Today me, tomorrow thee
Efficient resource allocation in competitive settings using karma games
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2019-07
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Working Paper
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Abstract
We present a new type of coordination mechanism among multiple agents for the allocation of a finite resource, such as the allocation of time slots for passing an intersection. We consider the setting where we associate one counter to each agent, which we call karma value, and where there is an established mechanism to decide resource allocation based on agents exchanging karma. The idea is that agents might be inclined to pass on using resources today, in exchange for karma, which will make it easier for them to claim the resource use in the future. To understand whether such a system might work robustly, we only design the protocol and not the agents' policies. We take a game-theoretic perspective and compute policies corresponding to Nash equilibria for the game. We find, surprisingly, that the Nash equilibria for a society of self-interested agents are very close in social welfare to a centralized cooperative solution. These results suggest that many resource allocation problems can have a simple, elegant, and robust solution, assuming the availability of a karma accounting mechanism.
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published
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1907.09198
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Cornell University
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09574 - Frazzoli, Emilio / Frazzoli, Emilio
08686 - Gruppe Strassenverkehrstechnik
09478 - Dörfler, Florian / Dörfler, Florian
02655 - Netzwerk Stadt u. Landschaft ARCH u BAUG / Network City and Landscape ARCH and BAUG