Pragmatism (Philosophy)

This article draws on the “transactional view” developed by John Dewey and Arthur Bentley in order to help us understand the images that circulate within our electronic networks beyond the representational figure appearing on the surface of our screens. To grasp their dynamics, one needs to take into account the multiple layers they are made of, from the materiality of electronic flows, through the strata of machine languages, the transfer protocols and the design of their interface. The image we identify and isolate in its representational features is a lure that obfuscates the multiple implications of the transactions that generate it. Taking stock of these transactions is a precondition to debunk some of the illusions carried by the images.

In their insightful work on false beliefs and optimistic bias, Anneli Jefferson and Lisa Borttolotti (2017, 2018) and other contributors of their project, introduce us to fascinating contemporary inter-disciplinary studies that throw evidence on the social and psychological use of optimistic bias. As these authors point out, the case of optimistic bias seems to exhibit a poor relation to a fact-based focus in belief-formation.

Biosemantics is an inclusive naturalistic philosophical account of the intentional content of both mental and linguistic representations. As it is well known, Millikan explains the normative dimension of intentional content in terms of natural function. However, Millikan’s account (and its reception) suffers from three fundamental problems (1) Usually, her account is not situated in the suitable philosophical tradition, in my view, this tradition is classical pragmatism (Peirce, Mead, Morris) and the pragmatist themes in Sellars’ philosophy, and not classical cognitive science (or Fodorian Psychosemantics). The first chapter of the book is, thus, an exercise in re-contextualization. (2) Biosemantics has neither a philosophically satisfactory notion of naturalism nor a very clear idea of normativity. I claim that biosemantics needs both, a non-reductionist notion of naturalism (I call it “Biological Naturalism”) and a unified account of normativity. Chapters 2 and 3 are dedicated to these tasks. (3) Millikan’s account of perception is underdeveloped. By taking up arguments and distinctions from Thomas Reid, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and J.J. Gibson chapter 5 establishes a theory of the non-conceptual content of (visual) perception in a biosemantic framework.
The manuscript is in need of revision on two different levels: Firstly, the architecture of the book is not clear enough, it contains too much material, and the exposition of Millikan’s point of view could be more straight forward. Secondly, two important arguments do not work in their present shape, namely the argument for self-consciousness in non-human animals (section 4.4) and the argument from animalism against the infamous swampman problem (sections 4.1-4.3). I have received many valuable comments, suggestions, and criticisms.
Obviously, my current SNF-Project at the University of Fribourg “Biosemantics and Normative Pragmatism (Millikan and Brandom)” is a continuation of the Habilitation into the realms of concepts, thought, and self-consciousness."

“Power is war, the continuation of war by other means”: Foucault’s reversal of Clausewitz’s formula has become a staple of critical theory — but it remains highly problematic on a conceptual level. Elaborated during Foucault’s 1976 lectures (“Society Must Be Defended”), this work-hypothesis theorises “basic warfare” [la guerre fondamentale] as the teleological horizon of socio-political relations. Following Boulainvilliers, Foucault champions this polemological approach, conceived as a purely descriptive discourse on “real” politics and war, against the philosophico-juridical conceptuality attached to liberal society (Hobbes’s Leviathan being here the prime example).
However, in doing so, Foucault did not interrogate the conceptual validity of notions such as power and war, therefore interlinking them without questioning their ontological status. This problematic conflation was partly rectified in 1982, as Foucault proposed a more dynamic definition of power relations: “actions over potential actions”.
I argue, somewhat polemically, that Foucault’s hermeneutics of power still involves a teleological violence, dependent on a polemological representation of human relations as essentially instrumental: this resembles what Derrida names, in “Heidegger’s Ear”, an “anthropolemology”. However, I show that all conceptualisation of power implies its self-deconstruction. This self-deconstructive (or autoimmune) structure supposes an archi-originary unpower prior to power: power presupposes an excess within power, an excessive force, another violence making it both possible and impossible. There is something within power located “beyond the power principle” (Derrida). This (self-)excess signifies a limitless resistantiality co-extensive with power-relationality. It also allows the reversal of pólemos into its opposite, as unpower opens politics and warfare to the messianic call of a pre-political, pre-ontological disruption: the archi-originary force of différance. This force, unconditional, challenges Foucault’s conceptualisations of power, suggesting an originary performativity located before or beyond hermeneutics of power-knowledge, disrupting theoreticity as well as empiricity by pointing to their ontological complicity.
The bulk of this essay is dedicated to sketching the theoretical implications of this deconstructive reading of Foucault with respect to the methodology and conceptuality of political science and social theory.

The article discusses Nicolas Winding Refn’s film Only God Forgives (2013), and focuses on questions of artistic representation and reception in relation to such cinematic elements as genre film, style, mise-en-scène, graphic violence and art experience. The arguments for the analyses are supported by John Dewey’s theory of art as experience where he claims that aesthetic experience is essentially infused with emotions that provide for a unifying quality cementing diverse constituent parts of the artwork. The article also takes into consideration Refn’s standpoint on the use of violence in art. While violence is a way of externalizing emotions, as Refn claims, it may not necessarily be the real experience viewers want to entertain; however, through an art experience, which is integral and complete as Dewey asserts, they are able to perceive and detect meanings that were “scattered and weakened in the material of other experiences”.

It is argued here that James’s notorious pessimism about logic and even truth (or at least ‘absolute’ truth), while most prominent in his later views, stem from the naturalistic conception of concepts developed much earlier in The Principles of Psychology, and it is his commitment to naturalism about our conceptual powers, rather than to any sort of mysticism or irrationalism, that motivates his skepticism about the scope and power of logic, and ultimately about the objectivity of truth itself.

Resumen: Este artículo tiene como objetivo mostrar que 1) la teoría de la evolución es ontológicamente neutral en el debate entre naturalismo metafísico y teísmo y 2) que es consistente sostener en conjunto el naturalismo metodológico y el teísmo. Para ello, examinaré en primer lugar el argumento de Plantinga que intenta mostrar que hay consistencia entre teísmo y evolución y que, por el contrario, hay inconsistencia entre la teoría de la evolución y el naturalismo (tanto metodológico como metafísico). Me interesa aceptar la primera parte del argumento de Plantinga, pero rechazar la segunda. Defiendo que el argumento de Plantinga es válido si y sólo si se supone una teoría de la verdad por correspondencia. A continuación, argumento que si se reemplaza dicha noción por la concepción pragmatista de la verdad de James, es posible concluir 1 y 2.

Abstract: This paper aims to show that: 1) theory of evolution is ontologically neutral inside debate about metaphysical naturalism and theism; and 2) that it is consistent to hold simultaneously methodological naturalism and theism. In order to achieve this, I will first examine Plantinga's argument that tries to show that there is consistency between theism and evolution, but, on the contrary, there is inconsistency between theory of evolution and (methodological and metaphysical) naturalism. I accept the first part of this argument, but I reject the second part. I will defend that Plantiga's argument is valid if and only if it is supposed a theory of truth by correspondence. Finally, I will argue that if such notion is replaced by James's pragmatist conception of truth, it is possible conclude 1 and 2.

Książka jest wysoce intertekstualna: absorbuje i transformuje (Julia Kristeva) teksty i obrazy z różnych epok i z różnych kultur. Interpretacja owych tekstów i obrazów - zawsze własna - wskazuje na niezwykłą wiedzę, orientację intelektualną biegłość autorki w wielu dziedzinach nauki. Rozważania teoretyczne podporządkowane są pytaniu: czy jedzenie jest sztuką? Czytelnik dowie się, jak na nie odpowiadali wybitni myśliciele i myślicielki, a zarazem pozna ich upodobania kulinarne. Co jadł Kant, co było daniem popisowym Hume’a i dlaczego Sartre stronił od skorupiaków, a Giard unikała gotowania? Dorota Koczanowicz tworzy swoistą komparatystykę jedzenia; jeśli można tak rzec: porównawcze sztuki kulinarne - przez pryzmat humanistyki. (...)

Szczególną uwagę poświęca ona praktykom artystycznym od F.T. Marinettiego, Abramoyić i Ulaya oraz Marthy Rosler do Julity Wójcik, Elżbiety Jabłońskiej, Anny Królikiewicz, Marije Vogelzang, a w szczególności Daniela Spoerriego. Twórczość tego ostatniego doczekała się interpretacji autorki w pierwszoosobowej opowieści. Z kolei rozważania o sztuce Rirkrita Tirayaniji przenoszą nas do kultury tajskiej, dzięki czemu książka wzbogaca się o perspektywę postkolonialną. Spotkanie i - dodałbym - gościnność wobec Obcego to doświadczenie mocno obecne we współczesnej sztuce jedzenia.
Z recenzji Tomasza Kitlińskiego

The article proposes a diachronic reconstruction and philological analysis of Gramsci’s reflections on logic and methodology, with particular attention to section IV of Notebook 11. The Author maintains that the same answer found by Gramsci to the question of the logical instruments of thought – a solution based on the idea of “instrumental value” – enables him to “translate” in historicist terms the features of individual philosophy (systematicity, continuity of development, universality) and to clarify the tasks of the individual philosopher considered as a “specialized intellectual”. It is also argued that this historicist “translation” of individual philosophy (or “philosophers’ philosophy”) does not entail its simple and direct reduction to politics but, rather, the explanation of its peculiar “politicalness” and the redefinition of its “relative autonomy”. The Author concludes with some comments on the theoretical and material links between Notebooks 10 and 11.

La comprensión del mundo nunca puede conseguirse desde una sola perspectiva y el manejo de una red sofisticada de multiplicidades y mediaciones es fundamental en cualquier intento de entendimiento.
Las«cosas»—en entornos físicos o psíquicos—, los signos de esas cosas y las interpretaciones de esos signos constituyen una urdimbre triádica que supera cualquier aproximación unaria, fundamentalista o dogmática. De esta manera, los dogmas religiosos de una metafísica acotada, los dogmas cientistas del empirismo o los dogmas lingüísticos de la filosofía analítica han llevado,
inevitablemente, a fracasos parciales del saber. Solo algunas perspectivas plurales —donde se combinen: (1) matemáticas y arte, (2) teoría y experiencia, (3)
idealidad y realidad, (4) imaginación y lenguaje, (5) invisibilidad y visibilidad, entre otras muchas polaridades— tienen alguna esperanza de poder cubrir la
complejidad del mundo.

This book bridges a gap between discussions about truth, human understanding, and epistemology in philosophical circles, and debates about objectivity, bias, and truth in journalism. It examines four major philosophical theories in easy to understand terms while maintaining a critical insight which is fundamental to the contemporary study of journalism. The book aims to move forward the discussion of truth in the news media by dissecting commonly used concepts such as bias, objectivity, balance, fairness, in a philosophically-grounded way, drawing on in depth interviews with journalists to explore how journalists talk about truth.

For the Routledge Research in Journalism Series.

Der Pragmatismus zählt als eines der bedeutsamsten Theorieparadigmen der Philosophie des einundzwanzigsten Jahrhunderts sowie als eine der wirkkräftigsten Perspektiven der gegenwärtigen philosophischen Forschung. Das Proseminar bietet eine Einführung in den Begriff des Pragmatismus an mit besonderer Berücksichtigung seiner Rolle in der Werkentwicklung John Deweys. Das Werk Deweys spannt nicht weniger als sieben Jahrzehnte um und befasst sich mit allen klassischen Teildisziplinen des Philosophierens sowie mit der Pädagogik und der Psychologie; eher als durch eigenständigen Systembau entwickelt es sich durch eine stetige kritische Auseinandersetzung mit vergangenen und zeitgenössischen Denkweisen. Daher darf es auch nicht überraschend sein, dass die Haltung Deweys selbst zum Pragmatismus im stetigen Wandel begriffen war und vielleicht auch unentschieden blieb. Im Seminar wird der Versuch unternommen, die pragmatistische „Mentalität“ (James) als Reaktion auf bestimmte philosophische, wissenschaftliche und gesellschaftliche Probleme zu begreifen.

In this paper I intend to examine the theoretical contribution of James’s and Dewey’s pragmatist instances to the problem of emotion. I suppose that with their starting point of holistic base and the consequent attempt to transcend the classical dichotomies of body and mind, fact and value of both authors manage to understand the intrinsically aesthetic and anthropological bond of emotion as a distinctive qualitative constitution of experience – even though they explore it through different angles. They view it as a horizon of sense, full of emotional moods. From this standpoint, emotion is not investigated on intrapsychic and intraphysic level, but starting from the sensory media - in with which, and with which, it comes into being and takes shape, in an attempt to determinate not the meaning of emotion as such, but rather the significance of emotion.

"Instrumentality of Moods: Pragmatism and Useful Uselessness of Art." – In this essay the author deals with the problem of “useful uselessness” of art as the background for identifying the nature of pragmatist philosophy of art. First, he introduces an isolationist approach according to which art is distinct or even separate from the rest of life. In the second part he turns to contextualist theories which maintain the integrality of art and life. Although pragmatist aesthetics seems to be thoroughly contextualist from the point of view of this distinction, the author argues that it should be conceived as mediating between the two. Finally, in the third part, he draws on John Dewey’s understanding of “qualitative” nature of thought to localize on this ground the proper pragmatist conception of purpose of art consisting in “creating moods”.

The aim of this study is to introduce in detail the model of descriptive definition of Stephen C. Pepper. After an outline of his analysis of nominal definitions, Pepper’s own conception of descriptive definition is presented. Further on, the study seeks to reveal deeper connections of this model to Pepper’s account of cognitive situation based on the dynamic and reciprocal relation between uncritical knowledge (common sense) and critical knowledge. Finally, the potentially dangerous consequences of ignoring the proper nature and status of definition are discussed.

John E. Smith argued that there were almost as many pragmatisms as pragmatists. Almost all pragmatists criticized abstractive and reductive reasoning in the modern academy, but most entertained different visions of how and to what end academic reasoning should be repaired. Smith's vision was shaped by his strong preference for the classical pragmatisms of Peirce, Dewey, James and also Royce, whose differences contributed to the inner dynamism of Smith's pragmatism. Smith was far less impressed with the virtues of neo-pragmatists who rejected key tenets of the classical vision. My goal in this brief essay is to outline a partial list of these tenets, drawing on Smith's writings and those of a sample of recent pragmatists who share his commitment to the classical vision, such as Richard Bernstein, John Deely, and Doug Anderson. I restate the tenets in the terms of a pragmatic semeiotic, which applies Peirce's semeiotic to classical doctrines of habit-change and reparative inquiry. I conclude by adopting the tenets as signs of pragmatism's elemental beliefs. Consistent with Peirce's account of "original" beliefs, these are not discrete claims about the world or well-defined rational principles but a loose and dynamic network of habits. The habits grow, change, inter-mix or self-segregate through the run of intellectual and social history. They can be distinguished but only imprecisely, described but only vaguely, encountered per se only through their effects. Among these effects are sub-communities of pragmatic inquiry, sub-networks of habits, and existentially marked series of social actions and streams of written and spoken words: including context-specific, determinate claims about the world, about other claims, and about habits of inquiry like pragmatism. Among these claims are my way of stating of the tenets and my arguments about the history of pragmatism. Such claims are determinate, but the habits and tenets of pragmatism are not.

THIS IS PART II OF A TWO PART PUBLICATION

This paper examines the differences between moralist, realist, and pragmatist approaches to political legitimacy by articulating their largely implicit views of judgment. Three claims are advanced. First, the salient opposition among approaches to legitimacy is not between "moralism" and "realism." Recent realist proposals for rethinking legitimacy share with moralist views a distinctive form, called "normativism": a quest for knowledge of principles that solve the question of legitimacy. This assumes that judging legitimacy is a matter of applying such principles to a case at hand. Second, neither Rawls nor Habermas is a normativist about political legitimacy. The principles of legitimacy they proffer claim to express rather than adjudicate the legitimacy of a liberal-democratic regime, and thus cannot solve the question of legitimacy at a fundamental level. But perhaps we should question the normativist aspiration to theoretically resolving the problem to begin with. My third claim is that a "pragmatist" approach enables us to rethink political legitimacy more deeply by shifting focus from the articulation of principles to the activity of judging. Implicit in Rawls and Habermas's theories I then find clues towards an alternative account of judgment, in which the question of legitimacy calls not for theoretical resolution but for ongoing practical engagement.

Notre proposition souhaite interroger l'écart, en apparence irrémédiable, qui peut exister entre le projet (présenté, valorisé et parfois financé) d'une innovation et sa réalisation effective. Dans le domaine de la pédagogie universitaire et, plus largement, des politiques publiques, il n'est pas rare que, « sur le papier », une innovation n'a d'intérêt que proportionnellement à sa nouveauté (le nombre de routines universitaires qu'elle « brise »), son ampleur (le nombre d'acteurs qu'elle engage) ou son ambition théorique (le nombre d'hypothèses qu'elle se propose d'éprouver). Cependant, dans les faits, il semble que ces trois critères (nouveauté, ampleur et ambition théorique), mis en avant par les politiques éducatives actuelles (De Ketele, 2010; Paivandi et al., 2019; Rege Colet et Romainville, 2006; Viaud, 2015), sont autant de difficultés à la réalisation de cette innovation et viennent souvent complexifier la tâche des personnes impliquées jusqu'à la rendre, parfois, impossible. Impossibilité qui devient alors la justification d'une politique néolibérale de l'innovation.

Dans cet essai, je traite de la notion de pratique réflexive, dans sa dimension épistémologique, et de ses enjeux pour les professions de l’ « agir envers autrui », dont le travail social, puisque divers types de savoirs y sont « en action », en usage, notamment pour identifier ce qu’est un « problème social » et de le tenter de le résoudre.
Différentes questions sont abordées, de façon exploratoire : Quelle place est reconnue aux connaissances pratiques, tacites, aux connaissances ordinaires, ou à des connaissances collectives élaborées sur base d’autres critères que ceux qui sont reconnus par la communauté scientifique ? Quels types de savoirs scientifiques sont pris en considération, et de quelle façon ? Que « produisent »-ils ? Quelles sont les conséquences de ces choix ? Lorsque d’autres formes de savoirs sont prises en considération, quel est leur statut épistémique ? Comment évaluer la validité des différents types de savoirs, lorsqu’ils sont mis en œuvre dans des situations concrètes ? Un des enjeux traités est celui de la prise en compte des savoirs propres aux usagers, premiers concernés par les « problèmes sociaux » et par l’intervention.
Comme j’y traite de la question spécifique de l’ « usage » des savoirs en contexte de pratique et de ses enjeux, c’est vers l’épistémologie pragmatiste que je me suis tournée et plus particulièrement vers Schön et Dewey.
J’ai donc cherché à dégager les apports et limites de leur conceptualisation pour une épistémologie des pratiques du travail social et pour une conceptualisation de la réflexivité qui prennent en compte les effets de l’interaction avec les usagers, mais aussi leurs propres aspirations, significations, savoirs, dans l’élaboration et la résolution des problèmes sociaux qui les concernent. En conclusion, j’identifie les types de collaborations entre recherches et pratiques ouvertes par ces perspectives.

L’économie peut-elle, et doit-elle, se prévaloir d’être totalement déconnectée de la philosophie ?
La plupart des économistes semblent répondre à cette question par l’affirmative.
En ce sens, Joseph Schumpeter énonce l’idée d’un voile philosophique qui peut « s’enlever également dans le cas de l’économie : l’analyse économique n’a été modelée à aucune époque par les opinions philosophiques que les économistes se trouvaient avoir » dans son ouvrage « Histoire de l’analyse économique » publié à titre posthume en 1954.
Cependant, plusieurs limites semblent être attachées à certains des postulats de l’économie classique et moderne, qui revendique plus que jamais son statut de science.
Nous évoquerons tout d’abord certaines de ces limites, sans prétendre en faire une liste exhaustive pour autant.
Puis, nous nous intéresserons à l’Institutionnalisme économique, courant ayant émergé au début du XXème siècle aux Etats-Unis, ainsi qu’aux liens que cette école de pensée, menée par Thorstein Veblen et John Roger Commons, a pu lier avec le pragmatisme philosophique.

Este ensayo de Richard Rorty se erige sobre la base de una tesis fundamental: que Spinoza inauguró una tradición filosófica que eventualmente culminaría en el pragmatismo. La superación del dualismo cartesiano por medio de una noción del cuerpo y la mente como partes de una misma unidad permite un cierto entendimiento del mundo que finalmente nos permite preguntarnos ¿cuál es la naturaleza de la verdad?

Como se sabe, a partir del surgimiento de la corriente pragmatista -a raíz de la formulación por parte de Charles S. Peirce de la máxima pragmática- la noción de “verdad” ha ocupado un lugar central en su modo peculiar de pensar. Tal es el peso que esta cuestión tiene desde el origen del pragmatismo que el más reconocido de sus representantes, William James, llegó a decir que el pragmatismo debe entenderse como una teoría de la verdad. En este sentido, me resulta desmesurada la postura rortiana en tanto que pretende interpretar al espíritu pragmatista como una actitud filosófica que considera que respecto de la verdad, como así también de otras nociones epistemológicas, no hay algo interesante para decir más allá de lo que pueda pensarse dentro de determinadas prácticas sociales. Más que una interpretación del movimiento pragmatista, Rorty efectúa una relectura forzada llevando agua para su molino neopragmatista. Es cierto que Dewey y James no son Peirce, pero lejos están de encarnar claros antecedentes del espíritu rortiano, el cual explica el conocimiento en términos de solidaridad y la verdad en términos de un acuerdo no forzado de un grupo particular. Tales nociones rortianas de verdad y conocimiento enclavadas en el culturalismo permiten ubicar tanto a James como a Dewey fuera de la jurisdicción del neopragmatismo radical y, consecuentemente, acercarlos al reformismo tal y como pretende Haack. En efecto, la fundadora del fundherentismo distingue entre un pragmatismo reformista y un pragmatismo radical. El primero, a cuya cabeza se ubica Peirce, va a reconocer la validez de las problemáticas tradicionales sobre la verdad, el conocimiento y la realidad, aceptando cierta objetividad en torno a ellas. En cambio, el segundo, llamado también pragmatismo revolucionario o vulgar, no reconoce legitimidad alguna a las cuestiones epistemológicas fuera de las prácticas sociales, y rechazan todo tipo de objetividad en relación al conocimiento, a la verdad y a la realidad. A partir de esta distinción Haack coloca a Dewey y a James a medio camino entre el reformismo y el radicalismo, por lo que pasarían a integrar un pragmatismo intermedio en donde algunos de sus miembros se acercarían más al reformismo, otros al radicalismo. Sin embargo, Del Castillo considera vanos los esfuerzos por parte de Haack para acercar a James y a Dewey al reformismo peirceano. Por el contrario, sostiene que ambos filósofos integran las filas del radicalismo, aunque un radicalismo distinto del de Rorty. Sin ánimos de participar de la polémica, al menos en esta oportunidad, encuentro más acertada la propuesta de Susan Haack pues, sencillamente, entiendo que para ambos filósofos sí tiene cierta legitimidad e importancia la reflexión en torno a las tópicas epistemológicas, especialmente, en torno a la noción de verdad.
Dejando de lado tales disputas, deseo señalar que es opinión de muchos considerar la teoría pragmática de la verdad como aquella que identifica la verdad con lo útil, con lo que funciona, o bien con lo que nos provoca satisfacción. Como corolario, quienes así entienden la teoría pragmatista de la verdad, ven en el pragmatismo una corriente de pensamiento oportunista, inescrupulosa y relativista, en la que todo vale en tanto se satisfaga nuestros intereses personales o de una determinada comunidad, y esto –sostienen– acarrea nefastas consecuencias ético-políticas como la legitimación del uso de la fuerza, la aceptación de la supervivencia del más fuerte, la justificación del imperialismo o del totalitarismo, entre otras.  Tal cuestión interpretativa no carece de relevancia, prueba de ello es que filósofos de gran talla como Russell y Moore interpretaron la teoría de la verdad pragmática en modo semejante. En este sentido, y a fin de zanjar esta cuestión, el objeto del presente trabajo será explicitar la concepción acerca de la verdad que sostiene el filósofo John Dewey y sus réplicas a este impropio modo de interpretar al pragmatismo.

Par cette proposition, nous voudrions interroger deux actes que l'on pense rarement ensemble ; l'acte d'éduquer de la recherche en éducation et celui de gouverner propre aux décisions politiques. Nous nous proposons d'étudier ces deux actes ensemble pour mettre à jour un véritable problème pour la pratique éducative : ces deux actes sont eux-mêmes pensés à partir de la même conception de l'intelligence : une intelligence individuelle. Le problème est alors le suivant : est-ce que les acteurs de l'éducation, en ne cherchant à éduquer leurs élèves qu'à partir d'une conception individualiste de l'intelligence, ne les rendent-ils pas en posture de se laisser gouverner par n'importe qui ou n'importe quoi ? Nous souhaitons montrer que ce problème fut particulièrement sensible à John Dewey et qu'il traverse son œuvre de recherche pédagogique et politique tout au long de la première moitié du XXème siècle pour formuler un projet politico-pédagogique original et aux pratiques innovantes.

The history of the reception of Richard Rorty´s work in Argentina can not be told without referring to Eduardo Rabossi and Alicia Páez, who must be considered as the first Argentine Rortians. Rabossi was one of the most important analytical philosophers in Latin America. Páez was a philosopher primarily educated in French thought who prematurely died at the beginning of the Nineties. I will show that the fact that it is possible to tell a story with two so different leading characters is part of what I will call " the Rortian Effect, " which is the opening to the possibility for a critical dialogue between philosophical traditions.

La historia de la recepción de la obra de Richard Rorty en la Argentina no puede contarse sin hacer referencia a Eduardo Rabossi y Alicia Páez, quienes deben ser considerados como los primeros Rortianos en dicho país. Rabossi fue uno de los más importantes filósofos analíticos de Latinoamérica. Páez fue una filósofa principalmente formada en el pensamiento francés que falleció prematuramente a principos de los´90. Argumentaré que el que sea posible contar una historia que tenga a estas figuras tan dispares como protagonistas es parte de lo que llamaré " Efecto Rorty, " esto es, la apertura de la posibilidad de un diálogo crítico entre tradiciones filosóficas.

Não se pode contar a história da recepção da obra de Richard Rorty na Argentina sem fazer referência a Eduardo Rabossi e Alicia Páez, que devem ser considerados como os primeiros rortyanos desse país. Rabossi foi um dos mais importantes filósofos analíticos da América Latina. Páez foi uma filósofa que se formou pricipalmente no pensamento francês, tendo falecido prematuramente no começo dos anos 90. Argumentarei que o fato de que se pode contar uma história que tem essas figuras tão díspares como protagonistas é parte do que chamarei "Efeito Rorty," isto é, a abertura da possibilidade de um diálogo crítico entre tradições filosóficas. __________________________________________________________ When I took the decision of writing about the reception of Rorty´s work in Argentina, I feared that my paper might simply develop into an exercise of unchained narcissism. My first reaction was to think that I had to expose some considerations about my own philosophical development, and about the texts of two friends of mine,

If your library has access to Springer Link a full version of this book can be downloaded via: http://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-319-40703-6 . 

This book focuses on the discursive processes that allow activists to make sense of themselves and of the modes of politics they engage in. It shows how political and metadiscursive awareness develop in tandem with a reconfiguration of one’s sense of self. The author offers an integrated pragmatic and poststructuralist perspective on self and subjectivity. He draws on Essex style discourse theory, early pragmatist philosophy, and linguistic pragmatics, arguing for a notion of discourse as a multi-dimensional practice of articulation. Demonstrating the analytical power of this perspective, he puts his approach to work in an analysis of activist discourse on integration and minority issues in Flanders, Belgium. Subjects articulate a whole range of norms, values, identities and narratives to each other when they engage in political discourse. This book offers a way to analyse the logics that structure political awareness and the associated boundaries for discursive self-interpretation.

'At a time in which notions of both politics and activism are being profoundly reshaped, Zienkowski's incisive analysis goes to the heart of what may drive such changes. Empirically delicate and theoretically astute, this is discourse analysis at its best.' - Jan Blommaert, Tilburg University, The Netherlands

'This book is a must-read for anyone interested in the discursive logics that shape self and society, as well as how to study them. It combines discourse theory and pragmatic perspectives on interaction, generating an innovative interpretive and functional heuristic for doing poststructuralist discourse analysis. As an added bonus, it provides a creative and critical contribution to discussions on the workings of ideological fantasy. Highly recommended!' - Jason Glynos, Reader, University of Essex, UK

'If you ever wondered what the world looks like through the eyes of well-informed and politically active members of disadvantaged minorities, you must read "Articulations of self and politics in activist discourse". As a discourse analysis with a truly multidisciplinary orientation, Jan Zienkowski offers unrivaled insights which, based on research in a Belgian context, have unfortunately gained relevance through recent dramatic events.' - Jef Verschueren, Professor, University of Antwerp, Belgium

Beginning with Emerson’s turn from his pulpit, many argue that American philosophy has rigorously held forth against supernaturalism and metaphysics. While most read self-reliance as a call for individualism, I argue that self-reliance is the application of the moral sentiment to the source of existence Emerson calls the Over-soul. Figures like George Kateb, Stanley Cavell, and Jeffrey Stout have presented a very different picture of American pragmatism. Stout, in particular, is responsible for building up what I call “the myth of the Emersonian democrat.” We find that a few philosophical positions generally constitute this myth. The Emersonian democrat is secular, sceptical, relativist, anti-realist, and anti-metaphysical. In
fact, on my reading of the strand of pragmatism running from Emerson through James to Dewey, the
pluralism of the Emersonian democrat depends on certain metaphysical commitments. The traditional
reading of Emerson as anti-religion, and by extension, anti-religious, impedes a better understanding of self-reliance and obfuscates some of the Emersonian inheritances in James and Dewey.

While recent work in lyric theory has put the generic category of the lyric into radical question, less attention has been paid to how lyric poets employ the instabilities of figuration and reference to critical, and ultimately social, ends. Taking as a test case the most popular poet of a regionally authentic American lyric, Robert Frost, I argue that Frost uses techniques of lyric voicing to critique the very means by which persons appear as familiar individuals, of a sociality or place, and therefore worthy of certain liberties and property claims. I draw upon Frost's early New England poems, his relationship with Edward Thomas, as well as his final public lecture, "On Extravagance" to show how he links " drifts" in reference and cumulative "shifts" in sound or sense to the lived experience of transience, particularly within the context of rural economies. Frost allies the vocation of poetry and lyric form not with a rugged isolationism but a more conditional notion of freedom, one that forms across a variety of egoisms, boundaries, and moral or ethical values.

This class, introducing students to the pragmatist tradition and to neo-pragmatism, turned out unexpectedly: students knew so little of the history of modern philosophy that  it was necessary to include  summaries of. e.g., Descartes' approach.  One of the term papers in this class, by the way, was subsequently published in the Transactions of the C. S. Peirce Society.

Cet article est une tentative philosophique ; celle de construire un cadre de pensée à l’intérieur duquel on puisse penser la pédagogie inverse. A partir de la logique de l'enquête défendue par John Dewey (1859-1952), nous chercherons les implications de celle-ci dans le domaine de la pédagogie pour repenser le rapport entre l'enseignant et l'élève. Ce faisant, nous espérons formuler alors les principes éthiques qu'une telle pédagogie nécessiterait alors pour s'appliquer dans toute sa cohérence. L'objectif d'une telle démarche est de montrer comment, en rejetant le dualisme de la recherche et de l'enseignement, le pragmatisme peut faire de l'enseignement une expérience aussi enrichissante sur le plan humain que sur le plan scientifique.

La literatura de la imaginación, al contrario de lo que creería el crítico literario Harold Bloom, comprendía la unidad inseparable, como en el caso de la personalidad de Lincoln, de la conciencia estética y moral, permitiendo que la ética literaria y la experiencia estética de las 'Perspectivas democráticas' resultaran afines. Las 'Perspectivas democráticas' de Whitman representan a la perfección el significado de la escritura como un acto de independencia que refleja indistintamente tanto al individuo como a la sociedad, en una clara muestra de fe en la democracia. El valor democrático de las páginas de Whitman es emancipador para el lector. Se trata, en conclusión, de una experiencia estética afín a la ética literaria que ha fundado una nación, los Estados Unidos de América.

I am planning a history of the notion of philosophical nonsense and naturally difficult historical and exegetical questions have come up.  Charles Pigden has argued that the notion goes back at least as far as Hobbes and that Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant (on some interpretations) and pragmatists such as William James, as well as numerous Twentieth-Century philosophers make use of it.  In this ‘paper’ I put forward for general discussion such questions as whether Hobbes was the first 'nonsensicalist', whether Kant was a 'nonsensicalist' at all, which philosophers if any have considered contradictions to be meaningless and whether Wittgenstein thought that his concept of criterion could legitimately be used verificationistically.  I shall continue to add further questions as they occur to me.