Hatred

Przystępując do pracy nad tą książką, wiedzieliśmy, czego się spodziewać: dobrze znamy literaturę przedmiotu i na co dzień obserwujemy polską mediasferę. Chcieliśmy tylko pokazać, jak można badać nienawiść w mediach za pomocą narzędzi analitycznych nauki o komunikowaniu i mediach. A jednak wiele rzeczy zaskoczyło nas i zdziwiło. (…) Najbardziej dotknęły nas dwie sprawy.


Pierwsza – że nie musieliśmy specjalnie szukać przypadków skrajnej nienawiści, długo i mozolnie kolekcjonować przykładów. Po prostu sięgnęliśmy do mediów w dniu, w którym postanowiliśmy napisać tę książkę, i bez problemu znaleźliśmy mnóstwo materiału do badań.

Druga to nieodpowiedzialność mediów. Redakcje mają do dyspozycji różne mechanizmy służące temu, żeby nie wpuszczać nienawiści na swoje łamy. Tymczasem nie tylko same ją generują, ale też dają pole do jej niemal nieskrępowanej ekspresji. Chowają się przy tym za plecami odbiorców, mówią: to nie my, to czytelnicy. Skrywają się też za wolnością wypowiedzi – przecież nie będą cenzurować własnych forów dyskusyjnych. Wymówkę znajdują w domniemanych życzeniach czytelników i widzów – przecież tego chce ich grupa docelowa. Podnoszą w ten sposób temperaturę w garnku, w którym gotujemy się jak żaba z anegdoty, i nie wiadomo, czy już nie jest za późno. (…)

Mamy nadzieję, że przedstawione w niniejszym opracowaniu sposoby systematycznej obserwacji nienawiści w mediach staną się przyczynkiem do szerszych badań tego zjawiska i podjęcia prób jego eliminacji. Liczymy na to, że ta książka będzie przydatna nie tylko przedstawicielom akademii, ale również redakcjom, które mogą wykorzystywać zaprezentowane metody analizy własnych działań w mediach.

Od Autorów

The view we defend is that in virtue of its nature, disgust is not fit to do any moral or social work whatsoever, and that there are no defensible uses for disgust in legal or political institutions. We first describe our favoured empirical theory of the nature of disgust. Turning from descriptive to normative issues, we address the best arguments in favour of granting disgust the power to justify certain judgements, and to serve as a social tool, respectively. Daniel Kahan advances a pair of theses that suggest disgust is indispensable (Moral Indispensability Thesis), and so has an important part to play in the functioning of a just, well-ordered society (Conservation Thesis). We develop responses and show how they rebut the arguments given in support of each thesis. We conclude that any society free of social disgust would be more just, reasonable and compassionate.

The experience of sense is based on first, our sensory-motor experience, our emotions, and our inner relation with the world; and second, our diverse creative capacities in using sensory-motor processes to understand abstract concepts. Even the most abstract concepts, such as emotions, have a meaning that is rooted in our sensory perception and our physical experience. Our knowledge and experience are dependent on our brain, which is within our body and the body operates in the world, so that when the body ends up in a general and destructive way, we lose the power of experience (Johnson, 2007, p. 36). Over the past two decades, there has been a striking breakthrough in our knowledge of what emotions are and how emotions can help us with meaning. “Conceptual metonymies” are one group of the cognitive mechanisms of meaning making that were first introduced in the book “The Metaphors we live by” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Actually, emotional effects are expressed in terms of conceptual metonymies in the language. Unlike many people, emotions and feelings should not be considered intangible or unfounded. Their main position is clear and they can be related to certain systems in the body and the brain (Damasio, 2005, p. 246).  In this article, we intend to present the conceptual metonymies of the concept of hatred in contemporary Persian language in a figurative way, and in fact, we seek to reach the goal that Persian speakers feel the concept of hatred. Because feelings of emotion can be expressed through conceptual metonymy, this cognitive mechanism will be used to achieve this goal. The purpose of this research is to examine the conceptual metonymies of the emotional concept of hatred from the cognitive-corpus perspective and to adapt the results of the analysis of linguistic data with neurobiological findings. In this paper, we will present the definition of “emotion” and distinguish it from “feeling”. The conceptual metonymies of hatred showed that in Persian Language, all four aspects of the effects of affection on human beings (physical, mental, facial, and behavioral), along with the linguistic analysis, confirmed the results and neurobiological findings of the emotions. Analysis of data related to the emotional concept of hatred in Persian speakers of the fact that an emotion in addition to the stimulus that causes it (the cause of affection) has a variety of effects on human beings, and these effects are spoken language by means of a conceptually perceptual cognitive tool Expressing From the neurobiological point of view, feelings, cognition of the viscera and musculoskeletal status provide us; in other words, feelings allow us to live up to our body and provide us with a glimpse of what our skin and our flesh pass through. Because emotions are the guarantor of our survival and our ability to function in harmony with the environment and with individuals, so the foundation of the human nervous system is often composed of inherent regulating tendencies that guarantee the survival of living beings. Survival is coincident with the final analysis of the unpleasant state of the body and the achievement of coexistence, that is, balanced biological functions. For example, this internal nervous system is inherently intent on avoiding pain and looking for potential pleasure. In Kövecses’s view (1393, p. 157), conceptual metonymies is a situation in which part of a domain (concept) represents another part of the same domain and vice versa. He says that emotional metonymy can be divided into two general categories: “the cause of emotions instead of emotions” and “the effect of emotions instead of emotions”. Conceptual metonymies related to the concept of hatred fall into two broad categories: the cause of hatred instead of hate and the effects of hatred rather than hate. Of the contemporary Persian language, from a total of 96 extracted data, 39 are related to the effects of hatred that fall into subcategories and 57 are related to hatred. Finally, a three-stage model for the formation and emergence of emotions, including the hatred that was the result of cognitive-neurobiological analysis, was presented for the occurrence of the opposite event and the cause of the formation of hatred (the acts and words of the particular people who cause hate): “hateful or disgusting” attributes as the external motive that creates hatred in humans; the formation of the hatred (the effect of hatred on the face and body of hatred experincer); the appearance of hatred (showing hatred in a different way).