A Political Philosophy in Public Life: Civic Republicanism in Zapatero's Spain

A POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN PUBLIC LIFE

A POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN PUBLIC LIFE

CIVIC REPUBLICANISM IN ZAPATERO’S SPAIN

JOSÉ LUIS MARTÍ

AND

PHILIP PETTIT

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS      PRINCETON AND OXFORD

Copyright © 2010 by Princeton University Press

Published by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540

In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, 6 Oxford Street, Woodstock, Oxfordshire OX20 1TW

press.princeton.edu

All Rights Reserved

Second printing, and first paperback printing, 2012

Paperback ISBN 978-0-691-15447-3

The Library of Congress has cataloged the cloth edition of this book as follows

Martí, José Luis, 1975–

A political philosophy in public life : civic republicanism in Zapatero’s Spain / José Luis Martí and Philip Pettit.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-691-14406-1 (hardcover : alk. paper)

1. Republicanism—Spain. 2. Rodríguez Zapatero, José Luis, 1960– 3. Spain—Politics and government—1982– I. Pettit, Philip, 1945– II. Title.

JN8210.M37    2010

320.01—dc22

British Library Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available

This book has been composed in Sabon

Printed on acid-free paper. ∞

Printed in the United States of America

3  5  7  9  10  8  6  4  2

CONTENTS

PREFACE

1 The Spanish Context

2 Civic Republican Theory

3 The Theory in Practice? Spain 2004–8

Appendix: Challenges and Queries

4 An Interview with Prime Minister Zapatero

5 Giving Philosophy a Public Life

NOTES

REFERENCES

INDEX

PREFACE

POLITICAL THEORY AND POLITICAL practice occupy different worlds, operating in spaces that are as discontinuous as the many universes postulated in science fiction or string theory. And yet wormholes occasionally open between those spaces, providing temporary portals and creating the possibility of some traffic across the divide. This book is an attempt to record one such opening and to reflect on its more general significance.

After his election to the leadership of the Spanish socialist party in 2000, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero decided to explore academic philosophies in order to systematize his ideas for renewing his social democratic view of government. For a variety of reasons he settled on a formulation in terms provided by the tradition of civic republicanism, thereby connecting his philosophy of politics with a classical European heritage. Philip Pettit’s book, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government, had just appeared in Spanish, and over the years that followed Zapatero and his allies in the party used it to develop the platform that they took into the 2004 election.

Mr. Zapatero won that election and soon afterward invited Pettit to give a lecture in Madrid on the civic republican view of government. This Pettit did in July 2004, outlining the central ideas in the republican approach and enumerating the challenges that Zapatero would have to face if he were to stick to the program. In his reply the prime minister insisted that he would be faithful to the program and, in token of his sincerity, publicly invited Pettit to assess the fidelity of his government to republican principles prior to the 2008 election. Pettit presented his review in a lecture that he gave in Madrid three years later, in June 2007.

The review appears as chapter 3 of this book, where it is filled out by responses to various queries that were raised among Spanish commentators and critics; these form an appendix to the chapter. The first of the two chapters that lead up to the review provides a full account of how the Spanish socialist party came to embrace civic republicanism and the second gives an outline of civic republican theory. The fourth chapter, immediately following the review, presents an extended interview with Prime Minister Zapatero on questions related to his program. And then the fifth and final chapter provides some general reflections on what is required for a political philosophy to be available for practical employment, indicating the strengths of civic republicanism in this regard. A Spanish book, Examen a Zapatero, which appeared shortly before the March 2008 election, included chapters 3 and 4 of this book together with a shorter, earlier version of chapter 2 (Pettit 2008).

The review of Zapatero’s government is positive, finding that the intense program of legislation implemented in his first term in power fits extremely well with the desiderata that civic republicans highlight. There is no way of proving that the policies implemented were enacted for explicitly republican reasons, since we have no detailed information on how arguments transpired in party back rooms. But if Zapatero is to be taken at his word, and if the tenor of his public rhetoric is to be believed, then the fit between the policies he adopted and the principles of civic republicanism is hardly an accident.

Prime Minister Zapatero was returned to office in the election of March 2008 but we make no attempt in this book to explore how far he has remained faithful to the civic republican commitments he adopted in his first term. Since economic fortunes have now taken a severe downturn in Spain, as in the world at large, the best we may hope for in the short run is that he will at least consolidate the reforms that were put in place. He committed himself to doing this at the plenary congress of his party, the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), in July 2008.

Nor does the book attempt to review legislation that occurred in the final months of Zapatero’s first term in government. The main casualty here is the Law of Historical Memory, which was passed by the Spanish parliament and signed into law on October 31, 2007. This law reverses the agreement to bury the past that was an implicit part of the post-Franco settlement. It recognizes the victims of both sides in the Civil War and under Franco’s regime but otherwise seeks to redress the balance of historical memory in favor of the opposition to Franco. Thus it denies legitimacy to Francoist laws and trials, prohibits political events at his burial place in the Valley of the Fallen, and provides state help for the exhumation of his victims (Treglown 2009).

It should be of some interest for readers to see what the Zapatero government achieved in its first term and that is one reason for wanting to publish this book. But we also hope that the book will be of interest for more general and perhaps more enduring reasons. We are committed to the civic republican research program in political philosophy, and we see this book as contributing to reflection on what that program requires in institutional terms. Those with similar commitments, or those with an interest in interrogating the claims of civic republicanism, may find the book worthwhile for similar reasons. We also hope that the book may offer some stimulus for thinking about the general connection between political theory and political practice—and about how far theory can or should seek to be nonutopian—since it offers a case study in how linkages may be forged.

The bulk of the book was prepared in the academic year 2008–9, when José Luis Martí was a Laurance S. Rockefeller Visiting Fellow at the University Center for Human Values at Princeton. This fellowship gave us the opportunity to work closely together and we are grateful to Princeton University for making it possible. We are also grateful to many friends and colleagues who have helped us through various stages of preparation. Those to whom we are separately indebted are mentioned in two notes at the beginning of chapters 1 and 3, respectively. Those to whom we are jointly indebted include David Casassas, Robert Fishman, Philipp Koralus, Victoria McGeer, Jan Werner Muller, Amalia Amaya Navarro, Águeda Quiroga, and Fernando Vallespín. We have learned a great deal from some communications with William Chislett, author of a regular newsletter for the Real Instituto Elcano (Chislett 2004–9)—these newsletters figure prominently in our references—and of a recent book on Spain (Chislett 2008). We were productively challenged by exchanges with Pedro J. Ramírez, Felipe Sahagún, and other El Mundo colleagues. And we benefited from an exchange with Prime Minister Zapatero, and from separate exchanges with Minister Moratinos, as well as ex-Ministers Aguilar and Caldera, in the wake of the review. Perhaps our greatest debt is to José Andrés Torres Mora, a member of the Spanish Parliament and an adviser to Zapatero; he has been a constant source of information, advice, and encouragement. Special thanks are owed to Julie Scales, who patiently and efficiently proofread chapter 1 and helped to translate the interview with Zapatero, and to the readers of the manuscript for Princeton University Press who passed on a wealth of useful feedback. Finally, we must record our gratitude to Ian Malcolm of Princeton University Press whose support for the venture was essential both in its genesis and in its completion.

A POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN PUBLIC LIFE

1

THE SPANISH CONTEXT

JOSÉ LUIS MARTÍ

¹

JOSÉ LUIS RODRÍGUEZ ZAPATERO, prime minister of Spain,² has affirmed on several occasions that he endorses and is inspired by the political philosophy of civic republicanism, and specifically by the work of Philip Pettit. As Zapatero has stated: this modern political philosophy called republicanism … is very important nourishment to what we want for our country (Prego 2001, 166). Consequently, both civic republicanism and Pettit’s name have been present in the Spanish media and debates in recent years, being widely and critically discussed by both the Left and the Right. José Andrés Torres Mora, one of Zapatero’s closest advisers, who is also a sociologist and deputy in the Spanish Congress, describes Pettit’s influence in these terms: Philip Pettit provided us with the appropriate grammar to furnish our political intuitions, to express the kind of proposals and dreams we had in mind for Spain. Pettit’s republicanism has been our north star (Torres Mora 2008).

This is the first time in recent history, to my knowledge, that any political leader has unambiguously embraced civic republicanism. Some obvious questions raised then are: Why did Zapatero commit himself to such a political philosophy just after his 2000 election as Secretary General of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español or PSOE)? Why did Zapatero feel the need to engage a concrete political philosophy? And why has Pettit’s theory been considered important nourishment, the appropriate grammar, and the north star for Zapatero’s policies in Spain? These are some of the questions I am going to address in the present chapter, as I rehearse the main events in the history of Zapatero’s Spain relative to his endorsement of such a political philosophy.³ The chapter will set the scene for the rest of the book, particularly for chapters 3 and 4.

Zapatero’s commitment might be surprising to many people—as surprising as it was in Spain in 2000. Yet it made sense in the context of the new millennium. After three decades of neoliberal dominance and the random mixing of neoliberal ideas with more traditional social democratic commitments, as in the case of Tony Blair’s Third Way, social democracy was faced with an ideological crisis. In this impoverished context, civic republicanism (or civicism, as Pettit has also called it) has obvious attractions as a way of grounding social democracy. It is based on the value of freedom, offering a normative philosophy that challenges neoliberalism or libertarianism in its own preferred terms.⁴ In endorsing civic republicanism, Zapatero opposed libertarianism and rightwing liberalism more generally, as well as the Third Way and other philosophical ways of rethinking social democracy. He opted for a modest but powerful new foundation for the Left.

In what follows I shall speak frequently of the civic republican ideal of freedom as nondomination. The notion is fully explained in chapter 2, but it may be useful to offer a brief characterization here. Freedom as nondomination is contrasted, in Pettit’s work, with freedom as noninterference. Two points explain the contrast. First, you may enjoy freedom as nondomination and yet suffer some interference, such as the interference of coercive law. That sort of interference will not reduce your freedom to the extent that the law is under your control as a member of the citizenry and does not impose an alien will: it is nonarbitrary, to use a favorite republican phrase. But, as you may suffer interference without being dominated so, to go to the second point of contrast, you may be dominated—you may be subject to the will of others—without suffering any actual interference. This will happen to the extent that others can impose their will, should they take against your pattern of choice, but do not do so because of being content with your choices. What you choose in such a situation, you choose by their leave. It may be sheer luck that you do not attract their interference, and that you enjoy their leave to choose as you do, or it may be the product of a self-censoring strategy; you may shape your choices so as to keep them sweet.

Subjection to the arbitrary will of others is exemplified in Roman tradition by the position of the servant or servus in relation to the master or dominus; hence the talk of freedom as nondomination. The ideal of freedom as nondomination raises a dual challenge for the state. The state should provide protection against the private forms of domination that people may suffer as a result of disadvantage in any resources, legal, educational, financial, contractual, or cultural. Yet at the same time the state should be nondominating in how it relates to its people, giving them constitutionally and democratically mediated control over the policies and initiatives it adopts. It will have to interfere in their economic and other affairs in order to provide protection against domination, but the interference should be subject to popular control in a way that makes it nonarbitrary.

This ideal had strong appeal for Mr. Zapatero, as the interview in chapter 4 makes clear. It means that freedom is deeply connected with equality on the one hand, and with democracy on the other. As we shall see, Mr. Zapatero makes frequent reference to this ideal of freedom, presenting it not as something that thrives in the absence of government, but as an ideal that requires both the engagement of government in people’s lives, and people’s active contestation and vigilance. One particular aspect of the civic republican tradition that obviously caught Mr. Zapatero’s attention was the eyeball test to which Pettit had drawn attention in his book (1997, 166; see also chapter 2 in this volume). According to this test you enjoy freedom in relation to others—to a particular other or to others as represented in a group or in a government—only insofar as you can look them in the eye, without fear or deference, with a shared consciousness of this equal status. You can command the respect of others and enjoy the dignity of an equal among equals.

POLITICAL BACKGROUND

Spain has had two different socialist prime ministers in its recent democratic history: Felipe González and José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero,⁵ both from the Partido Socialista Obrero Español.⁶ Felipe González led the country for almost fourteen years, from 1982 to 1996, following a classic social democratic ideology, at least during his first three terms.⁷ His popularity and charisma made it possible for him to win four consecutive elections.⁸ Among his achievements, the most noteworthy are the consolidation of democracy, his contribution to the development of a nascent welfare state in Spain,⁹ the modernization of the country, and Spain’s entry to the European Economic Community (now the European Union) in 1986 and to NATO in 1988. His excellent connections with European leaders, especially with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the President of the French Republic François Mitterrand, aided in positioning Spain on the international forefront, making it more respected and better known around the world. But not all was well and good. A number of serious grievances contributed to an unpleasant and bitter end to González’ political life. There was harsh opposition from Spanish labor unions, giving rise to several general strikes, some serious episodes of institutional corruption which came to light mainly during his last term, a public charge of collusion or even complicity with state terrorism directed mainly against the ETA (the Basque terrorist group),¹⁰ and a highly controversial privatization of the major public industrial and energy companies.

In 1996, in his fifth election since he was elected in 1982 (his seventh election in total), González was defeated by José María Aznar, who had brought new life to the Partido Popular (PP), the main center-right party in Spain.¹¹ However, because González still maintained a certain degree of popularity, the PP was able to capture only 39% of the votes, just one point ahead of the PSOE, giving Aznar, once elected, a tiny majority in the Congress of Deputies. This obliged him to negotiate in order to reach agreements with other parliamentary groups, mainly the Basque and Catalan nationalist parties, to be elected as prime minister and to pass the government’s legislative initiatives.¹² This situation probably explains why Aznar’s first term was a period of slight reform and smooth transition. But Aznar led the PP to a second and much greater victory in 2000, winning 44% of the votes, ten points ahead of the PSOE, and obtaining an (absolute) majority of deputies. This strengthened his government and allowed him to rule freely and implement his agenda.

Helped by the creation of the main right-wing think tank in Spain, FAES, the PP in the Aznar era held two basic ideological allegiances: libertarianism and Catholic conservatism.¹³ On the one hand, Aznar openly admired the way Ronald Reagan’s and Margaret Thatcher’s governments had applied neoliberal or libertarian ideas, deregulating markets and abstaining from intervention in a manner favored by the right-wing liberals in his party. On the other hand, Aznar maintained strong ties to conservative Spanish circles and identified with the American neoconservative movement connected with George W. Bush; indeed he became one of Bush’s closest international friends and allies. As I will explain later, one of Aznar’s most contested political decisions during his second term was to engage Spain in the second war in Iraq.¹⁴ The most applauded achievements were the good macroeconomic indicators—a much lower unemployment rate, a zero budget deficit, very low inflation—the privatization of the last large state-owned companies, and the introduction of several tax cuts.

All this background is relevant because, as I will explain soon, one of Zapatero’s first priorities was to differentiate himself from both González and Aznar. The PSOE was suffering a serious crisis in the post-González years, basically due to a lack of clear and unitary leadership.¹⁵ There were several internal divisions in the party that finally crystallized after the PSOE’s huge electoral defeat on March 12, 2000.¹⁶ A few months later, at the thirty-fifth PSOE conference, the party had to elect a new secretary general, and there was a common perception that a complete renewal was required. Different groups in the party presented their own candidates: namely, José Bono, representing the traditional aparato still influenced by González; Matilde Fernández, representing the reformista sector; Rosa Díez, then a deputy in the European Parliament and a very well-known Basque politician; and José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, supported by a recently constituted minority group Nueva Vía (New Way), formed by young members of the PSOE who had not taken part in any of González’ governments.¹⁷ Zapatero had been a deputy in congress since 1989—when he was only 26—and had been very active there, but he was practically unknown at that time to Spaniards, and even to his own party. Despite his outsider status in the race, however, he won the election.¹⁸

Once elected as secretary general on July 23, 2000, Zapatero gave his first address to the party conference, expressing some hopeful substantive commitments and previewing his personal style; both things would characterize his political performance later. For this reason, the speech deserves some attention here. The substantive commitments endorsed can be reduced to the values of freedom and democracy, and they were complemented by a personal style that emphasized the virtues of dialogue and a good mood or disposition. But perhaps the most important idea underlying the whole address was the necessity of change: change for the party itself and change for Spanish society as a whole.¹⁹ Zapatero, as the new socialist leader, needed to differentiate himself from González and from an administration that had left a legacy of corruption scandals, suspicions of connivance with state terrorism, high unemployment rates, and economic crisis.

In this context Zapatero flew solo: "beyond today, we have a lot of things to do, a lot of things to live. The best part of our lives is not in our backpack, in our past; the best day in our lives is still to come" (Rodríguez Zapatero 2000).²⁰ There was to be change, then, but not abrupt and disruptive change: "you have clearly demanded a change and I am decisively committing myself to make it possible. But don’t forget, don’t ever forget, that it must always be a tempered change" (Rodríguez Zapatero 2000).²¹

The two substantive fundamental values expressed in this speech were participatory, deliberative democracy and freedom, and in his view they were related to each other as well as to solidarity. This meant a departure from the usual ideological discourse in González’ PSOE, which had focused more centrally on equality. The new departure was present in Zapatero’s view, even before he had explicitly endorsed civic republicanism:

We are going to deepen democracy: more participation, more transparency, but also more responsibility because democracy is precisely the free reflection of the people’s will…. We want, therefore, an active and cohesive democracy … a democracy that has recovered the value of the citizenry and strengthens the commitment of all. This is what defines us [the socialists], this is what distinguishes us: our