

Inside Cyle a diplomatists
diary During the Dardanelles
expedition - Lewis Einstein

1-VIII-1912

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Bulgaria decides.

Aug. 1., Discussed the Serbian Bulgarian situation with Koloucheff, who came to lunch. He thought the military occupation of the Salonika Nish line probable, in order to exert pressure on Serbia to make the necessary concessions. Personally I believe it would be a master stroke. It would (1) force the hand of Greece; (2) effectively deter Bulgaria from attacking Serbia, which in such would mean attacking the Allies; (3), facilitate Serbian concessions, as the Allies being in the possession of this territory could guarantee its delivery; (4), justify asking for such concessions by the additional aid afforded to Serbia., (5), render increasingly difficult the possibility of the Central Powers forcing a passage to Bulgaria & Turkey; (6), facilitate an eventual Serbian offensive. Koloucheff did not believe that Bulgaria in any case would tolerate the passage of German troops, which was contrary to her interests. But he spoke in the harshest terms of the Serbian Government. His hatred is unmeasured

though he ^{me} agreed with that to substitute an enlarged Austria would not be to his country's interests. Sooner or later war was inevitable over Macedonia if it were not ceded freely. In that case Bulgaria 'to pay its debts' would move against Turkey. He quoted the words of General Savoff who declared that in 22 days they could ^{be} at Gallipoli, & in 31 the Dardanelles would be open. I asked him, if such a cession proved impossible, would Bulgaria begin war against Serbia at this time. He said "No", out of respect for Russia. Bulgaria was anxious, moreover, he had the honor to tell me, to create a new canon of morality in spite of the example set by the great powers.

Sept; 7. The agreement with Bulgaria, I am told confidentially, was signed last night. In return for neutrality Bulgaria obtains the right bank of the Maritza, later she may invade Serbia contemporaneously with Germany. The agreement is to be kept secret till published in Sofia. So much for its public clauses. Its secret ones will remain in the dark, but doubtless include the passage of munitions. I heard that only lately when a train of 3000 cars arrived of these at the Bulgarian frontier they allowed 200 to pass on condition that the remainder should be given them for their own army. Without German munitions the Dardanelles defences could not last a month, for they can here only turn 300 6 inch. shells per day. Koloucheff, however emphatically denied to me the existence of any agreement. He said one had some time ago been discussed over the railway, but this had fallen through, yet 2 Bulgarian generals Ivanoff & Novacheff, are here presumably for this purpose. We shall ^{know} eventually, but the situation looks bad for the Entente, and with 300,000 Turkish troops at the Dardanelles these as Koloucheff maintains are

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impregnable. The Turks have one great advantage in being able to rest their divisions when tired, which becomes more difficult for the Allies. On the other hand I am told that only 20% of the Turkish can be sent back to the front, whereas in Germany the proportion is 78%.
