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Peripheral Insiders:¹⁾ Papuan and Indonesian Nationalism

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Introduction

The year 2020 was to be remembered as the year that prompted an amplification of the racial justice movement in the United States as well as many European countries. The trigger was the killing of George Floyd at the hand (or knee) of a police officer in the U.S. city of Minneapolis in May. A bystander recorded what happened to Floyd and placed it on social media for the world to see. What followed was the racial justice movement spontaneously organized in major cities in the U.S. The movement was well covered by the media, in particular by the social media with the hashtag #BlackLivesMatter, sustained by concerned citizens in the world, and led to a global anti-racist movement.

The #BlackLivesMatter movement started from the U.S. and spread to many parts of the globe, and appeared to prove that anti-racism has become a

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global public norm. This is a new milestone in the long struggle against racism, that an anti-racism movement has gone beyond national boundaries. In the history of racism, it has often been treated as a national issue because it has historical, political, and cultural roots within a national society. The term systemic racism or structural racism demonstrates how racism or racial discrimination manifests on a daily basis. In other words, even if anti-racism may have become a global norm, the reality and practice of racism remain a national matter and has a national character. Racism is a risk that may destabilize the political and social order in a particular country. It is also a risk that would violate human rights. It is significant to contextualize racism in a country to understand the reality and practice of racism.

A variant of #BlackLivesMatter organized in Indonesia in the middle of 2020; it is known by the hashtag #PapuanLivesMatter. It was a protest movement to counter racism against the Papuans and to seek the justice for Papua and the Papuans.²⁾ Unlike many #BlackLivesMatter movement in western countries that dominated the mainstream media, #PapuanLivesMatter movement scattered in some parts of the globe with much less media coverage. It is a movement to protest against racial discrimination and violence towards the Papuans, the indigenous population of Indonesia's easternmost island. The protest movement sprung up inside Indonesia, as well as abroad among overseas Papuans and activists. Although #PapuanLivesMatter movement may have been inspired by #BlackLivesMatter movement (Varagur 2020), it is a matter of racism specific to Indonesia, which has a history of violence against the Papuans, both in their mineral-rich island and outside when they reside in other provinces in the country. Indonesian authorities tried to contain and suppress the protest movement, provoking precisely the violence it claimed to prevent. Racism against the Papuans has escalated and politicized in the last two decades, in particular from the 2010s onward, roughly coinciding with the advent of social media in the country.

2) I will use mainly the term "Papua" to refer to both Papua and West Papua. But depending on the context, I may use "West Papua." Originally, the Dutch claimed the land as New Guinea in the nineteenth century.

This essay aims to provide a context of racism against the Papuans in Indonesia and examine how it has transformed in the age of social media and today factors as a risk for Indonesia or Indonesian nationalism. To approach racism in Indonesia, the essay starts with placing Papua and the Papuans in the historical context, then explores how Indonesians in general perceive the Papuans, and examines how anti-Papuan racism is reported in the media discourse.

Peripheral Insiders

Racism or systemic racism in Indonesia has habitually applied to the Chinese, but recently also applies to the Papuans. There are similarities and contrasts between discriminations against the Chinese and the Papuans. Both the Chinese and the Papuans have been marginalized and categorized as minorities in Indonesian society. Historically, however, the Chinese are well recognized minority from the colonial period, whereas the Papuans as minority are a post-colonial invention (Anderson 1998, 321-322). The Chinese are excluded because they descended from immigrants and considered to be historically, legally, and culturally outsiders. Chirot and Reid refer to them as “essential outsiders” (Chirot and Reid 1997); they are “outsiders” because they are “foreigners,” although since before the Dutch colonial period they have been socially and economically integrated in Indonesia, even playing essential roles in a number of aspects of the country’s history. On the contrary, the Papuans are the native population of the country’s easternmost island Papua, which was incorporated into the country’s jurisdiction after independence, and the Papuans continue to occupy marginalized position in the country’s social and cultural history. In this essay I refer to them as “peripheral insiders”. The Papuans are “insiders” because they are “native” in the country’s territory, and yet they are “peripheral” due to their geographic location and especially their position in the imagined national community.

Papua is also the name of one of two provinces in the Indonesian-part of the vast island, the other being West Papua. While “Papuan” is a generic term for the native population of the island, it is also used to distinguish Papuans

from people of other ethnic groups in Indonesian who migrated to the island in the last half century or so. Papua has a slightly different history after World War II than the rest of Indonesia.

During the colonial period, unlike the Chinese who were well integrated into the fabric of the colonial plural society, the Papuans were basically left out untouched by civil administration. Administratively speaking, it was only in 1936 when the resident of Ambon signed the order to establish a new district in Papua. For much of the nineteenth century a small number of missionaries and traders as well as low-ranking Dutch officials were the only Europeans residing in the territory. Papua were habitually characterized as from the “Stone Age” or a “virgin land” (Rutherford 2018, 16). Papua drew public attention from 1927 onwards when the Dutch colonial authorities establish an exile camp for political prisoners in Boven Digul, Papua. Surrounded by thick jungles, the natural isolation was to keep political prisoners away from influencing the mass and it inspired fear in the minds of most colonial subjects. The independence activist Sukarno, who later became the first president of Indonesia, was exiled there in the early 1930s.

While Boven Digul figured immensely in the Indonesian nationalist movement during the colonial period, the movement itself neglected the existence of the Papuans. When Indonesia declared its independence, Papua was not included in the emancipated territory. In the discussion at the Committee for the Preparation of Indonesia’s Independence (BPUPKI), Mohammad Hatta, the future Vice President of Indonesia, rejected the notion that Papua was a part of Indonesia. Hatta remarked, “The Papuans are of the Negroid race, the Melanesian Nation; let the Papuans determine their own destiny and future” (Putusan Perkara 2004, 11). When Indonesia declared its independence on 17 August 1945, Papua, then called western New Guinea, was still under Dutch rule. Even when Indonesia’s sovereignty was internationally recognized in December 1949, Papua was not a part of it and became an overseas territory of the Netherlands from 1949 to 1962. During this time, the Dutch succeeded to create a Papuan ethnic group, or to be precise a Papuan nationalist group by guiding them onto a separate path towards independence (Penders 2002).

Papua almost gained its independence from the Netherlands in the early



[Map of Indonesian provinces: <https://depositphotos.com/51886223/stock-illustration-indonesia-administrative-map.html>]

1960s. On 1 December 1961, West Papua established its national anthem and the national flag, the Morning Star. But in May 1963 Indonesia almost unilaterally integrated Papua and renamed it “Irian Barat” (West Irian). In 1973 it was renamed again to Irian Jaya (Victorious Irian). Some Papuans did not accept this political integration to Indonesia. On 1 July 1971, they proclaimed its independence as the Republic of West Papua. Since then, their struggle to gain independent status from Indonesia began. In return, Papua became an important region for the Indonesian military operation to suppress any kind of “separatist” activities (Chauvel 2003; Chauvel and Bhakthi 2004; Mote and Rutherford 2001).

After the 32-year-long Suharto’s authoritarian regime collapsed in May 1998, the political environment surrounding Papua slightly changed. In 2002, the province of Irian Jaya has been renamed as Papua. In February 2003 West Irian Jaya was separated from the province of Papua, and on 7 February 2007 changed its name to Papua Barat (West Papua). Many Papuans keep their hope for either autonomous status in Indonesia or independence.

Under the Suharto regime, the Papuans were an underprivileged minority. Benedict Anderson once described how Indonesians view the Papuans not as Indonesian but as “objects,” “possessions,” “servants,” and “obstacles” for the development of Indonesia. Because, Anderson argues, “Papuans were never seriously invited to the common project of Indonesian nationalism” (Anderson

1999, 5). Papuan political movement for independence and/or an autonomous status have been perceived as separatism that necessitated military reactions and discriminative polices. But why do not Indonesians just let the Papuans go if the Papuans are “never seriously invited to the common project of Indonesian nationalism”?

This question relates to how the Indonesian government deals with political movement in Papua; why does the Indonesia government try to hold on to Papua as part of the country’s vast territory, or not grant the special autonomous status to Papua? A brief comparison with two other “separatist” regions, Aceh and East Timor, illustrates the unique position of Papua (Anderson 1998; 1999). Aceh, located in the western tip of the territory, was granted the special autonomous status in 2006, while East Timor located in the southernmost region gained its independence in 2002. To most Indonesians, Aceh has always been a part of Indonesia with a strong and long tradition of Islam; Acehnese also fought against the Dutch like other fellow Indonesians. East Timor was a former Portuguese colony and had been included as a part of Indonesia for a period of only a quarter of the century (1976-2002). Therefore, in the imagination of most Indonesians, the Acehnese are fellow Indonesians and involved the common project of Indonesian nationalism from the beginning, but the East Timorese did not have the chance to join the project. Then what about the Papuans? An answer lies in how Indonesians imagine the Papuans as a part of the Indonesian nation.

Nation in Time and Mind

In her study of the creation of Japanese nation, *Re-Inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation*, Tessa Morris-Suzuki introduces the idea of linear time (history) to understand societies at the periphery of the embryonic nation (Morris-Suzuki 1998). She examines two peripheral societies of Japan, the Ainu and the people of Ryukyu/Okinawa, and demonstrates how the Japanese government engaged them in the project of nation-building to create a modern Japan. By introducing the idea of “civilization” (*bunmei*), modern Japanese intellectuals reconfigured these peripheral societies no longer in terms of their “foreignness” to the center,

but in terms of their “underdevelopment” vis-à-vis the people of Tokyo (Morris-Suzuki 1998, 28). Such a reinterpretation has allowed the Japanese state to engage with its newly included peripheries, and to reimagine those who resided at peripheries as a part of a homogeneous national community. Their difference is no longer imagined as due to their distinct cultures, but as a consequence of underdevelopment. “The modern transfer of difference from the dimension of space to the dimension of time was closely linked to the emerging sense of ethnicity as the chief criteria of nationhood” (Morris-Suzuki 1998, 32). The degree of development and the proximity to modernity have become a criterion by which ethnic groups within a national jurisdiction are hierarchically positioned; the dominant ethnicity at the center sits at the top.

Similar criteria and imagination of the nation in relation to ethnic groups within its border can be applied to how Indonesians in general imagine the Papuans. In this context, Felip Karma’s memoir is worth mentioning. Karma (born 15 August 1959) is a Papuan independence activist and former Indonesian civil servant in Jayapura, Papua. On 1 December 2004, he was arrested for organizing a ceremony in Abepura, Papua. Several hundred Papuans gathered to raise the Morning Star flag and celebrate the anniversary of the 1961 declaration of independence from Dutch rule. For this Karma was charged with treason (Penal Code Article 106) and in May 2005 sentenced to 15 years in prison. He was released from Abepura Prison, West Papua, on 19 November 2015, four years before the end of his sentence.

Karma published his memoir in 2014 entitled *Seakan Kitorang Setengah Binatang: Rasialisme Indonesia di Tanah Papua* (As If We Were Part Animals: Indonesian Racism in Papua) (Karma 2014). Incidentally, one year before his release, his memoir was published. It is based on interviews with four of his friends and supporters, without prior knowledge of his early release. The book title, *As If We Were Part Animals*, sums up the way Papuans were perceived by most Indonesians — as backward savages, part animals.

In 1997 to 1998, Karma attended the Asian Institute of Management in Manila, the Philippines. His experience there changed his way of thinking and he began to take a critical view toward Indonesia.

In Manila, I was valued as a human being and I was not harassed, humiliated or discriminated. That's what I felt when socializing (*dalam pergaulan*). For instance, when I shopped at the supermarket or at the market. During interaction with the community, I felt valued as a fellow being. So I was seen as a part of them, or in Javanese term *diwongke* or humanized, unlike what I have experienced in Papua or in Java.

During my school years in Java, we Papuans were often treated like part animals (*setengah binatang*). We were seen as if we were an evolutionary stage of the Darwin theory, the process of animals turning into humans.

I felt that from my college friends in Solo. So they were not only from the uneducated society, but also from the educated circle. That's how they treated us. Often Papuans were taunted "Monkey! *Ketek* [monkey in Javanese]! Like that." (Karma 2014, 8, my translation).

Karma looks back in the memoir of his college days in the 1970s Solo, Central Java, and compares them with the way he was treated in Manila. Two points can be made from his recollections. First is about the racial slurs. The Indonesian "friends" in college who were educated nonetheless compared Karma and his fellow Papuans to apes. The fact that the slurs came from an educated circle were stressed to indicate the prevalence of racism toward Papuans in Indonesia. The same racial slurs persisted half a century later. Second, as the first point suggests, is how Indonesians in general perceive the Papuans in the large national community. As Karma illustrates, the Papuans are perceived through the lens of Charles Darwin's theory of evolution and are placed halfway between apes and humans. They are the peripheral societies stranded in evolutionary terms. In other words, Indonesians imagine the Papuans as a constituent of the Indonesian nation, but for the contrasting purpose to accentuate the modernity and civility of the dominant Javanese culture at center. As such characterizations of Papua and the Papuans as backward, underdeveloped, primitive, savage, and uncivilized are not random. The Papuans are in reality an "internal Other" of the Indonesian nation.

The history of colonization in Indonesia also matters. Java was the center of Dutch colonial expansion since the nineteenth century and Batavia became

the capital of the colonial administration of the Netherlands Indies. Dutch colonialism manufactured underdeveloped regions within the territory by developing particular regions. Papua was among the least developed regions because it was colonized the last by the Dutch. As mentioned above, the Papua land was formally administered by the Dutch in 1936. At the turn of the twentieth century, Papua or the Dutch New Guinea was “still being explored.” In the eyes of Dutch colonialists, Papua was much less known than even the interior of Sumatra, Borneo, and Celebes (De Kat Angelino 1931, 97), not to mention Java and the coastal areas of major islands. The late colonization has preserved Papua’s “underdeveloped” state.

There is another reason why Indonesians or the Javanese, the dominant ethnic group in the country, look down on the Papuans. It has to do with the Papuan’s physical appearance. The Javanese look different from the Papuans; the Papuans have dark complexion and curly hair, which in Indonesia are their distinguishing characters. It is no doubt that emphasis on skin color and hair texture is a typical case of racism. Filep Karma however rejects this simple distinction between Papuans and Indonesians — claiming that “Papuans are not always dark skin, curly hair.” (Karma 2014, 25) In a speech on 1 December 2004 in Abepura to commemorate the declaration of Papuan independence, he remarked:

In Java, there is a straight-haired person, a native Javanese, but he cares about our people. [...] Javanese, Manadonese, anyone with a sense of belonging to the Papuan nation is part of the Papuan nation. On the other hand, many indigenous Papuans, with black skin and curly hair, their hearts are more Indonesian (Karma 2014, 25, my translation).

Thus Karma complicates and dismantles the racist definition of Papuans and Indonesians, hinging his own definition on the hearts and solidarity of each person rather than on exterior appearance. In this regard he echoes many scholars of nationalism who regard it as an outcome of invented tradition and cultivated sense of belonging than a consequence of biology (Anderson 2006; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1983).

Papua in Media Discourses

Primitive, backward, underdeveloped, uncultured, and uncivilized, in addition to distinguished physical traits, are the shared image of Papuans in the imagination of many Indonesians. These attributes have taken root over approximately a century and for the entire history of post-colonial Indonesia, and provided the basis for racism against the Papuans. But on its own this racialized image does not inspire or provoke violence against the Papuans; it provides the language by which Papuans are to be discussed and demeaned, but certain political-social conditions served as the grounds for violence against the Papuans. In particular, political democratization and social transformation after the Suharto regime collapsed are a key to understanding why racism against the Papuans escalated into violence. A particular attention also needs to be paid to rapid changing political and social environments in the 2010s when racism discourse became prominent, and widely reported and shared among citizens in Indonesia.

Keeping the above-mentioned description of the Papuans in mind, you can find two narratives about Papua and the Papuans in Indonesia. The dominant narrative is based on the fact that most Indonesians do not care about Papua, and they do not really know about Papua except for its supposed underdevelopedness and richness in terms of mineral resources. When the mainstream media cover the story of Papua, it has to do with violence and separatist movement, when the police or military, or other government facilities are attacked by Papuans and/or armed Papuan organizations.

From the 2010s on, when social media and digital media began to take root in Indonesian media environment, an alternative narrative has emerged. A representative media is an online media, *Suara Papua* (The Voice of Papua), which was launched on 10 December 2011. It claims to “prioritize the values of justice, humanity and religious diversity.”³⁾ It strives to raise ‘neglected’ voices and it focuses on drawing attention to human rights violations against Papuans. Since there is little press freedom in Papua, this kind of alternative media and

3) The motto is taken from *Suara Papua's* website.

narrative plays a significant role in raising people's awareness about Papua.

In the 2010s, political conditions also changed. In 2014 President Joko Widodo took the office, which gave a hope for a Papuan political movement. In the same year, the United Liberation of Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) was formed and the West Papuans have unified behind five political leaders who represent the West Papuans' right to self-determination. But the high expectation was soon diminished, as under the Widodo supposedly more inclusive administration racism against Papuans have become more politicized and Papuan students in other parts of Indonesia have become targets of abuse and discriminations. The administration has increasingly been targeting and criminalizing student movement organizations such as the Alliance of West Papuan University Student (AMP) and the Movement for University Students and the Papuan People (Gempar), as well as other political organizations (Dewan Adat Papua and PASIFIKA 2017, 6).

For instance, on 15 July 2016 in Yogyakarta, Central Java, West Papuan students were taunted by the police and right-wing mass organizations. They were members of the West Papuan University Student Alliance (Aliansi Mahasiswa Papua) under the name of United People for the Liberation of West Papua (Persatuan Rakyat untuk Pembebasan Papua Barat). They had notified the police of their plan to organize a long march on 15 July in support of the ULMWP's application for full membership of the Melanesian Spearhead Group and the demand for self-determination for the people of West Papua. The application however was rejected. Instead of publicly protesting, the students decided to stay in their dormitories and sing songs of praise and liberation. But the police considered these acts threatening. The news was quickly circulated among right-wing mass organizations, such as the Sultan's Palace (Kraton), Yoga Paramilitary (Laskar Yoga), Pancasila Youth (Pemuda Pancasila), Forum Komunikasi Putra Putri Purnawirawan dan Putra Indonesia (Communication Forum of the Sons and Daughters of Indonesia). The police and right-wing mass organizations gathered around the student dormitory, and when confronted, taunted Papuan students with racial slurs such as monkey, pigs, dogs, infidels, stupid and stink, and telling them "go back to Papua" (Dewan Adat Papua and PASIFIKA 2017, 10). Along with racial slurs, physical violence against Papuan

students also took place on the site; members of right-wing mass organization punched and stepped on Papuan student's face. Many Papuan students were injured.

While the 2016 incident was a reaction by the police and right-wing mass organizations to the Papuan student planned march, a similar incident in 2019 took place without such a trigger. The 2019 incident took place on 17 August, which is commemorated as the day Indonesia proclaimed independence from the Dutch. On the eve of the independence day, a group of mass organizations gathered in front of a West Papuan students' dormitory in Surabaya. They had heard a rumor that the Indonesian national flag had been disposed in the gutter near the dormitory. The rumor had spread by way of social media and digital messenger service. The students were practically held hostage inside the dorm, as the angry mob outside threatened violence. The following morning, the police came to the dormitory to search for evidence of the alleged desecration of national symbol and took 43 students into custody.

The incident was covered in conventional and social media, and reports of threatened and abused Papuan students led to a protest movement in Sorong, West Papua, on 18 and 19 August (Davidson 2019). The backlash protest quickly escalated into riots in several cities in Papua. When the police searched the dormitory, the police and mass organizations reportedly heaped racial slurs on the students. It is important to stress here that the incidence was triggered by a rumor that spread on social media and thus provoked both the police and right-wing mass organizations to attack the students. It was clear that the Papuan students were a victim of rumor; but the ensuing backlash protest and riot in Papua was also attributed to rumor.

In response to the widespread protest in Papua, the police took a different step. Two days after the police raid of the dormitory, the National Police Chief, Tito Karnavian, held a press conference. Tito explained, "The [initial] incidents in Surabaya and Malang were actually small incidents, which have been localized, and were resolved by the local authorities... But certain individuals then spread false information or hoax on social media. [Rumor] that there were profanities directed at Papuan students, and that one Papuan student died in Surabaya" (CNN Indonesia 2019). Then he acknowledged that "certain

individuals took advantage of the incidents to trigger even more riots.” The national police chief admitted that the backlash violence had been induced by false information on social media. He suggested that the police cyber unit investigated the case.

Ten days after the press conference, the media revealed the alleged “hoax” related to the independence day incident. Surprisingly, the plan to spread disinformation on social media had started three days earlier or on 14 August. A WhatsApp chat group organized a meeting to prepare for an “action” at the Papuan student dormitory. It sought to plant the national flag in front of the dormitory — thus compelling the students to celebrate Indonesia’s independence day. This was followed on 16 August on the WhatsApp chat group for sons and daughters of retired police and military officers (INFO KB FKPPPI), where an image was uploaded with the caption “The Red and White Flag was ditched into the gutter by separatist group.” On 17 August, another post on the same group reads: “Attention please, it’s urgent, we need assistance with larger crowd because the Papuan guys are fighting back and ready with sharp weapons, bows and arrows. URGENT URGENT URGENT” (Gunadha 2019).

The police investigation revealed another aspect of the incident, one connected to hate speech. Eleven days after the incident, the police named Tri Susanti as coordinator of the siege at the Papuan student dorm; she became suspect in a hate speech case. She was then an opposition party functionary as well as representative in three right-wing mass organizations, FKPPPI (Retired Officers Communication Forum), FPI (Islamic Defenders Front) and PP (Pancasila Youth). The initiative or involvement of the three right-wing mass organizations could not be denied. On 21 August, two days after the National Police Chief implied Susanti’s involvement of hate speech against the Papuan students, leaders of the three organizations paid a visit to the Regional Police Headquarter and publicly apologized to the police if their actions had angered Papuans (Raharjo 2019). Another two days passed. This time the Surabaya branch of FKPPPI declared that they had severed ties with Tri Susanti due to her action in relation to the incident at the Papuan student dormitory (Baihaqi 2019). She was charged with Article 45A paragraph 2 in conjunction with Article 28 paragraph 2 of the Information and Electronic Transaction Law (Gunadha and

Pramudita 2019). After the trial a half year later, on 3 February 2020, she was sentenced to 7 months in prison for spreading false information.

The August 2019 incident was organized by “certain individuals” who planted a narrative of Papuan students’ treason by desecrating the national flag, thus implying their separatist aspirations. This narrative spread through social media and successfully mobilized mass organizations. Even the police took the information seriously and conducted a search at the student dormitory. For two consecutive days, mass organizations gathered in front of the dormitory’s main gate and shouted racial slurs to the students in threatening manner. A number of police officers reportedly did the same. When the story turned out to be a hoax, the police cybercrime unit investigated the incident and identified suspects. The alleged leader was detained, put on trial, and sentenced.

The incident was arguably a product of cyberspace. Information on social media platforms is easily manipulated. As I mentioned before, online media can provide a space for an alternative narrative about and for the Papuans. At the same time, online media can turn out to be phantom media. As of December 2018, there were 18 such media on Papua (Zuhra 2018). They frame news and information about Papua. They emphasize that there is no human rights violation in Papua, that the Indonesian government has done good things for Papua, that the army and the police have carried out their duties properly, that Papuan people live peacefully and trouble-free. In such phantom media, it is the Free Papua groups who are the criminals or mere stooges of foreign governments attempting to colonize Papua and takeover its vast resources. As alternative voices have emerged in the 2010s, counter-narratives operated by the military or other sources are not far behind. A kind of media war or psychological warfare on or about Papua is being fought on the cyberspace. This media war contributed to nationalistic counter act by right-wing mass organizations and to some extent the law enforcement officers loyal to the Indonesian government.

The media war also escalated racism against Papuans. From the outset of the 17 August incident, human rights lawyers have accused the action and behavior by police and mass organizations of racism. The mainstream media, like CNN Indonesia, reported the incident as a case of racism (Ariefana 2019a).

In the interview, Papuan human rights lawyer, Emanuel Gobay, sighed, “at the end of 74 years of Indonesian independence, the disease of racism is still living in the body of the state apparatus and Indonesian citizens” (Ariefana 2019b). Nevertheless, the discourse about racism that emerged on social media in Indonesia has also given Papuans new and more ways to talk about their experience in Indonesia. While discrimination against the Papuans is not new, the media framing of it as “racism” is. As much as disinformation and hoax can be credited to the new media landscape, the tool with which to counter it is also available there, making possible the hashtag #PapuanLivesMatter.

Conclusion

In June 2020, it became clear that social media connected Papua to a global movement. It connected Papuans with a much broader audience, experience, and movement for justice and solidarity. Hashtag #PapuanLivesMatter was adopted alongside #BlackLivesMatter. The people now “speak up against the racial discrimination and violence that Papuans have long endured” (Sutrisno 2020). On 18 August 2020, a gathering was held in Surabaya, the city where the independence day incident against Papuan students took place, but this time to commemorate the one-year anniversary of the incident. The gathering was organized by Papuan students who more or less have been victims of systemic racism in Indonesia. Some posters read “Commemorating one-year anniversary of ‘Monkey’ Racism,” and “End Racial Discrimination against the people of Papua” (CNN Indonesia 2020). In this way, awareness of racism and human rights has arguably been mediated by social media. It gives people new language to discuss and counter instances of racism and discrimination.

The discourse on racism cannot but compel Indonesians to reimagine their national community. More than two decades ago, this national potential risk was suggested. In his speech entitled “Indonesian Nationalism Today and in the Future” delivered in Jakarta, Indonesia, on 4 March 1999, Benedict Anderson reminded Indonesians of what Indonesian nationalism is and what Indonesian human rights can be — and how the two are intertwined:

What I mean is the right of those people, all of them, fated to be born on Indonesian soil in the time of the Republic, to participate voluntarily, enthusiastically, equally, and without fear in the common project of Indonesian nationalism. Put conversely, their right not to be treated as animals, devils, serfs, or the property of other Indonesians. These “Indonesian human rights” can only be struggle for and realized by Indonesians themselves (Anderson 1999, 9).

As the Papuan case indicated, the Indonesian human rights is still far from becoming a reality.

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