

## Supplementary Material for “The Sample Complexity of Online One-Class Collaborative Filtering”

### 6. Proof of Theorem 1

Theorem 1 follows immediately from the following result.

**Theorem 2** *Suppose that there are at least  $\frac{N}{2K}$  users of the same type, for all user types, and assume that at least a fraction  $\nu$  of all items is likable to a given user, for all users. Moreover, suppose that for some  $\gamma \in [0, 1)$ , all users satisfy condition (1). Pick  $\delta > 0$  and suppose that the number of nearest neighbors  $k$ , the batch size  $Q$ , and the parameter  $\eta$ , are chosen such that  $k \leq \frac{9N}{40K}$ ,  $\eta \leq \nu/2$ ,*

$$\frac{k}{Q} \geq \frac{64 \log(8M/\delta)}{p_f \Delta^2}, \quad (7)$$

and

$$Q \geq \frac{10}{\nu} \log(4/\delta). \quad (8)$$

Then the reward accumulated by the User-CF algorithm up to time  $T \in [T_{\text{start}}, \frac{4}{5} \nu M p_f]$  with

$$T_{\text{start}} = \frac{\left(512 \max\left(\log\left(\frac{4NQ}{k\Delta}\right), \log\left(\frac{88}{\delta}\right)\right)\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}}{(3p_f^2(1-\gamma)^2\nu)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \left(1 - \max\left(\frac{1}{T}, \frac{2}{\eta Q}\right)\right)}$$

satisfies

$$\frac{\mathbb{E}[\text{reward}(T)]}{NT} \geq \left(1 - \frac{T_{\text{start}}}{T} - 2^\alpha \frac{(T - T_{\text{start}})^{1-\alpha}}{T(1-\alpha)} - \max\left(\frac{1}{T}, \frac{2}{\eta Q}\right)\right) (1 - \delta). \quad (9)$$

Theorem 1 follows by choosing the parameter of the User-CF algorithm as follows:

$$\eta = \frac{\nu}{2}, \quad k = \frac{9}{40} \frac{N}{K}, \quad \text{and} \quad Q = k \frac{p_f \Delta^2}{64 \log(8M/\delta)}.$$

To see this, note that by definition, the conditions on  $k$  and  $\eta$  and condition (7) on  $Q$  are satisfied. By (4), condition (8) holds and  $\frac{2}{\eta Q} = \frac{K}{N} \frac{c' \log(M/\delta)}{p_f \Delta^2}$ . Moreover,  $\max\left(\log\left(\frac{4NQ}{k\Delta}\right), \log\left(\frac{88}{\delta}\right)\right) \leq \tilde{c} \log(N/\delta)$ .

#### 6.1. Proof of Theorem 2

Theorem 2 is proven by showing that at time  $t \geq T_{\text{start}}$  the following holds for all users  $u$ :

- i) the neighborhood of  $u$  is sufficiently well explored by similarity exploration steps so that most of the nearest neighbors of  $u$  are *good*, i.e., are of the same user type as  $u$  (similarly, neighbors are called *bad* if they are of a different user type than  $u$ ),
- ii) for  $t \geq T_{\text{start}}$ , the estimates  $\hat{p}_{ui}$ , for all  $i \in \mathcal{Q}_q, q = 0, \dots, \frac{t}{\eta Q} - 1$  correctly predict whether  $i$  is likable by  $u$  or not, and
- iii) there exist items in the sets  $\mathcal{Q}_q, q = 0, \dots, \frac{t}{\eta Q} - 1$  that are likable by  $u$  and that have not been rated by  $u$  at previous times steps.

Conditions i, ii, and iii guarantee that an exploitation step recommends a likable item.

Formally, we start by defining the following events:

$$\mathcal{G}_\beta(t) = \{\text{At time } t, \text{ no more than } \beta k \text{ of the } k\text{-nearest neighbors of } u \text{ are bad}\}, \quad (10)$$

$$\mathcal{L}(t) = \{\text{at time } t, \text{ there exists an item } i \in \mathcal{Q}_q, \\ q = 0, \dots, t/(\eta Q) - 1 \text{ that is likable by } u\}, \quad (11)$$

and

$$\mathcal{E}(t) = \bigcup_{q=0, \dots, \frac{t}{\eta Q} - 1} \mathcal{E}_q(t), \quad (12)$$

with

$$\mathcal{E}_q(t) = \{\text{Conditioned on } \mathcal{G}_{\frac{\Delta}{4Q}}(t), \text{ for all } i \in \mathcal{Q}_q, \\ \hat{p}_{ui} > p_f/2, \text{ if } p_{ui} > 1/2 + \Delta, \text{ and} \\ \hat{p}_{ui} < p_f/2, \text{ if } p_{ui} < 1/2 - \Delta\}. \quad (13)$$

For convenience, we omit in the notion of  $\mathcal{L}(t)$ ,  $\mathcal{G}_{\frac{\Delta}{4Q}}(t)$ ,  $\mathcal{E}(t)$ , and  $\mathcal{E}_q(t)$  the dependence on  $u$ . The significance of those definitions is that if  $\mathcal{L}(t)$ ,  $\mathcal{G}_{\frac{\Delta}{4Q}}(t)$ , and  $\mathcal{E}(t)$  hold simultaneously, then the recommendation made to user  $u$  by an exploitation step at time  $t$  is likable. We can therefore lower-bound the reward  $\mathbb{E}[\text{reward}(T)]$  as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\mathbb{E}[\text{reward}(T)]}{NT} &= \frac{1}{NT} \sum_{t=0}^{T-1} \sum_{u=0}^{N-1} \mathbb{P}[X_{ui(u,t)} = 1] \\ &\geq \frac{1}{NT} \sum_{u=0}^{N-1} \sum_{t=0, t \notin \{\eta Q q : q=0,1,\dots\}}^{T-1} \mathbb{P}[\text{exploitation at } t] \mathbb{P}[X_{ui(u,t)} = 1 | \text{exploitation at } t] \end{aligned} \quad (14)$$

$$\geq \frac{1}{N} \sum_{u=0}^{N-1} \left( \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=0}^{T-1} (1 - (2/t)^\alpha) \mathbb{P}[X_{ui(u,t)} = 1 | \text{exploitation at } t] - \max\left(\frac{1}{T}, \frac{2}{\eta Q}\right) \right) \quad (15)$$

$$\geq \frac{1}{N} \sum_{u=0}^{N-1} \left( \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=T_{\text{start}}}^{T-1} (1 - \delta)(1 - (2/t)^\alpha) - \max\left(\frac{1}{T}, \frac{2}{\eta Q}\right) \right) \quad (16)$$

$$\geq (1 - \delta) \left( 1 - \frac{T_{\text{start}}}{T} - 2^\alpha \frac{(T - T_{\text{start}})^{1-\alpha}}{T(1-\alpha)} - \max\left(\frac{1}{T}, \frac{2}{\eta Q}\right) \right). \quad (17)$$

Here, (14) follows from

$$\mathbb{P}[X_{ui(u,t)} = 1 | \text{preference exploration at } t] \geq 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \mathbb{P}[X_{ui(u,t)} = 1 | \text{similarity exploration at } t] \geq 0.$$

For (15) we used, for  $t \neq \eta Q q$ ,

$$\mathbb{P}[\text{exploration at } t] = 1 - (t - \lfloor t/(\eta Q) \rfloor)^{-\alpha} \geq 1 - (t(1 - 1/(\eta Q)))^{-\alpha} \geq 1 - (2/t)^\alpha$$

which follows from  $\eta Q \geq 2$ . Moreover we used for (15) that the fraction of preference exploration steps up to time  $T$  is at most  $\max(\frac{1}{T}, \frac{2}{\eta Q})$ . To see that, note that at  $T \in \{\eta Q q, \dots, \eta Q(q+1)\}$  we have performed  $q+1$  preference exploration steps. It follows that, for  $q \geq 1$ , the fraction of preference exploration steps performed up to  $T$  is given by  $\frac{q+1}{\eta Q} \leq \frac{2}{\eta Q}$ . Thus, for any  $T \geq 1$ , the fraction of preference exploration steps is  $\leq \max(\frac{1}{T}, \frac{2}{\eta Q})$ . Equality (16) follows from

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{P}[X_{ui(u,t)} = 1 | \text{exploitation at } t] &\geq \mathbb{P}[\mathcal{E}(t) \cap \mathcal{G}_{\frac{\Delta}{4Q}}(t) \cap \mathcal{L}(t)] \\ &\geq 1 - \delta. \end{aligned} \quad (18)$$

Here, inequality (18) holds for  $t \geq T_{\text{start}}$  and is established below. Finally, inequality (17) follows from

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{t=T_{\text{start}}}^{T-1} t^{-\alpha} &\leq \int_{T_{\text{start}}-1}^{T-1} t^{-\alpha} = \frac{1}{1-\alpha} t^{1-\alpha} \Big|_{t=T_{\text{start}}-1}^{T-1} \\ &= \frac{(T-1)^{1-\alpha} - (T_{\text{start}}-1)^{1-\alpha}}{1-\alpha} \leq \frac{(T - T_{\text{start}})^{1-\alpha}}{1-\alpha}. \end{aligned}$$

It remains to establish (18). To this end, define for notational convenience

$$A := \frac{256 \max \left( \log \left( \frac{4NQ}{k\Delta} \right), \log \left( \frac{88}{\delta} \right) \right)}{3p_f^2(1-\gamma)^{2\nu}},$$

and let  $T_s$  be the number of similarity exploration steps executed up to time  $T$ . Inequality (18) follows by noting that, for all  $t \geq T_{\text{start}}$ , by the union bound,

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{P} \left[ (\mathcal{E}(t) \cap \mathcal{G}_{\frac{\Delta}{4Q}}(t) \cap \mathcal{L}(t))^c \right] &\leq \mathbb{P}[\mathcal{E}^c(t)] + \mathbb{P} \left[ \mathcal{G}_{\frac{\Delta}{4Q}}^c(t) \right] + \mathbb{P}[\mathcal{L}^c(t)] \\ &\leq \mathbb{P}[\mathcal{E}^c(t)] + \mathbb{P} \left[ \mathcal{G}_{\frac{\Delta}{4Q}}^c(t) | T_s \geq A \right] + \mathbb{P}[T_s \leq A] + \mathbb{P}[\mathcal{L}^c(t)] \end{aligned} \quad (19)$$

$$\leq \frac{\delta}{4} + \frac{\delta}{4} + \frac{\delta}{4} + \frac{\delta}{4} = \delta. \quad (20)$$

Here, inequality (19) follows since for two events  $C, B$  we have that

$$\mathbb{P}[C] = \mathbb{P}[C \cap B] + \mathbb{P}[C \cap B^c] = \mathbb{P}[C|B]\mathbb{P}[B] + \mathbb{P}[C|B^c]\mathbb{P}[B^c] \leq \mathbb{P}[C|B] + \mathbb{P}[B^c]. \quad (21)$$

Inequality (20) follows from

$$\mathbb{P}[\mathcal{E}^c(t)] \leq \delta/4 \quad (22)$$

$$\mathbb{P} \left[ \mathcal{G}_{\frac{\Delta}{4Q}}^c(t) | T_s \geq A \right] \leq \delta/4 \quad (23)$$

$$\mathbb{P}[T_s \leq A] \leq \delta/4 \quad (24)$$

$$\mathbb{P}[\mathcal{L}^c(t)] \leq \delta/4. \quad (25)$$

In the remainder of this proof, we establish the inequalities (22)-(25). The key ingredient for these bounds are concentration inequalities, in particular a version of Bernstein's inequality (Bardenet and Maillard, 2015).

**Proof of (22):** By the union bound, we have, for all  $t = 0, \dots, M-1$ , that

$$\mathbb{P}[\mathcal{E}^c(t)] \leq \sum_{q=0}^{M/Q-1} \mathbb{P}[\mathcal{E}_q^c(t)] \leq \frac{\delta}{4}$$

as desired. Here, we used  $\mathbb{P}[\mathcal{E}_q^c(t)] \leq \frac{\delta Q}{4M}$ , which follows from Lemma 1 stated below with  $\delta' = \frac{\delta Q}{4M}$  and  $T_r = 1$  (note that the assumption (26) of Lemma 1 is implied by the assumption (7) of Theorem 2).

**Lemma 1 (Preference exploration)** *Suppose we recommend  $T_r$  random items to each user, chosen uniformly at random from a set  $\mathcal{Q} \subseteq [M]$  of  $Q$  items. Suppose that  $p_{vi}$  is  $\Delta$ -bounded away from  $1/2$ , for all  $i \in \mathcal{Q}$  and for all  $v \in \mathcal{N}_u$ , where  $\mathcal{N}_u$  is a set of  $k$  users, of which no more than  $\beta k$ , with  $\beta \leq \frac{\Delta T_r}{4Q}$ , of the users are of a different type than  $u$ . Fix  $\delta' > 0$ . If*

$$T_r \frac{k}{Q} \frac{p_f \Delta^2}{64 \log(2Q/\delta')} \geq 1 \quad (26)$$

*then, with probability at least  $1 - \delta'$ , for all  $i \in \mathcal{Q}$ ,  $\hat{p}_{ui} > \frac{p_i}{2}$  if  $p_{ui} \geq 1/2 + \Delta$  and  $\hat{p}_{ui} < \frac{p_i}{2}$  if  $p_{ui} \leq 1/2 - \Delta$ .*

**Proof of (23):** Inequality (23) follows from Lemma 2 below, which ensures that a user has many good and only few bad neighbors.

**Lemma 2 (Many good and few bad neighbors)** *Let  $\mathcal{T}_u$  be the subsets of all users  $[N]$  that are of the same type of  $u$  and suppose its cardinality satisfies  $\geq \frac{N}{2K}$ . Suppose that, for some constant  $\gamma \in [0, 1)$ , condition (1) holds, and that the number of nearest neighbors  $k$  satisfies  $k \leq \frac{9N}{40K}$ . Choose  $\beta \in (0, 1)$ , and suppose*

$$T_s \geq \frac{64 \log(N/(\beta k))}{3p_f^2(1-\gamma)^2 \frac{1}{M} \min_{v \in \mathcal{T}_u} \langle \mathbf{P}_u, \mathbf{P}_v \rangle} \quad (27)$$

*similarity exploration steps have been performed. Then, with probability at least  $1 - 11e^{-\frac{3}{64} T_s p_f^2 (1-\gamma)^2 \frac{1}{M} \min_{v \in \mathcal{T}_u} \langle \mathbf{P}_u, \mathbf{P}_v \rangle}$ , the set of nearest neighbors  $\mathcal{N}_u$  of user  $u$  (defined in Section 3), contains no more than  $\beta k$  bad neighbors.*

To see that inequality (23) follows from Lemma 2, we first note that  $T_s \geq A$  guarantees that condition (27) of Lemma 2 is satisfied (with  $\beta = \frac{\Delta}{4Q}$ ). To see this, note that since each user likes at least a fraction  $\nu$  of the items, we have

$$\frac{1}{M} \min_{v \in \mathcal{T}_u} \langle \mathbf{p}_u, \mathbf{p}_v \rangle \geq \nu \left( \frac{1}{2} + \Delta \right)^2 \geq \frac{\nu}{4}. \quad (28)$$

Lemma 2 therefore implies

$$\mathbb{P} \left[ \mathcal{G}_{\frac{\Delta}{4Q}}^c(t) | T_s \geq A \right] \leq 11e^{-\frac{3}{64} T_s p_f^2 (1-\gamma)^2 \frac{1}{M} \min_{v \in \mathcal{T}_u} \langle \mathbf{p}_u, \mathbf{p}_v \rangle} \leq 11e^{-\log(88/\delta)} = \frac{\delta}{8},$$

as desired. For the second inequality above we used (28) and  $T_s \geq A$ .

**Proof of (24):** We next establish the inequality  $\mathbb{P}[T_s \leq A] \leq \delta/4$ . To this end, recall that a similarity exploration step is carried out at  $t = 0, \dots, T-1, t \neq \eta Qq, q = 0, 1, \dots$  with probability  $1/(t - \lfloor t/(\eta Q) \rfloor)$ . Recall from the discussion below inequality (17), that the fraction of time steps up to time  $T$  for which  $t = \eta Qq$ , for some  $q$ , is at most  $\max(\frac{1}{T}, \frac{2}{\eta Q})$ . It follows that the number of similarity exploration steps,  $T_s$ , carried out after  $t \geq T_{\text{start}}$  steps of the User-CF algorithm, stochastically dominates the random variable  $S = \sum_{t=1}^{\tilde{T}} Z_t$ ,  $\tilde{T} = T_{\text{start}}(1 - \max(\frac{1}{T}, \frac{2}{\eta Q}))$ , where  $Z_t$  is a binary random variable with  $\mathbb{P}[Z_t = 1] = 1/t^\alpha$ . It follows that

$$\mathbb{P}[T_s \leq A] = \mathbb{P}[T_s \leq \tilde{T}^{1-\alpha}/2] \leq e^{-\frac{\tilde{T}^{1-\alpha}}{20}} \leq \delta/4, \quad (29)$$

where the first inequality holds by definition of  $T_{\text{start}}$ , i.e.,

$$T_{\text{start}} = (2A)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} / \left( 1 - \max\left(\frac{1}{T}, \frac{2}{\eta Q}\right) \right),$$

and the second inequality holds by Lemma 3 stated below. Finally, the last inequality in (29) follows from

$$\tilde{T} = (2A)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \geq \frac{128}{3} \log(44/\delta).$$

The following lemma appears in (Bresler et al., 2014).

**Lemma 3** Let  $S = \sum_{t=1}^{\tilde{T}} Z_t$  where  $Z_t$  is a binary random variable with  $\mathbb{P}[Z_t = 1] = 1/t^\alpha$ ,  $\alpha \in (0, 4/7)$ . We have that

$$\mathbb{P}[S_T \leq \tilde{T}^{1-\alpha}/2] \leq e^{-\frac{\tilde{T}^{1-\alpha}}{20}}.$$

**Proof of (25):** Suppose  $t < \eta Q$ , consider user  $u$ , and let  $N_0$  be the total number of items likable by  $u$  in the set  $\mathcal{Q}_0$  (recall that  $\mathcal{Q}_0$  is chosen uniformly at random from the subset of items  $[M]$  of cardinality  $Q$ ). Note that  $N_0 > \eta Q$  implies that at  $t < \eta Q$ , there exist items that are likable by  $u$  in  $\mathcal{Q}_0$  that have not been recommended to  $u$  yet. Therefore, we can upper bound the probability that no likable items are left to recommend, for  $t < \eta Q$ , by

$$\mathbb{P}[\mathcal{L}^c(t)] \leq \mathbb{P}[N_0 \leq \eta Q] \leq \mathbb{P}[N_0 \leq Q\nu/2] \leq \mathbb{P}[N_0 \leq \mathbb{E}[N_0] - Q\nu/2] \quad (30)$$

$$\leq e^{-Q \frac{(\nu/2)^2}{2\nu(1-\nu) + \frac{2}{3}\frac{\nu}{2}}} = e^{-Q \frac{\nu/4}{2(1-\nu) + \frac{1}{3}}} \leq e^{-Q \frac{\nu}{10}} \leq \frac{\delta}{4}. \quad (31)$$

Here, the first inequality in (30) follows from  $\eta \leq \nu/2$ , by assumption; the second inequality in (30) follows from  $\mathbb{E}[N_0] \geq \nu Q$  (since at least a fraction of  $\nu$  of the items is likable by  $u$ ), the first inequality in (31) follows from Bernstein's inequality (Bardenet and Maillard, 2015), and finally the last inequality in (30) holds by assumption (8). We have established that  $\mathbb{P}[\mathcal{L}^c(t)] \leq \delta/4$ , for  $t < \eta Q$ . Using the exact same line of arguments yields the same bound for  $t \in [\eta Q, \eta M]$ .

It remains to upper bound  $\mathbb{P}[\mathcal{L}^c(t)]$  for  $t \in [\eta M, \frac{4}{5}\nu M p_f]$ . To this end, let  $N_u^c(T)$  be the number of (likable) items that have been rated by user  $u$  after  $T$  time steps, and note that if  $N_u^c(T)$  is strictly smaller than the (minimum) number of likable items, then there are likable items left to recommend. Formally,

$$\mathbb{P}[\mathcal{L}^c(t)] \leq \mathbb{P}[N_u^c(T) \geq \nu M] \quad (32)$$

where we used that for each user  $u$ , at least  $\nu M$  items are likable. Recall that with probability  $p_{ui}p_f \leq p_f$  a likable item  $i$  is rated if it is recommended to  $u$ . Once rated, an item is not recommended again.

Note that  $N_u^c(T)$  is statistically dominated by a sum of independent binary random variables  $Z_t$  with  $\mathbb{P}[Z_t = 1] = p_f$ . We therefore have that

$$\mathbb{P}[N_u^c(T) \geq \nu M] \leq \mathbb{P}\left[N_u^c(T) \geq T(p_f + \frac{p_f}{4})\right] \leq e^{-\frac{Tp_f^2}{2}} \leq e^{-\frac{T_{\text{start}}p_f^2}{2}} \leq \frac{\delta}{4}. \quad (33)$$

Here, the first inequality holds by the assumption  $T \leq \frac{4}{5}\nu Mp_f$ , the second inequality follows by Hoeffding's inequality, the third inequality follows by  $T \geq T_{\text{start}}$ , and the last inequality follows from  $T_{\text{start}} \geq \frac{2}{p_f^2} \log(4/\delta)$ , which holds by definition of  $T_{\text{start}}$ . Application of (33) on (32) concludes the proof of  $\mathbb{P}[\mathcal{L}^c(t)] \leq \delta/4$ .

## 6.2. Proof of Lemma 2

Recall that  $\mathbf{r}_u^{\text{sim}} \in \{0, 1\}^M$  is the vector containing the responses  $R_{ui}$  of user  $u$  to previous *similarity* exploitation steps up to time  $t$ , and that we assume in Lemma 2, that  $T_s$  similarity exploration steps have been performed up to time  $t$ . To establish Lemma 2, we show that there are more than  $k$  users  $v$  that are of the same user type as  $u$  and satisfy  $\frac{1}{T_s} \langle \mathbf{r}_u^{\text{sim}}, \mathbf{r}_v^{\text{sim}} \rangle \geq \theta$ , and at the same time, there are fewer than  $k\beta$  users of a different user type as  $u$  that satisfy  $\frac{1}{T_s} \langle \mathbf{r}_u^{\text{sim}}, \mathbf{r}_v^{\text{sim}} \rangle \geq \theta$  for a certain threshold  $\theta$  chosen below. This is accomplished by the following two lemmas.

**Lemma 4 (Many good neighbors)** *Suppose there are at least  $\frac{9N}{2K}$  users of the type as user  $u$  (including  $u$ ), and suppose that  $T_s$  similarity exploration steps have been performed. Then, with probability at least  $1 - 10p_{\text{good}}$ ,*

$$p_{\text{good}} := e^{-\frac{3}{16}T_s p_g(1-\theta/p_g)^2}, \quad p_g := p_f^2 \frac{1}{M} \min_{v \in \mathcal{T}_u} \langle \mathbf{p}_u, \mathbf{p}_v \rangle,$$

at least  $\frac{9N}{40K}$  users  $v$  of the same user type as  $u$  obey  $\frac{1}{T_s} \langle \mathbf{r}_u^{\text{sim}}, \mathbf{r}_v^{\text{sim}} \rangle \geq \theta$ .

**Lemma 5 (Few bad neighbors)** *Suppose that  $T_s$  similarity exploration steps have been performed. Then, with probability at least  $1 - p_{\text{bad}}$ , where*

$$p_{\text{bad}} = e^{-\frac{T_s p_b(\theta/p_b - 1)^2/4}{1 + (\theta/p_b - 1)/3}}, \quad p_b := p_f^2 \max_{v \notin \mathcal{T}_u} \frac{1}{M} \langle \mathbf{p}_v, \mathbf{p}_u \rangle,$$

at most  $Np_{\text{bad}}$  users  $v$  of a different user type than  $u$  obey  $\frac{1}{T_s} \langle \mathbf{r}_u^{\text{sim}}, \mathbf{r}_v^{\text{sim}} \rangle \geq \theta$ .

We set

$$\theta = \frac{p_g + p_b}{2}.$$

With this choice, by Lemma 4, there are more than  $\frac{9N}{40K} \geq k$  (the inequality holds by assumption) users  $v$  of the same type as  $u$  that satisfy  $\frac{1}{T_s} \langle \mathbf{r}_u^{\text{sim}}, \mathbf{r}_v^{\text{sim}} \rangle \geq \theta$ , with probability at least  $1 - 10p_{\text{good}}$ . By Lemma 5, there are no more than  $Np_{\text{bad}}$  users  $v$  of a different type as  $u$  with  $\frac{1}{T_s} \langle \mathbf{r}_u^{\text{sim}}, \mathbf{r}_v^{\text{sim}} \rangle \geq \theta$ . Thus, by the union bound,  $\mathcal{N}_u$  contains less than  $p_{\text{bad}}N$  bad neighbors with probability at least

$$1 - 10p_{\text{good}} - p_{\text{bad}} \geq 1 - 11e^{-\frac{3}{64}T_s p_g(1-\gamma)^2}.$$

Here, we used

$$p_{\text{good}} = e^{-\frac{3}{64}T_s p_g(1-p_b/p_g)^2} \leq e^{-\frac{3}{64}T_s p_g(1-\gamma)^2}$$

where the inequality follows by  $p_b/p_g \leq \gamma$ , by (1). Moreover, we used

$$\begin{aligned} p_{\text{bad}} &= e^{-\frac{T_s p_b(\theta/p_b - 1)^2/4}{1 + (\theta/p_b - 1)/3}} = e^{-\frac{T_s p_b(p_g/p_b - 1)^2/16}{1 + (p_g/p_b - 1)/6}} = e^{-\frac{T_s p_g(\sqrt{p_g/p_b} - \sqrt{p_b/p_g})^2/16}{1 + (p_g/p_b - 1)/6}} \leq e^{-\frac{T_s p_g(\sqrt{1/\gamma} - \sqrt{\gamma})^2/16}{1 + (1/\gamma - 1)/6}} \\ &\leq e^{-\frac{T_s p_g(\sqrt{1/\gamma} - \sqrt{\gamma})^2/16}{1 + (1/\gamma - 1)}} = e^{-T_s p_g(1-\gamma)^2/16}. \end{aligned} \quad (34)$$

Here, the first inequality follows from the absolute value of the exponent being decreasing in  $p_b/p_g$ , and from the assumption  $p_b/p_g \leq \gamma$ , by (1).

To conclude the proof, we needed to establish that the maximum number of bad neighbors  $Np_{\text{bad}}$  satisfies  $Np_{\text{bad}} \leq \beta k$ . This follows directly by noting that, by assumption (27), the RHS of (34) is upper-bounded by  $\frac{\beta k}{N}$ .

## 6.2.1. PROOF OF LEMMA 4

Consider  $u$  and assume there are exactly  $\frac{N}{2K}$  users from the same user type. There could be more, but it is sufficient to consider  $\frac{N}{2K}$ . Let  $v$  be of the same user type. We start by showing that  $\frac{1}{T_s} \langle \mathbf{r}_u^{\text{sim}}, \mathbf{r}_v^{\text{sim}} \rangle \geq \theta$  with high probability. To this end, note that  $\langle \mathbf{r}_u^{\text{sim}}, \mathbf{r}_v^{\text{sim}} \rangle = \sum_{t=0}^{T_s-1} R_{u\pi(t)} R_{v\pi(t)}$  where  $\pi$  is the random permutation of the item space drawn by the User-CF algorithm at initialization, and  $R_{u\pi(t)} R_{v\pi(t)}$  is a binary random variable, independent across  $t$ , with success probability  $p_f^2 p_{u\pi(t)} p_{v\pi(t)}$ . Setting  $a := p_f^2 \frac{1}{M} \langle \mathbf{p}_u, \mathbf{p}_v \rangle$ , for notational convenience, it follows that

$$\mathbb{P} \left[ \frac{1}{T_s} \langle \mathbf{r}_u^{\text{sim}}, \mathbf{r}_v^{\text{sim}} \rangle \leq \theta \right] = \mathbb{P} \left[ \frac{1}{T_s} \langle \mathbf{r}_u^{\text{sim}}, \mathbf{r}_v^{\text{sim}} \rangle \leq a - (a - \theta) \right] \quad (35)$$

$$\leq e^{-\frac{T_s(a-\theta)^2/2}{a+(a-\theta)/3}} \quad (36)$$

$$= e^{-\frac{T_s a(1-\theta/a)^2/2}{1+(1-\theta/a)/3}} \leq e^{-\frac{3}{8} T_s a(1-\theta/a)^2} \quad (37)$$

$$\leq e^{-\frac{3}{8} T_s p_g(1-\theta/p_g)^2} \leq p_{\text{good}}. \quad (38)$$

Here, (36) follows from Bernstein's inequality (Bardenet and Maillard, 2015), and for (38) we used that the RHS of (37) is decreasing in  $a$ .

Next, consider the random variable

$$W = \sum_{v \in \mathcal{T}_u} G_v, \quad G_v = \mathbb{1} \left\{ \frac{1}{T_s} \langle \mathbf{r}_u^{\text{sim}}, \mathbf{r}_v^{\text{sim}} \rangle \geq \theta \right\},$$

where  $\mathcal{T}_u$  is the subset of all users  $[N]$  that are of the same time as user  $u$ , as before. By Chebyshev's inequality,

$$\mathbb{P} \left[ W - \mathbb{E}[W] \leq -\frac{\mathbb{E}[W]}{2} \right] \leq \frac{\text{Var}(W)}{(\mathbb{E}[W]/2)^2}. \quad (39)$$

Since there are at least  $\frac{N}{2K}$  users of the same type, the cardinality of  $\mathcal{T}_u$  is lower bounded by  $\frac{N}{2K} - 1$ . It follows with (38) that

$$\mathbb{E}[W] \geq (1 - p_{\text{good}}) \left( \frac{N}{2K} - 1 \right).$$

Next, we upper bound the variance of  $W$ . We have

$$\text{Var}(W) = \sum_{v \in \mathcal{T}_u} \text{Var}(G_v) + \sum_{v, w \in \mathcal{T}_u, v \neq w} \text{Cov}(G_v, G_w).$$

With  $G_v = G_v^2$ ,

$$\text{Var}(G_v) = \mathbb{E}[G_v^2] - \mathbb{E}[G_v]^2 = \mathbb{E}[G_v] (1 - \mathbb{E}[G_v]) \leq 1 - \mathbb{E}[G_v] \leq p_{\text{good}}.$$

Similarly,

$$\text{Cov}(G_v, G_w) = \mathbb{E}[G_v G_w] - \mathbb{E}[G_v] \mathbb{E}[G_w] \leq 1 - (1 - q)^2 \leq 2p_{\text{good}}.$$

Thus, we obtain

$$\text{Var}(W) \leq \left( \frac{N}{2K} - 1 \right) p_{\text{good}} + \left( \frac{N}{2K} - 1 \right) \left( \frac{N}{2K} - 2 \right) 2p_{\text{good}} \leq \left( \frac{N}{2K} - 1 \right)^2 2p_{\text{good}}.$$

Plugging this into (39) yields

$$\mathbb{P} \left[ W - \mathbb{E}[W] \leq -\frac{\mathbb{E}[W]}{2} \right] \leq \frac{8p_{\text{good}}}{(1 - p_{\text{good}})^2} \leq 10p_{\text{good}},$$

for  $p_{\text{good}} \leq 1/10$ . It follows that the number of good neighbors is larger than

$$W \geq \mathbb{E}[W] / 2 \geq (1 - p_{\text{good}}) \frac{N}{4K} \geq \frac{9N}{40K}$$

with probability at least  $1 - 10p_{\text{good}}$ .

## 6.2.2. PROOF OF LEMMA 5

Let  $u$  and  $v$  be two fixed users of different user types. Similarly as in the proof of Lemma 4, we start by showing that  $\frac{1}{T_s} \langle \mathbf{r}_u^{\text{sim}}, \mathbf{r}_v^{\text{sim}} \rangle \leq \theta$  with high probability. To this end, note that  $\langle \mathbf{r}_u^{\text{sim}}, \mathbf{r}_v^{\text{sim}} \rangle = \sum_{t=0}^{T_s-1} R_{u\pi(t)} R_{v\pi(t)}$  where  $\pi$  is a random permutation of the item space and  $R_{u\pi(t)} R_{v\pi(t)}$  is a binary random variable, independent across  $t$ , with success probability  $p_{\text{f}}^2 p_{u\pi(t)} p_{v\pi(t)}$ . Setting  $a = p_{\text{f}}^2 \frac{1}{M} \langle \mathbf{p}_u, \mathbf{p}_v \rangle$ , for notational convenience, it follows that

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{P} \left[ \frac{1}{T_s} \langle \mathbf{r}_u^{\text{sim}}, \mathbf{r}_v^{\text{sim}} \rangle \geq \theta \right] &= \mathbb{P} \left[ \frac{1}{T_s} \langle \mathbf{r}_u^{\text{sim}}, \mathbf{r}_v^{\text{sim}} \rangle \geq a + (\theta - a) \right] \\ &\leq e^{-\frac{T_s(\theta-a)^2/2}{a+(\theta-a)/3}} \end{aligned} \quad (40)$$

$$\leq e^{-\frac{T_s p_b (\theta/p_b - 1)^2/2}{1+(\theta/p_b - 1)/3}} = p_{\text{bad}}^2. \quad (41)$$

Here, (40) follows from Bernstein's inequality. Specifically, we use that  $\pi$  is a random permutation of the item space as well as that  $R_{ui} R_{vi}$  are binary random variables independent across  $i$  (note that Bernstein's inequality also applies to sampling without replacement, see e.g., (Bardenet and Maillard, 2015)). Finally, for inequality (41), we used that  $a \leq p_b = p_{\text{f}}^2 \max_{v \notin \mathcal{T}_u} \frac{1}{M} \langle \mathbf{p}_v, \mathbf{p}_u \rangle$ .

Set  $N_{\text{bad}} = \sum_{v \notin \mathcal{T}_u} \mathbb{1} \{u \text{ and } v \text{ are declared neighbors}\}$ . By inequality (41), we have  $\mathbb{E}[N_{\text{bad}}] \leq p_{\text{bad}}^2 N$ . Thus, by Markov's inequality,

$$\mathbb{P}[N_{\text{bad}} \geq N p_{\text{bad}}] \leq \frac{\mathbb{E}[N_{\text{bad}}]}{N p_{\text{bad}}} \leq \frac{p_{\text{bad}}^2 N}{N p_{\text{bad}}} = p_{\text{bad}},$$

which concludes the proof.

## 6.3. Proof of Lemma 1 (preference exploration)

Assume w.l.o.g. that  $p_{ui} > 1/2 + \Delta$ , for all  $i \in \mathcal{Q}$ . The case where some of the  $p_{ui}$  satisfy  $p_{ui} < 1/2 - \Delta$  is treated analogously. To prove Lemma 1, we may further assume that  $p_{ui} = \frac{1}{2} + \Delta$ , for all  $i \in \mathcal{Q}$ , since  $\mathbb{P}[\hat{p}_{ui} > \frac{p_{\text{f}}}{2}]$  is increasing in  $p_{ui}$ .

Consider a fixed item  $i \in \mathcal{Q}$ , and let  $\mathcal{N}_u^{\text{good}}$  be the subset of  $\mathcal{N}_u$  corresponding to users that are of the same type as  $u$  and to which additionally an recommendation has been made by drawing  $T_r$  items uniformly from  $\mathcal{Q}$  for each user  $u$ . Let  $N_g$  be the cardinality of  $\mathcal{N}_u^{\text{good}}$ . In order to upper-bound  $\mathbb{P}[\hat{p}_{ui} \leq \frac{p_{\text{f}}}{2}]$ , we first note that by (21),

$$\mathbb{P} \left[ \hat{p}_{ui} \leq \frac{p_{\text{f}}}{2} \right] \leq \mathbb{P} \left[ \hat{p}_{ui} \leq \frac{p_{\text{f}}}{2} \mid N_g \geq n_g \right] + \mathbb{P}[N_g \leq n_g]. \quad (42)$$

Here, we defined

$$n_g := \frac{T_r k}{Q} (1/2 - \beta). \quad (43)$$

We next upper bound the probabilities on the RHS of (42). We start with the first probability on the RHS of (42):

$$\mathbb{P} \left[ \hat{p}_{ui} \leq \frac{p_{\text{f}}}{2} \mid N_g = n'_g \right] \leq \mathbb{P} \left[ \frac{\sum_{v \in \mathcal{N}_u^{\text{good}}} R_{vi}}{n'_g + \beta k} \leq \frac{p_{\text{f}}}{2} \mid N_g = n'_g \right] \quad (44)$$

$$= \mathbb{P} \left[ \frac{1}{n'_g} \sum_{v \in \mathcal{N}_u^{\text{good}}} R_{vi} \leq \frac{p_{\text{f}} n'_g + \beta k}{2 n'_g} \mid N_g = n'_g \right]$$

$$= \mathbb{P} \left[ \frac{1}{n'_g} \sum_{v \in \mathcal{N}_u^{\text{good}}} R_{vi} \leq p_{\text{f}} \left( \frac{1}{2} + \Delta \right) - p_{\text{f}} \left( \Delta - \frac{\beta k}{2n'_g} \right) \mid N_g = n'_g \right]$$

$$= \mathbb{P} \left[ \sum_{v \in \mathcal{N}_u^{\text{good}}} \left( R_{vi} - p_{\text{f}} \left( \frac{1}{2} + \Delta \right) \right) \leq -n'_g p_{\text{f}} \left( \Delta - \frac{\beta k}{2n'_g} \right) \mid N_g = n'_g \right]$$

$$\leq e^{-\frac{n'_g p_{\text{f}} (\Delta - \beta k / (2n'_g))^2/2}{(1/2 + \Delta) + (\Delta - \beta k / (2n'_g)) / 3}} \quad (45)$$

where (44) follows from the number of users  $n_{ui}$  in  $\mathcal{N}_u$  that received recommendation  $i$  being upper bounded by  $N_g + \beta k$  (recall that  $\beta k$  is the maximum number of bad neighbors in  $\mathcal{N}_u$ ), and by assuming adversarially that all recommendations given to bad neighbors did yield  $R_{vi} = 0$ . Finally, (45) follows from Bernstein's inequality; to apply Bernstein's inequality, we used that  $\mathbb{E}[R_{vi}] = p_f(1/2 + \Delta)$ , and that the variance of  $R_{vi}$  is upper bounded by  $p_f(1/2 + \Delta)$ , for  $v \in \mathcal{N}_u^{\text{good}}$ . Next, note that by Bayes theorem,

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{P}[\hat{p}_{ui} \leq 1/2 | N_g \geq n_g] &= \frac{\mathbb{P}[\{\hat{p}_{ui} \leq 1/2\} \cap \{N_g \geq n_g\}]}{\mathbb{P}[N_g \geq n_g]} \\ &= \frac{\sum_{n'_g \geq n_g} \mathbb{P}[\hat{p}_{ui} \leq 1/2 | N_g \geq n_g] \mathbb{P}[N_g = n'_g]}{\mathbb{P}[N_g \geq n_g]} \\ &\leq e^{-\frac{n_g p_f (\Delta - \beta k / (2n'_g))^2 / 2}{(1/2 + \Delta) + (\Delta - \beta k / (2n'_g)) / 3}} \end{aligned} \quad (46)$$

$$\leq e^{-\frac{n_g p_f \Delta^2 / 8}{1/2 + \Delta + \Delta / 6}} \leq e^{-\frac{n_g p_f \Delta^2}{16}} \leq e^{-\frac{T_r k p_f \Delta^2}{Q^6 4}}. \quad (47)$$

Here, inequality (46) follows from inequality (45) and using that the RHS of inequality (45) is increasing in  $n'_g$ . For inequality (47) we used the definition of  $n_g$  in (43), and that

$$\frac{\beta k}{n_g} = \frac{\beta k}{\frac{T_r k}{Q}(1/2 - \beta)} = \frac{Q}{T_r} \frac{\beta}{1/2 - \beta} \leq \Delta. \quad (48)$$

Here, the inequality (48) holds by  $\beta \leq \frac{\Delta T_r}{4Q}$ , by assumption, and  $\beta \leq 1/4$ , due to  $\Delta \leq 1/2$  and  $T_r \leq Q$  (since we recommend each item at most once).

We proceed with upper bounding  $\mathbb{P}[N_g \leq n_g]$  in (42). Recall that  $N_g$  is the number of times item  $i$  has been recommended to one of the  $\geq (1 - \beta)k$  good neighbors in  $\mathcal{N}_u$ .

We will only consider the  $T_r$  random items recommended to each user; this yields an upper bound on  $\mathbb{P}[N_g \leq n_g]$ . Recall that those items are chosen from the  $Q$  items in  $\mathcal{Q}$ , and that, by assumption, of the  $k$  neighbors at least  $(1 - \beta)k$  are good. By Bernstein's inequality,

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{P}[N_g \leq n_g] &= \mathbb{P}\left[N_g \leq T_r \frac{(1 - \beta)k}{Q} - \frac{T_r k}{2Q}\right] \\ &\leq e^{-\frac{T_r k (\frac{1}{2Q})^2 / 2}{\frac{1 - \beta}{Q} (1 - \frac{1 - \beta}{Q}) + \frac{1}{3} \frac{1}{2Q}}} \leq e^{-\frac{T_r k (\frac{1}{2Q})^2 / 2}{\frac{1 - \beta}{Q} (1 - \frac{1 - \beta}{Q}) + \frac{1}{3} \frac{1}{2Q}}} \leq e^{-\frac{T_r k \frac{1}{8Q}}{1 + 1/6}} \leq e^{-\frac{T_r k}{10Q}}. \end{aligned} \quad (49)$$

Application of inequalities (47) and (49) to inequality (42) together with a union bound yields

$$\mathbb{P}[\hat{p}_{ui} \leq 1/2, \text{ for one or more } i \in \mathcal{Q}] \leq Q \left( e^{-\frac{T_r k p_f \Delta^2}{Q^6 4}} + e^{-\frac{T_r k}{10Q}} \right) \leq 2Q e^{-\frac{T_r k p_f \Delta^2}{Q^6 4}}, \quad (50)$$

where we used that  $p_f \Delta^2 \leq 1$ . By (26), the RHS above is smaller than  $\delta'$ . This concludes the proof.

## 7. Proof of Proposition 1

Consider a set of users with  $K$  user types that are non-overlapping in their preferences, specifically, consider a set of users where every user  $u$  belonging to the  $k$ -th user type has preference vector

$$[\mathbf{p}_u]_i = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } i \in [k(M - 1)/K, \dots, kM/K] \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Consider a given user  $u$ . At time  $T$ , the expected number of ratings obtained by  $u$  is upper bounded by  $p_f^2$ . Thus, for all  $T \leq \frac{\lambda}{p_f^2}$  in at least a fraction  $\lambda$  of the runs of the algorithm, the algorithm has no information on the user  $u$ , and the best it can do is to recommend a random item. For our choice of preference vectors, with probability at most  $1/K$ , it will recommend a likable item. Therefore, an upper bound on the expected regret is given by  $(\lambda + 1/K)NT$ .