



Plenary sitting

**B10-0028/2024 }
B10-0031/2024 }
B10-0033/2024 }
B10-0036/2024 }
B10-0039/2024 }**

RC1

18.9.2024

JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

pursuant to Rule 136(2) and (4) of the Rules of Procedure

replacing the following motions:

B10-0028/2024 (Verts/ALE)

B10-0031/2024 (S&D)

B10-0033/2024 (Renew)

B10-0036/2024 (PPE)

B10-0039/2024 (ECR)

on continued financial and military support to Ukraine by EU Member States
(2024/2799(RSP))

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PE762.623v01-00 } RC1

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on behalf of the PPE Group

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on behalf of the S&D Group

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European Parliament resolution on continued financial and military support to Ukraine by EU Member States (2024/2799(RSP))

The European Parliament,

- having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and Russia since 1 March 2022, in particular that of 17 July 2024 on the need for the EU’s continuous support for Ukraine¹,
 - having regard to the Charter of the United Nations, the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions and the additional protocols thereto, and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
 - having regard to the report of 14 February 2024 by the World Bank, the Government of Ukraine, the European Commission and the United Nations, entitled ‘Ukraine – Third Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA3) February 2022 – December 2023’,
 - having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/792 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Ukraine Facility²,
 - having regard to the European Council conclusions and the Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine of 12 July 2023,
 - having regard to the joint security commitments between the European Union and Ukraine of 27 June 2024,
 - having regard to the statement by the foreign ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom of 10 September 2024 on Iran’s transfer of ballistic missiles to Russia,
 - having regard to NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept,
 - having regard to Rule 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,
- A. whereas Russia has been carrying out an illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine since 24 February 2022, in continuation of previous aggressions perpetrated since 2014, including the annexation of Crimea and the subsequent occupation of parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and it continues to persistently violate the principles of the UN Charter through its aggressions against the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine and to blatantly and grossly violate international humanitarian law, as established by the Geneva Conventions of 1949;
- B. whereas the UN General Assembly, in its resolution of 2 March 2022, immediately qualified the Russian war against Ukraine as an act of aggression in violation of

¹ Texts adopted, P10_TA(2024)0003.

² OJ L, 2024/792, 29.2.2024, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/792/oj>.

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and, in its resolution of 14 November 2022, recognised the need to hold the Russian Federation accountable for its war of aggression and legally and financially responsible for its internationally wrongful acts, including through reparations for the injuries and damage caused;

- C. whereas the International Criminal Court (ICC) has issued several arrest warrants for Russian officials responsible for the war crimes of directing attacks against civilian objects, unlawfully deporting the population and unlawfully transferring the population from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation, to the detriment of Ukrainian children; whereas in September 2024, Mongolia failed to execute the ICC's arrest warrant against Vladimir Putin;
- D. whereas Ukraine and its citizens have shown unwavering determination in successfully defending their country, despite the high cost in civilian and military casualties; whereas Russia's forces continue to carry out systematic and indiscriminate attacks against residential areas and civilian infrastructure in Ukraine, resulting in the deaths of thousands of Ukrainian civilians, forced deportations and disappearances, including those of children, along with illegal imprisonments and torture of Ukrainian citizens, executions of civilians, soldiers and prisoners of war, and acts of terror throughout the country, including the use of sexual violence and mass rape as a weapon of war; whereas millions of Ukrainians continue to be displaced inside and outside Ukraine, having fled from Russia's aggression;
- E. whereas since 24 August 2024 Russia has been carrying out its most intense aerial bombardment campaign yet against Ukraine, launching large numbers of ballistic missiles, glide bombs, drones and other weapons against Kharkiv, Kyiv, Poltava, Sumy, Odesa and Lviv, where a recent drone and missile attack killed seven civilians just 70 km from the Polish border; whereas Russia has effectively damaged or destroyed up to 80 % of the country's energy infrastructure, which risks creating a severe humanitarian crisis in Ukraine during the coming winter months; whereas such systematic attacks constitute war crimes under international law;
- F. whereas Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced that a Russian missile had hit a bulk carrier carrying wheat in the Black Sea bound for Egypt on 12 September 2024, making food security a renewed target; whereas Russian drones and missiles targeting Ukraine are increasingly violating EU and NATO airspace, putting citizens in our eastern regions at risk;
- G. whereas the humanitarian situation in Ukraine, especially near the front lines, has become increasingly critical; whereas, according to the UN, recent Russian attacks on critical civilian infrastructure have left tens of thousands of Ukrainians without essential services and more than 14.6 million people, around 40 % of the Ukrainian population, will need humanitarian aid in 2024; whereas the intensified hostilities in Kharkivska Oblast in May also caused the largest displacement in Ukraine since 2023; whereas, owing to a funding shortfall, the UN reports that humanitarian aid workers are currently unable to fully meet critical needs in the country; whereas the prolongation of the conflict will result in persisting and worsening urgent needs in the coming months;

whereas the destruction of infrastructure in Ukraine is having disastrous consequences for the health of women, who are often doing the nursing, medical and care work;

- H. whereas Hungary issued a decree in breach of the Temporary Protection Directive³, cancelling state-funded shelter for refugees from western Ukraine, leaving many, the majority women and children, homeless;
- I. whereas the latest estimate in the joint Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA3) released by the Government of Ukraine, the World Bank Group, the Commission and the United Nations is that as of 31 December 2023 the total cost of reconstruction and recovery in Ukraine will amount to at least USD 486 billion over the next decade, up from USD 411 billion estimated one year ago;
- J. whereas the EU and its Member States have thus far contributed more than EUR 100 billion in financial, humanitarian, refugee and military assistance to Ukraine; whereas the EU provided over EUR 25 billion of macro-financial support to Ukraine in 2022 and 2023 and has established the Ukraine Facility, a dedicated financial instrument that will allow it to provide Ukraine with up to EUR 50 billion in predictable and flexible financial support from 2024 to 2027; whereas the EU made its first regular payment of approximately EUR 4.2 billion under the newly established Ukraine facility in July 2024; whereas this payment follows the previous bridge and pre-financing support, totalling EUR 12.2 billion since the establishment of the Facility in March 2024;
- K. whereas Russia has substantially increased its own military spending and production in 2024; whereas Russia is also using Belarus's ammunition stockpile and relying on the military support of several countries, primarily Iran and North Korea; whereas there are reports indicating that China is providing Russia with substantial assistance to bolster its military capabilities, extending beyond dual-use technologies; whereas according to governmental sources Iran has recently transferred shipments of Fath-360 close-range ballistic missiles to Russia; whereas France, Germany and the United Kingdom have announced a new set of sanctions against Iran;
- L. whereas the EU and its Member States, together with international partners and NATO allies, continue providing military support to Ukraine in order to assist it in exercising its legitimate right to self-defence against Russia's war of aggression in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter; whereas the EU Military Assistance Mission to Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine), has trained about 60 000 members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to date in both combined arms training and specialised training; whereas NATO will ensure an annual financial contribution to Ukraine of EUR 40 billion;
- M. whereas there continues to be a low level of military aid both in terms of quality and quantity and a delay in actual delivery of weapons and ammunition to Ukraine after

³ Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof, OJ L 212, 7.8.2001, p. 12, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2001/55/oj>.

delivery decisions are taken; whereas many Member States are not meeting their pledges and some leading contributors have even announced plans to significantly cut their contribution to military aid for Ukraine in 2025; whereas the EU has decided to use the windfall profits from frozen assets of the Central Bank of Russia to support Ukraine, in particular for additional military assistance; whereas no legal framework has been established for the effective capture and redistribution of capital gains from frozen Russian assets;

- N. whereas, in addition, Hungary is blocking both the newly established EUR 5 billion Ukraine Assistance Fund (UAF) set up in March 2024 within the European Peace Facility (EPF) and the eighth tranche of EPF reimbursements for Member States that delivered military aid to Ukraine over more than 18 months;
- O. whereas since February 2022 the EU has adopted 14 packages of European sanctions aimed at undermining Russia's ability to wage its illegal war of aggression;
- P. whereas EU Member States continue to purchase fossil fuels and uranium from Russia, contributing to the Russian economy and bolstering its war chest; whereas sales of Russian fossil fuels to the EU since the outbreak of the full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine have exceeded EUR 200 billion, which is double that of the total funding provided to Ukraine over the same period; whereas the EU has granted an exemption for Russian crude oil imported through the Druzhba pipeline to Hungary, Slovakia, and Czechia; whereas increased Russian gas imports by Azerbaijan are a cause for concern about Azerbaijan's role as an alternative gas supplier instead of Russia, as Baku, unable to meet European demand, may relabel Russian gas as Azerbaijani for European consumption;
- 1. Condemns, in the strongest possible terms, Russia's continued war of aggression against Ukraine, and the involvement of Belarus in this war, and demands that Russia immediately terminate all military activities in Ukraine, unconditionally withdraw all forces and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine and compensate Ukraine for the damage caused to its people, land, nature and infrastructure;
- 2. Expresses its undivided solidarity with the people of Ukraine, along with its full support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders, and underlines that this war of aggression constitutes a blatant and flagrant violation of the UN Charter and the fundamental principles of international law; reiterates its support for the commitments of the EU and its Member States to provide humanitarian assistance, military support, economic and financial aid and political support in every possible way until Ukraine's victory in order to ultimately stop Russia's war of aggression and allow Ukraine to liberate all its people and re-establish full control within its internationally recognised borders; stresses that the ultimate goal remains to achieve a just and lasting peace in Ukraine on Ukraine's terms, ensuring the safety and dignity of its people within a peaceful and stable Europe;
- 3. Calls for the EU and its Member States to actively work towards maintaining and achieving the broadest possible international support for Ukraine and identifying a

peaceful solution to the war, which must be based on full respect for Ukraine's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the principles of international law, accountability for war crimes and the crime of aggression committed by Russia, and Russian reparations and other payments for the massive damage caused in Ukraine; calls for active EU engagement in implementing Ukraine's Peace Formula and creating the grounds for holding the second Peace Summit;

4. Calls on the Commission to swiftly propose long-term financial assistance for the reconstruction of Ukraine in collaboration with partner countries, in particular by ensuring swift implementation of the Ukraine Facility and building on it to ensure continued support at adequate levels and resources for reconstruction commensurate with our political support for Ukraine;
5. Calls on all Member States to increase their funding for Ukraine and refrain from decreasing their contributions; reiterates its firm conviction that Russia must provide financial compensation for the massive damage it has caused in Ukraine; welcomes the decision of the Council to direct extraordinary revenues stemming from immobilised Russian state assets to the Ukraine Assistance Fund and the Ukraine Facility as well as the G7's decision to offer Ukraine a USD 50 billion loan secured through immobilised Russian state assets; calls for quick progress in implementing the G7's decision to offer Ukraine a USD 50 billion loan secured through immobilised Russian state assets, to ensure the timely disbursement of funds to Ukraine; calls for the EU to take the work forward, together with like-minded partners, by adapting sanctions legislation as necessary and by establishing a sound legal regime for the confiscation of Russian state-owned assets frozen by the EU;
6. Calls for a substantial increase in the EU's humanitarian aid in order to ensure that full support for Ukraine continues in 2025; notes that the need for humanitarian support is likely to continue for years to come and stresses the need for the EU to be prepared to meet these needs with long-term planning and adequate funds; calls on neutral states to increase their humanitarian aid to Ukraine;
7. Reiterates that Ukraine, as a victim of aggression, has a legitimate right to self-defence in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter; recalls that the significant, although still insufficient, military assistance provided by the EU, the US and like-minded partners is designed to allow Ukraine to effectively defend itself against an aggressor state and to re-establish full control over its entire internationally recognised territory;
8. Calls on the Member States to immediately lift restrictions on the use of Western weapons systems delivered to Ukraine against legitimate military targets on Russian territory, as this hinders Ukraine's ability to fully exercise its right to self-defence under international public law and leaves Ukraine exposed to attacks on its population and infrastructure;
9. Underlines that insufficient deliveries of ammunition and weapons and restrictions on their use risk undermining efforts made so far and deeply deplores the declining financial volume of bilateral military aid to Ukraine from Member States, despite the strong statements made at the beginning of this year; reiterates, therefore, its calls on the

Member States to fulfil their commitment of March 2023 to deliver one million rounds of ammunition to Ukraine, to accelerate weapons deliveries, in particular of modern air defence systems and other weapons and ammunition in response to clearly identified needs, including Taurus missiles; calls for the swift implementation of the commitments made in joint security commitments between the EU and Ukraine; reiterates its position that all EU Member States and NATO allies should collectively and individually commit to supporting Ukraine militarily, with no less than 0.25 % of their GDP annually;

10. Underlines the need for enhanced air defence cooperation between Member States to ensure protection from threats that reach into EU and NATO airspace;
11. Calls on the Commission to engage in strategic communication in the Member States to explain the importance of Ukraine's defence for Europe's broader stability and to ensure that EU citizens are well informed about the significance of this assistance, both for Ukraine's sovereignty and for peace and security across the EU; welcomes and applauds the public effort and citizen crowdfunding initiatives in some Member States to ensure a steady supply of weapons for Ukraine; further encourages similar initiatives across the EU to foster solidarity and public involvement in this critical cause;
12. Calls for the EU and its Member States to fulfil the commitments of the 2022 Versailles Declaration and to accelerate the full implementation of the Strategic Compass by enhancing European military cooperation at industrial and armed forces level, in order to make the EU a stronger and more capable security provider that is interoperable and complementary with NATO; stresses that concrete steps should be taken towards Ukraine's integration in EU defence and cybersecurity policies and programmes during the EU accession process; urges the EU institutions to accelerate the adoption of the European defence industry strategy so as to ensure the timely availability and supply of defence products, which would in turn allow for the timely provision of military support to Ukraine; calls on the Member States to honour their commitment to establish military production on Ukrainian territory; stresses the importance of cooperation with the Ukrainian defence industry and its integration, in the long term, into the EU's defence technological and industrial base;
13. Commends the Ukraine Defence Contact Group for its vital role in coordinating international support and urges the EU Member States to increase their contributions to bolster Ukraine's defence capabilities;
14. Urges the Member States to actively pressure Hungary to end its blockade of the EPF, including the newly established Ukraine Assistance Fund;
15. Strongly condemns the use of sexual and gender-based violence as a weapon of war and stresses that this constitutes a war crime; calls on host and transit countries to guarantee access to sexual and reproductive health and rights services, particularly emergency contraception, post-exposure prophylaxis and abortion care, including for survivors of rape;
16. Reiterates its call for the EU to step up efforts to address the dire situation of those

forcibly deported to Russia and children forcibly adopted in Russia, including by sanctioning persons directly responsible for and involved in the forced transfer and unjustified detention of Ukrainian children;

17. Urges Hungary to withdraw the decree cancelling state-funded shelter for refugees from western Ukraine and uphold its responsibilities under the EU Temporary Protection Directive;
18. Calls on the Council to maintain and extend its sanctions policy against Russia and Belarus and non-EU countries and entities providing the Russian military complex with military and dual-use technologies and equipment, while monitoring, reviewing and enhancing the policy's effectiveness and impact; condemns Iran's recent transfer of ballistic missiles to Russia; urges the Member States to further broaden and strengthen the sanctions regime against Iran and North Korea in view of these countries' military support for Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, and to add additional Chinese entities and individuals to the EU sanctions list for their support to Russia's defence and security sector; calls on the Council to systematically tackle the circumvention of sanctions by EU-based companies, third parties and non-EU states; calls on the Council to design a new horizontal sanctions regime to counter this circumvention, which will require a more general and holistically applicable instrument to target circumvention in all regimes implemented by the EU;
19. Stresses that the impact of existing sanctions and of financial and military support to Ukraine will continue to be undermined as long as the EU allows Russian fossil fuels to be imported; calls for a ban on importing Russian grain, potash and fertilisers, as well as raw materials, including aluminium, steel products, uranium, titanium, nickel, wood and wood products, and gas and oil; calls for the EU and the Member States to introduce a full ban on re-exported Russian refined oil products; calls, furthermore, for the implementation of 'rules of origin' documentation, which would ensure the true origin of oil products imported to the EU;
20. Calls on the G7 countries to more effectively enforce the price cap imposed on Russian seaborne oil and to crack down on the loopholes used by Russia to repackage and sell its oil at market prices; calls for the EU and its Member States to exercise strict control over Russia's 'shadow fleet', which, in addition to violating EU and G7 sanctions, poses an immense ecological threat to the ecosystem as a result of its technical deficiencies and frequent breakdowns;
21. Calls for a full embargo of Russian liquefied natural gas and sanctions against Gazprom and Russian oil companies; calls for the EU to impose the requirement that Arc-7 ice-class vessels exporting Russian liquefied natural gas be included on the sanctions lists of the US Office of Foreign Assets Control and of the EU, denying them access to ports or Western maritime services; calls for the EU and its Member States to impose targeted sanctions on maritime vessels used by Russia to circumvent sanctions on its oil and gas exports and servicing of its energy projects in the Arctic;
22. Calls for sanctions on Russia's nuclear sector and targeted sanctions against perpetrators of violations of nuclear safety and security at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant;

23. Condemns the increasing number of hybrid attacks carried out by Russia against the EU, its Member States and candidate countries, aimed at weakening European support for Ukraine through information manipulation, sabotage, covert destabilisation attempts and corruption; calls for the EU and its Member States to work strategically and proactively so as to counter hybrid threats, strengthen EU strategic communication and prevent Russia's interference in political, electoral and other democratic processes in the EU and its neighbourhood;
24. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the President, Government and Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Russian Government and the other governments concerned, and the United Nations.