes utterly inexplicable by any known mechanical or chemical laws—are dependent on the presence and influence of the mind, is uncertain. But there can be no doubt that all the conscious phenomena are wholly dependent upon it. For, although these phenomena disappear at death, this by no means proves that they are proper manifestations of the body itself. It proves nothing more than that the body, in order to be the sphere and instrument of the spirit, must retain a certain integrity of parts, and some approach to its normal state. When it relapses from this condition, as it always does at death,* it becomes an unfit instrument for the spirit, and is therefore abandoned.

6. The precise relation of body and spirit not known.—The precise relation which the mind holds to the body, we have no means of determining. We know that the mind is somehow conscious of the affections of the body, but whether by simply being present as a witness of them, or by itself actually participating in them, may be doubtful: though the latter seems the more consistent and probable hypothesis. But whatever may be the precise process of obtaining knowledge through the organs of the body, it is evident that it is rendered slow, laborious, and defective by such an arrangement. The enclosing the soul in a material body seems an evidence of our low estate. God and other pure intelligences know things at once, by direct intuition.

7. The antithesis of mind and matter.—We thus, at the outset, find in our own persons the ever-recurring antithesis of Mind and Matter, and meet at the very threshold of our inquiry into our own nature, that mystery of mysteries, the connection of the Material with the Immaterial. It is from this connection that the chief difficulties in mental philosophy arise. The various psychological* systems all turn upon the view which is taken of this connection.

* This is obviously so where death ensues from a wasting disease. But it is no less so in cases of sudden death, which are usually occasioned, either by violence done to some of the central parts of the nervous system—the special seat of the mind, or of the repairing system, without whose action the organization immediately degenerates from its normal condition.

* Psychological has the same meaning as mental, but is capable of a wider application.

CHAPTER I.

OF MIND IN GENERAL.

SECTION I.

DIFFERENT DESIGNATIONS OF THE GENERAL KNOWING PRINCIPLE.

1. The mind, soul, intelligence.—The general conscious principle in man, as an independent substance or existence, is variously denominated the Mind, the Soul, or the Spirit. Of this conscious principle, the most important function is that of intelligence, or knowledge. And hence, this general power of knowing, though really embracing several distinct processes,—higher and lower,—has itself received several distinct names, each intended to designate it as a whole with more or less exactness. These designations of the intelligent principle, all represent the mind as knowing, but with some variation of emphasis as to the particular processes involved.

2. The intellect.—The term Intellect, in its ordinary acceptation, designates the general knowing principle of the mind more simply and unequivocally, perhaps, than any other term. But even this refers more emphatically to the higher cognitive* powers, than to perception, memory, etc. By some philosophers, indeed, the intellect is regarded as the special faculty or repository of principles. But even in this sense, which is not a very common one, it underlies, if it does not wholly include, the general knowing powers of the mind. For these native principles, or original convictions of the mind, certify and warrant all knowledge. It is not without reason, therefore, that by general usage, treatises on the cognitive powers of man in general are called Intellectual Philosophies.

3. The understanding.—Understanding is another term frequently used to designate the intelligent principle in general. It is so used by Locke. His Essay on the Human Understanding, is a treatise on the cognitive powers in general. But recent usage, at least, does not warrant so wide an application of the term. "The term understanding," says Sir W. Hamilton,* usually and properly denotes only a part—the higher part—of the cognitive faculties, and is then exclusive of sense, imagination, etc. In other places he calls the understanding the faculty of relations and comparisons, which comes to the same thing. Understanding is comprehending, and implies comparison and a perception of relations. It is not the mind considered as receiving and retaining the materials communicated through the senses, but rather as analyzing, comparing, and elaborating these materials.

4. The reason.—Reason, also, is sometimes made to denote the general intelligent principle of the mind. But by the more prevailing and better usage, it is made to refer more especially, if not wholly, to the very highest and most ideal form of our intelligence. As discursive, as capable of proceeding from step to step through a proof, it stands opposed to the mere receptivity of sense; while, as calmly and dispassionately judging of the conclusiveness of proofs, it is equally opposed to the blindness and excitability of feeling and passion. In this form it is the faculty of proofs, and hence the process of proof is called reasoning.

5. Reason intuitive.—The reason, however, is not simply the faculty of reasoning. Reason, to adopt the distinction of Milton, is not only discursive, but intuitive, also,—intuitive of first principles of truth. Its perception of many truths is instinctive, as being the immediate and irresistible convictions of our rational nature. There must be a last reason in every case. Even the reason cannot give reasons for every thing. It must rest at last upon its own simple convictions. All that it can do, in such cases, is to show its convictions to be reasonable,—that they involve no contradictions among themselves, and that in the nature of the case, there can be no further reason given; that the convictions upon which it rests are necessarily final, and not susceptible of further analysis and reduction.

6. Reason transcendental.—As to the transcendental sense in which the term reason is used, it is of little consequence to the student of a sane philosophy, except as a matter of history. In the philosophy of Kant and his followers, reason is sharply distinguished from the understanding, as the faculty or repository of ideas, in the Platonic sense. According to this view, while the understanding knows only the finite, the limited, the phenomenal, the reason is conversant about the infinite, the absolute, the real. As the philosophy of the unconditioned is now generally abandoned by all sound minds, this meaning of reason may well be disregarded.

7. Consciousness.—The term Consciousness, also, might be named as another designation of the knowing principle in general. Consciousness, however, does not denote knowledge (or the faculty of knowledge) simply and purely as such, but knowledge as noted and registered. It is knowledge known, and capable of being recalled. As the grand revealer and register of knowledge, consciousness will receive a fuller treatment in the next chapter.

8. Different forms and faculties of knowledge.—But the general power of knowing, as it exhibits itself under several plainly distinguishable forms or processes, is usually distributed among several different faculties. According to the most approved distribution, the intuition, or direct apprehension, of external objects is called Perception,* and of internal states or operations of the mind, Self-Consciousness; the recalling of perceptions or states of consciousness, is Memory; the framing of individualized or concrete images, is Imagination; and of generalized or abstract notions, Conception; the connecting in thought of two concepts is Judgment; while the connecting of pairs of judgments successively, so as to necessitate a third judgment in each case, is Reasoning.

SECTION II.

INTELLIGENCE DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER MENTAL PHENOMENA.

1. Different classes of mental phenomena.—Besides knowing, we also feel and will. We are susceptible of the feelings of hunger, pain, weariness, hope, fear, joy, gratitude, and the various feelings which make up the sum of human happiness and misery. We are capable, also, of deliberating, choosing, and resolving. These phenomena are evidently quite distinct in character from the phenomena of knowing, and yet they are all united in a common consciousness. They are the concomitants of knowledge—its antecedents, conditions, effects, consequents, etc.—but not knowledge itself. They are all states of consciousness, but not properly cognitions.

2. Different classes of feelings.—Of our Feelings, some are so localized in different parts and organs of the body, that they may be called organic or corporeal feelings. Of this sort is the uneasy feeling in the stomach occasioned by the want of food; also, the various aches and pains in the internal organs, or at the surface of the body, caused by derangement, disorganization, or pressure. Another class of feelings, depending rather upon certain mental perceptions or thoughts, than upon local, physical causes, may be called intellectual or moral feelings,—they are commonly denominated Sentiments. They are such as: love, which is awakened by the perception or thought of an endeared object; desire, which is awakened by the perception or thought of any thing which we suppose will gratify a want; gratitude, awakened by favors received; the sense of beauty or deformity, awakened by the presence or thought of comely or uncomely objects or acts; and the sense of right and wrong, awakened by the perception or recollection of human conduct, as according to, or contrary to, right relations.

3. Pleasure and pain, good and evil.—The feelings excited by physical causes, constitute physical pleasure and pain; while those excited by our thoughts, constitute the more purely intellectual pleasures and pains. That which produces pleasure of either kind, is called good, and that which produces pain, evil,—yet, good and evil of different orders, according to the character of the pleasure or pain produced.

4. Designations and character of the different feelings.—The feelings, considered in their most general character, as modifications of our sentient nature, are called Affections;* considered as mental excitements or movements, they are called Emotions; when violent or excessive excitements, Passions; and when considered as appetences towards different objects, or revulsions from them, they are called Propensities, or Desires and Aversions. But however denominated, and wherever conceived as having their seat, even if distinctly localized in particular organs of the body, they are all, evidently, real mental affections, since they are as unlike any mere affections or qualities of matter, as are the phenomena of intelligence. And yet they are not knowledge, though often the conditions of