

Joint Publication 3-05.1



Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations



26 April 2007



PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides joint doctrine for organizing, planning, preparing, and executing joint special operations task force (JSOTF) operations to include targeting and mission planning. It also provides guidance for establishing command relationships normally associated with a JSOTF or theater special operations command.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, and the Services.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the

United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Walter L. Sharp". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, prominent initial "W".

WALTER L. SHARP
Lieutenant General, USA
Director, Joint Staff

SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-05.1
DATED 1 DECEMBER 2001

- **Consolidates Joint Publication (JP) 3-05.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations*, and JP 3-05.2, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning***
- **Updates special operations (SO) joint doctrine**
- **Reflects the change from SO missions and collateral activities to core tasks**
- **Reflects the inclusion of special operations forces and conventional forces integration**
- **Updates a joint special operations task force (JSOTF) headquarters organization and responsibilities**
- **Clarifies JSOTF command and control relationships**
- **Includes an expanded discussion of SO targeting and mission planning**
- **Reflects current joint doctrine as pertains to contingency and crisis action planning**
- **Updates joint doctrine that pertains to JSOTF planning, operations, intelligence, logistics, and communications**
- **Deletes the chapter on training, exercises, and assessments**
- **Adds a chapter on information management**

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	xi
CHAPTER I	
DOCTRINAL OVERVIEW OF JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS	
• Special Operations Forces	I-1
• Special Operations	I-1
• United States Special Operations Command	I-1
• Joint Special Operations	I-2
• Special Operations Forces Shape Environment and Set Conditions	I-3
• Integration of Special Operations Forces and Conventional Forces	I-4
CHAPTER II	
JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION	
• General	II-1
• Authority to Establish a Joint Special Operations Task Force	II-1
• Establishing a Joint Special Operations Task Force	II-2
• Organizing a Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters	II-3
• Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters Staff Functions and Responsibilities	II-6
• Boards, Centers, and Cells	II-28
• Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters Staff Checklists	II-28
• Notional Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters Standing Operating Procedure Outline	II-28
CHAPTER III	
COMMAND AND CONTROL	
• General	III-1
• Command Relationships	III-2
• Joint Special Operations Task Force Command and Control Considerations	III-2
• Joint Special Operations Task Force Command and Control of Assigned Forces	III-3
• Special Operations Forces and Conventional Forces Integration	III-7
• Logistic Support Relationships	III-16
• Interagency Coordination Considerations	III-17
• Multinational Command and Control Considerations	III-18

CHAPTER IV
PLANNING

- General IV-1
- Joint Special Operations Planning Considerations IV-1
- Special Operations Integration into Joint Planning and Targeting IV-5
- Special Operations Contingency Planning and Targeting IV-15
- Special Operations Crisis Action Mission Planning and Targeting IV-22

CHAPTER V
OPERATIONS

- General V-1
- Joint Operations Center V-1
- Operational Rehearsals V-2
- Mission Execution V-4
- Information Operations V-4
- Joint Fires V-5
- Combat Identification V-9
- Types of Operational Support Available to a Joint Special Operations Task Force V-10
- Force Protection V-11
- Operations Messages V-13

CHAPTER VI
INTELLIGENCE

- General VI-1
- National Level Intelligence Support VI-1
- Theater Level Intelligence Support VI-3
- Joint Force Commander-Level Intelligence Support VI-4
- Joint Special Operations Task Force Joint Intelligence Support Element VI-6
- Joint Special Operations Task Force Intelligence Operations Relative to the Intelligence Process VI-8
- Counterintelligence VI-12
- Intelligence Support to the Targeting and Mission Planning Process VI-13
- Multinational Intelligence Operations VI-15

CHAPTER VII
LOGISTIC SUPPORT

- General VII-1
- Logistic Functions VII-1
- Joint Special Operations Task Force Logistics Readiness Center VII-3
- Logistic Support VII-3
- Logistic Planning Considerations VII-6

- United States Special Operations Command Support to Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters and Components VII-6
- Base Operating Support VII-12
- Health Service Support VII-13
- Host-Nation Support VII-17
- Contracting Support VII-18
- Environmental Considerations VII-21

CHAPTER VIII
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM SUPPORT

- General VIII-1
- Fundamental Tenets of Special Operations Communications System VIII-2
- Joint Force Commander Responsibilities VIII-3
- Commander, Joint Special Operations Task Force Responsibilities VIII-3
- Joint Network Operations Control Center VIII-5
- Communications System Planning Considerations VIII-8
- Joint Special Operations Task Force Baseline Communications System Interface VIII-10
- Joint Special Operations Task Force Component Baseline Communications System Interface VIII-10
- Intelligence Communications VIII-14
- Multinational Communications Systems Standardization and Procedures VIII-18
- Global Command and Control System VIII-18

CHAPTER IX
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

- General IX-1
- Information Management Organization IX-1
- Information Sharing IX-1
- Collaboration IX-2
- Force Tracking IX-3
- Focal Point Security Challenges IX-4

APPENDIX

- A Psychological Operations in Support of Special Operations A-1
- B Civil Affairs in Support of Special Operations B-1
- C Joint Special Operations Task Force Liaison Personnel Procedures C-1
- D Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters Staff Checklists D-1
- E Notional Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters Standing Operating Procedure Outline E-1
- F Target Analysis Methodology F-1
- G Special Operations Intelligence Requirements: Missions G-1

H	Special Operations Intelligence Requirements: Insertion and Extraction	H-1
J	Special Operations Mission Planning Folder Formats	J-1
K	Special Operations Feasibility Assessment	K-1
L	Special Operations Initial Assessment	L-1
M	Special Operations Mission Tasking Package	M-1
N	Special Operations Target Intelligence Package	N-1
O	Mission Support Plans	O-1
P	Standard Special Operations Mission Designation	P-1
Q	Execution Checklist	Q-1
R	Special Actions	R-1
S	Operations Messages	S-1
T	References	T-1
U	Administrative Instructions	U-1

GLOSSARY

Part I	Abbreviations and Acronyms	GL-1
Part II	Terms and Definitions	GL-9

FIGURE

I-1	Special Operations Forces Truths	I-3
II-1	Notional Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters Organization	II-4
II-2	Notional Joint Special Operations Task Force J-1 Organization	II-7
II-3	Notional Joint Special Operations Task Force J-2 Organization	II-10
II-4	Notional Joint Special Operations Task Force J-3 Organization	II-12
II-5	Notional Joint Special Operations Task Force J-4 Organization	II-15
II-6	Notional Joint Special Operations Task Force J-5 Organization	II-17
II-7	Notional Joint Special Operations Task Force J-6 Organization	II-19
II-8	Notional Headquarters Commandant Element	II-27
II-9	Joint Special Operations Task Force Boards and Cells	II-29
III-1	Theater-Level Special Operations Forces Command and Control	III-1
III-2	Operational Areas Within a Theater	III-9
III-3	Special Operations Liaison Element Areas of Interest	III-14
IV-1	Planning Factors for Multinational Forces	IV-5
IV-2	Joint Special Operations Task Force Organization for Planning	IV-7
IV-3	Notional Joint Special Operations Task Force Joint Planning Group Composition	IV-8
IV-4	Types of Targets	IV-13
IV-5	Special Operations Input into the Contingency Planning Process	IV-17
IV-6	Special Operations Contingency Planning and Targeting Techniques	IV-19
IV-7	Joint Special Operations Task Force Support to Crisis Action Planning	IV-23
IV-8	Joint Special Operations Task Force Support to Crisis Action Planning: Input to the Joint Force Commander’s Orders	IV-24

IV-9	Operational Planning Process: Commander and Staff Responsibilities	IV-25
IV-10	Joint Special Operations Task Force Support to Crisis Action Planning: Developing Commander, Joint Special Operations Task Force's Orders	IV-30
IV-11	Special Operations Execution Mission Planning	IV-32
V-1	Notional Joint Special Operations Task Force Joint Operations Center	V-3
V-2	Special Operations Close Air Support: Preplanned Request	V-9
V-3	Special Operations Close Air Support: Immediate Request	V-10
VI-1	Notional Subordinate Joint Force Intelligence Organization	VI-5
VI-2	Notional Joint Special Operations Task Force/Joint Intelligence Support Element Organization	VI-7
VI-3	The Intelligence Process	VI-8
VI-4	Commander, Joint Special Operations Task Force Intelligence Responsibilities	VI-12
VI-5	Multinational Intelligence Principles	VI-15
VII-1	Notional Joint Special Operations Task Force Logistics Readiness Center	VII-4
VII-2	Notional Logistics Statement of Requirements Process (Service Common)	VII-5
VII-3	Notional Logistics Statement of Requirements Process (Special Operations-Peculiar)	VII-7
VIII-1	Special Operations Communications System Architecture Fundamental Tenets	VIII-2
VIII-2	Information Quality Criteria	VIII-4
VIII-3	Notional Joint Special Operations Task Force Joint Network Operations Control Center	VIII-5
VIII-4	Joint Special Operations Task Force Communications Interface	VIII-11
VIII-5	Notional Deployed Army Special Operations Forces Communications Connectivity	VIII-12
VIII-6	Notional Deployed Naval Special Warfare Task Group Communications Connectivity	VIII-13
VIII-7	Notional Deployed Air Force Special Operations Command Communications Connectivity	VIII-14
VIII-8	Notional Deployed Marine Special Operations Forces Communications Connectivity	VIII-15
VIII-9	Joint Special Operations Task Force Intelligence Communications Flow	VIII-16
VIII-10	Global Command and Control System Elements	VIII-19
C-1	Joint Force Liaison and Control Elements	C-6
F-1	Targeting Analysis Focus	F-1
F-2	CARVER Value Rating Scale (Notional)	F-3
F-3	Sample Strategic CARVER Matrix Application	F-5
F-4	Sample Operational CARVER Matrix Application	F-5
F-5	Sample Tactical CARVER Matrix Application	F-6

Table of Contents

P-1	Mission Designator Codes	P-2
P-2	Operational Unit Designator Codes	P-2
P-3	Mission Support Designator Codes	P-3
Q-1	Sample Execution Checklist	Q-2
R-1	Notional Special Actions Cell.....	R-2
R-2	Unconventional Assisted Recovery Coordination Cell Tasks	R-6

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- **Provides an Overview of Joint Special Operations**
 - **Provides Guidance for Organizing a Joint Special Operations Task Force**
 - **Discusses Command and Control Relationships and Considerations**
 - **Covers the Functional Areas of Planning, Operations, Intelligence, Logistic Support, Communications System Support, and Information Management**
-

Joint Special Operations

The successful conduct of special operations (SO) relies on individual and small unit proficiency in specialized skills applied with adaptability, improvisation, and innovation.

Special operations forces (SOF) are small, specially organized units manned by people carefully selected and trained to operate under physically demanding and psychologically stressful conditions to accomplish missions using modified equipment and unconventional applications of tactics against strategic and operational objectives. The unique capabilities of SOF complement those of conventional forces.

Joint special operations (SO) are conducted by SOF from more than one Service in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations may require low visibility, clandestine, or covert capabilities. SO are applicable across the range of military operations. They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces or other government agencies and may include operations through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces. SO differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, use of special equipment, modes of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets.

Establishing and Organizing a Joint Special Operations Task Force

A joint special operations task force (JSOTF) is organized in a manner similar to a conventional joint task force.

A joint special operations task force (JSOTF) normally is established by a joint force commander (JFC) to plan and conduct SO. The JSOTF, when established, is a joint task force (JTF) composed of SOF from more than one Service to carry out a specific operation or prosecute SO in support of the theater campaign or other operations as directed. It may have conventional forces assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. It may be established subordinate to another JTF or directly subordinate to a geographic combatant command or subunified command.

A commander, joint special operations task force (CDRJSOTF) may organize the JSOTF headquarters (HQ) as necessary to carry out all assigned duties and responsibilities. There are several options that may be used to organize a JSOTF HQ (use a theater special operations command [TSOC] HQ, augment a core SOF component HQ, or organize an ad hoc HQ from various SOF contributors). Whichever the option, a building process will be necessary. Additionally, this process must support the JSOTF mission and provide the best opportunity for success. When fully organized, the JSOTF staff will be composed of appropriate members in key positions of responsibility from each Service SOF having significant forces assigned to the command.

Command and Control

Special operations forces (SOF) are most effective when fully integrated and synchronized into the overall plan.

Given the ability of SOF to operate unilaterally, independently as part of the overall plan, or in support of a conventional commander, effective coordination and integration of the SOF effort is dependent on a robust command and control (C2) structure. Successful execution of SO requires centralized, responsive, and unambiguous C2. The time-sensitive nature normally associated with the majority of SOF missions as well as the sensitive nature of many of these missions requires a C2 structure that is, above all, responsive to the needs of the operational unit and provides the most flexibility and agility in the application of SOF. SOF C2 is tailored for each specific mission or operation.

SOF may be assigned to either the Commander, US Special Operations Command or to a geographic combatant commander (GCC). Normally, operational control of SOF is exercised by the JFC through the commander, theater special operations

command (CDRTSOC) as joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC) or CDRJSOTF.

SOF and conventional forces integration.

Conventional forces integrated with SOF create unique capabilities for the JFC to achieve objectives that might otherwise be unattainable. Flexible C2, specific mission generation processes, clear mission approval levels, and tactical interdependence can improve SOF and conventional forces integration. To facilitate effective integration, several key areas listed, while not all inclusive, should be addressed early-on: C2; liaison and control elements; characteristics and capabilities/limitations of both types of forces; integrated operations planning of both types of forces; joint fire support; and intelligence.

Planning

A JSOTF staff (and/or theater special operations command staff) may conduct both contingency planning and crisis action planning.

Within contingency and crisis action planning, the JSOTF, TSOC, and their component staffs must consider various planning considerations and unique SO targeting and mission planning requirements. The JSOTF and TSOC staffs must ensure that SO planning considerations are integrated into the JFC mission planning during the early stages.

SO integration into joint planning and targeting.

The TSOC is the primary link for integration of SOF into the GCC's planning process. The CDRTSOC has several ways to integrate SOF. Integration can be achieved through the CDRTSOC's principal roles as the theater SO advisor and the theater JFSOCC, or CDRJSOTF if designated. The CDRTSOC provides input into GCC's operation plans, the theater campaign plan, subordinate campaign plan, and theater security cooperation plan.

The CDRJSOTF has available several means to link with the supported JFC to integrate the planning and targeting processes. Key among these links are: the JSOTF joint planning group; and certain boards, centers, teams, and cells; and coordination and liaison organizations.

Principles of SO mission planning.

There are four principles of SO mission planning. These are: SOF may begin planning by providing options to the JFC; specific targets or mission assignments for SOF should always contribute substantially to the strategic and operational objectives within the lines of the operation being executed; SOF missions are complete packages that include insertion, resupply, fire and maneuver support, extraction and personnel recovery that must

be thoroughly planned before committing the force; and SO rarely can be repeated if they at first fail, since SO targets normally are perishable either from a military or political viewpoint.

Operations

A JSOTF conducts operations across the full range of military operations.

Operations can range in size, purpose, and combat intensity within the range of military operations that extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence to crisis response and contingency operations, and, if necessary to major operations and campaigns. In certain situations a JSOTF may operate independently, but it normally operates as part of a joint force. SOF core tasks may not fall clearly within a specific range of operations.

The CDRJSOTF normally organizes a joint operations center (JOC), under the direction of the JSOTF operations directorate, to serve as the focal point for all operational matters. The JOC should be staffed and equipped to maintain situational awareness; monitor and direct current operations; and plan and coordinate future operations. Early establishment of a JOC assists in the timely flow of information during the crisis action planning process since it provides a centralized point for the handling, tracking, and recording of information.

Intelligence

By their nature, SOF objectives and tactics require intelligence support that is frequently more detailed than needed in conventional operations.

It is essential that the JSOTF have timely, detailed, tailored, and fused all-source intelligence in identifying relevant SO targets, course of action development, and mission planning and execution. The ability to interface with theater and national assets is critical to success. SOF often require intelligence to avoid adversary forces, regardless of size or composition, as opposed to information that would allow conventional forces to engage the adversary. Additionally, intelligence support to SOF requires increased focus of various intelligence disciplines (such as geospatial intelligence, signals intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, and human intelligence) to include political, informational, economic, and cultural institutions and specific data related to SOF targets. Because SOF missions are particularly sensitive to adversary collection efforts, counterintelligence support must be considered in protecting SOF missions across the range of military operations.

Logistic Support

The Military Departments and US Special Operations Command share responsibility for logistic support of SOF.

The Military Departments are responsible for providing or arranging for the administration and support of Service forces assigned to the combatant commands, including Service common support of assigned SOF units. United States Special Operations Command is responsible for providing SO-peculiar support to SOF units worldwide. However, it is the supported GCC who has overall responsibility to ensure that all joint logistic and administrative support, including SOF support, is coordinated and executed. In-theater non-SOF specific logistic support can be provided through Service component and/or common-user logistic lead Service or agency support channels. The GCC exercises directive authority for logistics in order to eliminate gaps and redundancies. The designated theater executive agent is responsible for the administrative and logistic support of joint SOF HQ.

Communications System Support

Communications systems support to JSOTF and its assigned SOF must be global, secure, and jointly interoperable.

Communications systems support to JSOTF and its assigned SOF must be flexible so that it can be tailored to any mission, and it must add value to the SOF's operational capability. Communications system support the full range of SO worldwide. SOF must be able to communicate anywhere and anytime utilizing national capabilities to the maximum extent possible.

SOF communications support consists of multiple and varied groups of systems, procedures, personnel, and equipment that operate in diverse manners and at different echelons, from national to unit levels. Communications systems must support discrete as well as collective functions. To provide for necessary control, SOF communications systems must offer seamless connectivity from the lowest operational unit to the highest levels of command.

SOF communications systems must be interoperable with each other, with conventional forces, with US national resources, and with allies and HNs as determined by the scope of the operations. If necessary, they must integrate not only with state-of-the-art systems, but must also be capable of integrating with less sophisticated equipment often found in less developed nations.

Information Management

Information management can provide quality information to the right user at the right time in usable form to facilitate understanding and decision-making.

A goal of information management (IM) is to provide relevant, precise information that supports the CDRJSOTF in attaining situational awareness and understanding that allows the commander to make timely and effective decisions faster than the adversary. IM uses procedures and information systems to collect, process, store, protect, display, disseminate, and dispose of information. The CDRJSOTF should organize IM around three activities. These are: information sharing; collaboration; and force tracking.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides joint doctrine for organizing, planning, preparing, and executing, JSOTF operations to include targeting and mission planning. It also provides guidance for establishing command relationships normally associated with a JSOTF or TSOC.

CHAPTER I

DOCTRINAL OVERVIEW OF JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS

“We need a greater ability to deal with guerrilla forces, insurrection, and subversion . . . We must be ready now to deal with any size force, including small externally supported bands of men; and we must help train local forces to be equally effective.”

President John F. Kennedy, Message to Congress, 1961

1. Special Operations Forces

Special operations forces (SOF) are small, specially organized units manned by people carefully selected and trained to operate under physically demanding and psychologically stressful conditions to accomplish missions using modified equipment and unconventional applications of tactics against strategic and operational objectives.

2. Special Operations

The successful conduct of special operations (SO) relies on individual and small unit proficiency in specialized skills applied with adaptability, improvisation, and innovation. The unique capabilities of SOF complement those of conventional forces.

3. United States Special Operations Command

a. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) provides trained and combat ready SOF to geographic combatant commanders (CCDRs) and, as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, plans and conducts selected SO worldwide.

b. USSOCOM integrates and coordinates Department of Defense (DOD) psychological operations (PSYOP) capabilities supporting CCDRs’ information operations (IO) planning and execution as well as the US Strategic Command’s (USSTRATCOM’s) responsibilities for IO capabilities that cross geographic areas of responsibility (AORs) or across the core IO capabilities.

c. Commander, USSOCOM (CDRUSSOCOM) is the supported commander in performing the role of lead CCDR for planning, synchronizing, and as directed, executing global operations against terrorist networks in coordination with other CCDRs. USSOCOM considers its role in the synchronization of DOD efforts to be a core task of its headquarters (HQ). USSOCOM is responsible for integrating DOD strategy, campaign plans, intelligence priorities, and operations; prioritizing and synchronizing theater security cooperation activities, deployments, and capabilities; providing military representation to US national agencies and intergovernmental organizations for US and multinational campaigns against designated terrorist networks; and providing SOF to the geographic combatant commands for the synchronized and coordinated conduct of regional activities that may support future operations.

d. CDRUSSOCOM exercises combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) of all SOF stationed in the US, to include active component US Army civil affairs (CA) and PSYOP

forces. The exception is the SOF units moved from the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) AOR to the continental United States but which remain under the COCOM of USSOUTHCOM.

4. Joint Special Operations

a. Joint SO are conducted by SOF from more than one Service in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations may require low visibility, clandestine, or covert capabilities. SO are applicable across the range of military operations. They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces or other government agencies and may include operations through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces. SO differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, use of special equipment, modes of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets.

b. SOF perform two types of activities. First, they perform tasks that no other forces in DOD conduct and second, they perform tasks that are conducted by DOD forces, but do so to a unique set of conditions and standards, normally using equipment and tactics, techniques, and procedures not utilized by conventional forces. These tasks include special reconnaissance (SR), direct action (DA), unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defense (FID), counterterrorism, counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), IO, PSYOP, and CA operations. PSYOP and CA support to SO are discussed in Appendix A, “Psychological



Special operations forces are prepared to conduct specific tasks.

Operations in Support of Special Operations” and Appendix B, “Civil Affairs in Support of Special Operations”, respectively.

c. SOF capabilities include being able to quickly task-organize and deploy using a lower profile or footprint than conventional forces; gaining access to hostile and denied areas; rapidly surveying, assessing, and reporting local situations; working closely with regional foreign military and civilian authorities and populations; organizing people to help solve local problems; and providing tailored or unconventional responses to ambiguous situations. The specialized skills and low visibility capabilities inherent in SOF provide an adaptable military response in crisis situations requiring tailored, precise, and focused use of force.

d. SOF limitations stem from their few numbers and the time needed to develop and replace highly trained people and units. Additionally, focused efforts are essential to preserve the force in the face of occupational injury and illness and to rapidly recover and recondition people to the demanding standards required for return to duty and mission capable status. Austere SOF logistic support systems require extensive support from conventional force structures supplemented by host nation (HN) and/or contracted support. SOF are organized and trained for employment against targets of strategic and operational relevance. SOF are not used as a substitute for conventional forces. SOF truths stem from the capabilities and limitations associated with SOF and are depicted in Figure I-1.

5. Special Operations Forces Shape Environment and Set Conditions

In likely or potential operational areas, SOF play a major role in preparing and shaping environments, and they may set conditions that mitigate risk and facilitate successful follow-on



Figure I-1. Special Operations Forces Truths

operations. The regional focus and cross-cultural/ethnic insights of SOF and their prior relationships with HN personnel provide access to and influence in nations where the presence of conventional US forces is unacceptable or inappropriate. SOF contributions provide operational leverage by gathering critical information, undermining a potential adversary's will or capacity to wage war, and enhancing the capabilities of conventional US, multinational, indigenous or surrogate forces.

6. Integration of Special Operations Forces and Conventional Forces

The joint force commander (JFC), using SOF independently or integrated with conventional forces, gains an additional and unique capability to achieve objectives that may not otherwise be attainable. Circumstances may dictate that SOF support conventional forces; and conversely, that conventional forces support SOF. Integration enables the JFC to take fullest advantage of conventional force and SOF core competencies. SOF are most effective when SO are fully integrated into the overall plan and the execution of SO is through proper SOF command and control (C2) elements responsive to the needs of the supported commander. SOF C2 elements are provided to the supported or the supporting conventional force commanders and include joint special operations task forces (JSOTFs) (or combined joint special operations task forces [CJSOTFs] when organized with coalition or multinational SOF) to conduct a specific SO or prosecute SO in support of a larger joint operation or theater campaign; special operations command and control elements (SOCCEs) to synchronize integrated SOF/conventional force operations; and special operations liaison elements (SOLEs) to coordinate, deconflict, and integrate SO air, surface, and subsurface operations with conventional air operations. Exchange of SOF and conventional force liaison officers (LNOs) is also essential to enhance situational awareness and facilitate staff planning and training for integrated operations.

For further information on integration of special operations forces and conventional forces, refer to USSOCOM Pub 3-33, Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Integration and Interoperability Handbook and Checklist, Version 2, September 2006.

CHAPTER II

JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION

“A JFC (joint force commander) has the authority to organize forces to best accomplish the assigned mission based on the concept of operations.”

JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

1. General

a. A JSOTF is organized in a manner similar to a conventional joint task force (JTF). A JSOTF normally is established by a JFC to plan and conduct SO. The JSOTF, when established, is a JTF composed of SOF from more than one Service to carry out a specific operation or prosecute SO in support of the theater campaign or other operations as directed. It may have conventional forces assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. It may be established subordinate to another JTF or directly subordinate to a geographic combatant command or subunified command. For example, a geographic CDR (GCC) may elect to designate a JTF to prosecute operations in a specific operational area and attach SOF (established as JSOTF) to that JTF to plan and execute SO required to accomplish the mission. Likewise, a theater special operations command (TSOC) commander may establish a JSOTF to focus on a specific mission or region within the operational area assigned by the GCC. Further, while smaller contingencies may be more likely, large-scale operations may necessitate the establishment of multiple JSOTFs. In such cases, each JSOTF may focus on a particular set of functions or another operational area and be assigned respective joint special operations areas (JSOAs). Also, the JSOTF could operate as a JSOTF afloat embarked at sea in a forward area. This may be required when force protection and security are of concern, when a HN may not allow a land based JSOTF on its territory, and/or in instances when the JSOTF would be conducting operations primarily in a maritime environment.

b. The initial establishment of a JSOTF presents significant organizational, operational, and training challenges. These challenges affect the commander, joint special operations task force (CDRJSOTF) ability to rapidly fuse a diverse group of key personnel, with varying degrees of understanding and experience in joint SO, into a functioning JSOTF. Therefore, key personnel assigned to a JSOTF staff, as well as those key personnel who coordinate with a JSOTF HQ, should understand joint SO techniques and procedures in order to alleviate this problem and allow for an efficient establishment of the JSOTF.

2. Authority to Establish a Joint Special Operations Task Force

The establishment of a JSOTF may be based on the recommendation of the commander, theater special operations command (CDRTSOC) and the JFC normally is the establishing authority. Refer to Chapter III, “Command and Control,” paragraph 2, “Command Relationships,” for SOF units deploying from the US. The core of the JSOTF staff is normally drawn from the TSOC staff or an existing SOF component with augmentation from other Service SOF. A JSOTF may also be specifically established as a joint organization and deployed as an entity from outside the theater.

3. Establishing a Joint Special Operations Task Force

When the nucleus of a TSOC staff is used to establish a JSOTF, the CDRTSOC still maintains responsibility for continued theater strategic level activities in support of the geographic CCDR. The establishment of the JSOTF may impact on the TSOC's other missions by the loss of key TSOC staff personnel to the JSOTF. Therefore, a TSOC may require significant augmentation to its staff in order to stand-up and operate a JSOTF along with its normal theater missions.

a. **Crisis Development.** If a crisis situation develops in a CCDR's AOR that could involve the use of military forces, crisis action planning (CAP) procedures will be used as the framework for the timely development and exchange of information among all participants. As a crisis develops, the GCC's TSOC may initiate CAP for that contingency. As the mission evolves, the CDRTSOC may be tasked to establish a JSOTF, using members of the TSOC staff as the nucleus or core of the JSOTF staff.

b. **Decision Process.** CAP provides a basis for higher authority decisions that must be acted upon by the CDRJSOTF. JTF and JSOTF establishment normally occurs between the stages of crisis assessment and course of action (COA) selection of CAP. Once a CDRJSOTF is designated, the CDRJSOTF and JSOTF staff will participate in CAP procedures concurrently with the complex task of establishing the JSOTF.

c. **Liaison Officers.** During CAP, the CDRJSOTF may request LNOs from allocated SOF components to assist in mission analysis and COA development. Component LNOs ensure that all capabilities and limitations are considered during the process and that their component commanders remain fully informed of CDRJSOTF activities, plans, and intentions. The CDRJSOTF may also collocate LNOs with the CCDR and with the subordinate JFC, if designated, to advise their staffs on SO capabilities and keep the CDRJSOTF informed as to COAs being considered and potential operational requirements. These LNOs can significantly improve the flow of information, facilitate concurrent planning, and enhance the SOF mission planning and targeting processes. Specific LNO procedures are described in Appendix C, "Joint Special Operations Task Force Liaison Personnel Procedures."

d. **Nucleus of the JSOTF Staff.** The CDRTSOC normally determines how to create the nucleus of a JSOTF staff. A preferred method is to develop JSOTF staffs around a "core" drawn from the TSOC or other SOF component HQ. Augmentees may then be added to the designated CDRJSOTF's "core staff." The primary sources of these augmentees will be: a USSOCOM augmentation package drawn from the USSOCOM staff and USSOCOM Service component staffs and their subordinate commands; an augmentation package drawn from the staffs of the CCDR and Service components; individual mobilization augmentees assigned to the TSOC; and special operations detachments from the National Guard.

e. **Timely Establishment of the JSOTF.** A key responsibility of the establishing authority is timely establishment of the JSOTF. If time is available, planning should be accomplished in an unconstrained manner and mission analysis completed before forces are determined.

f. **CDRJSOTF Responsibilities.** The CDRJSOTF is responsible for making recommendations to the senior JFC or commander, JTF (CJTF) on the proper employment of SOF, and for executing operational missions. The CDRJSOTF develops a detailed plan for integrated employment of assigned and attached forces based upon an assessment of the operational situation. Other specific responsibilities include the following:

(1) **Organizing the Force.** CDRJSOTF has the authority to organize forces over which he or she has operational control (OPCON) in order to meet mission requirements. The CDRJSOTF is also responsible for organizing the JSOTF HQ in a manner to effectively assist in the control of SOF and provide support to subordinate SOF units.

(2) **Consider Operational Areas and Control Measures.** The CDRJSOTF may use a variety of means to delineate and facilitate simultaneous conventional and SO in the same general operational area. To assist in this process, there must be a well-structured deconfliction and coordination process that flows between the CDRJSOTF and JFC, and among all their components.

(3) **Establishing Command Relationships.** When establishing the JSOTF, the JFC delegates OPCON of SOF to the CDRJSOTF and other assigned forces. The CDRJSOTF exercises OPCON through subordinate SOF Service/functional component commanders, or subordinate CDRJSOTFs. The command relationships between a CDRJSOTF and subordinate forces are discussed in detail in Chapter III, “Command and Control.”

(4) **Providing SO Operational Direction and Guidance.** During planning, the CDRJSOTF provides the commander’s intent, guidance, and objectives to JSOTF component commanders. For execution, the CDRJSOTF provides timely and concise missions or tasks, together with the role of each subordinate. Tasks must be realistic and allow the subordinate as much freedom of execution as possible.

4. Organizing a Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters

A CDRJSOTF may organize the JSOTF HQ as necessary to carry out all assigned duties and responsibilities. There are several options that may be used to organize a JSOTF HQ (use a TSOC HQ, augment a core SOF component HQ, or organize an ad hoc HQ from various SOF contributors). Whichever the option, a building process will be necessary. Additionally, this process must support the JSOTF mission and provide the best opportunity for success. When fully organized, the JSOTF staff will be composed of appropriate members in key positions of responsibility from each Service SOF having significant forces assigned to the command. CDRJSOTF will make the final decision on the composition of the HQ, to include the establishment of boards, centers, cells, and bureaus, as required. Figure II-1 depicts a notional JSOTF HQ organization.




Figure II-1. Notional Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters Organization

a. **Staff Assignment Considerations**


- (1) The JSOTF staff must be qualified to perform their joint responsibilities.
- (2) Proportionate representation of force makeup as to numbers, experience, influence of position, and rank of members among the participating Service SOF.
- (3) Fill key positions of responsibility with members from Service SOF dependent on the mission and type of SO to be conducted. JSOTF manning documents also assign conventional personnel to non-SOF technical, administrative, and logistic positions.
- (4) JSOTF composition as it applies to capabilities, limitations, and required support.

b. **Augmentees.** When mission requirements exceed the JSOTF staff's capabilities (e.g., qualified personnel, facilities, or equipment), the CDRJSOTF should request assistance through the JSOTF establishing authority. CDRUSSOCOM supports JSOTF manning shortfalls by requesting augmentation from the Services and internal tasking from its assigned Active

Component and Reserve Component (RC) forces. Staff officers who augment the JSOTF nucleus from combatant commands or the Services should be trained and qualified to fill nominated JSOTF augmentation billets. Conventional forces support personnel can augment the JSOTF in non-SOF billets such as personnel, logistics, engineer, and other specialties. In addition, the CDRJSOTF should consider which organizations or entities need to be augmented to support core SOF components. As examples, does a special operations task force (SOTF) organization require augmentation to support Army SO? Is the naval special warfare task group (NSWTG) (a HQ) self-sufficient or does it require assistance? Will a Marine special operations company (MSOC) afloat, require a JSOTF (afloat) or augmentation to perform its mission? Does the Air Force special operations detachment (AFSOD) (a tailored detachment) require specific augmentee expertise to perform its mission? Are Service space support teams needed to support operations? Will an operational staff be required to operate in a forward area embarked as a JSOTF afloat? Early planning for total augmentation requirements provides a basis for programming resources and training.

c. **Response Cells.** An establishing authority may have a cell of experts prepared to augment a JSOTF (although normally augmentation is made to a JTF) to provide assistance in the early stages of organization and planning. These deployable packages and cells, found at the geographic combatant command level, can be tailored to provide assistance to a JSOTF for a limited duration.

d. **Orientation Program.** A staff and facilities orientation program should be established to ensure that all individuals assigned to the JSOTF staff become thoroughly familiar with the staff operating procedures within the JSOTF. It could be accomplished through the establishment of a joint personnel reception center, a short training program, or even use of a “buddy” system



The joint special operations task force staff must be qualified to perform their joint responsibilities.

whereby an experienced JSOTF staff member mentors a newly assigned individual. Whatever the program, the result should improve the efficiency of the staff and lead to joint team building.

e. **Reachback Augmentation.** JSOTFs should establish reachback arrangements to organizations outside the operational area, for SOF and conventional forces, for additional assistance in functional areas such as planning, intelligence, and logistics.

5. Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters Staff Functions and Responsibilities

CDRJSOTFs are provided staffs to assist them in the decision-making and execution process. The staff is an extension of the commander; its sole function is command support and its authority is delegated to it by the commander. A properly trained and directed staff will free the commander to devote more attention to directing subordinate commanders and maintaining situational awareness.

a. Manpower and Personnel Directorate (J-1)

(1) Functions

(a) The JSOTF J-1 provides oversight of joint personnel readiness, joint personnel services coordination, and joint manpower management for the JSOTF. If the mission is limited, the HQ staff will likely be small, and will have few if any, special staff officers. In this event, the J-1 may be responsible for oversight or coordination of additional staff functions such as: legal; financial management; safety; casualty reporting; postal operations; and morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR). If the JSOTF chaplain does not accompany the HQ for a specific mission, the J-1 may have additional responsibility for coordinating religious support. If the JSOTF chaplain is available, religious support planning and coordination are stand alone functions of the chaplain.

(b) The J-1 must be knowledgeable of the various Service, theater, and USSOCOM personnel policies. However, assigned and attached SOF elements will receive their manpower and personnel support through normal Service channels.

(c) Most of the JSOTF J-1 tasks are of a general nature and differ little from those performed by any JTF J-1. These include the development and coordination of personnel policies and plans; providing appropriate input to the JSOTF operations directorate (J-3) and plans directorate (J-5) for the personnel section of JSOTF operation plans (OPLANs); the maintenance of current personnel estimates, personnel readiness, and casualty reporting; oversight and planning of the JSOTF personnel replacement program; and the projection of future JSOTF personnel requirements, to include RC augmentation. The JSOTF J-1 also manages the command's evaluation reporting; joint awards and decorations; and leave programs. Service awards for which the CDRJSOTF may not have authority over are forwarded through channels to respective Service commands in theater for management. Additionally, the J-1 will provide assistance to the joint mortuary affairs office as part of the logistics directorate of a joint staff (J-4) on an as-

required basis. The JSOTF J-1 assists the mortuary affairs effort by managing the entry points for the casualty reporting and casualty notification systems for the Services.

(d) Some J-1 tasks are performed differently during SO than they are performed in conventional joint forces. What differentiates SO-specific J-1 tasks from general personnel and manpower tasks is that they must be applied to properly address the SO-specific dimensions of manpower and personnel matters. Additionally, because SO missions are often conducted in remote regions outside of established support areas, routine personnel-related duties may require effort beyond that required of a conventional staff.

(e) SO-unique situations affect several of the general joint manpower and personnel J-1 functions and will differ with the SO core task being performed. For example, during FID, the JSOTF J-1 may have mission-essential duties in addition to those associated with the JSOTF HQ itself. In these situations, the J-1 may be advising, assisting, and training an indigenous HN military organization. During unconventional warfare (UW) missions, the J-1 may be deeply involved in monitoring personnel strength, health, and readiness of a US-supported insurgent force. Thus, the J-1 can easily be involved in activities beyond the duties generally associated with a personnel and administrative staff officer. A notional JSOTF J-1 organization is depicted in Figure II-2.

(2) Responsibilities

(a) Administer personnel programs, coordinate and monitor entitlements and benefits, MWR, postal services, and personnel support for contingency operations; prepare evaluation reports, and awards and decorations recommendations.




Figure II-2. Notional Joint Special Operations Task Force J-1 Organization

- (b) Participate in JSOTF planning, mission analysis, and COA development.
- (c) Prepare the personnel estimates and annex E (Personnel) to the OPLAN.
- (d) Prepare and maintain the joint manning document. Request augmentation as required.
- (e) Establish and effectively operate the joint visitors bureau (JVB) and joint personnel reception center, as directed. The JSOTF may operate a protocol section vice a JVB based on size and capability.
- (f) Advise the CDRJSOTF on matters concerning JSOTF component personnel replacement plans and status.
- (g) Monitor unit strengths, both current and projected, by means of daily personnel status reports, casualty reports, and reports of critical personnel shortages.
- (h) Maintain records to support recommendations for joint unit and individual DOD awards and decorations. The JSOTF J-1 provides appropriate endorsements in accordance with (IAW) CDRJSOTF guidance.
- (i) When a safety officer is not assigned to the JSOTF special staff, implement and monitor the JSOTF safety program and recommend remedial actions.
- (j) Ensure that personnel-related activities are conducted to eliminate operations security (OPSEC) vulnerabilities.
- (k) When a Provost Marshal is not assigned to the JSOTF special staff, and in consultation with the staff judge advocate (SJA), administer policies and procedures for detainees, civilian internees, other detained personnel, and formerly captured or missing US personnel.
- (l) In consultation with the J-3, administer policies and procedures for indigenous and displaced civilians who fall under the care and responsibility of the JSOTF.
- (m) Assist in the planning and administration of a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO).
- (n) Establish liaison at key theater nodes to facilitate personnel functions.
- (o) Other responsibilities as directed.

For further information on personnel, refer to Joint Publication (JP) 1-0, Personnel Support to Joint Operations.

b. Intelligence Directorate (J-2)

(1) Functions

(a) The primary functions of the J-2 are to provide intelligence and counterintelligence (CI) support to the JSOTF HQ and to direct the tactical intelligence and CI activities of the JSOTF. An additional function of the J-2 is to support the CDRJSOTF and staff by providing timely indications and warning and by ensuring the availability of intelligence on the characteristics of the JSOA and the joint operations area (JOA). Members of the directorate actively participate in joint staff planning and coordinating, directing, integrating, and controlling of intelligence efforts. The JSOTF J-2 also ensures adequate intelligence collection and reporting to disclose adversary capabilities and intentions as quickly as possible. A notional JSOTF J-2 organization is depicted in Figure II-3.

(b) The JSOTF J-2 must be responsive to intelligence taskings and requests from higher HQs, lateral HQs, and subordinate SOF components. Additionally, the J-2 is the access point for joint force acquisition of JSOTF-produced intelligence and CI products. The J-2 supervises the production and maintenance of target intelligence packages (TIPs) and ensures that intelligence is integrated from all sources. SO intelligence may differ from that used by conventional forces in that it is often more detailed and more perishable, particularly in missions to combat terrorism and for the insertion or extraction of SOF. It can also be more broad-gauged and all encompassing than most military intelligence. This is especially true for FID, UW, and IO-related missions, in which target-area social, political, and economic information as well as adversary infrastructure data is germane to the missions that SOF are expected to accomplish. The JSOTF J-2 may request the deployment of a national intelligence support team (NIST). A NIST provides a tailored national-level, all-source intelligence team to deployed commanders during crisis or contingency operations.

(2) Responsibilities

(a) Tailor intelligence production, architecture, systems, and support to the specific, unique mission requirements.

(b) As required, establish a joint intelligence support element (JISE) and a tactical sensitive compartmented information facility (TSCIF).

(c) Develop, refine, and update the JSOTF intelligence estimate, based on the CJTF estimates, to provide a common understanding and view of the battlespace.

(d) Write and provide annex B (Intelligence), and annex M (Geospatial Information and Services) of the JSOTF operation order (OPORD) to the JSOTF J-3.

(e) Identify communication link requirements for feeding space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance into key operations and intelligence centers supporting SO.



Figure II-3. Notional Joint Special Operations Task Force J-2 Organization

(f) Request support from the theater J-2 for TIPs for preplanned targets, and for assistance and input in the development of TIPs for emerging missions. This support normally is provided by the supported CCDR's intelligence assets.

(g) Act as the central point of contact for intelligence requests for information (RFIs) within the JSOTF HQ and components. Answer RFIs when possible and validate and forward other RFIs as appropriate, using the Community On-Line Intelligence System for End-Users and Managers. Prioritize and track RFIs, and review RFI responses for content and completeness of answers.

(h) Provide intelligence support to targeting within the JISE/joint operations center (JOC), and to the joint planning group (JPG).

(i) Assist the JSOTF J-3 in developing and refining priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) based on the CDRJSOTF's critical information requirements.

(j) Provide support to the JSOTF J-3 in the planning and execution of IO and its constituent capabilities and related activities such as OPSEC and deception.

(k) Plan for and conduct CI and human resources intelligence as appropriate.

(l) Provide intelligence summaries IAW JFC guidance to the next higher HQ, laterally, to components, and other coordinating agencies and pass time-sensitive information collected by SOF assets to the JISE in a timely manner.

(m) Assign and task intelligence resources within the JSOTF.

(n) Provide threat assessments to the HQ commandant in support of antiterrorism and force protection. Update as required.

(o) Establish intelligence fusion with foreign partners as required.

(p) Establish open-source intelligence (OSINT) reachback capability for unclassified OSINT support.

(q) Other responsibilities as directed.

For further information on intelligence, refer to JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.

c. Operations Directorate

(1) Functions

(a) The JSOTF J-3 assists the CDRJSOTF in the planning, coordinating, synchronization, direction, control, monitoring, and assessment of operations. The CDRJSOTF normally will delegate tasking authority over subordinate units to the J-3 for mission type orders. While a JSOTF normally includes a J-5, in unusual situations where there is not a J-5, the J-3 assumes responsibility for current and future planning functions. A notional JSOTF J-3 organization is depicted in Figure II-4.

(b) The J-3 future operations division receives approved OPLANs in a handover from the J-5 future plans division, and then converts the approved OPLANs into OPORDs for tasking and execution. As part of this process, the J-3 future operations division, supported by the J-2 targets, plans, operations, planning group, directs the JSOTF targeting process and identifies targets and target systems for incorporation into OPORDs and fragmentary orders (FRAGORDs). It also integrates IO into future operations. The J-3 future operations division leads the JSOTF HQ CAP and assists the J-5 in contingency planning.




Figure II-4. Notional Joint Special Operations Task Force J-3 Organization

(c) The J-3 current operations division establishes the JOC and monitors the readiness of assigned and attached forces. It receives approved OPORDs and FRAGORDs in a handover from the J-3 future operations division, and then directs, monitors, coordinates, synchronizes, and assesses their execution.

(2) Responsibilities

(a) Understand the intent from the President and/or Secretary of Defense throughout the GCC and JFC to the CDRJSOTF.

(b) Plan, direct, monitor, coordinate, synchronize, and assess current and future operations.

(c) Maintain a current operations estimate.

(d) Maintain the JSOTF standing operating procedure (SOP).

(e) Prepare OPLANs, OPORDs, reports, and records.

(f) In coordination with the J-2, J-5 and the SJA, anticipate, review, and recommend changes to rules of engagement (ROE). Participate in ROE development. Assist the CDRJSOTF in proper dissemination of ROE.

(g) Review and recommend approval or disapproval of subordinate unit proposed COAs and OPORDs.

(h) Recommend SO, priorities for operational support, task organization, and organizational boundaries and other control measures.

(i) Coordinate staging areas, airspace, and JSOTF operations with those of other friendly forces.

(j) Plan and coordinate full-spectrum meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) operations for the JSOTF (including oversight of SOF component METOC requirements) and prepare annex H for all OPLANs or OPORDs.

(k) In coordination with J-2, establish and enforce OPSEC measures, to include focal point and special access programs.

(l) Coordinate with JSOTF HQ liaison elements.

(m) Plan and coordinate cover and deception activities.

(n) Review evasion and recovery plans.

(o) Plan and coordinate comprehensive SOF support to JFC's personnel recovery strategy.

(p) Minimize the potential for fratricide. Methods to do so may include ensuring reasonable safeguards used in planning processes and effective C2 systems used during execution phases.

(q) Coordinate requirements for integrated space capabilities in the operational area with the JFC-designated space coordinating authority (SCA).

(r) Direct after-action reviews and lessons learned reporting requirements.

(s) As required, conduct personnel recovery.

(t) Manage the special access program and focal point system.

(u) Provide operational oversight of reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) of SOF.

(v) Represent SOF activities to JTF/CJTF groups such as the joint targeting and coordination and board (JTCB) and IO cell.

(w) Develop annexes C, G, H, J, N, R, S, T, U, and X, to include CDRJSOTF's OPLANs, OPORDs, or subordinate plans.

(x) Coordinate with CA to ensure that CA operations and civil-military operations (CMO) are properly coordinated and synchronized.

(y) Plan, synchronize, and deconflict joint fires and joint air support within the JSOTF. If required, form a joint fires element (JFE) and a joint air coordination element (JACE).

(z) Other responsibilities as directed.

For further information on operations, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

d. Logistics Directorate

(1) Functions

(a) The J-4 is charged with the formulation of logistic plans and with the coordination and supervision of supply, maintenance, transportation, field services, general engineering, contracting, host-nation support (HNS) both en route to and within the operational area, and other logistic activities, as directed. If there is no command surgeon attached to the JSOTF, the J-4 is also responsible for health services; if a command surgeon is attached, health services and medical support planning are stand-alone functions of the surgeon. If there is no budget officer attached to the JSOTF, the J-4 may perform this function. A notional JSOTF J-4 organization is depicted in Figure II-5.

(b) While SOF logistic support is primarily a Service responsibility, the J-4 must monitor the JSOTF's logistic readiness to ensure successful accomplishment of the CDRJSOTF's assigned tasks. The routine sustainment of forces is monitored by the J-4 who is responsible for recommending logistic priorities to the CDRJSOTF, monitoring Service support to SOF, arranging inter-Service support agreements when advantageous, and coordinating SO peculiar logistic support with USSOCOM.

(2) Responsibilities

(a) Provide logistic oversight of SOF (US and multinational) in the operational area.

(b) Plan, coordinate, and manage external logistic support for the CDRJSOTF and staff. The HQ commandant normally provides internal support to the JSOTF.

(c) Comply with logistic procedures established by the JFC.

(d) Coordinate support requirements for SOF components, first from the parent Service, then with other SOF components. If unsuccessful, then coordinate with the JTF J-4 logistics readiness center (LRC) to satisfy the requirement.

(e) Coordinate all SOF service component requests for SO-peculiar supplies and equipment items through USSOCOM to the special operations forces support activity (SOFSA).



Figure II-5. Notional Joint Special Operations Task Force J-4 Organization

(f) Maintain a current logistic estimate to delineate the specific requirements that apply to logistic estimates or provide references that will clarify what is involved.

(g) Monitor and report equipment readiness status of the JSOTF.

(h) Recommend controlled supply rates of critical resources.

(i) Ensure the accountability of supplies and equipment.

(j) Plan, coordinate, and monitor administrative movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies.

(k) Coordinate with JSOTF communications system directorate (J-6) to ensure that communications and automated systems will support the JTF logistic operations. The JSOTF J-4 should identify those systems to which JSOTF J-4 access is required to support logistic operations and to quantify logistic communication requirements.

(l) Recommend stock levels for SOF support.

- (m) Provide logistic status to higher HQ.
- (n) Support operational resupply of SOF.
- (o) In conjunction with the J-5, plan and coordinate for strategic and operational movement of SOF via the time-phased force and deployment list.
- (p) In coordination with the supported CCDR's designated component, provide and/or ensure that adequate logistic support is provided to SOF during joint RSOI IAW the supported CCDR's reception plan.
- (q) Develop annex D and P to CDRJSOTF's OPLANs, OPORDs, or subordinate plans. If the JSOTF does not have a command surgeon or budget officer assigned, the J-4 may also be responsible for development of those particular annexes.
- (r) Ensure that adequate logistic support is provided for those detainees that are under the control of the JSOTF.
- (s) Ensure that adequate logistic support is provided for those indigenous and displaced civilians who fall under the care and responsibility of the JSOTF.
- (t) Ensure that access to USSOCOM is established for reachback support for SO-peculiar requirements.
- (u) Other responsibilities as directed.

For further information on logistics, refer to JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations.

e. Plans Directorate

(1) Functions

(a) The JSOTF J-5 conducts contingency planning for the JSOTF, develops and recommends C2 arrangements, coordinates ROE with the J-3, may represent the command at the JFC JTCB, and may chair the JSOTF targeting panel if designated. The J-5 participates in the JFC campaign and contingency planning process. The J-5 also may be tasked to develop plans unique to SO, such as UW, in support of the JFC. The J-5 also projects future SOF requirements for material, organization, and doctrine based on an analysis of current operations. In coordination with the JSOTF J-3 and J-4, the J-5 develops the JSOTF input to the theater time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) and submits it to the TSOC J-5 for approval and further action. A notional JSOTF J-5 organization is depicted in Figure II-6.

(b) While the JSOTF HQ is involved in contingency planning and CAP, detailed tactical mission planning is accomplished by the SOF element tasked by their JSOTF component



Figure II-6. Notional Joint Special Operations Task Force J-5 Organization

commander. The JSOTF J-5 normally is occupied with the command’s contingency or future planning cell. The J-5 also plays an important supporting role to the J-3 in CAP. The J-5 is the primary JSOTF HQ planning representative at the combatant command or JTF HQ for contingency planning and will normally write and coordinate the SO portion of the higher HQ plans. A JSOTF rarely conducts unilateral SO campaign planning; however, for protracted UW or FID operations, a JSOTF subordinate campaign plan may be appropriate.

(c) During the execution phase of an operation, the J-5 is the JSOTF’s future planner. The J-5 is responsible for developing the JSOTF input to the JFC future plans division, participating in the JFC JPG, and translating JFC future plans. The JSOTF J-5 may place a liaison element within the JFC future plans division to facilitate these actions. In these roles, the J-5 develops SO tasks to support each phase of the operation, develops future plans, and passes these plans to the J-3 for coordination and tasking to the subordinate components. The J-5 analyzes the operation and develops SO tasks for operations planned 72 hours in advance and beyond.

(2) Responsibilities

(a) Prepare and coordinate required OPLANs or OPORDs in support of the CDRJSOTF.

(b) Participate in preparation and coordination of JFC OPLANs, campaign plans, and OPORDs; develop JSOTF input to these plans; and advise the CDRJSOTF on issues associated with these plans during their development.

(c) Develop COAs within the framework of the JSOTF assigned objective or mission, forces available, and commander’s intent. This includes: anticipating tactical and operational opportunities and risks and recommending supporting ROE; wargaming;

synchronizing combat power in support of each COA; consideration of command relationships; and identifying decision criteria to support analysis of the developed COA.

(d) Promulgate the commander's decision in planning directives, OPLANs, or OPORDs.

(e) Conduct analysis and coordination of future operations during the execution phase of the operation.

(f) Coordinate planning efforts with higher, lower, adjacent, and multinational HQ, as required.

(g) Determine forces required and available and coordinate deployment planning in support of the selected COA.

(h) Ensure that the SOF requirements are entered in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES).

(i) Provide planning recommendations for HNS.

(j) Provide assistance to the J-3 in the preparation of orders.

(k) Coordinate and review the TPFDD input through the Global Command and Control System (GCCS).

(l) Coordinate with the J-3 to ensure that politico-military activities such as NEO and CMO are properly addressed with the appropriate US embassy and HN governments from a strategy and policy perspective.

(m) Participate in ROE development.

(n) Form and operate the JPG as directed.

(o) Provide input to appendix 4 (Special Operations) to annex C (Operations) of JTF OPLAN.

(p) Other responsibilities as directed.

For further information on planning, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

f. Communications System Directorate

(1) Functions

(a) The J-6 has the functional responsibility for communications, electronics, and automated information systems (AISs) in support of the CDRJSOTF. This includes development and integration of communications system architecture and plans that support the command's operational and strategic requirements as well as policy and guidance for implementation and integration of interoperable communications systems to exercise command in the execution of the JSOTF mission. A notional JSOTF J-6 organization is depicted in Figure II-7.

(b) The directorate not only provides communications and computer systems within the JSOTF HQ, but it effects coordination with second party providers such as the joint communications support element (JCSE) and US Army 112th Signal Battalion (SO) to provide circuits over satellite, radio, and other communications links.

(2) Responsibilities




Figure II-7. Notional Joint Special Operations Task Force J-6 Organization

(a) Establish the JSOTF HQ communications and computer systems requirements and participate in CDRJSOTF planning meetings, component planning meetings, and the JSOTF JPG planning meetings.

(b) Establish communications with the supported JFC and with other joint force components.

(c) Assist J-2 personnel in establishing sensitive compartmented information (SCI) communications (as needed).

(d) Act as liaison between the JSOTF and second party providers.

(e) Manage and maintain the JSOTF HQ communications and computer systems. This responsibility includes: operating a joint network operations control center (JNCC) that includes job control and frequency management; operating a message center and video teleconferencing (VTC) center; coordinating information assurance and computer network defense (CND) activities for JSOTF networks and information systems; and providing automated data processing equipment (ADPE) administration.

(f) Prepare communications estimate, communications plans, and communications annexes to OPLANs and OPORDs. Ensure that use of satellite communications (SATCOM) is addressed in these supporting documents.

(g) Monitor readiness status of communications equipment.

(h) Establish joint communications-electronics operating instructions (JCEOI).

(i) Establish and maintain JSOTF ability to operate freely and protect information. This includes maintaining programs such as information assurance, communications security (COMSEC), computer security (COMPUSEC), information operations condition (INFOCON), and CND.

(j) Manage and support friendly force tracking equipment for US SOF.

(k) Other responsibilities as directed.

For further information on communications system support, refer to JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.

g. Staff Judge Advocate

(1) Functions

(a) The SJA is the CDRJSOTF's legal advisor on all issues across the legal spectrum. In order to ensure that the JSOTF complies with international law, domestic law, and

DOD regulations, the JSOTF SJA coordinates with the JTF SJA and JSOTF component commands. The SJA performs legal functions as a participant in the JPG and other boards, centers, and cells as appropriate.

(b) Legal professionals provide decision makers with the information and analysis they need to help evaluate options, assess risks, and make informed decisions within the bounds of international and domestic law. The SJA applies a comprehensive understanding of the law, multilateral and bilateral agreements, and international legal customs and practices to help commanders evaluate the alternatives necessary to plan, train, mobilize, deploy, employ forces, and then transition to peace. From the earliest stages of planning, execution, and redeployment, legal professionals play a vital role in preparation of the battlespace by identifying and assisting in the resolution of legal constraints as well as providing relevant and responsive readiness programs to the military member.

(2) Responsibilities

(a) In consultation with the CDRJSOTF, J-5, and J-3, assist in ROE development, both initial and supplemental, and provide expertise on all ROE. Once familiar with the ROE, the SJA should assist the J-3 in the training of all personnel on the ROE.

(b) Participate as a member of the JPG and IO cell and provide expertise on legal issues that apply to emerging missions.

(c) Participate in ROE and targeting cells to ensure compliance with the law of war, ROE, and other legal requirements.

(d) Advise CDRJSOTF on the impact of international law and agreements affecting the mission.

(e) Provide legal advice to CDRJSOTF and the JSOTF targeting panel as part of the target validation phase of the targeting cycle.

(f) Review the OPLAN/OPORD for any legal considerations that may affect implementation of the plan or order, such as the law of war, status of forces, ROE, international agreements, and United Nations Security Council resolutions.

(g) Advise the CDRJSOTF on all disciplinary and military justice issues, with particular attention to Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and courts-martial convening authority.

(h) Oversee the reporting and investigation of incidents including law of war violations, claims, loss of equipment or funds, and personal injury or death.

(i) Coordinate with the JSOTF J-2 to ensure compliance with intelligence oversight requirements.

(j) Review, as required, future expenditures to ensure compliance with fiscal law and regulations.

(k) Other responsibilities as directed.

For further information on the SJA, refer to JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations.

h. Public Affairs Officer (PAO)

(1) Functions

(a) The PAO advises the commander on the impact that JSOTF operations are likely to have on public attitude, public affairs (PA) policies of higher HQ, and the command's need for media products. Additionally, a PAO will usually serve as the JSOTF public spokesperson and will prepare the PA portion of OPLANs and OPORDs.

(b) In FID and UW missions, and those missions involving extensive interaction with an indigenous population, the PAO may also serve as the link between the command and the senior US Department of State (DOS) representative and/or other designated authority responsible for releasing information to the HN media.

(2) Responsibilities

(a) Develop a PA plan and guidance prior to deployment and update as required. The PA plan should support the JFC's strategic communication planning.

(b) Ensure that PA assets are deployed with the JSOTF command group.

(c) Establish PA communications strategy for CDRJSOTF approval based on guidance from the JFC.

(d) Develop annex F (Public Affairs) to the CDRJSOTF's OPLANs, OPORDs, or subordinate campaign plans.

(e) Coordinate with the JSOTF J-3 or designated IO staff section to ensure that the PA, CA, and PSYOP activities are coordinated and deconflicted, while keeping them separate and distinct.

(f) Establish and participate in the joint information bureau (JIB), as appropriate. If a JSOTF does not establish a JIB, participate in the JFC JIB as directed by the CDRJSOTF.

(g) Depending on the scope and duration of an operation, coordinate with the broadcast media, as appropriate.

(h) Coordinate the use of combat camera assets with the JFC.

- (i) Participate in JSOTF or JTF IO cell planning, coordination, and execution.
- (j) Other responsibilities as directed.

For further information on PA, refer to JP 3-61, Public Affairs.

i. Surgeon

(1) **Functions.** The surgeon establishes, monitors, and evaluates JSOTF health service support (HSS) for the CDRJSOTF and SOF components.

(2) **Responsibilities**

- (a) Advise the CDRJSOTF on medical support.
- (b) Plan and manage medical support and medical resupply to joint SOF during operations.
- (c) Coordinate SOF theater patient movement policy with the subordinate JFC or supported CCDR staffs, as appropriate.
- (d) Provide medical technical supervision and coordination of SOF treatment facility activities.
- (e) Coordinate SOF medical support, including medical logistics, with the JFC and/or supported CCDR staff to prevent duplication of effort.
- (f) Manage the command preventive medicine program.
- (g) Complete all required medical reports and messages.
- (h) Publish annex Q (Medical Services) to the CDRJSOTF's OPLANs, OPORDs, and supporting plans, as appropriate.
- (i) Identify medical PIRs and RFIs to the J-2.
- (j) Assess allied, coalition, HN, and nongovernmental organization (NGO) HSS asset availability.
- (k) As required, coordinate with the theater patient movement requirements center and the area joint blood program office and disseminate medical regulating and blood management procedures.
- (l) Other responsibilities as directed.

For further information on HSS, refer to JP 4-02, Health Service Support.

j. **Chaplain**

(1) **Functions.** The chaplain is the CDRJSOTF's primary advisor in the areas of religion, morals, and morale as affected by religion. The chaplain develops and coordinates plans, policies, and procedures for religious support for the CDRJSOTF and supervises the provision of religious support throughout the JSOTF operational area.

(2) **Responsibilities**

(a) Advise the CDRJSOTF on religion, morals, and morale as affected by religion in order to provide for the religious free exercise needs of all assigned personnel and other authorized civilians.

(b) Advise the CDRJSOTF and staff on indigenous religious customs, traditions, organizations, communities, symbols, facilities, and sensitivities within the operational area and their impact upon the mission.

(c) Advise the command and leaders on ethical decision-making and moral leadership concerning issues related to policies, programs, initiatives, plans, and exercises.

(d) Monitor religious support programs and exercises staff technical supervision over the provision of religious support for forces under the CDRJSOTF's command.

(e) Provide direct personal religious support to the JSOTF HQ.

(f) Identify Service component religious support team requirements and coordinates for program funding, logistic support, personnel replacement, and augmentation requirements for subordinate religious support teams.

(g) Perform liaison with local national civilian religious leaders, NGOs, and intergovernmental organizations as required.

(h) Coordinate with combatant command, joint force, multinational force, and Service component command chaplains as necessary to ensure that subordinate religious support teams are resourced to provide religious support for members of their units and others as required.

(i) Develop and maintain staff estimates and joint religious support plans. Prepare appendix 6 (Religious Support) to annex E (Personnel) of all OPLANs or OPORDs.

(j) Other responsibilities as directed.

For further information on chaplain functions, refer to JP 1-05, Religious Support in Joint Operations.

k. Budget Officer

(1) **Functions.** The budget officer is the CDRJSOTF's financial manager and advisor. In lieu of a budget officer, the J-4 may perform this function. Financial management functions include obtaining various obligation authorities, funds control, cost capturing, and cost reporting.

(2) **Responsibilities**

(a) Serve as principal financial management advisor to the CDRJSOTF and as focal point for JSOTF financial management matters.

(b) Establish JSOTF financial management responsibilities.

(c) Ensure that established fiscal responsibility is maintained.

(d) Provide estimates of resource requirements, budgetary guidance and fund control to the JSOTF subordinate commands and the JFC as required. Provide actual and estimated cost and resource requirements to the JFC. Is prepared to furnish the financial status of the operation.

(e) Establish fiscal controls to ensure the efficient use of resources. This may include publishing procedures as necessary to address items such as ADPE and copier procurement, local purchase thresholds, and the establishment of blanket purchase agreements.

(f) Coordinate with the JSOTF J-1 on special pay and allowances for the JSOTF personnel.

(g) Coordinate with the JSOTF J-4 on logistic requirements and support to ensure that they complement the financial management responsibilities.

(h) Coordinate with the SJA and/or legal advisor on fiscal and contract issues.

(i) Coordinate with JSOTF HQ commandant on funding for internal JSOTF sustainment support funding.

(j) Coordinate with JSOTF or JFC contracting office/officer for the legal review of contracts.

(k) Obtain necessary advice from JSOTF SJA to ensure that expenditures comply with fiscal law and regulation.

(l) Develop appendix 3 (Finance and Disbursing) to annex E (Personnel) to CDRJSOTF's OPLANs, OPORDs, or supporting plans.

(m) Responsible for all aspects of cash management in the JSOTF to include training of paying agents and field ordering officers, coordinating for funds issuance, clearing and review of accounts and processing of reporting requirements.

(n) Careful coordination with executive agent, HQ, theater command elements, the TSOC, coalition forces and CJSOTF is required to deconflict authorities and establish formal processes ensure proper support and sharing of costs if appropriate.

For further information on budget functions, refer to JP 1-06, Financial Management Support in Joint Operations.

1. HQ Commandant

(1) **Functions.** The HQ commandant reports directly to the CDRJSOTF or deputy CDRJSOTF and is responsible for all aspects of the HQ support activities. The HQ commandant assumes initial responsibility for all equipment and facilities assigned to the JSOTF HQ and assigns subsequent responsibilities to personnel and agencies in direct control of those designated areas. The HQ commandant and HQ support activity is capable of providing essential day-to-day administrative and logistic support and sustainment to the JSOTF HQ in a field environment. The myriad of functions and responsibilities of the HQ commandant and the support activity staff require early coordination with the J-1 and J-3 in the planning process. There are numerous possibilities concerning the organization of the HQ commandant element. Each mission will dictate the requirements, capabilities, and structure of the organization. A notional HQ commandant element is depicted in Figure II-8.

(2) **Responsibilities.** The task support activity areas that follow are common to most operations for a JSOTF HQ. Certain procedures may vary. Preliminary requirements can be identified through the conduct of a site survey.

(a) Base operations support to include: unit level logistic support, billeting, transportation, messing, unit level health support, sanitation, environmental protection, engineering and construction requirements, and supply functions necessary to maintain the operation of the JSOTF HQ element.

(b) Assist the J-1, as required, with postal administration. This may require a terminal capability, distribution, collection, postal finance services, security, and customs and agriculture support.

(c) Determine specific personnel and equipment needs, as well as sources to support camp functions. Conduct a mission analysis early in the planning process.

(d) Assist the J-1 in operating the joint personnel reception center. This includes provision for facilities, security, and transportation.




Figure II-8. Notional Headquarters Commandant Element

(e) Assist the J-1, as required, with the operation of the MWR program. This includes provision for facilities, security, and transportation.

(f) Provide for camp physical security operations. Coordinate with the J-2 to obtain security, base defense, and force protection intelligence information and the J-3 to address force protection requirements. Ensure that a threat assessment is completed and measures identified to combat each threat. Also consider: rear area security, physical security of classified material, visitor control, refugee assistance, traffic control and flow within the HQ area, internment facilities, and other security considerations as warranted. The HQ commandant may be assigned the mission for base defense of the JSOTF HQ. In this case, the HQ commandant would assume the role of the base defense commander and be responsible for perimeter security, guard mount, physical security of the compound, and battle action drills.

(g) Coordinate movement, deployment, and redeployment of base camp operations.

(h) Ensure that coordination has been accomplished for JSOTF advanced echelon elements.

(i) Develop appendix 5 (Military Postal Service) to annex E (Personnel) to CDRJSOTF's OPLANs, OPORDs, or supporting plans.

(j) Provide administrative and personnel support to the JSOTF HQ element.

For further information on personnel, refer to JP 1-0, Personnel Support to Joint Operations.

6. Boards, Centers, and Cells

The CDRJSOTF may elect to form any number and type of organizational structures within the JSOTF HQ to support the mission. The first step in that decision-making process is to determine what organizational structures (boards, bureaus, centers, and cells) have been formed by the JFC and/or what organizational structures have been delegated to the CDRJSOTF as the principal commander to operate. Then the CDRJSOTF formulates which JSOTF HQ organizations (and LNOs or staff officers) are best suited to support both the JFC concept of operations (CONOPS) and the JSOTF mission. Typically, the CDRJSOTF forms subordinate organizations, each under the supervision of a specific staff director, to support the mission (see Figure II-9).

7. Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters Staff Checklists

Detailed checklists that may be of assistance to the JSOTF principal staff (J-1 through J-6, HQ commandant, and SJA) are provided in Appendix D, “Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters Staff Checklists.”

8. Notional Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters Standing Operating Procedure Outline

A TSOC or Service SOF unit that may be tasked to establish a JSOTF HQ may consider the need for preparing a SOP for use when organizing a JSOTF. It may be used for both exercises and actual contingencies, as appropriate. A notional outline for a JSOTF SOP is provided in Appendix E, “Notional Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters Standing Operating Procedure Outline.”




Figure II-9. Joint Special Operations Task Force Boards and Cells

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CHAPTER III COMMAND AND CONTROL

“If officers desire to have control over their commands, they must remain habitually with them, industriously attend to their instruction and comfort, and in battle lead them well.”

Stonewall Jackson, Winchester, Virginia, Nov 1861

1. General

SOF may be assigned to either CDRUSSOCOM or a GCC. A theater-level SOF C2 structure is shown in Figure III-1. Normally, OPCON of SOF is exercised by the JFC through the CDRTSOC as joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC) or CDRJSOTF. Commanders exercising command authority over SOF should:

- a. Provide for a clear and unambiguous chain of command using SOF C2 structures.
- b. Avoid frequent transfer of SOF between commanders.
- c. Provide for sufficient staff experience and expertise to plan, conduct, and support the operations.
- d. Integrate SOF in the planning process.




Figure III-1. Theater-Level Special Operations Forces Command and Control

- e. Match mission capabilities with mission requirements.

2. Command Relationships

a. SOF are most effective when fully integrated and synchronized into the overall plan. Given the ability of SOF to operate unilaterally, independently as part of the overall plan, or in support of a conventional commander, effective coordination and integration of the SOF effort is dependent on a robust C2 structure. Successful execution of SO requires centralized, responsive, and unambiguous C2. The time-sensitive nature normally associated with the majority of SOF missions as well as the sensitive nature of many of these missions requires a C2 structure that is, above all, responsive to the needs of the operational unit and provides the most flexibility and agility in the application of SOF. SOF C2 is tailored for each specific mission or operation.

b. SOF in the US are normally under COCOM of CDRUSSOCOM. When directed, CDRUSSOCOM provides US based SOF to a GCC. The GCC normally exercises COCOM of assigned and OPCON of attached SOF through the commander of a TSOC, a subunified command. When a GCC establishes and employs multiple JTFs and independent task forces, the TSOC commander may establish and employ multiple JSOTFs to manage SOF assets and accommodate JTF/task force SO requirements. Accordingly, the GCC, as the common superior, normally will establish supporting or tactical control (TACON) command relationships between JSOTF commanders and JTF/task force commanders.

c. When directed, CDRUSSOCOM can establish and employ a JSOTF as a supported commander.

3. Joint Special Operations Task Force Command and Control Considerations

a. Planning

(1) Command relationships must be specified in the initiating directive (such as the warning order [WARNORD], alert or planning order, and execute order [EXORD]) issued by the JSOTF establishing authority and C2 arrangements should be made no later than during the planning process.

(2) If not, the designated CDRJSOTF immediately should request guidance from the JSOTF's establishing authority and, when received, ensure that guidance is forwarded expeditiously to designated JSOTF component commanders.

b. **Deployment.** SOF units deploying from the US deploy under a deployment order from the Secretary of Defense, issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to CDRUSSOCOM and the gaining GCCs. The deployment order will direct the transfer of forces from CDRUSSOCOM to the gaining GCC and will specify the command authority the gaining GCC will exercise over the transferred SOF. Normally, the deploying SOF are not transferred to the designated supported GCC until conditions for transfer are met within the deployment orders.

The supported GCC normally will further transfer those SOF to the CDRJSOTF, when established to receive them.

c. Employment

(1) C2 for employment of JSOTF forces should be clearly established in the appropriate CDRJSOTF's OPORDs.

(2) Initial C2 arrangements may be designated in operation plans in concept format (CONPLANS), OPLANs, and/or OPORDs and modified as required during employment phases.

d. Termination

(1) Termination C2 considerations should be included in planning from the very beginning.

(2) Level of attainment of end state objectives will have some impact on the configuration of C2 arrangements and command relationships, particularly the requirements to provide organic sustainment and self-protection during the termination phase in a JOA where little, if any, HNS is available. The CDRJSOTF should maintain C2 of forces in the JOA until the last increment is redeployed.

e. Transition

(1) Transition C2 considerations will vary greatly from situation to situation, but should take into account the nature of envisioned continuing operations in the former JOA and the makeup of the forces involved (i.e., other US forces or a multinational force). Transition should also consider if certain SOF will remain in the JOA on continuing missions.

(2) The supported JFC should provide specific C2 guidance as soon as it is determined that JSOTF will be assigned new missions under a new command relationship.

f. **Redeployment.** C2 of redeploying SOF should remain with the CDRJSOTF in the JOA until arrival at their destination. As with deployment, SOF units normally redeploy under CJCS issued redeployment orders from the Secretary of Defense to the losing GCC and CDRUSSOCOM, the gaining GCC. Transfer of forces occurs when conditions of the redeployment orders have been met.

4. Joint Special Operations Task Force Command and Control of Assigned Forces

The CDRJSOTF may exercise C2 of assigned SOF or conventional forces through a number of organizations. These include, but are not limited to, the following:

a. **Army SOF (ARSOF).** ARSOF refers to: special forces (SF), Active Component CA and PSYOP, Army special operations aviation (ARSOA), and the Rangers. It is not a HQ.

(1) **Army Special Operations Component (ARSOC).** An ARSOC is the Army component of a joint force SO component.

(2) **SOTF.** SOTF is a general term to describe a group, regiment, or battalion in charge of Army SO, organized around the nucleus of a special forces (SF) unit and includes a mix of ARSOF units and their support elements. The CDRJSOTF may establish multiple subordinate SOTFs. The CDRJSOTF assigns each SOTF an area within the JSOA or functional mission under its OPCON.

(3) **SF.** SF units normally task organize to conduct operations from a number of operations bases. Used in this sense, the term “operations base” connotes an HQ and support element as well as a physical location. SF operations bases include the SOTF and the advanced operations base (AOB).

(a) **SOTF.** The SOTF is established by an SF group or battalion to synchronize the activities of subordinate SOTFs and/or AOBs. The SOTF may serve as an ARSOC directly subordinate to the CDRJSOTF, or may serve as the JSOTF when tasked. SOTFs are established to control and support deployed operational elements. Tactical SF elements conduct mission planning and preparation at a SOTF.

(b) **AOB.** An AOB is established by an SF company to extend the C2 and support functions of a SOTF. For example, an AOB may function as a launch-and-recovery site, radio relay site, or as a mission support base. The AOB may also function in a unilateral C2 capacity based on the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, and time available to serve as an area command or designated task force

(4) **Rangers.** Rangers normally exercise C2 through command posts collocated with other SOF or conventional units. They do not have the organic capability to establish their own operations bases.

(5) **ARSOA.** ARSOA are normally attached to a JSOTF. OPCON may be exercised by the CDRJSOTF through either functional or Service components of the JSOTF, depending on the specific situation. When a joint special operations air component commander (JSOACC) is established as a functional component of a JSOTF, the JSOTF normally exercises OPCON of all assigned and attached joint SO air assets through the JSOACC.

b. **AFSOF.** AFSOF denotes a subordinate unit, not a HQ.

(1) **Air Force Special Operations Component (AFSOC).** The AFSOC (not to be confused with the Air Force component of USSOCOM, Air Force Special Operations Command) normally is composed of an SO wing or special operations group (SOG). When subordinate AFSOF units deploy to SOTFs or AOBs, the AFSOC commander may establish one or more of the following provisional units.

(2) **AFSOD.** The AFSOD is a squadron-size AFSOF unit that could be a composite organization composed of different United States Air Force (USAF) assets. The detachment normally is subordinate to a theater AFSOC, JSOTF, JSOACC, or JTF depending upon size and duration of the operation.

(3) **Air Force Special Operations Element (AFSOE).** The AFSOE is an element-size AFSOF unit. It normally is subordinate to a theater AFSOC or AFSOD, depending upon the size and duration of the operation.

(4) **Combat Aviation Advisors (CAA).** CAA teams are SOF specifically trained and equipped to provide advisory assistance in the interrelated joint SOF areas of FID and coalition support, and UW. They are specifically tailored to assess, train, advise, and assist foreign aviation forces in air operations employment and sustainability. These teams support the GCCs primarily by facilitating the integration and interoperability of US and HN aviation forces supporting joint and multinational operations. Additionally, they directly support the combined and joint force air component commander's (JFACC's) combined and joint air operations plan to facilitate the availability, reliability, and safety of foreign aviation forces, as well as ensure appropriateness of air tasks assigned to multinational partners.

(5) **Special Tactics Teams (STTs).** A STT is a task-organized element that may include combat control, pararescue, and special operations weather team (SOWT) personnel. STTs functions include austere airfield and assault zone reconnaissance, surveillance, establishment, and terminal control; terminal attack control; combat search and rescue; combat casualty care and evacuation staging; and tactical weather observations and forecasting. When supporting JFACC operations, TACON of these teams should be assigned to the JFACC.

c. **Navy SOF (NAVSOF).** NAVSOF denote a subordinate unit, not an HQ.

(1) **Naval Special Operations Command (NAVSOC).** NAVSOC is the Navy component of a joint SOF component.

(2) **NSWTG or Naval Special Warfare Task Unit (NSWTU).** NAVSOF assigned to the JSOTF (or Navy component commander) are normally under the C2 of an NSWTG, when activated, or an NSWTU. A task group or task unit staff plans, coordinates, and oversees execution of SO executed by assigned operational elements in support of fleet commanders, JFCs, or the CDRJSOTF as appropriate.

(3) **Naval Special Warfare Task Element (NSWTE).** An NSWTE is a subordinate element of an NSWTU. Should a JSOTF afloat be established, naval special warfare unit (NSWU) operational personnel likely would form the core of the JSOTF afloat staff. The staff also may include personnel from other NSWU departments who would function as forward liaison personnel for shore-based administrative and support functions.



Should a joint special operations task force (JSOTF) afloat be established, naval special warfare unit operational personnel may form the core of the JSOTF afloat staff.

d. **Marine Corps SOF (MARSOF).** MARSOF refers to a subordinate unit, not a HQ.

(1) **Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC).** MARSOC is the Marine Corps component of a joint SOF component. It mans, organizes, trains, and equips MARSOF to accomplish its mission. Although the MARSOC HQ is a nondeployable unit, the MARSOC commander and members of the staff may deploy as needed in support of USSOCOM tasks to form, deploy, and employ a JSOTF. It includes the following subordinate commands.

(2) **Foreign Military Training Unit.** The foreign military training unit provides tailored military combat skills training and advisor support for identified foreign forces.

(3) **Marine SO Battalions.** There are two Marine SO battalions, each with four to five companies. These companies can be task organized to conduct SR, DA, and FID missions in support of USSOCOM or the supported GCC.

(4) **Marine SO Support Group.** It provides specified support capabilities for SO missions as directed by MARSOC.

e. **United States Coast Guard (USCG).** USCG is the Primary Federal Agency for maritime homeland security. In performing its role in the maritime operations threat response, USCG also supports DOD CONPLANS and maintains units that can deploy to supplement Armed Forces of the US in the maritime domain, domestically and overseas. These units are:

(1) **Maritime Security Response Team and Maritime Safety Security Teams.** These teams deter and respond to threats of maritime terrorism; conduct enhanced maritime interception operations and tactical boardings; and search and seize vessels posing a risk to facilities, ports, or the public.

(2) **Tactical Law Enforcement Teams.** These teams conduct advanced interdiction law enforcement boardings in support of US armed forces. They also train partner nation forces in maritime security and law enforcement, and counterproliferation measures.

f. **JSOACC.** The JSOACC is the commander within a joint SO command responsible for planning and executing joint SO air activities, and for ensuring effective coordination, synchronization, and integration of such activities with conventional air operations. The JSOACC will normally be the commander with the preponderance of aviation assets and/or greatest ability to plan, coordinate, allocate, task, control, and support assigned and attached SO aviation assets. When a joint special operations air component (JSOAC) is established as a functional component of a JSOTF, the CDRJSOTF normally exercises OPCON of all assigned and attached joint SO aviation assets through the JSOACC. However, there are also circumstances where the CDRJSOTF may elect to place selected SO aviation assets under separate control. A JSOAC provides a theater wide capability. In certain cases when there are multiple JSOTFs, the JSOAC will remain under the OPCON of the JFSOCC. A key responsibility of the JSOACC is to ensure close liaison is accomplished with other SOF components and with the conventional air components of other Service and/or functional component commands. The JFSOCC ensures liaison with the JFACC is accomplished through the SOLE in the JFACC's joint air operations center (JAOC). Through the SOLE, the JFSOCC ensures SO aviation activities are closely coordinated, synchronized, and integrated with the JFACC's operations to ensure airspace coordination, flight safety, OPSEC, and unity of effort.

5. Special Operations Forces and Conventional Forces Integration

a. **Background.** Combat operations in Afghanistan (Operation ENDURING FREEDOM) and Iraq (Operation IRAQI FREEDOM) provided examples where SOF and conventional forces initially operated simultaneously and independently in the same JOA. Lessons learned from these operations demonstrated the importance of integration and the need for these forces to operate within a synchronized framework. Challenges, primarily in the areas of C2, maneuver, and fire support coordination areas, surfaced for a variety of reasons. Lack of compatible systems, and lack of knowledge of both types of forces capabilities and limitations, at times, impacted mission accomplishment.

b. **Facilitating Integration.** Conventional forces integrated with SOF create unique capabilities for the JFC to achieve objectives that might otherwise be unattainable. Flexible C2, specific mission generation processes, clear mission approval levels, and tactical interdependence can improve SOF and conventional forces integration. To facilitate effective integration, several key areas listed, while not all inclusive, should be addressed early-on.

(1) **C2.** C2 relationships with conventional forces and SOF must be directed in such a way as to provide the necessary guidance, given an uncertain, noncontiguous, and asymmetric battlefield environment, without unnecessarily restricting the initiative and flexibility of subordinate commanders.

(2) **Liaison and Control Elements.** To fully integrate conventional forces and SOF, effective liaison must be established and maintained with all components of the joint force whose actions may affect the conduct of SO. Unity of effort and reduction of friction between conventional forces, SOF, allies, and coalition partners are accomplished through various liaison and control elements.

(3) **Characteristics and Capabilities/Limitations of Both Types of Forces.** Conventional forces and SOF each possess unique capabilities that, when integrated, can produce even greater warfighting potential for the JFC. Conventional forces operations are characterized by lethal firepower, robust sustainment, and extensive C2 capabilities. SOF operations are characterized by small units of highly trained and select personnel that conduct high-risk missions. Planning must consider both forces capabilities and limitations.

(4) **Integrated Operations Planning of Both Types of Forces.** Effective integration of conventional forces and SOF begins with peacetime planning and joint participation during training and exercises. SOF are also adept at conducting security cooperation missions worldwide and can facilitate cultural awareness and the introduction of conventional forces into an area or region. This capability must be considered during the planning process. During conflict, effective integration of both types of forces' functions and capabilities must be accomplished when planning in order to produce a synergy greater than the sum of the individual forces.

(5) **Joint Fire Support.** Joint fire support is the synergistic product of three subsystems: target acquisition, C2, and attack resources. These subsystems must be properly planned and executed to prevent fratricide and duplication while supporting operational momentum, maintaining the initiative, and conducting maneuver. Both conventional forces and SOF must be integrated fully into this system. In some cases, a JFE is embedded within a JSOTF. In this case, the JFE will coordinate, synchronize, and deconflict fires within the JSOA. When a JFE is not established, the JSOTF J-3 staff coordinates, synchronizes, and deconflicts fires within the JSOA. With or without a JFE, the establishment of a JSOA requires the JSOTF to coordinate and deconflict joint fires and to coordinate and deconflict air operations in its assigned airspace. That coordination and deconfliction function may also require a JACE to assist the JSOTF J-3 in the C2 of these related functions.

(6) **Intelligence.** Joint intelligence operations integrate conventional forces, SOF, theater, and national intelligence capabilities into a unified effort. Each intelligence discipline provides pieces of information synthesized through an analytical process to approach total situational awareness.

c. **Mission Synchronization.** The CDRJSOTF synchronizes SO activities with other joint force component commanders and affected US governmental agencies to ensure success by

facilitating mission execution while minimizing the risk of fratricide. This process can be difficult when SOF are employed prior to conventional operations or when an SO activity is highly classified or compartmented. The JFC and CDRJSOTF weigh legitimate OPSEC considerations against the need to coordinate and synchronize SO. To assist in this process, there must be a well-structured synchronization and coordination process that flows from the supported GCC, through the subordinate JFC, to the CDRJSOTF and other elements of the joint force.

(1) Establishment of a JSOA

(a) The JFC may establish a JSOA when geographic boundaries between SOF and conventional forces are the most suitable control measures. The CDRJSOTF may also request the establishment of a JSOA. The JSOA is an area of land, sea, and airspace, assigned by a JFC to the commander of a joint SO force to conduct SO activities. When a JSOA is designated, the CDRJSOTF is the supported commander within the designated JSOA. The CDRJSOTF may further assign a specific area or sector within the JSOA to a subordinate commander for mission execution. The scope and duration of the SOF mission, operational environment, and politico-military considerations all influence the number, composition, and sequencing of SOF deployed into a JSOA. It may be limited in size to accommodate a discrete DA mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of UW operations. Figure III-2 depicts a JSOA within operational areas of a theater.




Figure III-2. Operational Areas Within a Theater

(b) Establishment of a JSOA for SOF to conduct operations provides a control measure and assists in the prevention of fratricide.

(2) **SO Aviation.** The CDRJSOTF/JSOACC/commander AF SOF (CDRAFSOF) coordinates, synchronizes, and integrates SO with conventional air operations through the use of the SOLE in the JAOC, and through liaisons with other appropriate C2 organizations. CDRJSOTF/JSOACC/CDRAFSOF responsibilities include the following:

(a) Maintaining appropriate control over assigned SOF and attached aviation assets.

(b) Providing appropriate SOF aviation support to theater SO and conventional force operations, when tasked.

(c) Ensuring that SOF air and surface missions are integrated into the air tasking order (ATO) and the airspace control order (ACO). This document is published by the JFACC and normally requires submission of key mission information no later than 24 hours before the start of the ATO day. The SOLE may be required to coordinate and monitor SOF ATO/ACO inputs that cannot meet this time requirement.

(d) Coordinating special tactics requirements for SOF and conventional forces support.

(e) Avoiding fire from friendly air defense systems by ensuring SOF aircraft use identification, friend or foe procedures and by coordinating airspace coordinating measures with the airspace control authority (ACA) and area air defense commander (AADC).

(f) Placing SOF LNOs aboard appropriate C2 aircraft to synchronize specific SOF air missions during execution when OPSEC precludes the use of normal synchronization procedures.

(g) Coordinating conventional forces support for specific SO.

(3) **Land Based SO.** The CDRJSOTF synchronizes SO on land through the use of LNOs and SOCCEs at appropriate joint and land force HQ (Army corps, Marine expeditionary force, division, or landing force), depending on the actual situation. CDRJSOTF responsibilities include the following:

(a) Conducting and executing all aspects of fire support coordination. Fire support coordinating measures are established by:

1. The CDRJSOTF within a JSOA, when established.

2. The commander of an operational area (such as a joint force land component commander responsible for ensuring synchronization and integration of fires and implementing fire support coordinating measures when SOF tactical elements are operating within that commander's operational area).

3. The JFC beyond the boundaries of subordinate area commanders.

(b) Synchronizing ground maneuver through coordination of LNOs and SOCCEs at the appropriate land force HQ.

1. When SOF tactical elements operate within the boundaries of a land and/or maritime commander's operational area, the CDRJSOTF must consider the most appropriate C2 mechanism that achieves the SOF mission and complements the JFC's objectives.

2. Consider placing LNOs with the lead elements of a conventional force conducting linkup operations with SOF elements.

(4) **Maritime SO.** The CDRJSOTF synchronizes maritime SO through the use of LNOs at the joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC) staff (if designated) or appropriate Navy force HQ such as a carrier or expeditionary strike group. If a JSOTF afloat is established, it would serve as the forward liaison command to synchronize maritime SO and coordinate support for maritime SO with the JFMCC and Navy HQ. Responsibilities include the following:

(a) Synchronize indirect fires, air strikes, and maritime maneuver in support of designated SO to include:

1. Airspace control and air defense.

2. Surface maneuver and naval gunfire.

3. Subsurface maneuver.

4. All aspects of offensive naval air operations against land targets using tactical air and cruise missile assets as well as for air support to ground forces (including SOF), mine warfare operations, and strike rescue planning.

(b) Synchronize littoral and riverine SO using procedures as outlined for land-based SO.

d. **Coordination and Liaison Elements**

(1) **SOCCE.** The SOCCE is the focal point for the synchronization of SOF activities with conventional force operations. The SOCCE is predominantly an ARSOF C2 element formed for land-centric warfare, but NAVSOF may form a SOCCE when naval forces operate



Special operations mission synchronization and coordination is necessary to ensure success by facilitating mission execution while minimizing the risk of fratricide.

in conjunction with SOF. MARSOF can augment a SOCCE when Marine Corps forces operate in conjunction with SOF. It performs C2 or liaison functions according to mission requirements and as directed by the establishing SOF commander (JFSOCC or CDRJSOTF as appropriate). Its level of authority and responsibility may vary widely. The SOCCE normally is employed when SOF conduct operations in support of a conventional force. It collocates with the command post of the supported force to coordinate and synchronize SO with the operations of the supported force and to ensure communications interoperability with that force. The SOCCE also can receive SOF operational, intelligence, and target acquisition reports directly from deployed SOF elements and provide them to the supported component HQ. The JFSOCC, CDRJSOTF, and JSOTF component commanders may attach liaison teams from other SOF elements to the SOCCE as required. The SOCCE remains under the OPCON of the establishing SOF commander. The SOCCE performs the following functions:

- (a) Exercises C2 of SOF tactical elements supporting conventional forces.
- (b) Advises the conventional force commander on the current situation, missions, capabilities, and limitations of supporting and supported SOF units.
- (c) Advises the supporting SOF commander(s) of the supported force commander's current situation, missions, intentions, and requirements.
- (d) Provides required secure communications links.

(e) Coordinates and synchronizes SO activities with supported force operations.

(f) When linkup becomes imminent, assists the supported force commander and staff with linkup planning and execution.

(2) **SOLE**

(a) A SOLE is a team provided by the JFSOCC/CDRJSOTF to the JFACC (if designated) or appropriate Service component air C2 organization, to coordinate, synchronize, and integrate special operations air, surface, and subsurface operations with conventional air operations.

(b) The SOLE director works directly for the JFSOCC/CDRJSOTF. The SOLE director places SOF ground, maritime, and air liaison personnel in divisions of the JAOC to integrate with the JFACC staff. The SOLE accomplishes the coordination, synchronization, and integration of SOF air, surface, and subsurface operations by providing a SOF presence in the JAOC that is aware of the activities of SOF units in the field and by providing visibility of SOF operations in the ATO and the ACO. The SOLE must also coordinate appropriate fire support coordinating measures to help avoid fratricide. SOLE areas of interest are shown in Figure III-3.

(c) Although not an all-inclusive list, the SOLE provides the following functions:

1. Harmonizes JFSOCC or CDRJSOTF strategy and targets with the JFACC's intent and vision via liaison with the strategy division.

2. Injects all SOF requirements (to include AFSOF and NAVSOF contingents) within the JFACC's master air attack plan via close coordination with the JFACC's combat plans division.

3. With coordination with the combat plans division, the SOLE facilitates all JFSOCC or CDRJSOTF inputs into the ACO, ATO, and special instructions. The SOLE provides for sufficient staff experience and expertise to plan, monitor, and support the operations.

4. Provides updates for situational awareness to the JFACC combat operations division in order to coordinate JFACC close air support and/or request immediate support for time-sensitive targets.

5. Monitors and deconflicts SOF activities and locations to prevent fratricide.

6. Coordinates real-time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance requirements for CDRJSOTF.

7. Synchronizes SOF personnel recovery activities with the joint personnel recovery center (JPRC).




Figure III-3. Special Operations Liaison Element Areas of Interest

8. Coordinates SOF component space requirements with the designated space coordinating authority.

9. Coordinates and monitors AF/SOF support of conventional forces and operations (such as non-SOF units utilizing AC-130 gunships for close air support).



Team Tank: Special Operations Forces Rangers and conventional forces armor after a successful mission in Iraq.

10. Provides additional deconfliction between SOF aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles during theater air operations.

(3) **LNOs.** SOFLNOs ensure the timely exchange of necessary operational and support information to aid mission execution and preclude fratricide, duplication of effort, disruption of ongoing operations, or loss of intelligence sources. SOF LNOs may assist in the coordination of fire support, aircraft diplomatic clearance for overflight, aerial refueling, targeting, deception, PSYOP, CA operations (CAO), and other operational issues based on ongoing and projected SO missions. These efforts are crucial to maintaining the JFC's unity of effort, tempo, and coordination of limited resources and assets.

ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND ARMOR IN OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

It had been nearly 60 years since Army special operations forces (SOF) and Armor forces worked together in the Italian campaign of World War II. As of April, 2003, history repeated itself: C Company, 2nd Battalion, 70th Armor Regiment was tasked, under operational control, to 1/75th Ranger Battalion to help consolidate the gains of Task Force Viking (10th Special Forces Group) north of Baghdad, interdict high-value targets attempting to flee the city and provide heavy firepower for other Ranger operations.

Given the lack of recent operational experience between two such disparate elements, the armor company commander's first task was to brief the Ranger planners on the capabilities and logistics requirements of the M1A1 Abrams tank. Of primary concern was the availability of fuel; one thirsty tank would use nearly as much fuel as an entire Ranger company's ground mobility vehicle (GMV) fleet combined.

In the first Ranger/armor combined action of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM the mission was to secure K2 Airfield. Moving to the objective, under conditions of zero illumination and near-zero visibility, the armor commander's tank rolled into a 40-foot deep hole and overturned. After extracting themselves from the tank and caring for wounded, the commander then destroyed the tank in place. The commander then transferred to another tank to successfully continue the attack. In a later action, Team Tank (as they came to be designated) and the Rangers assaulted the Al Sarha Airfield and Iraqi Air Force Academy to seize that terrain and interdict Highway 1 north from Baghdad. In that action the armor forces closely supported the dismounted Rangers to breach walls, suppress heavily fortified enemy positions and destroy enemy vehicles as they appeared.

In the few short weeks they worked together the Rangers and armor integrated their SOF and conventional capabilities very well. In these actions the Rangers learned to account for the difficulties of long range travel for the tanks and to employ the tanks' ability to burst past the Ranger GMVs into the lead to engage and destroy enemy forces as they were encountered. The operations also revealed the need to reconcile the Rangers' use of infrared sights with the tankers' use of thermal sights. These successful "joint" operations validated the ability of special operators and conventional forces to bridge the gap and capitalize on the strengths of each.

**SOURCE: JOURNAL OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS HISTORY
WINTER 2005**

6. Logistic Support Relationships

Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, support for SOF is derived from Title 10, United States Code (USC), which states: "the Secretary of a military department is responsible for the administration and support of forces assigned by him to a combatant command." SOF logistic support includes the sustainment and replenishment of all classes of supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, facilities, base operating support and services.

a. Logistic support of SOF units is the responsibility of the parent Service or executive agent. This responsibility exists regardless of whether the SOF unit is assigned to a Service component, TSOC, JFSOCC, JSOTF, joint PSYOP task force, or joint CMO task force.

b. The GCCs and theater Service component commanders, in coordination with the TSOC, are responsible for ensuring that effective and responsive SOF support systems are developed

and provided. GCCs and Service components will document logistic considerations in supporting SOF operations as a separate appendix to annex D of a plan.

c. Types of logistic support for SOF units can be provided through one or more of the following:

(1) Parent Services will address SOF logistic pre-positioning requirements IAW Joint Programming Guidance.

(2) The majority of SOF missions require joint logistic planning and execution. When a theater Service component cannot satisfy its Service SOF support requirements, the GCCs will determine if another Service component can satisfy the requirement through common or joint Service arrangements. Joint logistic arrangements may also be used when it is determined more effective than normal Service support.

(3) When operations involving SOF impose time, geographic and/or resource constraints on the theater support infrastructure, making it impracticable for the theater to provide the requisite support to SOF, the GCCs may request from USSOCOM the deployment of organic USSOCOM combat service support (CSS) assets.

(4) SO-peculiar logistic support includes equipment, materiel, supplies, and services required for SO mission support for which there is no Service-common requirement. These are limited to items and services initially designed for, or used by, SOF until adopted for Service-common use by one or more Military Service; modifications approved by CDRUSSOCOM for application to standard items and services used by the Military Services; and items and services approved by the CDRUSSOCOM as critically urgent for the immediate accomplishment of SO mission. Responsibility for developing and acquiring SO-peculiar equipment and for acquiring SO-peculiar materiel, supplies, and services, belongs to USSOCOM. Service common support will be provided via USSOCOM Service component logistic infrastructure and in coordination with theater Service components.

7. Interagency Coordination Considerations

A JTF HQ is the operational focal point for interagency coordination. During interagency coordination, the JTF HQ provides the basis for a unified effort, centralized direction, and decentralized execution. Depending on the level of a JSOTF HQ in the command structure of an operation, the JSOTF may play a key role in the interagency process. If the JSOTF is the senior or stand-alone JTF, then the JSOTF assumes the primary responsibility as the focal point in the interagency process. A joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) or joint interagency task force (JIATF) may be assigned to the CJTF to assist with US and coalition agency/department activities and support. These organizations are tailored to fit the mission. Elements of the JIACG or JIATF may be assigned to the CDRJSOTF to assist with mission planning. At a minimum, the CDRJSOTF should emplace a liaison element with the JIACG or JIATF.

For further information on interagency considerations, refer to JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations.

8. Multinational Command and Control Considerations

a. **Command Authority.** The President retains command authority over US forces. This includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning employment, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling, and protecting military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It is sometimes prudent or advantageous (for reasons such as maximizing military effectiveness and ensuring unity of effort) to place appropriate US forces under OPCON of a foreign commander to achieve specified military objectives. In making the determination to place US forces under the OPCON of non-US commanders, the President carefully considers such factors as the mission, size of the proposed US force, risks involved, anticipated duration, and ROE.

b. **Use of SOF.** When directed, SOF deploy coalition support teams that can provide the CDRJSOTF with an accurate evaluation of the capabilities, location, and activities of coalition forces, thus facilitating both JSOTF and higher command C2. Coalition support teams have played an integral role in assisting and integrating coalition units into multinational military operations. Coalition support includes assisting with communications interface to integrate them into the coalition command and intelligence structure, establishing liaison to coordinate for combat support and CSS, and training coalition partners on tactics and techniques. Coalition support may also include providing terminal guidance for employment of munitions by US and coalition aircraft. C2 of coalition support teams will be determined by the JFC in coordination with the CDRJSOTF.

CHAPTER IV PLANNING

“A good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan next week.”

George S. Patton, Jr.: War As I Knew It, 1947

1. General

A JSOTF staff (and/or TSOC staff) may conduct both contingency planning and CAP. Within this planning, the JSOTF, TSOC, and their component staffs must consider various planning considerations and unique SO targeting and mission planning requirements. The JSOTF and TSOC staffs must ensure that SO planning considerations are integrated into the JFC mission planning during the early stages.

2. Joint Special Operations Planning Considerations

a. **International Law and Legal Considerations.** It is DOD policy that members of the DOD components comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and in all other military operations. International law considerations will directly affect all aspects of joint planning and targeting. SOF commanders and their staffs must understand and be able to apply the basic principles of international law as they relate to all aspects of SO, to include targeting, human rights violations, monitoring activities of surrogate forces, and other special environments. SOF commanders, as with all US forces commanders, are responsible for reporting law of war violations regardless of what forces are involved. Military personnel should be trained to recognize human rights violations, using the standard of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, to avoid aiding in any violations and to report violations to their chain of command.

b. ROE

(1) **Purpose.** ROE are the directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which US forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.

(2) **ROE Considerations.** ROE issues must be considered during COA development, wargaming, analysis, and selection. Many factors influence ROE, including national command policy, mission, operational environment, commander’s intent, and international agreements regulating conduct. ROE always recognize the inherent right of unit and individual self-defense. Properly developed ROE must be clear, tailored to the situation, and reviewed for legal sufficiency. ROE typically will vary from operation to operation and may change during an operation.

(3) **Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE).** The Secretary of Defense has provided the SROE as stand-alone guidance for US forces that can be easily and quickly amended or clarified to meet mission-specific requirements. SROE apply in the absence of specific guidance from higher authority in the form of supplemental measures. SROE also provide lists of numbered

supplemental measures that may be provided by, or requested from, higher authority to tailor ROE for a particular SOF mission. GCCs also may augment the SROE in order to respond to mission and threat in their AOR. CDRJSOTFs and staffs must understand the military, political, and legal objectives that necessitate ROE and be able to provide understandable and enforceable guidance to their subordinates.

c. **Termination Planning.** Planning for termination of SO must be ongoing during all phases of COA development, deployment of SOF, and execution of operations. In most cases, operations will be terminated in their own right when stated objectives have been met.

(1) The CDRJSOTF must establish measures of effectiveness to determine the accomplishment of strategic and operational objectives of the end state envisioned by the strategic concept and the necessary conditions to bring operations to a favorable end. These conditions must be in consonance with the JFC's CONOPS.

(2) The CDRJSOTF also must consider the safety of the force when withdrawing from the JOA and what additional support will be required for redeployment.

d. **Transition Planning**

(1) Transferring control of an operation to another organization requires detailed planning and execution.

(a) JSOTF operations may be transferred to another military force, regional organization, the United Nations, or civilian organizations. Often, high-level interagency approval and long lead times are required.

(b) Regeneration of SOF capabilities after a conflict will be a primary consideration in the transition plan. Additionally, there may be circumstances where there may not be a total transition of SOF. As examples, the JSOTF could retain certain intelligence gathering missions or be given a FID mission in concert with the transition.

(2) Handover procedures should be rehearsed and SOF element involved in the process should be able to articulate clearly the current situation to the tactical unit or civilian organization that replaces it. C2 of the redeploying SOF, sequencing of departing units, and continued emphasis on force protection are critical concerns.

e. **Interagency Planning Considerations.** It is essential that the CDRJSOTF organize for success early in the planning process. To the extent feasible, the joint planning effort should include all the participants from the outset. Interagency forums established early at the operational level will enable close and constructive dialogue between the engaged agencies. Within the purview of the CDRJSOTF's responsibilities, the following factors should be considered.

(1) **Identify the Interagency Players.** This analysis needs to include all other US agencies that may affect the outcome of the operation. In many cases, initial coordination of

other US agencies may have occurred at a level of command above that of the JSOTF. This identification also considers NGOs.

(2) **Understand the Interagency Hierarchy.** If a lead agency has been identified, know which agency has been assigned that responsibility. The CDRJSOTF coordinates through the JFC to establish liaison with the lead agency. Conversely, if one has not been established, the agencies may view themselves as “one among equals.” In such a case, the CDRJSOTF should attempt to insert discipline, responsibility, and rigor into the planning process in order to function effectively.

(3) **Define the Objectives of the Response Effort.** These should be broadly outlined in tasking orders from higher authority.

(4) **Define COAs for Military Operations with Agency Activities.** Include other US agencies in the COA development and approval process.

(5) **Understand the Role of Each Agency.** Understand their operating principles. Know their capabilities and limitations, points of contact, and crisis management organization. Consider with what agencies liaison should be established.

(6) **Determine Interagency Coordination Requirements.** Identify concurrence and approval requirements, and solicit solutions from all participants.

(7) **Identify Required Resources.** Determine which agencies are committed to provide resources. Avoid duplication of effort and increase coherence in the collective effort.

(8) **Define the End State.** What is the exit strategy and termination criteria? How will transition from military to civilian control occur? Has an end state been identified by higher military HQ in the strategic concept or civilian leadership through policy and strategy formulation?

(9) **Maximize Assets.** The JSOTF’s contribution should optimize the varied and extensive resources available to support and complement the broader, long-range objectives of the crisis response.

(10) **Establish Interagency Assessment Teams.** These are manpower-dependent teams that are deployed to the crisis area to evaluate the situation.

(11) **Implement CAP.** Involve the affected agencies in the planning process at the beginning. Continue the coordination throughout the planning cycle.

f. **NGO Planning Considerations.** NGOs are often on scene in a crisis area prior to the commitment of US forces. They are likely also to remain after the military end state of an operation and may stay for the long term. These organizations are independent, diverse, at times flexible, at times inflexible, grassroots focused, and primarily serve as relief providers. They also may assist or hinder JSOTF operations depending on the JSOTF mission and the objectives

of the organizations. When in an operational environment with these organizations, the CDRJSOTF and staff should consider the following:

(1) Can these organizations lessen the civil-military resources that the CDRJSOTF and staff would otherwise provide to support the operation? There may be a common ground to support unity of effort.

(2) What degree of professionalism or capabilities do they bring to the table? Is there a value added? If so, are they included in certain aspects of the JSOTF planning process?

(3) Can they provide information that might help accomplish the mission or protect the force?

(4) What logistic degree of burden will they place on the JSOTF? Often NGOs are in need of transportation, equipment, supplies, and security. The CDRJSOTF should consider how these potential burdens could be elevated and resolved at the JFC level.

(5) Does PA and/or CMO planning include identification of points of contact with NGOs that will operate in the JSOTF affected area? Does it include how referrals by news media queries regarding their operations will be handled?

(6) Is a civil-military operations center (CMOC) required to facilitate interaction with these agencies and the HN?

For further information on NGOs, refer to JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Volumes I and II.

g. Multinational Forces Planning Considerations

(1) Political objectives of alliance and coalition partners and military intentions of multinational forces may impact on JSOTF planning and operations. Each nation will have its own agenda and strive to accomplish it. In many instances, multinational forces will not be able to influence the planning effort without prior approval of their government and its commitment to the US SO CONOPS and mission.

(2) The CDRJSOTF must recognize and accept the differences between US and multinational forces and strive to harmonize the planning efforts of US and multinational forces. The CDRJSOTF must make multinational forces an integral part of the team. Where possible, the CDRJSOTF should develop standardization procedures to reduce uncertainty among multinational forces (e.g., mutually agreeable terminology and objectives). For instance, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) SOF has published doctrine that outlines the missions and operational norms for the employment of SOF from NATO countries. The CDRJSOTF should consider these norms, standardization agreements, and existing HN doctrinal and regulatory guidance for the employment of SOF when operating in a multinational environment. In some cases, prior training in JSOTF operations may have been accomplished by coalition SOF when

operating as a “framework nation” or as a “lead nation” SOF. A review of training manuals and courses from which these operating norms are derived is beneficial to understand the complexity of SOF multinational and combined operations.

(3) Planning factors that the CDRJSOTF may consider when working with multinational forces include, but are not limited to, those listed in Figure IV-1.

For further information on multinational operations, refer to JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.

3. Special Operations Integration into Joint Planning and Targeting

a. **SO Integration into the GCC Planning Process.** The TSOC is the primary link for integration of SOF into the GCC’s planning process. The CDRTSOC has several ways to integrate SOF. Integration can be achieved through the CDRTSOC’s principal roles as the theater SO advisor and the theater JFSOCC, or CDRJSOTF if designated. The CDRTSOC provides input into GCC’s OPLANs, the theater campaign plan, subordinate campaign plan, and theater security cooperation plan (TSCP).



Figure IV-1. Planning Factors for Multinational Forces

(1) **Theater SO Advisor.** The CDRTSOC advises the GCC and the other component commanders on the proper employment of SOF. The CDRTSOC may develop specific recommendations on assignment of SOF in theater and opportunities for SOF to support the overall theater campaign plan. The CDRTSOC also may be dual-hatted as a special staff officer in the theater staff.

(2) **JFSOCC and CDRJSOTF.** When designated by the GCC, the CDRTSOC may function as the theater JFSOCC and/or CDRJSOTF. If a JSOTF is unilaterally deployed in a theater of operations, not under the C2 of the CDRTSOC, then the CDRJSOTF may assume the roles and responsibilities of the JFSOCC.

(3) **Operation Plan.** The CDRTSOC ensures SO input into the GCC's OPLANs. Specifically, the CDRTSOC should provide input into appendix 4 (Targeting) to annex B (Intelligence), and appendix 3 (Information Operations) and appendix 4 (Special Operations) to annex C (Operations) and annex N (Space) of the OPLAN, as well as other annexes and appendixes as necessary.

(4) **Theater Campaign Plan.** The CDRTSOC participates in the GCC's campaign planning and provides specific recommendations on SO and the employment of SOF. Campaign planning may begin during the contingency planning process and continue during CAP.

(5) **TSCP.** These are TSCPs for all military activities involving other nations in the theater and are intended to shape the security environment. The CDRTSOC plans for SOF integration by providing SO input into the phased planning procedures and engagement activities prescribed in the TSCP. Specific SO inputs may be provided to appendix 3 (Security Assistance), appendix 4 (Combined Training), appendix 7 (Humanitarian Assistance), and appendix 8 (Other Engagement) of annex A (Engagement Activities).

b. **SO Integration into the JFC's Planning and Targeting Process.** The CDRJSOTF has available several means to link with the supported JFC to integrate the planning and targeting processes. Key among these links are: the JSOTF JPG; and, previously discussed, certain boards, centers, teams, and cells; and coordination and liaison organizations. The following discussion focuses on the JPG.

(1) **JSOTF JPG.** The JSOTF JPG synchronizes the planning effort for the CDRJSOTF. A methodology for JPG synchronization is shown in Figure IV-2. It is the direct link to the supported joint force JPG and, depending on established command relationships, also provides the link to the supported GCC's JPG to synchronize SO planning and targeting. The JPG conducts CAP and is the focal point for OPORD development, and contingency, campaign, and future planning. However, it should be understood that the CDRJSOTF might not have the capability to form a fully staffed JPG, nor may the type or duration of the mission require a "full-up" JPG. Should a JPG not be formed, its functions are normally performed by the J-5 future plans division. However, to enhance the CAP planning process, a JPG is recommended. The decision on the organization and functions of the JPG should be determined by the CDRJSOTF at the onset of



Figure IV-2. Joint Special Operations Task Force Organization for Planning

the JSOTF organization. It should also be made clear as to how the JPG and staff sections (particularly the J-3 and J-5) will interact during planning and execution of operations.

(2) **JPG Composition.** The composition and functions of the JPG may vary depending on the planning activities being conducted. The full JPG consists of all core and staff/component representatives associated with planning in the JSOTF. The full JPG should meet at the beginning of any planning effort. For example, if a campaign plan is required for an operation or a new mission is received during the execution of an operation, the full JPG should meet. This allows an information flow both in and out from the immediate JPG members to the entire JSOTF staff and components. Representation to the JPG should be a long-term assignment within the life cycle of the JSOTF to provide continuity of focus and procedural consistency. These representatives should be authorized spokespersons for their sections, components, or

organizations. A notional JSOTF JPG composition is shown in Figure IV-3. Not shown but extremely valuable in the JSOTF JPG are the political advisor, and representatives from the embassy/country team, PSYOP, CA, and interagency representatives as necessary. Functions determine the internal organization of the JPG. Some of the organizations and individuals associated with a JPG may include the following:




Figure IV-3. Notional Joint Special Operations Task Force Joint Planning Group Composition

(a) **JPG Chief.** The JPG chief synchronizes the planning efforts of the JSOTF JPG. The JPG chief should be a senior officer on the JSOTF staff, such as the J-5, deputy commander, or chief of staff, with experience in joint planning and operations.

(b) **Core/Lead Planners.** These are individuals in the JSOTF whose primary duties include leading the full JPG or planning cell through that process to produce the appropriate planning products, such as the OPORD. They normally are personnel who are assigned to the J-5 planning element of the JSOTF on a permanent basis.

(c) **Planning Cells.** In many instances, there is no requirement for the full JPG to meet after the initial planning session (such as the feasibility assessment [FA] or mission analysis). It may be appropriate for a smaller group to work in developing the planning products necessary for the JSOTF to accomplish a mission. This is especially true for the JSOTF planning efforts during execution planning where individual missions are planned. In these instances a core/lead planner is designated to plan and coordinate the mission from inception through handover to the current operations section of the JSOTF. These lead planners form small cells of only those individuals required for planning. If others are required as the planning progresses, the lead planner adds them to the group as required. There may be several planning cells working at any given time. These cells are coordinated through the efforts of the JPG chief and meetings of the full JPG.

c. Other SO Integrating Considerations

(1) **Principles of SO Mission Planning.** There are four principles of SO mission planning. These are:

(a) SOF may begin planning by providing options to the JFC. Timely articulation of how SOF can help achieve the JFC's intent leads to effective utilization of SOF and optimizes integration with the conventional force.

(b) Specific targets or mission assignments for SOF should always contribute substantially to the strategic and operational objectives within the lines of the operation being executed. Limited resources and the extensive planning required dictate that a commander selectively employ SOF for high priority operations. Further, the sensitivity of many SOF missions may dictate that the President and/or Secretary of Defense place specific political, legal, time-of-day, geographic, or force size constraints upon the supported and supporting force.

(c) SOF missions are complete packages that include insertion, resupply, fire and maneuver support, extraction and personnel recovery that must be thoroughly planned before committing the force. The nature of the target, adversary and friendly situation, and environmental characteristics of the operational area are key planning factors. They will dictate the size and capability of the assigned force, the nature of tactical operations, methods of insertion and extraction, length of force exposure, logistic requirements, and size and composition of the command and support structure.

1. SO targeting and mission planning must be conducted in coordination with all applicable GCC and/or subordinate joint force agencies through the appropriate supported JFC. During an ongoing crisis or during sustained combat, conventional targeting and strike response time for ordnance delivery is extremely quick and may affect SOF mobility corridors, infiltration routes, hide sites, personnel recovery sites, or target areas. Conventional force planners must be involved during the early planning stages to facilitate coordination and synchronization of all assets and to allocate conventional resources to support and augment SOF activities, and vice versa. SO mission planning must be supportive of, and supported by, all applicable aspects of the GCC's OPLANs.

2. Detailed targeting and mission planning is vital to successful mission execution and to the survival of deployed operational elements. Based on assigned strategic theater objectives and operational direction provided by the supported JFC, the CDRTSOC or CDRJSOTF provides mission guidance to the subordinate SOF commanders, providing those commanders with the basis for the development of a comprehensive mission plan that allows for the flexible execution required by SOF.

(d) SO rarely can be repeated if they at first fail, since SO targets normally are perishable either from a military or political viewpoint. Therefore, thorough, detailed and, whenever possible, repeated rehearsal is critical. Commanders should recognize and plan for such preparation time.

(2) **Mission Evaluation.** The feasibility of employing SOF to accomplish the mission is evaluated in the context of SOF mission criteria. No mission should be declared feasible or unfeasible for SOF based solely on time available to plan and prepare for a mission. A careful evaluation should be made of the specific mission requirements to determine if there is enough time available for mission success.

(3) **Automated Targeting Systems.** The use of automated targeting systems enable SO planners to participate collaboratively within the joint targeting process. Automated targeting systems support and enhance all phases of the joint targeting cycle by allowing users access to near real time targeting information. SO planners may access updated commander's objectives and guidance for the conduct of FAs. These applications can be used to analyze target system components and for submitting target nomination lists to support SO missions. Electronic target folders with imagery and target intelligence to support SO missions also can be accessed through these automated targeting systems.

d. JSOTF Integration into the Supported Command's Targeting Process

(1) Targeting

(a) Targeting recommendations are made to use SOF for particular targets in support of long- and short-term objectives. Targeting must also integrate ROE and other targeting guidance, and should include an analysis of the second- and third-order targeting effects.

(b) SO should be integrated as much as possible with other missions to achieve strategic and/or operational objectives. Examples of this include the following:

1. Integration of SO infiltration, exfiltration, and target attacks.
2. Integration of SR, DA, and UW operations against a specified target system.
3. Integration of SO attacks and those of other components; for example, SO attacks against a rail net are timed so that the stalled trains may be subsequently destroyed by air, naval, or land forces.
4. Integration of SO attacks and the overall campaign; for example, the decision to use SO attacks against a rail net must be weighed against the need to use that node for subsequent transport of friendly troops and supplies.

(2) **Levels of Targets.** In the context of this publication only, targets may be classified as strategic, operational, and tactical.

(a) Strategic targets are vital to both friendly objectives and the adversary's overall political, military, and economic operations or psychological stability. The use of SOF against strategic targets may be part of the GCC's theater strategy.

(b) Operational targets are deemed critical to the adversary's capability to conduct successful campaigns or major operations. Such targets may include logistic as well as command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence functions required to support and direct tactical operations.

(c) Tactical targets affect the adversary's capability to conduct battles on a relatively localized basis. Normally, SO tactical targets are attacked for their subsequent strategic and operational effects; not just for tactical success. Typical SO tactical targets could include command posts, individual ships, police stations, local telephone exchanges, and individual aircraft. SOF may be tasked to attack or reconnoiter a tactical target using indigenous forces or to exploit a particular aspect of the adversary's economic, psychological, or operations base.

(3) **Target Analysis Methodology.** Target analysis is the examination of potential targets to determine military importance, priority of attack, and weapons required to obtain a desired level of damage or casualties. It is a systematic approach to establishing the adversary vulnerabilities and weaknesses to be exploited. This is accomplished through the methodical examination of all information pertaining to a given target. The target analyst must determine a given target's vulnerability to attack, examine downtime and destructive effects, and determine how to satisfy the commander's objective or success criteria specified in the mission tasking package (during contingency planning) or in the request for support or FRAGORD (during execution phase planning). Examples of target analysis methodologies are in Appendix F, "Target Analysis Methodology."



Special operations forces conduct detailed and methodical target analysis.

(4) **Timing of Actions Against Targets.** The timing of actions taken against a target is an important consideration for SO. Given the estimates of the adversary conduct of operations versus the JFC's plans and objectives, targets developed during both contingency and crisis action planning fall into two general categories, planned and immediate (see Figure IV-4).

(a) **Planned Targets.** Planned targets are those known to exist in an operational area with actions scheduled against them to generate the effects desired to achieve JFC objectives. Examples range from targets on joint target lists in the applicable campaign plan, to targets detected in sufficient time to list in the ATO, mission-type orders, or fire support plans. Planned targets have two subcategories: scheduled or on-call.

1. **Scheduled targets** are planned targets upon which fires are to be delivered at a specific time. Scheduled targets can be attacked by nonlethal means as well, depending on the desired effects.

2. **On-call targets** are those that do not have fires scheduled to be delivered at a specific time, are known to exist in an operational area, and are located in sufficient time for contingency planning to meet emerging situations specific to campaign objectives.

(b) **Immediate Targets.** Immediate targets are those that have been identified too late, or not selected for action in time to be included in the normal targeting process, and therefore have not been scheduled. Immediate targets have two subcategories: unplanned and unanticipated.

TYPES OF TARGETS				
	PLANNED		IMMEDIATE	
	Scheduled	On-call	Unplanned	Unanticipated
Action against targets helps achieve campaign objectives	X	X	X	X
Aware of target during normal targeting process	X	X	X	
Action planned against target during normal targeting process	X	X		
Time for action specified during normal targeting process	X			
Example of time-sensitive target in this category	None	Know ahead of time that an important military convoy will cross a specific bridge, but do not know when during the day.	Find out about same convoy after normal targeting process.	Detect previously unknown convoy of significance just before or while crossing the bridge.

Figure IV-4. Types of Targets

1. Unplanned Immediate Targets. Unplanned immediate targets are those that are known to exist in an operational area but are not detected, located, or selected for action in sufficient time to be included in the normal targeting process.

2. Unanticipated Immediate Targets. Unanticipated immediate targets are those targets that are unknown or unexpected to exist in an operational area but, when detected or located, meet criteria specific to campaign objectives.

(5) Centers of Gravity (COGs), Decisive Points (DPs), and Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs). SOF may be tasked by the supported command to conduct SR and DA

missions to identify and/or attack adversary COGs and DPs that support JFC strategic and operational objectives. In addition, SOF also may be tasked to assess attacked targets to determine whether or not individual component missions, campaign phases, or a theater campaign in general are meeting JFC objectives per established MOEs.

(6) **No-Strike and Restricted Targets.** The JSOTF must ensure that it is included, at every level, in the coordination process with the supported JFC for identifying and nominating targets for the inclusion on the no-strike list and restricted targets (targets that have restrictions imposed that cannot be exceeded).

(7) **High-Payoff and High-Value Targets.** High-payoff targets (a target whose loss to the adversary will significantly contribute to the success of the friendly COA) and high-value targets (a target the adversary commander requires for the successful completion of the mission) may be tasked to the JSOTF by the supported JFC. It is incumbent on the CDRJSOTF during wargaming to conduct a thorough risk assessment and apply the SO operational mission criteria to these designated targets in order to determine if the targets are appropriate for SOF.

(8) **Time-Sensitive Targets (TSTs).** SOF's primary contribution against TSTs is clandestine and/or covert reconnaissance, surveillance, terminal guidance and control of weapons systems. If required, SOF can be employed to destroy or disable a TST, but if not planned for well in advance of the operations, this may compromise their primary mission and require extraction of the team.

(a) **Time-Sensitivity.** Time-sensitivity can play an important part in categorizing a target and determining its appropriateness as a SO target. Time-sensitivity can be viewed from either a targeting or mission planning perspective or a combination of both, as in the case of personnel recovery missions.

1. A target is time-sensitive when it requires an immediate response because it poses (or will soon pose) a danger to friendly forces or is a highly lucrative, fleeting target of opportunity.

2. A mission is time-sensitive when there is a limited window of opportunity during which the objective of the mission must be attained. In this case, the target may be available for SOF attack or reconnaissance over a long period, but the value is high only at a specific time.

(b) **Time Compression.** The SO time-sensitive targeting process will compress and/or truncate phases of the targeting cycle.

(c) **Risk Assessment.** Particular TSTs may be of such risk to SOF or to mission accomplishment that the CDRJSOTF is willing to accept a higher level of risk in order to attack the target immediately upon its detection. Normally, the risk associated with TSTs involves the possible trade-off of diverting SOF assets from another mission to that of the TST. The

CDRJSOTF and JSOTF planners must weigh the risks involved and balance the time required for proper planning and execution against the danger of not engaging the target in time.

(9) **Intelligence Support Considerations.** Intelligence support to SO mission planning is typified by its time-sensitive nature and the uniqueness of some intelligence requirements. A JSOTF is reliant on the national, joint force, or theater intelligence structure and architecture to satisfy intelligence requirements. At times, requirements for intelligence in certain geographical areas to support SO initially may not exist due to previously set priorities for collection. Additionally, although some SO missions require reliance on certain intelligence disciplines for collection, such as human intelligence (HUMINT) and CI, generally a multidisciplined approach with crosscueing among assets is employed.

(a) **Time-Sensitive Nature.** The compressed decision-making cycle under which some SO missions are planned requires early identification of PIRs to provide focused collection, analysis, and production. The JSOTF J-2's participation in the JPG from the onset is critical in formulating PIRs. Moreover, permanent J-2 representation in the JPG also is essential for supporting future operations and planning. The JSOTF J-2 is responsible principally for the timely management of JSOTF staff and component collection requirements and intelligence RFIs. The use of JSOTF J-2 LNOs to the joint force J-2 or the combatant command joint intelligence operations center (JIOC) can facilitate the responsiveness of a supporting intelligence organization. Seamless JSOTF integration into the theater intelligence architecture enables JSOTF connectivity across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of intelligence operations for access to products and databases. This access requires implementation of the “push” and “pull” construct of information dissemination.

For further information on the “push” and “pull” control principles, refer to JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.

(b) **Unique Intelligence Requirements.** Intelligence support to SO mission planning generates intelligence requirements that generally require greater analytical fidelity than requirements normally encountered at theater and national levels. The use of the JSOTF J-2 LNOs to the joint force J-2 or the combatant command JIOC can facilitate the understanding of SO intelligence requirements. Most combatant command JIOCs have SOF production element or intelligence personnel from the TSOC to oversee SO intelligence production. Some SO missions, such as FID and UW, are supported by general military intelligence products, generated at the theater and national levels, that contain military, political, economic, and social aspects of foreign countries. Specific SO intelligence requirements are discussed in Appendix G, “Special Operations Intelligence Requirements: Missions”, and Appendix H, “Special Operations Intelligence Requirements: Insertion and Extraction.”

4. Special Operations Contingency Planning and Targeting

a. **Introduction.** The CDRTSOC normally assists the GCC by providing input to the GCC's assessment to support strategic guidance, concept development, plan development, and plan refinement during the contingency planning process. However, if a JSOTF has been

established, the CDRJSOTF and JSOTF staff may also contribute to the contingency planning and targeting process as directed. For purposes of this discussion, general reference will be made to the CDRTSOC, while understanding that the CDRJSOTF may also be a significant contributor. As plans are refined, SO contingency mission planning and targeting also occurs in a detailed and methodic manner. SO contingency planning is provided as input to the GCC contingency planning process. Also, specific SO contingency mission planning and targeting techniques may be used by the CDRTSOC to further refine the SO part of contingency planning.

b. **SO Contingency Planning in Support of the GCC.** Contingency planning is preparation for a possible contingency based upon the best available information and using forces and resources apportioned for contingency planning by the CJCS. SOF commanders and their staffs rely heavily on assumptions regarding the circumstances that might exist when the plan is implemented. The CDRTSOC actively participates in all phases of theater-level contingency planning, both as a component commander and principal theater SO adviser. Contingency planning responsibilities of the TSOC include assisting in the development of OPLANs, CONPLANs, OPORDs, and supervising SO mission planning folder (SOMPF) production. A SOMPF format is in Appendix J, “Special Operations Mission Planning Folder Formats.” The SO portions of plans are modified and revised as necessary. The CDRTSOC also participates in theater-level strategy development and campaign planning. Plans developed during contingency planning provide a foundation for CDRTSOC planning and ease the transition during CAP. SO contingency planning is discussed in terms of the planning functions: strategic guidance, concept development, plan development, and plan refinement (see Figure IV-5).

(1) **Strategic Guidance.** Strategic guidance is formulated at the national level to provide suitable and feasible military objectives to counter threats. The GCC may provide input through one or more commander’s estimates. During this function, the CDRTSOC reviews tasks applicable to SO, ensures that the SOF apportionment is satisfactory, and provides SO input into the preparation of additional plans, among other responsibilities.

(2) **Concept Development.** The CDRTSOC prepares, or assists in preparation of, the theater SO staff estimate and participates in the concept development process that finalizes CONOPS and supports and assigns tasks to subordinate components. CDRTSOC participation throughout this function should ensure that SOF are effectively integrated into the GCC’s strategic concept.

(3) **Plan Development.** As the plan develops, the CDRTSOC assists the GCC in integrating SO and coordinating with CDRUSSOCOM for US based support.

(a) **Force Planning.** The CDRTSOC assists in preparation of the SO portion of the OPLAN and provides the initial SOF force list and TPFDD. Apportioned SOF should deploy as early as possible; the plan may require SOF forward presence during critical time periods when the likelihood of employment is increased.

(b) **Support Planning.** The CDRTSOC coordinates with the theater J-4, Service component commanders, and the SOF parent Services to determine support and replenishment




Figure IV-5. Special Operations Input into the Contingency Planning Process

requirements for apportioned SOF and how these requirements will be satisfied. SOF normally plan to deploy with their unit basic loads and a limited amount of supplies, unless otherwise directed by the GCC. The SO TPFDD input should include dedicated SOF support units.

(c) **Transportation Planning, Shortfall Identification, and TPFDD Refinement.** If the transportation planning process identifies SOF shortfalls, the CDRTSOC staff coordinates with theater planners to resolve the shortfalls. If transportation shortfalls cannot be resolved at the planner level, the CDRTSOC advises the GCC and adjusts the plan as directed. As the TPFDD is refined, the CDRTSOC ensures that SO data is current and correct, and that it is not inadvertently altered.

(4) **Plan Refinement.** During this function, the supported commander refines the complete plan while supporting and subordinate commanders, Services and supporting agencies complete their plans for review and approval. In general, the supported commander is not required to submit plans for the Secretary of Defense approval unless specifically directed to do so. To facilitate that refinement, the CDRTSOC must have identified to the GCC whether SO taskings have been met and whether SO resources have been used effectively within the constraints of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3110.01, *Joint Strategic*



The theater special operations command and/or joint special operation task force provides input to the geographic combatant commander during contingency planning.

Capabilities Plan (JSCP) apportionment guidance. Additionally, the CDRTSOC would assist in the resolution of unresolved shortfalls in SOF resources and capabilities.

c. **SO Targeting and Contingency Mission Planning Techniques.** SO target nomination and selection procedures are applicable to all SOF missions. Contingency SO targeting and mission planning techniques may consist of the following steps: target nomination, target validation, intelligence production, mission planning, and SOMPF maintenance. A technique for TSOC/JSOTF contingency planning and targeting is depicted in Figure IV-6.

(1) **Target Nomination.** Target nominations are generated in a variety of ways. A TSOC may receive them from its components or the GCC may task other components of the joint force to nominate SO targets in support of the GCC's objectives. The TSOC targeting panel, if formed, can be the conduit for receiving and processing target nominations. In addition to receiving nominations, the TSOC targeting panel may conduct an independent analysis of the plan and develop a proposed list of targets and missions. The role of the target panel is to formulate SOF targeting strategy and coordinate targeting activities for the TSOC JOC. The target panel conducts these activities through the GCC and component commander staffs. Also, the TSOC J-2 initiates and coordinates the intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE) and production of IPOE products. These products are updated throughout the planning processes and form the basis of the TIP.

(a) To facilitate the target selection process, target nomination format should include:




Figure IV-6. Special Operations Contingency Planning and Targeting Techniques

1. The target's basic encyclopedia (BE) number, name, functional category code, description and significance, critical damage point(s), effect(s) desired on the target, and collateral damage concerns.

2. Location coordinates with datum to include latitude/longitude and elevation in mean sea level/height above the ellipsoidal. All coordinates should be defined using World Geodetic Survey-84 datum.

3. Specific OPLAN/OPORD objectives for which the nominated target supports and the proposed SO mission such as DA and SR.

4. Statement of target significance to include recommended attack, strike, or surveillance objectives.

5. Time of execution.

(b) Exclusive of the target nomination format, the process also requires the following:

1. Gather Target Information. When feasible, TSOC planners coordinate with joint force planners to determine requirements for SOF in targeting and surveillance to support their operations.

2. Review Target Information and Other Considerations. After receiving this input, the targeting panel should also examine PSYOP and any unconventional assisted recovery mechanisms requirements.

3. Analyze Target Information. After considering all of the above input, the panel conducts an analysis of all probable targets using the SOF mission criteria and fills out target nomination worksheets on those targets selected.

4. Apply Common Sense Test. The operations element of the JOC should scrub the target list for a "sanity check" concerning the capability of it being executable.

5. Brief CDRTSOC. Once all of the previous steps have been accomplished, the TSOC targeting panel should provide a formal briefing to the CDRTSOC on the proposed targeting strategy for this phase of the operation.

6. Prioritize and Group Target Information. Once the commander has decided on a strategy for targeting, the TSOC targeting panel continues to coordinate with the J-3 to prioritize and group targets by date/time for execution.

(2) Target Validation

(a) CDRTSOC commences target validation upon compilation of SO target nominations. The TSOC targeting panel conducts a gross feasibility analysis, eliminating target nominations inappropriate for SOF employment. Targets are also vetted against the no-strike list and restricted target list, as well as evaluated for compliance with the principles of law of armed conflict (LOAC). Suitable targets are consolidated, prioritized, and forwarded to the JTCB as a proposed SO target nomination list (TNL).

(b) The JTCB reviews the proposed TNL to ensure targets are supportive of JFC objectives (strategic and operational).

(c) The GCC normally tasks CDRTSOC, via a mission tasking letter, to develop a FA (Appendix K, “Special Operations Feasibility Assessment”) on SO targets approved by the JTCB.

(d) CDRTSOC assigns a mission planning agent (MPA) for each target and tasks the appropriate MPA to develop the FA. The MPA prepares the FA while a supporting initial assessment (IA) (Appendix L, “Special Operations Initial Assessment”) is developed to support infiltration/exfiltration feasibility of the mission.

(e) CDRTSOC tasking for FA/IA development is transmitted via the mission tasking package (MTP) (Appendix M, “Special Operations Mission Tasking Package”). All FA/IA tasking are transmitted through the appropriate component. This procedure initiates SOMPF development.

(f) During FA/IA development, effective coordination is required between the MPA, supporting MPAs and agencies and conventional commanders (if applicable).

(g) The results of the FA/IAs are provided per the distribution schedule. Following a review by the CDRTSOC, if the proposed target is not feasible for SOF, it is deleted. If the proposed targets are feasible for SOF, the results of the FA/IAs are forwarded to the GCC. Targets identified as SOF feasible require an intelligence production requirement to be submitted by the TSOC to the combatant command JIOC.

(h) The resultant product of this step is a validated and prioritized SO target list. The combatant command intelligence planners ensure that the SO target list is integrated into the GCC’s joint integrated prioritized target list.

(3) **Intelligence Production.** Once validation is complete, the TSOC J-2 in coordination with combatant command intelligence production managers, prepares the TIP (Appendix N, “Special Operations Target Intelligence Package”).

(a) A critical part of the FA is the intelligence requirements section, which modifies and amplifies the information required to plan a mission. This becomes the request for information to be addressed in the TIP.

(b) TIPs are produced using minimum priority information requirements required by the MPA to develop the CONOPS. The TIP supports the entire mission planning process on the strength of the analysis provided. Direct liaison should be authorized between the SOF MPA and the intelligence production agency (IPA).

(4) **Mission Planning.** SO mission planning is designed to develop a CONOPS against a designated target. CDRTSOC tasks the designated MPA for CONOPS development. Using operational data and intelligence provided in the FA and TIP, the executing MPA develops the CONOPS. Coordination with supported and supporting units is essential for effective CONOPS development. A supporting unit may be tasked to develop a mission support plan (MSP) (Appendix O, “Mission Support Plans”). A MSP complements the CONOPS. The CDRTSOC facilitates this coordination. The completed CONOPS is forwarded to the CDRTSOC for approval.

(5) **Special Operations Mission Planning Folder Maintenance.** Maintenance is required by the intelligence production agencies and MPAs. This task is monitored to ensure that TIPs and CONOPS are updated.

5. Special Operations Crisis Action Mission Planning and Targeting

a. **Introduction.** During a crisis situation, both the JFC and CDRJSOTF should identify, coordinate, and quickly respond to the mutual planning requirements. The CDRJSOTF also must be able to shift the JSOTF planning focus as a crisis event unfolds and operations begin. SO CAP and targeting procedures are addressed in terms of events that occur from an initial request for support through execution of the SO mission. For the purpose of clarity during the discussion of SO CAP and targeting, the terms JFC and CDRJSOTF will be used to delineate responsibilities and functions of the supported and subordinate commanders. SO CAP will be addressed in terms of the operational activities: situational awareness, planning, and execution.

b. **SO CAP in Support of the JFC.** During a crisis situation, a JSOTF conducts both operational planning and execution planning as part of CAP as depicted in Figure IV-7. As a joint force is working through CAP, the JSOTF also is conducting parallel planning.

c. **SO CAP (Situational Awareness and Planning).** During the CAP operational activities of situational awareness and planning, the JSOTF’s efforts are directed toward two types of products. These products are inputs to the joint force’s OPORD (with its organic TPFDD) and development of the JSOTF’s own OPORD to provide JSOTF components with overall guidance and direction. The processes used to develop these two products usually are conducted concurrently.




Figure IV-7. Joint Special Operations Task Force Support to Crisis Action Planning

(1) **Providing Input to the JFC’s OPORD.** The focus of the JSOTF’s planning efforts in this activity of SOF operational planning is development of input to the JFC’s OPORD (see Figure IV-8). The JSOTF staff should provide information for all aspects of the JFC’s order (base order, all annexes, and appendices). This should be done as a collaborative planning effort between the joint force and JSOTF planners. Although all aspects of the joint force order will impact the JSOTF, it is especially important that the JSOTF provide input to the appendix 4 (Special Operations) to annex C (Operations) of the joint force OPORD. Major operational issues that also should be discussed in developing input to the joint force’s OPORD include the following: operational capabilities required, forces required, command relationships, targeting priorities, force allocation, task organization, deployment and basing options, mission approval procedures, and TPFDD input. The process that allows the JSOTF to contribute to the joint force’s OPORD is depicted in Figure IV-9 and includes the following:

(a) **Contributing to the JFC’s Mission Analysis**

1. Determining known facts. This includes:




Figure IV-8. Joint Special Operations Task Force Support to Crisis Action Planning: Input to Joint Force Commander's Orders

- a. Analyzing the GCC's mission and intent from a SO perspective.
 - b. Describing the friendly situation of the joint force, JSOTF, components, and other commands.
 - c. Determining current status or conditions of SOF already provided by the GCC.
 - d. Describing how possible SOF missions relate to the joint force's plans.
 - e. Describing other facts that may impact on the possible missions.
2. Developing assumptions to replace missing or unknown facts. As examples, but not limited to:




Figure IV-9. Operational Planning Process: Commander and Staff Responsibilities

- a. Status-of-forces at probable execution.
- b. Availability and support requirements of HN or multinational forces.
- c. Available time.
- d. Support from other government agencies (such as obtaining overflight rights).
- e. ROE changes if required.
- f. Political considerations that may affect the mission.

3. Reviewing operational limitations of actions required or prohibited by higher authority and other restrictions that limit the CDRJSOTF's freedom of action. These operational limitations include constraints and restraints.

a. Constraint: A constraint is a requirement placed on the command by a higher command that dictates an action, thus restricting freedom of action.

b. Restraint: A restraint is a requirement placed on the command by a higher command that prohibits an action, thus restricting freedom of action.

4. Identifying tasks to be performed by SOF. These include:

a. Determining specified tasks.

b. Determining implied tasks.

c. From the above, determining essential tasks.

5. Conducting initial SOF force structure analysis. Tentatively identifying required and available SOF assets, and required capabilities.

6. Conducting an initial risk assessment.

7. Determining end state (or success criteria) for SOF.

8. Identifying intelligence requirements. As early as possible, include support required beyond that of the capability of the joint force and identify PIRs. Clear, routine communication between the JSOTF J-2 and the joint force J-2 will facilitate the review of joint force intelligence products supporting the planning process.

9. Assisting in developing the joint force's mission statement.

10. Assisting in developing a mission analysis briefing for the JFC.

(b) **Assisting Mission Analysis Briefing and receiving JFC Planning Guidance**. The JFC normally provides guidance at this point. This planning guidance is then disseminated to the JSOTF and other joint force components.

(c) **Developing SOF Options for the JFC's COA**. The joint force staff develops multiple friendly COAs. The JSOTF performs the following actions in support of the joint force staff COAs:

1. Develop options for initial SO COAs.

2. Review mission analysis and JFC's guidance.

3. Develop/refine a comparison of adversary forces and current friendly force relative force ratios in combat power.

4. Review options for attacking/neutralizing the adversary's COGs and accomplishing the joint force's mission/tasks.

5. Provide options for SOF operational movement. These options include, but are not limited to, the following:

a. Formulating options for strategic deployment of SOF to the JOA. This consists of developing/integrating the deployment concept consistent with the JFC's supporting campaign scheme and sequence of operations and balancing requirements for initial combat and noncombat operations, force reception and buildup, and timing of required follow-on operations.

b. Considering options for intratheater deployment of SOF within the JOA. Identifying positions from which SOF could initiate major operations. Developing options for logistic support for the movement of SOF from ports of debarkation to initial positions. Also consider transportation, existing transportation infrastructure and required improvements, aircraft overflight agreements/restrictions en route to the JOA IAW the DOD Foreign Clearance Guide, available bases/airfields to support movement, intermediate staging bases (ISBs), and SOTFs.

6. Provide options for SOF operational maneuver. Develop options for the concentration of SOF in the JOA and develop options to conduct operations in-depth.

7. Provide options for SOF operational mobility. Consider effective use of existing facilities or infrastructure, the capture or isolation of facilities or infrastructure, and preparation of routes and operating bases.

8. Provide options for SOF counter-mobility. These include options in support of a quarantine/embargo and options in support of a blockade.

9. Provide options for SOF firepower.

a. Describe relationships between SO-based combat power and conventional air/naval/land combat power. Consider command relationships from the perspective of JFC objectives.

b. Identify/nominate or receive joint force component nominations for operationally significant targets affecting SO. Balance targeting requirements in support of maneuver with requirements in support of other joint force interdiction. Integrate SO-based interdiction capabilities into interdiction options, and identify and integrate both lethal and nonlethal means of attack.

10. Provide options for SOF force protection.

a. Consider options for protection of operational forces, means, and noncombatants to include evacuation of noncombatants from the JOA, establishing chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) protection measures, and coordinating personnel recovery operations.

b. Provide options for OPSEC.

c. Provide options for deception in support of the JFC's and GCC's deception plan.

d. Provide options for security of SOF.

11. Provide options for the SOF C2.

a. Plan to incorporate SOF in the joint force information architecture.

b. Develop options to task SOF.

c. Develop options for organizing the JSOAs in the JOA.

12. Test each COA input for validity.

13. Provide input to the JFC COA statement and sketches.

(d) **Participating in COA Analysis (Wargaming).** Contribute to the process of wargaming by mentally “fighting the battle” in time and space. The process may use the structure of “action — reaction — counteraction” sequences for critical events. Key elements the staff should determine include details about:

1. Required SOF operational capabilities (specific tasks to capabilities).

2. Required SOF.

3. Task organization of the JSOTF throughout the operation.

4. Command relationships.

5. Targeting priorities.

6. Deployment options and basing rights.

7. Decision points and intelligence requirements related to major events.

8. Operational support needed.

9. Identification of branches (what if) and sequels (what then).

(e) Participating in COA Comparison

1. Participate in determining the criteria to be used for comparing COAs. Criteria for comparison of SO options could come from the commander's intent and factors of mission accomplishment, adversary, terrain, troops available, time available, and political factors.

2. Ensure recommendations for SO have been coordinated with SO components of the joint force.

(f) Receiving JFC's Decision on COAs. The JFC may select or modify the recommended COA. Based on that decision, the JFC's "Commander's Estimate" document (or slides) normally will be sent/briefed to the supported GCC for approval.

(g) Providing SO Perspective in the Joint Force Order. After the COA is selected, the order is developed. Most of the information needed for this task already should have been developed through the estimate process (mission analysis through COA selection). SO input can be in many sections of the order, but the primary area should be appendix 4 (Special Operations) to annex C (Operations) of the order.

(2) Development of the JSOTF OPORD. Another product of operational planning for the JSOTF is the JSOTF OPORD (see Figure IV-10). As discussed previously, it is important that the JSOTF OPORD and the JSOTF's input to the joint force's OPORD be conducted almost simultaneously. The processes used to develop the OPORD follow the same process used for input to the joint force's order, but are refined and tailored to provide guidance to the JSOTF's components.

(a) Conduct Mission Analysis. Information obtained while developing input for the joint force's order should be updated and applied to the JSOTF level of planning. Topic areas include:

1. Review known facts.

a. Describe the friendly situation: joint force, JSOTF, components, and other requesting commands.

b. Describe how possible missions relate to the joint force's plans.

c. Describe other facts that may impact on the possible missions.

2. Review assumptions. Assumptions replace unknown facts. Assumptions must be valid and necessary for planning to continue. Consider support from other government agencies (such as for obtaining overflight rights); ROE changes if required; availability of forces; and political effects on the mission.



Figure IV-10. Joint Special Operations Task Force Support to Crisis Action Planning: Developing Commander, Joint Special Operations Task Force's Orders

3. Review operational limitations to include constraints and restraints.
4. Review required tasks. Include specified, implied, and essential tasks.
5. Review required and available assets and capabilities. This includes SOF assets that are required to accomplish possible joint force directed missions.
6. Review previous IPOE products and initial collection plan associated with the target. As early as possible, include support required beyond that of the capability of the JSOTF and identify PIRs.
7. Review risks to SOF.

a. Identify and assess risks that the JFC is willing to take to accomplish the mission, address SOF force protection issues, and assess time available as determined by JFC imposed limitations.

b. Estimate risk of collateral damage to noncombatants and non-targeted facilities, and visibility of mission forces for possible detection.

c. Compare the value of the missions to the possible loss of SOF and the negative impact to the nation or the theater campaign.

d. Consider not only the potential for loss of SOF units and equipment, but also the risks to US diplomatic and political interests should the mission fail.

e. Assess the risk of failure due to possible inadequate preparation, incorrect intelligence estimates, and time to obtain support from non-SOF assets.

f. Once risks have been identified, risk reduction measures are developed and added to the implied task list.

8. Review mission success criteria. State the criteria to measure progress and success in terms that are quantifiable and realistic.

(b) **Develop, Analyze, Compare, and Recommend SOF COAs.** This step is dependent on time available. COAs can be as simple as force options, or more complex and detailed. Specifically, the JSOTF should develop COAs to support the joint force as a whole. These COAs identify/confirm:

1. Who (type of SOF) will execute the task.

2. What type of SO mission, action, or task is contemplated.

3. Where the mission will occur.

4. When the mission will be executed (based on timeline established by the JSOTF or higher HQ).

5. Why each element of the force will conduct its part of the operation.

6. How the JSOTF will employ available SOF.

7. COAs are analyzed to identify strengths and weaknesses and further identify many of the elements of execution planning for each COA. Friendly COAs are then compared to reveal which COA has the highest probability of success. The end product of this step is a recommendation to the CDRJSOTF on a COA for the various types of missions the joint force has assigned the JSOTF.

d. **SO CAP (Execution).** The process for SO execution mission planning is dynamic and interactive (see Figure IV-11). It requires continuous coordination and communications among the joint force, JSOTF, and other components of the joint force. Collaborative planning can be of immense value during CAP.

(1) **Requests for Support.** Requests for support (which include, but are not limited to, targets for SOF) can come from a variety of sources. Among these are the joint force HQ (elements such as the JTCB and JPG); the joint force components; JSOTF components; and multinational forces. These requests, depending on command relationships and mission approval levels already established, may come from a supported command direct to the JSOTF or may go through the joint force to the JSOTF.

(2) **Conducts FA.** The JSOTF conducts a FA to provide an initial determination of the viability of a proposed mission/target for SOF employment. It is an abbreviated version of




Figure IV-11. Special Operations Execution Mission Planning

mission analysis, and COA development, analysis, and selection. It essentially answers the following SO criteria questions of: Is it an appropriate SOF mission? Does it support the JFC's mission and intent? Is it operationally feasible? Are required resources available? Does the expected outcome justify the risk? See Appendix K, "Special Operations Feasibility Assessment."

(3) **Submit FA to Joint Force.** Submission of the FA to the joint force provides the JFC with an assessment of SOF ability to accomplish specific requests for support.

(4) **Provide WARNORD to Subordinates.** The components should be informed early on if a mission is likely to be tasked. Critical intelligence products should be pushed to the MPA at this point. This provides the components with more time to begin their mission planning. This step is not necessary if the FA determines that the "SOF mission criteria" are not sufficiently satisfied for execution by SOF.

(5) **Provide Input for Developing the Joint Force FRAGORD.** The JSOTF JPG should be coordinating with the joint force JPG (through the JSOTF LNO or other means) to provide input to the joint force for development of the joint force FRAGORD that tasks the JSOTF for the mission.

(6) **Develop the JSOTF's FRAGORD.** Once the joint force FRAGORD has been sent to the JSOTF, the JPG reviews it to confirm and/or update the information that was developed during the FA. In some instances, a verbal WARNORD or FRAGORD may be the JSOTF's first indication of a mission. In this case the JPG will have to conduct a rapid and abbreviated mission analysis and COA selection process.

(a) **Confirm or Conduct Mission Analysis.** This is the same process as discussed in the FA, but the CDRJSOTF must now select the most feasible COA.

(b) **Confirm and Conduct COA Selection.** This is also the same process as discussed in the FA.

(c) **Confirm and Identify MPA.** Ideally, the MPA has been identified and given a WARNORD during the FA phase. However, this may not be possible in all instances therefore this step formally designates the MPA. At this point, push intelligence products to the MPA and coordinate TIP production.

(d) **Allocate Resources.** If necessary, the CDRJSOTF provides direction and assistance on the identification and coordination for additional resources that may be necessary for the MPA to conduct the mission. The CDRJSOTF must identify to the JFC those specific support requirements.

(e) **Identify Supporting Components.** In most missions, the MPA will require assistance from supporting commands and components. The type of support should be specified. In addition, the JSOTF (as the directing HQ for the support arrangement) should provide the

following information when establishing support command relationships in an establishing directive:

1. Specify the purpose of the support relationship, the effect desired, and the scope of the action to be taken.
2. Forces and resources allocated to the supporting effort.
3. Time, place, level, and duration of the supporting effort.
4. Priority of the supporting mission relative to the other missions of the supporting force.
5. Authority, if any, of the supporting commander to modify the supporting effort in the event of exceptional opportunity or an emergency.
6. Degree of authority granted to the supported commander (the MPA) over the supporting effort.

(f) **Confirm and Identify Intelligence Requirements.**

(g) **Confirm and Identify ROE Requirements.**

(h) **Identify Supporting Plans.** There may be instances where the JSOTF/MPA will be the supporting command. In these cases, the plans of the supported unit need to be identified and reviewed. This may also occur when the JSOTF is conducting a transition (or handover) to or from another command.

(i) **Identify Mission Approval Authority.** Clearly identify mission approval authorities for each mission.

(j) **Write and Transmit the FRAGORD.** The FRAGORD designates the MPA and supporting agencies; identifies specific taskings, planning timelines, and CONOPS requirements; grants direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH); and sometimes establishes the earliest anticipated launch time. Acknowledgment of the FRAGORD is required.

(7) **MPA Develops CONOPS and Support Requests.**

(a) **CONOPS Requirements.** The CDRJSOTF should clearly specify the requirements for the MPA in submitting the CONOPS for approval IAW the JSOTF SOP or as stated in the FRAGORD. Among those items that should be included in the CONOPS are the situation, mission (restated MPA mission), and execution (CONOPS, subordinate unit tasks, coordination, and operational limitations).

(b) Mission Support Requests (MSRs)

1. Support request (SPTREQ). For initial support, the MPA submits a SPTREQ to the supporting component HQ and provides an information copy to the JSOTF requesting resources needed to accomplish the tasked mission. It should be sent at the same time that the MPA sends the CONOPS message. For support from sources outside of the JSOTF (such as submarine and naval surface fire), the SPTREQ is sent only to the JSOTF for action. The JSOTF may grant liaison between SOF components and components of the joint force. The SPTREQ should list all MPA support requirements and identify any preference for a particular supporting agency. The MPA may submit additional SPTREQs as planning continues. For follow-on support, the MPA submits a SPTREQ to the supporting component HQ for action and provides an information copy to the JSOTF requesting follow-on support for a team already on a mission. The SPTREQ should be submitted as soon as possible.

2. Air support request (AIRSUPREQ). For initial support, the AIRSUPREQ is used to request preplanned and immediate close air support (CAS), interdiction, reconnaissance, surveillance, escort, helicopter airlift, and other aircraft missions. The MPA submits an AIRSUPREQ to the appropriate supporting joint force air component HQ and provides an information copy to the JSOTF requesting resources needed to accomplish the tasked mission. It should be sent at the same time the MPA sends the CONOPS. The JSOTF may grant direct liaison between SO components and components of the joint force. The AIRSUPREQ should list all MPA air support requirements and identify any preference for a particular supporting agency. The MPA may submit additional AIRSUPREQs as planning continues. Immediate CAS requests should be submitted using the joint tactical air strike request per JP 3-09.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS)*. Requests should be submitted through the JSOTF to deconflict fire support assets and expedite tasking to preplanned or alert CAS assets. SOF LNOs and coordination elements should be aware of mission coordination in progress.

3. Airspace Control Means Request. It is used to request that a defined block of airspace be designated as having special significance for air operations within an AOR. These areas include drop zones (DZs), ground free-fire zones, landing zones (LZs), pickup points, restrictive fire plans, designated areas of recovery, selected areas for evasion (SAFEs), and potential evasion locale. These zones may be defined as a circle around a central point, a corridor centered on a line, an area bounded by line segments, or airspace bounded by attitude. This request is submitted to the joint special operations air component who will forward them to the SOLE to enter into the ACO.

4. MSR confirmations. Prior to mission execution, the supporting SOF components send support confirmations in response to the support requests, or request confirmations in response to the AIRSUPREQs to the MPA with information copies provided to the JSOTF.

(8) **CONOPS Approval**

(a) **CDRJSOTF Has Mission Approval Authority.** If the CDRJSOTF has approval authority for execution of the mission, a JSOTF CONOPS is not submitted to the joint force. Once the CDRJSOTF is satisfied with the MPA's CONOPS, the JSOTF sends a CONOPS approval to the MPA and supporting components. Approval is sent as soon as possible after receipt of the MPA's CONOPS. The CDRJSOTF may delegate approval/execution authority to CDRJSOTF subordinate commanders.

(b) **CDRJSOTF Does Not Have Mission Approval Authority.** If the CDRJSOTF does not have approval authority for the mission, a JSOTF CONOPS is sent to the JFC for approval.

(9) **Monitor Other Support Plans.** There could be instances where commands or agencies, either within or outside the joint force, could provide support or follow-on actions to the JSOTF. The JSOTF should monitor the planning activities and coordinate actions to ensure unity of effort. Some examples of such efforts include the following:

(a) **Mission/Target Handover.** The JSOTF could handover a mission or target to another joint force component, another US Government (USG) agency, or even another nation's forces. JSOTF forces could be hampered in the handover if the incoming unit has not properly prepared for the actions.

(b) **Joint Air Operations.** The JFSOCC/JSOTF will monitor the ATO and ACO to ensure that support and deconfliction are provided as requested. The SOLE integrates all SOF air and surface activity into the JFACC's ATO and ACO.

(10) **Mission Backbriefs.** Mission backbriefs are briefings by subordinate commanders to the mission approving authority (the CDRJSOTF or JFC) explaining how the SOF operational element intends to accomplish the assigned mission. Representatives from the JSOTF JPG and JOC should attend the backbrief if at all possible. At this point planning has not ended and changes can still be made to the plan.

(a) The major benefits of backbriefs are that they allow the approving commander to:

1. Clarify the commander's intent.
2. Identify and emphasize the commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs).
3. Understand problems that the MPA may be having in planning the mission.
4. Understand the MPA's CONOPS.

5. Modify and/or approve the MPA's CONOPS.

(b) The approving commander should expect the following from the MPA:

1. Information concerning the MPA's assumptions, task organization, mission statement, commander's intent, CONOPS, threat assessment, and risk.

2. Discussion of any issue that needs clarification.

3. Requests for support and assistance in resolving issues.

(11) **Plans Handover Procedures.** At some point prior to mission execution, the JSOTF's planning effort should be handed over to the JOC for execution. This handover should be a formal process in which the JPG ensures that the JOC personnel are thoroughly familiar with the plan. The plans handover briefing should include the following:

(a) **Situation.** Include the general situation, target and mission description, and threat assessment.

(b) **Mission.** Include specified and implied tasks, and expected results of action taken in as specific terms as possible.

(c) **Task Organization.** Identify SOF operational elements. Include support and logistic elements as required.

(d) **CONOPS.** Include infiltration plan, actions on the objective, exfiltration plan, fire support plan, and emergency action plan.

(e) **Other.** Include limitations, ROE, support plans, status of support requests, status of the TIP, and command and signal.

(12) **Requests for Execution and EXORD.** The MPA requests authority for mission execution (verbal or via message/e-mail). If the CDRJSOTF has mission execution authority, approval is granted through an EXORD. If the JFC (or higher level of command) has execution authority, the CDRJSOTF prepares a request for execution and submits it to the JFC. The higher authority provides an EXORD and the CDRJSOTF subsequently issues an EXORD to the MPA and supporting commands.

(13) **Operation Summary (OPSUM).** Once the mission is complete, the MPA submits an OPSUM to the CDRJSOTF.

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CHAPTER V OPERATIONS

“Everything is simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult.”

Clausewitz: On War, 1812

1. General

A JSOTF conducts operations across the full range of military operations. Operations can range in size, purpose, and combat intensity within the range of military operations that extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence to crisis response and contingency operations, and, if necessary to major operations and campaigns. In certain situations a JSOTF may operate independently, but it normally operates as part of a joint force. SOF core tasks may not fall clearly within a specific range of operations.

2. Joint Operations Center

The CDRJSOTF normally organizes a JOC, under the direction of the JSOTF J-3, to serve as the focal point for all operational matters. The JOC should be staffed and equipped to maintain situational awareness; monitor and direct current operations; and plan and coordinate future operations. The JOC, or portions thereof, may be established early during the CAP process, particularly if SOF are considered for early deployment into the operational area. Early establishment of a JOC assists in the timely flow of information during the CAP process since it provides a centralized point for the handling, tracking, and recording of information.

a. **Key Functions.** Key functions of the JOC may include the following:

(1) **Force and Resource Monitoring and Management.** Monitors the current status of assigned, attached, and allocated forces and resources and provides information to assist in allocating and moving forces and materiel.

(2) **Planning.** Assists in the preparation of plans relating to current SO. In the absence of a JPG, assimilates these functions and assumes the responsibility for future planning.

(3) **Direction.** Directs and orchestrates current operations and takes other necessary actions within the authority delegated to the JOC by the CDRJSOTF.

(4) **Execution.** Supervises and monitors the execution of OPORDs to ensure that CDRJSOTF objectives are being met.

(5) **Situation Monitoring.** Monitors the current situation of JSOTF forces and continuously reviews their progress. Ensures that time-sensitive mission planning is synchronized and integrated with current operational missions.

(6) **Operations Assessment**

(a) The CDRJSOTF makes a determination of the overall effectiveness of SOF employment during military operations. During operations assessment, the CDRJSOTF considers battle damage assessment, effects assessment, and re-attack recommendations. The objective of operations assessment is to identify recommendations for the course of military operations. The JSOTF J-3 is normally the single point of contact for combat assessment for the JSOTF, assisted by the JSOTF J-2 and J-4.

(b) After each SO activity, the CDRJSOTF should evaluate SOF effectiveness. After-action reports and formal debriefings complete the mission planning and execution cycle. SOF commanders should submit after-action reports IAW the joint reporting structure. SOF planners and operators should review the results of previous missions, the Joint After-Action Reporting System (JAARS) database, and the SO debrief and retrieval system (SODARS) for insights applicable to current and future training and operations. USSOCOM should maintain SO databases of compartmented lessons learned. During peacetime, these databases provide continuity for a long-term regional security program that can build incrementally through many small-scale activities. Throughout the range of military operations, mission feedback can assist SOF commanders in exploiting enemy vulnerabilities or warn against unforeseen enemy capabilities. Relevant lessons learned are incorporated into JAARS and SODARS. The CDRTSOC should ensure that SOF leaving the theater are debriefed thoroughly.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 6120.05, Tactical Command and Control Planning Guidance for Joint Operations — Joint Interface Operational Procedures for Message Text Formats, contains message interface and message text formats and employment procedures for JOC use. Interim Military Standard 6040, US Message Text Format Electronic Documentation System, and the Joint User Handbook contain examples of formats approved for joint use.

b. **Organization.** The JOC's main organizational divisions are normally current operations and future operations. The JOC may include representation from ground, maritime, and air operations functional cells; an LNO cell; an IO cell; a fire support section; a PSYOP support element; and CA representatives as required. A personnel recovery coordination cell (PRCC) is required. Other JSOTF staffs or organizations may be represented in the JOC as the CDRJSOTF directs and should include interagency representatives and/or State Department representatives as required. It may also include the JPG if not organized separately under the supervision of the JSOTF J-5. A notional JOC organization is depicted in Figure V-1.

3. Operational Rehearsals

Rehearsals of key actions, especially actions in the objective area, are a vital part of SO mission preparation.

a. Conventional plans are normally prepared by staff officers sensitive to the capabilities and limitations of the joint force that will ultimately execute the plan. Conventional forces rehearse a plan primarily to understand it and gain efficiencies. The level of training cannot be changed




Figure V-1. Notional Joint Special Operations Task Force Joint Operations Center

significantly before mission execution. The plan must take into account the level of training of the force that must execute it. In the case of SOF, however, the planners, trainers, and operators are frequently the same personnel who execute the plan. Operational rehearsals evaluate and validate planned tactical actions, ROE, and control measures, as well as provide feedback that may cause the plan to change. The participating SOF elements and their individual members learn the plan to a standard that enables them to perform key actions, at high tempo, from start to finish without needing further detailed instructions during mission execution.

b. The tactical commander supervises an iterative process of planning, rehearsal, plan modification, and more rehearsal until preparation time runs out or the force is satisfied that the

plan can be executed in the most effective and efficient manner. This process exploits the knowledge, experiences, and training of the entire JSOTF to improve the plan and develop a range of options that can be rapidly implemented or modified to improvise a response to unexpected difficulties or mission anomalies that prevent execution of the basic plan. Options rejected as inferior during mission preparation may become paramount during mission execution. Rehearsals enhance the probability of mission success and reduce unnecessary risks to personnel and equipment.

c. For both planning and training purposes, rehearsals should be as realistic as possible. If time and resources permit, rehearsals should be conducted with realistic mock-ups, known distance to cover, and in real time including, if possible, idle intervals. Real time rehearsals identify the inherent effects of time on the SO force and its activities, and provide an essential element of realism to the pending operation.

4. Mission Execution

The CDRJSOTF may direct mission execution personally, or may delegate OPCON or TACON to a subordinate commander.

a. The CDRJSOTF normally delegates OPCON to a SOF component commander for missions conducted primarily by a single SOF element, such as a DA or SR mission conducted by a single SF operational detachment or sea-air-land (SEAL) platoon. Although the CDRJSOTF and component commanders are heavily involved in the targeting and mission planning process, the component commanders normally direct an SF battalion, NSW TU, SO squadron, or similar SOF tactical commander to exercise C2 during mission execution. The CDRJSOTF and component commanders monitor execution and synchronize friendly activities that could adversely affect the mission. Mission and mission support status matrixes can be used by the CDRJSOTF and component commanders to assist in monitoring mission execution. The JOC should also post mission status on its situation maps using the SO mission designation system (Appendix P, “Standard Special Operations Mission Designation”) and use a synchronization matrix and an execution checklist for monitoring of missions (Appendix Q, “Execution Checklist”). As an exception to normal C2 procedures, the CDRJSOTF or a component commander may exercise direct C2 as the SOF tactical commander of larger and more complex SO missions, such as a special mission unit hostage rescue, NEO, or a ranger battalion airfield seizure. The JSOTF also may conduct special actions (see Appendix R, “Special Actions”).

b. The SOF tactical commander actively participates in mission preparation (concept development, briefbacks, operational rehearsals, communications exercises) and all phases of execution from staging and infiltration to post mission evaluation.

5. Information Operations

IO are integral to the successful execution of military operations. IO contributes to information superiority by both defending military decision-making from adversary attacks and by influencing and degrading an adversary’s decision-making capability, thereby producing an

information advantage. Achieving information superiority requires integrating IO capabilities and planning early into the commander's intent and CONOPS and applying IO across the range of military operations. The goal of the JFC is to shape the information environment to achieve information superiority designated to commander's critical and decisive points in the operation or campaign. The JFC integrates military actions and capabilities throughout the operating environment in order to create and/or sustain desired and measurable effects on foreign target audiences; while protecting and defending the JFC's own forces, actions, information, and information systems.

For additional information, see JP 3-13, Information Operations.

a. **Core Capabilities.** The core IO capabilities consist of PSYOP, OPSEC, military deception, electronic warfare (EW), and computer network operations.

b. **Supporting Capabilities.** Capabilities supporting IO include information assurance, physical security, physical attack, CI, and combat camera.

c. **Related Capabilities.** There are three military functions: PA, CMO, and defense support to public diplomacy, specified as related capabilities for IO.

d. **SOF Interaction.** SOF interaction runs the gamut of IO. The IO core capability of PSYOP is also a core task of SO. The IO related capability of CMO is often involved with CA operations, another SO core task. The JSOTF JPG should include an IO cell within its organization to focus and centralize IO efforts. JSOTF planners should also consider obtaining IO support from other JFC components or national assets.

e. **JSOTF IO Staff Responsibilities:**

(1) Advising the commander on all matters pertaining to the integration, coordination, and synchronization of IO.

(2) Integrates IO into all orders and plans.

(3) Coordinates IO support with other components of the joint force, Services, and USG agencies.

(4) Forms and coordinates an IO working group.

6. Joint Fires

Joint fires assist SOF and attached forces to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, and key waters. Joint fire support is the synergistic product of three subsystems: target acquisition; C2; and attack resources. The JSOTF HQ is most concerned with the C2 subsystem. The JSOTF must consider incorporating the complementary capabilities of conventional forces under control of the JFC.

a. **JSOTF Staff Responsibilities**

- (1) Advising the commander on all matters pertaining to the integration, coordination, and synchronization of joint fires.
- (2) Writing the fires portion of all plans and orders.
- (3) Coordinating joint fire support with other components of the joint force and USG agencies.
- (4) Recommending, coordinating, and disseminating fire support coordinating measures and airspace coordination measures.
- (5) Maintaining and disseminating the joint, restricted target lists and no-strike lists.
- (6) Updating subordinate units on all fires related matters.
- (7) Monitoring execution of the ATO/ACO and coordinating changes with the SOLE and components.
- (8) Updating situation maps and overlays.
- (9) Form a joint fires element within the JSOTF staff, as appropriate, to assist in the above responsibilities.

**EXAMPLE OF A SUCCESSFUL SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND
CONVENTIONAL FORCES INTEGRATED OPERATION:
THE TAKE DOWN OF UDAY AND QUSAY HUSSEIN**

With very little warning, special operations forces (SOF) elements and a company of the 101st Airborne linked efforts to act on intelligence identifying the whereabouts of the notorious Hussein brothers, Uday and Qusay. In July, 2003, when a “walk-in” informant offered the current location of the brothers at a mansion in Mosul, SOF elements responded quickly. Organized specifically to pursue high-value targets (HVTs) in Iraq, the SOF elements worked with 101st Airborne staff to quickly develop a plan to act on the tip. A company of 101st Airborne troops cordoned off a section of the neighborhood and brought heavy weaponry that would prove decisive. When repeated attempts to talk the brothers out of hiding failed, the SOF ground commander directed the employment of 2.75-inch rockets from the available Kiowa helicopters, the firing of 18 TOW rounds (tube launched, optically tracked, wire guided), and employment of all available weapons systems by the 101st Airborne troops. Upon assaulting the building the SOF element determined one of the TOW missiles most likely neutralized three of the four targets, including both of the Hussein brothers (the fourth target was neutralized when he attempted to engage SOF elements entering

the building). This action demonstrated excellent coordination between SOF and conventional forces in quickly planning an action based on the strengths of each. The 101st Airborne was able to provide the significant number of troops necessary to cordon the neighborhood as well as provide the heavy firepower that turned out to be critical. The SOF element provided a strong ground control structure as well as the sophisticated experience in pursuit of HVTs.

SOURCE: SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES, IRAQ

b. **SOF Joint Fires Contributions.** SOF can facilitate joint fires with the following capabilities and enhanced capabilities:

(1) **SOF Capabilities**

- (a) Conduct SR.
- (b) Provide positive identification of specific targets.
- (c) Conduct target marking and terminal guidance.
- (d) Provide battle damage assessment.
- (e) Provide recommendations to no-strike and restricted strike list.
- (f) Provide AC-130 gunship support or other direct action support.
- (g) Provide information on other coalition or indigenous force status and positions.
- (h) Provide combat METOC support.
- (i) Conduct nonlethal fires.
- (j) Provide information from SOF intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance, and human assets.
- (k) Working with indigenous or surrogate forces.

(2) **Enhanced Capabilities.** SO can be enhanced by incorporating capabilities that exist in the conventional force. These include:

- (a) Conduct additional lethal and nonlethal fires.
- (b) Provide robust C2.

- (c) Provide multiple attack resource options.
- (d) Assist with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
- (e) Assist with joint terminal attack controllers (controllers in a tactical air control party or air naval gunfire liaison company).

c. CAS for SO

(1) CAS begins with a request from the SOF element commander for the support. As the requesting SOF commander plans and conducts a combat operation, the commander identifies situations where CAS can be employed to enhance mission accomplishment. The requesting commander submits either preplanned or immediate CAS requests. Optimum planning for CAS occurs when a JACE is located at the senior SOF C2 facility. The role of the JACE is to coordinate and integrate conventional air requirements and planning into SO.

(2) Preplanned requests are those that are foreseeable early enough in the planning process to be included in the ATO and may be either scheduled or on-call requests. Immediate requests arise from situations that develop once the battle is joined to exploit opportunities or to protect the force. Both of these requests normally do not include detailed target and timing information because of the lead-time involved. However, it is important to make the CAS request as soon as the need is anticipated so that it can be included in the JFC's air apportionment decisions.

(3) Preplanned SOF CAS requests normally will be forwarded to the JSOACC for tasking by organic assets. CAS requirements exceeding organic JSOACC capabilities will be forwarded to the JAOC by the JSOACC via an air allocation request (ALLOREQ). This preplanned CAS request is shown in Figure V-2.

(4) SOF elements requiring immediate CAS normally will contact the JSOTF JOC via established communication nets. The JSOTF JOC will determine if organic JSOTF assets are best able to conduct CAS given the required mission threats to organic air. Situational awareness of other multinational and joint assets able to respond will be considered via liaison elements such as the SOLE and SOCCE. The JSOTF JOC will forward immediate CAS requests to the JAOC if other components of the joint force are required or better able to complete the CAS mission. This immediate CAS request is shown in Figure V-3.

For further information on CAS, refer to JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS).

(5) Principal organizations that support CAS for the CDRJSOTF are the JSOACC, JACE, SOLE, SOCCE, and SO squadrons.




Figure V-2. Special Operations Close Air Support: Preplanned Request

(6) SOF communications nets provide a means for both SOF air assets to provide preplanned and immediate CAS and SOF surface teams to request immediate CAS. The majority of SOF surface unit requests will be immediate.

(a) **SOF Aircraft.** Communications between SOF aircraft and the JSOACC will be used to coordinate preplanned and immediate CAS requests. For preplanned CAS missions where TACON of SOF aircraft has been delegated to another component, SOF aircraft will access the established requesting component network. For immediate CAS (after CDRJSOTF approval), SOF aircraft will access the requesting component communications net to provide requested CAS support.

(b) **SOF Surface Units.** SOF surface units have a variety of communications capabilities that can be used for CAS. For CAS requests not supported via organic SOF assets, the CDRJSOTF will forward the request to the JFACC via established communication links (through the SOLE). Once the asset has been assigned, that information is passed to the requestor via the CDRJSOTF. The requesting unit will communicate with the CAS aircraft via the established providing component net.

7. Combat Identification

a. **Early Establishment.** Combat identification measures must be established early in the JSOTF planning cycle. These measures are particularly important in peace operations and




Figure V-3. Special Operations Close Air Support: Immediate Request

certain traditional noncombat operations conducted in an uncertain or hostile operational environment.

b. **Consistent with ROE.** Combat identification measures must be consistent with ROE and not interfere with SOF rights and responsibilities to engage enemy forces. These measures also must allow the JSOTF to conduct actions appropriate for self-defense.

c. **Consider in Plans and Orders.** Although not required in present OPLAN and OPORD formats, a combat identification appendix to annex C (Operations) of the JSOTF OPORD, OPLAN, or subordinate campaign plan outlining CDRJSOTF policy and guidance for JSOTF combat identification would provide a basis for combat identification within the JSOA. Supporting component OPORDs or OPLANs would provide the additional detail needed to ensure implementation of a robust JSOTF combat identification program. Additionally, other unique combat identification challenges exist when SOF operate with coalition and indigenous forces. These challenges also must be considered when developing plans and orders.

8. Types of Operational Support Available to a Joint Special Operations Task Force

There are external sources of support that a CDRJSOTF may request to increase operational capabilities of the command. Sources range from theater to national assets (both DOD and other USG agencies). Several are discussed elsewhere in this publication (intelligence, logistics,

communications system, PSYOP, CA, PA, legal, and medical). Other types of support may include, but are not limited to, the following:

a. **Space Support.** Specific support and integrated space capabilities provided by USSTRATCOM, through a JSOTF space cell, and the JFC-designated SCA, may include, but is not limited to the following:

(1) Status of supporting space systems and the operational impact of space system outages.

(2) Recommendations to space components to defer scheduled maintenance that might adversely affect SOF operations.

(3) Precision satellite visibility and look angles to SOF users of US space systems.

(4) Forecast of times when navigation may be degraded by less than optimal Global Positioning Satellite constellation geometry.

(5) Schedule of times that SOF activities are vulnerable to foreign space-based intelligence collection platforms.

(6) Predictions and effects of solar environment on communications systems functioning in the electromagnetic spectrum.

b. **METOC Support.** Environmental intelligence should be included in the CDRJSOTF decision-making process from initial planning to execution. METOC data can provide information by which to choose the best windows of opportunity to execute, support, and sustain specific SOF operations. In addition to the planning and execution support provided by the METOC staff at the JSOTF and components, SOWTs provided by AFSOF also can assist the CDRJSOTF in the collection of METOC data. Task organized SOWTs are trained and equipped to collect critical weather observations from data-sparse areas. These teams are trained to operate independently in permissive or uncertain environments, or as augmentation to other SO elements in hostile environments in direct support of SO. These SOWTs also may conduct FID and/or UW missions, as required.

c. **Combat Camera Support.** Combat camera can provide gun camera image processing for theater and national use. Combat camera also provides still and video products that can support PSYOP and PA.

9. Force Protection

Force protection must be a top priority during JSOTF operations. It is the responsibility of the CDRJSOTF and all subordinate commanders within the JSOTF. The intent should be to accomplish the mission with minimum risk to the force. Conducting the mission analysis process should assist in determining forces, means, and ways required to provide force protection. The

higher the level of focus for force protection procedures, the less likely the chance of disaster. Force protection considerations for the JSOTF should include, but are not limited to the following:

a. **Command Emphasis.** Prior to deployment of the JSOTF, the CDRJSOTF will promulgate a detailed force protection plan. The plan must be based on the most current intelligence and threat assessment for the area to which SOF are being deployed. Consideration will be given for the use of both active and passive measures. The SOF force protection plan must posture the force to protect itself against the most likely threat. The CDRJSOTF must adjust the plan as the threat changes. While force protection is the CDRJSOTF's responsibility, the CDRJSOTF should appoint a force protection officer to execute the plan. The force protection officer will plan and conduct training prior to deployment of the JSOTF in order to review and practice all aspects of force protection.

b. **Protection from the Enemy's Firepower and Maneuver.** CDRJSOTF's attempt to counter the enemy's firepower and maneuver by making SOF and systems difficult to locate, strike, and destroy, as well as protecting those systems and personnel from the effects of WMD. OPSEC and military deception are key elements of this aspect of protection.

c. **Detailed Coordination with Conventional Forces.** These measures may include target synchronization, friendly fires coordination, interface with the SOLE, integration of conventional forces in the JSOA when established, combat identification, and ROE.

d. **Prevention of Fratricide.** CDRJSOTFs make every effort to reduce the potential for fratricide. The destructive power and range of modern weapons, coupled with the high intensity and rapid tempo of modern combat, increase the potential for fratricide. It is a paramount consideration for SOF, particularly when conducting DA or SR missions. Commanders must be aware of those situations that increase the risk of fratricide and institute appropriate preventative measures. The primary mechanisms for limiting fratricide are command emphasis, disciplined operations, close coordination between component commands as well as multinational partners through appropriately placed liaison elements, rehearsals, fire support and airspace coordinating measures, SOPs, technology solutions, and enhanced situational awareness. Commanders should seek to minimize the potential for fratricide while not limiting boldness and audacity of SO in combat.

e. **Protection from Adversary Information Operations.** IO actions in support of offensive and defensive operations are planned and conducted to achieve information superiority over an adversary. IO supports defensive operations through the coordination of multiple capabilities and processes such as OPSEC, electronic protect, CND, information assurance, counter propaganda, and counter deception to protect friendly information, information systems and decision makers from the actions of adversary information operations. These same IO actions can also support force protection efforts. With the proper coordination and planning, IO actions in support of defensive operations could also contribute to the CDRSOTF's force protection plan.

10. Operations Messages

Guidance and instructions for messages, requests, and confirmations are described in Appendix S, “Operations Messages.”

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CHAPTER VI INTELLIGENCE

“Know the adversary and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.”

Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*

1. General

It is essential that the JSOTF have timely, detailed, tailored, and fused all-source intelligence in identifying relevant SO targets, COA development, and mission planning and execution. The ability to interface with theater and national assets is critical to success. By their nature, SOF objectives and tactics require intelligence support that is frequently more detailed than needed in conventional operations. For example, SOF tasked with DA against a building might need to know the location of doors, the direction that those doors swing, and the internal subdivisions of the building. Similarly, SOF tasked with SR against a target might need to know civilian and security force patrols in the area, uniforms of security personnel, and frequency of patrols. SOF often require intelligence to avoid adversary forces, regardless of size or composition, as opposed to information that would allow conventional forces to engage the adversary. Additionally, intelligence support to SOF requires increased focus of various intelligence disciplines (such as geospatial intelligence [GEOINT], signals intelligence [SIGINT], measurement and signature intelligence [MASINT], and HUMINT) to include political, informational, economic, and cultural institutions and specific data related to SOF targets. Because SOF missions are particularly sensitive to adversary collection efforts, CI support must be considered in protecting SOF missions across the range of military operations.

2. National Level Intelligence Support

a. **Responsibilities.** The Defense Joint Intelligence Operations Center (DJIOC) is the lead intelligence organization for coordinating intelligence support to meet the combatant command requirements. The DJIOC coordinates and prioritizes military intelligence requirements across the combatant commands, combat support agencies, RC, and Service intelligence centers. Additionally, the J-2, Joint Staff is the coordinating authority for the NIST program. The NIST mission is to provide a tailored national-level, all-source intelligence team to deployed commanders during crisis or contingency operations.

For further information on national-level intelligence support and the DJIOC, refer to JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.

b. **Supporting Agencies.** National-level agencies include the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) (which includes the Directorate for Human Intelligence), National Security Agency (NSA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), DOS, Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of the Treasury (TREAS), the Department of Homeland Security

(DHS), and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). Service-level intelligence organizations also provide national-level intelligence that is Service specific.

(1) **DIA.** The Director of DIA serves as the head of the DJIOC and reports to the Secretary of Defense through the CJCS. Additionally, DIA in conjunction with USSTRATCOM, tailors all-source intelligence collection. If the DJIOC requires DIA Directorate for Intelligence Production (DI) support to satisfy a requirement, DI's Operational Intelligence Coordination Center is contacted. If CI support is required to satisfy a requirement, the Joint Staff J-2 and DIA are contacted.

(2) **NSA.** NSA provides SIGINT, technical support to IO, and information systems security for the conduct of military operations IAW tasking, priorities, and standard of timeliness assigned by the Secretary of Defense.

(3) **CIA.** The CIA contributes significant support for joint operations. It includes intelligence used in developing strategy, determining objectives, determining deception objectives, planning operations, conducting operations, and evaluating the effectiveness of operations, among other activities.

(4) **NRO.** NRO is a DOD agency with the mission to develop and operate unique and innovative reconnaissance systems and conducts intelligence related activities essential to US national security.

(5) **NGA.** NGA is a DOD combat support agency responsible for providing GEOINT support. NGA manages national imagery tasking and procedures. It conducts imagery analysis for routine and crisis intelligence requirements by providing imagery and/or imagery reporting. NGA also provides a wide range of standard, specialized, and tailored geospatial support (e.g., navigation charts) during crisis operations.

(6) **DOS.** The DOS collects overt information relevant to US foreign policy concerns. Each combatant command has a senior foreign service officer assigned who serves as an advisor to the commander. The DOS Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), drawing on all-source intelligence, provides value-added independent analysis of events to department policymakers, ensures that intelligence activities support foreign policy and national security purposes; and serves as the focal point in the department for ensuring policy review of sensitive CI and law enforcement activities. INR's primary mission is to harness intelligence to serve US diplomacy. The bureau also analyzes geographical and international boundary issues.

(7) **DOJ.** Within the DOJ, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's National Security Branch is the primary element that can provide counterterrorism, CI, and intelligence support.

(8) **DOE.** Within DOE, the DOE Office of Intelligence can provide technical intelligence resources in four core areas: nuclear weapons and nonproliferation; energy security; science and technology; and nuclear energy, safety, and waste.

(9) **TREAS.** The TREAS Office of Intelligence and Analysis can provide an interagency source of information during JSOTF operations. It analyzes foreign intelligence related to US economic policy and participates with the DOS in the overt collection of general foreign economic information.

(10) **DHS.** The DHS is charged with the effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the US, reduce the US's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. DHS draws from and shares intelligence information with other national agencies. Within the DHS, the USCG is the lead maritime agency for the prevention and response to maritime terrorism under both Titles 10 and 14 USC. While DOD is the lead agency against traditional external threats and aggression, it may be in support of the DHS against internal asymmetric, non traditional threats such as terrorism. Accordingly, CDRUSSOCOM, as a supporting commander to either Commander, US Northern Command or Commander, US Pacific Command as supported commanders, may be tasked to provide a JSOTF or other SOF as required.

(11) **NCTC.** The NCTC serves as the primary organization for integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the US pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism (CT), excepting purely domestic collected information. Among other functions, it serves as the central and shared knowledge bank on known and suspected terrorists and international terror groups, as well as their goals, strategies, capabilities, and networks of contacts and support.

3. Theater Level Intelligence Support

a. **Responsibilities.** In general, the supported GCC is responsible for defining intelligence support needs, identifying intelligence resources, and establishing intelligence support procedures. The scope of needs, resources, and procedures will depend on the mission, nature, and composition of the force. The combatant command's JIOC strives to ensure that the intelligence needs of the command and subordinate joint commands are satisfied.

b. Supported GCC's JIOC

(1) The JIOC is the primary intelligence organization that provides intelligence support to joint warfighting at all levels. The JIOC construct fuses the main support capabilities of all national, Services, combat support agencies, and combat units into a "one-stop shopping center" for intelligence support and passes the information to the JIOC.

(2) If the JIOC is not able to completely satisfy every RFI, it will coordinate support from other intelligence organizations above and below its echelon for those it is unable to fulfill.

(3) The JIOC is the focal point for intelligence support to JFC operations, and must provide a complete air, space, ground, maritime, and special operations adversary situation by integrating all intelligence information.

(4) The JIOC is the single source for RFI processing and validation, in-theater intelligence analysis, production, and dissemination.



Intelligence gathering works two ways. The adversary also has a vote in the outcome.

(5) The JIOC has the mission of providing direct intelligence support to a deploying joint force.

4. Joint Force Commander-Level Intelligence Support

a. **Responsibilities.** The JFC provides the conduit for the intelligence flow to and from the JSOTF and theater and national supporting agencies. The mechanism to provide that support is a tailored intelligence organization provided by the JFC. The JFC (or CJTF) may establish either a JISE or a JIOC. The decision regarding which type of organization is established will depend on the breath of the mission assigned. A full JIOC may require augmentation and should be approved by the CCDR.

b. JISE

(1) A tailored subset of the theater JIOC, the JISE provides intelligence support to JTF operational forces and performs common intelligence functions. It may have liaison and augmentation support from national agencies. The JISE will coordinate intelligence support to the JFC with the NIST, if a NIST is deployed.

(2) By design, the JISE is scaleable, can expand to meet the needs of the JFC, and is tailored to fit the operating environment based on identified JFC requirements. A notional subordinate joint force intelligence organization with an embedded JISE is depicted in Figure VI-1.

(3) The JISE is composed of analytical experts and analysis teams that provide services and products required by the JFC, staff, and components, to include the JSOTF. These all-discipline and all-warfare specialty analysis teams should be focused on substantive operational intelligence problems. Analysis teams should take into account pertinent information from all




Figure VI-1. Notional Subordinate Joint Force Intelligence Organization

sources; a JISE’s capability for joint and all-source analysis is the key to operational intelligence that is timely, relevant, and complete.

(4) The JISE should provide support “upward” to the supported GCC’s JIOC, JFC, and the JFC staff and should provide support “downward” to the JSOTF and other components in support of the JFC.

(5) Analytical efforts of the JISE should have an operational focus, with responsibility for helping the JFC to better understand adversary capabilities, intentions, and potential COAs.

(6) In addition, the JISE also may be used to manage intelligence resources and efforts, and to coordinate application of senior, subordinate, and supporting commands’ intelligence activities. The JISE collection managers must also play an important role in nominating SR

missions for tasking to the JSOTF. This should be done in close coordination with SO planning experts on both the JFC and JSOTF staffs to ensure the appropriateness of SOF for the missions being nominated.

For further information on JIOC and JISE responsibilities, refer to JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.

5. Joint Special Operations Task Force Joint Intelligence Support Element


a. **Activation.** Once a JSOTF is activated, a JISE will be formed under the JSOTF J-2 to provide a robust capability to support the CDRJSOTF's critical warfighting functions and JSOTF component commanders' mission requirements. Joint personnel augmentation for the JISE will be assigned by the GCC and may be requested from USSOCOM.

b. **Functions.** The JISE is the primary center that serves the CDRJSOTF, the J-2, the JSOTF staff, and the SOF component commanders for all intelligence requirements. The JISE has reporting ties up the joint intelligence chain, through the JTF JISE, to the supported GCC's JIOC and DJIOC, laterally across the intelligence chain to other component intelligence structures, and down the chain to SOF component intelligence centers. The JSOTF's JISE structure must be tailored to support the CDRJSOTF's and component commanders' mission requirements. The JSOTF has a limited organic collection capability and is dependent on theater intelligence systems for indications and warning. The JISE construct provides increased timely and tailored intelligence flow as a result of increased tasking of intelligence resources. No echelon of command has sufficient assets to collect information and produce intelligence to meet all needs. The Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) provides SCI systems communications and connectivity between intelligence entities, sources, assets, and databases, to include VTC, intel-link, real-time event-by-event reporting, worldwide intelligence systems applications, and a variety of analytical tools. All functions relative to the intelligence process are managed through the JISE.

c. **Organization.** A typical JSOTF JISE includes the positions of director, senior watch officers, and administrative noncommissioned officers (NCOs). The JISE watch is the responsibility of the senior watch officer. The following divisions are normally included in a JISE: all-source production; collection management and dissemination; targets and plans; and JPG divisions. A GEOINT element also may be included. Figure VI-2 depicts a notional JSOTF JISE organization.

d. **Responsibilities.** JSOTF intelligence responsibilities are derived from the supported commander's intelligence requirements. While the JSOTF J-2 retains certain duties for the immediate J-2 staff, there is a great dependency on the synergy of an all-source analytical support entity that can manage the flow of requirements and information. JISE responsibilities include the following:

- (1) Develop threat assessments.



**Figure VI-2. Notional Joint Special Operations Task Force/
Joint Intelligence Support Element Organization**

- (2) Determine the adversary situation.
- (3) Evaluate operations effectiveness.
- (4) Provide operational intelligence support to JSOTF components.
- (5) Focus the intelligence effort downward in support of the forward-deployed SOF units.
- (6) Develop target intelligence packages.
- (7) Conduct future target development.
- (8) Coordinate with the SJA to ensure compliance with intelligence oversight requirements.
- (9) Provide information collected by JSOTF assets to the JFC J-2. Information of CI interest, particularly information derived from military source operations, must be coordinated first with the JSOTF CI coordinating authority (TFCICA) in order to effectively forward to and integrate the information with the JFC.

6. Joint Special Operations Task Force Intelligence Operations Relative to the Intelligence Process

Intelligence operations follow the intelligence process. In this context, the intelligence process focuses on the CDRJSOTF's mission and CONOPS. Intelligence operations have to be integrated into overall joint operations to achieve not only the CDRJSOTF's objectives but those of the subordinate JFC and/or supported GCC. The intelligence process is depicted in Figure VI-3.

a. **Planning and Direction.** Intelligence requirements provide the direction for current and future JSOTF intelligence operations during this phase of the process. Joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment enables the J-2 to focus and direct all phases of the intelligence process. Planning and direction involve identifying, prioritizing, and validating intelligence and system requirements. To support requirements, joint intelligence architecture enables a "pull down" capability for tailored intelligence to the CDRJSOTF and the SOF component commanders. These intelligence structures and assets also can provide a "push down" capability for critical short duration SO mission planning.




Figure VI-3. The Intelligence Process

(1) **SO Intelligence Requirements.** The currency, level of detail, and scope of SO intelligence requirements place unusual demands on theater and national intelligence systems. SO often require more intelligence collection, research, and analysis than most conventional missions. HUMINT is especially important to SO mission planning because it provides detailed information not usually available through technical means. HUMINT collection requirements flow from the JSOTF JISE through the HUMINT operations cell. GEOINT is important to SO planning. Detailed information from theater and national sources must be tailored so that it can be displayed, understood, and used by the tactical SOF element that will plan and conduct the mission. Detailed and current (less than 24 hours old) GEOINT of the objective area is normally needed. Some missions may require replicas, models, diagrams, and nonstandard GEOINT products. The scope of SO intelligence requirements also may include the social, economic, informational, and political dynamics of the operational area. The CDRJSOTF's information requirements compete for limited collection resources and all requirements may not be satisfied. CDRJSOTF intelligence requirements linked to theater PIR will have the best prospects for timely support.

(2) **Planning.** Early planning for intelligence is essential to conduct successful SO. The very precise information required by SO tactical commanders about operational areas and targets may not be readily acquired by national technical intelligence sources. Intelligence planning for SO, as with conventional force intelligence planning, involves managing the JSOTF intelligence staff in the execution of the intelligence process to provide mission-specific and oriented intelligence that will support operational objectives, planning, and decisions.

(a) The uniqueness of SO intelligence support is in the timeliness, quantity, integrity, authenticity, and specificity of the information required. The planning time lines for SO require responsive intelligence support.

(b) Intelligence organizations and agencies supporting SOF must be involved at the earliest stage of mission planning to ensure responsiveness to SOF mission requirements.

(c) In support of contingency planning, the J-2 must develop, identify, or review mission-specific intelligence requirements. SO-unique requirements are forwarded through appropriate channels for validation, collection, and reporting.

(d) In planning for time-sensitive potential or emerging SO missions (adaptive planning), the J-2 must accurately anticipate the information needs to meet mission requirements, use the "push/pull" system to ensure that mission planners access all available information, and expeditiously set into motion those actions as discussed during contingency planning.

b. **Collection.** This requires validating, prioritizing, and tasking through the J-2 collection manager. The JSOTF point of entry into the collection process is with the JSOTF collection manager through the daily meeting of the joint collection management board. Collection includes the identification and positioning of assets and/or resources to satisfy collection objectives. It also includes both the acquisition of information and the provision of this information to processing

and/or production elements. However, neither the JSOTF J-2 nor the JSOTF forces have the organic collection assets to satisfy all information needs.

(1) **Intelligence Data Flow.** Intelligence data normally flows to the CDRJSOTF through established USSOCOM, theater, Service, or functional component interfaces. “Skip echelon” intelligence support directly from national agencies to the CDRJSOTF may provide time-critical intelligence. The JSOTF J-2 acts as the theater SOF collection manager and ensures that validated subordinate unit intelligence requirements are incorporated into the theater intelligence collection plan. The J-2 also initiates and develops intelligence relationships with all theater intelligence organizations and maintains contact with national agency liaison elements (DIA, CIA, NSA, NGA) at the theater HQ. These liaison elements can ensure that theater-validated SOF intelligence requirements are addressed rapidly and efficiently within their respective agencies.

(2) **Collection Management.** Collection management is based on four principles: early involvement in identification of requirements; prioritization by assigning distinct ranking to each collection requirement; taking a multidiscipline approach to the collection effort; and tasking organic assets first. Following these principles, collection management has two distinct functions: collection requirements management (defining what intelligence systems must collect) and collection operations management (specifying how to collect). Within the JSOTF JISE, collection requirements and operations management personnel accomplish the following:

- (a) Identify, prioritize, and validate JSOTF intelligence requirements as originated by components and the JFC TFCICA.
- (b) Assess collection and reporting implications of each requirement.
- (c) Develop an all-source collection plan IAW established priorities.
- (d) Identify to the J-3 potential collection opportunities by component units.
- (e) Forward intelligence RFIs and PIRs to the JFC JISE and on to higher J-2 echelons for disposition.
- (f) Maintain awareness of the operational capability of collection systems.
- (f) Evaluate intelligence requirements satisfaction for content and timeliness.
- (g) Validate subordinates’ RFIs.

c. **Processing and Exploitation.** During processing and exploitation, collected data is correlated and converted into forms suitable for analysis and production. Data may be further exploited to gain the fullest possible advantage. The majority of responsibilities during this phase rests with the supported GCC’s J-2, who has the most capabilities and assets to perform this function. The JSOTF is both a provider and user of processing and exploitation of data.

Conversely, the JSOTF is a user of the collected information from sources such as HUMINT, GEOINT, SIGINT, MASINT, and OSINT. These are invaluable intelligence sources when used for planning timely, high-risk JSOTF missions.

d. **Analysis and Production.** This phase involves integrating, evaluating, analyzing, and interpreting information from single or multiple sources into a finished intelligence product. Time constraints, particularly with time-sensitive planning, tend to make the processing and production phases indistinguishable. The all-source production section of the JSOTF JISE is the focal point for producing TIPs.

(1) **Capabilities.** The JSOTF, subordinate nodes, and tactical elements require a significant amount of external intelligence product and information support, primarily in the preparation or planning phases. The theater JIOC is the focal point for conducting and coordinating intelligence production supporting the JSOTF and subordinate elements. Production done by the JSOTF and subordinate elements is minimal and consists of tailoring existing products, data, or information to operational or tactical requirements. In addition to these theater efforts, the national intelligence community may provide tailored intelligence support. Director, DJIOC, will report to SecDef through the CJCS. DJIOC will formulate recommended solutions to deconflict requirements for national intelligence with the Joint Functional Component Command-Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance and Director of National Intelligence representatives to ensure an integrated response to combatant command needs in meeting the intelligence requirements at the JFC or JSOTF level. This support may be in the form of a NIST, comprised of personnel from the DOD or other national intelligence agencies, providing reachback capability to intelligence resources within their respective agencies.

(2) **Management.** Management of intelligence production at the JSOTF level normally rests within an all-source production division or element. Its functions are to receive, review, validate, prioritize, and coordinate production requirements, determine which analyst can best develop and produce the desired information and then schedule, task, and edit the intelligence product. It normally has ground, air, and naval analysts assigned to provide joint Service expertise.

e. **Dissemination and Integration.** Intelligence must be provided in a form that is easily understood and directly usable in a timely manner by the user. The JSOTF JISE will serve as the dissemination center for all information provided from national- or theater-level assets, as well as that generated at the JSOTF level. Intelligence collected by the JSOTF components will be disseminated rapidly upward to the JFC through the J-2 CI/HUMINT staff element structure. The JISE will normally be responsible for all intelligence reports issued at the JSOTF level. All reporting and dissemination will be accomplished via the most secure expeditious means. Information may be disseminated via redundant means as well. For example, the information can be passed initially either by secure voice or e-mail, or joint deployable intelligence support system (JDISS); then the information will be followed up via message traffic, posting in a web portal, or by inclusion in a formal intelligence summary or report by record means. It is critical that as much information as possible be passed at the collateral level to the subordinate elements, since SCI access is limited at the lower echelons. The primary means to disseminate collateral intelligence is the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).

f. **Evaluation and Feedback.** Evaluation and feedback are a continuous process throughout the phases of the intelligence process. If the intelligence provided to the JSOTF as requestor was complete, timely, and in a usable format, the requirement is satisfied and subsequently closed. All-source production personnel within the JSOTF JISE use the factors of pertinence, reliability, and credibility in their evaluation determination process. During the evaluation and feedback process, the CDRJSOTF must ensure that the commander's intelligence responsibilities as stated in Figure VI-4 have been met.




Figure VI-4. Commander, Joint Special Operations Task Force Intelligence Responsibilities

7. Counterintelligence

CI is a critical force protection asset that offers the CDRJSOTF varied support including operations, investigations, collection, and threat analysis. The J-2 coordinates with the theater CI support officer to acquire theater and national CI support for joint SO. The CDRJSOTF should provide CI liaison to the JFC TFCICA. The CDRJSOTF should consider early deployment of supporting CI teams to establish liaison with HN security forces and the US country team. An effective CI program can detect, counter, and where possible, exploit foreign intelligence collection activities directed against SOF. CI contributes to the overall aspects of OPSEC and force protection by detecting and dealing with possible breaches in security. CI activities support the commander by detecting, evaluating, counteracting, and preventing hostile intelligence collection, subversion, sabotage, terrorism, or assassination operations from occurring. CI focuses on the following:

- a. How the adversary's intelligence structure works.
- b. What intelligence systems and platforms are available to the adversary.
- c. How vulnerable US forces are to adversary intelligence.

d. How the adversary has been known to target US forces, as well as how planners can anticipate where the adversary might target US forces.

e. How successful adversary intelligence has been, as reflected by:

(1) Adversary knowledge of US equipment and how to defeat it.

(2) Adversary knowledge of US force deployments.

(3) Adversary knowledge of US commanders and their intentions.

f. Force protection and combatting terrorism support.

8. Intelligence Support to the Targeting and Mission Planning Process

a. Targeting

(1) The primary function of the J-2 in support of the targeting process is to identify and nominate to the CDRJSOTF those critical adversary vulnerabilities that can be exploited to attain objectives. Support includes locating and portraying the components of a target or target complex and providing the information required to effectively apply friendly capabilities to delay, disrupt, debilitate, destroy, or otherwise dissuade or coerce the adversary.

(2) Decisions about target integration, force application, and execution may be resolved at the JFC level at the JTCB, or at the JFC-level working groups that precede the formal meetings of the JTCB. This board provides a joint forum for components and staff to ensure that the JFC's mission objectives are met by validating targets and advising the JFC on apportionment issues. The JFC J-2 is responsible for obtaining and managing targeting intelligence for the JFC commander and component forces including the JSOTF. This responsibility is carried out by the targeting and battle damage assessment personnel in the JFC JISE. The JFC JISE is the conduit for targeting intelligence at the tactical and operational levels of war. The supported GCC or JFC J-2 is responsible for targeting intelligence at the strategic level. All requirements from the JSOTF for intelligence information, GEOINT, target materials, and target development support are made through the JFC JISE.

(3) JSOTF intelligence support to the process is normally provided through the JPG targets and plans personnel with support from the collection management and dissemination as well as all-source production branches of the JSOTF JISE. The JSOTF J-2 JPG targets and plans personnel are responsible for the TIP to the SO mission planning folder. Examples of a TIP for SR/DA and FID/UW missions are shown in Appendix N, "Special Operations Target Intelligence Package."

b. **Mission Planning.** Advanced planning for intelligence is essential for successful SO. The very precise information required about operational areas or targets might not be readily acquired by national or theater intelligence agencies. Obtaining information to support SO may

require developing new intelligence sources. The J-2 provides SO planners with mission specific intelligence to support the operational decision-making process and is involved at the earliest stages of mission planning to ensure responsiveness of the intelligence system.

(1) **Contingency Planning.** During contingency planning, the J-2 develops mission-specific intelligence requirements that support the operational objectives of the plan. The J-2 should consider the following:

- (a) PIR and other intelligence requirements.
- (b) Existing all-source intelligence collection requirements and collection priorities against the priority and other intelligence requirements.
- (c) Gaps in the basic intelligence databases for recommended changes in collection priorities.
- (d) Unique intelligence production requirements to execute the assigned SO.
- (e) Dissemination of intelligence products.
- (f) Intelligence communication and reporting requirements.

(2) **CAP.** Time constraints become a key factor in intelligence support to time-sensitive planning. Moreover, there may be a lack of specific intelligence data because of these time



Joint special operations task force intelligence assets support the targeting and mission planning process.

constraints. The J-2 must accurately interpret indications and warning data to anticipate potential SO intelligence requirements. CAP requirements must be more precise than contingency planning requirements due to the immediacy of the mission. Rapid coordination, timely production, and reliable dissemination are essential.

9. Multinational Intelligence Operations

a. There is no single intelligence doctrine for multinational operations. Intelligence collection, production, and dissemination in a multinational environment presents unique challenges and depends on the capability to standardize operations and communications between elements. When operating in a multinational intelligence environment, it is crucial that the CDRJSOTF and staff know and understand what their authority, responsibilities, and roles are in the intelligence process. Multinational intelligence principles that should be considered when operating in this environment are depicted in Figure VI-5.




Figure VI-5. Multinational Intelligence Principles

b. Intelligence sharing procedures between multinational partners and counterparts should be agreed upon early in the JSOTF planning process. The JSOTF J-2 should have knowledge in foreign disclosure policy and procedures. Necessary foreign disclosure authorization from DIA and NGA, through the JFC and combatant command, should be obtained as required and as early as possible when it becomes evident that the JSOTF will be involved in multinational intelligence activities. Procedures should be put in to place to expedite new releases once operations have begun.

c. Communication, experience, and standardization all impact the effectiveness of multinational operations. Linguists and liaison personnel play a paramount role in the sharing of intelligence in the multinational environment. Intelligence must be written simply and properly classified to ensure releasability to those concerned.

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CHAPTER VII LOGISTIC SUPPORT

"I don't know what the hell this 'logistics' is that Marshall is always talking about, but I want some of it."

Fleet Admiral E. J. King: To a staff officer, 1942

1. General

The Military Departments are responsible for providing or arranging for the administration and support of Service forces assigned to the combatant commands, including Service common support of assigned SOF units. USSOCOM is responsible for providing SO-peculiar support to SOF units worldwide. However, it is the supported GCC who has overall responsibility to ensure that all joint logistic and administrative support, including SOF support, is coordinated and executed. In-theater non-SOF specific logistic support can be provided through Service component and/or common-user logistics (CUL) lead Service or agency support channels. The GCC exercises directive authority for logistics in order to eliminate gaps and redundancies. The designated theater executive agent is responsible for the administrative and logistic support of joint SOF HQ. This chapter will provide the details of how this occurs.

2. Logistic Functions

The JSOTF J-4 responsibilities include oversight of several broad functional areas: supply, maintenance, transportation, civil engineering, health services, and other logistic related support. Functional responsibilities of JSOTF J-4 staff are as follows: inform the CDRJSOTF and JTF J-4 of logistic, medical, engineering, and environmental problems impacting mission accomplishment; monitor and synchronize JTF logistic, medical, engineering, and environmental requirements; and maintain liaison with the JTF J-4 and other component commands, JSOTF counterparts, and other agencies or organizations as appropriate, in order to exchange information and resolve problems at the lowest level. The J-4 must ensure that JSOTF forces are supported by their Service executive agents, which is required by title 10, USC. The JSOTF J-4 may have to recommend and/or set priorities of support for common items and consolidated functions. Limited resources available to the JSOTF elements may require the J-4 to provide prioritization information to the JTF J-4 and/or the appropriate Service executive agent.

a. **Supply.** Each SOF component has particular capabilities to support, sustain, or enhance sustainment of their assigned units. These potential resources can assist the JSOTF J-4 in fulfilling logistic responsibilities. The CUL construct can save the Service components of the JSOTF considerable resources. The CUL approach reduces potential duplication by capitalizing on those common areas of logistic support that occur between or among Service components and support SOF components. Often, one Service component or agency is designated as the CUL lead to provide selected CUL support to one or more Service components. The intent is not to take control over providing Service-peculiar supplies and services, but to utilize those areas in which economies may be achieved. JP 4-07, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Common-User Logistics during Joint Operations*, covers CUL in detail. SOF follow Service

common supply support procedures for all classes of supply with some special SOF considerations for certain classes of supply as follows:

(1) **Class V** (ammunition). Ammunition support to FID and counterdrug operations must be coordinated through SOF supply channels for funding and approval.

(2) **Class VII** (major end items). SOF units will requisition authorized SO-peculiar items through USSOCOM for sourcing. Additionally, USSOCOM's joint operational stocks program maintains limited quantities of some SO-peculiar items for loan through SOFSA.

(3) **Class IX** (repair parts). SO-peculiar repair parts are the responsibility of USSOCOM through the SOF components.

b. **Transportation.** Given the nature of most SOF missions, either time constraints, planning considerations, or special mission requirements may place unique demands on common-user transportation assets. Generally, intertheater air mobility assets support SOF in the deployment, resupply, and redeployment phases of the operation. SOF organic airlift assets normally provide SOF with intratheater lift support (insertion, extraction, and resupply). When SOF operations exceed organic SOF lift capability, then common-user transportation assets should be considered. The GCC has a wide range of options for performing this movement control, normally through a theater joint movement center. Once established, the joint movement center is responsible for coordinating the employment of all modes of theater transportation. The JSOTF J-4 coordinates all administrative moves. Operational and deployment moves, including aircraft diplomatic overflight and access clearances through US embassies IAW the DOD foreign clearance guide, are coordinated among the JSOTF J-3 (lead) and J-4.

c. **General Engineering.** The JSOTF J-4, in lieu of an attached engineer, coordinates SOF requirements with the JTF engineer who supervises combat and general engineer units and operations, real estate activities, and environmental protection, among other activities.

d. **Maintenance.** Service-peculiar maintenance support remains the responsibility of the Service components. SOF components may have the capability to perform limited maintenance or units should deploy with direct maintenance capability for accompanying equipment. When practical, maintenance facilities for cross-Service use and retrograde procedures for returning reparable should be established and interservice use of salvage assets emphasized. Maintenance priorities will normally emphasize return of mission-essential weapon systems to combat readiness.

e. **Contracting.** For large contingencies or exercises, the JSOTF J-4 may include a contracting officer and disbursing officer on the JSOTF J-4 manning document. In some instances, the JTF may retain responsibility for contracting. For smaller operations, a designated SOF Service component may provide a contracting officer. Units are responsible for ensuring that funds are in place before any contracting actions are taken. While a contracting officer may support the entire JSOTF, the JSOTF HQ and all SOF components should deploy with organic paying agents and field ordering officers to handle small purchases. Authorized personnel may

deploy with a commercial purchase card, although these cards may not be honored in certain contingency areas. The JSOTF SJA will provide legal advice on contracts and contracting matters. Contracting support is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.

f. **Funding.** Funding is typically not provided “up front” for contingency operations, and therefore SOF Service components must capture incremental costs associated with the operation for possible future reimbursement. Guidance to “capture incremental costs” should be provided to SOF components as early as possible. The JSOTF SJA will provide legal advice on future expenditures to ensure compliance with fiscal law and regulations. Special attention must be given to initiatives that train or equip foreign forces, including police or security forces. Medical war reserve materiel (WRM) appropriated funds consumed in support of SOF should be reimbursed by operation and maintenance funds and reported in the total contingency incremental shortfall. Medical units with WRM assets will report consumption of their WRM to the appropriate authorities.

For further information on funding, refer to JP 1-06, Financial Management During Joint Operations.

3. Joint Special Operations Task Force Logistics Readiness Center

Depending on the size and level of the contingency and as part of the joint theater logistics management concept, the JSOTF J-4 may form an LRC to monitor and coordinate the logistics effort. Upon establishment, the LRC becomes the focal point for all SOF logistics and mobility matters in the JOA. The JSOTF J-4 uses the LRC to monitor the current situation, set priorities, synchronize logistic operations, and allocate resources to allow timely and continuous support of operations. The JSOTF LRC personnel work for the JSOTF J-4, but must coordinate extensively with the JOC and other JSOTF staff centers. The LRC functions may be performed by J-4 watch personnel in the JOC when circumstances or size dictate. If the JSOTF stands alone in the theater, key positions may include representatives from logistic functional areas of supply, services, munitions, and transportation; logistic plans; and maintenance and other personnel as directed by the J-4. A JSOTF LRC also may be organized along Service component lines with ground, air, and naval branches. Normally, engineering, medical, and contracting remain as separate branches. A notional JSOTF LRC is depicted in Figure VII-1.

4. Logistic Support

Specific logistic requirements are initially determined by the components. Logistic support for SOF units can be provided through one or more of the following means.

a. **Service Support.** The logistic support of SOF units is the responsibility of their parent Service except where otherwise provided for by support agreements or other directives. This responsibility exists regardless of whether the SOF unit requiring support is assigned to the Service component, the TSOC, or a JSOTF.




Figure VII-1. Notional Joint Special Operations Task Force Logistics Readiness Center

(1) **Title 10, USC.** Section 165 charges the Services with the responsibility for providing administration and support for forces assigned by the respective Service to the combatant command. The Secretary of Defense may transfer this responsibility in part or in full to another component of the DOD.

(2) **Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), CJCSI 3110.06, *Special Operations Supplement*.** The JSCP provides that GCCs and Service component commanders, in coordination with the TSOCs, are responsible for ensuring that effective and responsive SOF support systems are developed and provided. Each type of SOF unit depends on the theater logistic system for a different mix of direct support, general support and, in some cases, even unit level support. Other Service logistic support should also be considered, as SOF rarely operate in other than a joint environment.

(3) **Statement of Requirements (SOR).** Logistic execution and requirements determination begins with the receipt of the mission and subsequent analysis. Requirements determination is critical to coordinating theater support. For contingency planning, these requirements are normally communicated from each SOF unit to the CDRJSOTF in a formal SOR. The most important aspect of the SOR process is identification of requirements in sufficient time to allow for the necessary coordination and planning. A notional SOR process for Service common support is depicted in Figure VII-2.




Figure VII-2. Notional Logistics Statement of Requirements Process (Service Common)

b. Joint In-Theater Support. SOF missions could require joint logistic planning and execution. When the theater Service component cannot satisfy its Service SOF support requirements, the GCC determines if another Service component can satisfy the requirement through common or joint servicing arrangements. CUL arrangements also may be used when normal Service support cannot satisfy the requirements and when the GCC determines that CUL support is appropriate in order to provide more efficient support and to eliminate unnecessary duplication of support. SOF also have special support considerations such as operating outside of normal theater support areas and security-related issues.

c. SO-Peculiar Support

(1) SO-peculiar equipment, materials, supplies, and services are defined as those items and services required for SOF mission support for which there is no Service common requirement. Responsibility for developing and acquiring SO-peculiar equipment and for acquiring SO-peculiar materials, supplies, and services belongs to CDRUSSOCOM. USSOCOM will provide this support to theater-deployed SOF via USSOCOM Service component logistic infrastructures or directly from SOFSA. SOFSA forward (logistics assistance representative) support can be used by SOF components to expedite SO-peculiar support and for Service items that are impacting on SOF readiness.

(2) The identification of SO-peculiar requirements is an operational decision that is tied to the supported commander's CONOPS and mission requirements. Identification and coordination of these requirements are accomplished through USSOCOM and SOFSA. To ensure that the process is effective, the TSOC should publish clear procedures for subordinate units to obtain this support. These procedures require close coordination among the customer, the CDRJSOTF, and USSOCOM. CDRUSSOCOM monitors the process to assist and expedite it when required. There are two basic procedures for identifying and validating SO-peculiar equipment.

(a) **Predeployment from the US.** The commanders of deploying SOF units will submit requests for additional or above authorization equipment fills through Service command channels, with justification based on the assigned missions and operational requirements.

(b) **Postdeployment or In-Theater.** The commanders of SOF units will submit requests for SO-peculiar items through the CDRJSOTF to the CDRTSOC, to whom the GCC has normally delegated the authority to validate such requirements. The CDRTSOC will provide the SO-peculiar equipment from theater operational stocks if they are available. For equipment requiring US sourcing, the CDRTSOC will forward the validated SO-peculiar requirement to USSOCOM for appropriate action. If the items are unavailable within the command, USSOCOM will take appropriate procurement action to meet identified mission requirements.


(c) **SOR.** As with Service common requirements, there is a similar support process for SO-peculiar items. The fundamental difference is that the SOR is passed through the JSOTF to the TSOC and on to USSOCOM for action. The notional logistic SOR process for SO-peculiar support is depicted in Figure VII-3.

5. Logistic Planning Considerations

Logistic and operations planning must be done in concert to identify and refine support requirements. It is essential to conduct this planning concurrently during TPFDD development. Commanders at all levels must integrate operations and logistic planning from the beginning of the planning cycle. Complete and integrated staff coordination permits simultaneous planning to ensure logistic readiness of forces and facilities to support operations. An additional part of integrated planning involves reviewing the TPFDD prior to submitting it to a supported GCC. Appendix D, "Joint Special Operations Task Force Staff Checklists," provides a tool for logistic planning in support of SOF. It is not all-inclusive, but should serve as a point of departure for the planning of SOF support and sustainment.

6. United States Special Operations Command Support to Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters and Components

Because SOF organic capabilities are limited, SOF logistic planners should plan and coordinate for parent Service support IAW title 10, USC, section 165 responsibilities. Theater conventional logistic elements offer the most robust support capability and should be integrated into the concept of support early in the planning process. The SOF planner should cultivate



**Figure VII-3. Notional Logistics Statement of Requirements Process
(Special Operations-Peculiar)**

close support relationships with the Service theater logistic elements. In most cases, theater Service components will be able to support SOF if requirements are known in advance. When operations involving SOF impose time, geographic, and/or resource constraints on the theater support infrastructure, making it impracticable for the theater to provide the requisite support to SOF, the GCC may request from CDRUSSOCOM the deployment of organic USSOCOM CSS assets. In some instances, the parent Service and/or executive agent may be unable to react quickly enough to time-sensitive planning to provide SOF logistic support. For rapid response operations, USSOCOM component commands will maintain the capability to support SOF elements for an initial entry period of 15 days, if required, and SOF employment is of sufficient priority for such support. In the US Northern Command AOR, support should be available after 24 hours. Services and/or executive agents should be prepared to support SOF operations as soon as possible, but no later than 15 days. Additionally, contracted and HNS assets must be considered during the planning process.

a. **Deployment Cell (D-cell).** CDRUSSOCOM can provide a D-cell in support of CDRUSSOCOM-directed JSOTFs involved in a major regional contingency, national mission, or exercise. Support includes supply, food service, billeting, security, power production, minor construction, vehicle maintenance, and management.

(1) **D-Cell Concept of Employment.** D-cell is meant to bridge the gap for logistic support to the JSOTF until conventional support forces are in place and operational. It deploys by the most rapid means available to the site, establishes a layout of the site, and begins construction of the JSOTF base. The D-cell is capable of providing 24-hour operations. Personnel are cross-trained to assist in areas other than their primary specialty when required. For anything exceeding a small package capability, the D-cell requires augmentation from theater components and/or joint SOF. The primary difference between the small and large packages is the number of personnel it can support and the amount of equipment and personnel required for the package. The D-cell is able to conduct limited split operations at an ISB or forward support base (FSB). The D-cell commander remains in command of all assigned or attached personnel throughout the operation.

(2) **Functional Capabilities**

- (a) Design, lay out, and establish a bare base site.
- (b) Requisition, procure, and inventory control all equipment.
- (c) Act as a paying or purchasing agent.
- (d) Provide food service in a fixed or field dining facility.
- (e) Manage contract quarters.
- (f) Provide limited air base ground defense and base defense operations, information security, high value resource protection, convoy escort, courier duties, integrated defense with other SOF units, area damage control, terrorist threats, downed aircraft security, and detainee processing and detainment.
- (g) Construct bare base sites, targets, and defensive fighting positions.
- (h) Provide bare base electrical power and environmental control systems.
- (i) Provide vehicle maintenance and management of contracted vehicles.
- (j) Conduct overland and airland planning, including dangerous cargo and load planning certification.
- (k) Operate heavy equipment.

b. **ARSOF**

(1) **Sustainment Brigade Special Operations (SBSO)**

(a) The mission of the SBSO is to plan, coordinate, and provide logistic and signal support, and force health protection (FHP) to ARSOF across the range of military operations in two theaters simultaneously. HQ SBSO provides C2 to its organic elements to accomplish its mission of planning and coordination for ARSOF units supporting the GCC.

(b) Supporting ARSOF during the initial stages of a conflict is a challenge. Typically, ARSOF's early entry into a theater is before the arrival of conventional forces and the logistic support in the theater. Depending upon the TPFDD, minimal theater Army (TA) logistic and FHP assets are available to support arriving ARSOF units. A primary role of the SBSO is to fill the gap in support and to develop the bridge to TA logistic support and FHP assets. SBSO fulfills this role by deploying its logistic assets and FHP along with deploying organic ARSOF logistic assets. Once in theater, SBSO provides logistic expertise, support FHP, and facilitates integration of ARSOF support requirements into the TA support plan and insures timely response to ARSOF logistic requirements.

(2) **Army SO Liaison Elements.** Army SO liaison elements are the logistics service and support planning and coordination link between the GCC, TSOC, SBSO, and the ARSOF command structure. These liaison elements are not a source of supplies, funds, or augmentation personnel for logistic support. They plan and coordinate with the Army Service component command (ASCC), theater support commands (TSCs), SBSO, and apportioned ARSOF during contingency and crisis-action planning. Army SO liaison elements also serve as an advocate for ARSOF issues, logistic support, FHP, and ARSOF signal requirements to the ASCC. On occasions when the ASCC is not involved in the operation or deployment of ARSOF, the liaison elements may be tasked to coordinate directly with foreign vendors, US embassies, and allied forces.

(3) **ARSOF Logistic Flow Concept**

(a) **Developed Theater Logistics.** In a developed or mature theater, a sustainment base is established within the theater. Pre-positioned war reserve materiel stock (PWRMS) and operational project stocks are in place. Additionally, foreign nation support (FNS) agreements exist. TSC capabilities normally are sufficient to support and sustain ARSOF. In cases where the TSC is unable to fill an ARSOF logistical request or requirement, the SBSO or Army SO liaison element will exercise their reachback capability to USSOCOM or US Army Special Operations Command to fulfill requirements.

(b) **Undeveloped Theater Logistics.** An undeveloped theater does not have a significant US theater sustainment base. PWRMS, in-theater operational project stocks, and FNS agreements are minimal or nonexistent. When an ARSOF unit deploys into an undeveloped theater, it must bring sufficient resources to survive and operate until the TA establishes a bare-base support system or makes arrangements for HN and third-country support. The bare-base support system may function from the US, afloat (amphibious shipping or mobile sea bases), or at a third-country support base. The bare-base support system relies heavily on strategic airlift or sealift for resupply.

1. Deployed ARSOF units in an undeveloped theater may have to bypass normal logistic support echelons. They may maintain direct contact with their parent units in the US, or they may request a tailored support package from the SBSO to accompany them into the theater. The SBSO can then request directly from the US wholesale logistic system and provide support and sustainment to the ARSOF units. They may also rely on ASCC and theater support command contracting and attached CA expertise to obtain support and sustainment. In practice, the solution may be some combination of all four options.

2. The planning and development of support relationships must occur before and during joint readiness exercises, security assistance mobile training teams, and other FNS operations. Support relationships developed in the theater support plan are a basis for continuous support relationships between ARSOF and the TA elements providing its support package. The support package is normally organized as a provisional composite support battalion or company.

c. AFSOF

(1) AFSOF logistics is primarily focused on creating, preparing, deploying, employing, sustaining, and protecting the specialized air operations mission through the full range of military operations. Logistics and maintenance emphasize the launch, recovery, service, rapid repair, and relaunch cycle. The turnaround cycle may be compressed into relatively short periods of 12 hours or less. This places a significant burden on the logistic infrastructure, given the level of sophistication of the SOF aircraft modifications and the requirement to operate from austere locations. Additionally, AFSOF logistics may be required to provide initial contingency base operating support in support of SO.

(2) The parent wing, group and/or squadron are responsible for determining equipment, spares, and personnel requirements. Total requirements determination will be based on the deployment duration, operating tempo, and the extent of existing logistic and base operating support at the deployed location. Once deployed, the AFSOF logistics readiness officer will manage and coordinate logistic support including but not limited to supply and contracting support, communications, vehicle, fuels, billeting, and messing requirements, and establish connectivity with the theater and US logistic support systems.

(3) Should time permit prior to deployment, the wing or group logistic planning cell will develop a plan to support deployed air operations and concomitant logistic objectives. AFSOC units normally tailor their contingency support packages to accommodate the mission options for self-deployment, limited airlift deployments and, when applicable, shipboard operations. Employment of 30 days or less normally will be supported by mobility readiness spares packages and limited base operating support. Intermediate level maintenance support may be deployed to collocate with AFSOF or be centrally located to support SOF as well as theater operations. While AFSOC units are en route or at an austere location, the AFSOF LRC is the primary supply support medium for non-mission capable supply spares requests and orchestrates the acquisition to delivery process. Long term employments will be supported by established supply pipelines with the exception of non-mission capable supply conditions which will be accomplished by the

LRC. SOF unique requests may go through the JSOTF/TSOC J-4 to USSOCOM Special Operations Acquisition and Logistics Center (J-4) or directly to SOFSA.

(4) From an Air Force logistics perspective, support squadrons are organic to the special operations wings and SOGs. They deploy, in part, whenever elements of the parent wing or group deploy. The maintenance and mission support group, comprised of qualified personnel from a composite of support squadrons, provides the primary logistic support for US based AF/SOF. The SOGs based outside the US provide the primary logistic support of outside the US based AF/SOF. They accomplish their mission by meeting the following key objectives: maintaining personnel, equipment and supplies in constant state of deployment and combat readiness; providing world class training to logistic and maintenance personnel; and striving for technological superiority, robustness, agility, and full integration with joint operations.

d. NAVSOF

(1) When supporting fleet operations, the senior Navy commander will support NAVSOF using standard Navy support channels, with NAVSOF peculiar support provided by unit deployment packages.

(2) When operating ashore, Navy common support is the responsibility of the theater Navy component commander. If Navy support is impractical, the CDRJSOTF may coordinate inter-Service support from other SO components and/or theater assets.

(3) The combat service support teams (CSSTs) are responsible for planning logistic support for wartime operations, contingencies, and exercises. The CSSTs coordinate with theater commands responsible for support, the GCC's staff, the JFC staff, HN, and contractors to ensure that required support is provided to operational elements.

(4) The CSSTs' focus is to formalize agreements with theater organizations or coordinate as authorized with established support organizations rather than create an organic capability. The formally promulgated statement of requirement is the foundation of the CSST process that then leads to the more dynamic planning process. In practice, the CSST removes logistic roadblocks by taking whatever action is required on emergent issues through liaison, with appropriate organizations ensuring that agreements previously reached are honored.

(5) The NAVSOF logistic flow concept is essential to the Navy command supporting the theater, with coordination to the CSST as a facilitator of requests.

(6) A naval special warfare (NSW) CSST is assigned to each NSW group to provide full-spectrum logistic support for designated SEAL teams, SEAL delivery vehicle (SDV) teams, special boat units, NSW task groups or task units, and/or special mission units.

e. **MARSOF**

(1) When conducting training or operations afloat or ashore in a GCC AOR, the senior MARSOF commander (or JSOTF Marine Corps component commander) will provide or coordinate non-SOF-specific logistic and service support through standard Marine Corps support channels or designated supporting commands. Support exceeding the MARSOF commander's capabilities, or exceeding designated supporting command capabilities, will be requested through the theater Marine Corps Service component. SOF-specific logistic and service support exceeding the MARSOF commander's capabilities will be requested through SOF support channels via the appropriate JSOTF or TSOC.

(a) In the case of a MSOC deploying with and operating under the TACON of a Marine expeditionary unit (MEU), the MEU will provide Marine Corps-common, non-SOF-specific logistic and services support.

(b) In cases when MARSOF train or operate separately from other Marine Corps forces, or Marine Corps logistic and service support is otherwise impractical and exceeds MARSOF capabilities, the JSOTF or TSOC commander may coordinate inter-Service support from other SOF components and/or theater assets.

(2) Commander MARSOC is responsible for coordinating and supporting MARSOF logistic and service support while in garrison, and requests Marine Corps common support exceeding MARSOC capabilities through Marine Corps Service channels. SOF-specific support exceeding MARSOC capabilities will be requested from USSOCOM.

7. Base Operating Support

a. **Base Operating Support.** This is a provision of support to SOF transiting or remaining at a permanent or expeditionary site by a GCC, Service component, or JTF. Base operations support services and support are provided on a reimbursable basis between the base operating support-integrator and the SOF organization that uses the support or service unless otherwise directed by the GCC.

b. **Base Operating Support-Integrator.** The GCC designates a representative who acts as the joint base operating support provider for the requesting SOF organization. The GCC may designate a Service component or JTF as the base operating support integrator at each operating location. The base operating support-integrator coordinates contracting support and the efficient use of mission support resources. Where shortfalls or opportunities for efficiencies exist, the GCC may task components or JTFs to provide or coordinate specific capabilities. The base operating support-integrator provides master planning for facilities and real estate. Responsibilities include, but are not limited to, collecting and prioritizing construction requirements, seeking funding support, environmental management, force protection, and hazardous waste disposal.

c. **Prior to Base Operating Support.** SOF are predominantly the first force into austere areas. Sustained operations of 14 days or more are normal and often conducted with no cover or

sanitation for operators. In an effort to provide basic comfort for missions that meet these parameters, AFSOC has created the air rapid response kit. The air rapid response kit is designed to support SOF “beddown” until designated base operating support providers have arrived and established the site/location for ongoing operations. It bridges the gap between arrival of the initial force and bare base establishment.

8. Health Service Support

The JSOTF surgeon or the medical plans officer, as assigned to the CDRJSOTF, must ensure that an effective medical system is in place that will provide support for SOF missions. JSOTF and component medical personnel must comprehend fully the FHP taxonomy of care capabilities organized by the GCC.

For further information on HSS and FHP, refer to JP 4-02, Health Service Support.

a. JSOTF HSS Service Component Capabilities. SOF medics and corpsmen are all SOF paramedic and SO combat medics (with the exception of Air Force SO medical element personnel who do not have combat skills). They are capable of providing advanced tactical combat casualty care. Additionally, SF, AFSOF medical element, senior SEAL corpsmen, and MARSOF independent duty corpsmen are advanced medics with Service independent duty designations. These enlisted medical personnel are trained as independent, interoperable combat medics with the Service/mission unique medical capabilities (sea based, small unit operations, veterinary, or aviation medicine). SOF medical capability is very limited, and depending on the size and protraction of the mission, conventional FHP augmentation above first responder and casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) movement may be required.

(1) Air Force pararescuemen, SOF medical element medics, and SO aviation regiment medics provide SOF with a personnel recovery and CASEVAC capability aboard Air Force and Army SO aviation assets. Both Air Force and Army assets support all SOF operations, regardless of the lead service.

(2) Group, squadron, battalion, platoon, or team physicians, physician assistants, dentists, veterinarians, and preventive medicine professionals providing augmentation, advice, and expertise to the SOF health care team support SOF medics at forward operating areas. Air



Special operations forces often deploy to an austere environment where there is no dedicated or specified logistic support structure.

Force and Army SO support organizations provide advanced trauma management, sick call, logistic support, blood, laboratory, patient hold, and transportation capabilities to support SO bed down locations.

(3) Forward surgical capabilities are provided by AFSOC's SO surgical teams and SO critical care evacuation teams. These teams, when combined with the US Army Special Operations Command's SO support organizations create a more robust SOF medical capability.

(4) CA units do not have an organic FHP capability. CA battalions have medical personnel assigned, but are organized to only provide advice and expertise to the supported missions and not FHP to the force. Medically trained personnel in CA battalions provide assistance in identifying and assessing foreign public and private health systems, to include health and sanitation systems, agencies, personnel, and facilities. CA specialties work with nongovernmental and intergovernmental health organizations to rehabilitate or develop functional health care systems within the operational area.

b. JSOTF Medical Support Planning Considerations

(1) **Objective.** The SOF medical planner must have a thorough understanding of the unique aspects of SOF medical operations, such as limited medical support capabilities and austere operating environments. This individual must also possess thorough knowledge of conventional medical support systems and requirements, theater and inter-theater aeromedical evacuation capabilities, and the ability to translate SOF-unique requirements into that support framework.

(2) **Issues.** These issues are complicated by the nature of SOF operations and the ability of SOF units that routinely work together mixing Army, Navy, Air Force, and multinational assets. SEAL teams, for example, could be evacuated by Air Force aircraft to an Army theater hospitalization capability facility. The issues that warrant attention are matters pertaining to the different methods used by the Services for executing medical services and evacuation that may disrupt continuity or jeopardize medical care for the casualty.

(3) **Unique Planning and Support Considerations.** Unique aspects of medical support to SOF must be incorporated into medical planning at the theater joint force surgeon staff level, with full knowledge and concurrence of the JSOTF and TSOC planning staff. Components are authorized medical planners and command surgeons during full mobilization. Medical support must be planned and coordinated with subordinate joint force elements by the theater medical staff. The integration of conventional medical support extended to the full range of missions conducted by SOF must be synchronized with the SOF OPLANs prior to execution.

(a) Extended lines of communications (LOCs) and isolated or denied locations create problems for conventional units in support of SOF. Extending the full range of HSS functions to SOF is beyond the normal mission capabilities of the conventional medical units. The level of detail in planning and coordination is much greater, and the difficulty of support to

SOF increases. The theater medical staff, down to the JTF staff, must prioritize the missions and plan accordingly.

(b) Conventional medical units often are tasked beyond their organic capabilities to support the conventional force, and often their support missions are prioritized accordingly at the theater level. This problem of multiple taskings and limited resources makes the integration of support to SOF of high concern among planners at all levels of command.

(c) Evacuation of casualties during SO missions can be done by SOF aircraft, but these aircraft are not medically equipped or staffed to be used in a backhaul capacity. The planner must understand this limitation when determining how to best support SOF-generated evacuation requirements.

(d) SOF will often operate in theaters that are underdeveloped with little or no health care support structure. Point-to-point movement or medical regulating and strategic aeromedical evacuation might be required.

(e) SOF teams frequently operate in remote areas and are, therefore, exposed to health risks not normally seen in the other areas of the respective HNs.

(f) Some programs or missions are compartmented, and the need for essential secrecy requires restricted access for planning purposes. The medical planner must establish an exchange of only sufficient information to provide and ensure medical support for the plan.

(g) SOF medical support beyond inherent unit capabilities is totally reliant on the theater or external medical support systems for all other medical support. The theater surgeon has coordinating responsibility for all medical forces assigned to or operating in the geographic area.

(h) There is often a requirement to safeguard the patient's identity, which might compromise the unit's presence or jeopardize the mission. SOF missions are often politically sensitive.

(i) Communications with and control of medical assets may also be a concern. Connectivity plans and the procedures for communicating must be developed in order to pass real-time information so that casualties can be moved efficiently.

c. **Joint HSS Planning for SOF-Unique Missions.** The following list is provided as a guide for developing a joint HSS plan that meets unique SOF operational requirements. It focuses on the health service functions not organic to SOF that the conventional system would provide.

(1) A statement of the medical situation.

(2) Defined scope of mission.

(3) A statement of the patient movement policy.

(4) Clear delineation of the medical responsibilities, organizations, and employment of available medical support system elements. This includes emphasis on shifts in responsibility during the several phases of the operations, and on the measures necessary to ensure coordinated medical action by all elements of the task force.

(5) Estimate of requirements for medical support and available capabilities.

(6) Provisions for medical services in connection with the medical evacuation of casualties from the operational area (en route medical care).

(7) Class VIII (medical material) supply including receiving, storing, and issuing capabilities; resupply methods; and a durable medical equipment exchange policy and blood products transshipment, administration, and disposition.

(8) Procedures and responsibilities for keeping and safeguarding necessary records and reports on the flow of casualties and individual patient status information and detailed SOPs for reporting and records keeping.

(9) Provisions for access and availability of ancillary services (e.g., dental, laboratory, and X-ray).



Joint special operations force medical planning must be integrated and coordinated with the supported JFC's medical staff.

(10) Provisions for obtaining medical intelligence.

(11) Measures for preventive medicine, force health protection surveillance requirements, CBRN warfare medicine, and hygiene and sanitation procedures.

(12) Detail plans for mass casualty management.

(13) Ensure that adequate medical support is provided to detainees that are under control of the JSOTF.

9. Host-Nation Support

While HNS may be encouraged for common support items, the use of HNS in JSOTF operations must be weighed against OPSEC and mission requirements. Additionally, HNS authority must be coordinated with the JSOTF establishing authority and higher chain of command. HNS can also be a significant force multiplier as an alternative to deploying logistic support from the US. It may also increase the timeliness of response to a developing situation and reduce lift requirements necessary to deploy forces to the JOA.

a. Factors for Consideration of HNS

(1) Nations without a viable government infrastructure may not be able to provide logistic assistance; however, limited support may be obtained through local contractors.

(2) To maximize the JSOTF logistic effort, HNS functions (i.e., identification of requirements and procurement) should be centralized and coordinated within the J-4 organization.

(3) CA personnel either assigned or available to the JSOTF are trained to identify and coordinate HNS resources and can provide valuable assistance to the J-4 staff.

(4) HNS agreements should include the authority for the CDRJSOTF to coordinate directly with the HN for support, acquisition, and use of facilities and real estate.

(5) Every effort should be made to obtain language support for negotiations with local nationals. The JSOTF J-2 may assist in obtaining personnel for use in negotiations.

(6) A legal advisor must be involved in the HN agreements process.

(7) It is critical to determine a lead agency for contracting and negotiating for support.

(8) Authority for negotiations must be obtained through the supported JFC, up to the supported GCC and national military level and through the DOS channels. Negotiations for HNS fall under two basic categories: existing or nonexisting HNS agreements.

b. Existing HNS Agreement

(1) The JSOTF J-4, in coordination with the JFC J-4 and legal advisor, reviews the current HNS agreement and identifies the logistic support items in the HNS agreement that the JSOTF might request the HN to “activate.” The JSOTF then requests, IAW procedures established in the general agreement, that these logistic support items be implemented.

(2) The JSOTF J-4 identifies additional HNS logistic support that is required and begins negotiations (within the framework of the general agreement and as allowed by US law and policy) to obtain that support.

(3) The JSOTF J-4 ensures that the components use existing HNS, if applicable, to avoid duplication of effort with the HN.

(4) JSOTF component commanders inform the JSOTF J-4 if an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement (ACSA) exists with the HN. If an ACSA does not exist, the CDRJSOTF coordinates through the JFC with the supported GCC and the DOS, as authorized, to take actions to initiate an ACSA with the HN. An ACSA is a logistic tool for development during contingency planning. It is impractical to try to start the ACSA process for near term operations or during crisis.

c. Non Existing HNS Agreement

(1) The JSOTF J-4 determines potential HNS areas of logistic support and develops a concept of requirements for HNS. The JSOTF concept of requirements for HNS is coordinated through the JFC to the GCC for approval and action.

(2) The supported GCC reviews and approves the HNS requirements and forwards them to the DOS via the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Office of the Secretary of Defense with a request that a framework agreement be established between the HN and the United States. The framework agreement provides the procedures and the authority for the supported GCC to conduct military-to-military negotiations to obtain HNS through subordinate implementing agreements. As appropriate, the JSOTF J-4 should review with their legal adviser, JSOTF authority to negotiate and conclude implementing agreements as necessary with the HN. Such authority may lie with the JSOTF, the JTF, or the GCC. Once the implementing agreement is established, the JSOTF J-4 provides a detailed statement of requirements to the HN either directly or through the element authorized to conduct HN liaison. The negotiations can then begin. A legal officer must be involved in the process to ensure adherence to US laws.

10. Contracting Support

Contracting support can be an effective force multiplier for the JSOTF in terms of reducing the logistic tail and also can act as effective PA and CA tools for increasing HNS for an operation. For major operations, the JSOTF may include a contracting and disbursing officer on the J-4 manning document. If the operations are combined, contracting may be consolidated at a

centralized activity. For smaller operations, a designated component may provide the contracting officer. Units are responsible for ensuring that funds are in place before any contracting actions are taken. In nearly all operational situations, the JSOTF J-4 contracting actions should be coordinated closely with and approved by (if required) the higher level JTF J-4 or lead Service or agency contracting organization as appropriate. The JSOTF J-4 should consider the following when planning for contractor support.

a. **Manpower.** In order to provide adequate contracting manpower to support the JSOTF deployment, several factors must be evaluated and compared with the tasked unit type code packages. Generally, a JSOTF deployed to an improved site can be supported by a single contracting officer. The individual can be assigned to the JSOTF J-4 or be assigned to one of the collocated SOF components and be available to support other SOF units. The individual may also support other component locations. When determining the required number of contracting personnel, consider the following:

(1) Availability of central supply and contracting support within the AOR at locations other than the unit deployment base.

(2) The amount of preexisting facilities available at the deployed location to support unit organizations.

(3) Significant distance from the deployment site to contractor sources and difficult travel or communication conditions may require additional contracting manpower.

(4) The existence of pre-positioned supplies and preexisting service contracts, or support from other contracting units that can reduce the manpower requirement as long as these assets are made available to the JSOTF in a timely manner.

(5) The extent of HNS provided directly to the unit that will affect the contracting workload.

b. **Time Phasing.** Early arrival of the contracting officer in relation to unit personnel is critical. Conditions must ensure secure access to suppliers. Additionally, paying agent support is required during the early deployment, and immediate transportation, communication, and support must be provided to the contracting official.

c. **Contracting Procedures.** Procedures should be pre-coordinated to the maximum extent to include the following:

(1) Identification of key user personnel that will interface with contracting personnel. They should be trained in fund accountability, purchase request validation, purchase acceptance, quality assurance, and any delegated purchasing authority procedures.

(2) Identification of facilities for the contracting office and delivery sites for users if that can be predetermined from site survey information.

(3) Communications procedures adapted to existing telephone capabilities, off-base line access, priorities for telephone usage, and radio network availability. It is essential to coordinate and prioritize these communications requirements with the supporting communications elements well in advance of the deployment.

(4) Identification of Class A agents tasked to provide paying agent support to the contingency contracting officers.

(5) Identification of the legal advisor.

(6) Identification of personal security requirements during off base contracting trips.

(7) Identification of all support services required at the site, to include interpreters, local national drivers, or other support required by circumstances at the deployment location. Coordination with the logistic support functional area manager and the establishment of priorities and time phasing for these needs are essential.

(8) Identification of contractors and provision of reasonable assurance that these contractors will continue to perform during crisis situations.

(9) Review of contracts and contracting procedures by SJA.

(10) Identification of those tasks and elements of the mission from which contractors will be excluded because of their nonmilitary status.

d. **Command Responsibilities for Essential Contract Services.** The commanders, relying on contractor support, shall take action IAW DOD Instruction 3020.37, *Continuation of Essential DOD Contractor Services During Crises*, to ensure the following:

(1) Review contractor services annually to determine which services will be essential during crises and include appropriate provisions in statements of work furnished to the contracting office. This review also should include identifying essential services in statements of work and include provisions for contractor contingency plans to provide reasonable assurance of continued performance during crises. Data on the contractors as well as plans for replacement personnel should be reviewed.

(2) Conduct an annual assessment of the impact of unanticipated or premature loss of essential contractor services on the effectiveness of support to mobilizing and deployed forces.

(3) Where reasonable assurance of continued contractor performance cannot be provided, include provisions in contingency plans for obtaining essential services from other sources.

(4) Include provisions in contingency plans to assume or supplement the contractor-supplied essential services at the earliest opportunity during crisis situations when alternate sources can be identified to perform essential DOD contractor services.

(5) Handle information on essential contractor employees overseas as sensitive data, safeguarded under the direction of the contracting officer and released to authorized personnel only.

(6) Provide for the retention of contractor employees in contracts supporting foreign military sales requirements.

11. Environmental Considerations

All JSOTF operations must follow environmental guidelines disseminated by the JFC and arising out of US and international law. Accordingly, the CDRJSOTF should prepare Annex L, “Environmental Considerations,” of the OPORD. It should include a purpose statement, assumption, and limiting factors; responsibilities; and an environmental CONOPS at a minimum.

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CHAPTER VIII COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM SUPPORT

“The Services put more electronic communication connectivity into the Gulf in 90 days than we put in Europe in 40 years.”

Lieutenant General James S. Cassidy, J-6, The Joint Staff, 1992

1. General

a. **Range.** Communications system support to JSOTF and its assigned SOF must be global, secure, and jointly interoperable. It must be flexible so that it can be tailored to any mission, and it must add value to the SOF’s operational capability. Communications systems support the full range of SO worldwide. SOF must be able to communicate anywhere and anytime utilizing national capabilities to the maximum extent possible. The SOF operational unit requires a variety of methods for communicating, reporting, and querying available resources, regardless of geographic location. Information assurance must be applied to all SOF information systems in order to protect and defend friendly information and information systems. Communications systems must never compromise the SOF operational unit.

b. **Support.** SOF communications support consists of multiple and varied groups of systems, procedures, personnel, and equipment that operate in diverse manners and at different echelons, from national to unit levels. Communications systems must support discrete as well as collective functions. SOF missions are normally controlled at the lowest level that can accomplish the needed coordination, although political considerations may require control up to and including the national level. To provide for necessary control, SOF communications systems must offer seamless connectivity from the lowest operational unit to the highest levels of command.

c. **Interoperability.** SOF communications systems must be interoperable with each other, with conventional forces, with US national resources, and with allies and HNs as determined by the scope of the operations. If necessary, they must integrate not only with state-of-the-art systems, but must also be capable of integrating with less sophisticated equipment often found in less developed nations. Multiple communications systems may be needed to meet these objectives. With respect to communications systems, the policy in CJCSI 2700.01, *International Military Agreements for Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability Between the United States, Its Allies and Other Friendly Nations*, focuses on enhancing multinational combat capabilities for US military forces and to communicate and share data and information.

d. **Communications System Principles.** To ensure the continuous and uninterrupted flow and processing of information, joint warfighters must have systems that adhere to the communications principles of interoperability, agility, be trusted, and be shared. Additionally, communications systems must provide information assurance through authentication, non-repudiation, availability, confidentiality, and integrity and should provide for the defense of computer networks against adversary attack.

2. Fundamental Tenets of Special Operations Communications System

SO communications architecture should allow operators at all levels access to a worldwide communications backbone and seamless information transfer through a robust, global infrastructure known as the Global Information Grid (GIG). It contains the total combination of information sources, fusion centers, and distribution systems available to pursue SO operational objectives. This architecture utilizes the full spectrum to connect into the GIG and to support SOF operational elements. It is compliant with national and international standards to create a fully automated, operationally responsive, tailored communications support system. Communications tenets are depicted in Figure VIII-1.



Figure VIII-1. Special Operations Communications System Architecture Fundamental Tenets

a. **Seamless.** Seamless communications must provide connectivity to SOF in garrison, in transit, and while deployed. It must have a reachback capability to normal sources of information for planning, execution, and status from any location. Seamless communications architecture is digital and supports every phase of mission profile. It includes requirements for entry ports, high speed networks, and assured C2 connectivity.

b. **Robust.** Robust networks must be flexible, interactive networks that can adapt to the changing information requirements of SOF. Multiple means must be a part of the robust network. It requires multiple routes, alternative sources of connectivity, bandwidth on demand, and modularity and scalability.

c. **Automated.** SOF operators require information from numerous data sources that can be rapidly integrated and analyzed to make C2 decisions at all levels, from the JSOTF to the operational elements. To achieve a fully automated architecture requires human-computer interface, data element discipline, fused databases, multilevel secure local area network (LAN) and wide area network capability, digital switching, and a client server environment.

d. **Standards Compliant.** Adherence to standards and to the joint technical architecture ensures a capability to interchange hardware and software plus the ability to interface and exchange data among SOF, with other Services, or with multinational forces as required.

e. **Full Spectrum.** The nature of SO demands the use of the entire frequency spectrum and is not limited to those assets controlled by the JSOTF operational C2 structure. Full spectrum depends on using national systems to the extent possible in order to drive access to the infosphere down to the lowest SOF operational level.

f. **Protected.** SOF communications will become lucrative targets for adversaries of all types including foreign military, terrorist groups, special interest groups, and “hackers”. It is therefore imperative that SOF communications architectures consider the need to protect these critical resources from IO attacks. Creation and maintenance of sound COMSEC, COMPUSEC, and information security (INFOSEC) programs are a few of the methods to provide information assurance.

g. **Portable, Compact, and Lightweight.** SOF deployments can be constrained by physical and weight consideration of communications systems.

3. Joint Force Commander Responsibilities

The JFC ensures that communications systems, personnel, COMSEC, and equipment requirements of the CDRJSOTF are supported based on mission requirements. The JFC coordinates with the supported GCC for Service, Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), and Global SATCOM support center or regional SATCOM support center for SATCOM assets, and the Joint Staff for those assets controlled by the CJCS such as a JWICS mobile integrated communications system, or for coordination with other government agencies, as appropriate. The GCC may provide a theater communications package or individual communications personnel as augmentees to the JSOTF to help establish a complete, interoperable joint communications package. In addition, the JTF J-6 prepares policy and guidance to enable its subordinate forces to operate within the supported geographic combatant command communications structure.

4. Commander, Joint Special Operations Task Force Responsibilities

a. The CDRJSOTF must identify the communications requirements to support the JSOTF CONOPS. The JSOTF J-6 reviews candidate COAs for communications supportability and coordinates with the JTF J-6 staff during COA development.

b. The JSOTF J-6 also is responsible for the following:

(1) Provide overall technical control of all communications system supporting the JSOTF.

(2) Ensure that adequate and effective communications system are available to support the JSOTF C2 architecture.

- (3) Publish communications plans and instructions to support the assigned mission.
- (4) Review and coordinate communications plans prepared by subordinate commands.
- (5) Request CJCS-controlled transportable communications assets, including JCSE assets, IAW CJCSI 6110.01, *CJCS-Controlled Tactical Communications Assets*, and other established procedures.
- (6) Ensure that network operations and information operations are conducted continuously to preserve the integrity and security of networks, nodal communications system, and friendly information from hostile attack.
- (7) Ensure compatibility of JSOTF communications system.
- (8) Ensure adequate bandwidth is available to support JSOTF communications requirements.
- (9) Participate in the JPG to support mission planning communications requirements.
- (10) Ensure that the criteria standards for information quality are met as depicted in Figure VIII-2.




Figure VIII-2. Information Quality Criteria

5. Joint Network Operations Control Center

The JSOTF J-6 establishes and supervises the operations of the JNCC (depicted in Figure VIII-3) to support command network control, management of tactical communications systems within the JOA or JSOA, and strategic communications connectivity within the JOA. The CDRJSOTF may direct that the JNCC take any organizational form that suits the accomplishment of the mission. The final structure of the JNCC may be dependent on resource availability. A JNCC may consist of current operations, computer systems support, networks, HQ support, future operations and plans elements, jobs control, frequency management cells, and supporting administrative elements as necessary. It also may include the COMSEC custodian who is responsible to provide or coordinate all COMSEC material required by the JSOTF, to include changes required by the JTF. In addition, the JNCC might have a DISA LNO to serve as the interface between the JSOTF J-6 and DISA. It might also have a regional space support LNO who serves as the primary point of contact to advise the JSOTF J-6 concerning the planning and implementation of military satellite support.

a. JNCC Elements

- (1) The current operations element serves as the JNCC liaison with the JOC.
- (2) The computer systems support element manages automated data processing support to the JSOTF.




Figure VIII-3. Notional Joint Special Operations Task Force Joint Network Operations Control Center

(3) Network elements manage and control joint communications circuits and systems.

(4) The HQ support element provides all communications support for the HQ JSOTF.

(5) The jobs control element maintains open job ticket status for fault isolation and restoration of communications infrastructure, tracks maintenance actions including line replaceable unit depot orders, and conducts scheduled and unscheduled outage reporting. It also maintains entry control, message logs, and master station logs as required. It also downloads and uploads message traffic into and from the tactical LAN as required.

(6) The security element is responsible for ensuring that communications system are protected from unauthorized activity, including attack or exploitation. This element coordinates information assurance and computer network defense activities to protect and defend JSOTF information systems.

(7) The future operations and plans element supports JNCC operations elements.

(8) The frequency management element prepares, publishes, and distributes the SOF portion of the JCEOI. In addition, it is responsible for coordination with second party communication and computer support providers on any changes to SOF frequencies.

b. JNCC Requirements. Requirements for the JNCC are evaluated by the JSOTF J-6 Director. This will be based on the amount of communications required to support operations. Normally, a JNCC will be established to maintain control over all communications and computer support for the JSOTF. The JNCC tracks all equipment, circuits, and systems in use by the JSOTF and its subordinate units. Typically, the CDRJSOTF will task, through appropriate channels, either the 112th Signal Battalion (SO), AFSOC, or JCSE to assist in accomplishing communications functions of the JNCC. Additional JNCC requirements include the following.

(1) The JNCC will be responsible for the development of all circuit charts, equipment status boards, and network diagrams.

(2) The JNCC will maintain a log of events. This log will be maintained on the tactical local area network (TACLAN) and will contain all significant events, such as equipment outages, circuit outages, estimated repair times, and J-6 personnel status.

(3) The JNCC will prepare briefings as required. Normal operations require a daily status briefing for the commander and staff.

(4) The JNCC will prepare the following messages.

(a) Communications status summary is submitted daily and reflects AIS status as of 2359Z the previous day.

(b) Communications spot report is submitted after initial establishment of communications and whenever a significant AIS outage or event occurs.

(c) Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution report is submitted whenever meaconing, interference, jamming, and intrusion are suspected.

(d) All messages pertaining to INFOCONs and computer emergency response team support.

(5) The JNCC will coordinate with the JISE and JOC on the development of the communications section of the unit situation report (SITREP).

(6) The JNCC will act as the coordinating center among all staff functions as to equipment location and staging of J-6 information storage containers. In conjunction with the COMSEC custodian, the JNCC must ensure that keying material is available and under appropriate control at all times. Two-person control may, due to the tactical situation, be waived to allow safeguarding by only one person. This is on a case-by-case basis and must be approved by the approval authority or CDRJSOTF.

(7) The JNCC will ensure that adequate protection in the form of information assurance and CND is applied to JSOTF communications information system and networks. In addition to internal systems, the JNCC must maintain awareness of and protect against vulnerabilities in higher, lower, and lateral systems and networks that connect to JSOTF systems.



The joint special operations task force joint network operations control center ensures that the command has tactical, operational, and strategic communications connectivity within the joint operations area.

(8) The JNCC will be responsible to coordinate all COMSEC changes required by the COMSEC custodian or JTF. The JNCC must ensure that keying material is available and under two-person control at all times, unless the tactical situation dictates otherwise. Users of keying material must be notified in time to make the changes to ensure mission accomplishment.

(9) The JNCC will be the primary organizational element responsible for information assurance and CND. As such, the JNCC will establish and maintain COMSEC, COMPUSEC, and INFOSEC programs.

6. Communications System Planning Considerations

The JSOTF J-6 requires specific information to adequately determine communications requirements and plan for deployment of communications assets.

a. **Forces and Task Organizations.** What forces are in the region, what additional forces will be deployed, and what task organizations exist or will be established? This information provides the basis for determining communications connectivity requirements.

b. **Radio Nets.** The JSOTF J-6 must determine radio net connectivity requirements based upon the identification and selection of JSOTF and component radio nets that are to be activated. The JSOTF J-6 must also determine who the subscribers are and what media (to include specifics on type of equipment) will be supporting a subscriber on a given net.

c. **Networks and Circuits.** It must be clear as to which DOD and non-DOD networks exist and are operational. It should also be determined if there are commercial, HN military, and/or civilian networks that are required to satisfy connectivity requirements. Planners must also determine vulnerabilities associated with these networks and circuits and develop methods to address these vulnerabilities.

d. **Communications Equipment.** With accurate information about communications equipment, the JSOTF J-6 can then build interoperability into the communications system. The J-6 requires technical information on the equipment, its availability, and a list of systems that are interoperable. The use of automated planning tools is helpful in this effort.

e. **JCEOI.** GCCs develop contingency JCEOIs to support joint operations. These are finalized and distributed when required. Call signs and frequencies are also coordinated with component staffs. CDRUSSOCOM develops, maintains, and disseminates standard contingency JCEOI systems. These systems support joint operations worldwide, use established joint frequency allocation, and are not oriented toward a specific theater. When necessary, the JSOTF J-6 may tailor or create JCEOI to support contingency requirements. Whenever possible, JCEOI information should be compiled using an automated system. At a minimum, call signs, radio net frequencies, cryptographic material, and times of changes are needed to establish radio nets.

f. **Pre-deployment.** Communications support is an incremental process beginning with the gathering of JSOTF AIS requirements. Based on these requirements, communications

personnel will attend higher and lower AIS planning meetings; conduct pre-deployment site surveys (terrestrial and shipboard as required); formally request second party AIS support; deploy to the JSOTF location to do the initial AIS setup; provide AIS support to the JSOTF; and redeploy after the JSOTF mission is completed.

(1) **Second Party AIS Support.** The JSOTF J-6 reviews all JSOTF component frequency requirements and forwards a consolidated JSOTF list to the JTF J-6. Predeployment coordination should also be conducted with the joint frequency management office in the supported theater, the JCSE, AFSOC, and 112th Signal Battalion as necessary.

(2) **Notional AIS Set-Up.** JSOTF J-6 personnel should arrive with the JSOTF advance element to allow for initial set up of AIS support. Setup includes the integration of organic AIS and second party AIS support packages.

(a) Travel to a JSOTF deployed location. Begin initial setup and ensure that force protection measures are in place. Start laying cable and access single-channel tactical satellite (TACSAT) and high capacity multichannel SATCOM systems. Install secure voice and/or secure telephone equipment (STE) on HN's commercial telephone system if available.

(b) Configure TAACLAN file server and set up peripheral equipment (i.e., printers, facsimile machines, GateGuard/Message Dissemination Subsystem [MDS], GCCS, JDISS, and theater battle management core system [TBMCS]). Configure router and work through address conflicts. Establish initial tactical telephone service.

(c) Complete TAACLAN and peripheral equipment setup. Establish the SIPRNET and unclassified but sensitive Internet Protocol Router Network connectivity. Complete GCCS, JDISS, and TBMCS connectivity. Conduct initial VTC test.

(d) Establish or coordinate for information assurance and CND tools and services (such as firewalls, intrusion detection devices, secure phones, etc.) to protect information and information systems from attack, interruption, compromise, and/or exploitation.

(e) Conduct end-to-end sensitivity tests on all AIS.

(f) Resolve outstanding issues and conduct augmentee training.

(g) Ensure that all AIS are operational.

(h) As the main body arrives, the TAACLAN and all its services, to include peripheral equipment, may need to be expanded. The time line is dependent on the size of the JSOTF and how mature it is. Is this a jump or a first time setup? Time is of the essence when establishing communications for the JSOTF.

g. **JSOTF Communications “Crash Out” Package.** Some TSOCS have an attached Army signal detachment that installs, operates, and maintains the “crash out” communications

capability package that provides initial deployable communications for the JSOTF during the initial 72 hours of a contingency operation. These packages include high capacity SATCOM, cryptographic, terminal equipment, power generation assets, ultrahigh frequency (UHF) TACSAT, international maritime satellite, high frequency (HF) radios, secure voice, and/or STE, and computer terminals. As the higher capacity SATCOM networks are established, the JSOTF is provided access to the tactical switched telephone, data, automatic data information network, and Defense Switched Network services across a backbone of multichannel SATCOM systems. These systems tie the JSOTF, JTF, and components together, and must be managed by the JNCC and subordinate control elements throughout the operation to provide circuit control and operational planning support until the JSOTF is stood down.

h. Communications System Threats. A communications planning consideration that should be reviewed prior to and during deployment is the known or suspected threats to communications and computer systems that can be expected from within and outside of the operational area. Intelligence and CI sources can provide valuable information on threats to SOF communications systems. These threats impact the ability to gain and maintain information superiority. SATCOM information, to include the type of information, should be provided to J-2, J-3, and J-5 personnel to identify support requirements in ensuring space protection of these systems, as well as for establishing contingency plans in the event that critical information provided by SATCOM is lost.

7. Joint Special Operations Task Force Baseline Communications System Interface

A notional baseline of the JSOTF communications interface with supported and supporting commands, conventional force component commands, and HN agencies is depicted in Figure VIII-4. This is the baseline communications connectivity that can be modified depending on the command relationships established by the supported command.

8. Joint Special Operations Task Force Component Baseline Communications System Interface

These HQ may be forward-deployed independently or located at the JSOTF HQ, conventional, multinational, or HN facility. Component HQ utilize organic, pooled, and supporting communications assets. All communications capability is mission-tailored to meet specific information transfer requirements. The volume and bandwidth requirements for information transfer at the component HQ will be greater than at the controlling element one echelon down.

a. ARSOF. Figure VIII-5 depicts a baseline connectivity for two notionally deployed SOTFs (Rangers and SF) reporting to the CDRJSOTF. ARSOA will report to the JSOACC, if established, or in the absence of a JSOACC, to the CDRJSOTF. The Ranger regimental HQ is the entity that plans, coordinates, supports, and sustains Ranger operations. The Ranger battalion HQ provides C2 and performs combat missions. Highly detailed communication planning is conducted at this node to prepare subordinate Ranger forces to fulfill assigned tasks. The SOTF




Figure VIII-4. Joint Special Operations Task Force Communications Interface

is a C2 and support base established and operated by an SF group. It provides communications connectivity between the SOTFs and JSOTF HQ.

b. **NSWTG.** Figure VIII-6 depicts a baseline connectivity for a notional deployed NSWTG reporting to the CDRJSOTF. Tactical communications of Navy SOF is normally conducted by the NSWTG that establishes an operations base from which to plan, support, and execute missions. It may be located afloat or ashore. The location of the NSWTG may have impact on communications connectivity, particularly for intelligence support. Like the NSWTG, the NSWTU may be established afloat or ashore. As with the SOTF, the NSWTU is organized to isolate, launch, and direct missions. The task communications unit van provides a communications bridge among the NSWTG, NSWTUs, and the JSOTF.

c. **AFSOC.** Figure VIII-7 depicts a baseline connectivity for a notional deployed AFSOC reporting to the CDRJSOTF. In this scenario, the ARSOA regiment is controlled by the JSOACC




Figure VIII-5. Notional Deployed Army Special Operations Forces Communications Connectivity

under the single air manager construct. The JSOACC is the commander within the JSOTF responsible for planning and executing joint SO aviation missions and for deconflicting SOF and conventional air operations. The JSOACC will normally be the commander of the JSOTF component providing the preponderance of SO aviation assets and/or greatest ability to plan, coordinate, allocate, task, control, and support the assigned joint SO aviation assets. Under the JSOACC construct, there can exist a mix of AFSOD, AFSSOE, Army aviation FSBs, and forward arming and refueling points (FARPs). In the scenario depicted, the JSOACC is dual hatted as the Air Force component of the JSOTF.

d. **MARSOF.** Figure VIII-8 depicts a baseline connectivity for a notional deployed MARSOF reporting to the CDRJSOTF. Communications connectivity for a foreign military training unit company normally will be provided by a communication detachment from the Marine SO support group support company. Communications connectivity for a foreign military training unit team will be provided from organic assets of the senior C2 unit. Communications connectivity while aboard naval shipping will be provided by the ship’s communications system. The Marine SO company while afloat is under OPCON of the TSOC and is under TACON of




Figure VIII-6. Notional Deployed Naval Special Warfare Task Group Communications Connectivity

the MEU. The Marine SO company has the capability to execute missions from either ashore or afloat. When it becomes necessary for the Marine SO company afloat to transition ashore, it will establish a forward base of operations from which to plan, support, and execute missions. Communications connectivity ashore will be provided from organic assets. The special boat unit will support the Marine SO company for missions requiring special boat support. Communications connectivity for a special boat unit will be provided from organic assets.




Figure VIII-7. Notional Deployed Air Force Special Operations Command Communications Connectivity

9. Intelligence Communications

The JSOTF J-2 is heavily dependent on reliable communications and rapid information processing that is only available through the integration of effective communications and automated information systems. The installation, operation, and maintenance of intelligence communications and systems require meticulous planning and a mutually supporting execution effort by the J-2 and the J-6. Only through positive interaction of these two staff sections can the intelligence needs of the commander be met.




Figure VIII-8. Notional Deployed Marine Special Operations Forces Communications Connectivity

a. **JSOTF Sources of Intelligence Communications Support.** Sources of intelligence communications support for the JSOTF J-2 essentially mirror the support available to the CJTF or other component forces. The JSOTF must be significantly augmented when committed to an exercise or operation. Augmentation normally comes from theater assets, USSOCOM, and Service SOF components. Communications support may also come from the JCSE. Responsive communications support is essential. Since the JSOTF and SOF may be employed at some distance from conventional forces, J-2 communications between the JSOTF and forces in the field represent a tenuous lifeline for the operation and members of the operational teams. Additionally, Single Channel Antijam Portable Interface may be used to terminate critical

intelligence circuits. These include SOF intelligence vehicle, VTC, and the Special Operations Command Research, Analysis, Threat Evaluation System (SOCRATES). JSOTF intelligence communications flow is depicted in Figure VIII-9.




Figure VIII-9. Joint Special Operations Task Force Intelligence Communications Flow

b. Intelligence Communications Concept

(1) **Planning.** Communications planning must support the “push/pull” construct of moving intelligence to the requesting organization, and the “who else should know” principle of dissemination. During planning, it is critical that planners identify specific communications requirements for point-to-point communications nodes. Many SOF programs may be special category or close hold. Using a wide-area network such as SIPRNET may not be a viable option. Point-to-point communications nodes may need to be established for intelligence dissemination to limit access to only those with a need to know.

(2) **Flexibility.** Access to both long-range and short-range secure communications resources is necessary to ensure support for the wide variety of SO missions.

(3) **Interoperability.** SO elements must be able to communicate securely with all other SO elements as well as with conventional forces involved in the mission.

(4) **Multichannel Systems.** A secure multichannel communications system will be established to support the operating forces. This system consists of a tactical satellite terminal, line-of-sight communication systems, and tropospheric scatter systems. Parallel, redundant, and diverse routing is necessary to ensure communications connectivity.

(5) **Supplemental Communications.** The use of commercial communications leased lines can be used when available if acceptable within the constraints of cost and communications security.

(6) **Telecommunications Services.** These services consist of voice (secure and unsecured), record or message services, data services from large host computers or other authorized computers, imagery transmission services, and facsimile transfer (secure and unsecured).

c. External Intelligence Connectivity

(1) **Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System.** This terminal system provides the DOD information interchange standards for communicating via e-mail, chat, official message traffic, and file transfer protocol at the SCI level using JWICS as its communications path, and provides access to various theater and national intelligence community databases. It includes both rudimentary imagery exploitation and GI&S software.

(2) **Scalable Transportable Intelligence Communications System.** This is a voice and data net available at the national level and may be requested through the supported GCC.

(3) **Special Operations Command, Research, Analysis, and Threat Evaluation System.** This system, known as SOCRATES, is the USSOCOM version of JDISS. In addition to the theater JDISS, it is used by the JSOTF J-2 to support JSOTF components. This system includes some services and applications that are unique to the SOF community.

10. Multinational Communications Systems Standardization and Procedures

a. Standardization among allied nations and the United States is achieved through international forum IAW policy and procedures in CJCSI 2700.01, *International Military Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability Between the United States and Its Allies and Other Friendly Nations*. With respect to communications systems, this policy focuses on enhancing multinational combat capabilities for US military forces to communicate and share data and information.

b. Frequency managers and communications personnel must be given the authority to maintain control over communications frequency allotments and assignments, use, and communications discipline in operations involving multinational forces. Consideration must be given to coalition automatic data processing and information technology systems in order to ensure their compatibility and connectivity to the JSOTF communications architecture. The rules for foreign disclosure must be followed.

11. Global Command and Control System

a. GCCS provides the commander with a complete picture of the battlespace and the ability to order, respond, and coordinate communications information. Along with many other capabilities, GCCS will integrate the following:

- (1) Contingency planning and CAP.
- (2) Force deployment and employment.
- (3) Force status as provided in the Status of Resources and Training System.

b. GCCS provides the means for both strategic and operational direction as well as technical, administrative, and decision support for the C2 of US military forces.

c. GCCS does not include the operating forces, but it links with designated communications that extend from GCCS subsystem communications facilities to subordinate commanders or operating forces extend one echelon below the communications-related facilities of the DOD agencies and the Service HQ. Figure VIII-10 depicts the basic GCCS elements that can support JSOTF operations.

GLOBAL COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM ELEMENTS

- Tactical warning systems that notify command centers of threatening events
- Automated fused picture of friendly and enemy forces
- Defense Information Systems Network is used to convey and exchange information between users or commanders, hold conferences, and issue orders
- Data collection and processing systems
- Executive decision aids, such as documents, procedures, reporting structures, and an interactive capability allowing the user to connect with the system, enter data, and receive output reports, fused tactical pictures, and displays

Figure VIII-10. Global Command and Control System Elements

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CHAPTER IX INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

“I believe developing effective decision-making processes in conjunction with harnessing and exploiting the huge amount of information available to our forces is one of the greatest command and control challenges facing SOF commanders and staffs in today’s environment.”

Colonel Mike Findlay
Commander, Special Operations Command,
US Joint Forces Command
Joint Special Operation Insights, April 2004

1. General

Information management (IM) can provide quality information to the right user at the right time in usable form to facilitate understanding and decision-making. A goal of IM is to provide relevant, precise information that supports the CDRJSOTF in attaining situational awareness and understanding that allows the commander to make timely and effective decisions faster than the adversary. IM uses procedures and information systems to collect, process, store, protect, display, disseminate, and dispose of information.

2. Information Management Organization

The CDRJSOTF should organize information management around three activities. These are:

- a. **Information Sharing.** Information sharing accomplished via both physical and “virtual” means, primarily through a net-centric web page, to keep the JSOTF staff and SOF units in a synchronized effort.
- b. **Collaboration.** Collaboration accomplished through both physical meetings and virtual-based means to enable robust participation of multiple HQ and supporting organizations in planning and product development.
- c. **Force Tracking.** Force tracking provides better situational awareness. It also supports fires clearances and reduces the need for verbal position reporting.

3. Information Sharing

a. **Value.** Information sharing entails the creation, storage, and dissemination of information either by “push” or “pull” means. It ensures that a JSOTF maintains shared situational awareness and has access to all relevant information. Information sharing provides the situational awareness foundation for everything else, such as collaboration. There are numerous “push” and “pull” means to share information and the appropriate means is dictated by type of information and its urgency.

b. **Physical Means.** The JSOTF may organize around physical means such as centers, boards, cells, and working groups to conduct the “plan-direct-monitor-assess” process. Physical information sharing is done primarily by face-to-face discussions in these forums, and also shared via LNOs and through various documents.

c. **Virtual Means.** Virtual information sharing allows the JSOTF HQ when geographically separated from SOF units and staff to have access to the same information. This occurs both horizontally within the JSOTF HQ and adjacent units and staffs, and vertically with SOF components and the parent JFC. A net-centric approach provides an easily accessible point for information sharing. Information can be posted by all authorized users on a web page and easily found in either logically defined directories or by use of an advanced search engine. Information can also be “pushed” via e-mail and message traffic, or shared by VTCs. Members of the JSOTF HQ staff, LNOs, SOF HQ component, and higher/adjacent commands can all “push” or “pull” information IAW with defined access permissions.

4. Collaboration

a. **Value.** Traditional linear or sequential planning processes can be enhanced through collaboration tools that allow for an interactive and dynamic interface among a JSOTF HQ, its components, and adjacent and higher HQ. Instead of several HQ planning in parallel and possibly reaching disparate solutions, commands should be able to interact, inform, and advise each other as they jointly develop best solutions and COAs to tasks and missions. Furthermore, current operations personnel can gain shared situational awareness by using collaboration tools while monitoring missions during execution.

b. **Physical Means.** The JSOTF must define clearly how it will operate physical site meetings. There must be: a definitive schedule, publish a purpose and agenda; provide read ahead information; set clear objectives; control the meeting; and publish results.

(1) **Use of Time.** Scrutinize the need for each meeting, its relationship and logical ordering relative to other meetings, identify the specific personnel that need to attend, and start and stop on time.

(2) **Use of LNOs.** LNOs are essential to maintain personal trust and confidence among the JSOTF HQ, SOF, and conventional forces, and bridge physical separation of geography and time. They are a means of ensuring that an understanding exists horizontally with adjacent HQ, as well as vertically with higher and lower HQ. Each HQ should evaluate where it will provide LNOs. The normal protocol is to send LNOs to higher and supported commanders in order to correctly ascertain requirements and share both situational awareness and understanding. LNOs should participate in all key or primary boards, cell, organizations, and centers to provide their parent command’s viewpoints and inputs. LNOs are not staff officers and should not be tied to a specific staff directorate. LNOs represent their parent command to the commander of the unit to which they are assigned.

c. **Virtual Means.** Virtual collaboration augments physical collaboration by allowing geographically separate personnel and units to work together. Virtual collaboration provides a means to arrive at shared assessments, staff recommendations, and command decisions.

(1) **Discrete Virtual Meeting Collaboration.** The JSOTF may use discrete virtual meeting collaboration as a replacement for physical meetings as appropriate. Schedule these meetings as with physical meetings, but limit participation to only those with a need to participate. Clearly delineate the purpose and provide read ahead packets to allow for preparation and to establish command positions. Employ a net control process to control unwanted chatter and post a summary of the collaborative session to prevent unintended interpretations.

(2) **Continuous Chat Collaboration.** Continuous chat collaboration can be used for monitoring on-going operations. However, command and staff actions, while being coordinated over these means, should be recorded in the respective unit's command journal. Selection criteria for this type of collaboration should be based on ease of use, bandwidth efficiencies, and commonality with other collaborating HQ.

5. Force Tracking

Force tracking is a process through which the JSOTF receives, processes, and displays current information about friendly and adversary forces, activities, or capabilities aligned over terrain to produce a common relevant operational picture (CROP). The CROP is drawn from a broader database of information known as the common operational picture (COP).

a. **COP.** The COP is a single identical display of relevant information shared by more than one command. A COP facilitates collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness.

b. **CROP.** The CROP is a user filtered display of key operational graphics drawn from the COP. Examples of CROP operational graphics are friendly force locations, flight corridors, templated adversary positions, theater missile defense coverage, named areas of interest, mensurated or restricted targets, and other displays. When filtered to meet individual information requirements, the unified display becomes the CROP for that user.

c. **Managing Force Tracking.** The CDRJSOTF can opt to either provide open (full display of all unit locations) or discrete feeds (selective display) to the COP. Open feeds to the COP are used in order to prevent fratricide and enhance situational awareness; discrete feeds are used generally when force protection requirements, sensitive missions, and security take precedence. Successful COP management dictates that assignment and responsibility for maintenance and currency of each of the databases that supply CROP be clearly defined. Instead of being contained within the JSOTF HQ, this responsibility generally is distributed among operational layers of the SOF operational elements and supporting organizations.

6. Focal Point Security Challenges

The focal point system creates additional requirements for the information manager. However, it must not create friction to operations nor hinder information sharing and collaboration within and among HQ. Accordingly, information that is not specifically deemed to be focal point information should be handled through normal channels without compromising OPSEC of the system. The following procedures can help to alleviate OPSEC concerns:

a. Allow limited but appropriately controlled access to focal point/special category information, while minimizing changes to the HQ JSOTF normal organization, and its processes and procedures for planning and executing other operations.

b. Provide focal point operations center (FPOC) personnel with the ability to plan, direct, monitor, and assess operations. The direct and monitor functions should remain in the JOC whenever possible in order to ensure synchronization, integration, and deconfliction with other ongoing operations.

c. Conduct training of FPOC and other staff members supporting operations concerning the proper classification guidance and procedures to limit unnecessary focal point caveats. FPOC members need to implement and enforce these procedures.

d. Include focal point information handling procedures in the information management plan.

e. Establish a closed “focal point” local area external to the HQ.

APPENDIX A

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

1. Unconventional Warfare

PSYOP are a vital part of UW operations. When properly employed, coordinated, and integrated, they can significantly enhance the combat power of resistance forces. PSYOP augment SOF to conduct in-depth analyses of foreign target audiences, concentrating on their cultural, historical, political, social, economic, and religious characteristics for the purpose of exploiting the psychological vulnerabilities of foreign target audiences to support US objectives. The four major UW targets of PSYOP are listed below:

- a. The uncommitted.
- b. Hostile sympathizers.
- c. Hostile military forces.
- d. Resistance sympathizers.

2. Foreign Internal Defense

a. PSYOP support to FID focuses on assisting HN personnel to anticipate, preclude, and counter these threats. FID supports HN internal defense and development programs. US FID programs may address threats to a HN's internal stability such as civil disorder, illicit drug trafficking, and terrorism. In FID, specific PSYOP goals exist for the following target groups:

(1) Insurgents. To create dissension, disorganization, low morale, subversion, and defection within insurgent forces.

(2) Civilian Populace. To gain, preserve, and strengthen civilian support for the HN government and its counterinsurgency programs.

(3) Military Forces. To strengthen military support, with emphasis on building and maintaining the morale of the HN forces.

(4) Neutral Elements. To gain the support of uncommitted groups inside and outside the HN.

(5) External Hostile Powers. To convince hostiles that the insurgency will fail.

b. PSYOP can assist an FID mission by achieving many or all of the following goals.

(1) Improving popular support for the HN government.

- (2) Discrediting the insurgent forces with neutral groups and the insurgents themselves.
- (3) Projecting a favorable image of the HN government and the United States.
- (4) Supporting defector programs.
- (5) Providing support to CMO.
- (6) Supporting HN programs that protect the population from insurgent activities.
- (7) Strengthening HN support of programs that provide positive populace control and protection from insurgent activities.
- (8) Informing the international community of US and HN intent and goodwill.
- (9) Passing instructions to the HN populace.
- (10) Developing HN PSYOP capabilities.

3. Direct Action

PSYOP support for DA missions depends on the situation, mission, and type of forces involved. PSYOP support of DA missions needs to be closely coordinated and linked to US public diplomacy and command information programs. The following are common PSYOP tasks in DA operations.

- a. Explain the purpose of the operation to counter the enemy reaction and ensure that friendly, neutral, and hostile audiences know what has occurred and why.
- b. Establish control of noncombatants, neutrals, and other groups in the operational area.
- c. Reduce interference in the DA operation by hostile forces and nations.
- d. Exploit target audiences that might not otherwise be accessible. Exploitation includes demoralizing potential adversaries with the results of the operation.
- e. Assess the psychological impact of the operation.
- f. Reduce the adverse effects of mission failure.
- g. Capitalize on DA mission success in strategic PSYOP.
- h. Support DA missions in contingency operations.

4. Special Reconnaissance

PSYOP support SR by the following means:

- a. Assessing the psychological impact of the operation, to include the impact of compromised clandestine or covert operations.
- b. Limiting or negating the effects of compromise.
- c. Conducting cover and deception operations.
- d. Providing personnel to help in area assessments.

5. Counterterrorism

PSYOP support CT by integrating with other security operations to target the forces employing terrorism. The aim is to place the terrorist forces on the psychological defensive. To do so, PSYOP personnel analyze the terrorists' goals and use PSYOP programs to frustrate those goals. CT operations are complex and necessitate cooperation among many agencies and across geographic regions. PSYOP supports CT by the following means:

- a. Countering the adverse effects of a terrorist act.
- b. Lessening popular support for the terrorist cause.
- c. Publicizing incentives to the local people to inform on the terrorist groups.
- d. Persuading the terrorists that they cannot achieve their goals and that they are at personal risk (from a responsible government that will not negotiate).
- e. Promoting legitimacy of US and HN governments.

For further information on PSYOP, refer to JP 3-53, Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations.

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APPENDIX B

CIVIL AFFAIRS IN SUPPORT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

1. Foreign Internal Defense

CA, in support of CMO, can assist other SOF, indigenous forces, and HN government agencies in planning and implementing populace and resource controls, military civic action, security and clearance operations, and other initiatives aimed at achieving political mobilization and internal stability. The proper use of CA assets in FID is essential during all phases of an insurgency to counter a resistance movement. When used to its fullest potential, CMO can be crucial in preventing the escalation of an insurgency to higher phases. A national development program can solidify the position of the HN government and improve conditions for the people. CAO vary with the capabilities of the host government and with the level of insurgent activity. The economic, social, and political situations also are major influences.

2. Unconventional Warfare

CA can train, advise, and assist other SOF and indigenous forces in planning and executing programs for populace and resource control, military civic action, civil administration, and nation assistance aimed at expanding their legitimacy within contested areas. All CAO may support UW, although the most important role of CAO is facilitating the swift transition of power from the resistance forces to a legitimate government after the cessation of hostilities.

3. Direct Action

CA forces do not normally participate in DA missions. However, CA can advise and assist in mission planning relating to civilian contacts and control, area assessments, ROE, targeting, and compatibility between operational and postconflict objectives. CA forces are capable of mitigating the effects of DA missions on the local population in the target area.

4. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

CA can advise and assist other SOF, other DOD units and organizations, other government agencies, NGOs, and HNs in planning, conducting, and supporting foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) activities. To assist in achieving FHA objectives, CAO/CMO planners ensure that FHA programs benefit a wide spectrum of the country in which they occur, are self-sustaining or supportable by HN civilian or military, and are consistent with internationally accepted standards and principles. CAO/CMO planners closely coordinate FHA program development and implementation with the civilian humanitarian architecture, which could include United Nations, NGOs and HN assistance.

5. Psychological Operations

CA advises and assists PSYOP by conducting public information activities and providing timely feedback on the effectiveness of the PSYOP plan. CA also coordinates the use of local resources and facilities in support of PSYOP. CAO/CMO planners:

- a. Represent CA concerns in PSYOP activities.
- b. Coordinate with PSYOP planners to ensure consistency of messages and OPSEC without compromising CA credibility.
- c. Prepare CMO estimates, assessments, and the annex to the OPLAN or OPORD to identify and integrate CA support to PSYOP.
- d. Provide liaison to local agencies and civilian authorities.
- e. Coordinate civic action projects in support of PSYOP plans.

For further information on CA and CMO, refer to JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations.

APPENDIX C

JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE LIAISON PERSONNEL PROCEDURES

1. General

LNOs provide the critical link between the CDRJSOTF and higher, lateral, subordinate, supporting, and supported HQ. LNOs from subordinate and supporting units provide the CDRJSOTF with current information about their parent units' capabilities, activities, and intentions. LNOs sponsored by the CDRJSOTF at higher and supported HQ improve the CDRJSOTF's coordination with those HQ by providing dedicated communications links and simply being present during critical phases of mission planning and execution. The size, composition, and duration of liaison elements vary with the situation. Operation JUST CAUSE required a significant number of LNOs for short-term attachment. Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM required large SO liaison elements at supported conventional HQ on a permanent basis. The CDRJSOTF must identify liaison personnel and equipment requirements in all plans. It is critical that both the TSOC and JSOTF understand that they are responsible for liaison to their higher and lateral units. Subordinate JSOTF units are responsible to the JSOTF HQ for liaison and may be tasked to provide or augment personnel that the JSOTF HQ provides to higher HQ or units. LNOs work for their parent commanders, not the commanders of the units to which they have been sent.

2. Functions

In concise terms, liaison functions are: to monitor, coordinate, advise, and participate in operation planning; assist the command to which liaison is attached; and keep the parent commander informed of the situation, intentions, and operational requirements of the command to which LNOs are attached.

"During [Operation] JUST CAUSE, I had good, competent liaison officers; not just to keep me informed of what their respective units were doing, but to also convey to their units how the battle was going. They are crucial to success, and you have to pick your best people. They have to have the moxie to stand up in front of a two or four star general, and brief him what their commander is thinking, their unit's capabilities, and make recommendations."

LTG C. W. Stiner, USA
Cdr, JTF South,
Operation JUST CAUSE (1989)

3. Procedures

a. The CDRJSOTF must identify the requirement for liaison personnel and request them at the earliest opportunity. Specific qualifications and functions for these personnel should be noted by the CDRJSOTF.

(1) The CDRJSOTF should establish a familiarization program for all liaison personnel. This could be accomplished through a JPRC, JSOTF SOP, a review of the JSOTF Joint Program of Instruction (Level 1), attendance of Level 2 Joint Special Operations University courses, an initial train up period, or other means.

(2) The CDRJSOTF must determine which staff officer or staff section will provide overall direction and supervision of all liaison personnel reporting to the JSOTF HQ for duty.

b. The effective use of liaison personnel will enhance interoperability, synchronization, and integration while reducing fratricide and contributing significantly to mission success.

c. The JSOTF should exchange liaison personnel with the other joint force components, provide liaison personnel to the JFC and supported commands (other than the other joint force components), and receive and support liaison personnel from supporting and subordinate forces.

(1) Liaison personnel to the JSOTF HQ perform their duties within the JSOTF staff division that is normally responsible for JSOTF functions related to the liaison personnel's assigned duties.

(2) As the personal representatives of their commanders, LNOs will normally attend all staff meetings and briefings that affect their parent commands.

d. Liaison personnel must be thoroughly familiar with the capabilities and limitations of their parent units and Services.

(1) SOF component liaison personnel to the JSOTF HQ should be of sufficient rank to influence the decision-making process.

(2) Liaison personnel may be authorized to answer certain routine CDRJSOTF queries on behalf of their commands. In addition, the CDRJSOTF should not formally task components through the component liaison personnel to the JSOTF HQ. Formal tasking of components by the CDRJSOTF should be accomplished through normal command channels. However, effective LNOs will keep their parent commanders informed of pending taskings and provide informal advance copies as they become available.

4. Liaison Officer Checklist

The following checklist may assist liaison personnel in performing their functions.

a. Before departure for the gaining HQ, liaison personnel should be thoroughly briefed on the following:

(1) The JFC and JSOTF OPORD or OPLAN.

(2) The current situation activities and intentions of their parent unit.

(3) Their commander's intent, including details of the CONOPS (such as unit locations and combat readiness factors such as personnel strength and logistic considerations).

(4) The current status and missions of the unit to which they are being sent.

(5) OPSEC applicable to the mission.

b. Obtain specific information and/or liaison requirements from each staff section.

c. Understand clearly their mission and responsibilities.

d. Ensure that arrangements for communication and transportation will meet mission requirements.

e. Obtain necessary credentials for identification and appropriate security clearances.

f. If conducting liaison with a multinational unit, check language and interpreter requirements.

g. Become familiar with the potential issues, capabilities, employment doctrine, and operational procedures of their unit and, to the extent possible, those of the unit to which they are being sent.

h. Become familiar with command relationships among all major commands participating in the operation.

i. On arrival at the HQ to which they are sent, the liaison personnel are responsible for the following:

(1) Report to the supported commander or representative; state their mission and exhibit their directive or credentials (if in writing); offer assistance; and be prepared to brief them on their unit's situation, activities, intentions, and capabilities.

(2) Visit each staff section, provide information as required, and obtain all information required to be transmitted to their unit.

(3) Establish communication with their unit and exchange updated information, as required.

j. During the liaison tour, liaison personnel should be responsible for the following:

(1) Keep informed of the situation of their own unit and make that information available to the commander and staff of the unit to which they are sent. (Such action is of special importance to liaison personnel of attached or supporting units.)

(2) Find out how their parent command will be employed (e.g., mission, unit location, future locations, future operations, and commander's intent).

(3) Accomplish their mission without interfering with the operations of the HQ to which they are sent.

(4) Report promptly to their own HQ if they are unable to accomplish their liaison mission.

(5) Report to their parent command on those matters within the scope of their mission.

(6) As permitted by official orders, inform the visited unit commander of the content of reports dispatched to the liaison personnel's parent HQ.

(7) Inform the appropriate supported staff officer or commander about significant problems being experienced by the liaison personnel's parent unit that could affect operations of other commands and vice versa; make suggestions to enhance the effective employment of their parent command; and recommend improved procedures for maximizing the effectiveness of their parent commands.

(8) Ensure that the liaison location at the HQ is known at all times (e.g., inform the joint operations center's duty officer or chief of staff of daily activities).

(9) Advise parent unit (if possible) of departure from the liaison location.

(10) Attend the visited unit's daily situation update briefings and other meetings and briefings that affect the parent unit, as required.

(11) Keep an appropriate record of their actions and reports.

(12) Report their departure to the visited unit commander at the completion of their mission.

k. Upon return to their own HQ liaison personnel should complete the following.

(1) Brief the commander or designated representative on all pertinent information received during their visit (detailed information concerning the mission of the higher HQ unit locations, future locations, and commander's intent).

(2) Transmit promptly any request of the visited commander.

(3) Transmit mission requirements and requests for information from the visited HQ.

(4) Transmit information required by higher HQ in each staff area.

(5) Keep abreast of the situation and be prepared to respond to future liaison requirements.

5. Liaison and Control Elements

To facilitate integration of SOF and conventional forces, there are several joint force liaison and control elements that can enable unity of effort. These elements are depicted in Figure C-1.

JOINT FORCE LIAISON AND CONTROL ELEMENTS			
Element	Sent From	Sent To	Remarks
Liaison Officer	CF or SOF	CF or SOF	As required
BCD	Army	CF	ARFOR rep to JFACC
MARLO	Marine Corps	CF	MARFOR rep to JFACC
ANGLICO Team	Marine Corps	Army or Multinational	
NALE	Navy	CF	NAVFOR rep to JFACC
TLE	Navy	CF	Coordinate TLAM employment with JFACC
ALO	Air Force	CF	AFFOR rep to JFACC
JACE	Air Force	SOF	AFFOR rep to JFSOCC or JSOTF
ACCE	CF	CF or SOF	JFACC rep to JTF, JSOTF, JFLCC, and JFMCC. Primary conduit between the CAOC and the above to resolve coordination of joint air issues as they pertain to land, maritime, and special operations
SOCCE	Army SOF	CF	Established by SOF commander to perform C2 and/or liaison. SOF rep to JTF, Army corps, or MEF to synchronize SOF with CF maritime and land operations
SOLE	SOF	CF	JFSOCC rep to JFACC
SFLE	Army SOF	CV (Div level) and Multinational (Brigade and Battalion)	C2 liaison
ACCE - air component coordination element AFFOR - Air Force forces ALO - air liaison officer ANGLICO - air and naval gunfire liaison company ARFOR - Army forces BCD - battlefield coordination detachment C2 - command and control CAOC - combined air operation center CF - conventional forces JACE - joint air coordination element JFACC - joint force air component commander JFLCC - joint force land component commander JFMCC - joint force maritime component commander		JFSOCC - joint force special operations component commander JSOAC - joint special operations air component JTF - joint task force MARFOR - Marine forces MARLO - Marine liaison officer MEF - Marine expeditionary force NALE - naval and amphibious liaison element NAVFOR - Naval forces SFLE - special forces liaison element SOCCE - special operations command and control element SOF - special operations forces SOLE - special operations liaison element TLAM - Tomahawk land attack missile TLE - Tomahawk land attack missile liaison element	

Figure C-1. Joint Force Liaison and Control Elements

APPENDIX D
JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS
STAFF CHECKLISTS

The following checklists are provided to assist the JSOTF staff in the preparation, planning, and execution of their functional responsibilities. They are not intended to be all-inclusive and should be modified to suit the accomplishment of the stated JSOTF mission.

1. Joint Special Operations Task Force J-1 (Personnel) Checklist

a. General

(1) Does a joint system exist for the J-1 that allows summation of separate Service personnel status reports, including authorized, assigned, and deployed strengths; critical personnel shortages; casualties accounting; and personnel requisitions?

(2) Do current plans include a current summary of unit personnel needs?

(3) Are critical unit positions identified?

(4) Do the following issues pertain to JSOTF personnel?

(a) Have JSOTF augmentation shortfalls and requirements been identified and submitted to the Ccdr?

(b) Are minimum grade, security clearances, and requirements by sex specified?

(c) Are special experience requirements consistent with pay grade level and military occupational designations?

(d) Have instructions been issued for passports, visas, immunizations, uniform requirements, and travel restrictions?

(5) Have administrative procedures been established by Service component commanders, before deployment, for the following JSOTF personnel actions?

(a) Giving members the opportunity to update wills and powers of attorney and to seek other Service-provided legal assistance (as available)?

(b) Giving members the opportunity to adjust pay allotments and establish direct deposit?

(c) Making provisions to pay members while deployed?

(d) Providing passports and visas as required?

(6) Have other personnel actions been accomplished, such as medical screening, identification cards or tags, and Service record updates (including a record of emergency data)?

(7) Have the following support programs been established, if applicable?

(a) Special leave?

(b) Hostile fire or imminent danger pay?

(c) Federal income tax combat-zone exclusion?

(d) Free postage?

(e) Sole surviving son?

(f) Absentee voting?

(8) Have MWR activities for JSOTF personnel been coordinated?

(9) Is military postal support adequately and equitably addressed in JSOTF and Service component commands' plans?

(10) Have supporting US disbursing officers been requested to provide US and indigenous currencies for official purposes and for use by JSOTF members?

(11) Are planning factors for computing personnel attrition developed IAW existing Service procedures?

(12) Has liaison been established with the International Committee of the Red Cross regarding transfer of detainees, civilian internees, and other detained persons?

(13) Have procedures been developed between the J-1 and J-2 for the in-theater processing of returned formerly captured, missing, or detained US personnel?

(14) Have procedures been developed to process personnel returning through medical channels?

(15) Have procedures been established for emergency destruction of classified materials?

(16) Consistent with operational requirements, is the maximum practical use being made of local civilian labor?

(17) Have appropriate liaison positions been established with local civil authorities?

b. Plans and Policies

- (1) Have all policies regarding use of indigenous labor by the JSOTF been coordinated with component CA officers? (The JSOTF J-1 and J-3 should coordinate CA issues.)
- (2) Have J-1 supporting plans been developed for the evacuation of noncombatants?
- (3) Have internal SOPs been developed and coordinated to streamline the execution of recurring activities and reports?

2. Joint Special Operations Task Force J-2 (Intelligence) Checklist

a. General

- (1) With inputs from the JSOTF J-3, have the JSOTF J-2's missions, tasks, and requirements been clarified, prioritized, and confirmed with the CDRJSOTF?
- (2) Has a complete intelligence assessment of the situation been developed?
- (3) Have the current intelligence indications and warning indicators in the JSOA been identified?
- (4) Have current regional and threat assessments been accomplished?
- (5) Are situation assessments periodically updated?
- (6) Has an intelligence situation assessment been completed and submitted to the CDRJSOTF and up the chain of command?
- (7) Are the CDRJSOTF intelligence tasking and guidance completely understood, and have they been analyzed and applied to regional and/or theater assessments?
- (8) Have intelligence priorities been regularly updated and passed throughout the entire chain of command, including components and supported commands?
- (9) Has the status (such as number, type, and readiness condition) of the JSOTF's, JTF's and CCDR's organic intelligence collection and production assets been determined?
- (10) Has NIST support been requested, as appropriate?
- (11) Have the JSOTF J-2 requirements for personnel augmentation, to include regional or functional experts, linguists, and/or reservists, been identified?
- (12) Have the deployable elements to support the JSOTF's efforts in collection management, Service expertise, communications, and tactical in-depth analysis been identified?

(13) Have the JSOTF intelligence managers been kept abreast of intelligence personnel, equipment, and related movement requirements?

(14) Have the requirements for a JISE to support the JSOTF been determined? (Establishment of a JISE will be situation dependent.)

(15) Has the JSOTF J-2, in coordination with the JSOTF J-6, developed a JSOTF intelligence communications architecture that achieves interoperability and adequate and appropriate security laterally, vertically, and with multinational forces? (JSOTF communications links include satellite, microwave, radio, landline, and LAN to carry intelligence information.)

(16) Has the intelligence architecture for flow of responsibilities for PIRs and RFIs been determined?

(17) Has federation of intelligence responsibilities been considered, defined, and clearly delineated among the JSOTF, supported JTF, GCC, and national level agencies?

(18) Have any JSOTF subordinate units been receiving intelligence support directly from the supported CCDR or national levels?

(19) Has the JSOTF coordinated, through the JTF, with the supported GCC's JIOC to determine whether PIRs have already been established for the current situation? (PIRs should be built around CDRJSOTF's requirements.)

(20) In concert with the JSOTF J-3, JTF J-3, and the supported CCDR's JIOC, have PIRs been tailored for the current situation?

(21) Have PIRs been kept current, and are they updated periodically?

(22) Do any current events require closer examination or reporting to higher authority?

(23) Have the JSOTF J-2's automated data processing equipment requirements been identified, and are they compatible with the supported JTF's, GCC's and subordinate's systems (to include compatibility for multinational JSOTF operations when required)?

(24) In concert with the supported commander's J-2 and the JSOTF J-3, have all the JSOTF intelligence collection requirements been identified, developed, and published?

(25) Have JSOTF intelligence shortfalls in collection capabilities been identified?

(26) Have collection requirements to cover shortfalls been developed and forwarded through the JTF and supported CCDR's JIOC for subsequent tasking at the appropriate echelon?

(27) Have requirements for all GI&S support been identified?

(28) Have JSOTF GI&S shortfalls been identified?

(29) Has information to support the joint intelligence estimate for planning been passed, through channels, to DIA?

(30) Has the annex B (Intelligence) been prepared for the CDRJSOTF's OPLAN, OPORD, or subordinate campaign plan?

(31) Can the JSOTF J-2 continue to monitor and evaluate the crisis event and issue status reports to the superior commander as directed?

(32) Have procedures been established for emergency destruction of classified material?

(33) Have procedures been established and coordinated with the supported GCC's JIOC to support the production of TIPS?

(34) Have SOF IO requirements and sources been identified?

(35) Have procedures been implemented for issuing security badges and access control to the JSOTF HQ?

b. HUMINT, GEOINT, OSINT, SIGINT, and MASINT

(1) Have the JSOTF's requirements for HUMINT, GEOINT, OSINT, SIGINT, and MASINT collection been identified?

(2) Have the requirements for a HUMINT operations cell and supporting HUMINT collection forces, to include facility locations and personnel requirements, been established?

(3) Has the requirement for establishment of a joint captured materiel exploitation center (JCMEC) (or joint documentation exploitation center (JDEC) at the JTF or JSOTF level) and supporting technical intelligence collection forces been analyzed?

(4) Have elements been requested for a JCMEC or JDEC if determined to be necessary?

(5) If the full center capability is not necessary, have adequate smaller elements (teams or cells) been requested?

(6) Have the requirements for interrogation and debriefing capabilities been identified?

(7) Have HUMINT management, liaison, and exchange program requirements been identified?

(8) Has emergency dissemination authority for GEOINT products been obtained?

(9) Has tailored GEOINT been requested (once target has been identified)? Has GEOINT been forwarded to requesting command?

(10) Has the requirement for SIGINT operational tasking authority been identified? (If not, work with cryptologic support group and command NSA Central Security Service representative and/or GCC to obtain if applicable.)

(11) Have MASINT management liaison and exchange programs been identified?

c. Counterintelligence

(1) Have JSOTF CI and CT intelligence requirements been identified?

(2) Has the J-2, if required, been appointed the CI coordinating authority?

(3) Has CI been incorporated into the planning as a force protection measure?

(4) Has CI been included in collection management planning?

(5) Have intelligence security guidelines been developed and disseminated?

d. Multinational Interaction

(1) Has liaison been established between joint and multinational force intelligence structures?

(2) Have procedures been established and reviewed to expedite sharing US-generated intelligence products with multinational forces?

(3) Have friendly objectives, intentions, and plans been fully communicated to appropriate intelligence organizations?

(4) Have interoperability and security of communications system support systems been ensured?

(5) Has release and/or disclosure of imagery information to multinational forces been considered?

3. Joint Special Operations Task Force J-3 (Operations) Checklist

a. Current and Future Operations

Note: A number of the checklist items refer to the planning process and may fall under the responsibility of the J-5 depending on how the JSOTF is organized and who is directed to accomplish the planning.

- (1) Have current plans been evaluated?
- (2) Have SO options been developed, prioritized, and passed to the superior commander?
- (3) Have SO strategic and operational military objectives been developed and forwarded to the superior commander?
- (4) Have component and supporting commanders been tasked to analyze the situation and begin tentative planning to support proposed COAs?
- (5) Have the disposition and location of assigned and attached forces been reviewed and, if needed, has an increased force posture and force readiness been directed within established authority? (Respond as necessary within existing ROE, requesting modification if necessary.)
- (6) Have COAs been evaluated and prioritized?
- (7) Has the commander's estimate, containing an appropriate risk assessment, been developed and submitted to the superior commander?
- (8) Has the status of noncombatants in the JOA or JSOA been evaluated to determine the requirement for a NEO plan?
- (9) Has the process of obtaining country clearances and overflight, landing, and staging rights been initiated?
- (10) Are current force levels adequate to accomplish objectives?
- (11) What is the deployment status of reserve units?
- (12) Have replacement units and personnel been identified or shortfalls forwarded to the superior commander for resolution?
- (13) Has the superior commander's tasking and guidance been analyzed?
- (14) Has guidance been developed for components?
- (15) Have completed COAs, including validated forces and sustainment, been developed?
- (16) Have pre-hostility SO (SR, UW, PSYOP, CA, CT) been considered during COA development?
- (17) Have IO capabilities, requirements, and coordination been considered in SOF missions and activities?

(18) Has the CJTF or senior JFC been notified that the selected COA is ready for evaluation?

(19) Has the JSOTF legal officer been consulted concerning applicable international agreements, any special requirements of the LOAC that affect the particular operation, or the ROE authorized for the mission?

(20) Have joint fire support capabilities, requirements, and coordination, to include fire support coordinating measures, been considered in SOF missions and activities?

(21) Has a GCCS teleconference been established, or does one need to be established to support planning?

(22) What is the effect of identified shortfalls on the COA?

(23) Can the shortfalls be resolved using organic resources, or do they require elevation to the senior commander?

(24) How will the COA likely be perceived by the indigenous, US, and allied publics?

(25) Have supported command execution planning instructions been developed?

(26) Has the COA been adjusted based on the superior commander's guidance?

(27) Have all support annexes been incorporated in the OPLAN, OPORD, or subordinate campaign plan?

(28) Is the OPLAN, OPORD, or subordinate campaign plan complete and in the proper format?

(29) Has the OPLAN, OPORD, or subordinate campaign plan been submitted to the superior commander for approval?

(30) Has an EXORD been received?

(31) Has the OPORD, or subordinate campaign plan been adjusted for the senior commander's EXORD before issuing the commander's EXORD?

(32) Are plan objectives being met?

(33) Is a reassessment of objectives required?

(34) Are situations developing that require additional force and sustainment resources, or redirection of allocated force and sustainment resources?

(35) Do current conditions indicate the need for replanning actions?

(36) Does the situation call for termination of operations?

(37) Does the situation call for redeployment planning?

(38) Can the JSOTF J-3 continue to monitor and evaluate the event and issue status reports to the superior commander as directed?

(39) Have US and friendly government agencies, applicable nongovernmental agencies, and in-country relief organizations been contacted to ensure maximum support of component CA operations?

(40) Has the senior commander's CMO plan provided guidance on CMO priorities and are the priorities supporting on-going operations?

(41) Has PSYOP support been coordinated?

(42) Have combat identification measures been established?

(43) Have requirements for integrated space force enhancement been coordinated through channels with USSTRATCOM's Joint Space Operations Center (JSPOC)?

(44) Have the effects of WMD been evaluated and the appropriate technical operations units been notified?

b. Monitoring and Tracking the Flow of SOF

(1) In the absence of a JPG, the JSOTF J-3 may establish an operations planning and execution cell, composed of J-3, J-4, and J-5 planners (at a minimum), to complete the TPFDD planning tasks, monitor the flow of SOF, and track forces to their destination. The following questions may be of use to this team.

(a) Have plan identification numbers been established for each COA?

(b) Have movement requirements for each COA been created and tested?

(c) Has plan information been entered ?

(d) Have in-place or in-theater forces been identified ?

(e) Have NEO, medical evacuation, and retrograde cargo movement requirements been developed?

(f) Have units that are moving by organic lift been identified?

(g) Has the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) been requested to provide COA transportation evaluation?

(h) Have deployment estimates been developed for each COA?

(i) Does the closure profile meet COA requirements?

(j) Can identified transportation shortfalls be resolved organically, or do they need to be elevated to the senior commander?

(k) Have deployment requirements been verified?

(l) Has transportation lift allocation been verified?

(m) Has each daily deployment increment been validated?

(2) Have intratheater movement plans been developed?

(a) Is the first increment deployment flow being monitored?

(b) Has the next deployment increment been confirmed once the first increment is under way?

(c) Is organic lift being monitored to ensure that arrival times meet OPOD requirements?

(d) Have reception and onward movement capabilities been evaluated?

(e) Are use rates, requirements, and all transportation modes being monitored?

(f) Is the reprioritization of lift requirements (if required) being coordinated with the JTF, supported GCC, and USTRANSCOM?

(g) Is actual arrival data, if different than scheduled, being entered into the database? (Continue to update deployment information on the deployment database.)

(h) Is unit status being reported after arrival?

(3) Has a rotation schedule for SOF assets, personnel, and equipment been established?

c. Staffing, Centers, and Cells

(1) Has a JOC been established and properly staffed?

(a) Is there a necessity to establish a JOC or portions thereof during the CAP process?

(b) If established during the CAP process, what role does the JOC play?

(2) If directed by the CDRJSOTF (based on J-3 recommendation), are the following true?

(a) Has a PRCC been established?

(b) Has a JSOTF targeting panel been established?

(c) Has a ROE planning cell been formed?

(d) Has a weather cell been formed?

(e) Has an IO cell been formed?

(f) Has a CMOC been established?

(g) Has the CDRJSOTF provided initial guidance concerning the functions and responsibilities of the above organizations?

(h) Have these organizations been properly staffed?

(i) Have these organizations analyzed all phases of the operation (deployment through redeployment)?

(3) If directed by the CDRJSOTF, is the J-3 properly staffed to plan, monitor, and coordinate execution of joint SO air operations?

(4) If directed by the CDRJSOTF, is the J-3 properly staffed to coordinate and integrate the use of airspace in the JSOA?

(5) If directed by the CDRJSOTF, is the J-3 properly staffed to coordinate and integrate joint air defense operations within the JSOA?

(6) Has the base defense commander integrated the base defense plan into the tactical operations of the JSOTF?

d. Civil-Military Operations (Executed by the J-9 Staff if Established)

(1) Have recommendations been provided to the J-3 pertaining to the organization, use, and integration of attached CA forces?

(2) Have specific plans, policies, and programs been developed to further the relationship between the JSOTF and the civil component in the JSOA?

(3) Has the CDRJSOTF been advised of the impact that JSOTF operations and the civilian population will have on one another?

(4) Do CMO plans, policies, procedures, and programs deconflict civilian activities with military operations within the JSOA?

(5) In coordination with the SJA, has the CDRJSOTF been advised of his legal and moral obligations incurred from the long- and short-term effects (economic, environmental, and health) of JSOTF operations on civilian populations.

(6) Have civil-military plans, programs, and policies been coordinated, synchronized, and integrated with strategic objectives?

(7) Have systems been emplaced prioritizing and monitoring expenditures of allocated funds dedicated to CMO?

(8) Have procedures to facilitate movement, provide security, and control funds to subordinate units been identified?

(9) Has coordination been established with CMO funds controlling authority/financial managers to meet the CDRJSOTF objectives?

(10) Have the requirements for CMO/CAO area assessments and area studies been coordinated and integrated in support of the CMO plan?

(11) Have culturally significant sites been identified and coordinated with the joint targeting coordination board as no-fire or restricted fire areas?

(12) Has coordination been established for the integration of civil inputs to the CDRJSOTF CMO plan?

(13) Have military units and assets that can perform CMO missions been identified and integrated with the CMO plan?

4. Joint Special Operations Task Force J-4 (Logistics) Checklist

a. General

(1) Is there a concise statement of the purpose for which the logistic support plan is prepared?

(2) Does this paragraph provide a summary of the requirements, taskings, and CONOPS that the logistic planning supports?

(3) Are the objectives specified?

b. Assumptions

(1) Does this paragraph list the assumptions upon which the CONOPS and logistic support are based?

c. Responsibilities

(1) Joint Staff?

(2) USSOCOM?

(3) USTRANSCOM?

(4) Military Services?

(5) Unified commands and their component commands?

(6) TSOCs?

(7) Defense Security Cooperation Agency?

(8) NGA?

(9) DOS and American embassies?

(10) Security assistance organizations?

(11) Liaison offices?

(12) Defense Logistics Agency?

(13) Army and Air Force Exchange Service?

(14) Units or elements providing logistic support to SOF components?

d. Concept of Logistic Support

(1) Does this paragraph describe how supply, maintenance, transportation, and field service support will be provided?

(2) Does this paragraph specify which logistic elements will provide the support? Are the forces provided adequate?

(3) Does the planned support complement the tactical plan? Is it adequate and feasible?

(4) Have the terrain and enemy intelligence been analyzed to determine the impact on logistic support?

(5) Has the deployment flow been properly analyzed to determine the time phasing for introduction of logistic elements to support the combat forces?

(6) Have HNS availability and subsequent risks been considered?

(7) Has the support of SO-peculiar equipment, materials, supplies, and services been adequately addressed?

(8) Have validation procedures for SO-peculiar equipment, materials, supplies, and services been clearly established?

(9) Is there an ACSA with HNs in the JOA or with other coalition nations in the operation?

(10) Are provisions made for adequate logistic support of detainees, civilian internees, and other detained persons?

(11) Are provisions made for adequate logistic support for those indigenous and displaced civilians who fall under the care and responsibility of the JSOTF?

e. Supply

(1) General

(a) Are the supply system and procedural guidance provided?

(b) Is the flow of requisitions described?

(c) Is the flow of materiel described?

(d) Is a project code required and identified?

(e) Is a force activity designator upgrade required?

(f) Are in-country DOD activity address codes required?

(g) Are LOC procedures described?

- (h) Is the number of days of supplies required to accompany troops identified?
- (i) Are provisions made for contracting and local purchase support?
- (j) Are the stockage objectives by class of supply specified?
- (k) Will automated or non-automated procedures be used?
- (l) Will automated systems of supported units and task-organized CSS units interface?
- (m) Have the inter-Service support requirements been identified and common-, cross-, and joint-servicing arrangements coordinated for support of SOF?
- (n) What support will be provided by HN or foreign nation support?
- (o) What in-theater support is required?
- (p) Are retrograde procedures for excess and unserviceable items spelled out?
- (q) What are the provisions for emergency resupply?
- (r) Is an SCA available to coordinate access to space capabilities (reconnaissance and surveillance, environmental monitoring, imagery, communications, positioning and navigation) that can help resolve logistic issues through in-transit visibility?
- (s) Have initial preplanned supply support and emergency support packages been considered?
- (t) Is the communications capability provided and compatible with the automated systems being deployed?
- (u) Are changes to the DOD activity address file required, such as “ship-to” address?
- (v) Are some supply support activities to be designated as air LOCs?
- (w) Are procedures described for cancellation or diversion of materiel in-process or in-transit at the termination of the operation or exercise?
- (x) Are provisions made for logistic support of displaced civilians, detainees, and indigenous personnel?
- (y) Is there covered storage in the operational area to protect supplies from the elements? If not, are shipments packed for outdoor storage?

(z) Are materials handling equipment (MHE) requirements provided?

(aa) Is sufficient rigging material available for conventional and SO airdrop operations?

(bb) Is the Defense Automatic Addressing System aware of the communications routing identifier and DOD activity address codes to be used for processing direct requisitions and direct supply status?

(cc) Have distribution procedures for maps been addressed?

(2) Class I

(a) Are mess facilities identified and adequate?

(b) Are the ration cycles described by phase? Is a ration cycle proposed?

(c) Are fresh eggs, fresh fruits and vegetables, fresh meats, juices, milk, and canned soft-drink supplements to ration meals considered?

(d) Do local fresh fruits and vegetables meet US standards?

(e) Have unitized operational rations been considered for ease of handling and accountability?

(f) Are cash meal payment procedures established?

(g) What method of distribution will be used (unit distribution or supply point distribution)?

(h) Are bakery supplements to ration meals considered?

(i) Are veterinary personnel adequate for the subsistence support requirements?

(j) Are hospital rations required?

(k) Are chill, freeze, and refrigeration requirements for unit dining facilities and Class I supply point addressed?

(l) Are water support requirements satisfied?

(m) Are the water sources fresh, brackish, or salty?

(n) Is the water source local systems, surface, or wells?

- (o) What type of water purification unit is required?
 - (p) Are chillers required?
 - (q) What is the water planning factor in gallons per person per day?
 - (r) What are the treatment, storage, distribution, and cooling requirements? Are they satisfied by deploying unit capability?
 - (s) What are the well drilling requirements? Are there any existing wells? What is the quality of water from existing wells?
 - (t) Are potable ice considerations covered? What is the requirement planning factor?
 - (u) Have the medical planners provided for certification of ice as potable?
- (3) Class II
- (a) Are requirements for individual clothing and mission-essential consumables addressed?
 - (b) Have requirements for mission rehearsals and training been identified?
 - (c) Have provisions been made for the replacement of damaged personal clothing and chemical protective clothing?
 - (d) Which self-service supply center listing will be used as the basis for the Class II stockage?
 - (e) How will the logistic support element replenish organizational clothing and individual equipment and self-service supply center items?
 - (f) Do any of the following items require special consideration?
 - (g) SO-peculiar materials.
 - (h) Tentage and tentage repair kits.
 - (i) Administrative and office supplies.
 - (j) Folding cots.
 - (k) Insect bars with mosquito netting.

- (l) Banding material and tools.
 - (m) Water purification chemicals and test kits.
 - (n) Insect repellent and sun screen.
 - (o) Field laundry and bath supplies and hospital laundry supplies.
 - (p) Dining facility supplies, including paper and plastic products.
 - (q) Trash disposal supplies.
 - (r) Vector control equipment and supplies.
 - (s) Latrine chemicals and supplies.
 - (t) Batteries.
 - (u) Cold weather clothing and equipment.
 - (v) Air conditioners or fans.
 - (w) Maps, distribution, and storage.
- (4) Class III
- (a) Are Service requirements by location for each type of product established?
 - (b) Is the use of contractor-provided bulk fuels considered?
 - (c) Are ordering and accountable officer requirements addressed?
 - (d) Are existing pipeline distribution systems available? What are the pipeline and storage capabilities?
 - (e) Are remote refueling sites or FARPs required? What capabilities are required?
 - (f) Are inter-Service support billing and reimbursement procedures specified?
 - (g) Are petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL)-quality surveillance procedures specified? Are the required test kits on hand?
 - (h) Is there a petroleum laboratory available?
 - (i) Are additives required for commercial fuels? Who will provide them?

(j) Are any unique package product requirements addressed?

(k) Are industrial gasses addressed?

(5) Class IV

(a) Are unique requirements for construction, security, and rehearsal materials addressed?

(b) Is in-country procurement considered?

(c) Have Class IV data sources been queried on preexisting databases describing locally available construction materials?

(d) Are basic loads to be deployed?

(e) Will the use of pre-positioned materiel stocks be permitted?

(6) Class V

(a) Are unit basic loads to be deployed?

(b) Is the logistic support structure prescribed?

(c) Are explosive ordnance disposal support requirements and procedures addressed?

(d) Are SO-peculiar ammunition requirements addressed?

(e) Have Service-common ammunition requirements been coordinated through applicable Service channels?

(f) Have all SO aircraft requirements been considered (ammunition, security, ramp-space, maintenance, other)?

(g) Have the storage, handling, shipping, security, and safety requirements been reviewed and addressed in the planning?

(h) Are requirements identified by category of munitions?

(i) Are sustaining rates of munitions addressed?

(j) Are special permits needed? Who issues them?

(7) Class VI

- (a) Are the deploying personnel provided guidance on personal demand items?
- (b) Are sundry packs available?
- (c) Is indirect or direct exchange support considered?
- (d) If exchange support is required:
 - 1. Has HQ Army and Air Force Exchange Service (Plans) been notified?
 - 2. Have the exchange staffing, stock assortment, security, facility, transportation, and communications requirements been identified and coordinated?
 - 3. Is financial management support for the exchange identified?
 - 4. Has the policy on rationing and check cashing been determined?

(8) Class VII

- (a) Are SO-peculiar equipment requirements identified and validation procedures established?
- (b) Does the plan specify the equipment fill level for deploying units?
- (c) Are equipment redistribution (cross-leveling) requirements specified?
- (d) Are replacement actions for salvage equipment specified?
- (e) Are operational readiness float requirements addressed?

(9) Class VIII

- (a) Are medical supply procedures prescribed?
- (b) Does this portion of the logistic support plan complement the medical support plan?
- (c) Are medical resupply procedures established?
- (d) If applicable, are policies concerning medical treatment of non-US personnel provided?

(e) Are special medical equipment and supply requirements identified based on medical mission and the operational area?

(f) Are memoranda of understanding established with medical logistic providers to ensure that these medical supplies are stored, maintained, and ready to meet all operational contingencies?

(g) Are special storage requirements satisfied?

(h) Is the disposal of salvage medical supplies addressed?

(i) Are medical oxygen and other medical gas requirements (such as anesthesia) identified and resupply procedures established?

(j) Is local purchase an option? Are procedures and guidelines established?

(10) Class IX

(a) Are SO-peculiar repair requirements specified?

(b) Are common repair parts requirements, including repairables, specified?

(c) Are cannibalization procedures addressed?

(d) Are requirements for nonexpendable components addressed?

(e) Is stockage of major assemblies addressed?

(f) Have special storage requirements been addressed for dry batteries, classified repair parts, high dollar, and pilferables, etc.?

(g) Is disposal of hazardous materials, such as lithium batteries and radioactive residue, specified?

(11) Class X

(a) If Class X materials are required, does the plan describe the source?

(b) What is the source of funding for Class X supplies?

f. Maintenance

(1) Does the plan describe how unit, intermediate (direct support and general support), and SO-peculiar equipment maintenance will be performed?

- (2) Is missile maintenance support required and available?
- (3) Does the plan address calibration requirements?
- (4) Is maintenance exchange addressed?
- (5) Have extreme weather aspects been considered (e.g., heat, cold, humidity, and dust)?
- (6) Are site security and storage requirements identified?
- (7) Are special power requirements for maintenance facilities identified (e.g., voltage, phase, frequency, stability, and anticipated load in kilowatts)?
- (8) Are building suitability screening factors identified by type of maintenance facility (e.g., minimum height and width for doors, floor load bearing requirements, and environmental control necessities)?
- (9) Are operational readiness floats addressed?
- (10) How will repairs under warranty be performed in the operational area?
- (11) Will depot level maintenance be conducted in the operational area?
- (12) Is the evacuation of unserviceable repairables addressed?
- (13) Have procedures for replacing maintenance tools and equipment been specified?

g. Transportation

- (1) General
 - (a) Is there a requirement for expedited cargo distribution to the operational area?
 - (b) Are the transportation support systems for supply distribution and air LOC validation procedures outlined?
 - (c) Have MHE requirements been addressed?
 - (d) What is the availability of USTRANSCOM, DIA, or NGA data analysis regarding the country transportation infrastructure, to include ports, airfields, roads, railroads, and inland waterways?
 - (e) Is there a rail system available? What are schedules and capability?

- (f) Is the highway net described? What are the capabilities and limitations?
 - (g) What is the weather impact on ports, airfields, and highway nets?
 - (h) Are in-country highway, rail, air, and inland waterway mode requirements addressed?
 - (i) Are the transportation movement priority and transportation account codes provided? Are transportation funding procedures established?
 - (j) Has a dedicated in-country, intratheater, or intertheater movement system for personnel and high-priority cargo been established?
 - (k) Has coordination been made with USTRANSCOM for personnel and equipment movements?
 - (l) Has the use of foreign flag carriers been addressed?
 - (m) What agency will accept and coordinate administrative transportation requirements for SOF?
 - (n) What HNS support is available?
 - (o) Have medical evacuation requirements been included in the planning?
- (2) Airfields
- (a) What airfields are available to support military operations?
 - (b) Has a coordinating HQ been designated for all airlift support?
 - (c) Has support been planned for USAF mobile aeromedical staging facilities?
 - (d) What are the personnel and cargo reception capabilities of the aerial ports of embarkation and debarkation?
 - (e) What are the maximum cargo capabilities of the airfield?
 - (f) What are the characteristics and capabilities of the roads that access the airfield?
 - (g) What contract civilian or HN personnel and equipment assets are available to assist at the aerial ports of debarkation and embarkation?
 - (h) Has an arrival/departure airfield control group organization been designated?

(i) Have aerial port squadron and/or contingency response group requirements been identified?

(j) What airfield facilities are available for military use during arrival/departure airfield control group operations?

(k) What is the best source for additional information on the airfields?

(l) Have channel airlift requirements been specified?

(m) Have airbase defense requirements been properly addressed?

(n) Are procedures in place to determine if a USG position exists on whether landing and parking fees will be paid during the current operation and to pay fees, if required?

(3) Supply Routes

(a) What are the road movement and convoy restrictions?

(b) What routes are available to support military operations?

(c) What are the characteristics and capabilities of the routes available to support military operations?

(d) What are the dimensions and classifications of tunnels and bridges along the routes?

(e) What capabilities exist to repair damaged segments of routes?

(f) What segments of the routes are heavily used by the civilian populace?

(g) What are the most likely routes fleeing refugees would use?

(h) Are traffic control measures in-place?

(i) What is the best source for additional information on the routes?

h. Field Services

(1) Are laundry, bath, clothing renovation, and latrine requirements addressed? Local sources?

(2) Are graves registration and mortuary capabilities adequate to support the anticipated requirements?

- (3) Are procedures for salvage collection, evacuation, and disposal covered?
- (4) Are base or post exchange services required and provided?
- (5) Is fire protection provided for aviation, ammunition, and bases?
- (6) Are procedures for waste disposal addressed?
- (7) Are field bakery services required and provided?
- (8) Are procedures specified and do units have the equipment necessary for cleaning of equipment for redeployment to meet customs and agriculture requirements to enter the US?

i. Miscellaneous

- (1) Have billeting and support requirements at ISBs and FSBs been addressed?
- (2) Are HN military personnel with experience in US military schools identified?
- (3) Have arrangements been made with US and HN customs and immigration?
- (4) Are procedures for logistic reporting established?
- (5) Is delousing support required?
- (6) Are isolation or rehearsal facilities required?
- (7) What are the funding aspects of logistic support?
- (8) Are procedures in place for transference of equipment to allies or partners during multinational operations?
- (9) Have all requirements been costed?
- (10) Has an account processing code been established?
- (11) Have SO-peculiar equipment resourcing procedures been identified?
- (12) What is the electrical power cycles of the country? Are transformers required?
- (13) Are printing and duplicating requirements identified?
- (14) Are the communications to support logistic operations provided for in the communications planning? Telephone? Facsimile (secure and non-secure)? Secure copiers and storage and handling facilities? Computer connectivity for operation planning, situational

awareness, and Standard Army Management Information System and other logistic systems? Secure and non-secure VTC and other collaboration tools, if required? Are these systems protected using information assurance and defense in depth?

(15) Have requirements for aerial delivery, personal parachutes, and air items been identified?

(16) Is a source of cryogenic gases (oxygen, nitrogen, etc.) required?

(17) Have diving-support requirements been addressed?

(18) Have administrative-use vehicle requirements been identified?

(19) Are audio-visual requirements identified?

(20) Have communication frequencies been cleared with the HN government?

(21) Are there adequate provisions in the plan for contracting support?

(22) Has an adequate number of contracting officers with the proper warrant been provided?

(23) Is adequate financial management support available?

(24) Is adequate legal support available?

(25) Is adequate linguist support available?

(26) Are there provisions in the plan for maneuver or war damage claims resulting from logistic operations?

(27) Are automated logistic systems procedures properly addressed?

(28) Have backup master files been established and prepared for shipment separate from the primary master files?

(29) Are maintainers, operators, and managers assigned and well trained?

(30) Have site selection and preparation for automated equipment considered accessibility, geographic, terrain, and security requirements?

(31) Is there a continuity of OPLANs?

(32) Are sufficient copies of user manuals on hand and current?

(33) Are sufficient repair parts available for the computer hardware, including generators and other subsystems?

(34) Have provisions been made for backup support for repair parts, hardware maintenance, and the receipt of software change packages?

(35) Have details been worked out for transmission of documents to higher and lower echelons?

(36) Will customer units require training? Are customer user manuals available for automated system support?

(37) Have OPSEC requirements been integrated into logistic planning? Has the logistic signature been minimized?

(38) Have security police requirements for SO bases, facilities, training areas, rehearsal sites, and storage sites been identified and resourced?

5. Joint Special Operations Task Force J-5 (Plans) Checklist

a. General

(1) What is the current politico-military situation?

(2) Has a national strategic political-military plan been received from the supported JFC?

(3) Have current plans been evaluated?

(4) Have SO strategic and operational military objectives been developed and forwarded to the supported commander?

(5) Are current force levels adequate to accomplish objectives?

(6) Have replacement units been identified or shortfalls forwarded to the JSOTF establishing authority for resolution?

(7) Has the JSOTF supported commander's tasking and guidance been analyzed?

(8) Has guidance been developed for components?

(9) Have OPORD or OPLAN shortfalls and limitations been identified and resolved?

(10) Have all support annexes been incorporated in the OPORD or OPLAN?

- (11) Is the OPORD or OPLAN complete and in the proper format?
- (12) Does the database accurately reflect all force and sustainment requirements needed to accomplish the assigned mission?
- (13) Are these requirements properly routed, phased, prioritized, and sourced?
- (14) Do current conditions indicate the need for replanning actions?
- (15) Do current conditions indicate the need and suitability for planning for operations during prehostilities?
- (16) Does the situation call for redeployment planning?

b. CAP

Note: The following checklist is arranged by CAP component that the CDRJSOTF and planning staff should consider during a crisis situation. All items in the checklist may not apply directly to the CDRJSOTF, but are provided to illustrate the overarching CAP process.

(1) CAP Component I — Situation Awareness

(a) Situation Development

- 1. What are the national and military strategies and US national security policy for the region or country?
- 2. What is the nature of the conflict or crisis that might require military resources to resolve it?
- 3. What are or might be the potential missions or tasks from the President or Secretary of Defense?
- 4. Will action be unilateral or multinational?
- 5. What is the current situation (who, what, when, where, and why)?
- 6. How will the adversary conceptualize the situation? What are the goals, objectives, strategy, intentions, capabilities, methods of operation, vulnerabilities, and sense of value and loss?
- 7. What steps can be taken to collect additional information?
- 8. What is the status of communications with key US and foreign government agencies and personnel? Has a list of key phone numbers been established?

9. Has the supported commander developed an intelligence collection plan?

10. Has the supported commander deployed sufficient organic reconnaissance resources? Should national assets be tasked or repositioned?

11. Has the supported commander established a JNCC?

12. Are any US or multinational forces conducting operations within the JSOTF JSOA? What type? Duration? Who commands those forces?

13. What is the status of communications to and/or from and within the JSOA?

14. Has the supported commander established an IO cell?

(b) Crisis Assessment

1. Is NEO needed?

a. Are there any US or other DOD civilian noncombatants in the JSOA? How many? Where are they located? Are they in any danger?

b. Is there a NEO plan for this JOA? Has the DOS authorized a NEO? Has the DOS asked for DOD assistance?

c. Should PSYOP assets be used during the NEO?

2. Have agencies or commands (e.g., USSTRATCOM, NGA, or environmental support facilities) that provide specialized or long-lead support been notified of the ongoing analysis and the potential for future support?

3. What dedicated communications should be established with these agencies or commands for use by operations, intelligence, and logistic personnel?

4. What requests, if any, have been made by the foreign government(s)? What is the DOS position?

5. What security cooperation may be provided to the foreign government(s) concerned?

6. What FHA may be provided to the foreign government(s)?

7. What sources have been identified to fund assistance efforts?

8. Does the US have any treaty or legal obligations?

9. Are there status-of-forces agreements with the foreign government(s)?
10. Is a military coordinating committee required?
11. What CA assets should be used to support a NEO?
12. Is a CMOC established at the JTF to coordinate and facilitate US and multinational force operations with other government agencies, international organizations, NGOs, and foreign nation agencies and authorities?
13. What coordination and assistance will be required for other government agencies, intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, and foreign national agencies and authorities?
14. Is there a current plan for the area or situation?
15. What type and level of SO are most advantageous for the current situation?
16. What are the key friendly, enemy, and neutral target groups and their SO vulnerabilities?
17. Has a teleconference been established to support the operation?
18. What is the plan identification number applicable to the operation?
19. Is a database maintained by the supported commander that is current or applicable to the situation?
20. Are there adequate provisions to maintain secrecy, achieve surprise, and preserve the security of SOF against attack?
21. What OPSEC and military deception measures are required? Is a cover story required or available? Are diversionary actions needed to support the preparation, deployment, and employment of forces?
22. What national-level actions are necessary to protect secrecy and execute deceptions?
23. What are foreign governments' (including hostile) attitudes toward US intentions and military capabilities? How could these be shaped to US advantage?
24. What are the reactions of friendly, neutral, and unfriendly foreign governments?
25. What level of opposition can be expected from hostile governments?

26. What support can be expected from friendly and allied and coalition governments?

27. What access and overflight assurances do friendly forces have for deployment or employment operations?

28. What are the PA implications and responsibilities for the area?

29. Has a DOD media pool been activated?

(2) CAP Component II — Planning

(a) COA Development

1. What precisely must be accomplished in the crisis to strengthen or support the objectives established by the President and Secretary of Defense?

2. What are the general operations, intelligence, and logistic requirements to support the actions so as to bring about the objectives?

3. Do the military objectives identified take into account exploitable enemy vulnerabilities that are critical to the CDRJSOTF's responsibilities and intent or are critical to the enemy's intent?

4. From the CDRJSOTF's perspective, are the SO objectives attainable?

5. What is the commitment of the adversary to own COA?

6. What are the current ROE in the area?

a. Do they need to be changed because of the current situation?

b. Who should recommend changes?

7. What SOF are readily available and when could they arrive on scene?

8. What reception and operations support facilities are needed and available?

9. What types and amounts of logistic support are available from friendly and allied nations?

10. Are joint or multinational interoperability considerations involved?

11. Is medical support adequate to support planned operations?

12. Has DIRLAUTH been established, as applicable, within the operational, intelligence, and logistic nets, with the committed forces, supported and supporting commands (as applicable), and national agencies?

13. What medical support is available in the objective area or provided for in the OPLAN or OPORD?

14. What additional SOF are required (e.g., USSOCOM, theater SO command, or HN SOF)?

15. What is the unit readiness of the available or allocated forces?

16. What are the major constraints before forces can be committed?

17. What is the status of GI&S support within the area?

18. What are the environmental (meteorological, oceanographic) support capabilities and constraints within the area? Who is coordinating environmental support?

19. Will special CJCS-controlled communications assets, such as the JCSE, be required?

20. Are CA and PSYOP units required?

21. What is the command relationship of both CA and PSYOP forces?

22. Will the use of the IO core capabilities of EW, computer network operations, PSYOP, military deception, and OPSEC enhance mission success for each COA being considered?

23. Have subordinate and supporting commands or agencies been tasked to enter database requirements for development of deployment estimates by USTRANSCOM?

24. Has tactical exploitation of national capabilities program support from the supported CCDR been requested?

25. Have plans for the use of space systems (e.g., for reconnaissance and surveillance, warning, positioning and navigation, communications, imagery, environmental monitoring) been integrated into JSOTF plans?

26. What is the status of intertheater mobility resources and supporting elements? Are facilities, airports, seaports, and LOCs capable of supporting the operation?

- 27. What are the logistic factors that affect actions under consideration?
- 28. Is aerial refueling required during deployment and/or employment?
- 29. Will ISBs be required?
- 30. What is the backup COA?
- 31. What all-source intelligence resources are available? Has the full range of intelligence capabilities been employed to ensure maximum intelligence support to planning efforts by the supported CCDR? Has CDRJSOTF declared emergency reconnaissance and implemented SIGINT operational tasking authority, if delegated? Will a NIST be requested?
- 32. Has coordination been conducted with USSTRATCOM to determine whether repositioning or launch of space systems is required for JSOTF operations?
- 33. Will EW units, such as radar jammers or communications jammers, be required?
- 34. Which airports and seaports are available to SOF?
 - a. Are runway lengths and weight-bearing capacities adequate for the planned forces?
 - b. Are pier capabilities and depth of water sufficient to accommodate sealift?
- 35. Will use agreements need to be coordinated with other nations?
- 36. Have sufficient contracting officers with adequate contracting authority been assigned?
- 37. Has a sufficient amount of local currency been obtained to support the exercise or operation?
 - a. Are other currencies required?
 - b. Is the use of precious metals required?
- 38. Has local civilian labor support been acquired?
- 39. Have adequate funds been identified to support the COA?
- 40. Have procedures been established to ratify irregular purchases?

41. What procedures must be established to protect information exchange between the United States and foreign forces and governments?

42. Have standard JSOTF special technical operations (STO) billets been activated and indoctrination conducted on special access programs?

(b) COA Selection

1. What COA has been selected? Have the pros and cons of each alternative, with regard to enemy options, been fully and objectively assessed (wargamed)?

2. What decisions have yet to be made? What changes to ROE are required?

(c) Detailed Plan Development

1. Is the mission clear? Is CDRJSOTF's intent clear?

2. Are the ROE adequate for the JSOTF mission?

3. Will the selected COA accomplish the objectives?

a. If it will not, has this been clearly outlined to the supported commander?

b. Is the COA consistent with the laws of armed conflict and other aspects of the legal regime affecting the operation?

4. Are command relationships clear, unambiguous, and understood by all parties?

a. Between supporting and supported commanders?

b. For C2 for SOF?

5. Before operations commence, has the theater J-2 established a JIOC? Has the JSOTF J-2 established a JISE?

6. Has a JPRC been designated or established?

7. Has the CJTF elected to designate functional component commanders?

a. Have the functional component commands' staffs been organized so that component representation reflects the composition of the joint force?

b. Are commanders of the other JTF components aware of the functional component commanders' assigned authority and responsibilities?

c. Have LNOs from the other JTF and JSOTF components been assigned to functional component commanders to facilitate coordinated joint force operations?

8. Has an ACA been assigned? (Normally assigned as a JFACC responsibility, if a JFACC is designated.) Is required liaison provided?

9. Has an AADC been assigned? (Normally assigned as a JFACC responsibility, if designated.) Is required liaison provided?

10. What is the status of communications?

a. Have multiple means of communications been provided for?

b. Is there frequency deconfliction?

c. Are the joint communications-electronics operation instructions adequate?

d. Is there a requirement for joint airborne communications assets?

e. Have common communications security materials (authenticators, operations codes, and keylists) been identified for all circuits, networks, and users?

f. Are there any other special communications systems support requirements, to include GCCS capability for JSOTF components?

11. What country clearances are required for overflight, landing, or staging? What are the existing (or needed) agreements for overflight; staging; transit and refueling for combat, cargo, and evacuation aircraft; and basing rights?

12. What forces and CONOPS are available if the adversary escalates operations abruptly?

13. Has sufficient coordination with allies been conducted?

14. What constraints have been placed on USTRANSCOM's components (e.g., allocation of lift assets)?

15. What is the status of space system support coordination?

a. If a theater missile threat exists, has a special request for tactical warning support been made to USSTRATCOM's JSPOC? Additionally, has USSTRATCOM

been requested to provide support from the theater event system, to include equipment required to receive downlink data (e.g., constant source and joint tactical terminal)?

b. Has military satellite communications (MILSATCOM) support been coordinated with the USSTRATCOM and with DISA MILSATCOM Systems Office?

c. Has Defense Satellite Communications System Ground Mobile Facility support been coordinated with USSTRATCOM and the appropriate regional satellite communications support center, as required?

d. Have global positioning system (GPS) forecast runs been requested from USSTRATCOM's joint space operations center to determine times and locations of degraded navigational signals?

16. Has an ROE planning cell been formed?

17. Has the enemy situation changed appreciably? If so, what are the effects on the selected COAs?

18. Have all necessary actions been taken to provide for self-defense of JSOTF forces?

19. Will the predicted environmental conditions adversely affect the operation? Who will provide environmental updates to decision makers?

20. Is logistic and administrative planning adequate?

21. Has the OPORD been published?

22. Do the component commanders' plans adequately address the coordinated employment, direction, and control of their forces in conformity with the JSOTF CONOPS?

(3) CAP Component III — Execution

(a) Has intelligence identified enemy movements or changes in the disposition of rear echelon, strategic, or other critical units that may affect SO?

(b) What is the status of the deployment as planned? Are any phasing or prioritization changes required based on changes in the situation, mission, or strategic or operational lift availability? Are additional SOF required?

(c) Are any other changes necessary to ensure that military action will accomplish the objectives intended?

(d) Are there sufficient civil-military planners to coordinate escalation in military assistance to civilian governments and infrastructure?

6. Joint Special Operations Task Force J-6 (communications system support) Checklist

a. General

(1) Is the communications system planner brought into the planning process early?

(2) Is a joint communications system planning meeting scheduled? Is a communications system planner from each organization attending the communications system planning meeting?

(3) Are the C2 relationship decisions made in sufficient time to allow supporting communications to be adequately planned and communications system decisions to be promulgated in a timely manner?

(4) Are the communications system planners familiar with the C2 relationships for the JSOTF operation and are these relationships adequately covered in communications system planning documents?

(5) Are the operational impacts of potential communications problems brought to the attention of the operational planners and superior commanders?

(6) Is there a network diagram or description showing connectivity to all commands and organizations included in the OPLAN or implementing instructions?

(7) Are support systems adequate to enable the communications system to support each COA being addressed?

(8) Are close-hold and limited access procedures understood by all planners?

(9) Is planning adequate to ensure that all communications nets have interoperable COMSEC devices and keying material? Is secure equipment availability and installation adequate for this operation (e.g., encrypted UHF SATCOM narrowband secure voice terminals)?

(10) Have adequate information assurance and CND protections been applied to communications system? Have vulnerabilities been identified and appropriate risk mitigation strategies been evaluated and applied to reduce these vulnerabilities to an acceptable level of risk?

(11) Is the use of the intertheater COMSEC package (ICP) being considered to ensure interoperable keying material? Do all forces hold all necessary components of the ICP? Has NATO COMSEC been considered for operations in NATO?

(12) Are provisions being made to ensure that all participating organizations are notified as to which frequencies, call signs, and COMSEC procedures are to be used for the operation?

(13) Is there adequate planning to ensure that JCEOI are prepared in a timely manner? Are frequency management decisions made in a timely manner to enable JCEOI dissemination to participating units when needed?

(14) Are operations codes available at all commands?

(15) Is planning for SOF and conventional forces interoperability adequate for this operation?

(16) Are procedures in place to adequately plan communications system for SO under both SO and mission-imposed close-hold restrictions?

(17) Are theater and tactical communications system interfaces (Defense Information System Network entry points) adequate to provide timely and accurate situation reporting for crisis management reporting to senior commanders and the Joint Staff?

(18) Does communications system planning for deployment include command relationships, SO operational control procedures, SO communications for underway sea or airlift, and for Air Mobility Command communications system?

(19) Are deployable GCCS terminals needed and planned for?

(20) Does the JSOTF have qualified GCCS and SO-unique communications operators?

(21) Is planning adequate to have communications move into the objective area in the proper sequence and in sufficient amount and type to support the operation?

(22) Have the functions of the JNCC, if established, been developed and published?

(23) Has the J-6 determined what communications assets are already in the JOA (military, commercial, and other civilian) and can they be used?

(24) Is planning adequate to have the buildup of communications into the objective area early enough to prevent overload of initially deployed communications systems?

(25) Are CJCS-controlled assets requested to support the plan?

(a) Is there a request for assets IAW CJCSI 6110.01, *CJCS-Controlled Tactical Communications Assets*?

(b) Have transportation requirements for CJCS-controlled assets been coordinated?

(26) Are communications units, equipment, and personnel, including CJCS-controlled assets, included in the TPFDD?

(27) Has the operational impact of communications equipment arrival times been brought to the attention of the CDRJSOTF?

(28) Is there enough detail in the TPFDD about communications assets to assist in communications planning?

(29) Are there any special communications needs for the use and transfer of imagery or geospatial information?

(30) Is the impact of IO considered in planning? Are IO considerations and communications frequency deconfliction addressed by the IO cell JNCC LNO?

(31) Are emission control procedures, requirements for OPSEC, military deception, and avoiding mutual interference addressed in planning?

(32) Are communications systems support relationships with the Coast Guard understood?

(a) Are communications system needs of the Coast Guard adequately addressed in planning?

(b) Does the Coast Guard have sufficient interoperable communications systems support equipment and COMSEC for this operation?

(33) Are communications planners included early in planning for communications support for intelligence systems?

(a) Have the J-2, J-3, and J-6 prioritized the intelligence requirements within the overall communications requirements?

(b) Are all intelligence systems requirements identified? Which intelligence systems have organic communications and which ones require communications provided by the J-6?

(c) Are the intelligence systems communications integrated into the overall communications planning? Are there provisions for frequency deconfliction to protect friendly use of the spectrum?

(d) Are support systems adequate to enable the communications system to get near-real-time imagery, signals data, and an accurate picture of the local situation to the CDRJSOTF?

(e) Is the CDRJSOTF aware of various GPS user equipment employed in theater to include commercial sets?

(f) Has a GPS CONOPS been disseminated?

(g) Has the JSOTF standard datum been disseminated for GPS user equipment?

(34) Have personnel recovery, medical personnel, and communications system personnel coordinated communications early?

(a) Are personnel recovery and medical evacuation communications adequately covered in planning?

(b) Are plans for personnel recovery and medical evacuation communications adequately promulgated to the JSOTF?

(35) Are dedicated and secure communications for public affairs and the news media adequately covered in planning?

(36) Is there a heavy dependence on any one means of communications during the operation?

(37) Have SATCOM requirements been evaluated to ensure proper use of limited assets?

(38) Have procedures been established for emergency destruction of classified material?

b. Communications and Computer Systems

(1) Are the following systems available and operational, as required?

(a) VTC.

(b) JSOTF LAN.

(c) GCCS.

(d) JDISS.

(e) TBMCS.

(f) METOC.

(g) Commercial new(s) stations.

- (h) Message center, tactical.
- (i) Message center, GateGuard/MDS (general service and special category).
- (j) Commercial telephone, STU-III/STE.
- (k) Secure facsimile.
- (l) Tactical telephone, digital secure voice terminal, or voice over secure internet protocol.
- (m) UHF, JTF command network.
- (n) UHF, JFACC network.
- (o) UHF, combat search and rescue (CSAR) network.
- (p) UHF, SCI.
- (q) UHF, JSOTF network.
- (r) HF, JTF network.
- (s) HF, JFACC network.
- (t) HF, CSAR network.
- (u) HF, SCI.
- (v) HF, JSOTF network.
- (w) UHF, ARSOF network.
- (x) UHF, NAVSOF network.
- (y) UHF, JSOACC network.
- (z) UHF, special tactics squadron (STS) network.
- (aa) UHF, Ranger network.
- (bb) HF, ARSOF network.
- (cc) HF, NAVSOF network.

- (dd) HF, JSOACC network.
- (ee) HF, STS network.
- (ff) HF, Ranger network.
- (gg) Very high frequency (VHF)/frequency modulation (FM), ARSOF network.
- (hh) VHF/FM, NAVSOF network.
- (ii) VHF/FM, JSOACC network.
- (jj) VHF/FM, STS network.
- (kk) VHF/FM, Ranger network.
- (ll) UHF/air-to-ground, ARSOF network.
- (mm) UHF/air-to-ground, NAVSOF network.
- (nn) Global Broadcast System.
- (oo) UHF/air-to-ground, JSOACC network.
- (pp) UHF/air-to-ground, STS network.
- (qq) UHF/air-to-ground, Ranger network.
- (rr) Personal computer-to-personal computer transfer.
- (ss) Airborne C2 package.

7. Headquarters Commandant

Site Survey Checklist

- a. **J-1/HQ commandant, primary contact, and telephone number.**
- b. **Mailing address.**
- c. **Emergency leave procedures.**
 - (1) Red Cross telephone numbers.
 - (2) Scheduled airline ticket office.

- (a) Telephone number.
- (b) Location (street address or road directions).
- (c) Special requirements on temporary duty orders, (i.e., variation authorized).
- (d) Nearest civilian airport (road location).
- (e) Vehicle transport availability.
- (f) If in remote control base, configure same requirement as 1b(1)-1b and (2e) above for local area.

d. Check cashing facilities.

e. Laundry facilities, telephone number.

- (1) Washers, dryers, and commercial power available.
- (2) Contract service.
- (3) Conventional unit supported.

f. Currency conversion.

- (1) Required?
- (2) Cost?
- (3) Nearest bank, money exchange facility, or Class A agent required.

g. Religious service availability.

- (1) Denominations.
- (2) Time.
- (3) Location of facilities.
- (4) Requirements for chaplain assistance.

h. Availability of post exchange service (fixed location or mobile).

i. Availability of MWR items.

- (1) Audio/visual rentals.
- (2) Movie theater, library, book loan, and newspaper service.
- (3) Gym and/or pool.
- (4) Officer and NCO club membership requirements.
- (5) Athletic equipment issue.
- (6) Off site buses.

j. Orders requirements.

- (1) Temporary duty orders.
- (2) Orders for attachments.
- (3) NATO travel orders.

k. Special Post Operation Report Requirements.

l. Plaques or certificates for HNs (special language requirements), engraving.

m. Barber shop availability.

n. PAO and JVB contact.

o. Medical evacuation procedures.

- (1) Air.
 - (a) On-call reaction time to maneuver area.
 - (b) Standby.
 - (c) Contact procedures.
- (2) Ambulance availability.
- (3) Aid Station/Medical Clinic availability.
 - (a) How many beds?
 - (b) What type of equipment?

- (c) Capabilities?
 - (4) Medical, dental, and pharmacy coverage; flight surgeon for airborne operations
 - (5) Hospital facilities, contact, and telephone number.
 - (a) Military — contact, location, and telephone number.
 - (b) Civilian — contact, location, and telephone number.
 - (c) Distance from maneuver area.
 - p. **Requirements for manifest at arrival airfield.**
 - q. **J-1/HQ commandant office space requirements.**
 - r. **Equipment (typewriters, computers, desks, chairs, other).**
 - s. **Military police support availability, contact, and telephone number.**
 - t. **Civilian administrative support, contact, and telephone number.**
 - u. **Reproduction and copying capabilities.**
 - v. **Interpreter requirements and availability.**
 - w. **Uniform requirements (on and off site).**
 - x. **Passport required?**
 - y. **Safety and environmental concerns, contact, and telephone number.**
 - (1) In local area.
 - (2) In maneuver area, are fires permitted, cutting of trees allowed, digging holes, trash, disposal, and other activities allowed?
 - z. **Medical.**
 - (1) Diseases and medical situation in local and maneuver areas.
 - (2) Water purification requirements and testing (nitrates, lead, iron, other).
 - (3) Recent and ongoing epidemics in local and maneuver area.
-

(4) Resupply procedures.

(a) Nearest US facility.

(b) Local purchase.

(c) Method of payment — Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request, operational fund, and/or local contract.

aa. **Other.**

(1) LNO with HN civil authority.

(2) Off limits areas.

(3) Availability of very important person quarters, transportation, and meals.

(4) Reception station procedures for augmentees messing supportability (hours, personnel, costs).

Specific responsibilities from the above checklist may be performed, as directed by the JFC, CDRJSOTF, J-1, or HQ commandant.

8. Staff Judge Advocate

(1) Provide predeployment and postdeployment legal assistance, as necessary.

(2) Interpret and provide advice on status-of-forces agreement, if one exists, and other relevant international agreements between the United States and HN.

(3) Brief status of forces to all personnel.

(4) Interpret ROE and assist J-3 in training personnel.

(5) Assist in development of supplemental ROE, as necessary.

(6) Provide appropriate LOAC training to all personnel.

(7) Provide advice during target selection development, including the review of prohibited and limited target lists.

(8) Ensure that proper command relationships are identified.

(9) Ensure proper processing of all general orders, including orders establishing provisional rear detachments with UCMJ jurisdiction as appropriate.

- (10) Review and provide advice on noncombatant evacuation plans and procedures.
- (11) Review and provide advice on procedures for handling detainees, refugees, and displaced persons.
- (12) Provide advice on procedures for addressing asylum and temporary refuge.
- (13) Provide commanders tools to maintain good order and discipline, including prosecutions under the UCMJ, nonjudicial punishment, and other adverse administrative actions.
- (14) Adjudicate claims.
- (15) Advise the staff on contract law issues, including fiscal law, military construction, and humanitarian assistance (Denton shipments, 10 USC Section 402, “Transportation of humanitarian relief supplies to foreign countries”).
- (16) Advise the staff on HN labor law.
- (17) Advise the staff on environmental law, including hazardous waste disposal.
- (18) Brief all personnel on appropriate ethical standards.
- (19) Provide legal advice to other staff agencies, as appropriate.
- (20) Identify NGOs.
- (21) Report questionable activity to the general counsel and inspector general of the DOD intelligence component concerned.
- (22) Determine what other US legal services in the area are available.
- (23) Are there procedures and formats for reporting to the CDRJSOTF all alleged serious crimes and incidents of national or international interest involving JSOTF personnel (e.g., a serious vehicle mishap)?
- (24) Are there procedures and authority to convene courts-martial, to administer nonjudicial punishment, or to take other administrative actions for less serious crimes and incidents?
- (25) Have legal advisors been identified through coordination with Service component for all legal support required by CDRJSOTF?

9. Provost Marshal

a. Which component within the JSOTF will handle detainees, civilian internee, and other detained persons?

b. Are component forces trained in the proper handling and humane treatment of detainees, civilian internee, and other detained persons?

c. Which component within the JSOTF will handle indigenous and displaced civilians who fall under the care and responsibility of the JSOTF?

d. Are component forces trained in the proper handling and humane treatment of indigenous and displaced civilians who fall under the care and responsibility of the JSOTF?

APPENDIX E
NOTIONAL JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS
STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE OUTLINE

1. Personnel

- a. Purpose.
- b. Responsibilities.
- c. Organization.
- d. Policies and Procedures.
- e. Annexes and Appendices.
 - (1) Safety.
 - (2) Joint Personnel Status Reports.
 - (3) PA.
 - (4) Checklist.
 - (5) JSOTF Manning Models.
 - (a) Exercise-Specific.
 - (b) Contingency Operations.

2. Intelligence

- a. Purpose.
- b. Responsibilities.
- c. Organization.
- d. Policies and Procedures.
- e. Annexes, Appendices, and Tabs.
 - (1) JISE.
 - (2) Intelligence Support to Targeting and Plans.

- (a) Sample Mission Folder Checklist.
 - (b) TIP: SR and DA Missions.
 - (c) TIP: FID and UW Missions.
 - (d) TIP: IO.
 - (e) Intelligence Requirements Planning Guide.
- (3) Collection Management and Dissemination.
 - (4) All-Source Production.
 - (5) Reporting and Dissemination.
 - (6) TSCIF.
 - (a) Checklist.
 - (b) Guard Orders.
 - (c) TSCIF Emergency Action Plan.
 - (7) Support Functions.
 - (a) Intelligence Communications.
 - (b) Field Security.
 - (c) Geospatial Information and Services.
 - (8) References.
 - (a) Predeployment Checklist.
 - (b) Site Survey Checklist.
 - (c) Shift Change Briefing Format.
 - (d) Shift Change Checklist.
 - (e) Augmentee In-Processing Survey.
 - (f) Security Checklist.

- (g) Sample Emergency Action Plan.
 - (h) Intelligence Disclosure and Sanitation Worksheet.
 - (i) Daily Intelligence Summary Format.
 - (j) Intelligence Summary Format.
 - (k) Graphic Intelligence Summary Format.
 - (l) Mission Report Format.
 - (m) Mobility Supply Inventory.
 - (n) Mission Tracking Summary.
- (9) Intelligence Systems.

3. Operations

- a. Purpose.
- b. Responsibilities.
- c. Organization.
- d. Policies and Procedures.
- e. Annexes and Appendices.
 - (1) Fire Support.
 - (2) Space Support.
 - (3) SO Mission-Essential Task List.
 - (4) CSAR.
 - (5) IO.
 - (6) CMO.
 - (7) METOC.
 - (8) Standard SO Mission Designation.

- (9) Messages.
 - (a) SO Tasking Order (TASKORD).
 - (b) CONOPS.
 - (c) CONOPS Approval.
 - (d) SPTREQ.
 - (e) Support Confirmation (SPTCONF).
 - (f) AIRSUPREQ.
 - (g) Request Confirmation (REQCONF).
 - (h) OPSUM.
 - (i) SITREP.
 - (j) OPORD.
 - (k) FRAGORD.
 - (l) Airspace Coordination Measures Request (ACMREQ).
 - (m) ACO.
 - (n) ALLOREQ.
- (10) OPSEC Procedures.
- (11) JOC Shift Organization.
- (12) Commander's Brief.

4. Logistics

- a. Purpose.
- b. Responsibilities.
- c. Organization.
- d. Policies and Procedures.

e. Annexes.

- (1) Format for Logistics Portion of JSOTF SITREP.
- (2) Logistic Planning Considerations.
 - (a) Logistic Estimate of the Situation.
 - (b) Logistic Checklist for Developing OPLANs and OPORDs.
- (3) Reporting Emergency POL Format.
- (4) Civil Engineering Support Plan Format.
- (5) Environmental Management Support Plan Format.
- (6) Logistics Status Report.
- (7) JOPES Letter of Instruction and Validation process.
- (8) Sample OPORD.
- (9) Contracting Planning.
- (10) HNS.

5. Plans

- a. Purpose.
- b. Responsibilities.
- c. Organization.
- d. Policies and Procedures.
- e. Annexes.
 - (1) JPG Mission Analysis.
 - (2) WARNORD Format.
 - (3) OPORD Format.
 - (4) Plans Checklist.

6. Staff Judge Advocate

- a. Purpose.
- b. Responsibilities.
- c. Policies and Procedures.
- d. Annexes.
 - (1) Applicability of ROE.
 - (2) Legal Annex to OPORD.
 - (3) Compliance with Intelligence Oversight.
 - (4) Discipline and Military Justice.

7. Communications

- a. Purpose.
- b. Responsibilities.
- c. Organization.
- d. Policies and Procedures.
- e. Annexes and Appendices.
 - (1) Communication and Computer Systems (C-CS) Requirements Checklist.
 - (2) Site Survey Checklist.
 - (a) Terrestrial Site Survey.
 - (b) Shipboard Site Survey.
 - (c) SATCOM Site Survey.
 - (3) Deployment Checklist.
 - (4) C-CS Support to JSOTF.
 - (a) JNCC.

- (b) Message Center.
 - (c) VTC.
 - (d) ADPE Administration.
 - (e) INFOCON Program.
- (5) Redeployment Checklist.

8. Headquarters Commandant

- a. Purpose.
- b. Responsibilities.
- c. Organization.
- d. Policies and Procedures.
- e. Annexes.
 - (1) Billeting Support.
 - (2) JSOTF Camp Layout.
 - (3) Postal Activity.
 - (4) Physical Security Operations.

9. Medical

- a. Purpose.
- b. Responsibilities.
- c. Policies and Procedures.
- d. Annexes.
 - (1) Sample Medical OPORD.
 - (2) Sample Preventive Medicine OPORD.
 - (3) Sample for Medical Reports Format.

10. Chaplain

- a. Purpose.
- b. Responsibilities.
- c. Policies and Procedures.

11. Joint Personnel Reception Center

- a. Purpose.
- b. Responsibilities.
- c. Organization.
- d. Policies and Procedures.
- e. Annexes.
 - (1) Layout of JPRC.
 - (2) Joint Personnel Reception Briefing.
 - (3) Processing.

12. Financial Management

- a. Purpose.
- b. Responsibilities.
- c. Organization.
- d. Policies and Procedures.
- e. Annexes.
 - (1) DOD Authorities.
 - (2) Financial Management.
 - (3) Joint Operation Entitlements.

13. Information Management

- a. Purpose.
- b. Responsibilities.
- c. Policies and Procedures.
- d. Annexes.
 - (1) J-1 Data Flows.
 - (2) J-2 Data Flows.
 - (3) J-3 Data Flows.
 - (4) J-4 Data Flows.
 - (5) J-5 Data Flows.
 - (6) J-6 Data Flows.

14. Glossary

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APPENDIX F TARGET ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY

1. Target Analysis

Target analysis is the detailed examination of potential targets to determine their military importance, priority of attack, scale of effort, and lethal or nonlethal capabilities required to attain a specified effect. It is a systematic approach to establishing the adversary vulnerabilities and weaknesses to be exploited. This is accomplished through the methodical examination of all information pertaining to a given target. The target analyst must determine a given target's vulnerability to attack, examine downtime and destructive effects, and determine how to satisfy the commander's objective or success criteria specified in the MTP (during contingency planning) or in the request for support or FRAGORD (during execution planning).

2. Targeting Analysis Focus

a. TSOC planners, JSOTF planners, and MPAs all conduct target analysis; however, the focus of the analysis differs at each level. TSOC planners focus on the strategic and operational levels while most JSOTFs evaluate targets from an operational and tactical perspective. The components of the JSOTF that are designated as the MPAs focus on the tactical level (see Figure F-1).



Figure F-1. Targeting Analysis Focus

b. At the strategic level, the analyst determines which target system to attack. For example, the strategic analyst may determine that disabling the power system in a country would cause factories to close thereby undermining economic stability. At the operational level, the analyst determines which subsystem to attack. For instance, the operational level analysis might reveal that disabling a particular power plant would lead to failure of the entire power system or grid in the country or JOA. At the tactical level, the analyst determines which particular component of a target or node should be attacked to achieve the desired effect. In this case, a tactical analyst might determine that disabling a particular turbine or boiler would result in disabling the targeted power plant. A target can consist of a target system, subsystem, complex, component, or critical damage point or node.

c. Generally the TSOC staff conducts analysis at the strategic and operational level during contingency planning while determining how to support the GCC's strategic objectives. The JSOTF conducts analysis at the operational level during planning when determining how to satisfy joint force objectives. The JSOTF should also consider the tactical level of analysis, but not dictate to the MPA how to attack the target. The JSOTF should understand the intelligence and operational information requirements of the MPA and facilitate quick, collaborative FAs and planning by requesting and "pushing" that required information to the MPA. The MPA will conduct tactical level analysis during both contingency or execution phase planning.

d. Once the systems, complex, or subsystems have been selected, the analyst must develop concrete evaluation criteria. If loss of a component results in an immediate halt of output, then that component is very critical. If loss of the component results in a halt of output, but only after several days or weeks, then that component is less critical. Similarly, a percentage of output curtailed might be used as the evaluation criterion. Utilizing the factors of criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability (CARVER) is a simple method used by SOF commanders and their staffs during target analysis to evaluate the relative merit of striking a target under consideration.

3. CARVER Evaluation Criteria

Once all the evaluation criteria have been established, the SOF analyst uses a numerical rating system (1 to 5) to rank order the CARVER factors for each potential target. In a one to five numbering system, a score of five would indicate a very desirable rating (from the attacker's perspective) while a score of one would reflect an undesirable rating. A notional CARVER value rating scale is shown in Figure F-2. The analyst must tailor the criteria and rating scheme to suit the particular strategic, operational, or tactical situation.

a. **Criticality.** Criticality or target value is the primary consideration in targeting. Criticality is related to how much a target's destruction, denial, disruption, and damage will impair the adversary's political, economic, or military operations, or how much a target component will disrupt the function of a target complex. In determining criticality, individual targets within a target system must be analyzed with relation to the other elements critical to the function of the target system or complex. Critical targets may also be selected for SR missions.

CARVER VALUE RATING SCALE (NOTIONAL)									
VALUE	C	A	R	V	E	R	VALUE		
5	Loss would be mission stopper	Easily accessible. Away from security	Extremely difficult to replace. Long down time (1 year)	Special operations forces definitely have the means and expertise to attack	Favorable sociological impact. OK impact on civilians	Easily recognized by all with no confusion	5		
4	Loss would reduce mission performance considerably	Easily accessible outside	Difficult to replace with long down (<1 year)	Special operations forces probably have the means and expertise	Favorable impact; no adverse impact on civilians	Easily recognized by most, with little confusion	4		
3	Loss would reduce mission performance	Accessible	Can be replaced in a relatively short time (months)	Special operations forces may have the means and expertise to attack	Favorable impact; some adverse impact on civilians	Recognized with some training	3		
2	Loss may reduce mission performances	Difficult to gain access	Easily replaced in a short time (weeks)	Special operations forces probably have no impact	No impact. Adverse impact on civilians	Hard to recognize. Confusion probable	2		
1	Loss would not affect mission performance	Very difficult to gain access	Easily replaced in short time (days)	Special operations forces do not have much capability to attack	Unfavorable impact. Assured adverse impact on civilians	Extremely difficult to recognize without extensive orientation	1		

Note: For specific targets, more precise, target-related data can be developed for each element in the matrix.

Figure F-2. CARVER Value Rating Scale (Notional)

b. **Accessibility.** In order to damage, destroy, disrupt, deny, or collect data on a target, SOF must be able to reach it with the necessary equipment, either physically or via indirect means. During SR missions, SOF not only must observe the target, but also must remain in the area undetected for extended periods of time. The SOF unit also must be able to safely exfiltrate once the mission is complete. Weather, light data, physical security measures, and the adversary disposition at the target area are all considered. Sometimes, accessibility is judged as either feasible or infeasible.

c. **Recuperability.** In the case of DA missions, it is important to estimate how long it will take the adversary to repair, replace, or bypass the damage inflicted on a target. Primary considerations are spare parts availability and the ability to reroute production. A target is not a valid SOF target if it can be repaired or bypassed in a short amount of time or with minimal resources.

d. **Vulnerability.** A target is vulnerable if SOF has the means and expertise to attack it. At the strategic level, a much broader range of resources and technology is available to conduct the target attack. At the tactical level, resources may be limited to organic personnel, weapons, and munitions or assets that can be attached, borrowed or improvised.

e. **Effect.** The target should be attacked only if the desired effects can be created to achieve the objective. These effects may be of a military, political, economic, informational, or psychological nature. The effect on the populace is viewed in terms of alienating the local inhabitants, strengthening the resistance movement, or triggering reprisals against the indigenous people in the immediate target area. The effect on the populace may also impact on the detachment's infiltration, exfiltration, and evasion and recovery routes. Collateral damage must also be calculated and weighed against the expected military benefit to determine if an attack would be advisable under the concept of proportionality. Collateral damage includes, but is not limited to, civilian injuries, deaths, and adverse economic impacts of the proposed attack.

f. **Recognizability.** The target must be identifiable under various weather, light and seasonal conditions without being confused with other targets or target components. Sufficient data must also be available for SOF to find the target on the ground and to differentiate the target from similar objects in the target area. The same requirement exists to distinguish target critical damage points and target stress points from similar components and their parent structures and surroundings. With appropriate training or augmentation, SOF also should be able to recognize appropriate computer programs, communications circuits, or similar targets of IO missions.

4. Strategic CARVER Evaluation Criteria

The purpose of strategic target analysis is to determine the critical systems or subsystems that must be attacked to progressively destroy or degrade the adversary's warfighting capacity and will to fight. Strategic operations are designed to have long-range, rather than immediate, impact on the adversary and its military forces. For strategic level analysis, list the adversary's systems or subsystems (examples are electric, power, and rail facilities). The result of strategic

target analysis, as well as any additional guidance received from the President and Secretary of Defense, determines priorities as to which system and/or subsystem will be targeted (see Figure F-3).

SAMPLE STRATEGIC CARVER MATRIX APPLICATION							
TARGET SYSTEMS	C	A	R	V	E	R	TOTAL
Bulk Electric Power	5	3	3	5	5	5	26*
Bulk Petroleum	5	3	5	4	3	5	25*
Water Supply	3	5	3	5	5	3	24*
Communication Systems	3	4	5	2	2	2	18
Air Transport	1	1	3	1	2	2	10
Ports and Waterways	1	1	3	1	1	1	8
Rail Transport	2	4	4	1	4	3	18
Road Networks	1	5	3	5	2	5	21

*Indicates target systems suitable for attack. In this example, the Bulk Electric Power target system has been selected.

Figure F-3. Sample Strategic CARVER Matrix Application

5. Operational CARVER Evaluation Criteria

The purpose of operational target analysis is to determine the critical subsystem or target complex within the strategically critical system for interdiction (see Figure F-4).

SAMPLE OPERATIONAL CARVER MATRIX APPLICATION							
TARGET SUB-SYSTEMS	C	A	R	V	E	R	TOTAL
Generation	5	3	4	3	5	4	24*
Transmission	2	5	2	5	2	5	21*
Control	3	1	4	1	3	3	15
Distribution	2	4	2	4	2	3	18

*Indicates target sub-systems suitable for attack. In this example, the Bulk Electric/Generation sub-system has been selected.

Figure F-4. Sample Operational CARVER Matrix Application

6. Tactical CARVER Evaluation Criteria

The purpose of tactical target analysis is to determine the military importance, priority of attack, and weapons required to obtain a desired effect on a target or set of targets within a target system in order to obtain a desired effect on a node or component of a target. For tactical level analysis, list the complexes or components of the subsystems or complexes selected for attack (see Figure F-5).

SAMPLE TACTICAL CARVER MATRIX APPLICATION							
TARGET COMPONENT	C	A	R	V	E	R	TOTAL
Water Intake	3	5	1	1	5	4	19
Water Filters and Pumps	5	4	5	4	5	3	26*
Ion Filter	2	1	1	1	5	1	11
Pre-heater and Pumps	5	2	4	3	5	2	21*
Air Intake	2	1	1	1	5	1	11
Blowers	2	2	1	1	5	1	12
Barges	1	5	1	4	1	5	17
Docks and Oil Pumps	3	5	2	3	1	4	18
Storage Tanks	1	4	1	4	1	5	16
Pre-heaters and Pumps (Fuel)	5	4	4	3	5	4	25*
Boiler	5	4	5	3	5	4	26*
Turbine/Generator	5	3	5	4	5	5	27*
Transformers	3	4	2	4	5	4	22*
Power lines	5	1	1	1	1	1	10
Switching station	2	1	1	2	1	1	8
*Indicates target components suitable for attack. In this example, the Bulk Electric /Generation/ Turbine target has been selected.							

Figure F-5. Sample Tactical CARVER Matrix Application

APPENDIX G
SPECIAL OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS: MISSIONS

- Annex A Special Operations Intelligence Requirements: Direct Action and Special Reconnaissance Missions
- B Special Operations Intelligence Requirements: Foreign Internal Defense and Unconventional Warfare

SPECIAL OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS: MISSIONS

Answers to PIRs provide SOF with the critical items of information regarding the adversary and environment for particular SO missions. PIRs are required by the CDRJSOTF, JSOTF component commanders, and operational element commanders by a particular time to relate with other available information and intelligence in order to assist in reaching a logical decision. This appendix provides PIRs for DA and SR in Annex A, “Special Operations Intelligence Requirements: Direct Action and Special Reconnaissance Missions,” and requirements for FID and UW in Annex B, “Special Operations Intelligence Requirements: Foreign Internal Defense and Unconventional Warfare.”

ANNEX A TO APPENDIX G
SPECIAL OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS:
DIRECT ACTION AND SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS

NOTES:

1. PIR coding for FA, TIP and isolation (ISO) planning steps. Alpha code: “D”=DA missions; “S”=SR missions; “B”=both. Numeric coding: Priority “1”=essential; “2”=mission enhancing.
2. Enter “NA” for not applicable PIR.
3. Recommend TIP production time (90 days) not be exceeded for intelligence collection; annotate TIP with collection request date, number, and agency.
4. Update TIP with collected data upon receipt or annually.

SECTION I: Target Identification and Description

FA TIP ISO

A. Target identification data.

- | | | | | |
|----|---|---|----|--|
| B1 | — | — | 1. | Target name. |
| B1 | — | — | 2. | Mission number. |
| B1 | — | — | 3. | BE number. |
| B1 | — | — | 4. | Target coordinates: give geographic, source, datum, universal transverse mercator (UTM), and graphic reference(s). |
| B1 | — | — | 5. | Special operations aviation coordinates. |
| B1 | — | — | 6. | Category code. |
| B1 | — | — | 7. | SAFE area number. |
| B1 | — | — | 8. | Country. |

B. Description and significance.

- | | | | |
|----|---|---|-----------------------------|
| B1 | — | — | Reference MTP SECTION II:I. |
|----|---|---|-----------------------------|

C. Detailed target description.

- B1 — 1. Physical layout or functional organization.
 - B1 — a. Description.
 - B1 — b. Layout of structures and areas.
Annotated photo or line drawing.
 - B1 — c. Key component list (see Section C5 that follows for details).
 - (1) First component.
 - (a) Critical damage point.
 - 1. Stress point.
 - 2. Stress point.
 - (b) Critical damage point.
 - (2) Second component.
- S1 — 2. Line-of-sight study (if required by the mission type or specified by the MTP or FA).
- B1 — 3. Primary and alternate power sources.
 - B1 — a. Number.
 - B1 — b. Type.
 - B1 — c. Location.
 - B1 — d. Conduits.
 - B1 — (1) Location (power lines, communications cables, relationships).
 - B1 — (2) Type (color, construction, diameter, thickness).
 - B1 — e. Associated facilities (transformers, switches, yards, relays, spares).

- B1 — f. Fuel supply.
- B1 — (1) Location (above, partially below, or below ground; containers types).
- B1 — (2) Type fuel(s).
- B1 — 4. Communications associated with the target.
- B1 — a. Type (telephone [land line-cell], radios (FM/AM/HF/UHF), SATCOM voice/Morse code, data facsimile).
- B1 — (1) Methods and procedures for securing communications (scrambling, frequency jumping, one-time pads, brevity codes).
- B1 — (2) Visual signals (smoke, panels, flags).
- B1 — (3) Noise (rifle shots, klaxons, sirens).
- B1 — (4) Country of origin, year manufactured, model.
- B1 — (5) Number and type of antennas.
- B1 — b. Number (by type).
- B1 — c. Location.
- B1 — d. Associated facilities (link sites, switch centers, repair centers).
- B1 — (1) Power supply.
- B1 — (2) Switchboards and rerouting centers.
- B1 — (3) Antenna array.
- B1 — (4) Cables and number and location of personnel.
- D1 — 5. Components, critical damage points and stress points. Support to CARVER. The piece of equipment, portion of bridge, building, section of power line, staff member that, if destroyed, killed, or captured, will result in the inability of the target to function.

First component: 1. Name (list each component separately with all items in subparagraph a and b below).

Second component: 2. Name (list each component separately with all items in paragraph a and b below) (continue listing components as needed).

- B1 — a. Physical structure (equipment, machinery, room. Annotated photograph, sketch, floor plan, diagram).
- D1 — (1) Dimensions (length, width, height, separation).
- D1 — (2) Construction materials (masonry wood).
- D1 — b. Critical damage points — one (list each critical damage point separately with each item below).
- D1 — (1) Type (provide damage point and parent structure).
- D1 — (2) Location (be as specific as possible).
- D1 — (3) Dimensions.
- D1 — (4) Construction material (type, thickness).
- D1 — (5) First stress point (second stress point is [5b]. List each stress point separately with 6, 7, and 8 below).
- D1 — (6) Criticality (destruction or damage will have significant influence on target function).
- D1 — (7) Accessibility (ability to reach each point either physically or by indirect fire weapons).
- D1 — (8) Recuperability (time to replace, repair, or bypass and return to normal operations).
- D1 — (9) Vulnerability (means and expertise to conduct mission and achieve desired level of damage).
- D1 — (10) Effect (possible political, economic, or

sociological impact of damage or
destruction or the target on the populace).

— D1 —

(11) Recognizability (target recognizability under
varying weather, light, and seasonal
conditions).

6. On-site security.

— B1 —

a. Location (guard posts, bunkers, trenches, security
force barracks, motor pools). Annotated photo, sketch.

— B2 B1

b. Security procedures.

— B2 B1

(1) Patrols.

— B2 B1

(a) Type (air, ground — on foot or in vehicle,
surface, subsurface).

— B2 B1

(b) Frequency and pattern (route, timing).

— B2 B1

(c) Size.

— B2 B1

(d) Armament.

— B2 B1

(2) Lighting (power source and location).

— D2 D1

(3) Detection systems (perimeter barriers, fences,
buildings, extent and integration of defenses).

— D2 D1

(a) Overhead cameras.

— D2 D1

(b) Ground (seismic, infrared, motion, and
metallic).

— D2 D1

(c) Water alarms.

— D2 D1

(d) Electromagnetic (frequency spectrum).

— D2 D1

(4) Barrier and obstacles (height, width, depth,
special features — electrification, booby traps,
detection devices. Include intentional barbed
wire and incidental telephone poles).

— D2 D1

(5) Entry, internal procedures (keys, cipher locks

using cards or numbers, personnel, vehicle badges, decals, and colors).

- B2 B1 c. Military or internal security facilities and forces.
- B2 B1 (1) Location (coordinates of units that could interfere with operations).
- B2 B1 (2) Types of forces (garrison, artillery, surface-to-air missile [SAM], antiaircraft artillery [AAA], paramilitary, bandit).
- B2 B1 (3) Strength (table of organization and equipment [TO&E] strength).
- B2 B1 (4) Weapons (type, number, location).
- B2 B1 (5) Ammunition (type, number, location).
- B2 B2 (6) Communications (type, number, frequency).
 - B2 B2 (a) Connectivity with target.
 - B2 B2 (b) Location of links and conduits (telephone switch points, microwave towers, radio relay sites).
- B2 B2 (7) Alternate means of communication.
 - B2 B2 (a) Number, type, location.
 - B2 B2 (b) Interruption alarms.
- B2 B2 (8) Organic and available transport.
 - B2 B2 (a) Type (vehicles, helicopters, civilian and military, maintenance).
 - B2 B2 (b) Number.
- B2 B2 (9) Fuel supply.
 - B2 B2 (a) Type (diesel, gasoline, water-driven turbine).
 - B2 B2 (b) Location (source, tankers).

- B2 B2 (c) Access (hydrant, hose, hand pump).
 - B2 B2 (d) Storage (tanks, barrels, above ground, underground [depth]).
 - B2 B2 (e) Firefighting equipment.
 - B2 B1 7. Target area activity.
 - B2 B1 a. On target — operational routine (daily, weekly, monthly, seasonally).
 - B2 B1 b. Target vicinity — operational routine (daily, weekly, monthly, seasonally, in civilian neighborhood, industrial complex, business).
 - D2 D1 8. Target site alert procedures.
 - D2 D1 a. Security procedures.
 - D2 D1 b. Changes in procedures and posture (more guards at gates, entrances, in towers, emplacements, entrenching, barbed wire, obstacles).
 - D2 D1 9. Adversary reaction capability.
 - D2 D1 a. Dedicated (strength, equipment, training, weapons, reaction time).
 - D2 D1 b. Incidental (strength, equipment, training, weapons, reaction time).
 - — B1 10. Latest target and target area intelligence (examples: updated order of battle, target status, survival, evasion, resistance, escape (SERE) and SAFE areas).
- D. Target vulnerability assessment (use Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual — SO).

SECTION II: Natural Environment

FA TIP ISO

- A. Geographic data (including terrain, hazards to movement).
 - B1 — 1. Geographic terrain features.
 - B1 — a. Natural obstacles.
 - B1 — b. Man-made obstacles.
 - B2 B1 2. Avenues of approach (including road, rail, waterway, air). Trace approaches to the target using an overlay or graphic.
 - B2 B1 a. Most likely approach to be used by the adversary.
 - B2 B1 b. Exploitable approaches to impede reinforcement.
 - B2 B1 c. Potential obstacles, terrain features, or chokepoints.
 - B2 B1 d. Special conditions (seasonal variations).
 - B2 B1 e. Forging sites (depth, width, type bottom).
 - B2 B1 f. Trafficability (estimated rates of advance, transit time to target).
 - B2 B1 g. Exploitable civilian transport.
- B. Meteorological data (climatological overview, illumination data).
 - B1 B1 1. Current data (seasonal, diurnal, local geographic variations updates).
 - B1 — 2. Historical data (including unusual conditions: sandstorms, blizzards).
- C. Hydrographic data (coastal and otherwise).
 - B1 B1 1. Tidal activity.
 - B1 — 2. Currents.
 - B1 — 3. Temperatures.

- B1 B1 B1 4. Surf.
- B1 — 5. Special conditions (seasonal variations).
- B1 — 6. Beaches (natural and manmade obstacles).
- B1 — 7. Marine life.

SECTION III: Threat

FA TIP ISO

- B1 — A. Ground forces (including border guards — type, number, CBRN capability, night operations).
- B1 — B. Paramilitary and indigenous forces (type, number, CBRN capability, night operations).
- B1 — C. Naval forces (including coast guard and maritime border guards — type, number, CBRN capability, night operations).
- B1 — D. Air forces (type, number, CBRN capability, night operations).
- B1 — E. Air defense forces (including aircraft, radars, passive detectors — type, numbers).
- B2 B1 F. Electronic order of battle.
- B2 B2 G. Space-based assets.
- B2 B2 H. Computer Network Operations.
- — B1 I. Other (including indicators of adversary COA within a 24-hour period including reinforce, defend, delay, CBRN operations).

SECTION IV: Demographics and Cultural Features

FA TIP ISO

- B1 — A. Area population characteristics.
- B1 — B. Languages, dialects, and ethnic composition (national and in target area).

- B1 — C. Social conditions.
- B1 — D. Religious factors.
- B1 — E. Political characteristics.
- B1 — F. Economic conditions.
- B1 — G. Miscellaneous (including currency, holidays, dress, customs, foreign influences, and personnel).

SECTION V: Lines of Communications and Information Systems

FA TIP ISO

- B1 — A. Airfields.
 - B1 — 1. Description of each (graph, overlay, chart — type, location, capacity, POL, parking areas, aircraft).
 - B1 — 2. Factors limiting use.
- B1 — B. Railways.
 - B1 — 1. Description of network (graph, overlay, chart).
 - B1 — 2. Factors limiting use.
- B1 — C. Roadways.
 - B1 — 1. Description of network (graph, overlay, chart).
 - B1 — 2. Factors limiting use.
 - B1 — 3. Bypass routes.
- B1 — D. Waterways.
 - B1 — 1. Description (graph, overlay, chart).
 - B1 — 2. Beaches suitable for amphibious landing.
 - B1 — a. Beach length and configuration.
 - B1 — b. Usable beach length.

- B1 — c. Beach interruptions and obstacles.
- B1 — d. Type of coastline.
- B1 — e. Backshore description.
 - B1 — (1) Width.
 - B1 — (2) Gradient.
 - B1 — (3) Composition.
 - B1 — (4) Vegetation.
 - B1 — (5) Exits.
- B1 — f. Foreshore description.
 - B1 — (1) Width.
 - B1 — (2) Gradient.
 - B1 — (3) Composition.
- B1 — g. Nearshore.
 - B1 — (1) Width.
 - B1 — (2) Gradient.
 - B1 — (3) Composition.
- B1 — E. Ports.
 - B1 — 1. Depth.
 - B1 — 2. Tides.
 - B1 B1 3. Currents.
- B1 — F. POL.
- B1 — G. Power grid.

- B1 — H. Public information media and telecommunications (print, radio, television, telephone).

SECTION VI: Insertion and Extraction

FA TIP ISO

- 1 — A. Potential LZs, DZs, beach landing sites (BLSs), and helicopter landing zones (HLZs).

- U1 U1 B. Chokepoints between insertion point(s) and objective.

SECTION VII: SERE and Survival Data

FA TIP ISO

A. SERE and SAFE areas.

- B2 B1 1. Population.
- B2 B1 2. Characteristics and culture.
- B2 B1 3. Location.
- B2 B1 4. Approaches.
- B2 B1 5. Contact, recovery points, and procedures.
- B2 B1 6. Security hazards.
- B2 B1 7. Cover and concealment.

B. Survival data.

- B2 B1 1. Food.
- B1 — 2. Water (identify all known water sources).
 - B1 — a. Type.
 - B1 — b. Source.
 - B1 — c. Capacity.

- B2 B1 3. Shelter.
- B2 B1 4. Medical, health, and sanitation.
- B2 B1 a. General health and sanitation conditions.
- B2 B1 b. Diseases.
- B2 B1 c. Plants and animals of medical importance.

SECTION VIII: Unique Intelligence (mission-specific requirements, to include CI environment, not covered above)

SECTION IX: Intelligence Shortfalls

APPENDIX A: BIBLIOGRAPHY

APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY

APPENDIX C: GEOINT

FA TIP ISO

A. GEOINT.

- B1 — 1. Area (20-25 nautical miles (nm) radius from target center).
- B2 B2 2. Intermediate (5-6 nm or 10 kilometers (km)).
- B1 — 3. Target (entire target).
- B1 — 4. Broad-area-coverage (to identify, select, plan, and execute overland infiltration and exfiltration routes).
- B1 — 5. A copy of all maps and charts used to create the TIP.
- B1 — 6. Map of the target area (1:50,000).
- B2 — 7. Digitally manipulated imagery (line-of-sight studies, ground-based views on specific azimuths).
- 8. Solar/lunar geometry.

B. Photography.

- D1 — 1. Picture(s) or facsimile(s) of key components and critical damage points of target (such as building room, van, missile, warhead).

- D1 — 2. Picture(s) or facsimile(s) of stress points of critical damage point(s) (the bulls-eye: such as a junction box, bridge girder, valve).

APPENDIX D: SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION (if applicable)

ANNEX B TO APPENDIX G
SPECIAL OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS:
FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

NOTES:

1. PIR coding for FA, TIP and ISO planning steps.
 - a. Alpha coding: “U”=Unconventional Warfare; “F”=Foreign Internal Defense; “B”=Both.
 - b. Numeric coding: Priority “1”-essential; “2”-mission enhancing.
2. Enter “NA” for not applicable PIR.
3. Update TIP with collected data upon receipt or annually.

SECTION I: Objective Area Identification and Description

FA TIP ISO

A. Objective area (OA) identification data.

- | | | | | |
|----|---|---|----|--|
| B1 | — | — | 1. | Country(ies). |
| B1 | — | — | 2. | Geographic limits of OA (geographic or UTM). |
| B1 | — | — | 3. | Plan or operations (number and name). |

B. Description and significance.

B1 — — Reference Appendix A, SECTION II:I.

SECTION II: Natural Environment

FA TIP ISO

A. Geographic data (including terrain, hazards to movement).

- | | | | | |
|---|----|---|----|-----------------------------------|
| — | B1 | — | 1. | Geographic terrain features. |
| — | B1 | — | a. | General description of OA. |
| — | B1 | — | b. | Key natural and manmade features. |

— B1 — 2. Avenues of approach into OA (road, rail, waterway, air). Trace approaches using an overlay or graphic.

— B1 — a. Most likely approach of reinforcement.

— B1 — b. Potential obstacles, terrain features, and choke points.

— B1 — c. Special conditions (seasonal variations).

— B1 B1 d. Fording sites (depth, width, type bottom).

— B1 — e. Exploitable points and segments to impede reinforcements.

B. Meteorological data (climatological overview, illumination data).

U1 F1 B1 1. Current data.

U1 F1 — 2. Historical data (including unusual conditions: sandstorms, blizzards).

C. Hydrographic data (coastal, waterways, lakes).

— U1 — 1. Tidal activity.

— U1 — 2. Currents.

— U1 — 3. Temperatures.

— U1 — 4. Special conditions (seasonal variations).

— U1 — 5. Depths, underwater obstacles.

D. Water sources (color-coded overlay).

U1 F1 — 1. Type.

U1 F1 — 2. Source.

U1 F1 — 3. Capacity.

B2 B1 — E. Flora and fauna (plants and animals). Include information of tactical value, such as plants and animals that would impede or assist movement routes or rates, massing, dispersal,

acquisition, and weapon capabilities, security including location, numbers, size, type).

SECTION III: Threat

FA TIP ISO

A. Objective country.

1. Summary (strategy, force disposition, threat to US personnel).

F1 F1/U1 — a. Objective country's military strategy.

B1 B1 — b. Disposition of combat units.

— F1 — c. Principal military targets.

— B1 — d. Threat to US personnel and advisors.

B1 — — 2. Ground forces (TO&E strength, including border guards and reserves. Give type, number, capability of equipment, weapons, night vision capability, field defense positions located in UTM to nearest 100 meters).

B1 — — 3. Paramilitary and/or indigenous forces, internal security forces or police (TO&E strength. Type, number, capability, equipment, weapons, night operations).

B1 — — 4. Naval forces (including coast guard and maritime border guard — type, number, capability, equipment, weapons).

B1 — — 5. Air forces (type, numbers, capability, ordnance, reaction time, loiter times, sortie rate, performance characteristics, operating schedules, alert factors).

— B1 — 6. Air defense forces (including aircraft, radars, antiaircraft weapon systems type and deployment, passive detectors — type, numbers, capability. For ground control intercept (GCI) include proficiency, operating schedules, flexibility, and responsiveness).

— B1 — 7. Electronic order of battle.

- B2 B2 8. Force communications (communications system support: hierarchy and protocols, capabilities, TO&E operating characteristics, communications security equipment, and material type).
- U1 U1/F2 — 9. EW (types, capabilities, operational characteristics, frequencies, power output, locations of units, equipment, and electronic attack).
- B2 B2 10. List communications of military significance and susceptible to attack.
- B1 — 11. Weapon systems (both US and foreign. Type, availability, maintenance and logistic capabilities, suppliers, training).
- B1 — 12. Intelligence collection capability (include agency and means, effectiveness of each, and predisposition or bias toward or against).
 - B1 — a. HUMINT and CI.
 - B1 — b. SIGINT environment.
 - B1 — c. GEOINT.
 - B1 — d. Reconnaissance patrols.
- B1 — 13. Uniform and equipment markings.
- B2 B1 — 14. CBRN capability (types, sources, and storage locations). For CBRN-capable units — type, specify launcher or weapon system location, availability, ranges, employment or alert times, communications, and units' ammunition load; that is, 50 percent nuclear, 25 percent conventional high explosive, 25 percent chemical.
- B2 — 15. CBRN protection and decontamination (locations and types).
- B1 B1 — 16. SO and PSYOP (plans, programs, capabilities to conduct). Vulnerability to PSYOP.
- B1 F1/U2 — 17. Civil disturbance and riot control training (units and their capabilities).

- | | | | | |
|----|-------|----|-----|---|
| B2 | B1 | — | 18. | Government resistance potential (internal and external threats. List indigenous peoples and vulnerabilities). |
| — | B2 | B2 | 19. | Support of regional insurgencies (groups, movements, type of support). |
| | | | 20. | Support of terrorist and guerrillas. |
| B1 | B1 | — | a. | Groups supported (name, type, affiliation, operational techniques, capabilities, equipment). |
| — | U1/F2 | — | b. | Training and staging areas, infiltration or escape routes (location, techniques, equipment). |
| — | B2 | — | c. | Safe houses (disposition, size, location). |
| U2 | U1/F2 | — | d. | Reaction to introduction of US forces. |
| | | | B. | Opposition and resistance forces. |
| B1 | B1 | — | 1. | Groups and forces (names, organization, leaders, political affiliation, size, population support). |
| — | B1 | — | 2. | Military capabilities (organization, equipment training, ability to conduct sabotage, subversion, and deception). |
| — | U1/F2 | — | 3. | Groups and force communications (types, vulnerability to covert or overt attack). |
| F2 | F1 | — | 4. | US use of groups and forces (methods of contact and probability of cooperation). |
| B1 | B1 | — | 5. | Threat to US personnel and advisers. |
| — | — | B1 | 6. | Indicators and warning (indicators of preparation by the objective country or opposition forces for action within a 24-hour period for the following: attack, withdraw without engaging, reinforce, defend, delay, conduct special or CBRN operations). |

SECTION IV: Demographics, Cultural, Political, Social Features (PIRs must be answered for both objective country and opposition or resistance forces)

FA TIP ISO

- A. Area population characteristics.
 - B2 B2 1. Centers and density.
 - B1 — 2. Refugee movement(s).
 - B1 — 3. Attitude of civilians and civilian groups to US involvement (friendly, unfriendly, or neutral).
 - B1 — a. Groups.
 - B1 — b. Key civilians.
 - B1 — c. Biographic data.
 - F2 F2 4. Attitude of neutral population toward HN, threat policies, and actions.
 - F2 F2 5. Local sources that could help our position through liaison or other means (used by multinational, friendly, or US HUMINT organizations).
 - F2 F2 a. Human rights history (friendly and threat).
 - F2 F2 b. US policy toward HN's human rights actions.
 - F2 F2 6. Friendly contacts (embassies, businesses, missionaries, teachers, students).
 - F2 F2 a. Human rights history (friendly and threat).
 - F2 F2 b. US policy toward HN's human rights activities.
- B1 — B. Languages, dialects, and ethnic composition.
- F1 — C. Social conditions.
- F1 — D. Religious factors.

E. Political characteristics.

- B1 — 1. Internal groups (identify groups, indigenous elements who are members, level of popular support).
- B1 — 2. Key military leaders (biographic data, backgrounds, talents, connections, political affiliation, and orientation).
- F1 — 3. Attitude toward planned US operations (support, oppose, or tolerate action).
- B1 — 4. Opposition to existing US forces, facilities, or interests (general population and significant groups and forces).
 - B1 — a. Who (biographic data).
 - B1 — b. When.
 - B1 — c. Where.
 - B1 — d. Nature and form of opposition.
 - B1 e. Opposition's agenda (what do they want)?
- F1 — 5. Assistance available to US forces (extent and capabilities).
- B1 B1 — 6. Vulnerabilities of objective country government to insurgent attack (prioritize).
- B2 B2 7. Tensions (regional and national; causes, intensity, degree, and exploitability by the US or opposition).
- F2 F2 8. Information service, apparatus, or organization (key personnel, attitude toward the USG, usable by US forces).
- B2 B2 9. Propaganda apparatus (organization[s], key personnel, attitude toward the USG, usable by US forces).
- B2 B2 — 10. Employment of propaganda and disinformation (currently, future capabilities).

- F1 U1 — 11. Foreign influences (identify sources, leaders, themes, influence on government, unions, students, insurgent forces and general public).
- B2 B2 F. Available labor force (location, numbers, equipment).
- B1 — G. Customs (social, weapons, religious, cultural, mores).
- F2 F1 — H. Medical capabilities (use by US forces, limitations).
- F2 B1 — I. Health and sanitation conditions (facilities, agencies, capabilities).
- F1 — J. Economic conditions.
- F1/U2 K. Currency, holidays, dress.

SECTION V: Lines of Communications, Information Systems, and Logistics

FA TIP ISO

- A. Airfields.
 - F1/U2 — 1. Description of each (graph, overlay, chart — type, location, capacity, POL, parking areas, aircraft).
 - F1/U2 — 2. Limiting factors for use.
 - F1/U2 — 3. Available for US use (include any limitations).
- B. Railways.
 - U2 B1 — 1. Description of network (graph, overlay, chart).
 - U2 B1 — 2. Limiting factors for use.
- C. Roadways.
 - B2 B2 1. Description of network (graph, overlay, chart).
 - B2 B2 2. Limiting factors for use.
 - B2 B2 3. Bypass routes.

D. Waterways.

- B1 — 1. Description (graph, overlay, chart).
- B1 — 2. Identify beaches suitable for amphibious landing.
- B2 — E. Ports (include availability to US forces and limitations on US operations).

F. POL (refining, storage, and distribution).

- U1 — 1. Vulnerabilities.
- U1 — 2. Exploitability by US forces.

G. Power grid (generating and distribution networks).

- U1 — 1. Vulnerabilities.
- U1 — 2. Exploitability by US forces.

H. Public information media and telecommunications.

- B2 B2 1. Signal allocation controlling authority (agency and procedures).
- B2 B2 2. Radio and television broadcast (controlling agency, key personnel, station locations, channels and frequencies, output transmitters, operating hours, political affiliations).
- B2 B2 3. Newspapers (controlling agency, key personnel, printing locations, political affiliations, distribution).
- B2 B2 4. Communications network or system.
 - B2 B2 (a) Equipment type and switching system.
 - B2 B2 (b) Cable vaults and layouts.
 - B2 B2 (c) Transmission media for trunk groups (open wires, microwave).
 - B2 B2 (d) Relay towers (location).

- B2 B2 (e) System manning (civilian, military).
- B2 B2 (f) For multiple systems, indicate interconnections.
- U1/F2 — I. Exploitable civilian transportation (trucks, buses, river craft).
- F2/F2 — J. Primary modes of transportation (public and commercial).
- B1 B1 — K. US-provided materials, services urgently needed or required (by cooperating indigenous military, paramilitary, resistance forces, or local nationals. List and prioritize).
- F1/U2 — L. Stockpiles (equipment, supplies). Give location, type, volume.
- B2 F1/U2 — M. War-sustaining industries (ability to produce warfighting supplies).
- F1/U2 — N. War-sustaining resupply (outside suppliers of end items and war material, country, agent, company, storage location).
- U1 — O. Movement control centers.

SECTION VI: Infiltration and Exfiltration (potential LZs, DZs, BLSs, and HLZs). Include availability to US forces and limitations on US operations.

FA TIP ISO

- U2 B1 — A. List potential zones.
- U2 U1 — B. Chokepoints between insertion point(s) and objective.

SECTION VII: Military Assistance (PIRs must be answered for objective country and opposition or resistance forces)

FA TIP ISO

- A. Military assistance provided (countries committed to or providing assistance).
- F2 F2 1. External military assistance (legal or de facto).
- B2 B1 — 2. Foreign military advisers (country represented, adviser location, type of assistance).

- F1 F1/U2 — 3. Foreign combatants, paramilitary (strengths and locations).
- B2 B1 — B. Foreign personnel (noncombatants, medical, engineers).
Numbers and locations.
- F1/U2 — C. Foreign military material (trucks, heavy equipment).
- B1 — D. Deployments of foreign personnel and equipment (types, frequency, number, represented country, purpose, and projections).
- B2 B2 E. Foreign contractors services and construction (type of work, equipment, location, represented country or company).
- F1 F1/U2 — F. US support (current and projected).

SECTION VIII: SERE and Survival Data

FA TIP ISO

- A. SERE and SAFE areas.
 - F2 F1 1. Population.
 - F2 F1 2. Characteristics and culture.
 - F2 F1 3. Location.
 - 2 F1 4. Approaches.
 - F2 F1 5. Contact and recovery points and procedures.
 - F2 F1 6. Security hazards.
 - F2 F1 7. Cover and concealment.
- B. Survival data.
 - B2 B1 1. Food.
 - B1 — 2. Water (identify all known water sources).
 - B1 — a. Type.

- B1 — b. Source.
- B1 — c. Capacity.
- F2 F1 3. Shelter.
- B2 B1 4. Medical, health, and sanitation.
- B2 B1 a. General health and sanitation conditions.
- B2 B1 b. Diseases.
- B2 B1 c. Plants and animals of medical importance.

SECTION IX: Unique Intelligence (mission-specific requirements not covered above)

SECTION X: Intelligence Shortfalls

APPENDIX A: BIBLIOGRAPHY

APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY

APPENDIX C: GEOINT

FA TIP ISO

A. GEOINT for FID.

- U2 U2 1. GEOINT of infiltration and exfiltration routes.
- U2 U2 2. GEOINT of DZ, if specified.
- U1 — 3. Requester-specified requirements may include:
chokepoints, critical bridges, water and road junctions,
terrain features that could hamper movement or tactically
endanger friendly or adversary forces (no more
than 10 requirements, no request for scale larger than
1:12,000, and no GEOINT requested larger than 5 km
radius center of mass of target).
- U1 U1 — 4. Maps or charts of the entire OA (overall area chart and
1:50,000s).

- F1 — B. GEOINT for UW. Requester-specified requirements may include: GEOINT of LOCs, major cities, and chokepoints. List items, scales, and radius. Maps or charts of the country (1:1,000,000). Digitally manipulated imagery (such as line-of-sight studies, ground-based views on specific azimuths).

APPENDIX D: SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION (if applicable)

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APPENDIX H
SPECIAL OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS:
INSERTION AND EXTRACTION

(Includes fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, surface ships, subsurface and airborne platforms)

NOTES:

1. PIR Coding for FA, TIP and ISO Planning steps: Priority “1” = essential; “2” = mission enhancing.
2. Enter “NA” for not applicable PIR.
3. Recommend TIP production time (90 days) not be exceeded for intelligence collection: annotate TIP with collection request date, number and agency.
4. Update TIP with collected data upon receipt or annually.

SECTION I: Air Defense

FA TIP ISO

A. Adversary C2 structure.

- | | | | | |
|---|---|---|--|---|
| 2 | 1 | — | | 1. Type of center. |
| 2 | 1 | — | | 2. Location of centers. |
| 2 | 1 | — | | 3. Type of communication assets (landline, radio frequencies, microwave, SATCOM). |
| — | 1 | — | | 4. Doctrine and employment methods. |
| 2 | 2 | 1 | | 5. Authority to direct intercepts and SAM engagements. |
| | | | | 6. Launch authority. |
| — | 1 | — | | a. Who? |
| — | 1 | — | | b. How long? |
| — | 1 | — | | 7. Critical nodes in communications system. |
| — | 2 | 2 | | 8. Reaction to one aircraft in their area. |
| 2 | 2 | 1 | | 9. Defensive capability (AAA, SAM, combat air patrol). |

- 2 1 — 10. Air defense zone boundaries.
- B. Listening/visual reporting posts.
- 1 — — 1. Locations.
- 2 2 2. Hours of operation/shift change times.
- 2 2 3. Status (alert, overall readiness).
- 2 1 — 4. Communications ability.
- 2 1 5. Night vision capabilities.
- 2 1 — 6. Defensive capabilities.
- C. Passive detection devices.
- 1 — — 1. Type.
- 1 — — 2. Location.
- 3. Capabilities.
- a. Equipment reliability.
- b. Operators/limitations.
- 2 1 4. Hours of operation/shift change times.
- 2 1 — 5. Reporting network, procedures (links with direct threats).
- 1 — 6. Defensive capabilities (SAMs, AAA, small arms).
- D. Early warning radars.
- 1 — — 1. Type.
- 1 — — 2. Location.
- a. Site elevation.
- b. Antenna height.
- 2 1 3. Operating frequencies.

			4. Operations.
2	1	—	a. Status.
2	1	—	b. Mobile?
—	2	2	c. Hours/shift change.
—	2	2	d. Down times.
			5. Capabilities.
—	1	—	a. Electronic protection capability.
—	1	—	b. Emission control (EMCON).
—	2	2	c. Operator proficiency.
—	2	1	6. System limitations.
—	2	1	a. METOC-based beam refraction analysis.
—	1	—	7. Communication capabilities.
—	1	—	8. Defenses around radar sites.
			E. Air interceptors/helicopters.
1	—	—	1. Airfield locations.
			2. Aircraft.
1	—	—	a. Type.
1	—	—	b. Number.
1	—	—	c. Armament.
—	2	1	d. Tactics and employment doctrine (low level GCI).
—	2	1	e. GCI dependence and pilot proficiency at attacking a large aircraft.
1	—	—	f. Radar.

- 1 — g. Capabilities.
- 3. Operation.
- 2 2 a. Readiness.
- 2 2 b. Alert status.
- 2 1 c. Response times.
- 1 — 4. Airborne early warning tracks.
- 1 — 5. Combat air patrol locations.
- 1 — 6. Training areas.
- 2 1 — 7. Night capable?
- 2 1 — 8. Identification friend or foe capability.

F. Missile information (SAMs).

- 1 — — 1. Type include model/quantity.
- 1 — — 2. Location.
- 1 — a. Site elevation.
- 1 — b. Antenna height.
- 3. Operations.
- 2 1 a. Status.
- 1 — b. Mobile?
- 2 2 c. Alert/status.
- 2 2 d. Hours/shifts.
- 2 2 e. Down times.
- 2 1 f. Actual frequencies of radars.
- 1 — 4. Tactics/doctrine.

5. Capabilities.

- 2 1 a. Nonstandard capabilities.
- 2 1 b. Electronic protection.
- 1 — c. Night.
- 2 1 d. EMCON.
- 2 1 e. Operator proficiency.
- 2 1 6. Weapons status (free, hold, tight)/reaction time.
- 2 1 7. Limitations.
 - 2 1 a. METOC-based beam refraction analysis.
- 1 — — 8. Number of systems per army unit.

G. AAA information.

- 1 — — 1. Type (both gun and radar).
- 1 — — 2. Locations.
 - 1 — a. Site elevation.
 - 1 — b. Antenna height.
- 3. Operation.
 - 2 1 a. Actual frequencies.
 - 2 1 b. Status.
 - 2 2 c. Alert/status.
 - 2 2 d. Hours/shifts.
 - 2 2 e. Down times.
- 1 — 4. Fire control system.
- 1 — 5. Tactics and doctrine.

- 2 2 6. Capabilities.
 - 2 1 a. Nonstandard.
 - 2 1 b. Electronic protection.
 - 2 1 c. Night.
 - 2 1 d. EMCON.
 - 2 2 e. Operator proficiency.
- 1 — 7. Weapons free/reaction time.
- 2 1 8. Limitations.
 - 2 1 a. METOC-based beam refraction analysis.
- 1 — — 9. Numbers of systems per battalion/brigade/division.

SECTION II: Ground Order of Battle

FA TIP ISO

- 1 — — 1. Units, to include communications systems support link.
- 1 — — 2. Location.
- 1 — — 3. Patrol area.
- 1 — — 4. Composition.
- 2 1 — 5. Associated air defense equipment w/location.
- 2 1 6. Readiness posture.
- 7. Capabilities.
 - 2 2 a. Special.
 - 2 2 b. CBRN.
- 2 1 — 8. Assessment of future movement/location.

SECTION III: Naval Order of Battle

FA TIP ISO

- | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | — | — | 1. Type. |
| 1 | — | — | 2. Location. |
| 1 | — | — | 3. Patrol areas. |
| 1 | — | — | 4. EW radar types/capabilities/limitations/frequencies. |
| — | 2 | 1 | a. METOC-based beam refraction analysis. |
| — | 1 | — | 5. SAM types/capabilities/limitations/frequencies. |
| — | 2 | 1 | a. METOC-based beam refraction analysis. |
| — | 1 | — | 6. AAA types/capabilities/limitations/frequencies. |
| — | 2 | 1 | a. METOC-based beam refraction analysis. |
| — | 2 | 2 | 7. Crew proficiency. |

SECTION IV: Paramilitary/Internal Security Forces

FA TIP ISO

- | | | | |
|---|---|---|--|
| — | 1 | — | 1. Type and size. |
| — | 1 | — | 2. Location. |
| — | 1 | — | 3. Patrol areas. |
| — | 2 | 1 | 4. Organization/command structure. |
| — | 1 | — | 5. Air defense capabilities/locations and links. |
| — | 2 | 2 | 6. Readiness/proficiency. |
| — | 2 | 2 | 7. Operating schedule. |
| — | 2 | 1 | 8. Uniforms/markings. |

9. Capabilities.

— 2 1 a. Special.

— 2 1 b. CBRN.

SECTION V: Planning Materials

FA TIP ISO

1. Charts.

1 — — a. Tactical pilotage charts (TPCs).

2 1 — b. Joint operations graphics (JOGs).

— 1 — c. NGA support.

— 2 1 d. Specials.

2. Imagery.

2 1 — a. OA.

— 2 1 b. Critical en route points (no more than 10).

— 2 1 c. Critical air defense points.

— 2 2 d. Survival, escape and evasion.

3. Analytical Photogrammetric Positioning System data.

— 1 — a. OA.

— 2 1 b. Radar update points.

— 2 1 c. Critical turn points.

4. Joint Information Operations Center nodal analysis information and overlays.

2 1 — a. TPC (detection).

b. JOG.

- | | | | |
|---|---|---|--|
| 2 | 2 | — | (1) Detection. |
| 2 | 1 | — | (2) Kill. |
| | | | 5. Surveys. |
| 2 | 1 | — | a. DZs, LZs, HLZs, and recovery zones (RZs). |

SECTION VI: Physical Characteristics

FA TIP ISO

- | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | | 1. Weather data. |
| 1 | — | — | a. Climatology. |
| 1 | — | — | b. Solar data. |
| 1 | — | — | c. Lunar data (night vision goggles lunar data). |
| — | 2 | 1 | d. Tactical decision aid. |
| — | 2 | 1 | e. Infrared data, best and worst cases. |
| — | — | 1 | f. Unusual weather phenomenon. |
| — | 2 | 2 | 2. Prominent terrain features. |
| — | 1 | — | 3. Location of population, industrial concentrations. |
| — | 2 | — | 4. Location of strategic/choke points. |
| 1 | — | — | 5. Location of usable airfields (3000-4000 feet). |
| — | 1 | — | a. Water. |
| | | | b. POL. |
| — | 1 | — | 6. Location of prominent LOCs
(roads, rail, water, airways, telecommunications). |
| — | 1 | — | 7. Power lines. |

SECTION VII: Survival, Evasion and Escape Information

FA TIP ISO

- 2 1 1. SAFE (wells, food, pickup locations, hazards).
- 2 1 2. Population distribution and probable reaction of US personnel.
- 2 1 3. Location of dissident groups.
- 1 — 4. Travel restrictions, locals and foreign nationals.
- 1 — 5. Ways to blend with the local population.
- 2 — 6. Phone codes to use to contact friendly forces.
- 1 — 7. Evasion charts.
- 2 1 8. Evasion kits.
- 2 1 9. Contents of suggested personal survival kit.
- 2 — 10. Food, water, and shelter.
- 2 — 11. Medical (diseases, plants/animals of medical importance).

SECTION VIII: Intelligence Gaps (Information Still on Request)

SECTION IX: Friendly Forces

FA TIP ISO

- 1. Strike package.
 - 2 1 a. Ingress routes (times, altitudes).
 - 2 1 b. Egress routes (times, altitudes).
 - 2 1 c. Location of control points.
 - 2 1 d. Climb and descent.

- 2 1 2. Defense suppression support available/requested (jamming, destruction, monitor).
- 2 1 3. Combat air patrol location and capability.
- 2 1 4. SIGINT/electronic intelligence support available/requested.
- 2 1 5. Tanker support available/requested.
- 2 1 6. Location of ground forces and air defense assets.
- 2 1 7. Personnel recovery support available and contact procedures.

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APPENDIX J

SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSION PLANNING FOLDER FORMATS

The two types of SOMPF formats are for contingency planning and CAP. The formats are as follows:

1. Contingency Planning Format (used by the theater SOC)

- I. MISSION TASKING PACKAGE.
- II. FEASIBILITY ASSESSMENT (with supporting INITIAL ASSESSMENT).
- III. TARGET INTELLIGENCE PACKAGE.
- IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.
- V. MISSION SUPPORT PLANS.

2. Crisis Action Planning Format (used by a JSOTF during CAP and execution)

- I. REQUEST FOR SUPPORT.
- II. TARGET INTELLIGENCE PACKAGE (as available).
- III. FEASIBILITY ASSESSMENT.
- IV. WARNING ORDER (if necessary).
- V. JFC FRAGMENTARY ORDER.
- VI. CDRJSOTF FRAGMENTARY ORDER.
- VII. MISSION PLANNING AGENT CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.
- VIII. MISSION SUPPORT REQUESTS.
- IX. CDRJSOTF CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (if required based on mission approval level).
- X. JFC CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS APPROVAL (if required based on mission approval level).
- XI. CDRJSOTF CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS APPROVAL.

- XII. MISSION PLANNING AGENT MISSION BACKBRIEF (if required).
- XIII. CDRJSOTF REQUEST FOR EXECUTE ORDER (if required based on mission approval level).
- XIV. JFC EXECUTE ORDER (if required based on mission approval level).
- XV. CDRJSOTF EXECUTE ORDER.
- XVI. MISSION EXECUTION INFORMATION.
- XVII. OPERATION SUMMARY.
- XVIII. MISCELLANEOUS.

APPENDIX K

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FEASIBILITY ASSESSMENT

The FA is an initial determination of the viability of a proposed mission/target for SOF employment. It essentially answers the SOF operational mission criteria questions: **Is it an appropriate SOF mission? Does it support the JFC's OPLANs? Is it operationally feasible? Are required resources available? Does the expected outcome justify the risk?** The method used to answer the above questions is an abbreviated version of mission analysis and COA development, analysis, and selection. The process steps are as described below:

1. **Initiate Special Operations Mission Planning Folder Formats** (see Appendix J)

2. **Conduct Mission Analysis**

a. **Review the Request for Support**

- (1) Who is asking for support?
- (2) What are they asking for?
- (3) When is the support requested?
- (4) Where is support required?
- (5) Why are they asking for support?

b. **Assess Threat/Target Situation**

- (1) Review target IPOE products.
- (2) Conduct detailed target analysis. Use of the CARVER methodology may assist in conducting the analysis.
- (3) Analyze the threat en route to the target, at the target location, and along egress routes.
- (4) Evaluate the adversary's most dangerous COA and threats or contingencies not only at the target but also during ingress and egress.

c. **Determine Known Facts.** Describe the friendly situation. Determine known facts. This determination should:

- (1) Describe the friendly situation of the joint force, JSOTF, components, and other requesting commands.

(2) Describe how this mission relates to the requester's situation.

(3) Describe other facts that may impact on the feasibility of the mission.

d. **Develop Assumptions.** Assumptions replace necessary, but unknown facts. Assumptions must be valid and necessary for planning to continue. Consider support from other government agencies (such as for obtaining overflight rights); ROE changes if required; availability of forces; and political considerations on the mission.

e. **Determine Limitations.** Restrictions that are placed on the JSOTF can include:

(1) Constraints. Required actions (must do) that limit freedom of action (such as coordination required with conventional units).

(2) Restraints. Prohibited actions (cannot do) (as an example, cross border operations that are prohibited until a certain date).

(3) Other. Limitations due to terrain, weather, logistics, political, and other considerations.

f. **Identify Required Tasks**

(1) Identify Specified Tasks (any task specified in the support request).

(2) Identify Implied Tasks (tasks not specifically assigned but must be accomplished to perform the mission).

(3) Identify Essential Tasks (from those listed above, the tasks that define success).

g. **Identify Required and Available Assets and Capabilities.** These include SOF assets required to perform the mission that will be available for mission planning and execution, as well as any deltas in the requirements.

h. **Identify Intelligence Requirements.** As early as possible, the JSOTF and components identify intelligence requirements through collaborative planning. Intelligence requirements that are vital to mission accomplishment are recommended to the CDRJSOTF as PIRs. If the mission is feasible and intelligence does not exist to answer the requirements at the JSOTF level, PIRs are submitted either as RFIs or collection requirements to the joint force.

i. **Assess Risks to SOF**

(1) Identify and assess risks associated with the mission (risks the JFC is willing to take for mission accomplishment, such as forward presence versus risk of provocation); force protection issues (such as high risk of significant casualties, medium risk of fratricide, low risk

of terrorist activities, threat to own COGs, and other risks as determined); and time available as provided by JFC imposed limitations.

(2) The JFC may state or imply acceptable risk (as examples, it could be addressed in the JFC's intent, CONOPS, or as additional guidance).

(3) Estimate risk of collateral damage to noncombatants and non-targeted facilities.

(4) Compare the value of the target to the possible loss of the force and the negative impact to the nation or the theater campaign.

(5) Take into account not only the potential for loss of SOF units and equipment, but also the risks to US diplomatic and political interests should the mission fail.

(6) Assess the risk of failure due to possible inadequate preparation time.

j. **Determine Success Criteria.** State the criteria to measure progress and success. How much (to what degree) do we want to affect adversary activity? The criteria should use quantifiable terms and be realistic. Targeting effects are:

(1) Delay: Slow down the arrival of a unit.

(2) Disrupt: To break apart, disturb, or interrupt a function.

(3) Divert: Divert means to restrict the adversary's capabilities to pursue a particular COA.

(4) Destroy: Damage to a target so that it cannot function as intended nor be restored to a usable condition.

(5) Deny: Hinder the adversary's use of space, personnel, or facilities.

(6) Observe/Collect: Provide timely, relevant and accurate information. State the criteria to measure progress and success in terms that are quantifiable and realistic. Ensure that specified targeting effects can be created.

3. Develop, Analyze, Compare, and Recommend Courses of Action

a. Develop the COA as a broad statement of possible ways the JSOTF can accomplish the mission. COAs can be as simple as force options, or much more complex and detailed. This depends on the type of mission, the expected MPA, and time available. COAs should answer the following six questions:

(1) WHO (type of forces) will execute the tasks?

- (2) WHAT type of action or task is contemplated?
- (3) WHEN will the task begin?
- (4) WHERE will the task occur?
- (5) WHY (for what purpose) will each force conduct its part of the operation?
- (6) HOW will the JSOTF employ the available forces?

b. Analyze COAs to identify strengths and weaknesses and further identify many of the elements of execution planning for each COA. Compare friendly COAs to reveal which COA has the highest probability of success. The end product of this step is a recommendation to the CDRJSOTF on a COA.

4. Assess Special Operations Operational Criteria

The purpose of the feasibility assessment is to answer the following questions:

- a. Is it an appropriate SO mission?
- b. Does it support the JFC's operational plans?
- c. Is it operationally feasible?
- d. Are required resources available?
- e. Does the expected outcome justify the risk?

APPENDIX L
SPECIAL OPERATIONS INITIAL ASSESSMENT

(Includes fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, surface ships, subsurface and airborne platforms)

The IA provides a basic determination of the viability of the infiltration and exfiltration portion of a proposed SOF mission.

SECTION I: Mission Description (BE number, category code, geographic coordinates, UTM coordinates, map sheets, or other distinguishing means)

SECTION II: Assumptions

SECTION III: Mission Data

- A. Launch base(s), ISBs, and recovery base(s).
- B. LZs, DZs, seaward launch point(s) (SLPs), BLSs, RZs, and seaward recovery point(s) (SRPs).
- C. Abort and emergency divert base(s).
- D. Air refueling track(s) and FARPs.
- E. Flight and seaward approach routes.
 - 1. Ingress.
 - 2. Egress.
 - 3. Orbiting and holding.
- F. Range factors.
- G. Time factors.
- H. Route factors.
- I. Refueling factors.
- J. Crew factors.
- K. METOC (atmospheric, oceanographic, riverine, solar effects).

SECTION IV: Mission Assessment

- A. Threat.
 - 1. Air defenses.
 - 2. Deception of air defenses.
 - 3. Surface and/or subsurface water defenses.
 - 4. Ground defenses.
- B. Probability of team insertion.
- C. Probability of team resupply.
- D. Probability of team extraction.
- E. Overall probability of mission success.
- F. Other factors.

SECTION V: Limiting Factors

- A. Intelligence.
- B. Weather.
- C. Terrain and hydrography.
- D. Equipment.
- E. Munitions.
- F. Tactics.
- G. Logistics (including combat service support).
- H. Personnel.
- I. Training.
- J. Supporting forces.
- K. ROE and legal issues.

- L. Other factors.

SECTION VI: Supporting Data

- A. GEOINT requested.
- B. Intelligence information requested.
- C. Other information as necessary.

SECTION VII: Initial Assessment Board

- A. Composition.
- B. Recommendation.

(NOTE: Some of the information may not readily be available. Information on hand normally will suffice to conduct the IA. However, all effort should be made to obtain the above information and incorporate it into the IA.)

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APPENDIX M

SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSION TASKING PACKAGE

The MTP provides documentation and guidance provided by the CDRJSOTF to the MPA that provides basic guidance for target planning. It contains the tasking and administrative framework within which a given SOF target is planned.

SECTION I: Tasking and Transmittal Documents

- A. Tasking to CDRJSOTF.
- B. Subordinate tasking from CDRJSOTF.
- C. Coordinating instructions or DIRLAUTH.

SECTION II: Target Identification Data

- A. Name.
- B. BE number (or other distinguishing identification if BE number does not apply).
- C. Mission number (if applicable).
- D. Mission tasks.
- E. Functional classification code.
- F. Country.
- G. JSOA coordinates (geographic reference [GEOREF] and universal transverse mercator [UTM]).
- H. Geographic coordinates (GEOREF and UTM).
- I. General description and target significance.

SECTION III: JFC Mission Guidance (JFC's Mission Statement, Objectives, and Intent)

- A. Mission statement.
- B. Specific targeting objectives.
- C. Commander's intent.

D. C2.

E. ROE.

SECTION IV: Record of Changes

SECTION V: Record of Distribution

APPENDIX N

SPECIAL OPERATIONS TARGET INTELLIGENCE PACKAGE

As part of the SO mission planning folder, the J-2 is responsible for preparing TIPs with the support of the theater JIOC to support the targeting and mission planning process. TIPs provide information on target identification, environment, threat, demographics, LOCs, infiltration and exfiltration routes, survival data, and other intelligence information required for study by the SOF unit assigned the mission. Examples of TIPs for SR/DA and FID/UW missions are provided on the following pages.

TARGET INTELLIGENCE PACKAGE SR/DA MISSIONS

1. TARGET IDENTIFICATION AND DESCRIPTION

- a. Target identification data.
- b. Description and significance.
- c. Detailed target description.
- d. Target vulnerability assessment.

2. NATURAL ENVIRONMENT

- a. Geographic data (including terrain, vegetation, and hazards to movement).
- b. Meteorological data (climatological overview and tables, illumination data).
- c. Hydrographic data (coastal, waterways, lakes, lunar illumination, etc.).

3. THREAT

- a. Ground forces (including border guards).
- b. Paramilitary and indigenous forces (including intelligence and security police services).
- c. Naval forces (including Coast Guard and maritime border guard).
- d. Air forces.
- e. Air defense forces (including radar, passive detectors).
- f. Electronic order of battle.

g. Space capabilities (ground stations and their infrastructure, uplinks and downlinks, and space-based systems).

h. Other.

4. DEMOGRAPHICS AND CULTURAL FEATURES

a. Area population characteristics.

b. Languages, dialects, and ethnic composition.

c. Social conditions.

d. Religious factors.

e. Political characteristics.

f. Economic conditions.

g. Miscellaneous (e.g., currency, holidays, dress, customs).

5. LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS

a. Airfields.

b. Railways.

c. Roadways.

d. Waterways.

e. Ports.

f. POL.

g. Power grid.

h. Public information media and telecommunications (print, radio, television, telephone, Internet, etc.).

6. INFILTRATION AND EXFILTRATION

a. Potential LZs, DZs, HLZs, and BLSs.

b. Chokepoints between insertion point(s) and objective.

7. SURVIVAL, EVASION, RESISTANCE, ESCAPE, RECOVERY AND SURVIVAL DATA

- a. Survival, evasion, resistance, escape, recovery and safe areas.
- b. Survival data.

8. UNIQUE INTELLIGENCE (Mission specific requirements not covered elsewhere)

9. INTELLIGENCE SHORTFALLS

APPENDIX A: BIBLIOGRAPHY

APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY

APPENDIX C: GEOINT

APPENDIX D: SCI (if applicable)

**TARGET INTELLIGENCE PACKAGE
FID/UW MISSIONS**

1. OBJECTIVE AREA IDENTIFICATION AND DESCRIPTION

- a. OA identification data.
- b. Description and significance.

2. NATURAL ENVIRONMENT

- a. Geographic data (including terrain, hazards to movement).
- b. Meteorological data (climatological overview tables and illumination data).
- c. Hydrographic data (coastal, waterways, lakes, etc.).
- d. Water sources (color coded overlay).
- e. Flora and fauna (plants and animals of tactical importance).

3. THREAT

- a. Objective country (enemy order of battle).

- b. Opposition and resistance forces.

4. DEMOGRAPHICS, CULTURAL, POLITICAL, SOCIAL FEATURES

a. PIRs must be answered for both the objective country and opposition and resistance forces.

- b. Area population characteristics (including resistance potential).

- c. Languages, dialects, and ethnic composition.

- d. Social conditions.

- e. Religious factors.

- f. Political characteristics.

- g. Available labor force.

- h. Customs (social, weapons, religion, cultural, mores, etc.).

- i. Medical capabilities.

- j. Health and sanitation conditions.

- k. Economic conditions.

- l. Currency, holidays, dress.

5. LINES OF COMMUNICATION, INFORMATION SYSTEMS, AND LOGISTICS

- a. Airfields.

- b. Railways.

- c. Roadways.

- d. Waterways.

- e. Ports.

APPENDIX O MISSION SUPPORT PLANS

(Includes fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, surface ships, and submarines)

Mission support plans complement the CONOPS. The mission support plan is written by the supporting agency that will be tasked to conduct the insertion or exfiltration should the mission be tasked.

SECTION I: Mission

- A. Target identification data.
- B. Mission statement.

SECTION II: Mission Summary

- A. Mission tasking.
- B. OA.
- C. General concept.
- D. Summary of limiting factors.
- E. Probability of mission success.

SECTION III: Assumptions

SECTION IV: Threat Assessment

SECTION V: Navigation and Overall Mission Portrayal

NOTE: This represents the entire infiltration and exfiltration route from launch to recovery on a suitable scale chart annotating all information deemed necessary by the planning cell for portrayal of the mission. This should include, but is not limited to, the following:

- A. Launch base(s).
- B. ISB(s).
- C. LZ(s), DZ(s), RZ(s), SLP(s), BLS(s), and SRP(s).
- D. Recovery base(s).
- E. Abort and/or emergency divert base(s).

F. Air refueling track(s) and FARPs.

G. Routes.

1. Ingress.

2. Egress.

3. Orbiting and holding.

4. Safe passage procedures.

5. Strip charts, navigation logs, global positioning satellite receivers, and other aids (as required).

SECTION VI: Supporting Plans

A. Overall schedule of events.

B. Prelaunch requirements.

1. Updates to orders of battle.

2. PIR.

3. Problem areas and key factors.

C. Insert and extract platform(s) factors and logistic considerations.

D. Communications Systems Support.

1. Security preparations.

2. Departure procedures (overt or deception procedures).

3. Communications equipment requirements.

a. Insertion and extraction platform(s).

b. TSOC/JSOTF.

4. Specialized operational procedures and techniques.

5. Radio silence areas.

6. Go and/or no-go point.
 7. Publish JCEOI for air mission.
 8. Deception.
- E. Emergency procedures.
1. Engine-out capability.
 2. Weather.
 3. Faulty intelligence.
 4. Insertion and extraction platform(s) abort procedures.
 - a. Late departure procedures.
 - b. Maintenance problems.
 - c. Battle damage.
 - d. Platform destruction.
 - e. Bump plan.
 5. Drop tank or other fuel-related malfunctions.
 6. Lost communications procedures.
 7. Mission abort procedures.
- F. Evasion plan of action.
1. Crew/embarked personnel responsibilities.
 2. Immediate actions upon sinking, ditching, or bailout.
 3. Evasion movement.
 4. SAFE area intelligence descriptions.
 5. SAFE.
 6. Evasion team communications.

7. Personnel recovery contact procedures.

SECTION VII: Limiting Factors

- A. Intelligence.
- B. Weather.
- C. Equipment.
- D. Munitions.
- E. Tactics.
- F. Logistics (including combat service support and hazardous material).
- G. Personnel.
- H. Training.
- I. Supporting forces.
- J. ROE and legal issues.
- K. CI environment.
- L. Other factors.

SECTION VIII: SO Aviation, Surface Ship, and Submarine Requirements for JSOTF Components to Conduct IAs

- A. Target coordinates.
- B. Maximum and minimum distances the LZs, DZs, SLPs, BLSs, RZs, and SRPs can be from the target.
- C. Time frame in OPLAN or CONPLAN scenario.
- D. Desired launch and recovery base(s).
- E. Type of delivery or recovery required (e.g., airdrop, airland, fast rope, SDV, combat rubber raiding craft), and platform preferred.
- F. Number of personnel to be transferred and approximate weight per person.

- G. Approximate size and weight of additional equipment.
- H. Type and quantity of hazardous material (such as gasoline, lithium batteries).
- I. Assumptions made during supported unit's FA and CONOPS.
- J. Desired time over target.
- K. Resupply and/or extraction requirements.

(NOTE: Some of the information may not be readily available. Information in hand normally will suffice to conduct the CONOPS. However, all efforts should be made to obtain the above information and incorporate it into the CONOPS.)

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APPENDIX P

STANDARD SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSION DESIGNATION

1. Purpose and Scope

This appendix provides a convention for assigning discrete SO mission numbers. These numbers are assigned by the JSOTF, announced in the planning order or TASKORD, and are used by SO HQ to track missions.

2. General

The standard format serves two purposes. At the most basic level, it allows an individual to ascertain quickly certain basic aspects of the mission. During heavy activity, this saves time, reduces confusion, and facilitates effective coordination. On a broader level, standardizing mission designation means that staff augmentees or liaisons do not need to master a different system for each TSOC or JSOTF.

3. Operations Security

Planning documents listing SO missions should be classified and limited to those with a need to know, as the shifting emphasis in SO activity may foretell other operations (surge of SR in preparation for an advance, for example). Missions within the mainstream of operations may still be masked by a notional designator, if necessary. Exceptionally sensitive missions should be compartmented and kept within discrete special category channels.

4. Basic Format

The standard mission designation for SO have three components: mission designator, operational unit designator, and mission support designator. For example, the mission “UW041/ODA101/ADI010” may be separated as follows.

a. **Mission Designator.** The first set of characters indicates the type of mission and assigned number. Numbers need not be in numerical order, but they must be discrete. In this example, “UW041” designates unconventional warfare mission number forty-one. Mission code examples are listed in Figure P-1.

b. **Operational Unit Designator.** The middle set of characters designate the mission’s primary executor. In the example, this is Special Forces Operational Detachment ODA101. The MPA designates this unit and adds it to the mission designation. Some common SOF units are listed in Figure P-2.

c. **Mission Support Designator.** The last set of characters refers to mission support action (infiltration, resupply, exfiltration, etc.). The first three characters are determined during CONOPS development and are identified by the MPA. The mission supporting agency provides the

Mission Designator Codes			
CAO	Civil Affairs Operations	IO	Information Operations
CBT	Combatting Terrorism	NEO	Noncombatant Evacuation
CD	Counterdrug Activities	PO	Psychological Operations
CMO	Civil-Military Operations	PR	Personnel Recovery
CP	Coastal Patrol and Interdiction	SA	Security Assistance
CS	Coalition Support	SO	Special Operation (Other)
DA	Direct Action	SR	Special Reconnaissance
FHA	Foreign Humanitarian Assistance	TG	Terminal Guidance
FID	Foreign Internal Defense	UW	Unconventional Warfare
HD	Humanitarian Demining	WMD	Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Figure P-1. Mission Designator Codes

OPERATIONAL UNIT DESIGNATOR CODES			
CAA	Combat Aviation Advisors	SAB	SOA Battalion
CAB	CA Battalion	SAC	SOA Company
CAC	CA Company	SBU	Special Boat Unit Detachment
CAPT	CA Planning Team	SDV	SEAL Delivery Vehicle Platoon
CAT	CA Team	SFG	SF Group
CCE	SO Command & Control Element	SOD	SO Detachment
CRD	Chemical Reconnaissance Detachment	SOE	SO Element
DDS	Dry Deck Shelter Platoon	SOL	SO Liaison Element
FMTU	Foreign Military Training Unit	SOS	SO Squadron
MCT	Mobile Communications Team	SOW	SO Wing
MSOB	Marine Special Operations Battalion	SQD	SEAL Squad
MSOC	Marine Special Operations Company	STG	Special Tactics Group
MSOSG	Marine Special Operations Support Group	STS	Special Tactics Squadron
ODA	SF Operational Detachment A	STT	Special Tactics Team
ODB	SF Operational Detachment B (Company HQ)	TPD	Tactical PSYOP Detachment
ODC	SF Operational Detachment C (Battalion HQ)	TPDD	Tactical PSYOP Development Detachment
OTA	Support Operations Team A	Hull #	Maritime Vessel
PDD	PSYOP Development Detachment	Tail #	Individual Aircraft
PLT	SEAL Platoon	CA	Civil Affairs
POB	PSYOP Battalion	HQ	Headquarters
POC	PSYOP Company	PSYOP	Psychological Operations
POG	PSYOP Group	SEAL	Sea-Air-Land Team
RAB	Ranger Battalion	SF	Special Forces
RAC	Ranger Company	SO	Special Operations
RAR	Ranger Regiment	SOA	SO Aviation

Figure P-2. Operational Unit Designator Codes

remainder of the characters, representing the supporting mission number (normally sequential). In the example, “ADI010” indicates airdrop infiltration mission number ten. Figure P-3 lists some commonly used codes.

Mission Support Designator Codes			
ABC	Airborne Command & Control	MIS	Mine Search
ADI	Infiltration (Airdrop)	MPU	Message Pickup
ADS	Resupply (Airdrop)	LFD	Leaflet Drop
ALE	Exfiltration (Airdrop)	LOG	Logistic Support
ALI	Infiltration (Airland)	LSB	Loudspeaker Broadcast
ALS	Resupply (Airland)	OLE	Exfiltration (Overland)
ARC	Armed Reconnaissance	OLI	Infiltration (Overland)
ASR	Air-Sea Rendezvous	OLS	Resupply (Overland)
BTE	Beacon Emplacement	OSR	Offshore Sea Recovery and Rendezvous
CAE	Cache Employment	OTR	Other
CAS	Close Air Support	PRS	Photo-Recce Support
DST	Diver Support	SEC	Security
GRF	Ground Refueling	SR	Surveillance and Reconnaissance
HAR	Helicopter Air Refueling	TAS	Tactical Air Support
IFR	Inflight Refueling	TEW	Tactical Electronic Warfare
MAE	Exfiltration (Maritime)		
MAS	Resupply (Maritime)		
MAI	Infiltration (Maritime)		

Figure P-3. Mission Support Designator Codes

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APPENDIX Q EXECUTION CHECKLIST

1. Purpose

This appendix provides the format and procedures for preparing and using an execution checklist for monitoring of a CDRJSOTF directed mission. The checklist reflects the detailed sequence of events necessary for mission execution according to the approved CONOPS. The approved checklist has the effect of an order. Reports rendered in accordance with the checklist keep the CDRJSOTF informed of the current status of the mission from the launch of the first element to the recovery of the last element.

2. Procedures

The execution checklist is a sequential list of all key actions associated with mission execution and the codewords or alphanumeric characters assigned to each action. As each action is completed, designated personnel transmit the codeword or alphanumeric character over a specified frequency to a specified station, normally the JOC or airborne battlefield C2 center. Some codewords or alphanumeric characters, such as those for an aborted landing or early compromise of the mission, are transmitted only by exception. To preclude minimize message transmissions, other stations in the net monitor all transmissions to obtain operational information. These stations do not acknowledge any report unless it is directed to them.

a. Events labeled “M” (mandatory) on the checklist require a report when the event occurs or if the event cannot or has not been accomplished as scheduled.

b. Events labeled “X” (by exception) on the checklist require a report only if the event occurs.

c. Reports are rendered by call sign, codeword or alphanumeric character, and time event occurred (for example, “TANGO 35, THIS IS BRAVO 40, GOOSE AT 2136”).

d. When inquiring about the status of an event, use only the line number for the event. If the event has not occurred to plan, the appropriate codeword for the situation should be used in the response. Examples of exception codewords might include TURTLE = event delayed or PYTHON = event aborted (for example, “TANGO 35, THIS IS BRAVO 40, SAY STATUS OF LINE 101 – BRAVO 40, THIS IS TANGO 35, LINE 101 IS TURTLE 20 MINUTES”).

e. Figure Q-1 shows a simplified sample execution checklist.

SAMPLE EXECUTION CHECKLIST						
EVENT NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	TYPE	CALL (TO)	SIGN (FROM)	CODE WORD	TIME
100	SF RECON TM IN POSITION	M/CMP	T35	W28	BUZZARD	0145
101	SEAL TM IN POSITION	M/CMD	T35	B40	GOOSE	0150
102	#1 MC-130 DEPARTS MOB	M/CMP	T35	R06	CHICKEN	0200
103	#2 MC-130 DEPARTS MOB	M/CMD	T35	C06	MARTIN	0400
104	RGR CO TOT	M/CMD	T35	C06	EAGLE	0400
105	AIRDROP	X/CMD	T35	C06	VULTURE	0400

Figure Q-1. Sample Execution Checklist

APPENDIX R SPECIAL ACTIONS

1. General

a. When established, the JSOTF normally will deploy and stand up a special actions cell (SAC) located within the J-33 to handle sensitive staff actions and operations that exceed the abilities of normal staff channels due to their handling and classification levels. Although normally organized under the JSOTF J-3 the SAC will usually establish its operations within the confines of the J-2's sensitive compartmented information facility due to requirements of the communication, storage, and data processing systems required to handle the materials the SAC uses. In combined operations the SAC will often handle issues (not releasable to foreign nationals) that cannot be handled in normal staff channels because of the integration of coalition staff within the JSOTF.

b. Special Actions

(1) Special actions are those functions that due to particular sensitivities, compartmentation, or caveats cannot be conducted in normal staff channels and therefore require extraordinary processes and procedures. These actions are frequently interagency in nature, involve sensitive capabilities, and almost always not releasable to coalition partners or allies.

(2) Often special actions remain compartmented throughout planning but in many cases are downgraded and handled as normal functions once operations commence. Special actions require involvement of most staff directorates.

c. Special Actions Versus Special Activities

(1) Special activities are those activities conducted in support of national foreign policy objectives that are planned and executed so that the role of the US Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly.

(2) Special actions missions are not intended to influence US political processes, public opinion, policies, or media and do not include diplomatic activities or the collection and production of intelligence or related support functions.

2. Joint Special Operations Task Force Special Actions Cell

a. **Duties and Responsibilities.** The JSOTF SAC is responsible for conducting liaison, planning, and monitoring missions and programs that require some level of classified compartmented control, involve interagency integration, or are highly sensitive in nature. The SAC does not control intelligence functions that are the normal purview of the JSOTF J-2, but coordinates special actions closely with the J-2 functions. Generally, the SAC will be responsible for the following functions:

- (1) Compartmented planning support.
- (2) Interagency/special mission unit (SMU) operational integration.
- (3) Advanced special operations (ASO).
- (4) Special operational support.
- (5) STO.
- (6) Nonconventional assisted recovery (NAR).
- (7) Compartmented information management.

b. **Organization and Manning.** Manning the SAC is directly related to the missions assigned to the JSOTF. When determining the manning requirements for the special actions cell, the JSOTF J-3 must consider developing the joint manning document (JMD) around the core personnel who already make up the garrison SAC. See Figure R-1 for a notional core garrison special actions cell. Additionally, the core SAC must be manned with several personnel that have had advanced special operations techniques Level II & III training. Personnel who are in the NAR section should attend the required training provided by the US Joint Forces Command, Joint Personnel Recovery Agency. The JMD must be robust enough to support operations on a nonstop basis over an extended period of time.




Figure R-1. Notional Special Actions Cell

3. Special Actions Cell Functional Areas

a. Compartmented Planning Support to the JPG

(1) Composition of the JPG varies depending on the planning activities. However, the SAC representation to the JPG should be a long-term assignment within the life cycle of the JSOTF to provide continuity and consistency. The SAC representative(s) should be authorized spokespersons for the special actions cell. The SAC planners are also responsible for keeping the special actions chief informed of potential emerging missions that may require the functional expertise of the SAC.

(2) In some instances, compartmented planning support is required when the planning effort has operational aspects that are protected within focal point systems and/or special access programs. In instances such as these, it is appropriate for a smaller group to work on developing the planning products necessary for the JSOTF to accomplish the mission. In this case a small special planning cell would form with the SAC planner designated as the lead planner. If other staff planners are required as planning progresses, the lead planner indoctrinates them as required and then adds these personnel to the group as appropriate. There may be several special planning cells working concurrently. These cells are coordinated through the efforts of the JPG chief and during meetings of the full JPG.

b. Interagency and Special Mission Unit Operational Integration. When in support of interagency operations, the SAC ensures the CDRJSOTF and JFC and respective staffs have the required visibility of the regional support activities, battlespace management of personnel, personnel recovery mechanisms, fires integration, training, and combat operations. The complicated and nonlinear nature of the modern battlespace dictates that all US capabilities, not just military forces, be integrated into the commander's situational awareness on a level that precludes fratricide and optimizes efficiencies. Often SMUs and interagency partners will not have a robust C2 capability with the ability to integrate into the JFC's battlespace management systems. This is complicated by the need to restrict knowledge of operations or even the existence of a US presence in certain areas of the battlespace at given times. To alleviate this, the SAC will often serve as the conduit between the battlespace management systems and those compartmented capabilities serving within the JOA. Typically the SAC will coordinate with the JSOTF JFE in the JSOTF JOC to ensure that restricted fire measures are incorporated for those elements as required. The SAC may also provide friendly force track input to the JSOTF common operational picture manager to ensure those compartmented elements are represented. In either case the SAC will provide guidance to the JFE and COP manager on how the elements are to be portrayed and who will have access to that feed in order to protect their identities, capabilities, and activities. Compartmented elements that are coordinated through the SAC often will lack organic personnel recovery and tactical fires elements as well. The SAC will often be the entry point for coordination of PR support to compartmented elements. Typically the SAC will coordinate that support through the JOC JPRC. The SAC will often have a critical role in the coordination of interagency/SMU support; both to the JFC and SOF support to the interagency/SMUs. There are established procedures for DOD to provide support to sensitive interagency activities. When designated, the SAC serves as the commander's defense sensitive support office (DSSO). The processes

and procedures for this function exceed the classification level of this publication. The SAC should contact the appropriate TSOC for guidance on requesting and supporting sensitive interagency requirements. When designated as the command's DSSO, the SAC may have a majority of its manpower dedicated to those staff actions alone, depending on the level of interagency participation in the operation. Other related special actions functions are also closely tied to operational interagency and SMU integration. NAR and compartmented planning support are often very heavily influenced by interagency and SMU capabilities. The SAC will often have the responsibility to coordinate training between sensitive interagency or SMUs and JSOTF assets in order to support mission requirements.

c. Advanced Special Operations

(1) Advanced SO may take place during UW missions. UW are a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by SOF. UW includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape.

(2) JSOTF ASO require a solid relationship between the JSOTF SAC and the JSOTF J-2 so that information gathered from JSOTF HUMINT assets (military support operations [MSO]) can be quickly and formally distributed to the JFC J-2X. The JSOTF J-2 may choose to collocate the JSOTF CI officer with the SAC to optimize the relationship between HUMINT MSO and SOF CI operations or may choose to place the CI officer in the JSOTF J-2 element. This relationship will facilitate timely reporting between the JSOTF and the JFC CI and HUMINT element of the J-2 (J-2X). JSOTF HUMINT reporting is essential so that the JFC J-2X can analyze single source HUMINT information and then pass the information to the JFC all-source analysis section thus allowing the JFC to make decisions on a true all-source intelligence picture. Additionally, in order to avoid asset deconfliction concerns, the SAC must establish processes and procedures ensuring that the JFC J-2X is fully apprised of all JSOTF ASO asset databases and requirements.

(3) The SAC officer in charge must develop policies, processes, and procedures to integrate ASO into already established joint and interagency HUMINT, collection, analysis, and production systems.

d. NAR

(1) The JFC has the authority and responsibility to develop a fully integrated, full spectrum personnel recovery plan for those personnel within the joint force command. To fulfill that responsibility the JFC generally tasks the component with the greatest personnel recovery capability, most often in terms of C2 and resources to establish a JPRC and manage the personnel recovery program. The component commander with the greatest capability to manage NAR operations is the CDRJSOTF.

(2) Typically, the CDRJSOTF will be designated the theater executive agent for NAR with the responsibility to the JFC for planning, coordinating, and conducting NAR activities.

(3) NAR includes all forms of personnel recovery conducted by an entity, group of entities, or organizations that are trained and directed to contact, authenticate, support, move, and exfiltrate US military and other designated personnel from enemy-held or hostile areas to friendly control through established infrastructure or procedures.

(4) To be effective the NAR coordinator or unconventional assisted recovery coordination cell (UARCC) chief must:

(a) Ensure that the UARCC be integrated into the theater personnel recovery architecture and the JSOTF C2 architecture. JSOTF communications personnel must incorporate the needs of the NAR forces in their communications plan and provide for compatible and redundant secure voice and data transmissions. Dependent upon the coordinated theater personnel recovery CONOPS, there may be hardware, software and associated training issues to be addressed. The UARCC should conduct parallel planning with the JPRC and be prepared to assume control of the recovery mission, if necessary.

(b) Integrate within the JSOTF JPG and JOC in order to gain and maintain situation awareness of what operations are being planned. With that information, the UARCC can pass information down to tactical elements to anticipate events that may impact those elements. It is a venue to coordinate, deconflict and synchronize NAR operations and support. Without this staff interface, the UARCC, as the principal coordination node for the JFC's personnel recovery plan, is operating in the blind.

(5) Provide staff advice to the CDRJSOTF and the JSOTF J-3 with respect to the development and employment of NAR operations. It must clearly and accurately communicate in a timely manner with the JOC and the personnel recovery architecture. It must coordinate the actions of NAR forces up, down, and laterally. The UARCC must ensure that NAR forces and operations are fully integrated into the JFC's personnel recovery plan. It must ensure that NAR capabilities are deconflicted and synchronized within the entire battlespace. Figure R-2 depicts UARCC tasks.

e. Compartmented Information Management

(1) Compartmented information management (CIM) is defined as the processes by which information is obtained, manipulated, directed, and controlled. CIM includes all processes involved in the creation, collection and control, dissemination, storage and retrieval, protection, and destruction of information within the SAC. CIM is categorized by the following activities: information sharing, collaboration, and, conducted in order to enhance situational awareness to enable the JFC and CDRJSOTF to make informed and timely decisions within the construct of an operational JSOTF. The goal of CIM in the SAC is to provide for the timely flow and use of information, enabling the command to effectively evaluate changing priorities, and to make decisions during rapidly changing conditions. This requires a concise, complete, and well-understood information management plan that is not burdensome to the user.




Figure R-2. Unconventional Assisted Recovery Coordination Cell Tasks

(2) The SAC should appoint an information manager to ensure that proper CIM techniques and procedures are established.

APPENDIX S OPERATIONS MESSAGES

- Annex A Special Operations Tasking Order (SO TASKORD)
- B Concept of Operations (CONOPS)
- C Concept of Operations Approval
- D Support Request (SPTREQ)
- E Support Confirmation (SPTCONF)
- F Air Support Request (AIRSUPREQ)
- G Request Confirmation (REQCONF)
- H Operations Summary (OPSUM)
- I Situation Report (SITREP)
- J Operation Order (OPORD)
- K Fragmentary Order (FRAGORD)

OPERATIONS MESSAGES

1. General

This appendix provides guidance and instructions for drafting the various messages that a JSOTF JOC will produce or receive from the MPA. These messages will be drafted, published, and transmitted IAW procedures established by the JSOTF J-6. Messages provided are to be used as examples. Actual message formats will be IAW Service and/or USSOCOM authoritative directives.

2. Annexes

a. SO TASKORD. The CDRJSOTF uses the SO TASKORD to assign missions to the appropriate SOF component HQ.

b. CONOPS. The supported HQ submits a CONOPS to the CDRJSOTF in response to the original FRAGORD.

c. CONOPS Approval. The CDRJSOTF submits a CONOPS approval to the supported HQ in response to the CONOPS.

d. SPTREQ. The supported HQ submits initial and follow-on SPTREQ to the supporting component HQ.

e. SPTCONF. The supporting HQ submits a SPTCONF to the supported HQ, JSOTF, and tasked subordinate units to confirm all details of the SPTREQ except for confirming aircraft.

f. AIRSUPREQ. An AIRSUPREQ is used to request preplanned and immediate CAS, interdiction, reconnaissance, surveillance, escort, helicopter airlift, and other aircraft missions.

g. REQCONF. A REQCONF is used to inform the requesting command, the tasking authority, and the tasked units of action being taken, and to provide additional information about the missions. It is used for both preplanned and immediate air tasking cycles.

h. OPSUM. An OPSUM is provided by the JSOTF component commanders to the CDRJSOTF after post mission recovery and initial debriefing of a SOF tactical element.

i. SITREP. An example of a JSOTF SITREP, which normally covers activities over the last 24 hours and projected activities for the next 48 hours, is provided in this annex.

j. OPOORD. An example of a JSOTF OPOORD to assign missions to subordinate tactical units is provided in this annex.

k. FRAGORD. The CDRJSOTF uses the FRAGORD to issue new or different guidance or changes to a published OPOORD, without restating the information provided in the basic order.

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ANNEX A TO APPENDIX S SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASKING ORDER

1. General

This annex provides guidance and instructions for the TASKORD for all SOF missions. The TSOC will push available information and intelligence down to the supported unit; if mission essential information is currently available, it will be forwarded with the TASKORD.

2. TASKORD

The JSOTF uses the TASKORD to assign missions to the appropriate SOF component HQ (ARSOF, NAVSOF, MARSOF, or AFSOF). Missions contained within a TASKORD or other controlling directive should be referenced, rather than repeated. The TASKORD should be transmitted immediately after the conclusion of the JSOTF mission analysis and completion of its preparation. Upon transmission, the tasked component becomes the supported component. The TASKORD designates the MPA (MPA = supported unit), supporting agencies, and the IPA; grants DIRLAUTH; and establishes an earliest anticipated launch time (EALT). Acknowledgment of the TASKORD is required.

3. Special Operations Mission Numbers

The assigned mission will be identified throughout the SO mission planning process by a specific mission identification number. The CDRJSOTF normally assigns or allocates SOF mission designator sets to subordinate components to support mission analysis and specific C2 requirements of SOF elements for mission execution.

4. Procedures for TASKORD

- a. Sent By: JSOTF.
- b. Sent To: Supported HQ.
- c. When Sent: As soon as possible (ASAP) but ideally not later than (NLT) 96 hours prior to the start of the air tasking day in which the supporting air mission occurs.
- d. Responds To: N/A.
- e. Expected Response: CONOPS NLT 24 hours after receipt of TASKORD by the MPA.

5. TASKORD Format (minimum overall classification is Confidential)

- a. Baseline Format
 - (1) Basic Message Name. ORDER.

(2) Message Identification (MSGID). ORDER.

(3) Order Type (ORDTYP). TASKORD.

(4) Mandatory Data Sets. MSGID, ORDTYP, TIMEZONE, Acknowledge Message (AKNLDG).

b. Special Instructions

(1) **SITUATION**

(a) **Enemy Forces.** Express this information in terms of two enemy echelons below yours (for instance, corps address brigades; battalions address platoons). Describe the enemy's most likely and most dangerous COA. Include an assessment of terrorist activities directed against USG interests in the area of operations. Refer to Annex B (Intelligence) or the current intelligence estimate or intelligence summary. If you need to reference more sources, use the final subparagraph to refer the reader to the documentation.

(b) **Friendly Forces.** Include the mission, the commander's intent, and CONOPS for HQ one and two levels up. Subparagraphs state the missions of flank units and other units whose actions would have a significant bearing on the issuing HQ.

(c) **Attachments and Detachments.** List units attached to, or detached from, subordinate units of the JSOTF.

(2) **MISSION.** State the mission derived during the planning process. There are no subparagraphs in a mission statement. The mission statement will cover on-order missions. (NOTE: This is the mission of the unit issuing the order.)

(3) **EXECUTION.** Intent: State the commander's intent derived during the planning process:

(a) **Concept of Operations.** Summarize what the JSOTF wants the mission to accomplish without specifying how to do it. Provide the JSOTF commander's intent and the desired effects. Avoid excessive detail that may limit the MPA's planning. Do not make assumptions regarding techniques.

(4) **SUBORDINATE TASKS.** List tasks by component, with each component receiving its own paragraph. List tasks common to two or more components under coordinating instructions. Designate the MPA and supporting agencies. Establish suspense for CONOPS submission.

(5) **COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.** Establish the EALT and state any other instructions for coordination when the mission will be joint and/or involve conventional forces.

Include essential elements of information (EEIs), safety guidance, ROE, and other planning limitations when applicable. Include specific points of contact when possible.

(6) **GENERAL TEXT (GENTEXT)/ADMINISTRATION (ADMIN) AND LOGISTICS (LOG).** State the applicable administrative and logistic support arrangements. Refer to OPOD annexes when appropriate.

(7) **GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL.** Indicate any changes to the communications and electronics (C&E) policy, HQ locations, code words, code names, and liaison. If no change, indicate “NO CHANGE.”

(8) **ACKNOWLEDGE.** Include instructions for the acknowledgement of the plan or order by addressees. The word acknowledge may suffice or you may refer to the message.

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ANNEX B TO APPENDIX S CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

1. General

This annex provides guidance and instructions for the CONOPS for all SOF missions.

2. CONOPS

The supported headquarters submits a CONOPS to the JSOTF in response to the original TASKORD. The supported headquarters should also send its SPTREQ, AIRSUPREQ and the ACMREQ at the same time to the appropriate supporting component. The CONOPS should be sent within 24 hours of receipt of the TASKORD from the JSOTF J-35. The CONOPS provides the MPA's CONOPS in sufficient detail for the JSOTF to evaluate the concept and approve it for execution planning.

3. SO MISSION NUMBER

The assigned mission will be identified throughout the SO mission planning process by a specific mission identification number. (See Annex C).

4. CONOPS

a. Sent By: Supported HQ (MPA).

b. Sent To: JSOTF J-35.

c. When Sent: ASAP within 24 hours of receipt of TASKORD.

d. Responds To: TASKORD.

e. Expected response: JSOTF J-35 sends CONOPS approval (MCA) ASAP after receipt of CONOPS (normally within 8 hours).

5. CONOPS Format (minimum overall classification is Confidential).

a. Baseline Format

(1) Basic Message Name. ORDER.

(2) MSGID. ORDER.

(3) ORDTYP. CONOPS.

Mandatory Data Sets. MSGID, ORDTYP, TIMEZONE, AKNLDG.

b. Special Instructions

(1) **GENTEXT/SITUATION.** State relevant additional information that was not included in the FRAGORD or other references. If no change, state “NO CHANGE.”

(2) **GENTEXT/MISSION.** Provide the MPA’s restated mission as derived during analysis of the FRAGORD. Repeat the mission designator from the FRAGORD.

(3) **GENTEXT/EXECUTION.** Include the following:

(a) **CONOPS.** Enter a general statement of how the commander intends to accomplish the mission, including the major forces involved, time phasing, cross-service support, and necessary coordination.

(b) **SUBUNIT TASKS.** Enter a paragraph for each operational subunit. Include the operational unit designator; time, place, and means of infiltration and exfiltration; and specific mission tasks. This section forms the basis for information transmitted in the accompanying SPTREQ and AIRSUPREQ.

(c) **COORDINATION.** Identify coordination requirements for mission support from other SOF components. Indicate what SPTREQ and AIRSUPREQ have been sent, to whom, and when coordination must be completed. Identify necessary JSOTF assistance.

(d) **OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS.** Include estimate for probability of mission success (high, medium, or low) once in the JSOA. If none, state “NONE.”

(4) **GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG.** State the applicable administrative and logistic support arrangements. Refer to OPORD annexes when appropriate.

(5) **GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL.** Indicate any changes to the C&E policy, HQ locations, codewords, code names, and liaison. If no change, indicate “NO CHANGE.”

c. Notional CONOPS

OPER/ROBIN SAGE//
MSOID/ORDER/COMJSOTF NORTH//
ORDTYP/CONOPS/UW-001//
TIMEZONE/Z//
ORDREF/TASKORD/CDRJSOTF UW-001 AND UW-002//
GENTEXT/SITUATION/NO CHANGE//
GENTEXT/MISSION/

1. () SOTF 9 CONDUCTS JOINT/COMBINED UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN JSOA(S) BATCH AND SUBMIT COMMENCING 081200Z SEP XX IN SUPPORT OF CDRJSOTF OBJECTIVES. ON ORDER CONDUCTS NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION

OPERATIONS TO SECURE AMEMB NORTH PINELAND AND EVACUATE APPROX 260 AMCITS AND AMEMB STAFF FROM AMEMB TO FRIENDLY CONTROL. (UW-001/SFG9 AND UW-002/SFG9)).//

GENTEXT/EXECUTION/

2. () CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: SOTF 9 PLANS, PREPARES, AND CONDUCTS SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSIONS WITH FOB 91, FOB 92, 1/75TH RGR , AND AFSOB

3. ON NIGHT 09/10 SEP XX SOTF ELEMENT ESTABLISHES STAGING BASE AT US NAS RIO BRAVO TO SUPPORT SPECIAL OPERATIONS WITH A COMBINATION OF JOINT AND COMMON SERVICING

A. () FOB 91: ON NIGHT 10/11 SEP XX, FOB 91 INFILTRATES SF DETS (ODA 911/913/914) BY MC-130 AC TO CONDUCT UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN JSOA BATCH TO ORGANIZE, TRAIN, ADVISE, ASSIST, AND PROVIDE LIMITED EQUIPMENT TO RESISTANCE FORCES TO SUPPORT ACTIVITIES WITHIN NORTH PINELAND, AND TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF FUTURE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS BY PINELAND FORCES AND AGAINST OPFORLAND FORCES; EXTRACT BY MH-60 ON ORDER.

B. () FOB 92: ON 130030Z SEP XX, FOB 92 INFILTRATES SF DETS (ODA's 942, 944, 951) BY MC-130 TO CONDUCT UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN JSOA SUBMIT TO ORGANIZE, TRAIN, ADVISE, ASSIST, AND PROVIDE LIMITED EQUIPMENT TO RESISTANCE FORCES TO SUPPORT ACTIVITIES WITHIN NORTH PINELAND, AND TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF FUTURE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS BY PINELAND FORCES AND AGAINST OPFORLAND FORCES; EXTRACT BY MH-60 ON ORDER.

C. () 1/75 RGR: ON ORDER, GROUND TASK FORCE (TF RANGER) AIR ASSAULTS INTO AMEMB COMPOUND BY MH-53 TO SECURE COMPOUND PERIMETER AND EVACUATE APPROX 260 AMCITS AND AMEMB STAFF USING SAME AIRCRAFT. AFSOB AC-130 AIRCRAFT PROVIDE CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AS REQUIRED. SEPARATE CONOP TO FOLLOW WITH DETAILED EXECUTION MATRIX ONCE TASKORD RECEIVED.

3. () 3RD SOW: INFILTRATE 6 EACH SF UW TEAMS BY MC-130 AND EXTRACT BY MH-60. INSERT AND EXTRACT AIR ASSAULT RGR GROUND TASK FORCE BY 9 EACH MH-53 INTO AMEMB COMPOUND AND EVACUATE AMCITS AND AMEMB STAFF TO STAGING BASE. PROVIDE AC-130 CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AS REQUIRED. BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT CSAR.

4. () COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:

A. () SPTREQ 001/081601/SEP AND 002/081701/SEP.

B. () AIRSUPREQ 001/081602/SEP AND 002/081523/SEP.

C. () ASSIGNED ARSOTF 9 MISSION DESIGNATORS BASED UPON SOTF 9 MISSION ANALYSIS.

(1) JSOA BATCH DIVIDED INTO THREE SEPARATE JSOA(S).

(A) UW-101/ODA 911/JSOA ARMOR.

(B) UW-102/ODA 913/JSOA BADGE.

(C) UW-103/ODA 914/JSOA CAPER.

(2) JSOA SUMIT DIVIDED INTO THREE SEPARATE JSOA(S).

(A) UW-201/ODA 942/JSOA DEMON.

(B) UW-202/ODA 944/JSOA EATON.

(C) UW-203/ODA 951/JSOA FLUKE.

5. () OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS:

A. AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF
UW-001 AND UW-002 NOT RECEIVED.

B. PROBABILITY OF MISSION SUCCESS - HIGH.//

AKNLDG/NO//

DECL/OADR//

ANNEX C TO APPENDIX S CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS APPROVAL

1. General

This annex provides guidance and instructions for CONOPS approval for all SOF missions.

2. CONOPS Approval

The JSOTF submits a CONOPS approval to the supported HQ in response to the CONOPS. The response could approve or modify the CONOPS. The CONOPS approval is sent ASAP after receipt of the supported HQ CONOPS (normally within 8 hours). The JFC may delegate CONOPS approval to CDRJSOTF or may reserve that responsibility for the JFC.

3. Special Operations Mission Numbers

The assigned mission will be identified throughout the SO mission planning process by a specific mission identification number.

4. Procedure for CONOPS Approval

- a. Sent By: JSOTF.
- b. Sent To: Supported HQ (MPA).
- c. When Sent: ASAP after receipt of supported HQ CONOPS (normally within 8 hours).
- d. Responds To: CONOPS.
- e. Expected Response: None.

5. CONOPS Approval Format (minimum overall classification is Confidential)

- a. Baseline Format
 - (1) Basic Message Name. ORDER.
 - (2) MSGID. ORDER.
 - (3) ORDTYP. Other (OTH).
 - (4) Mandatory Data Sets. MSGID, ORDTYP, Order Reference (ORDREF), AKNLDG.

b. Special Instructions

(1) **ORDTYP.** Use EXORD if order constitutes approval to execute mission. Use OTH if mission is cancelled or authority is given to continue execution planning and preparation pending execution authority.

(2) **ORDREF.** Reference the CONOPS message that the CONOPS approval approves, cancels, or modifies.

(3) **GENTEXT/SITUATION.** Briefly state additional general situation information significant to this message. If no change, state “NO CHANGE.”

(4) **GENTEXT/MISSION.** Restate mission if it has changed. Otherwise, state “NO CHANGE.”

(5) **GENTEXT/EXECUTION.** Approve referenced CONOPS or provide additional guidance.

(6) **GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG.** Provide any changes. Otherwise, state “NO CHANGE.”

ANNEX D TO APPENDIX S SUPPORT REQUEST

1. General

This annex provides guidance and instructions for SPTREQ for all SOF missions.

2. SPTREQ

a. **Initial Support.** The supported HQ submits a SPTREQ for all support not requiring air assets to the supporting component HQ and provides information copy to the JSOTF requesting resources needed to accomplish the tasked mission. The SPTREQ will be submitted at the same time the supported component sends the CONOPS. For support from sources outside of the JSOTF (such as a submarine or naval gunfire), the SPTREQ is sent to only the JSOTF for action. The JSOTF may then grant direct liaison between SOF components and components of the designated JFC. The SPTREQ should list all MPA support requirements and identify any preference for a particular supporting agency. The MPA may submit additional SPTREQs as planning continues.

b. **Follow-on Support.** The supported HQ submits the SPTREQ to the supporting component HQ for action and provides an information copy to the JSOTF requesting follow-on support for a team already on a mission. The SPTREQ will be submitted ASAP. For support from sources outside of the JSOTF, the SPTREQ is sent to only the JSOTF for action. The JSOTF may then grant direct liaison between SOF components and components of the designated JFC.

3. Special Operations Mission Numbers

The assigned mission will be identified throughout the SO mission planning process by a specific mission identification number.

4. Procedures for Support Request

a. **Sent By:** Supported HQ. (MPA).

b. **Sent To:** Supporting HQ, info the JSOTF (for support from sources outside of the JSOTF, send directly to the JSOTF for action).

c. **When Sent:** ASAP in conjunction with the submission of the CONOPS Message. (In the case of follow-on support, sent ASAP).

d. **Responds To:** TASKORD (indirectly).

e. **Expected Response:** SPTCONF from supporting HQ within 24 hours of receipt of the SPTREQ. Confirmation is from the JSOTF if support comes from an external source or if the JSOTF must resolve a support conflict.

5. Support Request Format (minimum overall classification is Confidential)

a. Baseline Format

- (1) Basic Message Name. System-Reply or Remarks Message.
- (2) MSGID. SYS.RRM.
- (3) Mandatory Data Sets. MSGID, REPLY, RMKS.

b. Special Instructions. Enter the following information in the “RMKS” data set:

- (1) Type Support Requested. Indicate whether the SPTREQ is for:
 - (a) **“PERSONNEL”** (personnel augmentation). Include skill requirements, number requested, and any pertinent additional information.
 - (b) **“OPERATIONS”** (naval gun fire, submarine, off-shore rendezvous, etc.). Date-time group for execution (specify by type of event, such as a time on target for insertion), method of execution (lock-in/lock-out, etc.). Indicate number of personnel and amount of cargo.
 - (c) **“TRAINING”** (ranges, material, vessels, etc.). Identify specific training requirements that are beyond organic capabilities. Specify any joint preparation required, including Special Operations Forces Planning and Rehearsal System and mission rehearsal. Include times and dates.
 - (d) **“ADMINISTRATION” or “LOGISTICS”** (material, supplies, services, and facilities). Identify specific administrative or logistic requirements that are beyond organic capabilities. Refer to OPLAN annexes, memoranda of agreement, or statements of requirements if appropriate. Include times and dates.
- (2) Supporting Agency. When using multiple addressees, clearly indicate what support each supporting agency is expected to coordinate.
- (3) Number of Personnel. Indicate number of personnel requiring support.
- (4) Cargo. Include material and supplies carried for infiltration as well as resupply. Annotate if the cargo is hazardous.
- (5) Location. Identify or request a point, site, or zone. Refer to a specific reception site or beach-landing site nomination or confirmation message, or specifically request the supporting agency to nominate primary and alternate sites. Transmit sufficient data to positively identify locations.

c. Comments. Include in this section any additional information facilitating coordination or highlighting special requirements. Such information may include on-load and off-load locations and team briefing requirements.

d. Notional SPTREQ.

OPER/COASTAL WATCH//
MSGID/SYS.RRM/CDR 7th SFG//
REF/A/ORDER/CDRJSOTF/081601ZMAY9_//
AMPN/FRAGORD 001//
REF/B/ORDER/CDR 7th SFG/081600ZMAY9_//
AMPN/CONOPS 001//

RMKS/

1. () TYPE SUPPORT REQUESTED: TRAINING. SUPPORTING AGENCY: JSOTF. REQ MOUT SITE FACILITIES BE MADE AVAILABLE EFFECTIVE 9 MAY 9_ THRU 10 MAY 9_. TWELVE PERSONNEL WILL BE PARTICIPATING IN THE TRAINING AND DEMOLITIONS WILL BE USED FOR BREACHING.
2. () TYPE SUPPORT REQUESTED: LOGISTICS. SUPPORTING AGENCY: US NAS, RIO BRAVO. REQ PRECOORDINATED STAGING BASE CDRJSOTF MOA BE MADE AVAILABLE EFFECTIVE 10 MAY 9_ FOR DURATION OF NEO IN SAN SEBASTIAN.//
DECL/OADR//

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ANNEX E TO APPENDIX S SUPPORT CONFIRMATION

1. General

This annex provides guidance and instructions for SPTCONF for all SOF missions.

2. SPTCONF

The supporting HQ submits a SPTCONF to the supported HQ, JSOTF, and tasked subordinate supporting unit(s) to confirm all the details of the SPTREQ. (NOTE: SPTCONF is not used for confirming air support. Use the standard REQCONF format to confirm air support.) If the resources available for the support don't match those requested, the supporting HQ will coordinate with the supported HQ to determine the impact on overall mission accomplishment. Support that cannot be satisfactorily resolved between supporting and supported HQ will be referred to CDRJSOTF for resolution. The SPTCONF will be submitted ASAP and within 24 hours of receipt of the SPTREQ. The SPTCONF is sent directly to the JSOTF if the supporting HQ is outside of the JSOTF. The JSOTF may grant direct liaison between SOF components and components of supported JFC.

3. Special Operations Mission Numbers

The assigned mission will be identified throughout the SO mission planning process by a specific mission identification number.

4. Procedure for SPTCONF

- a. Sent By: Supporting HQ.
- b. Sent To: Supported HQ, info the JSOTF (for support from services outside the JSOTF send directly to the JSOTF).
- c. When Sent: ASAP but within 24 hours of receipt of SPTREQ.
- d. Responds To: SPTREQ.
- e. Expected Response: Acknowledgement by supported HQ.

5. SPTCONF Format (minimum overall classification is Confidential)

- a. Baseline Format
 - (1) Basic Message Name. Response to RFI.
 - (2) MSGID. RRI.

(3) Mandatory Data Sets. REF and RMKS.

b. Special Instructions. Insert an amplification (AMPN) free-text set after each formatted set to provide additional information. Additionally, a RMKS set is available as the last set in the main text.

(1) REF. The REF set should reference the SPTREQ(s) requesting mission support confirmed in the message.

(2) RMKS. Use the RMKS set for the following:

(a) Confirm details such as the number of personnel, amount of supplies, type of vessel or vehicle to be used, location of offshore rendezvous point (to eight digit coordinates when possible); and BLS clear signal (if required).

(b) Highlight problems or request action, such as MPA acknowledgement and acceptance of a change to the support requested.

(c) Request additional information from the MPA or JSOTF. Provide a point of contact and time that the additional information must be received.

c. Notional SPTCONF

OPER/COASTAL WATCH//
MSGID/RRI/COMNAVAIRSTA RIO BRAVO//
REF/A/SYS.RRM/9TH SFGA/081601ZMAY9_//
AMPN/SPTREQ 001//

RMKS/

1. () PRECOORDINATED STAGING BASE FACILITIES AND SERVICES AVAILABLE PER YOUR REF A EFFECTIVE 101200ZMAY9_, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN PARA 2.

2. () ONE 44-PAX BUS UNAVAIL. WILL SUBSTITUTE THREE 14-PAX VANS UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED.

3. () REQ FOLLOWING INFO ASAP:

A. () SIZE OF ADVON AND EXPECTED TIME OF ARRIVAL.

B. () ACTUAL NUMBER OF PERSONNEL FOR MESSING//DECL/OADR//

ANNEX F TO APPENDIX S AIR SUPPORT REQUEST

1. General

This annex provides guidance and instructions for AIRSUPREQ for all SOF missions.

2. AIRSUPREQ

The AIRSUPREQ is used to request preplanned and immediate CAS, interdiction, reconnaissance, surveillance, escort, helicopter airlift, and other aircraft missions. The supported HQ submits an AIRSUPREQ to the supporting component HQ and provides information copy to the JSOTF requesting resources needed to accomplish the tasked mission. The AIRSUPREQ will be submitted at the same time the supported component sends the CONOPS. The JSOTF may then grant direct liaison between SOF components and components of the supported designated JFC. The AIRSUPREQ should list all MPA support requirements and identify any preference for a particular supporting agency. The MPA may submit additional AIRSUPREQs as planning continues.

3. Special Operations Mission Numbers

The assigned mission will be identified throughout the SO mission planning process by a specific mission identification number.

4. Procedures for AIRSUPREQ

- a. Sent By: Supported HQ.
- b. Sent To: Supporting HQ, info the JSOTF.
- c. When Sent: ASAP, in conjunction with the submission of the CONOPS.
- d. Responds To: TASKORD (indirectly).

e. Expected Response: JSOAC must transmit ALLOREQ message to JFACC to provide an estimate of the total air effort, to identify any excess and joint force general support aircraft sorties, and to identify unfilled air requirements. Submitted NLT 24 hours prior to start of air tasking day. REQCONF from supporting HQ NLT 12 hours prior to start of air tasking day in which supporting event occurs.

5. AIRSUPREQ Format (minimum overall classification is Confidential)

- a. Baseline Format

(1) Basic Message Name. AIRSUPREQ.

(2) MSGID. AIRSUPREQ.

(3) Mandatory Data Sets. MSGID, Period (PERID), 8 REQUEST.

b. Special Instructions. See Joint User Handbook for Message Text Format (JUH-MTF), Annex 26 to Chapter 3 (AIRSUPREQ) for detailed instructions on preparing message map.

c. Notional AIRSUPREQ.

```
OPER/COASTAL WATCH//
MSGID/AIRSUPREQ/CDR 9TH SFG//
REF/A/ORDER/CDRSOC/072130ZMAY9_//
AMPN/FRAGORD 001//
REF/B/ORDER/CDR 9TH SFG/081600ZMAY9_//
AMPN/CONOPS 001//
PERID/111600Z/TO:112300Z/ASOF111545Z//
8REQUEST
/REQNO /PR/MSNTYP/MSTART /R/ACTYP/CMNT
/ADI001/1 /INFILT/110200Z/ /MC130/
/OTR001/1 /TRANSP/112300Z/ /C130/
/ALI001/1 /INFILT/130030Z/ /MH60/
/OTR002/2 /ARASLT/130100Z/ /MH53/
/TAS001/1 /CAS /130100Z/I/AC130/
/ALE001/1 /EXFILT/132300Z/ /MH60/
/ALE002/1 /EXFILT/140200Z/ /MH60/
8MSNLOC
/MSNNO /LOCTYP/LOCN /CMNT
/ADI001/CENTER/DZ BAKER /DZ BORIC IS ALTLOCN
/OTR001/EP /NAS RIO BRAVO/
/ALI001/CENTER/LZ BINGO /LZ BLITZ IS ALTLOCN
/OTR002/CENTER/LZ BEACH/
/TAS001/TGTPT /AMEMB/SAN SEBASTIAN
/ALE001/CENTER/PZ BROWN /PZ BUGLE IS ALTLOCN
/ALE002/CENTER/PZ BRITE/8AIRDROP
/REF /ELEV/DROPLOC /HDG/EDGMP/DZWD/CMNT
/ADI001/2100/12345N567890W/135/800 /3000/
8CARGO
/REF /CC/QTY/LOADTYP/CARGOWT/CMNT
/ADI001/S /10 /PARAT /
/OTR001/S /400/AMPN /40TON/
/ALI001/S /23 /CBT /
/OTR002/S /60 /CBT /EXFIL ADDITIONAL 260 EVACFRD
/ALE001/S /23 /CBT /
/ALE002/S /10 /CBT /
```

AMPN/OTR001 CARGO CONSISTS OF 400 CBT, 12 463L PALLETS, FOUR HMNV, TWO
5 TON W/TRAILERS

8LOADATA

/REF /ONLOC /ONTIME/OFFLOC /OFFTIME/ADI001/RIO BRAVO NAS/ /LZ
BAKER /110200Z

/OTR001/FBNC / /RIO BRAVO NAS/112300Z

/ALI001/RIO BRAVO NAS/ /LZ BINGO /130030Z

/OTR002/RIO BRAVO NAS/ /LZ BEACH /130100Z

/ALE001/PZ BROWN /132300Z/RIO BRAVO NAS/

/ALE002/PZ BRITE /140200Z/RIO BRAVO NAS/

DECL/OADR//

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ANNEX G TO APPENDIX S REQUEST CONFIRMATION

1. General

This annex provides guidance and instructions for REQCONF for all SOF missions.

2. REQCONF

The REQCONF is used to inform the requesting command, the tasking authority, and the tasked units of action being taken, and to provide additional information about the mission(s). It is used both in the preplanned and immediate air tasking cycles. It should be sent NLT 12 hours prior to start of air tasking day in which supporting event occurs.

3. Special Operations Mission Numbers

The assigned mission will be identified throughout the SO mission planning process by a specific mission identification number.

4. Procedures for Request Confirmation

a. Sent By: Supporting HQ (MPA).

b. When Sent: ASAP, but NLT 12 hours prior to start of air tasking day in which supporting event occurs.

c. Responds To: AIRSUPREQ.

5. REQCONF Format (minimum overall classification is Confidential)

a. Baseline Format.

(1) Basic Message Name. REQCONF.

(2) MSGID. REQCONF.

(3) Mandatory Data Sets. MSGID, PERID.

b. Special Instructions. See JUH-MTF, Annex 176 to Chapter 3 (REQCONF) for detailed instructions on preparing message map.

c. Notional REQCONF.

OPER/COASTAL WATCH//
MSGID/REQCONF/CSOAC/ REF/A/AIRSUPREQ/072130ZMAY96/
PERID/111600Z/TO:112300Z/ASOF111545Z//
8MISSION
/MSNNO /REQNO /PR/MSNTYP/MSTART /ACTYP/CMNT/
/SO1234/ADI001/1A/INFILT/110200Z/MC130/
/SO1235/OTR001/1B/TRANSP/112300Z/C130/
/SO1236/ALI001/1C/INFILT/130030Z/MH60/
/SO1237/OTR002/1D/ARASLT/130100Z/MH53/
/SO1238/TAS001/1E/CAS /130100Z/AC130/
/SO1239/ALE001/1F/EXFILT/132300Z/MH60/
/SO1240/ALE002/1G/EXFILT/140200Z/MH60/
DECL/OADR//

ANNEX H TO APPENDIX S OPERATIONS SUMMARY

1. General

This annex provides guidance and instructions for the OPSUM for all SOF missions.

2. OPSUM

JSOTF component commanders submit an OPSUM to the JSOTF as soon as possible after the post-mission recovery and initial debriefing of a SOF tactical element.

3. Special Operations Mission Numbers

The assigned mission will be identified throughout the SO mission planning process by a specific mission identification number.

4. Procedures for OPSUM

- a. Sent By: Component HQ (MPA).
- b. Sent To: JSOTF.
- c. When Sent: Submit as soon as possible after the element's initial debriefing. Submit changes to this initial OPSUM after final debriefing if appropriate.
- d. Responds To: N/A.
- e. Expected Response: N/A.

5. OPSUM Format (minimum overall classification is Confidential)

a. Baseline Format

- (1) Basic Message Name. OPSUM.
- (2) MSGID. OPSUM.
- (3) Mandatory Sets. MSGID, PERID.

b. Special Instructions

(1) **PERID**. Use field one to indicate the day and time the mission began, field two to indicate the day and time the mission was completed.

(2) **GENTEXT/GROUND OPSUM.** Use this data set after the PERID set. Field two is for the following free-text comments, as appropriate.

(a) Target location and identification.

(b) Purpose of mission.

(c) Composition of team.

(d) Evaluation of results. State whether original plan was followed (if not, outline deviations and rationale). State whether mission was successful or unsuccessful (if unsuccessful, outline the reasons).

(e) Friendly losses.

(f) Enemy losses. Indicate count or estimate.

(g) Significant observations.

(h) EEIs.

(i) Other significant information.

(j) Recommendations.

c. Notional OPSUM:

OPER/COASTAL WATCH//
MSGID/OPSUM/9TH SFG//
PERID/122300Z/TO:130600Z//
GENTEXT/GROUND OPSUM/

1. () TARGET IDENTIFICATION AND LOCATION. AMEMB SAN SEBASTIAN, 45QAB123456.

2. () TEAM MISSION. CONDUCT AIR ASSAULT 130100ZMAY9_ INTO AMEMB COMPOUND BY MH-53 TO SECURE COMPOUND PERIMETER AND EVACUATE APPROX 260 AMCITS AND AMEMB STAFF BY MH-53.

3. () TEAM COMPOSITION. GROUND TASK FORCE CONSISTED OF TWO RANGER COMPANIES (A, B/1/75 RGR) AND C/1/9 SFG UNDER COMMAND OF 1/75 RGR BN CDR AND STAFF.

4. () EVALUATION OF RESULTS:

5. () FRIENDLY LOSSES. ONE SF KIA, TWO RANGERS WIA, FOUR AMCITS WIA. NAMES WITHHELD PENDING NOTIFICATION OF NOK.

6. () ENEMY LOSSES. ESTIMATED 40 CASUALTIES FROM FRIENDLY SMALL ARMS. NEARBY ARMY BARRACKS DESTROYED BY AC-130 GUNFIRE. TWO POLICE VEHICLES DESTROYED BY AY-4S.

7. () SIGNIFICANT OBSERVATIONS. NONE.

8. () EEI. NONE.

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ANNEX I TO APPENDIX S
SITUATION REPORT

(EXAMPLE)
CLASSIFICATION
OTTCZYUW 1211644-UUUU—
ZNY UUUUU
O P 131559Z MAY 9_
FM CJTF ZERO ONE ZERO//JOC//
TO CJTF ZERO ONE ONE
INFO CDRUSJFCOM NORFOLK VA//J64/J34/J35/JOC//
CTF ZERO ONE TWO
CTF ZERO ONE THREE
CTF ZERO ONE FOUR
CTG ZERO ONE ZERO PT ONE
CTG ZERO ONE ZERO PT TWO
ZEN CTG ZERO ONE ZERO PT THREE
AFSOC HURLBURT FLD FL//DOX//
CDRUSASOC FT BRAGG NC//AOOP-POP-E//
COMNAVSPECWARCOM CORANADO CA//N32//
CDRUSSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL
CDR 1ST PSYOP BN FT BRAGG NC//COMJPOTF//
CDRSOSCOM FT BRAGG NC
JOINT MTF ANALYSIS/ALL MTF TFC/FT HUACHUCA AZ
DJECG LANT//J3/J7//

BT
CLASSIFICATION
EXER/OCEAN VENTURE 9_//
MSGID/SITREP/CDRJSOTF/017/MAY//
PERID/121600Z/TO:131600Z/ASOF:131400Z//
HEADING/OWN SITUATION//
5UNIT
/UNITDES /UNITLOC /CMNTS
/CDRSOCJFCOM (CDRJSOTF) /ST CROIX /CJTF
/-6 SOSOC(A) (-) /ST CROIX /SUPPORT ELEMENT
/-ARSOC
/—3RD SFG(A) (SOTF) /FT BRAGG /TG
/—ARSOC FWD (FOB) /ST CROIX /TG
/-NAVSOC
/—NSWTG LANT /FT PICKETT /TG
/—ST-2 OCE DET /ST CROIX /TG
———ST2A /ST CROIX /TG
/———ST2B /ST CROIX /TG
/——SDVT-2 TU /EMB ARCHERFISH /TG

/—SBU24 DET FWD /ST CROIX /TG
/-AFSOC
/—1ST SOGS /ST CROIX /TG
/—193SOGP /BORINQUEN PR
/—2-160 SOAR /ST CROIX
/—314AW /ST CROIX//
GENTEXT/OPERATIONS/
1. PAST 24 HOURS.
A. DA104 - TRUJILLO C2 COMPLEX - MISSION COMPLETE. RANGERS OFF
LOADED RRNAS.
B. DA207 - MISSION CANCELLED DUE TO ELECTRICAL PROBLEMS. SDV
RETURNED TO ARCHERFISH.
C. CTG CONDUCTED MC130/MH60 AIR REFUEL TRAINING.
D. CTG CONDUCTED EC130E COMMANDO SOLO MISSION.
E. DA008 - AGENT DEBRIEFED AT HEADQUARTERS OF CJTF .
2. NEXT 48 HOURS:
A. STAND DOWN CJTF AS OF 131600Z. PREPARE TO REDEPLOY 15 AND 16 MAY.//
GENTEXT/INTELLIGENCE-RECONNAISSANCE/OWN SOURCE
INFONONEVALUATED,
RAW INTEL:
INTERROGATION INFORMATION ON AGENT CAN BE OBTAINED FROM CJTF
DISUM 13 MAY 9_//
GENTEXT/LOGISTICS/
CATEGORY/STATUS/DAY1/DAY2/DAY3/DAY4/DAYS5-7/DAYS7-15/DAYS15-30/
MOBILITY AND TRANSPORTATION/A/G/G/G/G/G/G/G/
AMMO/G/G/G/G/G/G/G/G/
POL/G/G/G/G/G/G/G/G/
OTHER SUPPLY/G/G/G/G/G/G/G/G/
ENGINEERING/G/G/G/G/G/G/G/G/
MAINTENANCE/A/G/G/G/G/G/G/G/
HOST NATION SUPPORT/G/G/G/G/G/G/G/G/
COALITION SUPPORT/NA
REMARKS/
MOBILITY AND MAINTENANCE:
MH47 - OIL PUMP AND ENGINE TAIL CONE INOP. ETR 151200Z.
AC130 ANP 59 RADAR (WEATHER RADAR). BARRING THUNDERSTORM CAN
STILL PERFORM MISSION. ETR 151200Z.//
GENTEXT/COMMUNICATIONS CONNECTIVITY/
BEGINNING TO PHASE OUT COMMUNICATIONS.//
GENTEXT/PERSONNEL/ GO/ OFF/ WO/ ENL/ CIV/TOT/
1. A. CJTF HQ
- (1) CURRENT: 0/ 64/ 3/ 189/ 4/260/
- (2) CHANGE FROM LAST REPORT: // // // // //
- (3) BATTLE LOSSES: 0
- (4) NON-BATTLE LOSSES: 0

- (A) KILLED: 0
- (B) INJURED: 0
- (C) TRANSFERRED: 0
- B. NAVSOC
 - (1) CURRENT: 0/ 15/ 1/ 60/ 2/ 78/
 - (2) CHANGE FROM LAST REPORT: / -15/ / -28/ -2/-45/
 - (3) BATTLE LOSSES: 0
 - (4) NON-BATTLE LOSSES: 0
 - (A) KILLED: 0
 - (B) INJURED: 0
 - (C) TRANSFERRED: 45
- C. AFSOC
 - (1) CURRENT: 0/ 57/ 7/ 220/ 0/284/
 - (2) CHANGE FROM LAST REPORT: / -8/ -1/ -16/ /-25/
 - (3) BATTLE LOSSES: 0
 - (4) NON-BATTLE LOSSES: 0
 - (A) KILLED: 0
 - (B) INJURED: 0
 - (C) TRANSFERRED: 25
- D. ARSOC
 - (1) CURRENT: 0/ 60/ 10/ 355/ 0/425/
 - (2) CHANGE FROM LAST REPORT: // // // //
 - (3) BATTLE LOSSES: 0
 - (4) NON-BATTLE LOSSES: 0
 - (A) KILLED: 0
 - (B) INJURED: 0
 - (C) TRANSFERRED: 0
- E. VIRGIN ISLANDS NATIONAL GUARD
 - (1) CURRENT: 0/ 10/ 3/ 75/ 0/88/
 - (2) CHANGE FROM LAST REPORT: /// -1/ /-1/
 - (3) BATTLE LOSSES: 0
 - (4) NON-BATTLE LOSSES: 0
 - (A) KILLED: 0
 - (B) INJURED: 0
 - (C) TRANSFERRED: 1
- F. TOTAL PERSONNEL 0/ 206/ 24/899/ 6/1135/
- 2. PERSONNEL SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS.
 - A. UNUSUAL PROBLEMS - NONE
 - B. MORALE
 - 1) GOOD -
 - 2) BAD -
 - C. REST AND RECREATION - NTR
 - D. JOINT AWARDS: NTR
- 3. CIVILIAN PERSONNEL IN THEATER: DOD-5/NONDOD-1/TOTAL-6//
GENTEXT/COMMANDERS EVALUATION/-

ALL SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES MISSIONS HAVE BEEN EXECUTED. WE ARE
IN THE PROCESS OF RECOVERING OUR REMAINING FORCES ALONG WITH THE
LNO PACKAGE ABOARD THE USS MT WHITNEY. OPERATIONS WILL CEASE AT

131600Z MAY 9_//

DECL/OADR//

BT

#

NNNN

ANNEX J TO APPENDIX S
OPERATION ORDER

(EXAMPLE)

CLASSIFICATION

OPER/COASTAL WATCH//

MSGID/ORDER/CDRSOCCENT//

ORDTYP/OPORD/CDRSOCEUIV000 1 //

TIMEZONE/Z//

OFREF/0PLAN/CDRSOCCENT XXX//

HEADING/TASK ORGANIZATION//

5UNIT

/UNITDES/UNITLOC/CMNTS//

/3RD SOW/AFSOB 316 AC-130, 5 MC-130, 10 MH-60, 8 MH-53//

/9TH SFGA/SOTF 9/ARSOTF 9//

/1/75TH RGR BN/SOTF9//

GENTEXT/SITUATION//

1. () ELEMENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF SAN SEBASTIAN HAVE OVERTHROWN FRIENDLY GOVERNMENT OF SAN SEBASTIAN AND DECLARED MARTIAL LAW IN EFFECT. AIRPORT CLOSED TO CIVILIAN TRAFFIC. ESTIMATED 200 AMCITS IN COUNTRY HAVE TAKEN REFUGE IN AMEMB. AMBASSADOR HAS REQUESTED NEO.

A. () ENEMY FORCES: SAN SEBASTIAN HAS 500 MAN LIGHT INF BN AND 100 MAN POLICE FORCE VIC CAPITAL. AIR FORCE HAS 12 A-37 AIRCRAFT AND 4-6 SA-2/SA-3 SYSTEMS.

B. () FRIENDLY FORCES: AFFOR AND NAVFOR SUPPORT NEO AS REQUIRED. AMEMB MARINE GUARD WILL PROVIDE TERMINAL GUIDANCE AT COMPOUND.

C. () ATTACHMENTS AND DETACHMENTS: 1/75TH RANGER BN ATTACHED 9TH SFGA TO FORM ARSOTF 9.//

GENTEXT/M I S S I O N/

2. () JSOTF SAN SEBASTIAN CONDUCTS SPECIAL OPERATIONS TO EVACUATE APPROX 200 AMCITS AND 60 AMEMB STAFF FROM AMEMB SAN SEBASTIAN (SOO0 I/SFG9).// GENTEXT/EXECUTION/

3. () CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: 9TH SFG ESTABLISHES JSOTF AND DEPLOYS JOINT SOF FROM SOTF 9 USING 3RD SOW ASSETS TO SECURE AMEMB AND EVACUATE APPROX 260 AMCITS AND AMEMB STAFF MEMBERS TO FRIENDLY CONTROL.

4. () 9TH SFG: PLAN AND CONDUCT NEO AS CDRJSOTF SAN SEBASTIAN.

5. () 3RD SOW: PLAN AND CONDUCT SPECIAL AIR OPERATIONS AS JSOACC OF JSOTF SAN SEBASTIAN.

6. () COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:

A. () 9TH SFG IS MPA. 3RD SOW IS SUPPORTING AGENCY. THEATER JIOC IS IPA.

B. () EALT IS 122300ZMAY.

C. () PEACETIME ROE IN EFFECT.

D. () SUBMIT CONOP NLT 082300Z MAY/I/
GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/

7. () ANNEX D (SERVICE SUPPORT) AND ANNEX E (PERSONNEL), ORDREF IN
EFFECT./IGEBTEXT.COMMAND AND SIGNAL/

8. () ANNEX K (C-E), ORDREF IN EFFECT.//
GENTEXT/AUTHENTICATION/BANKS, BE OFFICIAL: SMITH, COL SOJ3//
AKNLDG/Y//
DECL/OADR/

ANNEX K TO APPENDIX S FRAGMENTARY ORDER

1. General

This appendix provides guidance and instructions for the FRAGORD for all SOF missions. The JSOTF JISE will push available information/intelligence down to the supported unit; if mission essential information is currently available it will be forwarded with the FRAGORD.

2. FRAGORD

The JSOTF uses the FRAGORD to assign missions to the appropriate SOF component headquarters (ARSOF, NAVSOF, MARSOF, or AFSOF). Missions contained within a FRAGORD or other controlling directive should be referenced, rather than repeating them. The FRAGORD designates the mission planning agent (MPA = supported unit), supporting agencies, and the IPA; grants DIRLAUTH; and establishes an EALT. Acknowledgment of the FRAGORD is required.

3. Special Operations Mission Numbers

JSOTF FRAGORDs are numbered sequentially and do not use specific mission identification numbers as per TASKORD.

4. Procedures for FRAGORD

- a. Sent By: JSOTF.
- b. Sent To: Supported HQ.
- c. When Sent: ASAP, as soon as a change in the mission is ordered.
- d. Responds To: OPORD (from the original mission).
- e. Expected Response: Supported unit acknowledges FRAGORD in message traffic to issuing HQ and submits new CONOPS.

5. FRAGORD Format (minimum overall classification is Confidential)

- a. Baseline Format
 - (1) Basic Message Name. ORDER.
 - (2) MSGID. ORDER.
 - (3) ORDTYP. FRAGORD.

(4) Mandatory Data Sets. MSGID, ORDTYP, TIMEZONE, AKNLDG.

b. Special Instructions

(1) **GENTEXT/SITUATION.** Provide an overview of the general situation using the following headings:

(2) **ENEMY FORCES.** Provide enemy composition, disposition, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions. Refer to intelligence annexes, summaries, or other reports. If no change from the last referenced intelligence summary, indicate “NO CHANGE.”

(3) **FRIENDLY FORCES.** Provide information on friendly forces other than those subordinates to the JSOTF that may affect the action of the MPA. If no change, indicate “NO CHANGE.”

(4) **ATTACHMENTS AND DETACHMENTS.** List units attached to, or detached from, subordinate units of the JSOTF. If no change, indicate “NO CHANGE.” instructions. Designate the MPA and supporting agencies. Include suspenses for CONOPs, mission support requests, OPSUMs, etc. GENTEXT/MISSION. If different than the base OPORD indicate “NO CHANGE.”

(5) **GENTEXT/EXECUTION.** Include the following:

(6) **CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.** Summarize what the JSOTF wants the mission to accomplish without specifying how to do it. Provide the JSOTF’s intent and the desired effects. Avoid excessive detail that may limit the MPA’s planning. Do not make assumptions regarding techniques.

(7) **SUBORDINATE TASKS.** List tasks by component, with each component receiving its own paragraph. List tasks common to two or more components under coordinating instructions.

(8) **COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.** Assign a mission designator. Establish the EALT and state any other instructions for coordination when the mission will be joint and/or involve conventional forces. Include CCIR, safety guidance, ROE, and other planning limitations when applicable. Include specific points of contact when possible.

(9) **GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG.** State the applicable administrative and logistic support arrangements. Refer to OPORD annexes when appropriate. If no change, indicate “NO CHANGE.”

(10) **GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL.** Indicate any changes to the policy, HQ locations, code words, code names, and liaison. If no change, indicate “NO CHANGE.”

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APPENDIX T REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-05.1 is based upon the following primary references.

1. US Government Publications

- a. Title 10, USC.
- b. DOD Reorganization Act of 1986.
- c. Cohen-Nunn Amendment to the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986, as attached to the Defense Authorization Act, FY 1987.

2. DOD Publications

- a. DOD Directive 2310.2, *Personnel Recovery*.
- b. DOD 4500.54-G, *Department of Defense Foreign Clearance Guide*.
- c. DOD Directive 4630.5, *Compatibility, Interoperability, and Integration of Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) Systems*.
- d. DOD Directive 5100.1, *Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components*.
- e. DOD Directive 5100.77, *DOD Law of War Program*.
- f. DOD Instruction 4630.8, *Procedures for Interoperability and Supportability of Information Technology (IT) and National Security Systems (NSS)*.

3. Joint Publications

- a. JP 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*.
- b. JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*.
- c. JP 1-0, *Personnel Support to Joint Operations*.
- d. JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.
- e. JP 1-04, *Legal Support to Military Operations*.
- f. JP 1-05, *Religious Support in Joint Operations*.

- g. JP 1-06, *Financial Management Support in Joint Operations*.
- h. JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*.
- i. JP 2-01, *Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations*.
- j. JP 2-01.2, *Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*.
- k. JP 2-03, *Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*.
- l. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*.
- m. JP 3-01, *Countering Air and Missile Threats*.
- n. JP 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*.
- o. JP 3-07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*.
- p. JP 3-07.2, *Antiterrorism*.
- q. JP 3-07.4, *Joint Counterdrug Operations*.
- r. JP 3-07.5, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*.
- s. JP 3-07.6, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*.
- t. JP 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol. I*.
- u. JP 3-09.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS)*.
- v. JP 3-13, *Information Operations*.
- w. JP 3-13.1, *Electronic Warfare*.
- x. JP 3-13.3, *Operations Security*.
- y. JP 3-13.4, *Military Deception*.
- z. JP 3-14, *Joint Doctrine for Space Operations*.
- aa. JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations*.
- bb. JP 3-26, *Homeland Security*.

- cc. JP 3-30, *Command and Control for Joint Air Operations*.
- dd. JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*.
- ee. JP 3-50, *Personnel Recovery*.
- ff. JP 3-52, *Joint Doctrine for Airspace Control in a Combat Zone*.
- gg. JP 3-53, *Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations*.
- hh. JP 3-57, *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*.
- ii. JP 3-59, *Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations*.
- jj. JP 3-60, *Joint Targeting*.
- kk. JP 3-61, *Public Affairs*.
- ll. JP 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistic Support*.
- mm. JP 4-02, *Health Service Support*.
- nn. JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*.
- oo. JP 6-0, *Joint Communications System*.

4. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications

- a. CJCSI 3110.01B, *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 1998*.
- b. CJCSI 3110.05C, *Joint Psychological Operations Supplement to the JSCP FY 2002*.
- c. CJCSI 3110.06, *Special Operations Supplement to JSCP FY 1998*.
- d. CJCSI 3110.12, *Civil Affairs Supplement to the JSCP*.
- e. CJCSI 3121.01B, *Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces*.
- f. CJCSI 3210.01, *Joint Information Warfare Policy*.
- g. CJCSI 3270.01, *Personnel Recovery Within the Department of Defense*.
- h. CJCSI 5120.02, *Joint Doctrine Development System*.

- i. CJCSI 6510.01D, *Information Assurance (IA) and Computer Network Defense (CND)*.
- j. CJCSM 3122.03B, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning Formats)*.
- k. CJCSM 6120.05, *Manual for Tactical Command and Control Planning Guidance for Joint Operations-Joint Interface Operational Procedures for Message Text Formats*.
- l. Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum-71-87, 29 May 1987, *Mission and Functions of the US Special Operations Command*.
- m. Military Classification Manual 1196, 17 Jan 96, *Unified Command Plan (UCP)*.

5. Multiservice Publications

a. *Multiservice Procedures for the Theater Air-Ground System* (FM 100-103-2; Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-25.2; Naval Warfare Publication 3-56.2; Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures [Instruction] 3-2.17).

b. USSOCOM Pub 3-33, *Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Integration and Interoperability Handbook and Checklist*, Version 2, September 2006. This pub can be viewed through the Joint Staff J-7 Joint Doctrine, Education, and Training Electronic Information System web portal: <https://jdeis.js.smil.mil/jdeis/>. Once there, go to the “SOCOM” website and its Center for Knowledge and Futures (J-7, J-9) Lessons Learned. There, it is listed as “USSOCOM Pub 3-33.” The pub also contains instructions for obtaining bulk hard copy distribution of the handbook and checklist.

6. Air Force Publications

- a. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, *Air Force Basic Doctrine*.
- b. AFDD 2, *Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power*.
- c. AFDD 2-1.6, *Personnel Recovery Operations*.
- d. AFDD 2-1.7, *Airspace Control*.
- e. AFDD 2-3.1, *Foreign Internal Defense*.
- f. AFDD 2-5.3, *Psychological Operations*.
- g. AFDD 2-7, *Special Operations*.

7. Army Publications

- a. Field Manual 3-05, *Army Special Operations Forces*.
- b. Field Manual 3-05.20, *Special Forces Operations*.
- c. Field Manual 3-05.30, *PSYOP*.
- d. Field Manual 3-05.40, *Civil Affairs Operations*.
- e. Field Manual 3-05.60, *ARSOF Aviation Operations*.

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APPENDIX U ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Group, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the United States Special Operations Command. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-05.1, 19 December 2001, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations*, and JP 3-05.2, 21 May 2003, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning*.

4. Change Recommendations

- a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: CDRUSSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL//SOOP-JE//
INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JEDD//
CDRUSJFCOM SUFFOLK VA//JT10//

Routine changes should be submitted electronically to Commander, Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Doctrine Group and info the Lead Agent and the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development J-7/JEDD via the CJCS JEL at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine>.

- b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff/J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE NUMBER	COPY NUMBER	DATE OF CHANGE	DATE ENTERED	POSTED BY	REMARKS

5. Distribution of Publications

Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R, *Information Security Program*.

6. Distribution of Electronic Publications

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are available at www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET), and <http://nmcc20a.nmcc.smil.mil/dj9j7ead/doctrine/> (SIPRNET), or on JDEIS at <https://jdeis.js.mil> (NIPRNET), and <https://jdeis.js.smil.mil> (SIPRNET).

b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PO-FL, Room 1E811, 7400 Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400.

c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a JDDC member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current joint publications. This JEL CD-ROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can be locally reproduced for use within the combatant commands and Services.

GLOSSARY

PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AAA	antiaircraft artillery
AADC	area air defense commander
ACA	airspace control authority
ACMREQ	airspace coordination measures request
ACO	airspace control order
ACSA	acquisition and cross-servicing agreement
ADMIN	administration
ADPE	automated data processing equipment
AFDD	Air Force doctrine document
AFSOC	Air Force special operations component
AFSOD	Air Force special operations detachment
AFSOE	Air Force special operations element
AFSOF	Air Force special operations forces
AIRSUPREQ	air support request
AIS	automated information system
AKNLDG	acknowledge message
ALLOREQ	air allocation request
AMPN	amplification
AOB	advanced operations base
AOR	area of responsibility
ARSOA	Army special operations aviation
ARSOC	Army special operations component
ARSOF	Army special operations forces
ASAP	as soon as possible
ASCC	Army Service component commander
ASO	advanced special operations
ATO	air tasking order
BE	basic encyclopedia
BLS	beach landing site
C&E	communications and electronics
C2	command and control
CA	civil affairs
CAA	combat aviation advisors
CAO	civil affairs operations
CAP	crisis action planning
CARVER	criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability
CAS	close air support
CASEVAC	casualty evacuation
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear

CCDR	combatant commander
CCIR	commander's critical information requirement
C-CS	communication and computer systems
CDRAFSOF	commander, Air Force special operations forces
CDRJSOTF	commander, joint special operations task force
CDRTSOC	commander, theater special operations command
CDRUSSOCOM	Commander, United States Special Operations Command
CI	counterintelligence
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIM	compartmented information management
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
CJSOTF	combined joint special operations task force
CJTF	commander, joint task force
CMO	civil-military operations
CMOC	civil-military operations center
CND	computer network defense
COA	course of action
COCOM	combatant command (command authority)
COG	center of gravity
COMPUSEC	computer security
COMSEC	communications security
CONOPS	concept of operations
CONPLAN	operation plan in concept format
COP	common operational picture
CROP	common relevant operational picture
CSAR	combat search and rescue
CSS	combat service support
CSST	combat service support team
CT	counterterrorism
CUL	common-user logistics
DA	direct action
D-cell	deployment cell
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DI	DIA Directorate for Intelligence Production
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIRLAUTH	direct liaison authorized
DISA	Defense Information Systems Agency
DJIIOC	Defense Joint Intelligence Operations Center
DOD	Department of Defense
DOE	Department of Energy
DOJ	Department of Justice
DOS	Department of State

DP	decisive point
DSSO	defense sensitive support office
DZ	drop zone
EALT	earliest anticipated launch time
EEI	essential element of information
EMCON	emissions control
EW	electronic warfare
EXORD	execute order
FA	feasibility assessment
FARP	forward arming and refueling point
FHA	foreign humanitarian assistance
FHP	force health protection
FID	foreign internal defense
FM	frequency modulation
FNS	foreign nation support
FPOC	focal point operations center
FRAGORD	fragmentary order
FSB	forward support base
GCC	geographic combatant commander
GCCS	Global Command and Control System
GCI	ground control intercept
GENTEXT	general text
GEOINT	geospatial intelligence
GEOREF	geographic reference
GI&S	geospatial information and services
GIG	Global Information Grid
GPS	global positioning system
HF	high frequency
HLZ	helicopter landing zone
HN	host nation
HNS	host-nation support
HQ	headquarters
HSS	health service support
HUMINT	human intelligence
IA	initial assessment
IAW	in accordance with
ICP	intertheater communications security (COMSEC) package
IM	information management
INFOCON	information operations condition
INFOSEC	information security

INR	Bureau of Intelligence and Research (DOS)
IO	information operations
IPA	intelligence production agency
IPOE	intelligence preparation of the operational environment
ISB	intermediate staging base
ISO	isolation
J-1	manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff
J-2	intelligence directorate of a joint staff
J-2X	counterintelligence and human intelligence element of the intelligence directorate of a joint staff
J-3	operations directorate of a joint staff
J-4	logistics directorate of a joint staff
J-5	plans directorate of a joint staff
J-6	communications system directorate of a joint staff
JAARS	Joint After-Action Reporting System
JACE	joint air coordination element
JAOC	joint air operations center
JCEOI	joint communications-electronics operating instructions
JCMEC	joint captured materiel exploitation center
JCSE	joint communications support element
JDEC	joint document exploitation center
JDISS	joint deployable intelligence support system
JFACC	joint force air component commander
JFC	joint force commander
JFE	joint fires element
JFMCC	joint force maritime component commander
JFSOCC	joint force special operations component commander
JIACG	joint interagency coordination group
JIATF	joint interagency task force
JIB	joint information bureau
JIOC	joint intelligence operations center
JISE	joint intelligence support element
JMD	joint manning document
JNCC	joint network operations control center
JOA	joint operations area
JOC	joint operations center
JOG	joint operations graphic
JOPEs	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JP	joint publication
JPG	joint planning group
JPRC	joint personnel recovery center
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSOA	joint special operations area
JSOAC	joint special operations air component

JSOACC	joint special operations air component commander
JSOTF	joint special operations task force
JSPOC	Joint Space Operations Center
JTCB	joint targeting coordination board
JTF	joint task force
JUH-MTF	Joint User Handbook for Message Text Format
JVB	Joint Visitors Bureau
JWICS	Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System
km	kilometer
LAN	local area network
LNO	liaison officer
LOAC	law of armed conflict
LOC	line of communications
LOG	logistics
LRC	logistics readiness center
LZ	landing zone
MARSOC	Marine Corps special operations command
MARSOF	Marine Corps special operations forces
MASINT	measurement and signature intelligence
MDS	Message Dissemination Subsystem
METOC	meteorological and oceanographic
MEU	Marine expeditionary unit
MHE	materials handling equipment
MILSATCOM	military satellite communications
MOE	measure of effectiveness
MPA	mission planning agent
MSGID	message identification
MSO	military support operations
MSOC	Marine special operations company
MSP	mission support plan
MSR	mission support request
MTP	mission tasking packet
MWR	morale, welfare, and recreation
NAR	nonconventional assisted recovery
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVSOC	naval special operations command
NAVSOF	naval special operations forces
NCO	noncommissioned officer
NCTC	National Counterterrorism Center
NEO	noncombatant evacuation operation
NGA	National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

Glossary

NGO	nongovernmental organization
NIST	national intelligence support team
NLT	not later than
nm	nautical mile
NRO	National Reconnaissance Office
NSA	National Security Agency
NSW	naval special warfare
NSWTE	naval special warfare task element
NSWTG	naval special warfare task group
NSWTU	naval special warfare task unit
NSWU	naval special warfare unit
OA	objective area
OPCON	operational control
OPLAN	operation plan
OPORD	operation order
OPSEC	operations security
OPSUM	operation summary
ORDREF	order reference
ORDTYP	order type
OSINT	open-source intelligence
OTH	other
PA	public affairs
PAO	public affairs officer
PERID	period
PIR	priority intelligence requirement
POL	petroleum, oils, and lubricants
PRCC	personnel recovery coordination cell
PSYOP	psychological operations
PWRMS	pre-positioned war reserve materiel stock
RC	Reserve Component
REQCONF	request confirmation
RFI	request for information
RMKS	remarks
ROE	rules of engagement
RSOI	reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
RZ	recovery zone
SAC	special actions cell
SAFE	selected area for evasion
SAM	surface-to-air missile
SATCOM	satellite communications
SBSO	sustainment brigade special operations

SCA	space coordinating authority
SCI	sensitive compartmented information
SDV	sea-air-land (SEAL) delivery vehicle
SEAL	sea-air-land team
SERE	survival, evasion, resistance, escape
SF	special forces
SIGINT	signals intelligence
SIPRNET	SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network
SITREP	situation report
SJA	staff judge advocate
SLP	seaward launch point
SMU	special mission unit
SO	special operations
SOCCE	special operations command and control element
SOCRATES	Special Operations Command, Research, Analysis, and Threat Evaluation System
SODARS	special operations debrief and retrieval system
SOF	special operations forces
SOFSA	special operations forces support activity
SOG	special operations group
SOLE	special operations liaison element
SOMPF	special operations mission planning folder
SOP	standing operating procedure
SOR	statement of requirements
SOTF	special operations task force
SOWT	special operations weather team
SPTCONF	support confirmation
SPTREQ	support request
SR	special reconnaissance
SROE	standing rules of engagement
SRP	seaward recovery point
STE	secure telephone equipment
STO	special technical operations
STS	special tactics squadron
STT	special tactics team
TA	theater Army
TACLAN	tactical local area network
TACON	tactical control
TACSAT	tactical satellite
TASKORD	tasking order
TBMCS	theater battle management core system
TFCICA	task force counterintelligence coordinating authority
TIP	target intelligence package
TNL	target nomination list

TO&E	table of organization and equipment
TPC	tactical pilotage chart
TPFDD	time-phased force and deployment data
TREAS	Department of the Treasury
TSC	theater support command
TSCIF	tactical sensitive compartmented information facility
TSCP	theater security cooperation plan
TSOC	theater special operations command
TST	time-sensitive target
UAR	unconventional assisted recovery
UARCC	unconventional assisted recovery coordination cell
UCMJ	Uniform Code of Military Justice
UHF	ultrahigh frequency
USAF	United States Air Force
USC	United States Code
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USG	United States Government
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
USSOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command
USSTRATCOM	United States Strategic Command
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
UTM	universal transverse mercator
UW	unconventional warfare
VHF	very high frequency
VTC	video teleconferencing
WARNORD	warning order
WMD	weapons of mass destruction
WRM	war reserve materiel

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Unless otherwise annotated, this publication is the proponent for all terms and definitions found in the glossary. Upon approval, JP 1-02 will reflect this publication as the source document for these terms and definitions.

advanced operations base. In special operations, a small temporary base established near or within a joint special operations area to command, control, and/or support training or tactical operations. Facilities are normally austere. The base may be ashore or afloat. If ashore, it may include an airfield or unimproved airstrip, a pier, or an anchorage. An advanced operations base is normally controlled and/or supported by a main operations base or a forward operations base. Also called AOB. (JP 3-05.1)

Air Force special operations component. The Air Force component of a joint force special operations component. Also called AFSOC. (JP 3-05.1)

Air Force special operations detachment. A squadron-size headquarters that could be a composite organization composed of different Air Force special operations assets. The detachment is normally subordinate to an Air Force special operations component, joint special operations task force, or joint task force, depending upon size and duration of the operation. Also called AFSOD. (JP 3-05)

Air Force special operations element. An element-size Air Force special operations headquarters. It is normally subordinate to an Air Force special operations component or detachment, depending upon size and duration of the operation. Also called AFSOE. (JP 3-05)

Air Force special operations forces. Those Active and Reserve Component Air Force forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called AFSOF. (JP 3-05)

area assessment. The commander's prescribed collection of specific information that commences upon employment and is a continuous operation. It confirms, corrects, refutes, or adds to previous intelligence acquired from area studies and other sources prior to employment. (JP 3-05)

area oriented. Personnel or units whose organizations, mission, training, and equipping are based on projected operational deployment to a specific geographic or demographic area. (JP 3-05)

Army special operations component. The Army component of a joint force special operations component. Also called ARSOC. (JP 3-05.1)

Army special operations forces. Those Active and Reserve Component Army forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called ARSOF. (JP 3-05)

CARVER. A special operations forces acronym used throughout the targeting and mission planning cycle to assess mission validity and requirements. The acronym stands for criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability. (JP 3-05.1)

civil administration. An administration established by a foreign government in (1) friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government; or (2) hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. Also called CA. (JP 3-05)

civil affairs. Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations. Also called CA. (JP 3-57)

civil affairs activities. Activities performed or supported by civil affairs that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present; and (2) involve application of civil affairs functional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, to enhance conduct of civil-military operations. (JP 3-57)

civil-military operations. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. (JP 3-57)

clandestine operation. An operation sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment. A clandestine operation differs from a covert operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the operation rather than on concealment of identity of the sponsor. In special operations, an activity may be both covert and clandestine and may focus equally on operational considerations and intelligence-related activities. (JP 3-05.1)

conventional forces. 1. Those forces capable of conducting operations using nonnuclear weapons.
2. Those forces other than designated special operations forces. (JP 3-05)

direct action. Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets. Direct action differs from conventional offensive actions in the level of physical and political risk, operational techniques, and the degree of discriminate and precise use of force to achieve specific objectives. Also called DA. (JP 3-05)

earliest anticipated launch time. The earliest time expected for a special operations tactical element and its supporting platform to depart the staging or marshalling area together en route to the operations area. Also called EALT. (JP 3-05.1)

emergency resupply. A resupply mission that occurs based on a predetermined set of circumstances and time interval should radio contact not be established or, once established, is lost between a special operations tactical element and its base. (JP 3-05.1)

exfiltration. The removal of personnel or units from areas under enemy control by stealth, deception, surprise, or clandestine means. (JP 3-05.1)

feasibility assessment. A basic target analysis that provides an initial determination of the viability of a proposed target for special operations forces employment. Also called FA. (JP 3-05.1)

force multiplier. A capability that, when added to and employed by a combat force, significantly increases the combat potential of that force and thus enhances the probability of successful mission accomplishment. (JP 3-05.1)

guerrilla force. A group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel organized along military lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held, hostile, or denied territory. (JP 3-05)

guerrilla warfare. Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. Also called GW. (JP 3-05.1)

in extremis. A situation of such exceptional urgency that immediate action must be taken to minimize imminent loss of life or catastrophic degradation of the political or military situation. (JP 3-05)

infiltration. 1. The movement through or into an area or territory occupied by either friendly or enemy troops or organizations. The movement is made, either by small groups or by individuals, at extended or irregular intervals. When used in connection with the enemy, it implies that contact is avoided. 2. In intelligence usage, placing an agent or other person in a target area in hostile territory. Usually involves crossing a frontier or other guarded line. Methods of infiltration are: black (clandestine); grey (through legal crossing point but under false documentation); and white (legal). (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

initial assessment. An assessment that provides a basic determination of the viability of the infiltration and exfiltration portion of a proposed special operations forces mission. Also called IA. (JP 3-05.1)

joint civil-military operations task force. A joint task force composed of civil-military operations units from more than one Service. It provides support to the joint force commander in humanitarian or nation assistance operations, theater campaigns, or civil-military operations concurrent with or subsequent to regional conflict. It can organize military interaction among many

governmental and nongovernmental humanitarian agencies within the theater. Also called JCMOTF. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

joint force special operations component commander. The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking special operations forces and assets; planning and coordinating special operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force special operations component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFSOCC. (JP 3-0)

joint special operations air component commander. The commander within a joint force special operations command responsible for planning and executing joint special operations air activities. Also called JSOACC. (JP 3-05)

joint special operations area. An area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a joint force commander to the commander of a joint special operations force to conduct special operations activities. It may be limited in size to accommodate a discrete direct action mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of unconventional warfare operations. Also called JSOA. (JP 3-0)

joint special operations task force. A joint task force composed of special operations units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The joint special operations task force may have conventional non-special operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. Also called JSOTF. (JP 3-05)

low visibility operations. Sensitive operations wherein the political-military restrictions inherent in covert and clandestine operations are either not necessary or not feasible; actions are taken as required to limit exposure of those involved and/or their activities. Execution of these operations is undertaken with the knowledge that the action and/or sponsorship of the operation may preclude plausible denial by the initiating power. (JP 3-05.1)

main operations base. In special operations, a base established by a joint force special operations component commander or a subordinate special operations component commander in friendly territory to provide sustained command and control, administration, and logistic support to special operations activities in designated areas. Also called MOB. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

Marine Corps special operations forces. Those Active Component Marine Corps forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called MARSOF. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

naval special warfare. A designated naval warfare specialty that conducts operations in the coastal, riverine, and maritime environments. Naval special warfare emphasizes small, flexible, mobile units operating under, on, and from the sea. These operations are characterized by stealth, speed, and precise, violent application of force. Also called NSW. (JP 3-05)

naval special warfare forces. Those Active and Reserve Component Navy forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called NSW forces or NAVSOF. (JP 3-05.1)

naval special warfare group. A permanent Navy echelon III major command to which most naval special warfare forces are assigned for some operational and all administrative purposes. It consists of a group headquarters with command and control, communications, and support staff; sea-air-land teams; and sea-air-land team delivery vehicle teams. Also called NSWG. (JP 3-05.1)

naval special warfare special operations component. The Navy special operations component of a unified or subordinate unified command or joint special operations task force. Also called NAVSOC. (JP 3-05)

naval special warfare task element. A provisional subordinate element of a naval special warfare task unit, employed to extend the command and control and support capabilities of its parent task unit. Also called NSWTE. (JP 3-05.1)

naval special warfare task group. A provisional naval special warfare organization that plans, conducts, and supports special operations in support of fleet commanders and joint force special operations component commanders. Also called NSWTG. (JP 3-05.1)

naval special warfare task unit. A provisional subordinate unit of a naval special warfare task group. Also called NSWTU. (JP 3-05.1)

Rangers. Rapidly deployable airborne light infantry organized and trained to conduct highly complex joint direct action operations in coordination with or in support of other special operations units of all Services. Rangers also can execute direct action operations in support of conventional nonspecial operations missions conducted by a combatant commander and can operate as conventional light infantry when properly augmented with other elements of combined arms. (JP 3-05.1)

sea-air-land team. US Navy forces organized, trained, and equipped to conduct special operations in maritime, littoral, and riverine environments. Also called SEAL. (JP 3-05)

special actions. Those functions that due to particular sensitivities, compartmentation, or caveats cannot be conducted in normal staff channels and therefore require extraordinary processes and procedures and may involve the use of sensitive capabilities. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

special activities. Activities conducted in support of national foreign policy objectives that are planned and executed so that the role of the US Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly. They are also functions in support of such activities but are not intended to influence US political processes, public opinion, policies, or media and do not include diplomatic activities or the collection and production of intelligence or related support functions. (JP 3-05)

special boat team. US Navy forces organized, trained, and equipped to conduct or support special operations with patrol boats or other combatant craft. Also called SBT. (JP 3-05)

special forces. US Army forces organized, trained, and equipped to conduct special operations with an emphasis on unconventional warfare capabilities. Also called SF. (JP 3-05)

special forces group. A combat arms organization capable of planning, conducting, and supporting special operations activities in all operational environments in peace, conflict, and war. It consists of a group headquarters and headquarters company, a support company, and special forces battalions. The group can operate as a single unit, but normally the battalions plan and conduct operations from widely separated locations. The group provides general operational direction and synchronizes the activities of subordinate battalions. Although principally structured for unconventional warfare, special forces group units are capable of task-organizing to meet specific requirements. Also called SFG. (JP 3-05)

special mission unit. A generic term to represent a group of operations and support personnel from designated organizations that is task-organized to perform highly classified activities. Also called SMU. (JP 3-05.1)

special operations. Operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations require covert, clandestine, or low visibility capabilities. Special operations are applicable across the range of military operations. They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces or other government agencies and may include operations through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called SO. (JP 3-05)

special operations command and control element. A special operations element that is the focal point for the synchronization of special operations forces activities with conventional forces activities. It performs command and control functions according to mission requirements. It normally collocates with the command post of the supported force. It can also receive special operations forces operational, intelligence, and target acquisition reports directly from deployed special operations elements and provide them to the supported component headquarters. It remains under the operational control of the joint force special operations component commander or commander, joint special operations task force. Also

called SOCCE. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

special operations forces. Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called SOF. (JP 3-05.1)

special operations liaison element. A special operations liaison team provided by the joint force special operations component commander to the joint force air component commander (if designated), or appropriate Service component air command and control organization, to coordinate, deconflict, and integrate special operations air, surface, and subsurface operations with conventional air operations. Also called SOLE. (JP 3-05)

special operations mission planning folder. The package that contains the materials required to execute a given special operations mission. It will include the mission tasking letter, mission tasking package, original feasibility assessment (as desired), initial assessment (as desired), target intelligence package, plan of execution, infiltration and exfiltration plan of execution, and other documentation as required or desired. Also called SOMPF. (JP 3-05.1)

special operations-peculiar. Equipment, material, supplies, and services required for special operations missions for which there is no Service-common requirement. These are limited to items and services initially designed for, or used by, special operations forces until adopted for Service-common use by one or more Military Service; modifications approved by the Commander, US Special Operations Command for application to standard items and services used by the Military Services; and items and services approved by the Commander, US Special Operations Command as critically urgent for the immediate accomplishment of a special operations mission. Also called SO-peculiar. (JP 3-05)

special reconnaissance. Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces. These actions provide an additive capability for commanders and supplement other conventional reconnaissance and surveillance actions. Also called SR. (JP 3-05)


special tactics. US Air Force special operations forces organized, trained, and equipped to conduct special operations. They include combat control team, pararescue, and combat weather personnel who provide the interface between air and ground combat operations. Also called ST. (JP 3-05)

special tactics team. A task-organized element of special tactics that may include combat control, pararescue, and combat weather personnel. Functions include austere airfield and assault zone reconnaissance, surveillance, establishment, and terminal control; terminal attack control; combat search and rescue; combat casualty care and evacuation staging; and tactical weather observations and forecasting. Also called STT. (JP 3-05)

theater special operations command. A subordinate unified or other joint command established by a joint force commander to plan, coordinate, conduct, and support joint special operations within the joint force commander's assigned operational area. Also called TSOC. (This term and its definition modify the existing term "special operations command" and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

unconventional warfare. A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery. Also called UW. (JP 3-05)

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY



All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Publication (JP) 3-05.1** is in the **Operations** series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

