SMALL BOATS,

BIG BUSINESS
THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF CROSS-
CHANNEL MIGRANT SMUGGLING

FEBRUARY 2024
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The research and drafting of this report were led by a team from the Global
Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC), including (in alphabetical
order) Lucia Bird, Giulia D’Amico, Sarah Fares, Alex Goodwin and Tuesday Reitano.
We had the benefit of the invaluable insights of a far wider group of contributors
based in Iraq, Albania, Afghanistan and all along the route to France, including
members of the GI-TOC Network of Experts, NGOs based in northern France,
journalists, field researchers and other associates. In particular, we would like
to acknowledge Xavier Darrivere, Geri Emiri, Afshin Ismaeli, Allah Mohammad
Mohmandzaï and Megan Teo. A number of our contributors preferred to remain
anonymous, but we nonetheless offer them our hugest thanks.
Interviews were conducted with Afghan asylum seekers in the UK by the Afghan
Institute for Strategic Studies at the University of Sussex, and we are grateful to
their team for their collaboration.
Finally, thanks as always to our marvellous colleagues in Publications and
Communications, who always enhance the quality and impact of our work.

© 2024 Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.

All rights reserved.

No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted

in any form or by any means without permission in writing from
the Global Initiative.

Cover: © Andrew Aitchison/In Pictures via Getty Images

Please direct inquiries to:

The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime
Avenue de France 23
Geneva, CH-1202
Switzerland
www.globalinitiative.net
CONTENTS
Executive summary: The industrialization of migrant smuggling���������������������������������������������������������������� 1

Introduction: The promised land��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 4

A brief history of human smuggling across the Channel������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 6

The smuggling ecosystem before 2018����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������6
The growing number of small-boat crossings�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8

The Kurds take charge����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11

Territory and geography���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13
Paying your passage: The hawala system��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 15
A violent business �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16

Anatomy of a crossing����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 17
Waiting for passage������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 17
Preparing for departure ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 19
The crossing�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 20

Responses: Delinking demand from organized crime��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 23

Notes���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 26

FROM VISION TO ACTION: A DECADE OF ANALYSIS,

DISRUPTION AND RESILIENCE
The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime was founded in 2013. Its vision was to
mobilize a global strategic approach to tackling organized crime by strengthening political commitment
to address the challenge, building the analytical evidence base on organized crime, disrupting criminal
economies and developing networks of resilience in affected communities. Ten years on, the threat
of organized crime is greater than ever before and it is critical that we continue to take action by
building a coordinated global response to meet the challenge.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: THE
INDUSTRIALIZATION OF
MIGRANT SMUGGLING

A s of January 2024, over 100 000 people had crossed the English Channel using small boats
since 2018. The current peak came in 2022, when over 45 000 people were detected
arriving in the UK illegally using small boats launched from the coast of northern France.1
Although small in comparison with the flows of migrants risking the journey across the Mediterranean
to reach Europe each year, this figure marked a record high for the UK since records began in 2018.2
The spike in the number of arrivals can be largely explained by the ‘industrialization’ of a system of
smuggling migrants by boat, a process that began in 2018.

Crossing the English Channel by boat is a technique developed by human smugglers in response to
tighter security in northern France adopted in an attempt to stem growing waves of migrants – the
so-called ‘migrant crisis’ of 2015–2018. Smugglers had previously sought to hide their clients in trucks
using the Channel Tunnel, but faced with heightened surveillance and interdiction by the authorities,
began to shift towards small boats as a means of transport at once simple and efficient, yet far more
perilous for the passengers. Brexit and the coronavirus pandemic are also factors behind this shift: the
former raised fears among migrants that they would be subjected to tougher border controls, while
both Brexit and the pandemic raised the price migrants had to pay for passage by truck (although this
method has continued to be used).

These factors are not the only reason. Human smuggling networks have commercialized the small-
boat route, keeping prices competitive and launching persuasive recruitment campaigns in migrants’
countries of origin. Operations have become more sophisticated and efficient. Smugglers manage
the flow by temporarily holding migrants away from the coast, where law enforcement attention is
concentrated. Once a boat or a flotilla has been dispatched, the next is prepared, reducing the time
migrants spend in makeshift camps, and thus their likelihood of being apprehended. Law enforcement
operations have driven innovation among smugglers, who have become adept at using small boats,
from supply of the vessels to the point they are launched, and using departure points that are out of
the spotlight of security agencies.

Iranian Kurdish criminal actors were the first to organize this method of crossing, but control over
smuggling in the coastal region was quickly asserted by Iraqi Kurdish groups, who now are the
arbiters of when migrants depart and from where.3 These groups have defined zones of interest,

1
 although violent competition over departure sites as well as pragmatic cooperation between clans
are common. Albanian people smugglers – perceived in the British media as the most significant actor
in this space – work under the auspices of Kurdish actors. During fieldwork for this study, Albanian
migrants said that their Albanian smuggler reported to Iraqi Kurd networks, who made the decisions
about departures.4

50
45 774
45

40

35

30 28 526
Thousands

24 830
25

20

15

10 8 466

5
1 843
299

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

(Jan–Sep)
FIGURE 1 Numbers of migrants detected using small-boat crossings, 2018 to September 2023.

SOURCE: UK Home Office, Irregular migration detailed datasets and summary tables, https://www.gov.
uk/government/statistical-data-sets/irregular-migration-detailed-dataset-and-summary-tables#detailed-
datasets

According to one smuggler based in Germany, a smuggling network tends to consists of between eight
and twelve people.5 The kingpin usually lives in another country, together with a trusted person who
controls the network for the kingpin. (Some smugglers continue to operate their networks from inside
prison, often having smuggled in a mobile phone.) On the French coast, the other network members
are assigned functions: three or four guide the migrants to the entry point; another three to four
take care of logistics, involving transporting the boat engines, hulls and fuel to the launching point.
The rest work as guards, monitoring the area for rival networks and law enforcement agents. It is a
highly lucrative business, with one source estimating that smuggling networks can earn more than a
million US dollars (approximately €920 000) a month.6 Xavier Delrieu, head of the French Office for
the Fight against the Illicit Trafficking of Migrants, estimated that the value of the migrant smuggling
industry in 2022 was €150 million.7

The migrant bears the overwhelming burden of risk – physical, psychological and legal. The boats are
often overloaded with passengers to maximize profits, and structurally unsuited for such dangerous
seas and capsize. Some make the journey successfully; others are intercepted, but many drown at sea.
According to the IOM Missing Migrants project, between 2014 and September 2023, 220 migrants
and refugees went missing or died, including children, when attempting to cross the Channel.8 The
greatest proportion of deaths – almost 60% – have occurred since 2019 (see Figure 2).9

2
60

50
50
45

40

31
30

22
20 17
13 13
11 10
10 8

2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

FIGURE 2 Migrant deaths in the English Channel, by year.

SOURCE: IOM, Missing Migrants

This report explores how the English Channel has become a commercialized human smuggling route. It
analyzes the shift in the mode of human smuggling transportation from land to sea, from trucks using
the Channel Tunnel to rigid inflatable boats (RIBs).10 It explores how the smuggler networks manage
payments for migrants, enforce control at the coastal areas and secure the supply of vessels. It also
provides an anatomy of a typical crossing on this route, highlighting the complex nature of migrants’
journeys, and provides recommendations for how to delink the steady demand among migrants to
reach the UK from the criminal smuggling networks that organize the crossings.

The report draws from triangulated fieldwork that engaged with people working in the smuggling trade;
this was conducted in the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Afghanistan, Iraq and Albania in 2022
and 2023. It also uses material from interviews with migrants and researchers who have experienced
the crossing, reviews of court proceedings, as well as a literature review.

3
INTRODUCTION: THE PROMISED
LAND

A twenty-mile stretch of water: the last step in a long, arduous journey. As night falls, migrants
waiting in Calais can glimpse the distant lights of their ultimate destination, the United
Kingdom. All that remains is that last leg, crossing the Channel.

For these migrants, the prospect of linking up with family members, the economic opportunities in
the UK afforded by the informal labour market, combined with the relative ease of learning English
(for those who are not already familiar with the language) are powerful incentives to undertake the
perilous final leg of their journey to reach the UK. For many, despite the hardships of relocation, the
quality of life they will experience in the UK is a marked improvement on the prospects in their country
of origin.11 These potent pull factors – as well as push factors, such as civil unrest, conflict or lack of
economic opportunity in their countries of origin – explain why the migrants keep coming. This clear
linkage is seen in the data of arrivals: the annual number of migrants from Afghanistan rose sixfold in
2022 after the Taliban returned to power in August 2021.12

Since around 2015, growing numbers of migrants have been turning to small boats to make the journey
to the UK. Although data for small-boat crossings has only been available since 2018, the rise has
been dramatic. According to official data, almost 110 000 migrants attempted to cross the Channel
between 2018 and September 2023.13

The general increase in global illegal migration over the past two decades, and the ‘small boats
crisis’ – as some are wont to describe the phenomenon – in particular, have put illegal migration
firmly in the public and political eye in the UK. The Conservative Party has explored several means to
deter irregular migrants, including by deporting some to Rwanda. British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak
pledged to ‘stop the boats’ as one of his five key priorities at the beginning of 2023. In December
2022, Sunak announced a new programme to return Albanian migrants to Albania, and said that the
current rejection rate of just 45% of asylum applications from Albanians was much lower than in
several European countries and ‘must not continue’. In his statement, the prime minister said guidance
would render the vast majority of such applications as ‘clearly unfounded’.14 The Conservative Party’s
flagship piece in its legislative armoury, the Illegal Migration Act, was granted royal assent in July 2023,
removing the right of asylum for those who had entered the country illegally after having transited
another country where they did not face persecution, regardless of their personal circumstances.15

4
Migrants set sea from the French coast in an inflatable boat, June 2023. © Volke/DeFodi Images via Getty Images

In the debate over small-boat arrivals, the authorities have highlighted the role of organized crime,
and validly so. In December 2022, Sunak said in Parliament: ‘Today far too many of the beneficiaries
of [the UK’s] generosity are not those directly fleeing war zones or at risk of persecution but people
crossing the Channel in small boats. … Their journeys are not ad hoc … but coordinated by ruthless,
organised criminals.’16

It is ironic, however, that the central, coordinating role played by organized crime in small-boat cross-
ings to the UK stems in large part from earlier efforts by the state to secure the Channel against
irregular migration. As such, and very much in line with lessons learnt elsewhere, efforts by the UK
and France to raise the barriers to migration will most likely have the effect of tightening the grip of
those ‘ruthless organised criminals’ Sunak refers to, and not breaking it.

Preliminary evidence indicates that despite the years of stern political rhetoric and hundreds of millions
of pounds spent on deterring migration, the migrants keep coming. While the UK government has been
keen to highlight the fall in the number of migrants detected on small boats in 2023 – adducing the
drop to its strategies of up- and downstream interventions17 – a spokesperson for the UK Immigration
Services Union cited bad weather as the cause for the drop, and said they expected numbers to rise
again in 2024.18

Yet even if smugglers do come under pressure, they are well positioned – and incentivized – to adapt.
As the next section explores, this multi-million-pound illicit industry has professionalized and central-
ized over the past five years, and there has been no diminution in demand. Should the government
continue to raise barriers to legal migration, making it increasingly difficult to cross the Channel, agile
smugglers will continue to pioneer new methods and their profits will only get higher.

As one French fisherman interviewed for this study said, the only solution is to take the United
Kingdom and put it in the middle of the Atlantic. ‘Although,’ he reflected, ‘the boats will still try to
get there.’19

5
A BRIEF HISTORY OF HUMAN
SMUGGLING ACROSS THE CHANNEL

S ince around 2015, the human smuggling system behind illegal Channel crossings has changed dra-
matically. The smuggling industry, which formerly relied on transporting migrants to the UK in trucks,
has been complemented – although not completely replaced – by a new approach: maritime crossings
using small boats. Meanwhile, the ethnic assortment of smuggling networks controlling the industry, whose
clients were usually fellow nationals, has been largely replaced by a more structured system dominated by
Kurdish groups, who have long been major players in the industry. The reasons behind this shift in the human
smuggling landscape – explored below – are various, but growing demand, state responses, Brexit, the covid
pandemic and technological developments have all played their part.

The smuggling ecosystem before 2018

Large-scale human smuggling across the English Channel is not a new phenomenon. In 2005, for example,
a major operation by the British Metropolitan Police uncovered a vast human smuggling network run by
Turkish Kurds that had helped tens of thousands of Turkish nationals reach the UK by truck, ferry, car and
light aircraft.20 Until 2018, concealment in vehicles using the Channel Tunnel and rail were the most common
means of smuggling migrants to the UK. Small-boat crossings – a method pioneered by Kurdish Iranians – were
then rare and appeared to bear a low success rate.21

In the early 2010s, migrants seeking to reach the UK would typically use the services of smugglers of generally
the same ethnicity.22 Around this time, the migrant routes leading to Calais and Dunkirk were controlled by
Iraqi Kurds and Vietnamese networks, but no single group wielded control of the key coastal departure points.
There were, however, signs of collaboration between different ethnic groups: in 2011, a Europol operation
discovered that a Vietnamese network smuggling Vietnamese nationals in the UK was cooperating with Iraqi
Kurd smugglers in a migrant camp in the Grande-Synthe suburb of Dunkirk.23

The ‘Jungle’ near Calais, where migrants in their thousands would

camp, awaiting their crossing, until it was shut down by the
authorities in 2016. © Moment Open via Getty Images

6
Bilateral efforts: Combating irregular migration

T he opening of the Channel Tunnel in May 1994 trans-

formed the transport links between the UK and
mainland Europe. The bilateral Sangatte Protocol, which
As irregular migration shifted to small boats – and the role
of organized crime grew – further agreements were struck,
including the 2018 Sandhurst Treaty and November 2022
entered into force August 1993, was intended to recali- joint declaration of the countries’ Interior Minister and Home
brate frontier controls to the new arrangement, but with Secretary. Later, a UK–France Joint Leaders’ Declaration in
irregular migration a continuing issue, the British and March 2023 pledged further cooperation ‘to undermine
French governments entered into further agreements, human traffickers’ business model’ and increase the num-
most notably the Treaty of Le Touquet (2003) and bilat- ber of crossings intercepted.25 The UK pledged funding of
eral accords in 2009, 2010 and 2014, that effectively made £541 million over the next three financial years, some 500
France responsible for intercepting irregular migrants try- additional personnel and additional infrastructure and sur-
ing to cross into the UK. The UK undertook to fund border veillance equipment. Both France and the UK committed
security measures on French soil, to the tune of at least to making increased use of covert intelligence sharing and
£232 million between 2014 and the end of the 2022/23 ‘joint efforts to tackle the supply chain of equipment that
financial year. 24
enables dangerous and illegal small boat crossings’.26 ■

Migrants board a truck

bound for Britain at
the entrance to the
Channel Tunnel in Calais,
December 2020. © Denis
Charlet/AFP via Getty
Images

The outbreak of the Syrian war and resultant exodus of millions of refugees precipitated the so-called
‘migrant crisis’ from 2015 to 2018, which transformed the human smuggling landscape. There was
a surge in numbers in migrant camps, such as the notorious ‘Jungle’ in Calais, where up to 10 000
migrants and refugees lived.

7
 In response to this situation, the British and French governments hardened security at major French
ports, increasing surveillance, installing heat, heartbeat and carbon dioxide sensors, and adding miles
of extra security fencing.27 Moats were also dug and barbed wire laid
along the railway line, and motion detection barriers installed. Fuel
stations were surrounded by seven-metre-high concrete walls to
prevent migrants from accessing trucks.28 The Jungle was shut down
in October 2016 by the French authorities, who subsequently insti-
tuted a ‘zéro point de fixation’ policy, which directed that makeshift
camps for migrants in Calais be systematically disrupted every 48
hours to prevent informal settlements from becoming established.29

To evade detection, Albanian and Kurdish smugglers increasingly

resorted to riskier methods, including concealing migrants in
containers and refrigerated lorries.30 In some cases, these resulted
in tragedy, most notably in the 2019 Essex lorry incident, where
39 people died after suffocating or freezing to death during the
journey.31

It was around this time that smugglers also began to industrialize an

Security was increased along the Channel
even riskier way of helping migrants into the UK: deploying small
Tunnel lines to deter migrants following the
2015 ‘migrant crisis’. Photo supplied boats to make the crossing.32

The growing number of small-boat crossings

Crossing the Channel in a small boat is a highly dangerous undertaking. Although the distance is
relatively short, conditions can be highly hazardous, both due to marine weather and because the
Channel is the busiest shipping route in the world, used by between 500 and 600 vessels every day.

These considerations perhaps explain why small-boat crossings remained a relatively small market in
the early 2010s (although one should nevertheless take into account that official data began to be
recorded only in 2018). Between July 2014 and May 2016, the Home Office noted only nine small
boats crossing the English Channel.33

This began to change in 2018, when 299 people – mostly Iranian, and some Iraqis – were recorded
as having made the crossing in small boats.34 Syrian and Afghan migrants and refugees also started
to use this route, alongside smaller numbers from other nationalities, predominantly Africans.35 By
November 2019, crossings using rigid inflatable boats (RIBs) had become the main method used by
smuggling networks offering services from the EU to the UK. Some 8 500 people arrived in the UK
on small boats in 2019, representing more than a sixfold increase against the year before. By 2020,
crossings by small boat amounted to 50% of all irregular arrivals in the UK, compared to 11% in the
previous year.36 As demand grew, smugglers began to seek disembarkation points further afield,
including Zeebrugge, in Belgium, and Petit Caux, some 150 kilometres south of Calais.37

The economics of the small-boat crossing were also changing, making it a more attractive option for
migrants than the truck route from a financial perspective as demand increased. Before 2018, the
price of a small-boat crossing had been much higher – reportedly €14 000 per person – but two
major events would soon change this calculus.38 Firstly, the implementation of post-Brexit border
controls raised the already high price of travelling by truck,39 while the coronavirus pandemic also

8
saw the number of truck journeys plunging, making the maritime route the more viable option. As
a consequence, crossing by boat became comparatively cheaper (between £2 500 and £4 000 per
person, or €3 000–€4 700)) 40 than travelling by truck, where prices rose to between £20 000 and
£25 000 (€23 600–€29 500) for Albanian migrants, although for other nationalities the maximum
reported price was £17 000 (€20 000).41

To maximize profit, smugglers began to increase the number of people they put on each boat.42
According to the central director of the French Police aux Frontières (border police), cited in a media
report, there was an average of 27 people occupying each boat in 2021, up from 12 per boat in 2019.43
Our research in 2023 has seen these numbers rise to, reportedly, between 45 and 65 crammed into
one boat.44 In some sense, this can explained by smugglers turning to bigger boats (see ‘Buying a boat’
below) but in the majority of cases smugglers are simply packing each boat with more and more people,
dramatically raising the risk of capsizing. The risk is heightened by the fact that the structural quality
of the boats is generally very poor. One French coastal lifeguard noted: ‘The handles come off very
fast and the floor of the boat is very fragile.’45 According to the UK’s National Crime Agency (NCA),
substandard materials are often used to reinforce the floor (to enable the boat the carry more people),
with the result that the floor sometimes gives way at sea, plunging the passengers into the water.46

In terms of the actors involved in the crossings, Kurdish Iranian smugglers

pioneered the mass use of small boats in the early days of the industry. As is
often the case, many Iranian smugglers were migrants themselves in Calais in
2018–2019, and turned to smuggling when they saw the money to be made.47
Networks of Kurdish smugglers were instrumental in driving the expansion of
the small-boat crossing in 2019–2020, assisting migrants and refugees from
Iraq, Iran and Syria, which have significant Kurdish populations.

From 2021, Albanian criminal networks also became increasingly involved

in RIB crossings. The number of Albanian migrants travelling on this route
reached over 12 000 in 2022, according to the UK government – more than
any other nationality making the crossing that year.48 According to the British
authorities, this ‘exponential’ rise was ‘due to the fact that Albanian criminal
gangs have gained a foothold in the north of France.’49 However, it may be that
smugglers’ upstream tactics also had a shaping influence on demand. Recruiters
(posting under fake identities) frequently target potential clientele in Albania
using social media, especially TikTok, with up-beat messages: ‘To England.
4 000 GBP. With boats. Every day’, or ‘To London. 100% sure, no chances of
failures. These are the best prices in the market.’50 Smugglers also played on
fears that tighter post-Brexit border controls would make it more difficult to
reach the UK without the assistance of a smuggler.
Tiktok channel in Albanian advertising
The lower price of boat crossings may also have opened the market to more cross-Channel smuggling services
Albanian migrants. Previously, when expensive truck passages were the only from France to the UK. Photo supplied

option, Albanians would have to take out loans, sell land or livestock, or become
indebted to smugglers or relatives.51

But contrary to the popular perception in the UK that Albanians are responsible for running the
Channel-smuggling operations, our fieldwork found that, although Albanians are present as an or-
ganized group within the supply chain, they work in fact as clients and middlemen for the dominant
actors in the world of small-boat smuggling: the Kurds.

9
Buying a boat

M any migrants attempting to make the crossing with-

out the aid of smuggling networks use whatever
vessel they can get, including dinghies, pool boats, kayaks
cross the Channel is transported from Germany.56 Recently,
Romania has emerged as a hub for boats coming from
China.57
and paddle boats. Sudanese migrants, who often have lim-
In some cases, groups of boat transporters appear to pro-
ited financial means, were reported to make use of such
vide their services to several smuggling rings. In Lille, one
vessels (although some Sudanese were reported to pay a
group of 30 predominantly French transporters com-
reduced fee (€700) to smugglers, perhaps in exchange for
posed of young people from disadvantaged neighbour-
having worked or promising to work for the network in the
hoods reportedly made an average of four boat deliveries
future).52 This situation has led to sports equipment store
to the coast each night in good weather.58 This group alleg-
Decathlon refusing to stock such items in areas where
edly supplied several different networks, with a flat fee
migrants are known to attempt the crossing, forcing them
of €200 paid per delivery of a boat. Their warehouse was
to buy them further afield, including in Paris.
shut down by French authorities in 2022, who also seized
The equipment and its supply chain used by smuggling 700 lifejackets.59 As part of its efforts to disrupt smuggling
networks are more complex. Most of the RIBs are manu- supply chains, in November 2022, the NCA carried out
factured in China. While the boats vary in size, they are usu- a joint operation with French police to dismantle a crime
ally approximately 8 metres long and just under 2 metres group that had been involved in supplying boats that could
wide. By 2022, the engine types commonly used were carry up to 60 people, resulting in 18 arrests.60
Yamabisi (30 or 40 horse power) manufactured in China,
The price for a boat, including the logistics costs, is about
which are available on the Chinese online platform Alibaba
€10 000.61 This relatively modest outlay translates into
for around €1 300.53 From China, the boat equipment is
extraordinary potential for profit: assuming an occupancy of
sent by container to Turkey and then moved to Europe.
50 people, each paying €2 000, a single trip can generate
The boats are transported from Germany, Belgium or the
€100 000 (although the smuggler will of course have other
Netherlands to the French coast in vans, SUVs or recrea-
costs to pay besides the hardware used in the crossing).62
tional vehicles. Germany is a particularly important tran-
Indeed, this scale of return has itself given rise to a new crim-
sit point on these routes, as many of the drivers are asylum
inal business, identified in 2023, whereby criminal networks
seekers in Germany who typically earn between €300 and
act as facilitators for individuals wishing to set up their own
€2 000 for transporting a boat to France.54 Investigations
smuggling operations. For €10 000, a would-be smuggler
into smuggling networks have also identified a number
can buy their own RIB, with delivery included to the coast,
of storage facilities for boats in Germany.55 According to
although Kurdish networks still retain overall control over
German Press Agency DPA, 90% of the equipment used to
who is allowed to cross, and when.  ■

Inflatable boats and outboard engines in

a Port Authority site in Dover in March
2023, believed to have been used by
migrants to make the crossing. © Daniel
Leal/AFP via Getty Images

10
THE KURDS TAKE CHARGE

F ieldwork conducted for this study found that there has been a shift in ethnic power dynamics
over the maritime route. Since 2019–2020, Iraqi Kurd smugglers have taken control of key
coastal embarkation points in northern France from Iranian Kurdish criminal actors. Although
Iranians continue to operate, their stretch of coast is clearly demarcated (Figure 3). Calais and areas
east of the city are now predominantly controlled by Iraqi Kurd networks, who are overall the most
powerful networks with the largest market share, with other nationalities (such as Africans and
Afghans) working under them (although Dunkirk is under the total control of Iraqi Kurds).63 The area
to the west of Calais is predominantly controlled by Kurdish Iranians.64 Along the coast, territory is
divided according to the smugglers’ home regions, such as Erbil, Sulaimaniya, Ranya, Sharazoor, in Iraqi
Kurdistan, and Sardasht in Iran, with each smuggling group controlling an exclusive point. Smugglers
from Ranya reportedly control a large part of territory in Calais and Dunkirk. Conflict breaks out when
these territorial boundaries are encroached upon by rival smugglers.65

Although Kurdish actors have been involved in smuggling migrants to the UK for decades, they have
garnered less attention in the UK in recent years than Albanian networks, perhaps due to the huge
spike in Albanian migrants in 2021 that dominated media coverage. As yet, much remains unclear
about the evolution and political economy of Kurdish groups in Europe, especially as they connect to
Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria – all countries with significant Kurdish minorities.

Yet in other ways, the Kurds’ prominence in

human smuggling is perhaps unsurprising. The Iraqi Kurds

Kurds have always been in a precarious situation: Iranian

Kurds Dunkirk
Grande-
as a millions-strong minority with ambitions for Synthe
Calais
an independent state, they have often led an
uneasy existence in their home countries – as one
Kurdish saying puts it, they have ‘no friends but
the mountains’. Over the years, these dynamics Boulogne- FRANCE
sur-Mer
have resulted in varying forms of repression and
persecution, which has driven an exodus of Kurds
Le Touquet- Boat departures
(often facilitated by smugglers) to Europe and else- Paris-Plage

where, creating diaspora communities that serve

as a positive feedback cycle for further waves of FIGURE 3 Kurdish smugglers’ embarkation territories.

migration. Once a community is established in a

new country, it becomes easier for new migrants to integrate – although they are often at the mercy
of their smugglers for work and accommodation in the new country.66

11
 Another reason for the Kurds’ modern-day involvement in human smuggling may simply be geography.
Their presence in the arc of land that transects Turkey, north-western Syria, northern Iraq (where
the Kurds have their own autonomous region) and the Zagros Mountains in Iran may also explain
their prominence in human smuggling, as this region lies along the overland migrant routes from
Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and Iran. For Kurdish smuggling actors, the Syrian War most likely provided
a fillip, as many Syrian migrants fleeing conflict attempted to enter Turkey and, to a lesser extent,
Iraqi Kurdistan.67

They may have ‘learnt the trade’ at home, but, today, Kurdish smugglers are not limited to their own
countries, but operate wherever business is brisk. In December 2021, for example, it was reported
that Kurdish smugglers were meeting African and Middle Eastern migrants in Minsk, Belarus, before
sending them on to Western Europe.68 Our fieldwork also confirmed the use of Belarus as a transit
hub before the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.69

UK

AFGHANISTAN

Ağrı
TURKEY
INDIA
Migration flows
Bitlis Van

Diyarbakır
Siirt IRAN
Hakkâri
Mardin Cizre
İslahiye Qamishli Mahabad
Duhok Amadiya
Kobani
Afrin Al Hasakah
Kırıkhan Mosul Erbil
Sinjar Baneh
Bijar
Kirkuk
SYRIA Sanandaj
Sulaimaniya Marivan
IRAQ Significant Kurdish
populations
Kermanshah

FIGURE 4 Areas with significant Kurdish populations – the so-called Kurdish arc.

SOURCE: Adapted from The Kurdish Project, https://thekurdishproject.org/kurdistan-map/

It is also clear that, while many bosses may be based in Western Europe, the link to the Kurdish arc
is still strong in some cases. Some of the profits from smuggling in Europe are reportedly reinvested
in their home country (in real estate, for example). In the case of Iraqi smugglers, this process is
facilitated by the fact that their earnings are held in the trust office in Iraq and they usually have a
family member who can take care of local affairs.70 Research conducted in Sharazoor District in Iraqi
Kurdistan discovered a luxurious villa built in the area of Said Sadiq, the owner of which is reportedly
known for having made his fortune in migrant smuggling in Calais.71 He also reportedly owns a car
repair garage, which also serves as a hub for migrants seeking to make the journey to London. The
Union Jack and EU flags hoisted above offer a hint as to the business’s dual purpose (see photo).72

Some smugglers are alleged to invest profits made in France in other illicit economies, such as drug
and arms trafficking, but more research is needed to substantiate these links and the extent to which
such groups maintain a presence in Europe.73

12
 The Iraqi home of an alleged Kurdish human smuggler
and his car repair workshop. Photos supplied

During research for this report, several characteristics emerged regarding the structure and nature
of Kurdish groups operating on the French coast: the importance of territory; the use of the hawala
system to facilitate migrants’ payments; and the role of violence in imposing control over migrants
and challenging other groupings for market share.

Territory and geography

The Kurdish smuggling networks on the northern French coast are not centrally coordinated. In other
words, there is no mafia-style Kurdish group with complete dominion over human smuggling along the
French coast. Rather, the smuggling landscape resembles the territorial nature of drug dealing in the
sense that each Iraqi Kurdish and Iranian group has its own territory; if a clan attempts to usurp the
beach of another clan, violence often ensues, including murder.74 That said, shared financial interests,
including the benefits of cooperation, act as a counterbalance against disputes.

And, as is the case with the drug trade, the bosses usually remain far from the area of active busi-
ness. Fieldwork conducted in June 2023 suggests that the network heads usually reside in one of
the principal countries of origin for migrants and refugees (predominantly Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan or
Albania); others are likely to stay in the UK or Germany.75 It was said that many network chiefs lived
in Turkey, where Istanbul acts as a funnel for Middle Eastern and Asian migrants, and where there
is also a significant Kurdish population.76 This geographic distribution may also reflect the focus of
business: smuggler networks that are predominantly focused on the maritime crossing will be based in
Western Europe, while others focusing on overland routes will be based in the sending countries. Yet
as the case of ‘Karwan’ illustrates (see the profile below), there are also strong ties between smugglers
in Western Europe and elsewhere that enable the full package model to function.

13
Profile of a smuggler

K arwan (not his real name) is a well-established smug-

gler, having been in the business for five years and
supervising a 15-person outfit in Calais.77 From Sulaimaniya,
To provide protection against rival networks, Karwan’s team
are well armed with automatic weapons and handguns (he
joked that they have more weapons than NATO in Calais). His
in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, he is now based in the UK. weapons are sourced from contacts in the Balkans; another
While his group comprises operatives from various nation- smuggler said that his group secures everything they need
alities, such as Albanians and Arabs, those involved in sur- (including pistols, AK-47s and ammunition) from the black
veillance belong to his home town, highlighting the impor- market in France through contacts from North Africa.78
tance of trust in the higher-level roles. Boats are procured from associates, including Germans, who
also sometimes collect and transport migrants to the launch-
His extensive network of alliances extends to smugglers
ing point. To avoid detection, the group frequently change
based in Iraq, Turkey and Greece, who provide the migrants
their phones and use WhatsApp numbers originating from
wishing to make the journey to the UK. Payment is usu-
their home countries (according to Karwan, it is a widely
ally made through a mutual trust office in Kurdistan. Upon
known fact that local phone numbers are under surveillance:
the migrants’ arrival in France, Karwan’s men stationed in
he uses a WhatsApp number from Iraq). Members who are
Paris take over the task of the migrants’ onward journey
arrested are provided with legal assistance.  ■
to Calais.

Despite the territorialism, if a group has an oversupply of migrants and not enough boats to service them,
it may transfer some migrants to another clan. Albanian and Vietnamese smugglers also work with Kurdish
smugglers, using them as providers of boats and to supply migrants. As such, there is an organic flexibility
to the nature of operations at the coast, which is interestingly married to a sophisticated means of
regulating the arrival of batches of migrants from waiting zones inland (see below ‘Anatomy of a crossing’).

According to migrant testimonies, dozens of smugglers operate on the coast with clearly demarcated
territories.79 Networks were described as divided into several ‘units’ with different functions: those who
take the migrants from a city such as Paris or Brussels to the camp; those who take the migrants from the
camp to the coast, those who cook and those who accompany migrants to the point of departure at the
beach.80 From the point of view of the migrants, it is not clear who is leading the smuggling process, and
as is typical with smuggling operations globally, it is rare that migrants will encounter the heads of these
criminal networks, even though they may be well known (see ‘Apple – an Iranian smuggling kingpin’).81 It
is also unclear whether those described as the kingpins by migrants and lower-level operatives will even
be the senior most smuggling organizer, or the one providing the financial backing. Often the very top of
the chain will never be known or seen.

Profile of an Iranian smuggling kingpin

E ach of the four main Iranian networks we identified is

allegedly led by a named individual. The most infamous
is nicknamed ‘Apple’. He reportedly has a Kurdish-Iranian
(and they can charge more as a result). Apple is known
to use good-quality boats and engines, and not to over-
load the boats. For an additional fee of €1 000–€1 500,
accent and uses a UK WhatsApp number (the other king- he also coordinates legal support if a migrant is arrested
pins use French or Iranian numbers). Some Iranian king- upon arrival. Apple is also known to use violence against
pins are more careful of their reputation (and clients) than any who fail to pay.  ■

the Kurdish, aware this is a key selling point among clients

14
Paying your passage: The hawala system
Kurdish smugglers offer both full package services from countries of origin (mainly Iraq and Iran) or
transit (predominantly via Turkey or Germany), alongside standalone Channel crossing services. In
reality, these packages are executed by a diverse range of smugglers, from those located in sending
countries to intermediaries in Germany and France, and those responsible for the actual crossing in
northern France.

Full package services sometimes include fraudulent or illegally procured documentation. Most of the
fake passports are reportedly made in Turkey, although according to one source, the most expensive
and highest-quality passports are fake Israeli passports that are made in Thailand and are generally
unchallenged by customs officials.82 Such packages are often advertised online, including on encrypted
services such as Telegram. One Telegram channel offered Iranian and Iraqi would-be migrants a full
package service via Turkey and Belarus (before the Russian invasion in 2022) to Germany for a set
price of €8 000. Many videos and photographs of the one-week journey accompanied the advert,
which is also used by migrants to find information and smugglers (the Farsi-language ‘Calais Dunkirk’
channel is well known).

Informal money transfer networks are used by migrants and refugees of a range of nationalities,
including Iranians, Iraqis, Sudanese and Afghans, to make payments to networks across the journey,
either in the full package scheme or in pay-as-you-go. The hawala payment system, which relies on
a trusted network of transfer agents to make payments outside the banking system, is being widely
used to facilitate the payment of migrants’ journeys from mainland Europe to the UK.83

With the full package system, travellers in Iran, Iraq or Turkey typically deposit payments with money
transfer agencies (known as Sarafi) allied with the smuggling network. Networks will share a list of
allied agencies with clients ahead of time. Hawaladars are present in the country of origin, at nodes
across the journey (including in and near transit camps in coastal areas) and in the UK.84 One migrant,
speaking to the press, noted that smugglers asked which country the client wished to pay in, with
options including Germany, the Netherlands, Kurdistan, Iraq, Syria or Turkey. Once the choice was
made, the client was furnished with the number of the relevant hawaladar to make payment.85

The hawaladar network not only enables payments

to be made to members of the smuggling network
elsewhere, but also empowers migrants and refugees
to collect money from home at later stages in the
journey. Hawaladars can also play a role in networks’
recruitment strategies. In Iraq, for example, they often
connect prospective clients with networks offering the
maritime journey across the Channel. Migrants report
that they prefer not having to carry large amounts of
cash and that this mode of payment reduces the risk
of being swindled or robbed.86 The payment network,
which operates largely without an easily traceable
paper trail, helps smugglers mask transactions from Researchers encountered an Afghan former special forces
authorities and avoids the risks inherent in taking cash soldier who was staying at this site near Calais Hospital
across borders. while waiting to make the crossing. Photo supplied

15
According to our fieldwork, fees appear to be relatively high, however, for such payment services,
with up to 10% commission being cited by one Iranian money transfer agent operating in Créteil, near
Paris, who also reportedly provides other services to migrants and refugees, including accommodation
and false documents. These high fees are notable, as hawala is generally a less expensive method
than other remittance services, which either charge higher fees or have less favourable exchange
rates.87 Sometimes money transfers are made using the hawaladar system, while the online platform
Western Union is also used.

A violent business
Control by violence is a defining feature of the Kurdish smuggling system at the French coast. The
highly lucrative nature of the business means that competition between, and within, networks is
sometimes fierce. There has been frequent media coverage of shootings since 2020.88 A 2023 in-
vestigation by the GI-TOC in Iraq found that two main Kurdish groups from Erbil and Sharazoor had
fought for control over the migration route in Dunkirk. Eventually, the Sharazoor faction achieved
supremacy, and the activity of the Erbil group reportedly declined.89 There have also been reports of
violence associated with an Iraqi Kurdish group over control of the business and launch sites for the
boats, leading to two attempted murders, in Germany and France.90

Our fieldwork also discovered that Iraqi Kurds hire third parties, commonly referred to generically as
‘mafia’, who may be armed with AK-47s, grenades and revolvers.91 Gun casings on the ground in areas
close to the Loon-Plage camp are common.92 In the past, only senior elements in the network hierarchy
were reportedly armed, but more recently weapons have been distributed to lower ranks, including
for purposes of intimidation, and because of growing tensions between networks. This trend in more
widespread arming could also be an indication of the increasing profits flowing through the smuggling
business since 2020. Either way, incidents of violence between competing ‘mafias’ have become more
common. According to sources, gunfire is commonly heard in areas near the camp in Grand-Synthe,
particularly late in the day, although this is not necessarily always a sign of hostilities: the release of
a smuggler from prison or a successful crossing may be celebrated by bursts of gunfire in the air.93

Violence is also used to control migrants. One interviewee, a female

Afghan migrant, recounted the harrowing scene of minor who was ‘I want to send money
suffering from hunger and cold, and passed away: ‘He was beaten by
to my family, so that
the smugglers. … He was not able to walk, and we lost him. Still I can’t
forget that scene and it is like a nightmare to me. That boy was saying, “I they have a better life.’
want to go to Europe and work hard. I want to send money to my family, so that they have a better
life. I want to earn so that my old mother should not work as a servant, and work to pay my father’s
medical payment.”’94 During fieldwork other migrants corroborated that those who do not pay risk
being killed by the mafia.95

16
ANATOMY OF A CROSSING

A rguably, the key concern for smugglers is managing their ‘stock’ of customers. Given the
extensive security measures put in place by the authorities at the departing areas, the
earlier system whereby migrants were kept waiting for months in large camps on the coast
(such as the infamous ‘Jungle’ that existed between 2015 and 2016 in Calais) is no longer tenable.
In response, the smuggling economy has developed a ‘long tail’ – essentially a ‘route to market’ – in
which migrants are accommodated mostly inland from the departure points before being moved into
position when conditions become favourable.

This just in time approach to the management of migrant ‘stock’ requires coordination between strings
of smugglers and intermediaries working in tandem to manage the flow. It also relies on organic
responses to dealing with surges in demand, such as cases where smugglers transfer clients to another
smuggler if they are short of capacity in terms of boats.

In this sense, the industrialized economy of migrant smuggling is similar to other forms of organized
crime, such as drug trafficking, mixing a deft understanding of international logistics and business
acuity with the local dynamics of violent contestation and operational improvisation – all in a context
of challenging and chaotic circumstances. At the bottom of the supply chain in this enterprise are
the migrants themselves, who are mainly clients but in some cases also pilot the boats (work they
undertake in exchange for a reduced fee or free passage). Above them are foot soldiers who do the
groundwork of escorting the migrants to the beach; touts who connect migrants with smugglers in the
transit hubs; and the smugglers on the ground and intermediaries further afield, managing stocks of
migrants. At the top of this lucrative supply chain are the heads of the networks, who, as mentioned
earlier (see the section on the Kurds), often reside overseas.

Waiting for passage

Migrants hoping to make the maritime crossing to the UK must first wait until sea conditions are
favourable. Before 2016, migrants in Calais often waited for months in makeshift camps, but under the
French zéro point de fixation policy makeshift camps in Calais are now raided by the French authorities
every 48 hours. Those waiting around Dunkirk are also subject to frequent raids, making the mass
clustering (‘fixation’) of migrants for long periods of time at transit hubs close to the coast impossible.

To surmount this challenge, smugglers have developed a range of solutions to house migrants further
afield, bringing them to the coast only when conditions are right, akin to a holding pattern. Migrants

17
 Holding point AMSTERDAM
Apeldoorn Osnabrück
Leiden Enschede
Den Haag Ede
Utrecht
Münster Bielefeld
Rotterdam Arnhem
Dordrecht
Paderborn

NETHERLANDS Dortmund
Vlissingen Duisburg
Eindhoven Bochum
Venlo
Oostende Düsseldorf
Bruges
Dunkirk Gent
Antwerp GERMANY
Calais Kortrijk BRUSSELS Hasselt Cologne
Maastricht Siegen
Boulogne sur-Mer
Bonn
Le Touquet
Lille BELGIUM Liège Gießen
Paris-Plage Namur
Lens Mons
Charleroi Koblenz
Arras Frankfurt
am Main
Wiesbaden

Amiens Mainz Darmstadt

Dieppe Saint-Quentin

Trier
FRANCE Rethel Kaiserslautern Mannheim
Rouen Soissons Reims
Saarbrucken
Verdun Heilbronn
Metz
Karlsruhe

PARIS
Stuttgart
Versailles Toul Nancy
Strasbourg

FIGURE 5 Commonly used inland migrant holding points in France, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands.

wait some distance inland from the coast in France (including Paris, Reims, Rouen, Arras, Lille and
Cambrai); in Belgium (in Brussels and towns near the border with France); and Germany (including
Frankfurt, Essen, Dusseldorf and Cologne). The smuggler will rent a property in these towns and fill it
with migrants, or use an intermediary who can provide a property. Other waiting nodes include centres
for reception and situation assessment (Centres d’Accueil et d’Examen de Situation Administrative –
CAES), which offer temporary accommodation and assess a person’s status.96 These centres are also
recruitment grounds for smuggling networks.97 It can be a lucrative sideline: one Afghan recruiter for
a Kurdish network said, ‘I earn between 100 and 200 euros per passenger that I bring to a smuggler.
I bring passengers of my own nationality, who contact me.’98

Some migrants, however, choose to stay closer to the coastal areas, often in hotels that are known
for accommodating almost exclusively migrants, refugees and low-level smugglers during the summer
months, when weather conditions are more amenable for the crossing. These hotels are among the
cheaper options on offer and in some cases reportedly provide additional services, such as shipping
migrants’ luggage to the UK upon arrival. They also act as recruitment hubs for smugglers, and
some hotels reportedly offer discounts on accommodation for smugglers’ clients. Given that they are
reportedly closely connected as a service adjunct to the smuggling industry, there have been repeated
instances of hoteliers being charged and tried in courts with facilitating the journey of the migrants,
and some hotels have been closed down by the police.99

18
Preparing for departure
To monitor sea conditions in the Channel, smugglers use an app called Windy, which provides live
information on wind and weather patterns. Attempts to cross peak in the summer.100 When sea
conditions are good – meaning the swell is below 0.7 metres and the wind below 15 knots101 – migrants
and refugees travel (either independently or with the support of the smuggling network) to transit hubs
around Calais and Dunkirk (Figure 6). Migrants who are unaccompanied prefer to use the Transport
Express Régional (TER) rail network, where passenger checks are less stringent than is the case with
France’s high-speed train system (the TGV), which applies passenger check-in controls. Local train
services are cheap: most migrants’ destinations in the area can be reached for as little as €1 on a
TER train. Buses are also free in Dunkirk and Calais, and in summer are often packed with migrants.

Others are transported to transit hubs by the Les Hemmes Canal des Leffrinckoucke
d'Oye Dunes
smuggling network. NGOs have seen cars with
Les Hemmes
Belgian, German or Dutch number plates at de Marck Dunkirk
Bleriot
Grande-Synthe, suggesting the transnational Gravelines
Oye- Zuydcoote
Sangatte
reach of the enterprise (although most of the Calais Plage
vehicles are based in the Parisian suburbs and Tardinghen
Wissant
Ambleteuse
peripheral towns). One source reported seeing Dunes de la Slack
15 French taxis at the same time at Loon-Plage,
Boulogne-sur-Mer
and even a coach full of migrants.102 Taxi drivers
in Lille spoke of the regular work they have taxiing Hardelot

migrants. Reportedly, when migrants Dannes

Le Touquet-
leave the airport, they already know Paris-Plage
the price of the journey to Calais, Berck FRANCE
according to the drivers. Their smugglers have
provided them with such information. ‘We
don’t ask questions. It’s not illegal [to taxi them
Baie de Somme
within France].’103

According to Albanian migrants and other Le Tréport

nationalities, the process of meeting up with
a smuggler at the northern French coast is
Petit Caux
Small-boat crossing point
often arranged through intermediaries. Once in Dieppe

France, migrants contact their acquaintances in FIGURE 6 Small-boat crossing points in northern France.
the UK who put them in touch with the smug- NOTE: There was one reported attempted crossing
gler, who in turn sends them the location of from Petit Caux.

the meeting point in Dunkirk or Calais, usually

by WhatsApp.104 Smugglers tend to send multiple locations and change them several times, should
they suspect the migrant is being followed by the police.105 Increasingly, migrants do not meet the
organizer of their journey in person – only the smuggler’s front men on the ground.

Some migrants will only seek out a smuggler for the crossing after reaching a transit hub like Grand-
Synthe, which generally hosts between 300 and 1 500 individuals. There, migrants can meet touts
(often fellow migrants) who connect the migrants with smugglers. Testifying to increased streamlining
of operations of smugglers, migrants stay in the transit hubs for much shorter periods of time (24 hours
to three weeks) compared to the two or three months that was the norm until early 2021. In good
weather, hubs like Grande-Synthe are almost completely empty, such is the speed of the turnaround.

19
After sending off boats, smugglers contact migrants on the waiting list, and the next influx begins.
Tents are often left for newcomers, including sleeping bags, blankets, clothes and kitchen equipment.

Yet migrants who have not paid for such services must make their own arrangements, and support
themselves while they wait for a boat to become available. In transit hubs like Grand-Synthe, this
often means that migrants must deal with the ‘mafia’, paying them for the right to stay in a tent and
to access services provided by NGOs, like phone charging or food.106 The time spent in these hubs
can take a noticeable toll on the mental and physical health of the inhabitants. There are reports of
violence, which is said to be more commonly experienced by Afghan migrants and refugees, and less
so by Albanian nationals, who also generally pay more for the crossing, and who are able to complete
the journey faster, as they have negotiated a more comprehensive package from home to end point,
and can move relatively easily through Europe. But for Central Asian and African migrants, whose
appearance makes them more visible, exploitation is rife. This is especially so in the case of female
migrants, often Eritrean and Ethiopian women, who are travelling alone or without men, and who are
often forced into prostitution. Our research found that Vietnamese migrants tend to keep themselves
apart in the camp, and NGOs find it challenging to reach out to them.107

Once the weather conditions are judged acceptable, the smugglers give the order for the migrants to
move to the beaches. Here, time is of the essence – any delay or error may jeopardise the crossing.

The crossing
Once the decision has been made to attempt the crossing, the smuggler’s ‘foot soldiers’ lead migrants
to the dunes to await delivery of the boat, taking care to avoid law enforcement. According to our
research, the boat is delivered by car or a van and unloaded in a matter of minutes. Migrants and foot
soldiers together unload the vessel and equipment, inflate the boat and assemble its floor. During this
time, other members of the smuggling team are stationed to monitor the roads and dunes, watching
for signs of the authorities. Not all attempts go to plan, and time is often spent lying in wait in forests
or dunes for several days if attempts to depart fail, such as when parts of the equipment are missing
or boat deliveries are held up because of roadblocks. Smugglers often have contingency plans for
such scenarios. In one instance, a crossing was disrupted when, first, one boat and then another
were intercepted by law enforcement, but the smugglers persisted and the third boat got through.108
Some migrants who cannot pay the fare wait in the dunes and try to sneak onto boats at the point
of departure, a tactic reportedly mostly used by young Sudanese men.

Migrants usually bring minimal belongings with them, sometimes even discarding their passports out
of fear that the French police will arrest and deport them. In some cases, migrants are required to
leave their phones before embarking, reportedly to prevent tracking by authorities, and are instead
provided with burner phones by the networks to facilitate navigation, sometimes with the number
of a rescue service to call if they run into trouble.109 This is reportedly becoming less common, with
migrants often retaining their own phones but being forbidden from using them on the boat. They are
asked by the smugglers to delete photos and videos of the camp by smugglers, so that British police are
unable to accrue evidence; sometimes they are also asked to throw their phones overboard if there is
a rescue operation at sea.110 The app Maps.Me, which works offline, is used to navigate on the boat or
to reach the dunes.111 Should a crossing attempt fail, they are forced to remain in the dunes, sometimes
for several days with little to no food as they await the next opportunity to cross. In Leffrinckouke,
near Dunkirk, an official from the municipality found two sheep slaughtered by migrants for food.112

20
A migrant boat navigates the waters and shipping vessels between France and England, November 2022.
© Andrew Aitchison via Getty Images

Smugglers used to test the engines out of the water, which damages the cooling system, making it
more likely that the engine will malfunction at sea.113 Today, however, much equipment is not tested
at all, which can lead to difficulties in starting the engine. This is especially true in instances where the
‘captain’ of the boat – often a migrant or refugee – knows nothing about boat engines. One Iranian
who had captained a boat in exchange for free transit had told the smuggler he had experience with
boat engines, but later admitted he had only ever driven agricultural machinery.114 According to
Albanian migrants, the captains are usually Kurdish migrants or somebody who can understand the
smugglers’ explanation of how to use the boat and its equipment. However, according to smugglers,
Africans with experience of piloting boats are generally preferred. These are recruited if they can
provide video proof that they have piloted a boat between Libya and Italy or Morocco and Spain; in
return, their passage is free.

One new method involves the so-called ‘water taxi’, which arrives by sea to pick up passengers from
the beach and then leaves for the UK.115 This method helps avoid the attention of law enforcement,
who can detect the movement of numbers of people and seize boats as they are being delivered
or prepared for launching on the beach. The arrival of a boat by sea renders these interceptions
inoperable, as the police will not intercept a boat already at sea for fear of casualties. Another inno-
vative approach was revealed by an NCA investigation in August 2023, in which an Albanian–British
smuggling ring bought a boat that was moored in a marina in the UK before making the crossing to
the Belgian coast, picking up migrants and bringing them back to the UK.116

The boats usually carry a mix of nationalities, although there are reported cases of vessels carrying
passengers of a single nationality among the wealthiest clients, such as Iranians and Albanians. As
one smuggler said, ‘When there is money to be made, [the question of] whether one is Iraqi or
Iranian no longer matters.’117 Migrants and refugees are often deceived regarding the number of
passengers they will be travelling alongside. Boats are typically overloaded – sometimes carrying up
to 65 passengers – meaning the boats ride low in the water, and passengers often need to bail out
water to prevent sinking. UK Home Office data indicates a steady rise in the number of passengers per
boat since 2018.118 In some cases, the responsibility for such overloading lies with the intermediaries

21
hired by the smugglers, not the smugglers themselves. Some intermediaries, who are usually Afghan
or African, will add extra passengers to the boats and pocket the surplus fare. As this often leads to
migrant deaths, the runners often face severe repercussions for such activity.119

The French police make concerted efforts to disrupt and intercept smugglers on land in northern
France, including by puncturing the boats. No arrests are made, however, partly because it is not
illegal to board a boat in France, but this response also follows the Smuggling of Migrants protocol,
which prevents the criminalization of migrants in smuggling.120 At sea, sometimes the French coast
guard approaches boats, checks the migrants are safe and escorts the boats to the limit of French
territorial waters in case of mishap, but the coast guard does not normally intervene given the risk
of potential accidents.121 Migrants will sometimes threaten to jump off the boat if the French coast
guard come too close.

Networks of smugglers often work together to send ‘surges’ of small boats across the Channel to
overwhelm law enforcement capacity. Smugglers have also been known use decoy boats to distract
police attention and raise the chances of other boats getting through. Migrants on decoy boats are
reportedly offered a discount for the next crossing attempt.122

The journey across the Channel can take between four and eight hours, depending on the skills of
the person at the helm.123 While some boats complete the journey to the UK coast, many, particularly
in cases where the boat experiences difficulties, will dial the British emergency services once they
believe they are in English waters. For many others, however, the journey ends in tragedy.

Once on land, UK Home Office officials house migrants in initial accommodation – usually hotels –
before they are moved on elsewhere or assessed for rights to asylum. Due to backlogs in processing
arrivals, this temporary measure may last for months.

A memorial in Calais to Vietnamese migrants who died while

attempting to cross the Channel. Photos supplied

22
RESPONSES: DELINKING
DEMAND FROM ORGANIZED
CRIME

I t is not difficult to recognize the complexity of the challenge to ‘stop the boats’, as Sunak promised
at the beginning of 2023,124 or the pragmatic compromise of core international norms and principles
that are required once organized criminal groups are involved, and when the pressures of political
imperatives are considerable.

All international experience and evidence shows, however, that securitized and punitive measures
are unlikely to achieve the desired goals. Legislation to prevent migrants from staying in the country,
tougher security in northern France and upstream accords with origin countries such as Albania
may on the face of it present a daunting prospect for would-be migrants, but in reality are likely to
only represent another iteration of the cycle that ultimately plays into the hands of smugglers. The
higher the obstacle, the more people will turn to smugglers, who, in turn, will charge more for riskier
approaches to infiltrate their clients into the UK.

An incontestable fact is that demand to access the UK will remain high. The This solid demand base
enhanced measures set out by the UK and France to curb illegal migration
has been the making of
may have an inhibitory effect on both the migrants’ ability to cross the
Channel, or, if they do succeed, their ability to stay in the UK. But policy the smuggler networks.
in Westminster may not register in the minds of those in Kabul, Baghdad, Tirana and Damascus
setting out on their journeys, for whom the legal hurdles of entering the UK will pale in comparison
with the prospect of remaining at home. Indeed, that migrants keep coming to the UK despite the
much-publicized cost-of-living crisis, which has hit the UK harder than its European neighbours,
indicates that the attraction of the UK is broad, multifaceted and deep-rooted. This solid demand
base has been the making of the smuggler networks, who in the pursuit of profit are putting highly
vulnerable people in situations of extreme risk.

That current responses are also complemented by a strong focus on organized crime is an appreciation
of this reality, but despite the vast outlays, particularly by the UK, the level of blanket interdiction
required to stop the boats is daunting. All a smuggler needs to do is place a boat somewhere along the
shoreline of northern France (or, more rarely, Belgium) where migrants are waiting – a line more than
250 kilometres long, some in remote and inaccessible spots (as highlighted by the use of Petit-Caux,

23
for example). Getting the boat to the launch site may be a logistical challenge, but as evidenced
by the ‘water taxi’ method, smugglers are always adept at finding new ways that circumvent law
enforcement. The same applies to the online sphere, where the UK has cracked down on the digital
communication channels used by smugglers to interact with and attract their clients: new channels
are easy to establish.

Given these conditions – the impossibility of total interdiction and the certainty of demand – how
can the issue of human smuggling as a dimension of irregular migration be addressed?

More important to recognize now is, firstly, how the business model of smuggling has evolved around
a mass market strategy: a large number of migrants desiring to cross the Channel are needed to
keep the smuggling enterprise profitable, and, secondly, that this particular route is now significantly
consolidated by a set of criminal actors working in an established relationship. This explains why the
Kurdish controllers of beaches and boats are readily prepared to work with other criminal groups
with the capacity to recruit large numbers of migrants, as the Albanians have done. For this reason,
effort needs to be placed at the major points of recruitment, using a strategic approach that is both
nuanced and predictive, rather than reactive.

The key to this approach is to delink migration from the demand for smugglers’ services. Those
nationalities and ethnicities drawn to make the UK their final destination tend to be those with
already established diaspora groups in place, and therefore it is among these communities where
strong cooperation programmes need to be put into place. Migrants who cross the Channel on small
boats hail from a diverse set of demographics, which can be separated into a few categories, with
strategies for each.

First are the economic migrants, such as Albanians, who often end up working in construction in
the UK.125 As the arrivals data show, nationalities with long histories of migration to the UK, such as
Indians and Pakistanis, have been opportunistically recruited by upstream smuggling networks to take
advantage of the lower costs of the passage as an unprecedented opportunity to cross the Channel.
Scrutinizing construction sites for such migrants would be one labour-intensive means of tackling this
demographic, but legalizing their work may be far more effective. Offering short-term or seasonal visas
that are easy to renew would enable economic migrants to undertake legal work and generate legal
income that could be remitted home. Enforcing visa limits would of course be resource-intensive – but
far less so than detecting ‘invisible’ workers, and this model could be designed to support specific
domestic labour shortages. And enabling economic workers such opportunities may also reduce the
incentive to bring over families and settle in the UK, as remittances from the UK would invariably
carry more purchasing power in the migrants’ country of origin.

Second are the migrants who are likely to have legitimate asylum claims, such as refugees fleeing
Afghanistan and possibly Iraq, Libya, Sudan and Somalia. While the UK can deflect its international
human rights obligations by forcing them to claim asylum in their first country of safety, as long as
their preferred ultimate destination is the UK, where they have higher chances of positive integration,
the problem of irregular entry will remain. This inevitably means pushing profits into the hands of
organized criminal groups, possibly triggering far wider domestic security threats. Therefore, both
to spare the asylum seekers the difficult and dangerous journey across land and water, these groups
should be allowed to process asylum claims in safe and supportive locations closer to their country
of origin, which would help prevent them from entering into the human smuggling ecosystem and
allow the UK to better screen, plan for and support the transition of those deemed eligible. This has

24
been the cornerstone of successful efforts, such as the 2016 EU–Turkey deal, to address irregular
migration in a number of migration corridors where strong diaspora ties exist.

In both cases, there is a need to think proactively. Sudan is one country where there is a long history
of UK migration, where there is an ongoing conflict and a well-developed smuggling infrastructure.
As a police analyst said, ‘We must not underestimate the Sudanese, they are coming in force but
30 years late. They are a community and would like to stay together if they can.’126 A Sudanese
smuggling industry could start to grow by linking up with Kurdish smugglers to exploit this increasingly
established route, and this is a risk that policymakers should be planning for, as it is easier to prevent
than stop migration surges.

Providing safe and legal routes for these two categories of migrants would significantly reduce the
number of possible clients for voracious smuggling networks who are seeking a mass market to make
their business model successful. Reducing the size of the market would also reduce the visible levels
of profit that attract criminal groups who have previously only shown limited activity in Europe.

The final element of the strategy has to be to tackle the dominant Kurdish smuggling groups specif-
ically. These are not currently prominent criminal actor groups in Europe, unlike Albanians or other
ethnic groupings. European enforcement agencies have limited knowledge and experience of Kurdish
organized crime, their evolution, structure and political economy, and would be well served to advance
it. A deep investigation is required to understand the markets that the Kurds are involved in and the
protection networks that are enabling their growth.

25
NOTES

1 How many people cross the Channel in small boats and 10 It should be noted, however, that vehicle-based smuggling is
how many claim asylum in the UK?, BBC, 30 August 2023, still used extensively by smugglers.
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-53699511. UK Home Office, 11 Even those who find the reality does not meet expectations
Irregular migration to the UK, year ending December 2022: rarely communicate their disappointment given the sacrifices
Official statistics, 23 February 2023, https://www.gov.uk/ made by family members to help them reach the UK.
government/statistics/irregular-migration-to-the-uk-year- 12 The number of Afghan migrants reached 9 088 in 2022
ending-december-2022/irregular-migration-to-the-uk- compared to 1 437 in 2021. See Faye Brown, Over 100,000
year-ending-december-2022#how-many-migrants-were- people now likely to have crossed Channel in small boats
detected-arriving-in-the-uk-via-small-boats. since records began, Sky News, 10 August 2023, https://
2 By comparison, according to IOM statistics, which monitor news.sky.com/story/over-100-000-people-now-likely-
mixed migration flows, there were about 190 000 migrant to-have-crossed-channel-in-small-boats-since-records-
arrivals in Europe in 2022; in 2023, the figure rose to just began-12937171; interview with Afghan migrant, Calais,
over 281 000. See IOM UN Migration, Displacement tracking June 2022.
matrix, https://dtm.iom.int/europe/arrivals. 13 UK Home Office, Irregular migration detailed datasets
3 Based on fieldwork in northern France, UK and Belgium, and summary tables, https://www.gov.uk/government/
including interviews with law enforcement, migrants and statistical-data-sets/irregular-migration-detailed-dataset-
smugglers, civil society organizations, 2022 and 2023. and-summary-tables#detailed-datasets..
4 Interview with an Albanian smuggling intermediary in 14 British Prime Minister’s Office, PM statement on illegal
November 2022. The finding that Kurdish criminal networks migration, 13 December 2022, https://www.gov.uk/
are so influential is notable. It is the intention of the GI-TOC government/speeches/pm-statement-on-illegal-migration-
to conduct more fieldwork in Iraq and elsewhere to provide 13-december-2022#:~:text=Prime%20Minister%20Rishi%20
more granularity as to how these networks operate. Sunak%20made,of%20Commons%20on%20illegal%20
5 Interview with smuggler based in Germany, by phone, migration.&text=Mr%20Speaker%2C%20before%20I%20
September 2023. start,children%20so%20tragically%20in%20Solihull.
6 Based on interviews with smugglers, by phone, September 15 UNHCR, UK Illegal Migration Bill: UN Refugee Agency and
2023. UN Human Rights Office warn of profound impact on human
7 Louis Chahuneau, Inside France’s battle against migrant rights and international refugee protection system, 18 July
smugglers: A closer look, InfoMigrants, 4 August 2023, 2023, https://www.unhcr.org/news/press-releases/uk-illegal-
https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/50834/inside- migration-bill-un-refugee-agency-and-un-human-rights-
frances-battle-against-migrant-smugglers-a-closer-look. office-warn.
8 See IOM, https://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/ 16 British Prime Minister’s Office, PM statement on illegal
europe?region_incident=All&route=3896&incident_ migration, 13 December 2022, https://www.gov.uk/
date%5Bmin%5D=&incident_date%5Bmax%5D=. government/speeches/pm-statement-on-illegal-migration-
9 Six dead after refugee boat capsizes in English Channel, 13-december-2022#:~:text=Prime%20Minister%20Rishi%20
Al Jazeera, 12 August 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/ Sunak%20made,of%20Commons%20on%20illegal%20
news/2023/8/12/six-dead-after-migrant-boat-capsizes- migration.&text=Mr%20Speaker%2C%20before%20I%20
crossing-from-france-to-uk. start,children%20so%20tragically%20in%20Solihull.

26
17 UK Home Office, Latest statement in response to small boat 28 Migrants à Calais: construction d’un mur «anti-intrusions» de
crossings, 15 January 2024, https://homeofficemedia.blog. migrants autour d’une station-service, FranceInfo, 24 January
gov.uk/2024/01/15/latest-statement-in-response-to-small- 2019, https://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/hauts-de-
boat-crossings/. france/pas-calais/calais/migrants-calais-construction-mur-
18 Emily Dugan, Small boat arrivals in UK likely to rise in 2024, anti-intrusions-migrants-autour-station-service-1612929.
says Border Force officials’ union, The Guardian, 1 January html.
2024, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2024/jan/01/ 29 IRASEC and France Terre d’Asile, En route to the UK: A
small-boat-arrivals-in-britain-likely-to-rise-in-2024-says- field survey on Vietnamese migrants, March 2017, https://
border-force-officials-union. www.france-terre-asile.org/images/stories/publications/
19 Interview with a fisherman in the port of Calais, July 2022. pdf/En_route_to_the_United_Kingdom_-_a_field_survey_of_
20 Rosie Cowan, Huge trafficking operation smashed as Yard vietnamese_migrants.pdf.
holds suspected ringleaders, The Guardian, 12 October 2005, 30 National Crime Agency, National Strategic Assessment
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2005/oct/12/crime. of Serious and Organised Crime, 2019, https://
21 British Home Affairs Committee, Channel crossings, nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/who-we-are/publications/296-
migration and asylum, First Report of Session 2022–23, 18 national-strategic-assessment-of-serious-organised-
July 2022, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5803/ crime-2019/file.
cmselect/cmhaff/199/report.html#heading-2. Official formal 31 Essex lorry deaths: Men jailed for killing 39 migrants in trailer,
data of RIB crossings only began to be published in 2018, BBC, 22 January 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-
so there are very little actual quantitative breakdowns of england-essex-55765213.
demographics that utilised the route prior to 2018. 32 According to a report by the British Parliament, ‘[i]t is likely
22 One exception to migrants using smugglers of the same that some of the increase in small boat crossings is driven by
ethnicity is migrants from Africa, predominantly Sudanese. tightened security on other methods of journeying to the UK
En route to the UK: A field survey on Vietnamese migrants, by irregular means.’ See UK Parliament, Channel crossings,
IRASEC and France Terre d’Asile, March 2017, https://www. migration and asylum, first report of session 2022–23,
france-terre-asile.org/images/stories/publications/pdf/ https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5803/cmselect/
En_route_to_the_United_Kingdom_-_a_field_survey_of_ cmhaff/199/report.html#heading-2.
vietnamese_migrants.pdf. 33 Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, An
23 Ibid, p 44. inspection of the Home Office’s response to in-country
24 In addition to this sum, the UK paid out £87 million in the clandestine arrivals (‘lorry drops’) and to irregular
same period to strengthen border security in northern migrants arriving via ‘small boats’ (May 2019–December
France, some of which has been paid to the French 2019), November 2020, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.
government. See Irregular migration: A timeline of UK– uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
French co-operation, Research briefing, 22 March 2023, file/933953/An_inspection_of_the_Home_Office_s_
House of Commons library, https://commonslibrary. response_to_in-country_clandestine_arrivals___lorry_
parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9681/#:~:text=The%20 drops___and_to_irregular_migrants_arriving_via__small_
UK%20committed%20to%20providing,%2F24%20and%20 boats_.pdf.
2025%2F26; France and Britain’s Le Touquet Treaty on 34 British Home Office, Irregular migration to the UK, year
migration - key points, France24, 17 January 20218, https:// ending March 2023, 25 May 2023, https://www.gov.uk/
www.france24.com/en/20180117-france-britains-le- government/statistics/irregular-migration-to-the-uk-year-
touquet-treaty-migration-key-points. ending-march-2023.
25 British Prime Minister’s Office, UK–France Joint Leaders’ 35 European Migrant Smuggling Centre, 5th Annual Report,
Declaration, 10 March 2023, https://www.gov.uk/ EUROPOL, 2021, https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/
government/publications/uk-france-joint-leaders- default/files/documents/emsc_5th_annual_report.pdf.
declaration/uk-france-joint-leaders-declaration. 36 UK Home Office, New Plan for Immigration: policy
26 Ibid. statement (accessible), 29 March 2022, https://www.gov.uk/
27 Alex Lee, The Essex lorry deaths expose the tragic cost of government/consultations/new-plan-for-immigration/new-
high-tech borders, Wired, 26 October 2019, https://www. plan-for-immigration-policy-statement-accessible.
wired.co.uk/article/essex-lorry-deaths; Isobel Cockerell, A 37 Veronique Weber, Près de Dieppe, 59 migrants voulaient
blanket of surveillance covers Calais, but more migrants are rejoindre l’Angleterre sur des canots de fortune, Actu, 19
dying at sea than ever before, Coda, 30 November 2021, October 2020, https://actu.fr/normandie/petit-caux_76618/
https://www.codastory.com/authoritarian-tech/surveillance/ pres-de-dieppe-59-migrants-voulaient-rejoindre-l-angleterre-
surveillance-borders-calais-migrants-drones-police-boats/. sur-des-canots-de-fortune_36887230.html.

27
38 Judicial records shared by the judicial authority of Lille in 52 Interview with Sudanese migrant and NGOs, July 2022.
charge of the investigation cited by Lasjaunias, Aude, see The 53 Fieldwork, mid-2022. Prices checked most recently in March
fisherman smuggling migrants who has thrown the port of 2023 on https://www.alibaba.com/showroom/yamabisi-
Dunkirk into turmoil, Le Monde, 7 November 2015. 40hp.html. Previously, Yamaha engines were more common.
39 Interview with Albanian migrant (2), November 2022. 54 Interview with sources in criminal justice system in north of
40 Interviews with Albanian migrant (1) and with a relative of France, July 2022.
Albanian migrant (2), November 2022. 55 Interview with a smuggler and court documents seen by the
41 Ibid. GI, Dunkirk, July 2022.
42 UK Home Office, Irregular migration to the UK, year ending 56 Rajeev Syal, Smuggling operation sent thousands across
September 2023, 23 November 2023, https://www.gov.uk/ Channel illegally in small boats, The Guardian, 6 July 2022,
government/statistics/irregular-migration-to-the-uk-year- https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2022/jul/06/
ending-september-2023/irregular-migration-to-the-uk-year- smuggling-operation-sent-thousands-of-people-across-
ending-september-2023. channel-illegally-in-small-boats.
43 La voix du Nord, Manche: les traversées clandestines, un 57 Interview with Western law enforcement, Romania, June
business lucratif pour des passeurs très organisés, https://www. 2023.
lavoixdunord.fr/1167294/article/2022-04-15/manche-les- 58 Court documents seen by the GI-TOC, Dunkirk and
traversees-clandestines-un-business-lucratif-pour-des- Boulogne, July 2022.
passeurs-tres. 59 France busts lucrative cross-Channel people smuggling
44 Interview with smugglers’ escort, northern France, August ring, RFI, 23 September 2022, https://www.rfi.fr/en/
2022; Rachel Flynn, Six dead and dozens rescued after france/20220923-france-busts-people-smugglers-accused-
migrant boat capsizes in Channel as search continues, The of-making-thousands-from-channel-crossings.
Independent, 13 August 2023, https://www.independent. 60 UK arrests suspected English Channel people-smuggling
co.uk/news/uk/home-news/migrant-boat-english-channel- ‘kingpin’, Al Jazeera, 5 May 2022, https://www.aljazeera.
rescue-b2392030.html. com/news/2022/5/5/uk-arrests-suspected-english-
45 Interview with French coast lifeguard, northern France, channel-people-smuggling-kingpin; Channel crossings:
August 2022. Smugglers are using ‘death trap’ boats, agency says, BBC, 12
46 Channel crossings: Smugglers are using ‘death trap’ boats, December 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-
agency says, BBC, 12 December 2021, https://www.bbc. kent-59628067.
co.uk/news/uk-england-kent-59628067. 61 Traversées clandestines de la Manche: des réseaux de
47 Interviews with law enforcement officers and smugglers, passeurs de plus en plus organisés, L’Express, 19 April 2022,
August 2022. https://www.lexpress.fr/actualites/1/societe/traversees-
48 UK Parliament, No case for routinely offering asylum to clandestines-de-la-manche-des-reseaux-de-passeurs-de-
claimants from ‘safe’, Albania, Home Affairs Committee, 12 plus-en-plus-organises_2172024.html.
June 2023, https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/83/ 62 Ibid.
home-affairs-committee/news/195596/no-case-for- 63 According to migrant testimonies, media monitoring and
routinely-offering-asylum-to-claimants-from-safe-albania- trials in the Calais area, in which Iraqi nationals are the most
home-affairs-committee/. common nationality among defendants in smuggling trials.
49 Albanian migrants: Why are they coming to the UK and how 64 Interview with activist, Boulogne, July 2022.
many have arrived?, BBC, 8 March 2023, https://www.bbc. 65 Interview with smuggler based in Germany, by phone,
com/news/explainers-63473022. September 2023.
50 Fjori Sinoruka, Rise in TikTok ads among Albanians selling 66 Eray Arda Akartuna and Amy Elise Thornton, The Kurdistan
smuggling operations to UK, Balkan Insight, 8 August 2022, Worker’s Party (PKK) in London: Countering overseas
https://balkaninsight.com/2022/08/08/rise-in-tiktok-ads- terrorist financing and support with “nudge” and situational
among-albanians-selling-smuggling-operations-to-uk/; approaches, Terrorism and Policial Violence, pp 10–11, https://
‘They think they will find paradise, but...’, the strong warning doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2021.1941902.
from The Times: In five years Albania will be empty, SOT, 67 Laura Adal, Organized crime in the Levant, GI-TOC, March
4 November 2022, https://sot.com.al/english/aktualitet/ 2021, p 20, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/
mendojne-se-do-gjejne-parajsen-por-paralajmerimi-i-forte- uploads/2021/03/Organized-Crime-in-the-Levant-Conflict-
nga-the-time-i547067. transactional-relationships-and-identity-dynamics-GITOC.
51 Interview with an Albanian migrant (5) in November 2022; pdf.
see also We ran out of gas in the middle of the ocean, SOT, 68 Jack Newman, Middle Eastern migrants reveal how ‘Kurdish
19 October 2022, https://sot.com.al/english/aktualitet/iku- mafia’ gangsters in Minsk facilitated their travel across
ilegalisht-ne-angli-rrefehet-shqiptari-dhe-tregon-veshtersite- Europe and into France – where they now prepare to make
na--i543654. the dangerous Channel crossing, Daily Mail, 3 December

28
 2021, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10273727/ 85 Diane Taylor, Kingpins in Channel smuggling operation
Migrants-reveal-Kurdish-mafia-gangsters-Minsk-facilitated- ‘living and working freely’ in the UK, The Guardian, 254 July
travel-Europe.html. 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/jul/24/
69 Interview with Western diplomats, Poland, December 2023. kingpins-in-channel-smuggling-operations-living-freely-in-
70 Interview with ‘Karwan’ by phone, September 2023. the-uk-say-migrants.
71 GI-TOC fieldwork, Iraq, June 2023. 86 Interviews with migrants, northern France and Belgium,
72 Ibid. 2022 and 2023.
73 The GI-TOC will be conducting more research, including 87 Mohammed El-Qorchi, Hawala, Finance and Development,
fieldwork in Iraq, to map out how these criminal groups December 2002, 39, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
operate and the nature of their relationship with their Kurdish fandd/2002/12/elqorchi.htm.
affiliates in Europe. 88 See, for example, Alexis Constant, Grande-Synthe: un migrant
74 For instance, shootouts in May 2022 between rival tué par balle ce lundi soir, 24 heures après une fusillade qui a
smugglers saw one Kurdish Iraqi migrant killed. Another spate fait un blessé grave, La Voix Du Nord, 24 May 2022, https://
of shootings in September 2022 believed to be motivated www.lavoixdunord.fr/1184033/article/2022-05-24/grande-
by disputes between rival Kurdish smugglers also led to one synthe-un-homme-tue-par-balle-et-un-autre-blesse-pres-d-
Iraqi being shot in the head, while a Kurdish smuggler was un-camp-de.
shot in his sleep in February 2023. See Alexis Constant, 89 Fieldwork in Iraq, June 2023.
Grande-Synthe: un migrant tué par balle ce lundi soir, 24 heures 90 Press release, 39 arrests in cross-border operation against
après une fusillade qui a fait un blessé grave, La Voix Du Nord, migrant smuggling in small boats across English Channel,
24 May 2022, https://www.lavoixdunord.fr/1184033/ EUROPOL, 6 July 2022, https://www.europol.europa.eu/
article/2022-05-24/grande-synthe-un-homme-tue-par- media-press/newsroom/news/39-arrests-in-cross-border-
balle-et-un-autre-blesse-pres-d-un-camp-de; Rival smugglers operation-against-migrant-smuggling-in-small-boats-across-
blamed for shootings in French migrant camp, InfoMigrants, english-channel.
9 September 2022, https://www.infomigrants.net/en/ 91 The following article reports how a migrant, a 32-year-old
post/43206/rival-smugglers-blamed-for-shootings-in-french- Kurd, who witnessed armed violence in the camp, would
migrant-camp#:~:text=A%20string%20of%20shootings%20 reply ‘mafia, mafia’ when asked by reporters about the
at,victim%20of%20gun%2Drelated%20violence; Matt shootings. See Agence France Presse, French police clear
Datham, Suspected Channel smuggler shot in his sleep, Channel migrant camps after violence leaves one dead,
The Times, 15 February 2023, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/ Barron’s, 25 May 2022, https://www.barrons.com/news/
article/suspected-channel-smuggler-shot-in-his-sleep- french-police-clear-channel-migrant-camps-after-violence-
l3j79v8wd. leaves-one-dead-01653477908.
75 Interviews with sources in the criminal justice system, low- 92 Interview with social workers, northern France, July 2023.
level smugglers and migrants, northern France, 2022–2023. 93 Fieldwork, northern France, 2023; interview with migrant,
76 Interview with small smugglers in Belgium (Antwerp) and northern France, July 2023; Camp de migrants de Loon-Plage:
France, June 2023. 13 passeurs présumés interpellés, pleusiuers arms saisies, Le
77 This profile is based on an interview with Karwan by phone, Figaro, 14 June 2016, https://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/
September 2023. camp-de-migrants-de-loon-plage-13-passeurs-presumes-
78 Interview with smuggler based in Germany, by phone, interpelles-plusieurs-armes-saisies-20230614.
September 2023. 94 Interview with Afghan migrant (8), July 2023.
79 Interview with Albanian migrant (2), November 2022. 95 Interviews with migrants, northern France (camps in Grand
80 Interview with Albanian migrant (1) and interview with an Synthe and Loon-Plage), 2022 and 2023.
Albanian smuggling intermediary, November 2022. 96 InfoMigrants, Terms and acronyms that asylum seekers need
81 Interview with Albanian migrant (1), November 2022. to know in France, 30 May 2022, https://www.infomigrants.
82 Interview with source within criminal justice system, net/en/post/40724/terms-and-acronyms-that-asylum-
northern France, October 2023. seekers-need-to-know-in-france.
83 Interviews with migrants, northern France, 2022 and 2023. 97 Interviews with smugglers, 2022–2023.
84 An extensive investigation resulting in 39 arrests included 98 Interview with Afghan recruiter, Belgium, June 2023.
hawaladars based in the UK. See Press release, 39 arrests in 99 Interview with NGO in Calais, August 2022; Charles Piquet,
cross-border operation against migrant smuggling in small Calais: le procès des gérants du Pacific et du Tudor reporté,
boats across English Channel, EUROPOL, 6 July 2022, Nord Littoral, 22 October 2022, https://www.nordlittoral.
https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/ fr/156235/article/2022-10-22/calais-le-proces-des-gerants-
news/39-arrests-in-cross-border-operation-against-migrant- du-pacific-et-du-tudor-reporte.
smuggling-in-small-boats-across-english-channel. 100 See InfoMigrants, English Channel: Summer sees migrants
risk all to reach UK via unstable boats, 17 August 2017,

29
 https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/51184/english- 118 UK Home Office, Irregular migration to the UK, year ending
channel-summer-sees-migrants-risk-all-to-reach-uk-via- September 2023, 23 November 2023, https://www.gov.uk/
unstable-boats. government/statistics/irregular-migration-to-the-uk-year-
101 Interviews with migrants and French coast guard, northern ending-september-2023/irregular-migration-to-the-uk-year-
France, August 2023. ending-september-2023.
102 Interview with social workers, Loon-Plage, France, July 2023. 119 Interview with smuggler based in Germany.
103 Interviews with taxi drivers, Lille Airport, July 2023. 120 Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and
104 Interviews with Albanian migrant and Albanian smuggling Air, Supplementing The United Nations Convention Against
intermediary, November 2022. Transnational Organized Crime, Article 5, https://www.
105 Interview with an Albanian smuggling intermediary, unodc.org/documents/middleeastandnorthafrica/smuggling-
November 2022. migrants/SoM_Protocol_English.pdf.
106 It should be noted that not all migrants pay to access such 121 Interview with a relative of an Albanian migrant, November
NGO services. 2022.
107 Interview with social workers, July 2023. 122 Interview with migrants, northern France, July 2022. Steve
108 Fieldwork, northern France, mid-2023. Reynolds, head of the NCA-led Invigor task force, said that
109 The telephone number provided is typically for CROSS: ‘there is evidence of some degree of coordination. There
Centres Régionaux Opérationnels de Surveillance et de have been some quite large events, surges, where there have
Sauvetage (regional surveillance and lifesaving centres). been nine or ten boats’. As well as being a means of releasing
110 Interview with an Albanian smuggling intermediary, a backlog of demand, it may be that the surge approach
November 2022. helps to avoid interdiction. According to Reynolds, ‘there’s no
111 Interview with migrants, northern France, July 2022. specific intelligence to suggest that they operate like cocaine
112 Interview with municipal official, northern France , northern couriers, where they maybe send 10 people on the basis that
France, July 2022. two are going to get caught and the other eight get through,
113 Notably, this is challenge reported across a wide range of but there might be – we just don’t know for sure.’ See People
smuggling routes, including between West Africa and the smugglers run mass boat launches to beat Channel patrols
Canaries. – Crime unit chief says gangs are coordinating their actions
114 Interview with Afghan who managed to cross the Channel, in France, The Guardian, 28 September 2019, https://www.
October 2023. theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/28/smugglers-send-
115 Stéphanie Maurice, Migrants: la préfecture du Pas-de-Calais migrant-surges-across-channel-to-beat-patrols.
barre l’accès d’un fleuve à l’aide de bouées, Libération, 11 123 Interview with Albanian smuggling intermediary 2, November
August 2023, https://www.liberation.fr/societe/migrants-la- 2022.
prefecture-du-pas-de-calais-barre-lacces-dun-fleuve-a-laide- 124 Daniel Sandford, What does Rishi Sunak’s promise to stop
de-bouees-20230811_AMNIJUF2T5CSTP6CDB4G747O24/. the boats mean?, BBC, 4 January 2023, https://www.bbc.
116 National Crime Agency, Update: Small boats people co.uk/news/uk-64164339.
smuggling network dismantled following covert NCA 125 Interviews with Albanian migrants, November 2022.
investigation, 29 August 2023, https://nationalcrimeagency. 126 Interview with law enforcement source, July 2022.
gov.uk/news/small-boats-people-smuggling-network- 127 Убийцы в законе, Versiya, 28 December 2015, https://
dismantled-following-covert-nca-investigation. versia.ru/perestrelki-i-zakaznye-ubijstva-vnov-stanovyatsya-
117 This is according to court testimony given by an Iraqi normoj.
smuggler, August 2022.

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