Rosecrans’ Staff At Chickamauga: The Significance Of Major General William S. Rosecrans’ Staff On The Outcome Of The Chickamauga Campaign [Illus. Ed.]

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Text originally published in 1992 under the same title.

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Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

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ROSECRANS' STAFF AT CHICKAMAUGA: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM S. ROSECRANS' STAFF ON THE OUTCOME OF THE CHICKAMAUGA CAMPAIGN

by

ROBERT D. RICHARDSON, MAJ, USA

B.S., UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY, 1977

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

ABSTRACT 7

CHAPTER 1 — INTRODUCTION 8

CHAPTER 2 — ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND 13

CHAPTER 3 — PREPARATION 30

CHAPTER 4 — CROSSING, TURNING MOVEMENT, CONSOLIDATION 56

CHAPTER 5 — THE CHICKAMAUGA BATTLE 72

CHAPTER 6 — CONCLUSION 84

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 92

Chickamauga Campaign And Battle Maps 93

Chickamauga – 19th & 20th September 1863 93

Chickamauga Campaign – Davis’s Crossroads – 11th September 1863 94

Chickamauga Campaign – 18th September 1863 After Dark 95

Battle of Chickamauga – 19th September 1863 Morning 96

Battle of Chickamauga – 19th September 1863 Early Afternoon 97

Battle of Chickamauga – 19th September 1863 Early Afternoon 98

Battle of Chickamauga – 20th September 1863 9 A.M. to 11 A.M. 99

Battle of Chickamauga – 20th September 1863 11 A.M. to Mid-Afternoon 100

Battle of Chickamauga – 20th September 1863 Mid-Afternoon to Dark 101

Battle of Chickamauga – 20th September 1863 Brigade Details 102

Route of Hood’s Division to Chickamauga 103

Johnson’s Movements – Morning of 18 September 1863 104

Advance of Hood’s Column – General Situation 18 September 1863 105

Hood’s Corps – General Situation 0700, 19 September 1863 106

Array of Hood’s Division 1400, 19 September 1863 107

Hood’s Division – Begins the Assault 1500, 19 September 108

Viniard Field – 1600 19 September 1863 110

Hood’s Division General Situation – 1630, 19 September 111

Array of Hood’s Division – 1100, 20 September 1863 112

The Break Through – 1110-1130 20 September 1863 113

Hood’s Division – 1300, 20 September 1863 114

Hood’s Division - 1330, 20 September 1863 115

APPENDIX 1 116

ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND 116

FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS 116

TWENTIETH ARMY CORPS 116

TWENTY-FIRST ARMY CORPS 116

RESERVE CORPS 117

CAVALRY CORPS 117

APPENDIX 2 — GENERAL WILLIAM S, ROSECRANS' STAFF 118

CHIEF OF STAFF 118

AIDE-DE-CAMP 118

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL 118

ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL 118

CHAPLAIN 119

COMMISSARY OF SUBSISTENCE 119

QUARTERMASTER 119

CHIEF QM DEPOT 119

QM STORES AND SHOPS 119

INSP OF SUTLER GOODS 119

RAILROAD CARS 119

RIVER TRANS, FORAGE, FUEL 119

COMMISSARY OF MUSTERS 120

SUPERINTENDENT OF RAILROAD 120

CHIEF OF ORDNANCE 120

PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL 120

PAYMASTER 120

JUDGE ADVOCATE 120

MEDICAL DIRECTOR 120

CHIEF OF ARTILLERY 121

CHIEF OF ENGINEERS 121

CHIEF OF SIGNAL 121

SUPERINTENDENT OF TELEGRAPH 121

MAIL AND POLICE 121

SECRET POLICE 121

CHIEF OF COURIER LINES 121

BIBLIOGRAPHY 122

BOOKS 122

PRIMARY 122

SECONDARY 123

PERIODICALS 124

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS 125

DISSERTATIONS. THESIS. AND MONOGRAPHS 125

MANUSCRIPTS 126

ABSTRACT

ROSECRANS' STAFF AT CHICKAMAUGA: the significance of Major General William S. Rosecrans' staff on the outcome of the Chickamauga campaign, by Captain Robert D. Richardson, USA.

Probably the most unpredictable variable in the Fog of War, next to leadership, is the command and control process, comprised of three components: organizations, process, and facilities. Organizations include the formulation of staffs by the commander to accomplish the mission. Incorporated in the organization of the staffs are the roles, responsibilities, and functions.

Large Civil War armies like the Army of the Cumberland and the Army of the Tennessee required significant numbers of staff officers to support the armies logistically and to maneuver them operationally. During the Campaign and Battle of Chickamauga, these staff officers often played major roles and were instrumental in determining the outcome of the battle. The roles and functions performed by these staff officers evolved through the history of conflict.

This study is an analysis of the roles, responsibilities, and functions of General Rosecrans' staff prior to and during the Chickamauga campaign, using lessons learned in comparison to current Army doctrine on command and control. Primary sources for staff information on the Army of the Cumberland are the Official Records and actual telegrams from the staffs during this period. Doctrinal manuals on senior level staffs did not exist; therefore, these staffs were composites of regimental and War Department staff positions and ad hoc positions. The study uses evolving doctrine from Command and General Staff College that defines an outstanding staff as one that informs, anticipates, coordinates and executes the commander's guidance with enthusiasm and innovation.

This study concludes that Rosecrans' staff was significant to the outcome of the Battle of Chickamauga. Although none of the staff functions developed critical deficiencies during the campaign, their inability to relieve the commander of administrative burdens compelled him to abandon the battlefield.

CHAPTER 1 — INTRODUCTION

The Appointment of general officers is important, but of those of the general staff all important.—General George Washington July 5, 1798 {1}

In order to demand superior performance from soldiers and leaders fighting with the latest doctrine and weapons, the United States Army must accelerate the development of command and control systems. The technology of warfare continues to magnify both the lethality and the complexity of weapons and support equipment. The Army continuously updates its leadership and tactics doctrine to accommodate the effects of technology. However, the unifying element that coordinates the employment of these components at the decisive place and time on the battlefield, the command and control system, has not kept pace with leadership and tactical emphasis.

The increasing distance between units, caused by the improving technology of weapons, places a greater burden of command and control on the leader of tomorrow's combat units. Additionally, AirLand Battle doctrine encourages independent maneuvering within the higher commander's intent and emphasizes four basic tenets: initiative, agility, depth, and synchronization. Therefore, future battles will probably involve isolated and independent engagements unless command and control capabilities continue to improve.{2}

The command and control system connects the leader with the maneuver and support doctrine. Deficiencies in either leadership, maneuver doctrine or command and control can result in catastrophic results. History provides numerous examples of engagements involving deficiencies in command and control. One such campaign in the Civil War that incorporates strong independent leadership, AirLand Battle maneuvers, and a unique command and control system is the Chickamauga campaign (16 August-22 September 1883).

The U.S. Army's FM 100-5 states the only purpose of command and control system is to implement the commander's will in pursuit of the unit's objectives. The system is composed of three components: organizations, process, and facilities. The term organizations pertains to formulation of staffs by the commander in order to accomplish his assigned missions. The organization of the staff is further subdivided into roles, responsibilities and functions.{3}

This thesis looks at the effect of a staff on the commander's success or failure in the major campaign. The study will analyze the staff systems including the positions, personnel, training, and missions for a veteran army in a potentially decisive operation. Although time and technology have altered the staff titles and system, the primary purpose of the staff and basic responsibilities of the entity remain unchanged. Because the staff functions and effectiveness in the Civil War correlate with the staff functions and effectiveness of today, the current criteria for evaluating staff functions and effectiveness should apply to the Chickamauga Campaign.

One of the best definitions of an outstanding staff found was in a Command and General Staff College product used for emerging doctrine. It defines an outstanding staff as "one that informs, anticipates, coordinates, and executes the commander's guidance with enthusiasm and innovation. In Chickamauga, the ability of the staffs to inform, anticipate, coordinate and execute can indicate their effectiveness to their commander. Today's modern battlefield, like battlefields of the past, will contain significant challenges at all echelons of command. The more capable leaders are of meeting those challenges, the greater the decisive edge over the opponent.{4}

Large Civil War armies, like the Army of the Cumberland and the Army of the Tennessee, required significant numbers of staff officers to support them logistically and to maneuver them operationally. These staff officers played major roles and were instrumental in determining the outcome of the Battle and Campaign of Chickamauga. The roles and functions performed by Civil War staff officers evolved from the history of human conflict.

The evolution of the military staffs began in ancient warfare when the first civilized human asked for an opinion. The Egyptians demonstrated the first recorded use of staffs around 2000 B.C. The introduction of professional soldiers and the extensive employment of chariots and horses created the requirement for supply bases and logistical assistants. Historic records exhibit the availability of paper, writing utensils, and an alphabet, which allowed for the recording of orders by an adjutant general. Initially the Egyptians built their army for defensive purposes. Later, with the development of intelligence gathering systems and staff officers, the Egyptian army accumulated sufficient information to attack other nations.{5}

During the unification of the Greek city states, Phillip of Macedon (382-336 B.C.) constructed an army with new staff positions that assisted his son, Alexander the Great, in becoming a great conqueror. Phillip created engineer organizations to develop his missile-firing weapons, to construct his fortifications, and to conduct his siege operations. To enforce the Macedonian army's regulations, Phillip formed a police force, an early type of provost-marshal. To establish lines of communication for his army on the march, Phillip expanded the use of commissary and transportation personnel. The Macedonians developed hospital organizations during this period to respond to the increasing casualties from the escalation of violence on the battlefield.{6}

About 300 years after Alexander the Great, the Romans instituted a unique concept of command. Each legion had six tribunes grouped in three sets of two. Each set controlled the legion for one day. The remaining four tribunes served as staff officers. Julius Caesar established a permanent commander of the legion and the tribunes served as a chief of staff and as an adjutant. The staffs in Caesar's legions contained supply officers, volunteer aides, orderlies, information collecting agencies, and engineers.{7}

The next significant era in staff development occurred in the 17th century. Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, the Father of Modern Warfare, established the staff system present in the Civil War. Gustavus separated the duties of the chief quartermaster from those of the chief commissary. The quartermaster was responsible for supplies, movement, and quartering of soldiers, and the chief commissary was responsible for distribution of provisions. Gustavus also echeloned staffs from regiments, brigades, and divisions to his own headquarters. The new judge advocate office separated the prosecution functions from the apprehension duties of the provost-marshal. The headquarters staff contained the same positions as the regimental headquarters with the inclusion of the chiefs from several combat support functions including artillery, engineers, and arms (ordnance).{8}

Prussia, England, and France studied and adopted Gustavus Adolphus' efficient organizations. England and France were the first to employ these staffs in the New World. George Washington, who served as a staff officer for the British forces in the colonies, used this experience when he built his staffs. General Friedrich Wilhelm Von Steuben, selected by General Washington to serve as the colonial army's inspector, added Prussian efficiency and discipline to the disorganized American staff. Von Steuben believed the primary duty of the staff was to relieve the commander from routine tasks so that he could concentrate on the employment of his combat forces, Washington's and Von Steuben's efforts to establish a permanent General Staff dissolved, along with the army, after the American Revolution.{9}

Washington continued to emphasize to Congress the need for a staff of high quality. In 1789 Congress established the Department of War which included adjutants, inspectors, quartermasters, paymasters, and surgeons. On 3 March 1797, the offices of Judge Advocate