Measuring U.S. Fiscal Capacity using Discounted Cash Flow Analysis

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## Valuation using Textbook Finance

Government securitizes claim to surpluses

Assets	Liabilities
$PV_{2021}(\{T\})$	$PV_{2021}(\{G\})$
	Debt

Debt is fully backed by PDV of surpluses; Fiscal Capacity:

 $PV_{2021}(\{T-G\}_{2022}^{2052}) + PV_{2021}(D_{2052}) = PV_{2021}(\{T-G\}_{2022}^{\infty})$ 

Suppose U.S. government collects tax revenue *T*/*Y*, spends *G*/*Y* and runs surplus *S*/*Y* that are constant as % of GDP.

$$PV_{2021}(\{T-G\}) = \frac{S}{Y} \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \frac{Y_{2021+j}}{(1+r^{\$,y})^j} = pd^y \times \frac{S}{Y} \times Y_{2021}$$

- Only GDP is risky in this calculation
- Measure of extra fiscal capacity per % of surplus (as fraction of GDP): Total Wealth/GDP Ratio

$$pd^y = \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{2}$$

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$$pd^{y} = \frac{1}{r^{\$, y} - g} = \frac{1}{r^{f} + term + rp^{y} - g}$$

▶  $r^f - g$  is not sufficient statistic; depends on risk-free rate  $r^f$  and growth rate g, but also on term premium and GDP risk premium  $rp^y$  (unlevered equity premium).

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# U.S. Steady-State Fiscal Capacity

Total wealth/GDP ratio is given by

$$pd^{y} = \frac{1}{(r^{f} + term) + rp^{y} - g} = \frac{1}{2.07\% + 2.60\% - 3.50\%} = \frac{1}{1.17\%} = 85.8$$

• Total wealth is  $85 \times GDP$ 

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• What is steady-state surplus S/Y needed to get to  $PV_{2021}({T-G}) = 0.99 \times Y_{2021}$ ?

Asset	s/GDP	Liabilities/GDP		
$PV_{2021}({T})/Y_{2021}$	$19.7 = 23.06\% \times 85.8$	$PV_{2021}({G})/Y_{2021}$	$18.7 = 21.9\% \times 85.8$	
		$D/Y_{2021}$	$0.99 = 1.16\% \times 85.8$	

- Need a steady-state primary surplus of 1.16% of GDP to get to D/Y = 0.99
- CBO projects deficits of 3.19% until 2052.

## Upper Bound on U.S. Steady-State Fiscal Capacity

- But tax revenue *T*/*Y* is pro-cyclical (risky) and spending *G*/*Y* is counter-cyclical (safer)
  - Higher risk premium on *T* claim  $rp^T > rp^Y$ ; lower risk premium on *G* claim  $rp^G < rp^Y$
  - Lower multiple on *T* claim  $pd^T < pd^Y$ ; higher multiple on *G* claim  $pd^G > pd^Y$

Assets/GDP	Liabilities/GDP	
$PV_{2021}(\{T\})/Y_{2021} \le 19.7 = 23.0\% \times 85.8$	$PV_{2021}({G})/Y_{2021} \ge 18.7 = 21.9\% \times 85.8$	
	$D/Y_{2021} \le 0.99 = 1.16\% \times 85.8$	

0.99 is really an upper bound on fiscal capacity

$$PV_{2021}(\{T-G\}) \le pd^y \times \frac{S}{Y} \times Y_{2021} = 0.99 \times Y_{2021}$$

## Boost Treasury's Fiscal Capacity

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- Unless you think ...Treasury will start to run large surpluses during pandemics and financial crises
- Suppose tax revenue *T*/*Y* is counter-cyclical (safe) and spending *G*/*Y* is pro-cyclical (in PDV) (risky)

$$PV_{2021}(\{T-G\}) = pd^T \times \frac{T}{Y} \times Y_{2021} - pd^G \times \frac{G}{Y} \times Y_{2021}.$$

• We can have steady-state deficits  $\frac{T}{Y} << \frac{G}{Y}$  and positive fiscal capacity iff  $pd^T > pd^Y > pd^G$ 

Assets/GDP		Liabilities/GD	P
$PV_{2021}(\{T\})/Y_{2021} \ge \frac{T}{Y} \times 85.8$		$PV_{2021}(\{G\})/Y_{2021} \leq$	$\frac{G}{Y} \times 85.8$
		$FC \ge$	$\frac{S}{Y} \times 85.8$

Taxpayers provide insurance and U.S. Treasury collects insurance premium
Not what Treasury does (see Pandemic, GFC, etc.) or will do anytime soon!

- 1. **Deterministic Economies Approach** ( $rp^y = 0$ ): Debt is not fully backed by PDV of surpluses;  $PV_{2021}(D_{2221}) \neq 0$  because we're discounting at  $r^f g < 0$ 
  - ▶ We can keep rolling over the debt ;There's a lot more wealth than you think!  $pd^y \rightarrow \infty$

Assets			Liabilities	
Until 2221	$PV_{2021}({T}_{2022}^{2221})$		$PV_{2021}(\{G\}_{2022}^{2221})$	
<i>After</i> 2221	$PV_{2021}(D_{2221})$	eq \$0		
			D	$PV_{2021}(\{T-G\}_{2022}^{2221}+D_{2221})$

- 2. **Our Textbook Finance Approach** ( $rp^y > 0$ ): Debt is fully backed by PDV of surpluses;  $PV_{2021}(D_{2221}) \rightarrow 0$  because we're discounting at  $r^f + term + rp^y g > 0$
- 3. **Bubbly Finance Approach**. ( $rp^y \approx 0$ ): Debt is not fully backed by future surpluses and PDV of future debt  $PV_{2021}(D_{2221}) \neq 0$  because we're discounting at DR < 0
  - Bubble in some long-lived assets, typically in models without long-lived investors; Total wealth/GDP ratio pd<sup>y</sup> → ∞ (missing investors, missing wealth hypothesis)

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  - We cannot keep rolling over the debt because r<sup>f</sup> cannot always be smaller than g without creating arb. opps.

	Assets		Liabilities	
Until 2221	$PV_{2021}(\{T\}_{2022}^{2221})$		$PV_{2021}(\{G\}_{2022}^{2221})$	
After 2221	$PV_{2021}(D_{2222})$	<b>\$</b> 0		
			D	$PV_{2021}(\{T-G\}_{2022}^{2221})$

#### ▶ Total wealth/GDP ratio $pd^y \rightarrow \infty$

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<i>After</i> 2221	$PV_{2021}(D_{2221})$	$\not\rightarrow$ \$0		
			D	$PV_{2021}({T-G}_{2022}^{2221}+D_{2221})$

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
Need to believe U.S. Treasury has special ability to engineer bubbles. U.K. has not been able to do this in 3 centuries.

U.K.	1729 - 1914	1729 - 1946	1946 - 2020
S/Y	2.5%	1.2%	1.8%

#### Outline

- 1. Simple Steady-State Example
- 2. Fiscal Capacity Measurement using CBO Projections
- 3. Duration Mismatch

## U.S. Treasury Balance Sheet using CBO Projections



- feed in CBO surplus projections until 2052 and projected (D/Y)<sub>2052</sub> is 185%.
- Assumption: Treasury runs surpluses of 2.16% after 2052 such that  $(D/Y)_{2052} = 85.8 \times 2.16\% = 185\%$

## U.S. Treasury Balance Sheet using CBO Projections

• CBO projects surpluses until 2052 and debt outstanding at 2052.

	Assets				s
Until 2052	$PV_{2021}({T}_{2022}^{2052})$	\$124.95	$PV_{2021}({G}_{2022}^{2052})$	\$146.11	
After 2052	$PV_{2021}(D_{2052})$	\$33.54			
			Fiscal Capacity	\$ 12.38	

Baseline fiscal capacity estimate of \$ 12.38 trillion:

 $PV_{2021}^{upper}(\{T-G\}_{2022}^{2052}) + PV_{2021}^{upper}(D_{2052}) = -\$21.16 + \$33.54 = \$12.38 \text{ tr.} << \$22.40 \text{ tr.}$ 

- Fiscal capacity limited in spite of low rates
- Market is pricing in large fiscal correction (relative to CBO projections) or financial repression (e.g., Japan)

U.S. Treasury Balance Sheet with Convenience Yields

- ▶ US. Treasurys are special and earn convenience yields.
- Assumption: Treasury collects 0.60% × 99.6% = 0.598% of GDP in convenience-yield revenues per year

	Assets				s
Until 2052	$PV_{2021}(\{T\}_{2022}^{2052})$	\$124.95	$PV_{2021}(\{G\}_{2022}^{2052})$	\$146.11	
Until 2052	$PV_{2021}(\{CS\}_{2022}^{2052})$	\$4.04			
After 2052	$PV_{2021}(D_{2052})$	\$33.54			
			Fiscal Capacity	\$ 16.42	

• Extended fiscal capacity estimate of \$ 16.42 trillion:

$$PV_{2021}^{upper}(\{T-G\}_{2022}^{2052}) + PV_{2021}^{upper}(D_{2052}) + PV_{2021}^{upper}\left(\{CS\}_{2022}^{2052}\right) = \$12.38 + \$4.04 = \$16.42 \text{ tr.}$$

### Creating a Bubble

• We can reverse-engineer  $rp^y = 1.37\%$  to match the valuation of Treasurys at \$22.40 tr.

	Assets		Liabilitie	s
Until 2052	$PV_{2021}(\{T\}_{2022}^{2052})$	\$150.57	$PV_{2021}(\{G\}_{2022}^{2052})$	\$176.55
After 2052	$PV_{2021}(D_{2052})$	\$48.38		
			Fiscal Capacity	\$ 22.40

▶ Fiscal capacity estimate boosted to \$ 22.40 trillion by increasing PDV of future debt:

 $PV_{2021}^{upper}(\{T-G\}_{2022}^{2052}) + PV_{2021}^{upper}(D_{2052}) = -\$25.98 + \$48.38 = \$22.40 \text{ tr.}$ 

• We have generated a bubble:  $pd^y \to \infty$ 

$$(r^f + term) + rp^y - g = 2.07\% + 1.37\% - 3.50\% < 0.$$

All un-levered companies growing at rate of GDP have infinite valuations; Missing wealth hypothesis!


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# Backloaded Surpluses



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


- Treasury runs primary deficits of 3.19% until 2052 ; projected (D/Y)<sub>2052</sub> 185%
- Treasury runs primary surpluses of 2.16% after 2052 such that  $(D/Y)_{2052} = 85.8 \times 2.16\% = 185\%$
- Surpluses have high duration, but the Treasury's debt does not.

Treasury has not matched cash inflows and outflows.

## Rate Increase \_\_\_\_\_

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- Consider permanent rate shock of 100 bps.
- Treasury runs primary surpluses of 4.82% after 2052 such that  $(D/Y)_{2052} = 46.18 \times 4.82\% = 223\%$
- An increase in steady-state surpluses by 2.67% of GDP

• Lower risk-free rates and *rp<sup>y</sup>* increase FC, but also increase duration mismatch.

# What do you Think?

- Simple framework based in textbook finance for analyzing fiscal capacity using CBO projections
- U.S. Treasury's fiscal capacity is probably more limited than you think, ..unless you think
  - U.S. GDP risk premium is very low and there is a more wealth than commonly thought
  - U.S. Treasury has engineered permanent violations of the no-bubble constraints in securities markets
- Backloading of Surpluses Exposes Treasury to Interest Rate Risk, especially if you think
  - GDP risk premium is very low and there is a more wealth than commonly thought