In the midst of geopolitical turmoil, Europe’s biggest economy produced complicated electoral results at the end of February. While negotiations for a coalition are on, it is worth taking a look at some of the lessons of the elections — and the possible future course of South Africa’s most important partner in the EU.
The results of Germany´s snap elections, with a record turn-out of 82,5%, were hardly surprising and were consistent with recent polls. Yet that does not make the shift to the right less tectonic or the picture of jubilant right-wing extremists less painful. One in five voters opted for the far-right AfD, making it the second largest party. The conservative CDU/CSU won the elections, albeit with a result — 28.5 % — well below their expectations.
The centre-left Social Democrats (SPD), bruised and battered by their worst result in 138 years, had little time to lick their wounds. They are needed in government, to keep the far right from power. As the Conservatives renewed their promise not to collaborate with the AfD, the only viable option was what was known as a “grand coalition” and now barely makes for a majority in parliament.
CDU/CSU and SPD have already produced a detailed declaration of intent and started formal negotiations — at record speed, by German standards. The geopolitical moment demands urgency, after all. A Europe rattled by the uncertainty around the US’s security guarantees cannot afford a drawn-out leadership limbo at its heart right now.
Despite the sober sense of responsibility, building the necessary trust is not easy. The prospect of paving CDU leader Friedrich Merz’s way to the Chancellery hardly thrills SPD, whose members will have to greenlight any coalition agreement.
Merz is known more for his ability to polarise (he called anti-fascist protestors “left and green idiots”) than to unite. “Yesterday’s man,” as The New York Times dubbed him, moved former chancellor Angela Merkel’s party notably to the right. Weeks before the election, Merz broke a taboo by tabling motions in parliament that relied on the support of the far-right. Serving AfD this triumph sparked mass protests and even invited public criticism from Merkel. SPD needs assurances that he will not be wielding majorities with AfD again as a stick to bash the SPD into line.
While entering the negotiations, SPD also needs to process some difficult truths. The party lost 1.1 million votes to the left in the February elections, particularly to the rejuvenated Linke. Yet it also lost more than twice as many voters to the right, to both the Conservatives and the AfD.
The AfD is the most popular party, particularly with blue-collar workers, the unemployed and young men, outperforming SPD at a ratio of about 3:1 in these groups. This voter migration can hardly be explained by socio-economic policy positions, given the rights’ anti-poor, anti-worker manifesto. It might have more to do with the following lessons, which might also resonate with some South African experiences.
First, if you do not make your coalition work, you will lose voters. The three parties in the previous German coalition lost about 20 percentage points combined. The liberal FDP even failed to make the 5% threshold for parliament. The SPD and Greens had good reasons to blame the Liberals for the coalitions’ collapse, yet that did not shield them from punishment.
Voters were just fed up with parties that appeared to be more concerned with bickering among themselves, than addressing their concerns. Those concerns have grown in recent years. The Russian invasion of Ukraine instilled a new defining sentiment into politics: fear. Of war and of economic decline.
A study on the “German Dream” by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung last year diagnosed Germans as having a deep sense of insecurity and disillusionment with political parties. Three-quarters said the country was headed in the wrong direction.
To realise their modest dreams of peace and economic stability — the two most important issues for voters in this campaign — the majority acknowledged that big changes would be needed. Yet 53% did not see political actors as being up to the challenge and 84% said that political actors lacked vision. It certainly did not help in this context that the candidates for the chancellery were the most unpopular in the history of polling.
The second lesson — you don’t bring right-wing populists down by mimicking them. The far right knew to exploit voters’ insecurity and disillusionment with an anti-establishment campaign that successfully shifted the blame and focus towards migration.
Conservatives, who had initially started campaigning on the economy, quickly tuned into the far-right framing in the wake of several violent attacks. They also linked the issues of migration and insecurity. As everywhere else where that strategy has been tried before, copying the agenda and sound of extremists only legitimised them. AfD’s polls went up slightly from there, Conservatives’ polls went down slightly.
The third lesson — austerity feeds extremists. As shown by Kamala Harris’s campaign in the US, it is not enough to point out how bad the other side is. Voters expect you to offer solutions that measure up to the magnitude of the problems. And they need to trust that you are able to follow through with them.
In Germany, a coalition that was seen to apply band-aids to open fractures did not inspire any confidence that the progressive camp was up to the task. While voters saw astronomical sums being mobilised to bail out banks in the financial crises back in the day, and to support Ukrainian defence now, in their daily lives they experienced rising cost of living, a housing crisis and crumbling public infrastructure and services.
Over decades, necessary public investments were sacrificed at the altar of debt-to-GDP-ratio, as Liberals and Conservatives resisted any reform of the debt break enshrined in the German constitution .
Now, suddenly, it seems that, given the defence scare in Europe induced by US President Donald Trump, the austerity fetish has made way to “whatever it takes”. The EU plans to soften its stability pact to enable states to take on more debt. And, in Germany, in their first days of courting, the Conservatives and SPD have already agreed to reform the constitutional debt break, particularly for defence spending, and also set up a €500 billion special fund for infrastructure investment.
The Conservatives’ welcome U-turn on this issue hardly signifies a shift to anti-fascist economic policy, though. In coalition negotiations, the SPD continues to grapple with the centre-right’s staunchly neoliberal economic model. CDU/CSU are pushing for tax cuts, particularly for the highest earners, and reduced public spending, including on welfare programmes. While there is little disagreement about the need to cut red tape and enhance state efficiency, the libertarian goal of a “lean state” could not be further from the progressive notion of a “capable state”.
A less controversial topic in negotiations, on the surface, might be Germany’s role in the world. For sure, a CDU/CSU-SPD government would continue to be pro-EU, pro-Ukraine, pro-multilateralism, pro-cooperation and transatlantic (despite Trump).
The nuances would be important though. Strengthening Europe is a rational response to the US’s retreat from cooperation and multilateralism. But so is investing in further global partnerships and alliances, particularly with the Global South.
In the German coalition talks, it will be upon the SPD to shield international development cooperation from further cuts. As SPD chairman Lars Klingbeil affirmed, if anything, Germany should step up its international engagement as others are retreating. Yet it is not just about money — the moment requires deepened political partnerships.
Middle powers, like Germany and South Africa, which do not want to be drawn into big-power competition should team up further in their pursuit of an international order based on rules, cooperation and solidarity.
Within the emerging coalition, it will remain upon SPD to ensure that Germany does not fall for a purely Eurocentric view of the world, but keeps building flexible alliances globally and lasting partnerships with countries like South Africa. The historical relationship between the ANC and SPD could help both sides navigate their difficult coalition politics in this regard. It is a good moment to revive it.
Sebastian Sperling is director of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung’s South Africa office, a German political foundation rooted in the labour movement and based on social democratic values.
