Hegel

Der Gedanke, der sich in der modernen Idee der Autonomie verdichtet, ist ein doppelter: Die Figur der Autonomie enthält zugleich eine neue Auffassung von Normativität und eine eigene Konzeption von Freiheit. Dem Gedanken der Autonomie zufolge ist ein Gesetz, das wahrhaft normativ ist, eines, als dessen Urheber wir uns selbst betrachten können; und eine Freiheit, die im vollen Sinne wirklich ist, drückt sich in Gestalt eben solcher selbstgegebener Gesetze aus. Die Idee der Autonomie artikuliert so die Einsicht, dass man Freiheit und Gesetz nicht durch ihre Entgegensetzung bestimmen kann, sondern durcheinander erläutern muss. Wirkliche Freiheit ist nicht Freiheit von Gesetzen, sondern Freiheit in Gesetzen; verbindliche Normen sind nicht das, was Freiheit äußerlich beschränkt, sondern das, was Freiheit innerlich verwirklicht. Die Idee der Autonomie, die für die moderne praktische Philosophie seit Rousseau und Kant grundlegend ist, zielt so darauf, Freiheit und Verbindlichkeit in einem Zuge zu artikulieren: durch die Form selbstgegebener Gesetze. Mit Beiträgen von Robert Brandom, Judith Butler, Thomas Khurana, Christoph Menke, Terry Pinkard und Sebastian Rödl.

https://classiques-garnier.com/l-histoire-et-la-question-de-la-modernite-chez-antonio-gramsci.html

Le marxisme ouvert d’Antonio Gramsci permet de redéfinir la philosophie de l’histoire en échappant à tout dogmatisme. Gramsci cherche en effet à penser le processus historique dans sa consistance tout en accordant un rôle central à l’activité et aux luttes humaines, en particulier grâce aux notions de praxis, d’hégémonie et de rapports de forces. L’auteur des Cahiers de prison s’attache ainsi à comprendre la complexité de la modernité européenne, depuis ses origines jusqu’à la crise organique qui marque son temps, et s’arrête notamment sur la Renaissance, la Réforme, la Révolution française, le Risorgimento, l’américanisme, le fascisme et le socialisme soviétique.

While the very possibility of a philosophy of history has been widely questioned, this book shows that Antonio Gramsci’s open Marxism gives it new life, away from all dogmatism. Gramsci seeks to conceive the historical process in its consistency while giving a central role to human agency and struggles, thanks to notions such as praxis, hegemony and relations of force. His determination to understand both the coherence and the complexity of European modernity leads him to trace its development from its origins to the organic crisis it was undergoing in his time, from the Renaissance and the Reformation to Americanism, Fascism and Soviet socialism, via the French Revolution and the Risorgimento.

Hegel's approach to sociopolitical normativity can be understood as a response to problems that are also faced by contemporary constructivists and realists. From Hegel's perspective, realists may be able to account for the nonrelative status of norms' content. But they undermine the notion of individual freedom. Meanwhile, constructivists' ability to defend individual freedom comes at the cost of rendering normative content contingent. To avoid these problems, both Aristotle and Kant devise hybrid accounts. However, Aristotle's fundamental commitment to objectivist substance-metaphysics undermines individual choice. Meanwhile, Kant's prioritization of unconditioned individual subjectivity over normative content renders norms subjective. In order to retain both choice-guaranteeing subjectivity and content-defining objectivity, Hegel bases his argument on the metaphysics of "the concept of the will." Within its

This paper has two broad concerns, both of which are primarily pursued with reference to Hegel's philosophy of history. Firstly, it examines if Hegel can help explain the difficulty we have in modernity to respond to climate change and ecological crisis. It argues that Hegel provides a useful analysis of this problem, since the model of self-determination that he appeals to is comprehensively embedded in embodied forms of culture. This helps explain why even a self-correcting world-view like modernity is obdurate in the face of this crisis. Secondly, Hegel claims that the defining attribute of spirit is its capacity for self-production. Modernity is characterized by the emerging and widespread knowledge that spirit is self-producing. Modernity develops institutions that facilitate and provide an objective reality for spirit's self-production and its freedom. This aspect of the paper examines if the distinctive capacity of spirit for self-determination, which is realized in modernity, is subject to the same atrophying conditions by which Hegel says all other historical shapes of spirit are characterized. It asks if the present ecological crisis, something that is directly attributable to spirit itself, represents the limits of self-producing spirit. The paper concludes by examining the difficult position of those countries that cannot be considered as responsible for the emergence of the Anthropocene but whose actions in the present will amplify its impact.

A overview of the "Self-Consciousness" chapter of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit.  I analyze the basic significance of each of the three themes of the chapter, (which Hegel calls "desire," "recognition," and "thought"), and I consider how the relationship between self and other is constituted in each of these fundamental relationships.

Menschliche Kulturen befinden sich in einem Prozess beständiger Umgestaltung und unterliegen mitunter radikalen Veränderungen. In diesem Band werden mit den Mitteln und Methoden der Geschichtsphilosophie, der Soziologie, der Handlungstheorie und der Kulturwissenschaften die grundlegenden Mechanismen und Logiken kultureller Transformationsprozesse herausgearbeitet. Ein interdisziplinäres Spektrum von Perspektiven – u.a. auf die philosophische Ästhetik, die politische Philosophie und die Wissenschaftsgeschichte – zeigt darüber hinaus die Verschiedenartigkeit des Wandels in unterschiedlichen Bereichen der Kultur auf.

(mit Beiträgen von Emil Angehrn, Stefan Deines, Daniel M. Feige, Astrid Erll, Doris Gerber, Oliver Marchard, Johannes Rohbeck, Hartmut Rosa, Martin Seel und Mario Wenning).

Tesi di laurea triennale in filosofia in cui, attraverso la lettura dei testi di A. Kojève, si cerca di rendere chiavi di lettura perfettamente idonee alla comprensione del mondo in cui viviamo quei concetti-cardine del pensiero del russo-francese quali la fine della storia e la fine della politica.

Inhalt
Christoph Binkelmann: Enthusiasmus und Skepsis. Das europäische Pendel
Burkhard Nonnenmacher: Kants Postulatenlehre als Prüfstein für Heideggers »These der neuzeitlichen Ontologie«?
Günter Zöller : Ex aliquo nihil. Fichtes Anti-Kreationismus
Kai U. Gregor: Eine Kritik innerhalb der Grenzen der Vernunft. Wilhelm Weischedels Grundlegungsversuch einer Philosophischen Theologie im Zeitalter des Nihilismus und ein Gedanke Fichtes
Marco Rampazzo Bazzan: Die Staatslehre Fichtes unter dem Aspekt der
politischen Theologie nach Carl Schmitt
Cristiana Senigaglia: Die Spur der Andersheit: Fichte und Levinas
Detlev Pätzold Hegels Philosophie der Religion: Die Stellung der Religion zwischen Kunst und Philosophie
Arthur Kok: Absoluter Geist und Schöpfung. Jan Hollaks neothomistische Hegelkritik
Kazimir Drilo: Kritik des religiösen Bewusstseins. Falk Wagners theologische Interpretation von Hegels »Wissenschaft der Logik«
Jakub Kloc-Konkołowicz: »Der Mensch lebt in zwei Welten […]«. Religion und Staat in Hegels Ansicht und in der heutigen Debatte
Elena Ficara: Der ontologische Gottesbeweis bei Hegel und in der analytischen Philosophie 
Robert Marszałek: Die Gegenwart der Religionslehre des mittleren Schelling
Mildred Galland-Szymkowiak Philosophie und Religion bei K.W.F. Solger.
Ein Beitrag zur nachkantischen Frage nach dem Prinzip der Philosophie
Patrick Grüneberg: Der transzendentale Gott
Wibke Rogge: Emmanuel Lévinas: Über die Beziehung des Unendlichen zum Seienden als Gemeinschaft in der Trennung
Ansgar Lyssy : Darwin, Gott und Neurotheologie. Was können uns die Biowissenschaften über die Religion sagen?

This essay invites us to take Emmanuel Levinas’s thought in the spirit in which it was written: a profound engagement with Husserlian’s phenomenology and, secondarily, with Heidegger’s existential philosophy. Levinas’s central idea, whether called “responsibility,” “substitution,” or the “other-in-the-same,” has often been criticized as mere “smoke and mirrors”—an indemonstrable hermeneutics of ethical investiture. The purpose of this essay is to show how Levinas analyzed and exploited ambiguities in Husserl’s work on intersubjectivity and sensibility, in view of developing his own phenomenology. It is organized as follows: Following an initial discussion of Husserl’s importance as an intersubjective thinker, I situate briefly Husserl’s interest in, and his approach to ethics. I discuss his early equation of object sensations with sentiments of value. Section II turns to Husserl’s interest in “intropathy” (Einfühlung), a concept he appears to have adapted from Theodor Lipps (1851-1914). It was Einfühlung that allowed Husserl to attempt various phenomenological constitutions of the other person; just as it was Einfühlung that provided a bridge between his extensive investigations into intersubjectivity and passive synthesis. Section III develops Husserl’s phenomenology of passive synthesis in light of the evolution of his conception of the living present and of transcendental consciousness. Section IV returns to a moment (1908) when Husserl’s other, like Levinas’s other in 1961, was “absolute”. Section V discusses Einfühlung in Cartesian Meditation V and Husserl’s notes on intersubjectivity during the period 1921 and 1928. Section VI examines intropathy and pairing with the other’s body in view of self-objectification and what Husserl occasionally called Ent-fremdung (alienation). It ventures a rapprochement with concepts in Levinas’s later work (e.g., “recurrence”). Section VII explores Husserl’s approach to affective forces and a phenomenological “unconscious,” with an eye on Levinas’s 1974 resistance to the passive spontaneity of meaning-formation. Section VIII discusses Husserl’s reading of a master-servant relationship and the fusion of wills in praxis. Section IX examines his subjectivity “thrust into the interior” of another subjectivity, and the possibility that the Husserlian monad might have windows. Section X returns to Husserl’s conception of sensation, this time as originary (hyletic) contents that ‘feed’ the flow of time-consciousness. It summarizes Levinas’s interrogation of Husserl’s formalism, notably between 1905 and 1909. In each section, I emphasize ambiguities in Husserl’s thought and the way in which Levinas utilized these between 1961 and 1974. My hope is to sketch some of the lesser known, phenomenological sources of his thought, and thereby encourage discussion of Levinas as an unorthodox Husserlian.

The argument of the first Discours is governed by the antithesis between the ‘original’ nature of man on the one hand and the corruption of modern civilisation on the other; this antithesis is developed in terms of a contrast between the freedom implied by true being and the enslavement and estrangement which is the human condition in the modern world. Rousseau is concerned not so much with historical details as with the moral theme which allows him to separate the original elements of man’s being from the artificial elements added by the process of civilisation. By ‘original’ Rousseau means ‘what belongs incontestably to man’. Rousseau is therefore concerned to distinguish the essential and authentic as given by true original being from the accidental and artificial elements added by civilisation.

http://ojs.francoangeli.it/_omp/index.php/oa/catalog/book/510?fbclid=IwAR1kePaq_Yq-hpJUZ63DNFlz1dpKcQfE3UXX8VdxRnZYQmnWuyUTl3CpL7o

Il volume riunisce contributi che, rispondendo ad un’esigenza oggi molto sentita, si interrogano sui concetti di libertà, responsabilità e imputazione: si tratta di categorie fondamentali non solo in ambito morale, per definire la colpa del soggetto agente, ma anche in ambito giuridico, per definire una pena che sia equa e giusta.
I saggi qui presentati analizzano, da un lato, le condizioni di attribuzione di responsabilità e di libertà all’essere umano; dall’altro, rintracciano forme di libertà anche in riferimento alla natura (tradizionalmente compresa come regno della necessità) e all’indagine filosofica stessa. Si dispiegano così differenti prospettive, che risultano complementari nella comune ricerca di un fondamento filosofico.
A partire da un classico della filosofia antica, Platone, si giungerà, passando attraverso le concezioni della libertà di Leibniz, Kant e Fichte, alla filosofia di Hegel, di cui proprio nel 2020 si celebra il duecentocinquantesimo anniversario della nascita, proseguendo da qui verso la contemporaneità. Ci si interrogherà, infine, sul significato della pratica filosofica e sulla responsabilità che essa comporta.

Scritti di: G. Battistoni, G. Erle, S. Fuselli, P. Giuspoli, F.L. Marcolungo, F.
Menegoni, A. Moretto, A. Schmidt, K. Vieweg.

Les pages les plus connues de Hegel selon Jean-Louis Vieillard-Baron sont celles que l’on nomme ordinairement comme « Dialectique du maître et de l’esclave » dans la Phénoménologie de l’Esprit de 1807. Traditionnellement, on comprend la dialectique du maître et de l’esclave comme le combat des deux consciences pour se faire reconnaître par l’autre, afin de parvenir à la conscience de soi-même. La scène commence par le fait du dédoublement. La conscience de soi s’est perdue dans son autre qui n’est en fait que son extériorité,  son double, mais qui,  dans un deuxième temps, supprime cet autre car c’est elle-même qu’elle voit dans l’autre. Il s’agit donc pour la conscience de soi de se reconnaître elle-même comme conscience de soi. Ceci passe par le dédoublement en deux consciences individuelles et l’utilisation de l’autre comme intermédiaire entre soi et soi. Et ce, afin de passer à la conscience universelle, sujet éthique et gnoséologique qui reste posé, mais non argumenté, dans le criticisme kantien et que l’ouvrage de Hegel vise à justifier en raison. Ainsi le mouvement de la reconnaissance implique à la fois le dédoublement de la conscience de soi et l’unité spirituelle des deux consciences de soi divisées. On voit bien ici la portée politique implicite dans la dialectique du maître et de l’esclave.
Or du point de vue de la pensée d’Emmanuel Levinas, Hegel n’affirme pas l’identité de la conscience de façon simple qu’en excluant l’autre. La conscience de soi est nécessairement orientée vers la suppression de cet autre. Elle s’affirme, selon Levinas, dans un narcissisme absolu. Tout ce qui est autre qu’elle-même est négatif.  La phénoménologie de l’esprit décrit et analyse l’expérience de domination et de perte d’autonomie pour celui qui est dominé. Dans le sixième paragraphe du texte « La trace de l’autre » paru dans la revue Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, de 1963, Emmanuel Levinas étend cette thématique à la totalité de l’histoire de la pensée occidentale en signalant : «La philosophie est atteinte, depuis son enfance, d’une horreur de l’Autre qui demeure Autre, d’une insurmontable allergie. C’est pour cela qu’elle est essentiellement une philosophie de l’être, que la compréhension de l’être est son dernier mot et la structure fondamentale de l’homme. C’est pour cela aussi qu’elle dévie la philosophie de l’immanence et de l’autonomie ou de l’athéisme. Le Dieu des philosophes, d’Aristote à Leibniz, à travers le Dieu des scolastiques- est un dieu adéquat à la raison, un dieu compris qui ne saurait troubler l’autonomie de la conscience, se retrouvant  elle-même à travers toutes ses aventures, retournant chez soi comme Ulysse qui, à travers toutes ses pérégrinations, ne va que vers son île natale. La philosophie qui nous est transmise attribue à ce retour non seulement la pensée théorétique, mais tout mouvement spontané de la conscience. Non seulement le monde compris par la raison cesse d’Être autre car la conscience s’y retrouve, mais tout ce qui est attitude de la conscience, c’est-à-dire valorisation, sentiment, action, travail et, d’une façon plus générale engagement, est en derrière analyse conscience de soi, c’est-à-dire identité et autonomie. La philosophie de Hegel représente l’aboutissement logique de cette allergie foncière de la philosophie. » 

Toutefois, cette opposition de Levinas à Hegel est solidaire d’une certaine interprétation métaphysique de Hegel qui soulignait le rôle de l’esprit absolu dans une spéculation philosophique subordonnée à une certaine exigence de cohérence rationnelle  totale. Or, on sait  que Hegel est, avec Platon, le plus « contrefait » des philosophes. Il est donc possible de trouver une interprétation de Hegel qui plutôt que de les opposer rapproche Hegel et Levinas de façon assez inattendue. Cela s’avère possible si on prend en considération l’importante influence qu’a exercé le commentaire de la Phénoménologie de l’Esprit livré par Alexandre Kojève sur la pensée de Merleau- Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre et Eric Weil qui ont influencé à leur tour la pensée de Levinas. De plus, le problème du désir, qui occupe une place centrale dans la pensée de Levinas, occupe une place tout aussi importante pour la démarche de la conscience dans la lecture de Hegel par Kojève. En effet, la conscience, comme point d’aboutissement de tout phénomène, est elle-même une force qui n’est pas seulement attirée par son autre, à savoir l’objet, mais qui tend aussi à repousser ce qui est identique. Autrement dit, la conscience saisit désormais l’importance de son propre rôle dans la concurrence des désirs, des attractions et des répulsions de forces. Ainsi, la vérité de tout phénomène n’apparaît que si l’on tient compte du jeu de toutes les forces qui interviennent, qu’elles soient directes ou indirectes. En ce sens, les phénomènes ne se réduisent pas si facilement à une loi, mais l’entendement se trouvera donc ouvert à une infinité de relations fluides, mouvantes, vivantes  dans une quête sans fin. La philosophie de Hegel s’ouvre à un monde contingent, imprévisible où chaque partie réfracte la totalité des relations auxquelles elle participe  et qui changent constamment. On sait bien que pour Kant comme pour Leibniz la conscience de lui-même ne pouvait pas déroger aux lois qui gouvernent son émergence. Hegel bouleverse ce préjugé : cette conscience de  soi dont tout le travail consiste précisément à s’extraire de ce monde, à entrer en lutte avec les autres. Pour cet homme la vérité est la tension entre l’infini de l’autre et l’infini de son propre pouvoir de négation. La dialectique est devenue alternance d’angoisse et de révolte, puissance érotique de dépense et d’ouverture à l’autre.  En faisant cela, Kojève ajoute une nouvelle oscillation entre esprit subjectif et esprit objectif. Quant à l’esprit subjectif, l’accent est mis sur la dialectique du désir et du manque, tandis que l’esprit objectif met en avant les besoins immédiats. Besoin de saisir, de maîtriser la réalité et désir d’assumer, de revendiquer l’échec de cette entreprise. Chacun d’entre nous, comme le dirait Jaques Lacan, se balance entre l’imaginaire et le réel, entre l’existence rêvée de l’enfant et le désir impossible pour la mère, entre le fantasme de maîtrise et la douleur du manque. Lacan dirait que cela correspond précisément à la prééminence de l’autre chez Hegel. Pensée de Jaques Lacan qui est, selon  Slavoj Žižek,  « L’une des plus authentiquement hégéliennes ». Donc, il ne s’agit pas pour Hegel de supprimer la différence, mais de donner un champ plus vaste au régime de la négativité propre à cette différence. Tout cela implique donc une possible interprétation post-métaphysique de Hegel qui donne un lieu prioritaire à l’autre.

Notre thèse vise donc à confronter la pensée de Levinas à celle d’Hegel autour du problème de la reconnaissance. Elle a pour but non seulement de faire une lecture critique de la pensée de Levinas à la lumière de la pensée de Hegel, mais de mener également une lecture critique du problème de la reconnaissance chez Hegel à la lumière des exigences de Levinas. Le propos est d’envisager une relecture du problème de la reconnaissance qui permette de surmonter l’ensemble des critiques. Ainsi, nous projetons de faire une relecture de l’ensemble de la philosophie hégélienne en donnant une portée post-métaphysique à son œuvre.

This essay aims to demonstrate a clear and significant difference, not merely expository revisions or additions, in the logical progression of Being between Hegel's two main versions of the Doctrine of Being (1812-1817 and 1827-1830, 1832). This controversial issue is analysed by retracing and examining changes that international scholarship still widely neglects. Focussing on Hegel's introduction of the doubled transition of Quality and Quantity in the genesis of Measure, the essay argues that the main point of the revisions is that Hegel views the whole determinateness of Being as self-sublating its own externality, because in one determination of Being passing into another one, the first does not vanish; instead, both remain within their relational unity. Hegel's new version of the genesis of Measure indicates an essentially qualitative appreciation of the quantitative methods of the empirical sciences. This accords with Hegel's growing acknowledgment in Berlin of the independent cognitive status of the natural sciences in regard to philosophy, and with his reassessment of the relation among intuition, representation and conceptual cognition of the objects of consciousness, to do justice to their real differences and their being for themselves within their own existence.

Uma das grandes diferenças do filósofo para o sofista é o apego à verdade. A verdade nesse sentido tem o significado literal de conhecimento, que é um discurso ou explicação comprovável sobre o real, o todo. O sofista não se preocupa com a factualidade de seu discurso, pois este é utilitarista, feito no sentido de gerar ou obter algo. Por exemplo, manipular ou iludir a percepção de uma plateia para retirar benefícios próprios ou para seus associados.

Em termos heraclíticos, nesse caso, o logos humano não tem como critério estar o mais próximo possível de transliterar o logos das coisas, a lógica da própria realidade, da existência em si, ou do objeto de estudo particular em questão. Já o filósofo tem um apego profundo pela factualidade de seu discurso, pois se por definição este é literalmente um amigo do conhecimento, portanto, só pode ser também amigo da verdade. Seu discurso não é feito para manipular ou iludir, posto que a verdade muitas vezes é oposta àquilo que se espera ou se deseja.

Visa, contudo, explicar e descrever a realidade, a existência ou um objeto de estudo em particular. Em termos heraclíticos, nesse caso, o logos humano tem exatamente como critério estar o mais próximo possível de transliterar o logos das coisas, a lógica da própria realidade, da existência em si, ou do objeto de estudo particular em questão. O filósofo pode se enganar, mas diferente do sofista, este não o faz de forma deliberada, mas por erro ou impossibilidade. Essa complicada questão, o "problema do critério da verdade", é o fator central analisado no presente ensaio.

In this paper I sketch the emergence of transcendence and immanence to the binary pair of opposites we know today. I show that such usage doesn't stretch back beyond Kant and that its real career only takes off in the 1830s. Major influences on this development are the debate about Spinoza's 'pantheism', Hegel's idealism, and the place of religion in the modern world. In a second part, I look at some historical scholarship of the time to illustrate how the duality of transcendence and immanence began to inform the reading of earlier religious history. I end by pointing to some new contexts that are beginning to emerge at the turn of the 20th century, notably Catholic thought, and which ensured that the popularity of that duality continued to grow.

In this chapter I focus on a few selected building blocks that will pave the way for a renewed, thorough, and sober phenomenological reading of Marx’s philosophy. I intend to show here that this can be done best through 1) moving Marx away from a Hegelian framework, 2) understanding the concept of critique as an attempt to de-naturalize social phenomena and as disclosure, and 3) showing that Marx’s concept of philosophy, his method, as well as his understanding of technology, are forms of “disclosure.” This, in turn, should point us away from a dialectical understanding of Marx and open up new venues for a phenomenologically inspired critique of political economy.

En el presente escrito se buscará dar cuenta del papel que juega el lenguaje en la fenomenología, esto teniendo en cuenta que implícita o explícitamente es un tema transversal en toda la obra. Es por ello que se intentará dar razón de la importancia que tiene el lenguaje en el transcurso de la construcción y el desarrollo del espíritu, y cuál es su aporte en la llegada al absoluto; así que se hará un seguimiento general, haciendo énfasis en los capítulos en los que Hegel resalta de forma más explícita su importancia (la cultura y la Gewissen).

In this paper, I shall discuss the problematic relations between logical and
temporal aspects of the Hegelian system. The assumed interdependence of
time and concept makes Hegel’s system peculiar for it seems to exceed the
opposition between diachrony and synchrony. This distinctive trait of speculative
dialectics has caused many misunderstandings in the reception of Hegelianism.
In particular, it has led to simplifying and one-sided interpretations
of the role of time in Hegel’s system, which violate the basic assumptions
of absolute idealism. There are two main types of such misreading,
namely (1) a historistic one, according to which thought structures are derivatives
of the accidental historical process, whose nature precludes the
possibility of a system as it falls into a spurious infinity. And (2) a panlogistic
interpretation, according to which history is subordinate to the eternal
concept that predetermines the necessary logic of all worldly events. In this
perspective, time is only a semblance that is exposed and eventually abolished
when absolute knowledge is established.

"Il virus dell'Occidente. Universalismo astratto e sovranismo particolarista di fronte allo stato d'eccezione", Mimesis, Milano 2020.

In questo libro parlo male di: Foucault, Heidegger, Agamben, Cacciari, Di Cesare, Wu Ming, Zizek, Badiou, C. Galli, Runciman, Urbinati, Ignazi, Panebianco, Giavazzi, della Loggia, Battista, Molinari, Brennan, Mearsheimer, Milanovic, Aresu, Zhok, Formenti e molti altri.

Parlo invece bene di: Hegel, Marx, Engels, Croce, Gramsci, Lukacs, Jullien, Habermas, Prospero, Illetterati, Moroncini, Tedesco, Brancaccio, Mazzucato, Bell, Pieranni, Esposito, Dal Lago, Marramao, Losurdo, Deng Xiaoping, Zhang Boying, Zhao Tingyang, Balibar, Chomsky, Bergoglio e altrettanti.

Cerco di dare infine a Costanzo Preve il suo, nel bene come nel male.

Accattatevèllo. Il divertimento non è assicurato ma nel mio minuscolo ci ho provato.

"La pandemia di Covid-19 ha fatto emergere le contraddizioni delle  società capitalistiche, rese sempre più fragili e disuguali da decenni  di guerra ai salari e ai diritti delle classi subalterne, dallo  smantellamento del welfare e dal prevalere di forme di  coscienza ultracompetitive. Certo della propria eternità e incapace di  immaginare un modello alternativo di legame sociale, l’Occidente ha  creduto che il “virus cinese” colpisse solo i paesi arretrati o ritenuti  autoritari e che mai potesse diffondersi nelle nostre efficienti e  trasparenti democrazie tecnologiche. Invece di prendere sul serio  l’esperienza di altre realtà che hanno gestito meglio l’emergenza grazie  alla capacità dello Stato e della politica di guidare l’economia e la  produzione, subordinando gli interessi privati a quelli della  maggioranza, ha negato a essa ogni riconoscimento, fino a procurarsi da  solo un rischio estremo per eccesso di hybris.
A questa  rinuncia suicida a guardare l’alterità non è sfuggito il dibattito  filosofico: di fronte allo stato d’eccezione, sia le posizioni  dirittumaniste astratte sia il sovranismo particolarista e populista –  che dell’odierna egemonia neoliberale costituisce non l’alternativa, ma  una scissione conservatrice – condividono infatti il medesimo  atteggiamento suprematista, con il rifiuto di elaborare una forma  concreta di universalismo e di pensare una diversa configurazione del  rapporto tra individuo, società civile e Stato, ma anche una diversa  forma di convivenza tra le nazioni".

Stefano G. Azzarà (Messina, 1970) insegna Storia della filosofia all’Università di  Urbino. È segretario alla presidenza dell’Internationale Gesellschaft  Hegel-Marx e dirige la rivista scientifica “Materialismo Storico”. Il  suo lavoro si concentra sul confronto tra le grandi tradizioni  filosofiche e politiche degli ultimi due secoli: conservatorismo,  liberalismo, marxismo. Ha pubblicato diverse monografie e numerosi  articoli su riviste italiane e internazionali.

http://mimesisedizioni.it/il-virus-dell-occidente.html

INDICE

Capitolo primo
I.1. Crisi storiche e naturalismo capitalistico
I.2. Lo spettro del «totalmente altro»: la Cina e  l’Occidente
I.3. Circoscrivere il contagio o procurarsi da  soli un rischio?
I.4. Costruzione e criminalizzazione del nemico
I.5. Democrazie liberali e “regimi autoritari”  nello stato d’eccezione
I.6.  Democrazia o democrazie?
I.7. Democrazia liberale e democrazia socialista
Appendice.  Universalismo concreto e dialettica dell’inclusione nel Tianxia, la  «via del Cielo»

Capitolo secondo
II.1. Il virus dei filosofi 1. Eccezione e  repressione
II.2. Il virus dei filosofi 2. Immunizzazione e  esclusione
II.3. Il virus dei filosofi 3. L’individuo e  l’altro
II.4. Il  virus dei filosofi 4. Liberalismo e «anarchismo da Gran Signore»
II.5. Miseria della critica della biopolitica
II.6. Nihil sub sole novum?
II.7. Perché tutto cambi
II.8. Perché non cambi nulla nell’essenziale. Un  nuovo saccheggio economico?
II.9. Perché non cambi nulla nell’essenziale.  Un’ulteriore concentrazione del potere?

Capitolo terzo
III.1. Quale ritorno dello Stato?
III.2. Jones e Brennan: critica della democrazia  moderna, fine del suffragio universale e monopolio epistocratico del potere
III.3. Ripristino del liberalismo  particolaristico e capitalismo organizzato: verso uno «statalismo  autoritario»
III.3.a.  Milanović: «capitalismo meritocratico liberale» contro «capitalismo politico»
III.3.b. Mearsheimer: fine  dell’illusione dell’universalismo liberale dirittumanista e revival  del realismo particolaristico
III.3.c. Aresu: «capitalismo  politico» o trasfigurazione della riscossa delle classi dominanti?
III.4.  Sovranismo e comunitarismo
III.5.  Il “socialismo” comunitarista
III.6.  Esternalizzazione del conflitto. “Oltre destra e sinistra”
III.7. Liberalismo e sovranismo, universalismo e  particolarismo
III.8. Ricostruire la democrazia moderna

In order to restore the global economy to solid and sustainable growth, capitalism needs to be reformed from an irrational profit-maximising model into a more rational profit-equalising one. In the aggregate the growth rate of gross operating surplus plus gross mixed income must equal that of gross domestic product and not exceed it, thereby ensuring that the compensation of employees increases proportionally as well. This would prevent the deflationary effect of having continually to refinance debt as it increases disproportionally relative to GDP over successive economic cycles, the root cause of which is not treating the compensation of employees as both a cost and an income in the pursuit of maximising profitability. In SNA national income accounting methodology, income derived GDP is equal to gross operating surplus plus gross mixed income plus compensation of employees plus taxes on production and imports less subsidies. Thus, as profit and mixed income increase relative to GDP, employee compensation must necessarily decrease proportionally with allowances for taxes and subsidies. As wages and salaries are both a cost and an income, which is a self-evident truth, if they are suppressed as a cost on the supply side of an economy in order to maximise profit, this reduction affects aggregate demand by a proportional amount on the demand side by weakening the multiplier. This distorts supply and demand, leading to serious economic imbalances over time. Prices or rather their relative components of wages and profit determine the equilibrium of supply and demand in the aggregate rather than the other way around as the fundamental tenet of neo-classical economics proposes.

The equation below provides evidence that the first principle of wages being a cost and an income is key to balancing supply and demand, and income and expenditure over the economic cycle as well as economics becoming a fully-fledged science. Using United States’ national accounts time series data between 1972 and 2007 to empirically demonstrate a causal connection between the real and financial economies, the increasing dysfunction of the business cycle can be explained. Evidence from other national economies is examined as well. Despite wages being both a cost and a source of demand being obvious and fundamental to Keynes’ demand side theory in his General Theory, it has never been properly acknowledged or its effects fully understood. This reluctance to examine profit is an example of the dialectical opposition between convention based on excessive self-interest in the face of a seemingly uncertain and threatening environment and reason based on the underlying scientific laws of nature. Convention is always stronger than reason in the short to medium term and is only forced to become more rational in the longer term once it has finally collapsed under the weight of its contradiction with reality. The convention of profit-maximising capitalism could soon be at this point if the wall of corporate refinancing it faces in the next few years proves to be insurmountable.

In Hegel’s idea there are three main constituent step to establish a state which are family, civil society and state. People first become together in a family, and then they build a civil society, and finally they establish a state. Hegel attached a step to these stages which is existence of civil society, but in this issue the most important part of the differences between Hegel and Thomas is about what people can do when the state act wrong for people. In Thomas’s theory, when the government makes something that community disagrees, community can only pray for the government to find the God’s true way, but for Hegel, the state can’t do anything wrong, because the state is already coming from the society to supply the common benefits and the state takes it as the community’s duty. The source of this differences is about why they made law. For Thomas, people made the law and set up rules because of the God’s wishes. It is apparent that religion, law and other social institutions can be positive for Hegel in that they are maintained by force or manipulation. In short, these institutions are no longer genuine , so for Hegel, people establish law to ensure their common benefits.

In a world where exploitation and uneven development condemn billions to suffering, the proper understanding of the intellectual relationship between Hegel and Marx appears a small matter indeed.  Marx’s Capital, however, remains the single most important text for comprehending the system that generates this suffering.  The question of the proper reading of this work thus remains important.  Sooner or later this brings us to the Hegel/Marx question.  The views of John Rosenthal are critically examined and an alternative perspective defended.