Winning the War: Advanced Weapons, Strategies, and Concepts for the Post-9/11 World

PROLOGUE

What they really fear is a weak America.

—Caspar Weinberger

WE HAVE SOME PLANES. With startling clarity that simple phrase punctuated the dark shadows that had been gathering for decades. It ushered in the formal beginning of a new kind of war. Uttered from the bloodied cockpit of American Airlines Flight 11 on that fateful September morn—a day that would from that time forward be known simply as 9/11—these words signaled the onset of an asymmetric response to America’s military power. But the terrorists would soon live to regret their actions. Ultimatum—was President George W. Bush’s succinct and poignant answer for a nation infuriated.

When war came in Desert Storm, the deadly efficiency of American-led coalition forces astounded all military analysts around the world. Few doubted that Western technology would be triumphant, but the battle succeeded beyond their wildest imagination. In mere minutes over the night skies of Iraq American Army and Air Force pilots established air superiority. Within four hours they had air supremacy, meaning they could fly at will with total impunity. Given the devastating defeat of Iraqi forces, most people have forgotten that Saddam’s air defense system was far from third-rate. Rather, as Iraq was a client state of the former Soviet Union its forces contained their state-of-the-art equipment. A few Iraqi pilots launched to challenge the fighter aircraft of the unified forces. Quickly they and their comrades learned an unforgiving lesson. You fly—you die.

The target list had been carefully developed under the insightful guidance of Air Force Colonel John Warden based on his five-ring model for defeating an enemy.¹ Next the command and control structure was systematically destroyed, followed by attacks against critical elements of the infrastructure. In short order Baghdad could not communicate with the troops in the field and the supply lines were cut off. Instant Thunder, Colonel Warden’s plan to conduct parallel attacks with precision guided weapons against the enemy’s centers of gravity, was executed with paralyzing effectiveness. In the first twenty-four hours of bombing, the air campaign took out more key targets than in any year of saturation aerial attacks during World War II.

Six weeks later, the ground campaign began delivering equal punishment. In less than 100 hours the battle was over. Iraqi armor that had held the Iranian forces at bay for eight years was no match for the swift-moving Abrams M-1 tanks that unexpectedly appeared out of the vast unnavigable desert. Shooting on the move with deadly accuracy, the M-1s, supported by attack helicopters and A-10 Warthogs, shredded the prepared defenses sending the Iraqi Army fleeing for their lives.

Desert Storm had a predictable downside. Thanks to the modern news media, pictures of the carnage were instantly available all around the world. Those countries that had been equipped by the Soviets knew they could not compete against American technology. The message to potential adversaries was quite clear: You don’t want to fight the United States and its allies in open battle and on our terms. Thus it is reasonable to assume that the attacks of 9/11 have a causal relationship with our technologically overwhelming success in Desert Storm.

In many ways the United States has been slow to learn the fundamental lessons pertaining to application of power. There was no doubt about our technological superiority in Vietnam—yet we lost the war when we lost the political will to continue. While Desert Storm was a stunning military victory, a decade later Saddam Hussein was still in power and thumbing his nose at everyone. Technology alone is not the answer.

Worse yet was the improper employment of the military during the Clinton years. Simultaneous with the military services’ being crippled through excessive budget cuts, they were sent off on missions forty-six times during 1992 through 1999. That was far more frequently than the sixteen commitments during the entire Cold War. For the most part the interactions were ineffective, and sometimes they were counterproductive. Probably the single worst example was the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia following an ill-fated raid by Army Rangers and Delta Force members designed to capture the uncontrolled warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid. Disaster came as the direct result of poor policy decisions by the White House and secretary of defense that failed to provide adequate support for the missions assigned. The story became well known through Mark Bowden’s stunningly accurate book Black Hawk Down² and was further popularized through director Ridley Scott’s graphic depiction of events in the movie of the same name. The troops performed admirably. Irresponsible civilian leadership failed them.

As a result of the decision to withdraw by then-President Clinton, tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of people would die because of reluctance to place U.S. troops in harm’s way. With minimal force, genocide in Rwanda could have been curtailed, a decision Clinton would publicly apologize for years later in a trip to Africa. At the time, we sat by until the pictures of bodies floating down the rivers became unbearable. As the situation in the Balkans deteriorated, policy makers again wavered while ethnic cleansing went unchallenged. Eventually it was decided to enter into a marginally nugatory air campaign—one in which politicians of various nationalities, more concerned with correctness than military effectiveness, determined targets.

During the same period, known terrorist organizations were becoming bolder. The response of the United States to various attacks was to lob cruise missiles toward suspected encampments. The effects were to unnecessarily deplete our supply of critical munitions while convincing our adversaries that we were afraid to engage them on the ground. With constrained budgets, no new contracts were established to replenish missile stocks and our active-duty military forces were drawn down to an unacceptably low level.

Concomitantly, the intelligence community was both reduced in strength and politicized. After an academician was chosen as Director of Central Intelligence, reporting bad news was not viewed as career-enhancing and the old hands left in large numbers. In the aftermath of 9/11 it would be learned that an opportunity to eliminate known terrorist Osama bin Laden years earlier had been turned down by the State Department. We would also learn that the clues to prevent the attack were available. There was just no one to piece the puzzle together.

Despite misuse and abuse by the leadership of the Executive Branch, the military did maintain some sense of direction and improvements in technology. Advances were made in precision guidance and sensor systems while the intelligence community struggled to stay abreast in communications technology that made collection increasingly difficult.

Following 9/11 came President Bush’s declaration of a War on Terror and the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom.³ The first major objective was to remove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan and to attack the al Qaeda terrorist network that operated safely from the mountain complexes near Pakistan. It took a month to establish the necessary political alliances for basing and overflight rights. That time was also needed to position the logistical support and aircraft required to initiate a substantial air campaign.

At the forefront of the action inside Afghanistan were various elements of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). Operating in small units, special operations forces (SOF) were trained to function behind enemy lines, develop and coordinate guerrilla forces, and conduct direct action strikes against designated targets. Worthy of note is the fact that during the massive reductions of conventional units in the 1990s USSOCOM remained relatively level in personnel and funding. However, like other units they had been constantly committed for the past decade, and it was not unusual for some element of the command to be active in more than 150 countries in any given year.

It was a combination of special operations forces and airpower that was responsible for the apparent quick victory in Afghanistan. It was fortunate that most of the opposing Afghan forces chose to switch rather than fight. Being on the winning side is an old tradition in that part of the world. Most analysts overlooked the bad news—that these Afghans would switch back should that be to their advantage. Further, each tribe came with separate agendas, and not all were commensurate with creation of a national government. The best news for Americans was that U.S. casualties were extremely low. Unfortunately, more were killed and wounded due to misguided friendly ordnance than by enemy action. The big fights forecast for strongholds never materialized; a harbinger of changes in protocols in conflicts yet to come.

The other good news for the United States was that we did not have to place large ground forces in the theater. The reality is that except for Marine Expeditionary units and a few light Army elements, we could not have introduced a significant force into Afghanistan—certainly not an armored capability such as that of Desert Storm. First, we don’t have them. Second, and more significant, you can’t get there from here. Strategic lift capability is the long pole in every deployment plan.

Military forces aside, the composition of the new adversaries has dictated new objectives—ones that focus efforts on soft infrastructure targets in areas populated with noncombatants. In initiating the War on Terror, President Bush said this would be a new kind of war. He was correct, but it remains to be determined how the parameters are defined and whether we have the intestinal fortitude to prosecute such a conflict. It will cause us to take actions for which we have criticized others when they were faced with similar situations. Definition of the conflict is a nontrivial issue and one that is still in question. The determination of this president is detailed in Bob Woodward’s book Bush at War.⁴ It remains to be determined if he and the American people will see it through.

In my view we have slipped into World War X. I call it WWX because no one knows with certainty how many global conflicts have occurred and there is academic debate about how the Cold War should be viewed. This new war will be fought along the lines of belief systems, not merely nation-states. Pres. George W. Bush’s idea of Axis of Evil falls short both geographically and conceptually. As an attempt to classify easily identifiable adversaries, it does not adequately accommodate the complexity of terrorism. Rather, it calls to account known adversaries that can safely evoke hatred in many Americans. It also reflects a politically correct view that all religions can accommodate the coexistence of differing belief systems and still function in a world that is dependent on worldwide trade and economic interests.

Unfortunately, the world is not that simple. While 9/11 was what futurist John Peterson calls a punctuation in history, it is only one of many events that will embroil us in a global conflict. The apparent military success in Afghanistan may disperse al Qaeda leadership temporarily, but it does little to address the underlying causes that allowed this network to gestate and flourish. Obsession with being politically correct will lead to failure and the deaths of many innocent civilians. There is hope provided we act decisively. However, those actions will call for uncompromising use of force and will also take the lives of noncombatants. The existing laws of war will be challenged and found to be inadequate.

America will be forced to make some very tough choices. If this is done with sufficient courage and foresight national survival is possible and our allies will also benefit from our position of strength. Dalliance will create an inextricable morass—one from which it will be difficult to emerge with our existing quality of life and concomitant civil liberties.

It is already incisively clear that America will have to act unilaterally in many cases if our national interests are to be protected. Alliances are transient and the United States is nearly unique in having transformed a heterogeneous population into a unified nation. In most areas of the world true allegiance stops at family, community, or possibly tribal borders. Nations are transient useful myths created for economic expediency, delineated by cartographers and warlords, and perpetuated by those seeking to obtain and project power.

Now emerges a true paradox for defense. As we are disproportionate users of natural resources, particularly energy, there is a need to simultaneously develop expanded ties in foreign economies while protecting the vulnerable infrastructure required to support our way of life. Those opposed to globalization view the United States as a voracious consumer, one that exploits weaker developing countries to support unsustainable growth. Developing nations will compete for those same resources, thus exacerbating an inevitable clash of cultures. While some propose that humans will spontaneously evolve as spiritually motivated beings, the evidence against that likelihood is overwhelming. Therefore, we are faced with the probability that use of force will become essential but that a deterrent capability will allow us to retain sovereignty while balancing our responsibilities to assist in the evolution of the rest of the world.

This book will provide an understanding of evolving weapons systems and concepts to be employed across the spectrum of conflict and beyond. The thesis accounts for a totally integrated approach that considers the intricate interrelationships between national security and global interests in the environment, social advancement in health and education enmeshed in reciprocal economy. It will call for judiciousness in use of force when such is prudent. This will address the significant advances that have occurred in non-lethal weapons since the writing of my previous book, Future War. It will expound on the ability to deliver overwhelming force on demand, including the ability to place U.S. forces on the ground quickly and safely and then sustain them for the duration of the operation. At the same time, it will explore the protection necessary to defeat asymmetric attacks against our infrastructure. And finally, it will propose that we unilaterally place weapons in space that will guarantee national security when speed and assurance of destruction are needed. Given the politically correct aversion to space-based missile defense assets, these technologically viable proposals will alter the way you view space.

The thing that people around the world are always talking about is a too strong America and all that. What they really fear is a weak America. Caspar Weinberger, during an interview with Larry King following 9/11, spoke those words.⁵ They are correct. Now we address what to do about it.

PART I

THE TOOLS OF WAR

THUNDER ROLLED ACROSS THE Arabian Peninsula, and in the wake of Desert Storm lay strewn a scene of unparalleled carnage. Seemingly invincible, American Forces had defeated a relatively sophisticated and experienced adversary. The ease and swiftness with which Iraq fell astonished all observers. Countries that relied on matériel from the former Soviet Union now knew their defenses were no match for Western forces.

The expensive arms buildup of the Reagan years had paid off handsomely. First, incapable of matching the combination of economic power and advanced strategic weapons systems, the Soviet Union hand crumbled and imploded. Now the superiority of Western technology employed in conventional combat was proven unequivocally. Air defenses were neutralized in hours. The combat-tested Iraqi Air Force fell from the skies every time they attempted to engage coalition forces. Even survival dashes to Iran frequently ended tragically. On the ground Iraq’s expansive armored forces were systematically decimated. The thoroughly disheartened troops surrendered to the advancing army so fast that handling the vast numbers was a considerable problem.

From the video game–like qualities of pictures recorded by combat cameras the press coined the phrase Nintendo War. Spectacular displays of remotely designated precision-guided rounds destroying their targets captivated audiences. The night sky over Baghdad blossomed with antiaircraft rounds fired in futility as stealth fighters flew with impunity and ravaged Saddam’s command and control infrastructure.

While both the military and weapons developers rejoiced over the efficiency of their modern weapons, shortcomings, usually not reported on television, were noted. Laser-guided bombs occasionally lost lock and went astray due to interference from clouds or smoke rising from earlier strikes. Terrain-following cruise missiles failed to locate targets because bombs had destroyed tall buildings that would have provided key markers. Satellites did not provide the continuous coverage desired by field commanders. Of most concern was the ratio of casualties accidentally inflicted from the air on ground forces of the United States and its allies. Clearly, there was work to be done.

The need for better non-lethal weapons was confirmed by troops involved in a myriad of peace support operations. The Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD) had harvested the low-hanging fruit of simple systems that could be quickly provided. Now it was time to explore more advanced technology.

This part of the book will provide an overview of the full range of weapons entering the American arsenal. In keeping with the premise that all of these weapons concern pragmatic application of force, we will range from non-lethal to hyperlethal systems needed to vanquish the wide array of threats now proliferating.

CHAPTER ONE

PHASERS ON STUN

EVER SINCE DISCUSSION OF nonlethal weapons began, the analogy with the world-famous Star Trek weapons has been pandemic. Captain James T. Kirk’s line Phasers on Stun has been repeated as both headlines and in the text of most articles about these systems.¹ To be sure, the Phaser, with its ability to temporarily incapacitate sentient beings, destroy materials it strikes, and kill only if necessary, would be an ideal weapon. Of course, it uncannily allows 100 percent recovery of the targets for which the stun setting is selected. The Phaser is small, light, and versatile and holds seemingly infinite energy. Unfortunately, it doesn’t exist. But that does not mean that attempts are not being made to develop such a system. Even if some pretty advanced thinking is perfected, the handheld weapon is a long way