Soccer Dad's Mideast Media Sampler, 6/05/13

Today's sampler and analysis of Mideast media content from my pal Soccer Dad:
 1) Tom the dreamer


In Israel lives the Joseph Story, Thomas Friedman uses Stephen Hawking's recent boycott of Israel (an action he didn't take against China or Iran) as a chance to lecture Israel once again.

This global trend, though, is coinciding with a complete breakdown in Israel’s regional environment. Israel today is living a version of the Biblical “Joseph Story,” where Joseph endeared himself to the Pharaoh by interpreting his dreams as a warning that seven fat years would be followed by seven lean years and, therefore, Egypt needed to stock up on grain. In Israel’s case, it has enjoyed, relatively speaking, 40 fat years of stable governments around it. Over the last 40 years, a class of Arab leaders took power and managed to combine direct or indirect oil money, with multiple intelligence services, with support from either America or Russia, to ensconce themselves in office for multiple decades. All of these leaders used their iron fists to keep their sectarian conflicts — Sunnis versus Shiites, Christians versus Muslims, and Kurds and Palestinian refugees versus everyone else — in check. They also kept their Islamists underground.

So what does Friedman suggest?

In my view, that makes resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict more important than ever for three reasons: 1) to reverse the trend of international delegitimization closing in on Israel; 2) to disconnect Israel as much as possible from the regional conflicts around it; and 3) to offer a model.

There is no successful model of democratic governance in the Arab world at present — the Islamists are all failing. But Israel, if it partnered with the current moderate Palestinian leadership in the West Bank, has a chance to create a modern, economically thriving, democratic, secular state where Christians and Muslims would live side by side — next to Jews. That would be a hugely valuable example, especially at a time when the Arab world lacks anything like it. And the world for the most part would not begrudge Israel keeping its forces on the Jordan River — as will be necessary given the instability beyond — if it ceded most of the West Bank and Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem.

Together, Israelis and Palestinians actually have the power to model what a decent, postauthoritarian, multireligious Arab state could look like. Nothing would address both people’s long-term strategic needs better. Too bad their leaders today are not as farsighted as Joseph.

Let's address Thomas's three points.
1) When Friedman brought up Hawking's boycott he allowed:

I strongly disagree with what Hawking did. Israelis should be challenged not boycotted.

Of course, superficial as he is, Friedman doesn't acknowledge that the BDS movement isn't about criticizing Israel but about destroying it. He should be condemning Hawking, not merely disagreeing with him. The "trend of delegitimization" is based on opposition to (or hatred of) Israel, not opposition to occupation. That he accepts Israel's culpability in the delegitimization campaign shows that he is more aligned with those who wish to destroy than he is willing to admit.

https://twitter.com/soccerdhg/status/342316938485174272
2) The growing Shi'ite/Sunni divide manifest over Syria shows how wrong this is. When Sheikh Qaradawi calls Alawites worse infidels than Jews or Christians, and Hezbollah casts its participation in Syria's civil war as a defense of a Shi'ite shrine, Israel is a non-factor. He acknowledges the growing political power of Sunni Islamists. If Israel makes peace with the Palestinians, who is more likely to be ruling the PA in ten years? The ideologically coherent Islamists of Hamas or the more secular Fatah? Israel is a footnote to the main currents of Middle East right now.

3) Did you notice a name missing from this column? Salam Fayyad. Remember how Friedman promoted "Fayyadism" as the future of the Palestinian Authority? Well now Fayyad has been replaced and he's gone done Friedman's memory hole. The problem was that he was a fig leaf. His seriousness made him a fig leaf for Western governments who wanted to pretend that their aid to the PA wasn't being misspent. But more importantly he wasn't Mahmoud Abbas. And Abbas got his position because he wasn't Yasser Arafat. The more moderate Palestinian leaders go their positions because of who they aren't rather than because of what they do. But that's why they don't accomplish much. The model of democratic governance in the Arab world is illusory. If the Palestinians were governed by those they supported politically, they would be governed by Hamas.

What Thomas has in common with Joseph is that both had dreams. Joseph, however, correctly predicted the future, Thomas, with his infinitely repackaged lectures of Israel shows that he has little grasp of past or present events and is, therefore, much less likely to foresee the future accurately.
I'd also point out that this column wasn't appreciated by the anti-Israel crowd.
https://twitter.com/scottroth76/status/342155642397663232
This column proves that he doesn't really know what they're about.
https://twitter.com/Embjdr_Israel/status/342365934083788800

2) The GCC's case against Hezbollah


While he doesn't expect that it will make any difference Abdulrahman Al-Rashed explains why the Gulf Cooperation Council declared Hezbollah to be a terrorist organization.

Although Hezbollah is involved in terrorist operations against Kuwait, Saudi and Bahrain, and has been for decades, these countries did not do anything against it. Hezbollah was completely involved in the attempt to assassinate Kuwait’s emir in a car bomb in 1985. The major culprit in that crime is Mustapha Badreddine. He was the perpetrator and he is also wanted by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon in their investigation of the assassination of Rafiq Hariri. The paradox is that Saddam Hussein released him five years later after he invaded Kuwait! Hezbollah also hijacked a Kuwaiti airplane in Muscat and killed two Kuwaiti passengers.
Several Hezbollah terrorist plans in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have also been uncovered, and the party was not punished for any. Only the U.S., which categorized Hezbollah as a terrorist organization in 1995, placed it on the list of sanctioned organizations. Gulf countries chose to remain silent regarding Hezbollah’s crimes against its governments and citizens, because it was seen as a resistance organization with popular support among Arabs, when in fact it was a helpful hand of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards helpful hand. Gulf countries also wanted to maintain the balance of power in Lebanon and it maintained minimal relations with Hezbollah in order to support civil peace in Lebanon.

Gulf countries have finally decided to categorize Hezbollah as a terrorist organization after it became a major party fighting along Bashar al-Assad’s regime and is involved in the murder thousands of Syrians. Although the move comes late, I doubt that it will be implemented on different levels, and it will remain simply a political decision.

Hezbollah is a Shi'ite terror organization sponsored by Iran. It isn't all that surprising that GCC countries would be among its foremost enemies.


3) Talkin' Turkey


Claire Berlinski provides the recent background for the foment going on in Turkey:

Of late, almost every sector of the electorate has felt unease about one part or another of Erdogan’s agenda. Restrictive new alcohol legislation, rammed through parliament, as usual, with contempt for the minority opposition, has prompted outrage; the so-called peace process with the PKK, which no one understands, has caused great unease. Anxiety is growing as well, not only about press censorship, but also about the prosecution of those who insult government officials or “Islamic values” on social media. There is outrage about the bombing in Reyhanl that left 52 Turks dead and which appears to have been attributable to a series of inexcusable police and intelligence blunders (but no one knows, and no one believes what the press writes); there is fear of war with Syria; there is concern about strange reports that al-Nusra, a Syrian militant group affiliated with al-Qaida, has been cooking up Sarin gas in Adana, five miles east of the United States’ Incirlik Air Base; and there is deep skepticism about Erdogan’s plans for grandiose construction projects—such as a third airport, a second Bosphorus canal, and a gigantesque mega-mosque intended to exceed in size every mosque left behind by his Ottoman predecessors. The thing will dominate Istanbul’s already-martyred skyline, and replace yet another pleasant and leafy park.

The recent announcement that a new bridge over the Bosphorus was to be named after Sultan Selim the Grim, slayer of the Alevis—a substantial and beleaguered Turkish religious minority—didn’t help matters. Nor did it soothe fears when a minor AKP official from the sticks wrote on Twitter that “My blood boils when spineless psychopaths pretending to be atheists swear at my religion. These people, who have been raped, should be annihilated.” Two weeks ago in Ankara, a disembodied voice on the subway, having apparently espied them by means of a security camera, denounced a couple for kissing. The voice demanded that they “act in accordance with moral rules.” In return, incensed Ankara lovers staged kissing protests: as the couples shyly smooched outside the subway station, a group of young men confronted them, chanting “Allahu Akbar!” It was reported but not confirmed that one of the kissers was stabbed; but given the mood of hysteria here right now, it would be unwise to believe every rumor one hears.

Erdogan, it seems, severely underestimated the degree of his subjects’ displeasure, confident that God, a strong economy, and a weak opposition were all he needed to ensure his hegemony. He brusquely dismissed the tree protesters’ concerns: “We’ve made our decision, and we will do as we have decided.” An AKP parliamentarian then unwisely announced that some young people “are in need of gas.”

Michael Rubin explains that there isn't unanimity in Turkey's government:

Turkey’s been a pressure cooker for quite some time. Turks have radically different visions about their future. While the spark for the current unrest was an environmental protest against building a shopping center over a small Istanbul park, the greater issue is unease about Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s religious agenda and the rollback of rights inside Turkey. It is also a clash between visions. While Istanbul’s elites have traditionally looked toward Europe and the West for inspiration, the core of Erdogan’s constituency is Anatolian, and tends to look toward religion.

At the same time, it’s useful to think about a tripartite clash going in within the Turkish government. There are three main factional leaders: Erdogan, President Abdullah Gul, and Islamic thinker Fethullah Gulen who, depending on the analyst, is either a malicious cult leader or the leader of a movement promoting tolerance. All three are Islamist, but Erdogan seems most interested in personal power, and Gül is most tolerant. Gulen — who lives in a heavily guarded compound in Pennsylvania and whom Turks believe has long had American government support — dominates the security services. Whether people hold him accountable for the police abuse seen on the streets of abuse remains to be seen.

(Still Rubin doesn't believe that Erdogan is likely to lose power.)
Not exactly what you'd want from President Obama's best friend in the region.

Soccer Dad's MidEast Media Sampler, 2/25/13

Today's sampler and analysis of Mideast media content from my pal Soccer Dad:


Intifada: then and now

In response to a recent news program in Israel, Col. Jonathan D. Halevi wrote The Palestinian Authority’s Responsibility for the Outbreak of the Second Intifada: Its Own Damning Testimony for the Jerusalem Center of Public Affairs. Even now, as Halevi writes:

More than ten years after the outbreak of the Second Intifada, there are still journalists, former security officials, and pundits who raise questions about the role of the Palestinian Authority in the devastating violence during which suicide bombing attacks struck Israel’s major cities, leaving more than a thousand dead and many more permanently maimed. 

What he has compiled shows:

This body of material, presented here in an unvarnished way, reveals that Yasser Arafat and important segments of the Palestinian leadership at that time were directly responsible for what happened and no amount of revisionist history can exonerate Arafat for standing behind one of the bloodiest periods in Israel’s modern history.

Halevi of course presented statements of intent. Halevi covers them beginning with the earliest by Imad Falluji and continuing until Suha Arafat's latest revelations. I'd like to point out two events that often escape scrutiny.

The first was a report in Ha'aretz that was captured by IMRA at the time.

Over the past several weeks, the Palestinian Authority has granted extended vacation leaves to dozens of jailed Hamas and Islamic Jihad activists, among them militants who were involved in serious terror attacks against Israel.Ha'aretz: PA granted dozens of jailed Islamic Jihad, Hamas terrorists "extended vacation" 

This was reported September 18, 2000, ten days before Ariel Sharon walked on the Temple Mount.

Also the first reported casualty of the so called "Aqsa intifada" was David Biri, an 19 year old soldier.

Sgt. David Biri died of wounds sustained in a bombing near Netzarim in the Gaza Strip. Two pipe bombs were detonated electronically by Palestinian terrorists hiding on the side of the road as several civilian cars, escorted by an army jeep, drove by.

Sgt. Biri was killed September 27, a day before Sharon visited the Temple Mount. The manner of his killing showed planning. Clearly there was already a heightened level of organized violence against Israel prior to the official beginning of the so called intifada.

It's important to remember that the second intifada was not a spontaneous uprising against the occupation but a coordinated campaign of violence against Israel. Now there are suggestions that a new intifada has started.

The New York Times reports Palestinians Dispute Israel’s Findings on a Prisoner’s Death:

“I hold Israel fully responsible for killing Arafat Jaradat,” added Mr. Qaraka, who earlier on Sunday called for an international investigation into the death. “The Israeli story was forged and full of lies.”

The 4,500 Palestinians in Israeli jails refused meals on Sunday to protest Mr. Jaradat’s death, and hundreds of Palestinians demonstrated in several cities and villages in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

After days of such demonstrations, which have included violent clashes between Palestinians and Israeli soldiers and settlers, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s special envoy, Isaac Molho, sent a message to the Palestinian leadership on Sunday that Israeli officials described as an “unequivocal demand to restore quiet.” Israel also transferred to the Palestinian Authority $100 million in tax revenue it had been withholding.

Later on the New York Times in full sympathy mode reports:

Few issues resonate more deeply in Palestinian society than the plight of prisoners: about 800,000 have been detained in Israeli jails since 1967, according to Palestinian leaders; Mr. Jaradat was the 203rd to die in that time. 

Forget for a moment that 203 out of 800,000 is a very small proportion. (Elder of Ziyon noted that young Palestinians die in Israeli jails at less frequently that young American die anywhere.) Of course Palestinians weren't simply arrested en masse to fulfill some sadistic need of Israeli officials. They were arrested for violations of the law, often violent terrorist incidents. In fact as the article observed that quite a few in Israeli jails committed their crimes after Oslo; after the Palestinians promised to forswear terror. (Many of these violent terrorists - who would never have been released if they'd been arrested by any other country - were released in the Gilad Shalit deal in late 2011.) But no New York Times reporter would write, "The prisoner issue has deep resonance with Israeli society as many of those incarcerated committed acts of violent and sometimes deadly terror since the signing of the Oslo Accords." The only statements evoking sympathy are in support of the Palestinian narrative.

Finally we get this:

Several leaders and commentators warned Sunday that the death, coming amid a severe financial crisis in the West Bank, could lead to extended protests, with most predicting a largely nonviolent movement of civil disobedience like the one Palestinians undertook from 1987 to 1993 rather than the campaign of suicide bombings that began in 2000. 

The first intifada was not nonviolent. It was less lethal than the later one. Throwing rocks and firebombs are not nonviolent.

But now there are those who are trying to explain away the current unrest as another spontaneous "non-violent" intifada and justifying it.

Elder of Ziyon, Israelly Cool and Israel Matzav show different forms that this campaign is taking.

Back in December, Khaled Abu Toameh wrote about the rumors he was hearing from the Palestinian Authority and Hamas:

Both Abbas and Hamas see the two events -- the war in the Gaza Strip and the UN vote — as "historic achievements" and military and political victories over Israel.

Emboldened by the "victories," Abbas and Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal recently reached a secret agreement on the need to launch a "popular intifada" against Israel in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Palestinian sources in Ramallah revealed.

The two men believe that such an intifada at this stage would further isolate Israel and earn the Palestinians even more sympathy in the international arena, the sources said.

Reporters aren't likely to look past the violence and explain it away, but past experience shows that the violence is likely orchestrated. The events of recent months seem to confirm Abu Toameh's reporting.

The Tower (an online news site produces by The Israel Project) observes:

Throughout 2012 senior Palestinian leaders – Fatah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad – called for Palestinians to launch a third Intifada and resume violent attacks against Israel. And as predicted, recent weeks have seen an uptick in orchestrated demonstrations and public violence among Palestinians targeting Israelis, including lynching attempts that reminded Israelis and observers of the lynchings that marked the beginning of the Second Intifada.

As early as January of this year, military and security sources in Israel were reported to have identified an emerging wave of violence driven in part by Fatah’s failed diplomatic gambits, including those strenuously opposed by President Obama who repeatedly warned of the counterproductive danger of the PA’s unproductive diplomatic maneuvering, and by a deliberate attempt by Fatah leaders to exploit and provoke the frustration they themselves created...

Lynching isn't usually described as non-violent.

Jonathan Tobin believes that the surge of violence is intended to make an impression on President Obama:

It’s difficult to say yet what exactly will be on President Obama’s mind when he heads to Israel next month, but an all-out push for another futile try to make peace with the Palestinians may not be on the agenda. It’s likely the president will continue his advocacy for a two-state solution, but after more than four years of failure even this administration appears to have gotten the message that any more effort expended on the peace process will be sunk, as it has every other time, by Palestinian intransigence. But the Palestinian Authority, which has ignored every attempt by the Obama White House to tip the diplomatic playing field in their favor, may be planning its own little surprise for the president.

And Honest Reporting ties the current news to the Halevi report.

One theme that has emerged from the reporting is that Hamas and Fatah are in agreement about the escalation of violence. In other words, Abbas, who has failed to come to a power sharing agreement with Hamas, has nonetheless found common ground with Hamas in fighting Israel. What does that say about Israel's "peace partner?"

Soccer Dad's MidEast Media Sampler, 1/30/13

Today's sampler and analysis of Mideast media content from my pal Soccer Dad:



In a New York Times op-ed nearly two years ago, Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas wrote:

Palestine’s admission to the United Nations would pave the way for the internationalization of the conflict as a legal matter, not only a political one. It would also pave the way for us to pursue claims against Israel at the United Nations, human rights treaty bodies and the International Court of Justice.

Now a pro-Palestinian activist, George Bisharat has filled in details as to how this process will work. In Why Palestine should take Israel to court in the Hague he writes:

The Palestinians’ first attempt to join the I.C.C. was thwarted last April when the court’s chief prosecutor at the time, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, declined the request on the grounds that Palestine was not a state. That ambiguity has since diminished with the United Nations’ conferral of nonmember state status on Palestine in November. Israel’s frantic opposition to the elevation of Palestine’s status at the United Nations was motivated precisely by the fear that it would soon lead to I.C.C. jurisdiction over Palestinian claims of war crimes.

Israeli leaders are unnerved for good reason. The I.C.C. could prosecute major international crimes committed on Palestinian soil anytime after the court’s founding on July 1, 2002.

 Bisharat then cites Col. Daniel Reisner, the one time head of the IDF's legal department:

The former head of the Israeli military’s international law division, Daniel Reisner, asserted in 2009: “International law progresses through violations. We invented the targeted assassination thesis and we had to push it. At first there were protrusions that made it hard to insert easily into the legal molds. Eight years later it is in the center of the bounds of legitimacy.”

From the complete context, it's pretty clear that Reisner didn't mean violations as much as ill defined areas of the law. (Bisharat's implication is clear: the United States should be subject to ICC prosecution for targeted killings in Pakistan and Yemen.)

Bisharat makes a dubious claim here:

And it has treated civilian employees of Hamas — including police officers, judges, clerks, journalists and others — as combatants because they allegedly support a “terrorist infrastructure.” Never mind that contemporary international law deems civilians “combatants” only when they actually take up arms.

Elder of Ziyon has addressed the issue of the police officers in some detail.

This is a critical paragraph, and it highlights Goldstone's credulity. There is a clear statement from the police spokesman saying that the police were instructed to face the enemy, which is not a very ambiguous statement. Months later, when he is reached by commission members to explain this problematic statement, he seizes the opportunity to "clarify" that he only meant that they should be doing normal police duties.
And Goldstone believes him.

Not only that, his "proof" is an absurd statement that no policemen were killed in combat (presumably during the ground invasion.) This is a lie. According to PCHR and my research, 16 policemen were killed from January 4th and on, 34 policemen were killed, and my research indicates that at least 16 of them were members of terror organizations.

What international law "deems" can be fluid.

Even the concept of "occupation," on which Bisharat rests much of his case isn't as clear cut as he presumes. Eugene Kontorovich wrote recently:

I recently came across a discussion in the U.N.’s International Law Commission from 1950, as part of the drafting of the Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States. There were quibbles from countries such as France about whether annexation is always banned, or whether there might be various exceptions.

In response, the Secretary observed: “It might be suggested that in order to constitute a crime under international law an annexation must be carried out through the use of armed force, with a view to destroying the territorial integrity of another State.” [See I Yearbook of Int. Law Comm. 137 (1950).]

Indeed, it was not surprising that there was some confusion and concern about the extent of an annexation norm, since as the delegates admitted, there were some “frontier adjustments” made by the Allies after WWII.

The larger problem is that the New York Times continues to promote the Palestinian effort to avoid negotiations and have a settlement imposed on Israel internationally, with no editorial objections.

Please also see Seth Mandel's The Shameful Attack on Israel from Amnesty International.

2) Iran and Hagel

At the end of a long analysis of the behavior of the Iranian regime, Michael Rubin writes in Deciphering Iranian decision making and strategy today:

Wars in the Middle East are caused not by oil or water but by overconfidence. In 1988, an Iranian mine damaged a US guided missile cruiser. In retaliation, President Ronald Reagan ordered Operation Praying Mantis to destroy Iranian oil terminals. The US Navy decimated its Iranian challengers in the ensuing battle, the largest US naval surface engagement since World War II. The red line Reagan established created a tacit understanding that governed US-Iranian relations for another 15 years. As the Iranian leadership has concluded that it could—literally—get away with murder in Iraq and Afghanistan, that American red lines were ephemeral, and that the United States was not prepared to stop its nuclear program, Tehran has grown bolder. Iranian diplomats might talk, but the powers that be will not abide by any deal. The IRGC and its proxies will continue to test American red lines until the United States forcibly pushes back.

This is not calling for America declaring war on Iran, though, I suppose, some would consider it such. But if red lines are necessary for limiting the spread of Iranian influence, what does it mean that President Obama has nominated Sen. Chuck Hagel to be Secretary of Defense?

Seth Mandel asks (and answers)Are Hagel and Obama “Soul Mates” on Defense Policy?

They would travel to Iraq together, where Hagel was dismissiveand suspicious of the military’s top brass. Obama would take office and do the same. Hagel would speak out against tough Iran sanctions, and Obama would work against them from the White House, opposing several iterations of them and finally watering them down when he couldn’t prevent sanctions from passing Congress. Hagel would loudly criticize even the contemplation of military action against Iran, and Obama would have his secretary of defense deliver a similar message to Israel. It is this pattern that has led Hagel’s critics to express concern about his nomination to be secretary of defense. Many worry Obama shares Hagel’s views; Obama’s defenders assure us he does not. 

Mandel quotes a recent op-ed by Bob Woodward answering the question in the affirmative.

The AP reports:

Iran's elite Quds Force and Hezbollah militants are learning from a series of botched terror attacks over the past two years and pose a growing threat to the U.S. and other Western targets as well as Israel, a prominent counterterrorism expert says.Operating both independently and together, the militant groups are escalating their activities around the world, fueling worries in the U.S. that they increasingly have the ability and the willingness to attack the U.S., according to a report by Matthew Levitt of the Washington Institute for Near East Studies. His report points to two attacks last year -- one successful and one foiled by U.S. authorities -- as indications that the militants are adapting and are determined to take revenge on the West for efforts to disrupt Tehran's nuclear program and other perceived offenses.The report's conclusions expand on comments late last year from U.S. terrorism officials who told Congress that the Quds Force and Hezbollah, which often coordinate efforts, have become "a significant source of concern" for the U.S. The Quds Force is an elite wing of Iran's powerful Revolutionary Guard, the defenders of Iran's ruling clerics and their hold on power.

At a time where it appears that Iran will be more aggressive, President Obama has nominated someone who will be hesitant to fight back or establish red lines.

Soccer Dad's MidEast Media Sampler 1/25/13

Today's sampler and analysis of Mideast media content from my pal Soccer Dad:

 1) False friend Cohen


In Israel's True Friends, Roger Cohen wrote argued that Israel's "'true friends' ... are in facts true friends only of the Israeli right:"

... propels Israel into repetitive miniwars of dubious strategic value.

(Apparently he needed some editing as the verb "propels" doesn't seem to match its antecedent.)


According to a recent paper, Operation Pillar of Defense: Objectives and Implications:

From a military standpoint, Operation Pillar of Defense was different from Operation Cast Lead in several significant ways. Since 2008, Hamas and other Gaza factions have expanded their rocket arsenals to include longer-range rockets. In 2008, Israeli intelligence estimated that all factions in Gaza possessed around five thousand rockets; by the outbreak of Pillar of Defense they were estimated to have ten to twelve thousand, including, for the first time, rockets that could reach Tel Aviv. Indeed, those rockets were used during the recent conflict, albeit in a symbolic fashion. Israel, however, did not sit idly by between these two operations, and the cardinal development of this conflict was the amazingly successful performance of the Israeli-manufactured Iron Dome rocket-defense system. The deterrence achieved by Operation Cast Lead afforded Israel some time, and Israel used this time to develop Iron Dome with its remarkable 85-percent success rate achieved during Operation Pillar of Defense, providing both security and a sense of security to the Israeli population. That, moreover, was one of the major reasons Israel did not ultimately feel it had to launch a ground operation into Gaza. In the absence of Iron Dome, the pressure in Israel – in response to casualties and damage – may well have pushed the government into such an operation, as occurred during Cast Lead.

Cast Lead and Pillar of Defense weren't propelled by an false friends of Israel. They were in response to growing terrorist threats.


Elder of Ziyon notes:

It has been over two months since the last rocket was launched from Gaza into Israel.
...
As far as I can tell, there has never been a two-month period without rockets into Israel since the first Qassam was shot into Israel in February 2002.

"Strategically dubious?"


Given the obvious falsity of his claim, Cohen loses any credibility to designate others to be friends of Israel or claim to be one himself.


2) The Hillary watchdogs


The Washington Post has a bewildering editorial, Hillary Clinton’s clarity on threats in North Africa. Why is it bewildering?

The outgoing secretary’s statements were particularly striking when compared with President Obama’s inaugural address Monday, which promised to end “a decade of war” in favor of nation-building at home, and with the White House’s current approach to Mali. France sent troops there this month to prevent jihadists linked to al-Qaeda who are entrenched in Mali’s northern deserts from taking over the rest of the country.

But as the Wall Street Journal reported Thursday, Mr. Obama and his advisers have taken a skeptical view of the need for U.S. involvement. French requests for air refueling and surveillance help are still on ice two weeks after being made; the administration grudgingly agreed to transport some French troops to the country but only after trying to stick Paris with the bill. The Journal reported that while the Pentagon has wanted to target the leaders of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which was involved in the Benghazi attack as well as last week’s assault on a gas field in Algeria, White House policymakers argue that the group doesn’t pose a direct threat to the United States.

For one thing, while the Post's editors clearly prefer Secretary Clinton's views to those of the White House, there's nothing more here than an implicit criticism of the President.


But there's a question here. If Secretary Clinton is at such odds with the President's foreign policy why did she serve the whole first term? This isn't some minor disagreement, but one about the fundamental direction of the country's foreign policy. Even if she's a loyal soldier, how could she have possibly represented the administration if she holds view so different from President Obama?


The editorial continues:

Ms. Clinton evidently doesn’t agree. “People say to me all the time, well, AQIM hasn’t attacked the United States,” she said. “Well, before 9/11, 2001, we hadn’t been attacked on our homeland since, I guess, the War of 1812 and Pearl Harbor. So you can’t say, well, because they haven’t done something they are not going to do it.”

The outgoing secretary’s point about U.S. leadership — and the results of its absence — doesn’t apply just to Mali. It is equally true of Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and other “unstable environments.” If Mr. Obama continues to eschew an active U.S. role in those places, or to retreat from one, there will be, as Ms. Clinton said, “consequences.”

There's some wisdom in these words, but is this what she truly believes? Talking tough is not the same thing as acting in accordance with those words. This brings us to the other puzzling aspect of the editorial. The editorial omits any mention of the Secretary's "What difference does it make?" (Not that she took that approach when the subject was Iraq during the Bush administration.) After explaining what difference the cause of the attack made, Barry Rubin observes:  

The Obama Administration wants to bury this analysis because it calls attention to the threat of revolutionary Islamism and, in the last case, to the negative aspects of its own Libya policy. Whether or not that initiative of overthrowing Libyan dictator Muammar Qadhafi was a good idea the fact remains that such a policy has costs. Whether or not unilateral actions and the use of force is a good idea or not in any specific case, standing aside and doing nothing while Americans were killed will also have its costs. Whether or not America has made mistakes in its past policies, apologies and concessions will only persuade the Islamists and a large sector of the local population that the United States is weak, can be defeated, and therefore attacks should be escalated.

Aside from the irrelevance of motive, the other point Clinton made was to emphasize that the most important thing was to punish those responsible. While that sounds impressive, virtually nothing has been done to achieve that goal. In general, of course, the problem is identifying and finding the terrorists, especially if they are located in a country which provides a safe haven to terrorists. The United States never effectively punished, for example, those who attacked the Marine barracks in Beirut in the 1980s.

It would appear that Secretary Clinton's tough talking was just words. Possibly she's trying to maintain her viability as a candidate in 2016. But the Washington Post took her empty words as promises of action. (Similarly, I heard Bob Schieffer previewing Face the Nation on the radio this morning, saying "She acquitted herself well.") Our tough watchdog media has apparently decided that boosting Hillary Clinton is its primary duty at this time.

Soccer Dad's Middle East Media Sampler, 1/16/13

Today's sampler and analysis of Mideast media content from my pal Soccer Dad:


MEMRI recently found a video of Mohammed Morsi referring to Jews as "descendants of apes and pigs." Apparently in response to a column in Forbes magazine, the New York Times has now reported, Morsi’s Slurs Against Jews Stir Concern. Towards the end of the article the reporter, David Kirkpatrick writes:

“These bloodsuckers who attack the Palestinians, these warmongers, the descendants of apes and pigs,” Mr. Morsi declared, using a slur for Jews that is familiar across the Muslim world. Although he referred repeatedly to “Zionists” and never explicitly to Jews, Mr. Morsi echoed historic anti-Semitic themes: “They have been fanning the flames of civil strife wherever they were throughout their history. They are hostile by nature.” Some analysts said the gap between Mr. Morsi’s caustic statements as a Brotherhood leader and his more pragmatic actions as president illustrated the many factors besides ideology that shape political decisions. “What you believe in your heart is not the same as what you do in power,” said Shadi Hamid, research director of the Brookings Doha Center. Whatever Mr. Morsi’s opinions about Jews, he has left Egypt’s foreign policy toward Israel largely unchanged, Mr. Hamid said. Mr. Morsi’s past statements may still raise questions about how he would act in the future if Egypt were not constrained by its financial dependence, relative military weakness and a network of Western alliances. But in contemporary Egyptian politics the gap between his past vitriol and his present comity may serve mainly as a tempting target for his opponents, Mr. Hamid said.

Though it's good that Kirkpatrick acknowledges that without explicitly mentioning Jews that Morsi's statement from three years ago  "echoed historic anti-Semitic themes," Kirkpatrick still refers to analysts who insist that Morsi is "pragmatic."

In May of last year, Kirkpatrick answered readers' questions about the upcoming Egyptian elections. One of his responses was:

Q. I have seen reports of virulent anti-Semitism and anti-Israel hate speech at rallies of presidential candidates. Could you please let us know about these activities which appear to be highly disturbing.

A. A concerned citizen in New York asks about campaign rally rhetoric about Israel and possible anti-Semitism. I have not seen or heard any slurs against Jews on the campaign trail, and I do not think that has figured in the campaign in any way. Israel is a more complicated issue. All the leading candidates have pledged to respect Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel. But Egyptians — secular and liberal or Islamist — are deeply hostile to Israel. The overwhelming feeling here is that Israel has failed to live up to its end of the Camp David accords leading to the peace treaty because it has not recognized a Palestinian state and instead allows settlements to continue on territory envisioned as part of that state. An episode last summer fired up the hard feelings anew because Israeli war planes killed a handful of Egyptian security officers inside the border when Israel was pursuing some suspected terrorists; Israeli officials initially refused to apologize and Egyptians stormed the Israeli embassy. But eventually Israel apologized, pledged an investigation and the situation calmed down.So most candidates have sought to balance their commitments to the peace (which is popular) and some criticism of Israel (which most here consider an enemy.)

It may be interesting to note which candidates are most hostile to Israel. Not the Islamists. Mohamed Morsi and Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh are relatively positive about the importance of the peace. By far the most hostile to Israel and even the treaty is Hamdeen Sabahi, a Nasserite socialist with support from Egypt’s secular-liberal and cultural elite.

In short, Kirkpatrick's response was that Egyptians are anti-Israel - and he explains why that hatred is understandable - but not antisemitic. He further explained that the Muslim Brotherhood isn't even the most anti-Israel party in Egypt.

In another question and answer session a few months later, Kirkpatrick responded to a question about Sayyid Qutb:

Q. I wish you had asked the following questions: 1. What is Morsi’s opinion of [Sayyid] Qutb’s writings and their role in defining the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. Does he reject Qutb’s assessment of the inherent conflict between the Muslim world and the cosmopolitan West or does he accept them?

2. Hamas in the Gaza Strip is an affiliate of the Muslim Brotherhood. Would Morsi criticize any moves Hamas has taken since gaining control of Gaza, such as harassing Western nongovernmental aid organizations, and even some Christian congregations?
3. Morsi attended graduate school in the United States for his Ph.D. in materials science, and yet has endorsed the 9/11 deniers’ belief that the World Trade Center towers collapse was due to explosives planted by parties other than the Al Qaeda terrorists. Indeed, Morsi has expressed skepticism that amateur pilots could have flown the planes into the towers. Does Morsi still believe this?

4. In his years in the U.S., Morsi undoubtedly was exposed to the First Amendment and the importance of free speech to Americans. Yet after the Cairo embassy attack, Morsi’s first reaction was to call for the American government to place the filmmakers of the “Innocence of Muslims” on trial. Why did Morsi demand this, and did he expect the U.S. government to comply? Thanks. — Philippe Byrnes | Albuquerque

A.I see you are following Egypt closely! And these are also questions that come up often.
Sayyid Qutb was a historically significant and widely influential midcentury Islamist thinker. And he was a part of the Brotherhood during the revolution that brought Gamal Abdel Nasser to power. But he is now best remembered for his most radical and militant ideas. Those ideas were always controversial within the Brotherhood, whose founder, Hassan el-Banna, emphasized inclusiveness. And the Brotherhood has disavowed militancy or violence since at least Nasser’s revolution in 1952.

But I find Qutb often looms larger in the West these days than he does in Egypt or the Middle East, because his later ideas became the foundation of a different, far more militant and antidemocratic strain of Islamist thinking that led to Al Qaeda. The Muslim Brotherhood has never endorsed terrorism or Al Qaeda. And when Al Qaeda took responsibility for the terrorist attack of Sept. 11, 2001, Mr. Morsi — then a leader of the Brotherhood’s political arm and its parliamentary minority — was quick to denounce it.
We tried briefly to ask Mr. Morsi about Hamas’s rule in Gaza, and, in a polite way, he told us it was a silly comparison. Egypt is a giant and far more diverse. It has an established Christian minority whose rights are at least written into the law, and it has a relatively strong tradition of respecting the rule of law, compared to some of its neighbors. But I regret that we did not get a chance to ask him exactly your question.

We did not ask Mr. Morsi about 9/11, but, despite his engineering degree in materials science, his aides tell me he does indeed question the official United States government account of what happened to the buildings.

I know that a lot of Egyptians question the official story but at the same time think the attacks were a horrendous crime. I suspect part of the explanation is that many Egyptians, probably including Mr. Morsi, deeply distrust the United States for some of the reasons that he tried to articulate. And I think another part of the explanation is that Egyptians have been lied to by their own government and its official media for at least 60 years (and the privately owned media is not so accurate either). I sometimes have to explain to Egyptians that The New York Times is not owned or controlled by the United States government.

Mr. Morsi’s first response to the attack on the United States Embassy here did condemn the violence. It is not true that he first called for legal actions against the makers of the video mocking the prophet.

But his reaction was more than a day late. The Muslim Brotherhood, which is allied with Mr. Morsi, had called for a nonviolent protest against the film in advance of the day the protest took place, and afterward it continued to call for criminalizing such films. And when Mr. Morsi and the Brotherhood both condemned the violence, their statements were mixed with criticism of the video. Many Egyptians seem to believe that it is possible to criminalize grave insults to established religions without intruding too much on freedom of expression — an idea utterly alien to the United States’ legal tradition. — David Kirkpatrick

Here Kirkpatrick clearly tried to draw the line between the Muslim Brotherhood and Al Qaeda, with the former being moderate or, at least, pragmatic. He does his best to defuse the questions rather than answer them. Despite presenting an equivocal image of Morsi after the fact, his reporting this week showed a willingness to acknowledge that the Muslim Brotherhood may not, in fact, be so moderate.

In a related editorial,President Morsi’s Repulsive Comments, the editors of the New York Times write:

That kind of pure bigotry is unacceptable anywhere, anytime. But it is even more offensive in public discourse, coming from someone who became the president of a major country. Mr. Morsi’s comments deserve to be condemned unequivocally, as the Obama administration did on Tuesday. Jay Carney, the president’s spokesman, said, “We completely reject these statements.” The problem goes deeper than just Mr. Morsi, however. The remarks were made at a time when anti-Israel sentiment was running high in Egypt and the region after the three-week Gaza conflict in 2009 between Israel and Hamas. The sad truth is that defaming Jews is an all too standard feature of Egyptian, and Arab, discourse; Israelis are not immune to responding in kind either. ... Does Mr. Morsi really believe what he said in 2010? Has becoming president made him think differently about the need to respect and work with all people? So far, there has been no official reaction.

First of all the reference to Israeli is gratuitous. There is no comparison between the mainstream antisemitism in Egypt or most Muslim societies and the fringe expressions of hatred in Israel. The condemnation of Morsi is welcome, but while decrying Morsi's comments as "an all too standard feature of Egyptian, and Arab, discourse," when the Times has covered the issue in its news section, it has been given to equivocation. In late 2011, Isabel Kershner wrote about Itamar Marcus's book on Palestinian incitement.

In one of the most egregious examples of Palestinian doublespeak, Yasir Arafat spoke in a mosque in South Africa in May 1994, only months after the signing of the Oslo accords, and called on the worshipers “to come and to fight and to start the jihad to liberate Jerusalem.” As the ambassador to Washington at the time, Mr. Rabinovich said he found himself in the awkward position of having to explain to anyone who would listen that jihad, usually translated as holy war, could also mean a spiritual struggle, in order to justify continuing the peace process. Still, he said, it is not by chance that those focusing on Palestinian incitement and publicizing it are “rightist groups who use it as ammunition.”

Instead of treating  incitement as a major issue, Kershner used the quote from Ambassador Rabinovich to make it sound as if the issue is partisan in nature.

Once the New York Times reported on Morsi's remarks, the White House responded with a condemnation. (via memeorandum) Elder of Ziyon comments:

I am looking forward to seeing the reaction in the Arabic media to this.  

In response to White House spokesman, Jay Carney's praise of Morsi for uphodling Camp David, Israel Matzav writes:

And therefore he's not an anti-Semite? 'Go convince Hamas to stop shooting rockets at Israel for a while and we'll give you 20 F-16 fighter jets that are better than any of the ones you have' makes Morsy not an anti-Semite?

This hasn't been a good week for Egypt's Islamist government. In an editorial this week the Washington Post condemned Egypt’s climate of intimidation:

Mr. Morsi’s office protests that it is not responsible for these investigations; it points out that the charges against Mr. Yousef, as well as some other journalists, were initiated by private lawyers, who are allowed to lodge complaints with prosecutors. But several of the cases originated with complaints from the president’s office. And the government has not hesitated to impose its agenda on state-run media, installing its own editors and yanking unsympathetic news hosts off the air.It has also tolerated — at least — a climate of intimidation. The offices of several independent television channels were besieged for weeks by supporters of a popular cleric. During demonstrations against Mr. Morsi’s government, his Muslim Brotherhood supporters took to the streets and were accused of targeting journalists; one was killed by a rubber bullet.While calling for preservation of democratic freedoms in Egypt, the Obama administration has been slow to take note of or respond to the attacks on journalists. Officials say they are feeling their way with Mr. Morsi’s government, trying to preserve cooperation on matters such as counterterrorism. Yet the United States retains considerable leverage over Egypt, including its influence over a pending International Monetary Fund loan the government badly needs. That sway should be aimed at preserving space for free media and a democratic opposition — which, in Cairo, is not just a liberal good but a vital U.S. interest.

This is much stronger than the New York Times editorial, which simply called on President Obama to give President Morsi a good talking to. The United States does have leverage, and the Post is correct to suggest that the American government should use it. This is why Morsi has been pragmatic so far. But if he knows that there are no consequences to his increasing authoritarianism, he certainly will not liberalize.

Soccer Dad's Mideast Media Sampler, 1/8/13

Today's sampler and analysis of Mideast media content from my pal Soccer Dad:

1) Friends don't let friends drive Chuck

What's driving the nomination of Senator Chuck Hagel to be Secretary of Defense? According to Roger Cohen of the New York Times, it shows Israel's True Friends? (Are the people in the accompanying picture an example of Israel's True Friends according to Cohen?) The article is mostly incoherent ignorance. For an example of Cohen's argument there's this paragraph:

Five years on, that needed dialogue has scarcely advanced. Self-styled “true friends” of Israel now lining up against the Hagel nomination are in fact true friends only of the Israeli right that pays no more than lip service to a two-state peace (when it even does that); scoffs at Palestinian national aspirations and culture; dismisses the significant West Bank reforms that have prepared Palestine for statehood; continues with settlement construction on the very shrinking land where a Palestinian state is envisaged (and was granted nonmember observer status at the United Nations last November by 138 votes to 9 with 41 abstentions, including Germany); cannot find a valid Palestinian interlocutor on the face of the earth despite the moderate reformist leadership of Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad; ignores the grave implications for Israel of its unsustainable, corrosive dominion over another people and the question of how Israel can remain Jewish and democratic without a two-state solution (it cannot); bays for war with Iran despite the contrary opinions of many of Israel’s intelligence and military leaders; and propels Israel into repetitive miniwars of dubious strategic value.

Cohen writes of "reforms that have prepared Palestine for statehood," but this week Fayyad complained that Arab countries are not meeting their pledges to the Palestinian Authority. An entity prepared for statehood wouldn't require donations to function. Abbas, as anyone familiar with the Middle East knows, is no reformer, but an out-of-touch autocrat mostly interested in perpetuating his own rule. Since Israel withdrew from most of the West Bank in 1995 and all of Gaza ten years later Again, anyone paying attention also understands that no Israeli politician is "baying" for war with Iran, but rather pleading for tough sanctions that will prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear threat. As far as the "miniwars" that Cohen decries, they have little to do with Israel's supporters, but are the result of terrorist organizations using Israeli concessions to threaten Israeli citizens. Israel's supporters defend Israel's right to defend itself; a right that Cohen apparently feels is "dubious."

It's amazing how much ignorance Cohen packed into a single paragraph.

A New York Times editorial, Nominations for Defense and the C.I.A. assesses the Hagel nominations:

While a member of the Senate from Nebraska in 1998, Mr. Hagel criticized the nomination of James Hormel to be ambassador to Luxembourg because he was “openly, aggressively gay.” That was a repugnant reason to oppose anyone for public office. Last month, Mr. Hagel issued a statement in which he described his comments 14 years ago as “insensitive,” apologized to Mr. Hormel and insisted he was “fully supportive of ‘open service’ and committed to L.G.B.T. military families.” Some leading foreign policy professionals who are gay, including Mr. Hormel, have since said they could support Mr. Hagel’s candidacy. Still, it will be important to hear Mr. Hagel explain at his confirmation hearing how his views have changed and how he plans to make sure that all service members are treated equally and receive the same benefits regardless of sexual orientation. It would also help if he acknowledged that his past comments were not just insensitive but abhorrent. ... Mr. Hagel’s independence and willingness to challenge Republican orthodoxy on Iraq, sanctions on Iran and other issues — both in the Senate and later as an administration adviser — have so alarmed neocons, hard-line pro-Israel interest groups and some Republican senators that they unleashed a dishonest campaign to pre-emptively bury the nomination. It failed, but the confirmation process could be bruising. The opponents are worried that Mr. Hagel will not be sufficiently in lock step with the current Israeli government and cannot be counted on to go to war against Iran over its nuclear program if it comes to that.

Note what the priority of the New York Times is. That Hagel of the correct view of alternative lifestyles. But because Hagel has apologized, he's okay now. What about his more numerous noxious comments about Israel? That doesn't bother the editorial writers at the Times as they excuse him for not being in "lockstep" with the current Israeli government. Whew! At least he'll be American official not an Israeli one. Hagel's comments about Israel aren't offensive to the editors of the New York Times because they agree with them!

Alana Goodman does a good job of summarizing Hagel's (in)actions that were anti-Israel. (Since these actions also were in regard to anti-American elements, they also could be construed as anti-American.) Of course, Goodman didn't summarize the actions; she was just copying a statement from the NJDC, which now supports Hagel! My father pointed out that she missed a significant point of the NJDC's hypocrisy. The NJDC statement from 2007 ended with:

And here's what the anti-Israel group, CAIR wrote in praise of Hagel:

"Potential presidential candidates for 2008, like Hillary Clinton, John McCain, Joe Biden and Newt Gingrich, were falling all over themselves to express their support for Israel. The only exception to that rule was Senator Chuck Hagel …” [Council on American-Islamic Relations, 8/28/06]

CAIR is anti-Israel and it praised Hagel for that exact quality! How again is it that Hagel is a "true friend" of Israel?

2) "Occupation" is a relative term

Dore Gold writes in European settlements and double standards:

Yet in the case of Northern Cyprus, the U.N. did not qualify its demand for a Turkish withdrawal by allowing, for example, the Turkish military to remain in even part of the island. Looking at these different considerations, it appeared that the international community should have judged the dispute over Northern Cyprus far more severely than the way it viewed the dispute over the West Bank, where Israel had multiple rights that it could exercise if it decided to do so. However, in practice, that was not the case. As usual, on Dec. 10, the European Union declared yet again that it was "deeply dismayed by and strongly opposes Israeli plans to expand settlements in the West Bank, including in east Jerusalem." Its statement made wild charges that Israeli construction in E1 "could also entail forced transfer of civilian population." It finally added that "the European Union reiterates that settlements are illegal under international law and constitute an obstacle to peace." Ironically, while the EU releases harsh statements of this sort against Israel for any construction activity in West Bank settlements, it has nothing to say about tens of thousands of Turkish settlers that have moved into Northern Cyprus.

Eugene Kontorovich argues that there could be a practical benefit for Israel stemming from this hypocrisy:

Discussions of a potential ICC referral often focus on potential liability by Palestinians as a factor that would dissuade them (or the Court) from proceeding. But Israel’s best bet for heading off such a suit would be to advertise the implications for other non-member states that would clearly be on the settlement hook: Turkey and Russia. For the record, I think it quite unlikely that the ICC will indict Israeli leaders over settlements, but I’d bet the farm it wouldn’t indict Israel and Turkish leaders in this decade. Indeed, if I were the Israeli government, I’d spend less time preparing an ICC defense that working up a Cypriot case against Turkey, as a favor to its new bestie. By the way, the Europeans who are “settling” N. Cyprus do not themselves violate the Geneva Conventions, because i) only the “occupying power” can violate it, and ii) it only prohibits “transfer” of “nationals of the occupying power.” Assuming the Europeans are not Turkish citizens, they can’t be settlers. Similarly, American Jews who move to, say East Jerusalem as American citizens cannot be said to be “settlers,” though popular usage may vary.

This is just one more example of how ignorance and misinformation color the way many look at the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Soccer Dad's Mideast Media Roundup, 1/7/13

Today's sampler and analysis of Mideast media content from my pal Soccer Dad:

 1) An intellectually honest editorial


Daled Amos and Israel Matzav linked to a Washington Post editorial, Overheated rhetoric on Israeli settlements:

Overall, the vast majority of the nearly 500,000 settlers in Jerusalem and the West Bank live in areas close to Israel’s 1967 borders. Data compiled by the S. Daniel Abraham Center for Middle East Peace show that more than 80 percent of them could be included in Israel if the country annexed just more than 4 percent of the West Bank — less than the 5 percent proposed by President Bill Clinton 12 years ago. Diplomats were most concerned by Mr. Netanyahu’s decision to allow planning and zoning — but not yet construction — in a four-mile strip of territory known as E-1 that lies between Jerusalem and Ma’ale Adumim, a settlement with a population of more than 40,000. Palestinians claim that Israeli annexation of the land would cut off their would-be capital in East Jerusalem from the West Bank and block a key north-south route between West Bank towns. Israel wants the land for similar reasons, to prevent Ma’ale Adumim — which will almost certainly be annexed to Israel in any peace deal — from being isolated. Both sides insist that the other can make do with a road corridor. This is a difficult issue that should be settled at the negotiating table, not by fiat. But Mr. Netanyahu’s zoning approval is hardly the “almost fatal blow” to a two-state solution that U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon described.

I won't pretend to agree with some of the criticism of Israel in the editorial, but this is a very important point. Nothing Israel is doing endangers the peace process.


In praising this editorial, Barry Rubin explains two ways in which the settlement blame game is wrong:  

First: the day after the Israel-PLO agreement was signed in 1993, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin made it clear that Israel’s interpretation was that it permitted continued construction on existing settlements. The Palestinian Authority did not object, and that policy did not prevent it from negotiating over the next seven years.
Misrepresentations — deliberately? — often make people think that Israel is establishing new settlements or expanding the size of existing ones. Both claims are untrue.
Second: if the Palestinian side wants an end to settlements, that should be an incentive for reaching a peace agreement faster and thus getting rid of all settlements on the territory of the new state of Palestine. Notice that Israel — under Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, no less — demolished all of the settlements in the Gaza Strip as, among other things, a sign of what could be gained by a peace deal.
Yet the Palestinian side has been in no hurry to make a deal. In theory, when it complains about settlements, the response should be: “So why don’t you compromise for peace and get rid of them, rather than having them become ‘larger?’”

This is important. It means that those who complain that settlements are destroying the peace process are really the ones who are preventing peace. They are providing cover for the Palestinians, who refuse to negotiate in good faith with Israel. If Abbas knew that elite world opinion thought he was the obstructionist, he might be inclined to negotiate. Since he knows that the "settlements" excuse exists he can drag his feet, feigning outrage and pay no price - diplomatic or political - for his obstinacy and get Israel blamed in the bargain, he has no incentive to negotiate.


The editorial is extraordinary for another reason. Shortly after Binyamin Netanyahu formed a new government in 2009, The Washington Post ran an editorial, Israel's new Government and Palestinian Statehood, that concluded:

The problem with that course is that it could deliver a fatal blow to the two-state solution, which most Israelis recognize as the only way to preserve a democratic Jewish state. As outgoing Prime Minister Ehud Olmert understood, the time for that solution may be running out. It is vital that the United States and European governments insist on Israeli acceptance of it -- just as they have done with Palestinian governments -- and that they publicly oppose actions that could undermine it, such as settlement expansion. If that creates tension between the United States and Israel in the short run, the result may be productive. Israelis -- starting with Mr. Netanyahu -- need to get the message that acceptance of a two-state solution has become a prerequisite for normal relations with the United States.  

Four years ago the Washington Post viewed the newly elected Prime Minister Netanyahu the primary obstacle to peace in the Middle East. What's changed?


A few months later, a member of the of the editorial board (and former Jerusalem correspondent for the paper) Jackson Diehl wrote Abbas's waiting game on peace with Israel:

Yet on Wednesday afternoon, as he prepared for the White House meeting in a suite at the Ritz-Carlton in Pentagon City, Abbas insisted that his only role was to wait. He will wait for Hamas to capitulate to his demand that any Palestinian unity government recognize Israel and swear off violence. And he will wait for the Obama administration to force a recalcitrant Netanyahu to freeze Israeli settlement construction and publicly accept the two-state formula.
...
What's interesting about Abbas's hardline position, however, is what it says about the message that Obama's first Middle East steps have sent to Palestinians and Arab governments. From its first days the Bush administration made it clear that the onus for change in the Middle East was on the Palestinians: Until they put an end to terrorism, established a democratic government and accepted the basic parameters for a settlement, the United States was not going to expect major concessions from Israel.
Obama, in contrast, has repeatedly and publicly stressed the need for a West Bank settlement freeze, with no exceptions. In so doing he has shifted the focus to Israel. He has revived a long-dormant Palestinian fantasy: that the United States will simply force Israel to make critical concessions, whether or not its democratic government agrees, while Arabs passively watch and applaud. "The Americans are the leaders of the world," Abbas told me and Post Editorial Page Editor Fred Hiatt. "They can use their weight with anyone around the world. Two years ago they used their weight on us. Now they should tell the Israelis, 'You have to comply with the conditions.' "  

Last year, in Mahmoud Abbas's unhappy anniversary, Diehl wrote:

Abbas’s defenders will claim that Netanyahu’s right-wing government, and the Obama administration’s inability to influence it, left him with few options. That’s a canard. In fact, Abbas has never seriously tested the Israeli leader. He could have done that by fully committing to the negotiations the Obama administration tried to organize or to those sponsored by Jordan’s King Abdullah this year. That would have forced Netanyahu to reveal his terms for Palestinian statehood — and brought real pressure to bear on him if they were unreasonable.

Instead, Abbas has repeatedly backed away from serious diplomacy, citing as an excuse Israeli settlement construction in Jerusalem and the West Bank — something that did not stop him from participating in negotiations with previous Israeli governments. He embarked on his unity-U.N.-intifada strategy on the premise that it would bring about Palestinian statehood without the need for negotiations with Netanyahu.
And, not for the first time, Mahmoud Abbas succeeded only in delaying Palestinian statehood — and weakening his own cause.

I believe that Jackson Diehl was the mover behind last week's editorial, as he was watched Mahmoud Abbas closely over the past four years. This is the way journalism should work. opinions and reporting should be based on observations not unsupported allegations. As the editors of the New York Times becomes even more unhinged when discussing Israel, it's encouraging that another important paper can discuss Israel soberly.


Postscript: On Twitter two of those to criticize the editorial were M. J. Rosenberg and Lara Friedman. Rosenberg a known anti-Zionist accused editorial page editor (and Diehl's boss) Fred Hiatt of being an "Israel firster." Friedman a leader of the supposedly pro-Israel group, Americans for Peace Now, cited anti-Zionist Matt Duss. See item #2 below.


2) Zealots, the truth and polls


Recently, a campaign to support the flagging nomination of Sen. Chuck Hagel as Secretary of Defense began. Part of that campaign were two op-eds in the New York Times casting opponents of Hagel as extremists. One by longtime political correspondent James Besser asserted:

There is also a lesson here for American Jewish leaders, who increasingly tremble in the face of a small minority of zealots, whose vision of Israel’s future diverges from that of the majority of American Jews and clashes with core American values of freedom and democracy.

The other by regular columnist Thomas Friedman argued:

The only thing standing between Israel and national suicide any more is America and its willingness to tell Israel the truth. But most U.S. senators, policy makers and Jews prefer to stick their heads in the sand, because confronting Israel is so unpleasant and politically dangerous.

In different ways both argued that mainstream support for Israel is driven by fanatics who are divorced from reality and that support for Hagel, came from thoughtful people free from ideological blinders. It's interesting to revisit these arguments in light of a recent poll of American views towards the Middle East. (via Daily Alert)

There continue to be stark partisan differences in Middle East sympathies. Conservative Republicans maintain strong support for Israel with fully 75% saying they sympathize with Israel compared with just 2% who sympathize with the Palestinians. By contrast, liberal Democrats are much more divided: 33% sympathize more with Israel, 22% with the Palestinians. Independents sympathize more with Israel by a 47% to 13% margin.

There were two other categories, but the only group that didn't have a preference for Israel over the Palestinians by at least 3 to 1 was those self-identified as "liberal Democrats."


Friedman and Besser comfortably fit in the liberal Democrat, the least pro-Israel, grouping. Each, in his own way, from that perspective, accuses the mainstream pro-Israel organizations of being out of touch and in agreement with extremists.


I pointed this out to Barry Rubin who summarized the phenomenon like this:

Option 1: Israel is at fault for losing the Obama cult crowd and a small but vocal increasingly left-wing sector of Americans (many of whom aren’t that thrilled with the United States either).

Option 2: Given an increasingly left-wing ideology that’s based on faulty assumptions and neglects the dangerous radicalism of Islamist forces and other enemies of America, it is the dominant worldview in the mass media, academia, and ruling circles in America that is to blame for turning away from Israel.

Understand this well: Option 1 requires Israel to change; Option 2 requires the people voicing such complaints about Israel to change. Well, these people don’t want to examine their assumptions and change their views. They’d end up suffering for their support of Israel, they’d be out of step with the mob; they might have to—shudder!—step away from what’s popular and “in.” My goodness, they might even have to question Obama’s brilliance and policies! No contest. So it’s not surprising that Option 1 wins out. Hey, do what you have to do to avoid admitting your wrong and paying some price for telling the truth. But don’t blame us.

When J-Street was founded, its supporters claimed that it represented the true consensus of pro-Israel Americans. More specifically they claimed that there needed to be an alternative to AIPAC, which was too "right wing." Now, more than four years later, AIPAC is still the main pro-Israel lobby and J-Street remains marginal. The market for J-Street's pro-Israel views is rather limited.


If groups claiming to be "pro-peace" don't have much traction in the pro-Israel community, who are their allies?


This leads to another phenomenon. Last week, Haviv Rettig Gur wrote How the Hagel nomination battle became a fight over the Israel lobby. Part of Gur's argument is:

And opposition has even come from gay rights groups, including the Human Rights Campaign. Though Hagel has apologized for comments made in the 1990s that seemed to denigrate gays, the criticism has continued from some quarters of the gay rights movement, especially on the right. In the latest critique, published in a full-page ad in the New York Times on Thursday, the pro-gay rights Republican group Log Cabin Republicans urged supporters to “tell President Obama that Chuck Hagel is wrong for Defense Secretary” and expressed support for “a stronger and more inclusive Republican Party.”

Hagel’s supporters have responded vigorously to the agitation of the Israel lobby, and in the process perhaps sought to crowd out opposition to Hagel that can’t be as easily dismissed as illegitimate and – Zbigniew Brzezinski said it outright – disloyal.

What's shocking isn't that there is strong support for Israel in America, but that a significant minority of the political elite are willing to disparage this support in such crude terms.


While Besser or Friedman might claim that they are pro-Israel or looking out for Israel's best interests, what's undeniable is that they find themselves closer to those who would suggest that Israel's supporters are guilty of dual loyalty than to mainstream pro-Israel opinion. They don't realize how far they have migrated.


Richard Baehr has related thoughts about American public opinion regarding Israel.


3) The "realist" paradox


Jackson Diehl, in an essay today, The Middle East Morass writes:

In Washington, some of the loudest calls for Obama’s reengagement come from the “realist” foreign policy camp, populated by figures such as former national security advisers Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft — and former senator Chuck Hagel, whom Obama is considering for defense secretary. These folks opposed the war in Iraq, and they reject U.S. intervention in Syria or military action against Iran’s nuclear program. They have been arguing for years that it is time for the United States to recognize limits to its power.

When it comes to Israel, however, the realists assume boundless U.S. strength. If only he chooses to do so, they argue, Obama could join with U.S. allies or the U.N Security Council in imposing a two-state solution on the Israelis and Palestinians, like it or not. The supposition seems to be that a United States too weak to force Bashar al-Assad out of Syria can compel Israel’s advanced democracy and the leaderless Palestinians to accept compromises they have resisted for decades.

I don't buy everything in this essay. I'm not convinced of the good intentions of Brent Scowcroft or Zbigniew Brzezinski. However this is an important point.


Instapundit points to a paradox in Senator Hagel's expected nomination.