Immanuel Kant’s Rights Theories

Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804) examined the idea of human rights within
politics in such a way that it “is only a legitimate government that
guarantees our natural right to freedom, and from this freedom we derive
other rights”. From this basis it can be assumed that Kant looks at the
development, creation and implementation of rights as primarily
dependent on the state and how the government within the state functions.
Furthermore, Kant stresses that a society can only function politically in
relation to the state if fundamental rights, laws and entitlements are given
and enhanced by the state. As Kant teaches, these “righteous laws” are
founded upon 3 rational principles:
1. The liberty of every member of the society as a man
2. The equality of every member of the society with every other, as a
subject
3. The independence of every member of the commonwealth as a citizen.

Kant’s Ethics
It is rare for a philosopher in any era to make a significant impact on any single topic in philosophy. For a
philosopher to impact as many different areas as Kant did is extraordinary. His ethical theory has been as
influential as, if not more influential than, his work in epistemology and metaphysics. Most of Kant’s work on
ethics is presented in two works. The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) is Kant’s “search for and
establishment of the supreme principle of morality.” In The Critique of Practical Reason (1787) Kant attempts to
unify his account of practical reason with his work in the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant is the primary proponent
in history of what is called deontological ethics. Deontology is the study of duty. On Kant’s view, the sole feature
that gives an action moral worth is not the outcome that is achieved by the action, but the motive that is behind
the action. The categorical imperative is Kant’s famous statement of this duty: “Act only according to that maxim
by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.”
a. Reason and Freedom
For Kant, as we have seen, the drive for total, systematic knowledge in reason can only be fulfilled with
assumptions that empirical observation cannot support. The metaphysical facts about the ultimate nature of
things in themselves must remain a mystery to us because of the spatiotemporal constraints on sensibility. When
we think about the nature of things in themselves or the ultimate ground of the empirical world, Kant has argued
that we are still constrained to think through the categories, we cannot think otherwise, but we can have no
knowledge because sensation provides our concepts with no content. So, reason is put at odds with itself
because it is constrained by the limits of its transcendental structure, but it seeks to have complete knowledge
that would take it beyond those limits.

Freedom plays a central role in Kant’s ethics because the possibility of moral judgments presupposes it. Freedom
is an idea of reason that serves an indispensable practical function. Without the assumption of freedom, reason
cannot act. If we think of ourselves as completely causally determined, and not as uncaused causes ourselves,
then any attempt to conceive of a rule that prescribes the means by which some end can be achieved is pointless.
I cannot both think of myself as entirely subject to causal law and as being able to act according to the conception
of a principle that gives guidance to my will. We cannot help but think of our actions as the result of an uncaused
cause if we are to act at all and employ reason to accomplish ends and understand the world.
So reason has an unavoidable interest in thinking of itself as free. That is, theoretical reason cannot demonstrate
freedom, but practical reason must assume it for the purpose of action. Having the ability to make judgments and
apply reason puts us outside that system of causally necessitated events. “Reason creates for itself the idea of a
spontaneity that can, on its own, start to act–without, i.e., needing to be preceded by another cause by means of
which it is determined to action in turn, according to the law of causal connection,” Kant says. (A 533/B 561) In its
intellectual domain, reason must think of itself as free.
It is dissatisfying that he cannot demonstrate freedom; nevertheless, it comes as no surprise that we must think
of ourselves as free. In a sense, Kant is agreeing with the common sense view that how I choose to act makes a
difference in how I actually act. Even if it were possible to give a predictive empirical account of why I act as I do,
say on the grounds of a functionalist psychological theory, those considerations would mean nothing to me in my
deliberations. When I make a decision about what to do, about which car to buy, for instance, the mechanism at
work in my nervous system makes no difference to me. I still have to peruse Consumer Reports, consider my
options, reflect on my needs, and decide on the basis of the application of general principles. My first person
perspective is unavoidable, hence the deliberative, intellectual process of choice is unavoidable.
b. The Duality of the Human Situation
The question of moral action is not an issue for two classes of beings, according to Kant. The animal
consciousness, the purely sensuous being, is entirely subject to causal determination. It is part of the causal
chains of the empirical world, but not an originator of causes the way humans are. Hence, rightness or wrongness,
as concepts that apply to situations one has control over, do not apply. We do not morally fault the lion for killing
the gazelle, or even for killing its own young. The actions of a purely rational being, by contrast, are in perfect
accord with moral principles, Kant says. There is nothing in such a being’s nature to make it falter. Its will always
conforms with the dictates of reason. Humans are between the two worlds. We are both sensible and intellectual,
as was pointed out in the discussion of the first Critique. We are neither wholly determined to act by natural
impulse, nor are we free of non-rational impulse. Hence we need rules of conduct. We need, and reason is
compelled to provide, a principle that declares how we ought to act when it is in our power to choose
Since we find ourselves in the situation of possessing reason, being able to act according to our own conception
of rules, there is a special burden on us. Other creatures are acted upon by the world. But having the ability to
choose the principle to guide our actions makes us actors. We must exercise our will and our reason to act. Will is
the capacity to act according to the principles provided by reason. Reason assumes freedom and conceives of
principles of action in order to function.
Two problems face us however. First, we are not wholly rational beings, so we are liable to succumb to our non-
rational impulses. Second, even when we exercise our reason fully, we often cannot know which action is the
best. The fact that we can choose between alternate courses of actions (we are not determined to act by instinct
or reason) introduces the possibility that there can be better or worse ways of achieving our ends and better or
worse ends, depending upon the criteria we adopt. The presence of two different kinds of object in the world
adds another dimension, a moral dimension, to our deliberations. Roughly speaking, we can divide the world into
beings with reason and will like ourselves and things that lack those faculties. We can think of these classes of
things as ends-in-themselves and mere means-to-ends, respectively. Ends-in-themselves are autonomous beings
with their own agendas; failing to recognize their capacity to determine their own actions would be to thwart
their freedom and undermine reason itself. When we reflect on alternative courses of action, means-to-ends,
things like buildings, rocks, and trees, deserve no special status in our deliberations about what goals we should
have and what means we use to achieve them. The class of ends-in-themselves, reasoning agents like ourselves,
however, do have a special status in our considerations about what goals we should have and the means we
employ to accomplish them. Moral actions, for Kant, are actions where reason leads, rather than follows, and
actions where we must take other beings that act according to their own conception of the law into account.
c. The Good Will
The will, Kant says, is the faculty of acting according to a conception of law. When we act, whether or not we
achieve what we intend with our actions is often beyond our control, so the morality of our actions does not
depend upon their outcome. What we can control, however, is the will behind the action. That is, we can will to
act according to one law rather than another. The morality of an action, therefore, must be assessed in terms of
the motivation behind it. If two people, Smith and Jones, perform the same act, from the same conception of the
law, but events beyond Smith’s control prevent her from achieving her goal, Smith is not less praiseworthy for
not succeeding. We must consider them on equal moral ground in terms of the will behind their actions.

The only thing that is good without qualification is the good will, Kant says. All other candidates for an intrinsic
good have problems, Kant argues. Courage, health, and wealth can all be used for ill purposes, Kant argues, and
therefore cannot be intrinsically good. Happiness is not intrinsically good because even being worthy of
happiness, Kant says, requires that one possess a good will. The good will is the only unconditional good despite
all encroachments. Misfortune may render someone incapable of achieving her goals, for instance, but the
goodness of her will remains.

Goodness cannot arise from acting on impulse or natural inclination, even if impulse coincides with duty. It can
only arise from conceiving of one’s actions in a certain way. A shopkeeper, Kant says, might do what is in accord
with duty and not overcharge a child. Kant argues, “it is not sufficient to do that which should be morally good
that it conform to the law; it must be done for the sake of the law.” (Foundations of the Metaphysics of
Morals, Akademie pagination 390) There is a clear moral difference between the shopkeeper that does it for his
own advantage to keep from offending other customers and the shopkeeper who does it from duty and the
principle of honesty.(Ibid., 398) Likewise, in another of Kant’s carefully studied examples, the kind act of the
person who overcomes a natural lack of sympathy for other people out of respect for duty has moral worth,
whereas the same kind act of the person who naturally takes pleasure in spreading joy does not. A person’s moral
worth cannot be dependent upon what nature endowed them with accidentally. The selfishly motivated
shopkeeper and the naturally kind person both act on equally subjective and accidental grounds. What matters to
morality is that the actor think about their actions in the right manner.
We might be tempted to think that the motivation that makes an action good is having a positive goal–to make
people happy, or to provide some benefit. But that is not the right sort of motive, Kant says. No outcome, should
we achieve it, can be unconditionally good. Fortune can be misused, what we thought would induce benefit
might actually bring harm, and happiness might be undeserved. Hoping to achieve some particular end, no
matter how beneficial it may seem, is not purely and unconditionally good. It is not the effect or even the
intended effect that bestows moral character on an action. All intended effects “could be brought about through
other causes and would not require the will of a rational being, while the highest and unconditional good can be
found only in such a will.” (Ibid., 401) It is the possession of a rationally guided will that adds a moral dimension
to one’s acts. So it is the recognition and appreciation of duty itself that must drive our actions.
d. Duty
What is the duty that is to motivate our actions and to give them moral value? Kant distinguishes two kinds of law
produced by reason. Given some end we wish to achieve, reason can provide a hypothetical imperative, or rule of
action for achieving that end. A hypothetical imperative says that if you wish to buy a new car, then you must
determine what sort of cars are available for purchase. Conceiving of a means to achieve some desired end is by
far the most common employment of reason. But Kant has shown that the acceptable conception of the moral
law cannot be merely hypothetical. Our actions cannot be moral on the ground of some conditional purpose or
goal. Morality requires an unconditional statement of one’s duty.
And in fact, reason produces an absolute statement of moral action. The moral imperative is unconditional; that
is, its imperative force is not tempered by the conditional “if I want to achieve some end, then do X.” It simply
states, do X. Kant believes that reason dictates a categorical imperative for moral action. He gives at least three
formulations of the Categorical Imperative.
1. “Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a
universal law.” (Ibid., 422)
2. “Act as though the maxim of your action were by your will to become a universal law of nature.” (Ibid)
3. Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and
never as a means only.” (Ibid., 429)
What are Kant’s arguments for the Categorical Imperative? First, consider an example. Consider the person who
needs to borrow money and is considering making a false promise to pay it back. The maxim that could be
invoked is, “when I need of money, borrow it, promising to repay it, even though I do not intend to.” But when
we apply the universality test to this maxim it becomes clear that if everyone were to act in this fashion, the
institution of promising itself would be undermined. The borrower makes a promise, willing that there be no such
thing as promises. Thus such an action fails the universality test.

The argument for the first formulation of the categorical imperative can be thought of this way. We have seen
that in order to be good, we must remove inclination and the consideration of any particular goal from our
motivation to act. The act cannot be good if it arises from subjective impulse. Nor can it be good because it seeks
after some particular goal which might not attain the good we seek or could come about through happenstance.
We must abstract away from all hoped for effects. If we remove all subjectivity and particularity from motivation
we are only left with will to universality. The question “what rule determines what I ought to do in this situation?”
becomes “what rule ought to universally guide action?” What we must do in any situation of moral choice is act
according to a maxim that we would will everyone to act according to.

The second version of the Categorical Imperative invokes Kant’s conception of nature and draws on the
first Critique. In the earlier discussion of nature, we saw that the mind necessarily structures nature. And reason,
in its seeking of ever higher grounds of explanation, strives to achieve unified knowledge of nature. A guide for us
in moral matters is to think of what would not be possible to will universally. Maxims that fail the test of the
categorical imperative generate a contradiction. Laws of nature cannot be contradictory. So if a maxim cannot be
willed to be a law of nature, it is not moral.
The third version of the categorical imperative ties Kant’s whole moral theory together. Insofar as they possess a
rational will, people are set off in the natural order of things. They are not merely subject to the forces that act
upon them; they are not merely means to ends. They are ends in themselves. All means to an end have a merely
conditional worth because they are valuable only for achieving something else. The possessor of a rational will,
 however, is the only thing with unconditional worth. The possession of rationality puts all beings on the same
footing, “every other rational being thinks of his existence by means of the same rational ground which holds also
for myself; thus it is at the same time an objective principle from which, as a supreme practical ground, it must be
possible to derive all laws of the will.” (Ibid., 429)N

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