Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan leaves after attending a military parade to mark the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus in response to a short-lived Greek-inspired coup, in the Turkish-controlled northern Cyprus, in the divided city of Nicosia, Cyprus July 20, 2024. Photo: REUTERS/Yiannis Kourtoglou

Following the recent regime change in Syria, Israel now faces a complex reality in which it must prevent the flow of advanced weapons to hostile actors in Syria while exploring possibilities for political dialogue with the new regime. At the same time, Turkey’s growing presence in Syria poses a strategic challenge due to both the potential for military confrontation and the possibility that Turkey may help Hamas expand its operations in the north.

Turkey’s trends in Syria align with the neo-Ottoman vision, which seeks to restore Turkey’s influence in the Islamic world. Beyond the military dimension, Erdogan is advancing an image of Turkey as savior, aiding refugees and helping Syrians with their country’s reconstruction. This image, along with the consolidation of internal control, serves as a counterbalance to criticism over human rights violations and Turkey’s historical legacy.

Turkey’s increasing involvement in Syria not only reflects its strategic aspirations but also acts as a political tool through which Erdogan is presenting Turkey as a humanitarian and protective power, furthering its position in the Muslim world at the expense of its rivals — Israel, Iran, and Arab countries.

The rapidly changing reality in Syria presents Israel with a mix of challenges and opportunities. Jerusalem is concerned about the security of its citizens in the face of Syria’s instability, but is also cognizant of emerging diplomatic possibilities that could transform the entire region. The bringing of those possibilities to fruition will require the acquiescence of Turkey, however, which is highly unlikely at present.

Israel’s security challenge stems primarily from the fear that both conventional and unconventional weapons could find their way into hostile hands close to its northern border. Missiles, chemical weapons, and even Syria’s military arsenal present real threats. However, a Syrian regime that is allegedly non-hostile toward Israel might, at least in the short term, offer diplomatic opportunities that align with Israel’s interests.

Israel remains vigilant and prepared to act. Thus, it prefers to destroy any weapons that pose a threat, ensuring that conventional and unconventional weaponry in the region does not fall into the hands of jihadist elements, even if they are Sunni and fierce enemies of Hezbollah and Iran. The concern is that Sunni and Shiite jihadist forces might position themselves at Israel’s border, threatening the Golan Heights and the eastern Galilee. Moreover, despite claims of ideological moderation by the HTS party, there is concern that extreme religious ideology could take over and turn the country into an authoritarian-controlled zone. Abu Mohammad Al-Jolani, the leader of the HTS, is a member of ISIS, and Israel cannot afford the presence of ISIS on its border.

Israel needs to eliminate any strategic capability from Syria for several reasons.

First, the new regime’s position toward Israel, while not openly hostile at the moment, remains unclear. It is too dangerous to allow weapons to remain in the area given that Al-Jolani could adopt ISIS’s extreme positions in the future.

Next, the fact that the Syrian border with Lebanon is now controlled by the Kurds, who view Israel as a partner, is an unplanned positive development in Israel’s efforts to prevent the smuggling of Iranian weapons to Hezbollah. However, the Kurds in Syria are in constant danger from the Turkish military. Zeki Aktürk, the Press and Public Relations Advisor of Turkey’s Ministry of National Defense, declared in December 2024 that “Turkey will not allow ‘terrorist organizations, foremost the PKK/YPG terror organization,’ to seize territories by exploiting the situation in Syria. We will continue to take destructive preemptive actions.” He also stated, “We believe that the new Syrian regime and its army, the Syrian National Army, will liberate the Syrian people and the areas occupied by the PKK/YPG terror organization.” This approach to Turkish involvement in northeastern Syria is also supported by the opposition party CHP, which is usually a harsh opponent of Erdogan. For example, its members have declared that Erdogan is not assertive enough against Israel. Yankı Bağcıoğlu, Vice Chairman of the CHP, whose responsibilities include relations with the military and national security policy, said that if there is a threat to Turkey in Syria, a military operation against the Kurds could be carried out. In this context, Erdogan can once again be seen exploiting internal and international conflicts to strengthen his rule and neutralize the opposition.

Another relevant minority in Syria is the Druze population in the southwest, along the Jordanian border. As Israel has a Druze community, it may be possible to renew an alliance to ensure defense of the shared border.

Because the new Syrian regime’s policy toward Israel remains uncertain, Israel has no choice but to maintain a high level of military readiness and take steps to prevent the Iran-Hezbollah-ISIS axis from reorganizing there. Israel must also quickly identify and destroy any weapons that might eventually be aimed in its direction. If the new Syrian regime does ultimately adopt a positive position toward Israel – which is unlikely, at least as long as Turkey remains active – Israel could strengthen its position in the region through diplomatic and economic cooperation, presenting a more optimistic political-security picture overall.

With that said, the Turks are very confident about their position of power in Syria. By shifting its support among different forces in that country after the Arab Spring, Turkey expanded its influence in northern Syria. Turkey aims to turn Syria into a satellite, not unlike like the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. It is possible that the relationship with Syria will eventually go through Ankara, as Turkey may demand a military alliance with the new regime to ensure its influence in the region. It has leverage to make this demand, as it has invested significant forces and money in Syria. Such an alliance would further bolster Turkey’s standing, both in the region and internationally.

Turkey is already playing a significant role in Syria’s reconstruction. It has invested billions of dollars in that country, especially since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011. In terms of humanitarian aid, Turkey has provided support to millions of Syrian refugees affected by the war, allocating about $40 billion (according to a speech by Erdogan five years ago) for aid to Syrian refugees. Turkey also frequently states its intention to repatriate the Syrian refugees back to their homeland.

In addition, Turkey has invested in the reconstruction of areas in northern Syria –  especially those under its control, such as Afrin and Idlib – and allocated funds for infrastructure, education, health, and public services. According to Turkish media, the reconstruction of Syria requires a total investment of $400 billion. The first phase will involve the construction of infrastructure and thousands of housing units, with Turkish companies at the forefront of that effort. The forecast is that over the next decade, sectors such as furniture, energy, logistics, and retail will generate $100 billion for Turkey’s economy.

Turkey has also spent billions of dollars on military operations in Syria, including deploying military forces, operating military bases, and paying local militias. Due to these massive investments, Turkey may demand a permanent military presence in Syria, especially given Syria’s current fragile state. This could pose a threat to Israel.

Turkey does not want its vision in Syria to be compromised. It demands that Israel withdraw beyond the border, with Erdogan going so far as to threaten at least twice to take military action against Israel if it does not comply. The tension engendered by this language could manifest in several ways.

First, Turkey wants to eradicate all Kurdish activity in Syrian territory, especially along its border. But, as noted above, the Kurds are a partner Israel relies on. These are obviously conflicting interests. Moreover, Israel is very concerned about Turkey’s connection with, and well-known support for, Hamas. Turkey may establish Hamas bases in areas under its control in Syria, creating a link between Hamas in the north and Hamas in the south. In view of this danger, Israel is trying to prevent Turkish control from spreading in Syria and reduce the threat to its borders. Given these facts, even a small-scale military clash could arise between Israel and Turkey in the future.

Experts in Israel-Turkey relations have often used the term “frenemy” to describe the dynamic between the two countries, especially since the second decade of the 2000s. In light of current developments, such as the growing threat from Turkey towards Israel from the north, Turkey’s demand that Israel withdraw from Syria, and its belief that Israel plans to occupy parts of southeastern Turkey as part of the biblical Kingdom of Israel, it might be time to reconsider the “frenemy” and perhaps replace it with the term “enemy.”

Turkey’s presence in Syria, from Erdogan’s shifting from supporting anti-Assad forces in the early stages to conducting military operations in northern Syria, is a means of exploiting the conflict to achieve central objectives: to block Kurdish forces associated with the PKK and to expand Turkey’s regional influence. By framing Turkey’s involvement in Syria as national security defense, Erdogan has managed to both justify increased military intervention and strengthen his image as a strong and determined leader on the international stage.

Erdogan appears to be not just strong but a savior. Turkey’s presence in Syria is perceived as part of neo-Ottomanism, a term that describes the geostrategic and cultural policy of the Turkish government particularly under AKP administration. The concept aims to restore Turkey’s regional influence in areas that were once under the control of the Ottoman Empire (such as the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and North Africa), combining political, economic, and cultural power. Turkey is succeeding where Russia and Iran failed, and now holds the most significant footprint in Syria.

Turkey’s international image is largely negative. It is perceived as an oppressor of minorities, as responsible for the Armenian genocide during the Ottoman Empire, and as stubborn in its refusal to acknowledge its historical responsibility. The image of Muslim savior would help Turkey improve that global image. This aligns well with Turkey’s strategic needs as it tries to establish itself as a regional power with global influence.

Against the backdrop of Turkey’s ongoing efforts to achieve legitimacy in Europe, its involvement in Syria reflects a strategic shift in its national vision. Given its failure to integrate into the European Union and achieve equal status among Western nations, Turkey is turning its attention to the Islamic world, where it aims to establish itself as a dominant regional power and gain the recognition and prestige it believes it deserves. It wants to be seen as a nation that succeeds, unlike other Muslim-majority countries, at saving Muslim societies, both within and outside its borders.

Erdogan oscillates between peace negotiations and military repression depending on his political needs. In the early years of his rule, Erdogan led a peace process with the PKK in order to garner support from the Kurdish population and present himself as a leader capable of resolving one of Turkey’s longest-running conflicts. However, when the dynamics shifted—especially after the electoral success of the pro-Kurdish party (HDP)—the Turkish military launched a campaign against the PKK, using the conflict to garner nationalist support and weaken the political influence of the HDP.

In Syria, a new opportunity presented itself. On March 1, the PKK declared that it would lay down its weapons and announced a unilateral ceasefire. This could mark the beginning of the end of the PKK’s 40-year violent struggle for independence in Turkish territory. Consequently, Ankara will no longer regard Turkey’s PKK and its branches in Iraq and Syria as a terrorist organization.

The hope is that the end of the armed conflict between Turkey and the PKK in Iraq will not only conclude Turkish military operations in the region but ultimately improve political and economic relations between the Kurdish regions of Iraq and Turkey. The same may happen in Syria, where unprecedented opportunities for effective governance and stability are opening up in the north.

However, while Nechirvan Barzani, President of Iraqi Kurdistan, embraces this message, there is no rush to disarm the SDF in Syria. Abdi has already declared that the disarmament does not apply to his group. Despite the agreement he signed with al-Jolani, according to which their military forces and the institutions they established would merge into the new Syrian state, the agreement represents more of a dialogue in the form of a state of non-war. It does not contain any solution for the Kurds in Syria.

Turkey may bring peace to its borders and present itself as a peacemaker and savior of the Muslim world, a role it has sought for many years (evidenced by its attempts to mediate between Israel and the Palestinians, Russia and Ukraine, and others). However, while Turkey’s image may be bolstered as a peacekeeper that ensures stability in the region, this very role could paradoxically lead to further fragmentation among the Kurds, deepening the already existing rift within Kurdish society – this time in Syria.

Prof. Efrat Aviv is a senior researcher at the BESA Center and a senior lecturer in the Department of General History at Bar-Ilan University. A version of this article was originally published by The BESA Center.