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Purpose: The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) publishes the ***Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB)*** quarterly under the provisions of ***AR 25-30***. ***MIPB*** presents information designed to keep intelligence professionals informed of current and emerging developments within the field and provides an open forum in which ideas; concepts; tactics, techniques, and procedures; historical perspectives; problems and solutions, etc, can be exchanged and discussed for purposes of professional development.

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Always Out Front

by Major General Barbara G. Fast
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Leadership Development in Military Intelligence: Mentorship

The Importance of Mentorship

As a lieutenant colonel, I wrote an article for ***MIPB*** entitled, *Mentorship: A Personal and Force Multiplier*. With the Army fully engaged in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, I firmly believe that the concept of mentorship is even more important today than it was then, as intelligence plays such a critical role in current operations. As our operations tempo has increased, and we find ourselves busy with immediate requirements and missions, it is critically important that all leaders make the time to develop their subordinates and to mentor the next generation of intelligence leaders.

For some, the mentor is an individual who was influential in our lives: a coach, a teacher, a military supervisor, or role model. For others, it may be the concept of a general officer or a sergeant major who brings "chosen" subordinates up through the ranks guiding them towards the "good jobs" to achieve promotions. Senior leaders must be a guiding force, building combat experienced junior Soldiers into the leaders for our future MI Corps.

Mentorship in the military has enjoyed mixed success as leaders and institutions have struggled to define and formalize it. In 1985, General John C. Wickham, Jr., then Chief of Staff of the Army, published a White Paper which designated "Leadership" as the Army Theme of the Year. In the paper, he outlined eight principles which established a framework for building more effective leaders. His first principle challenged every leader to be a mentor to subordinate Soldiers. The idea was that sharing your knowledge and leadership would be the greatest legacy that you could leave to your subordinates and the U.S. Army. That is still a vital theme for us today. In his memorandum, *Leaving a Legacy Through Mentorship*, 14 July 2005, General Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the Army, restated the idea that:

> ***There are many honorable ways to leave a legacy; our focus for 2005 is on leaving a legacy through mentorship. Mentorship is an extremely powerful tool for personal and professional development; it improves technical and tactical competence, leadership skills, self-awareness, and morale. The Army's definition of mentorship is the voluntary developmental relationship that exists between a person of greater experience and a person of lesser experience that is characterized by mutual trust and respect.***

Characteristics of Mentorship

There are several characteristics that form the basis to the mentor-protégé relationship. Such a relationship may have both career and psychological aspects to it. The career aspect of mentorship involves sponsorship of the protégé. The mentor provides the protégé exposure and visibility. This might be done by involving the subordinate in briefings and meetings, or allowing the individual to accompany the mentor to conferences and other events. Mentors help their protégés find challenging assignments which will allow them to progress in their careers. Most mentors are in a position to know what types of assignments and actual operational experience are right in terms of career and personal growth. This is not to imply that Army leaders make sure the best jobs are given to a select few; the individual's job performance and demonstrated potential, as written in the formal evaluation by supervisors, are the basis of the promotion. Where mentors play an influential role is in helping their protégés help themselves to succeed, not in causing success.

Throughout the relationship, the mentor coaches the protégé. The mentor provides advice and constructive criticism, working to maximize the protégé's strengths and minimize weaknesses. Some of this is done through sharing experiences, but frank and honest discussions and observations are at the heart of the relationship. The protégé must feel able to freely discuss personal and professional dilemmas as the mentor provides opportunities for gaining knowledge, skills, and competence.

Another characteristic of mentorship is psychological. This consists of role modeling, counseling, and acceptance and confirmation of the protégé. Mentors lead their protégés, not just professionally, but personally. The mentor lets the protégé see how they lead and make decisions. Mentors impart values, moral and ethical responsibilities, and standards of conduct by which they live.

Mentor-protégé relationships are geared toward the longer term. This permits true development of the protégé. Working together, they develop a career path which incorporates schooling, assignments, professional development, operational experience, and how to balance a career with one's personal life.

It should be apparent that there are differences between being a leader and being a mentor. Most of us will be leaders at one time or another or nearly always. Leaders develop coach, advise, and motivate subordinates as an important part of their duties. This is part of normal professional development and should not be confused with mentorship. The rater-ratee relationship is an example of this type of leadership. From this professional interaction, the special chemistry that can be found in a formal mentoring relationship can develop.

So what does a mentor look like? A mentor, in the traditional sense, is usually 8 to 15 years older than the protégé. This translates to someone who is at least two ranks senior. Normally, mentors are successful and upwardly mobile, enjoying high rank or position in the Army. They are respected by their peers, possess the requisite knowledge of the Army, have proven themselves during times of crisis and operational challenges, and maintain a network of resources. Mentors who meet these criteria are not threatened by their protégés' potential to equal or surpass them in there careers.

Mentorship in Military Intelligence

The need to work with subordinates in order to professionally and personally develop them is particularly important in Military Intelligence (MI). Our career field does not have a single career pattern for success; we have multiple specialty areas which collectively create the MI field. Each offers different operational and leadership opportunities. The types of jobs in which we serve vary greatly in scope and the types of knowledge required. A senior MI leader can be beneficial in helping MI Soldiers sort through personal professional development needs and working to establish career and personal goals. It is even more critical to have a coach in certain assignments such a battalion S2, who operates outside of the sanctuary of an MI unit. Here, where individuals are normally more junior yet have significant responsibility, a coach can be instrumental to the success of both the individual and the operation as whole.

MI must use mentorship as an important tool to provide the best professionals possible. Leading and mentoring are more important than ever before as our Soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers fight the Global War on Terrorism. The complexities, shortened decision cycles, and demands placed on the Intelligence Community have increased the roles for senior leaders in shaping junior leaders for success. Even though technology allows us to provide unprecedented intelligence support, the ability to think critically, analyze, synchronize and fight Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance—all higher-level skills—is imperative to success in the current operating environment.

ALWAYS OUT FRONT!

CSM Forum

This quarter's CSM Forum highlights critical events and contributions made by the Military Intelligence (MI) Corps' senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs). From its inception in 1987, the MI Corps Command Sergeants Major (CSM) have taken the responsibility and the lead in ensuring that all MI soldiers were trained to meet the intelligence missions.

CSM Robert H. Retter —July 1987 to February 1989

Driving force behind the development and implementation of the Operations and Intelligence (O&I) Course.

Noncommissioned Officers Academy (NCOA) is established on 1 July 1987, consolidating all MI Advanced Noncommissioned Officer training at Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

Develops and implements the Pre-Assignment Course for all MI CSM and SGM.

CSM David P. Klehn —February 1989 to January 1991

Training is developed to provide prescriptive tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for Intelligence personnel involved in the Department of Defense (DOD) Counter Narcotics Program.

Leadership Assessment Development Program is implemented in the NCOA based on a Program of Instruction (POI) developed by the Sergeants Major Academy.

Changes come to Career Management Field (CMF) 33, Electronic Warfare/Intercept (EW/I) Systems Maintenance. Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 33P10 EW/I Strategic Receiving Subsystems Repairer and MOS 33Q10 EW/I Strategic Processing and Storage Subsystems Repairer are consolidated into MOS 33Y10, EW/I Strategic Systems Repairer in October 1991.

Changes come to CMF 96. MOS 96U, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Operator, is created. MOS 96H, Aerial Intelligence Specialist is restructured to Ground Station Module (GSM) Operator for Joint STARS.

The UAV platoon is deployed to the CENTCOM AOR.

Contributions to the Military Intelligence Corps through NCO Support

CSM James A. Johnson —January 1991 to July 1993

MOS 97L, Translator/Interpreter, is created for Army Reserve Component (RC) linguists. The Language Working Group is established at Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

Doctrine for the handling of Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW) is revised.

Revolution in MI: Doctrinal and training focus moves to low intensity and regional conflict. Emphasis in the disciplines shifts from Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) to Human Intelligence (HUMINT).

MI training courses are transferred from Fort Devens, Massachusetts, to Fort Huachuca.

The UAV Task Force is established to coordinate all UAV issues for Fort Huachuca; UAV master plan is developed to serve as a guide for a national UAV training center.

The NCOA is accredited. The newly built NCO academic complex is dedicated.

CSM Robert T. Hall —July 1993 to January 1995

The All Source Analysis System (ASAS) is fielded. ASAS training is incorporated into selected Advanced Individual Training (AIT) and Basic Noncommissioned Officer Courses (BNCOCs).

The Army Family Team Building Program is implemented.

MOS 97L, Translator/Interpreter, created for Army Reserve Component (RC) linguists.

Environmental Awareness training is added to the BNCOC Common Core.

More emphasis is placed on language skills in the BNCOC and Advanced NCO Courses.

Changes come to CMF 98. MOS 98D, Emitter Locator/Identifier, is merged into MOS 98H to become MOS 98H Morse/Non-Morse Communications Interceptor/Locator.

CSM Randolph S. Hollingsworth —January 1995 to April 1998

Assisted in establishing and selecting the first G2 SGM for the Army.

The Intelligence XXI Vision is implemented wherein with the concepts of the commander drives intelligence, tactical tailoring, split-based operations, intelligence synchronization, and broadcast dissemination are emphasized.

MOS 96B, Intelligence Analyst, is identified as the "flagship" MOS in Intelligence Training XXI. There is intense evaluation and design to create "Cradle-to-Grave" training strategies to train 96Bs in all aspects of the 21st century battlefield.

All MI MOSs undergo Cradle-to-Grave studies to review training methods and POI content, eliminate redundant training, and ensure that all training builds upon previous training.

Implemented the Sergeant Audie Murphy Club and the Dr. Mary Walker Programs.

Reinstated the Post Soldier of the Year and NCO of the Year Recognition Programs.

CSM Lawrence J. Haubrich —January 2001 to December 2005

Developed selection criteria for the MI branch to ensure high quality and combat veteran NCOs were assigned as instructors to the NCOA and the MI Initial Military Training at USAIC and Fort Huachuca. Brought lessons leaned from Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM and Guantanamo and integrated them into POI.

Pursued the approval of bonuses for critical MI MOSs, thus ensuring recruitment and retention of critical skills and specialities in the MI Corps to include the UAV External pilots.

Spearheaded campaigns for the Combat Action Badge to be awarded to all combat support and combat service support MOSs when the badge was first introduced and the Global War On Terrorism Expeditionary Medal

I wish to thank Lori S. Tagg, Command Historian, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca and CSM (Retired) Randolph S. Hollingsworth for their research. —The Editor.

CSM Scott C. Chunn
—April 1998 to January 2001

NCO training is dramatically revised based on the Cradle-to-Grave studies. The primary focus shifts from Common Leader training to advanced MI technical training. Thirteen MI MOS specific courses are established.

The NCOA is chosen as the test bed for the new Common Leader training. The POI developed and validated during the pilot program conducted at Fort Huachuca would be used at 88 NCOA.

The intelligence companies of the Initial Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) begin Cadre/Cohesion, Operational Readiness Training (COHORT) at Fort Huachuca.

CMF 98 is restructured. The restructure includes the creation of MOS 98H (Hybrid) to replace MOS 96R, Ground Surveillance Systems Operator, and to eventually become MOS 98M Multi-Functional Collector.

to be awarded to all service members stationed at Guantanamo Bay and Colombia, South America.

Instrumental in the critical assignment of UAV personnel to ensure qualified soldiers went to Hunter UAV units. Created a tracking process for Hunter Operators upon graduation; ensured 3 to 6 students remained for the External Pilot course to maintain the External Pilot strength.

The Tactical UAV (Shadow 200) platoon trains and deploys directly from Fort Huachuca to the CENTCOM AOR.

Instrumental in the restructure of the NCOES.

ALWAYS OUT FRONT!

Technical Perspective

by Chief Warrant Officer Five James J. Prewitt-Diaz
U.S. Army Military Intelligence Corps

A Warrant Officer is not a Warrant Officer is not a Warrant Officer . . .

Just as our Army is changing to meet future threats, the Warrant Officer (WO) Corps is changing to meet the requirements of the transforming Army. Many actions and initiatives have been instituted to fix, improve, and ensure the long—term health and relevance of the WO Corps. The Army's transformation demands that our leadership take proactive actions to ensure that the WO cohort remains as a viable portion of our Army.

In almost every briefing regarding the WO program that I attend there are recurring obsolete ideas about what a WO should be. These outdated opinions are nested in the past but unfortunately continue to reappear and must be clarified before effective future change can occur. My intent and purpose of this column is to set the record straight on two of the most pervasive misconceptions regarding WOs. The first is that a Warrant Officer One (WO1) is an expert and the second is that a WO1 is interchangeable with senior WOs.

Myth: The WO1 is an Expert

The philosophy that an individual, upon appointment to WO1, is fully technically competent is not valid. The latest release of the **DA Pam 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management**, dated 14 October 2005, describes a WO1 as an "entry" level officer. Today's WO1s are accessed younger in their careers with an average of two assignments (one being in combat). They are chosen for the WO program, not because they have a vast experience base, but because they possess the ability to learn, the eagerness to tackle challenges, and the potential to contribute to the Army's mission as an officer, leader, and technician.

Of course everyone remembers the way it used to be. Twenty-five years ago the Army accessed WO1s from senior noncommissioned officer (NCO) ranks who had well over 10 years in the service. The expectation was that the more senior the NCO, the more experience that individual would bring to the WO ranks. This WO did not require training because he brought expertise gained from a long career in the NCO ranks. The main problem was that a WO accessed under this system often reached retirement age as a Chief Warrant Officer Two (CW2) or CW3. The Army could only keep a WO under this system for 6 to 8 years of WO service before the officer made the decision to retire. This practice compounded the senior WO shortages that we have today.

In order to obtain more WO service years and to fix the shortage of senior WOs, the Army has started to access WO at the five to eight years in service. Although there are concerns about the lack of technical expertise from this younger accessions, the fact of the matter is that no less than five WO studies have concluded that younger accessions is the logical approach to fixing several of the challenges faced today. The Army has made a conscious decision to invest in the future by accessing WOs earlier and allowing them to grow into CW4s or CW5s before retirement age. So, the new WO1s do not have the experience base that a WO1 accessed in the 1980s had—they are not supposed to, they are not experts.

Myth: A WO1 is interchangeable with a CW3/4

Another misconception is that since a WO1 is an expert, he is thus interchangeable with a CW3 or CW4. This erroneous belief permeates our Army culture and stems from the time in the 1960s and 1970s when Army force structure documents specified all warrant officer requirements as "WO"; that is, not graded. Up to that point, WO positions had not been graded because the methodology had not been developed to determine the differences between positions based on skill, experience, authority, and responsibility. Although this management system provided significant assignment and utilization flexibility, it also permitted the poor distribution, inefficient employment of skills and experience, and did not document career progression.

Since the 1966 Warrant Officer Career Program Study, thirteen related studies have concluded that WO position identification should be stated in terms of grade required in addition to specialty. In 1984, the Total Warrant Officer Study (TWOS) recommended the grading of WO positions as W1 and W2 to be at the junior level, and W3 and W4 to be senior level positions. TWOS refined the position grading methodology and was in fact the first comprehensive grading effort based on skill, experience, authority, and responsibility. These findings were later validated by the Army Development System (ADS) XXI in 2002 and later the Army Training Leadership Development Panel (ATLDP) in 2004 and further recommended the assignment of WOs by grade.

The advantages of position grading are that it provides clear upward progression and utilization of skills and provides commanders with a positive indication of experience level. In addition, grading more accurately reflects Army requirements, reduces assignment subjectivity by establishing a degree of experience, and provides a more equitable distribution of experience.

In conclusion, a WO is not a WO, is not a WO. WOs differ in levels of experience (indicated by rank), education, and specialty. The progression to positions of greater responsibility commensurate with grade, education, training, experience, and seniority is as valid for the WO as it is for the commissioned officer. The assumption that grade is interchangeable in WO positions, regardless of echelon and the qualifications required, results in misuse and a waste of personnel resources and the expertise gained as the result of years of training and experience. It is also detrimental to the morale of the WO Corps and mitigates incentive to improve professionally.



"Remember the past but look to the future"

OIF II: INTELLIGENCE LEADS SUCCESSFUL COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

by Lieutenant General Thomas F. Metz, Colonel William J. Tait, Jr, and Major J. Michael McNealy

When III Corps deployed to Iraq in January 2004, we knew that intelligence was key to victorious operations. As we reflect back on our thirteen months in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) II, first as the core of Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) and then as Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), that was clearly the case. Intelligence was the most important and challenging aspect of every endeavor. This article is intended to share some of what we learned about intelligence during our tour in Iraq.

The challenges we faced were perhaps most daunting as we transitioned from CJTF-7 to MNC-I on 15 May 2004. Both Shiites and Sunnis were fighting us on the battlefield, testing newly arrived formations. Furthermore, many of the Iraqi security forces had folded; the Abu Ghraib detainee abuse controversy was occurring; the insurgents were attacking Iraq's infrastructure (including our logistics lines); the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was culminating; and a sovereign Iraqi government was a month away. Less than nine months later, MNC-I had a series of major victories against the insurgency leading up to the very successful elections on January 30, 2005. Across our area of responsibility, coalition forces had battled the growing insurgency in myriad ways, during countless engagements, and with absolute determination. Many factors contributed to the victories, but intelligence proved to be the key to all. Never before has intelligence driven operations as effectively as in OIF. From small unit to theater level, intelligence provided the basis for every mission.

The demands of a new insurgency battlefield heightened our dependence on intelligence. While we had, and still maintain, robust technological advantages over the insurgents, the counterinsurgency battle requires a deep human intelligence (HUMINT) capability to understand the enemy, his intentions, and how to take the fight to him. We still need the technological advantages of our systems in the counterinsurgency fight, but our intelligence must leverage a significantly greater HUMINT capability.

Our intelligence capabilities during standard Cold War operations were quite effective in determining the enemy intentions, situation, and likely courses of actions. The rigid nature of these operations allowed our systems and intelligence personnel to apply templates to probable actions and maximize the collection capabilities of our technological systems. However, in the counterinsurgency environment (see Figure 1), our technical superiority in collection capabilities is somewhat marginalized and we become more dependent on collecting the enemy's intangible human dynamic which requires a heavier focus on HUMINT. Within the insurgency environment, a higher number of hard-to-predict events will occur, as occurs daily in Iraq. Assassinations, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs), and ambushes are less likely to be picked up



Figure 1. Under the Intelligence Umbrella.

through our Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). Rather, we are dependent on HUMINT to gather this information through interrogations, interaction with the community, and other means.

The key to the future of Military Intelligence (MI) is to retain the old capabilities while providing for the new challenges. As we continue to transform our Army in consideration of the contemporary operating environment, we will still have a significant need for our established technological capabilities to deter and counter potential foes like China, North Korea, and Iran; but we will also see a growing dependence on HUMINT. Models of how the enemy will fight become more ambiguous as adversaries continue to develop and evolve their own systems and tactics—especially in a counterinsurgency. We must be prepared for both major combat operations and counterinsurgency possibilities, knowing that our nation's enemies are studying what we have done in Iraq to better prepare them for a future conflict against us.

We benefited from a shared intelligence structure in Iraq, leveraging both the Intelligence Fusion Center (IFC) and the Coalition Analysis and Control Element (CACE). Although the IFC was on the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) Joint Manning Document (JMD) and the CACE was on the MNC-I JMD, both organizations supported all levels of command—providing intelligence from the four-star level down to maneuver battalion commanders in an environment that did not dictate strict intelligence roles. Intelligence vital for the MNF-I commander could be just as important to a battalion commander on the ground. As such, we disseminated the intelligence to as many levels as possible given both security requirements and availability of communications. This collaborative environment allowed for a great deal of cross-talk throughout the coalition in Iraq, setting a precedent for the future. Collection Management, Coalition's 2X (C2X), the C2 Systems Section, Foreign Disclosure Office, and Special Security Office were among the other functions we shared with MNF-I—providing synergy between the echelons. As we departed Iraq, the intelligence architecture was continuing to evolve, but the premise of collaborating and sharing intelligence both vertically and laterally was alive and well.

The intelligence effort in Iraq is a "bottom-up" process, however, with battalion and brigade S2s performing key roles. These officers and their sections are inundated daily with information from their areas of operation. Interrogation reports, tips, and other intelligence pour into the units at a rapid pace and require a tremendous amount of diligence and professionalism. In more cases than not, intelligence drives most of the battalion and brigade-level operations; in a counterinsurgency environment we have to take the fight to the enemy in a very direct manner. In contrast to the standard Cold War major combat operations resulting in securing terrain and/or defeating conventional units and weapons, counterinsurgency operations must target specific people and/or places which would have little significance to an operational ground war. The critical variables and dimensions of this operational environment create a daunting array of factors for which we must plan and adapt to in the counterinsurgency (see Figure 2). However, very few of these variables are collectible with our intelligence systems and must be addressed through HUMINT and good old-fashioned homework.

Actionable intelligence is hard to come by or act upon in Iraq. Without a doubt the complex nature of the insurgency is the most significant impediment. Compartmentalized cells operating throughout a specific area make collection on these groups very difficult and inhibit our ability to discern who is directing and facilitating insurgency operations. Another significant issue is that the sensor-to-shooter link is often cumbersome, fragile, and untimely. While we have worked to streamline our intelligence reporting to enable action, there are still significant challenges in terms of timeliness of intelligence and, at times,

accuracy. As previously mentioned, the daily fight at the battalion and brigade levels is the core of our intelligence work; the nature of the decentralized fight complicates intelligence collection and coordination between echelons.

Furthermore, the coordination between intelligence agencies is sometimes complicated by competing focuses, which is a historical challenge. Without going into detail, the integration of some HUMINT organizations was initially difficult because their missions were to locate weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and high value targets (HVTs) rather than support the local fight in which combat units were embroiled. For the Tactical HUMINT Teams (THTs), the challenges included insufficient predeployment training in combat skills, communications, and advanced source handling; they also had no organic security which made them dependent on whichever combat unit they were operating with for security. Additionally, and this is a recurring theme in the intelligence arena, they had insufficient linguistic capabilities. Intelligence restrictions, over-classification, and limited sensitive compartmented information (SCI) connectivity also impacted efficient intelligence sharing down to the brigade and battalion level.

Unfortunately, the Abu Ghraib controversy negatively impacted interrogation operations for a time. One result of the scrutiny prompted by the revelations about Abu Ghraib was the reluctance by some to effectively exploit detainees, but that was by and large a temporary overreaction. The lingering effect, however, was the ill will it created with the Iraqi people. In an environment where we needed to win the hearts and minds of good Iraqis, the Abu Ghraib scandal severely impacted the cooperation of citizens with soldiers, THTs, and other intelligence collectors—adding to the already existing cultural and language challenges.



Figure 2. Critical Variables and Dimensions of the Operational Environment.[1]

What Worked in OIF II

During OIF II, countless intelligence successes serve as examples of how to do things right. Of note, HUMINT and SIGINT collection provided significant intelligence upon which we executed operations against the enemy. One reason for this success came from the C2X portal which streamlined and databased HUMINT reporting, which was available to all the major subordinate commands (MSCs). Additionally, we surged Mobile Interrogation Teams (MITs) to assist with detainees from successful operations throughout the area of operations (AO). This flex of resources allowed for the quick and efficient collection of additional HUMINT for future exploitation. Our document and media exploitation greatly supported target development and execution. The integration of civilian-trained technicians from the Reserve and National Guard assisted forensic study and targeting efforts. Furthermore, the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) proved a vital resource for target and situation development at all levels. In terms of analysis, we successfully integrated national level subject matter experts (SMEs) into the analytical process across the command, and the bilateral interrogation operations with Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS), Ministry of Interior (MOI), and Ministry of Defense (MOD) proved an incredible success, garnering specific and vetted intelligence on insurgents throughout Iraq.

The "INTS" in OIF II

SIGINT: Our SIGINT collection was the most spectacular intelligence discipline on the battlefield, as we were able to collect on many targets cued by other intelligence disciplines. Trusted and useful, SIGINT provided an abundance of intelligence on insurgent networks, named persons of interest, and enemy operations. SIGINT is a critical area where continued development of linguists, not only in skill but in numbers, must occur.

IMINT: IMINT was the most dependable of the intelligence disciplines in Iraq, and the UAV was the key to IMINT. In the past, commanders have offered to trade combat power for UAVs. Our experience in Iraq demonstrated why. Commanders up and down the chain of com-

mand cannot get enough UAV coverage and will always want more. A battalion level UAV is clearly needed so that commanders are not dependent upon brigade or corps and above platforms—and can get the IMINT support they need. At corps level, we used UAVs to significantly weight the fight for the commanders on the ground, especially with the Hunter, I-GNAT, and Predator. There were countless times when we had to make the tough calls on which MSC would receive the I-GNAT or Predator coverage for the day; most days several MSCs shared the coverage, splitting up the support. However, even at the Corps level we would lose our I-GNAT and Predator coverage to higher priority users, leaving the MSCs significantly unsupported.

UAV coverage allowed the commanders to view insurgent operations, infiltration routes, protests, and a myriad of other events. UAVs provide a significant ability to instantly provide the commander the critical situational awareness he needs to make decisions. A force multiplier which greatly supported targeting across Iraq, IMINT has fast become a force multiplier. However, we still have some challenges in how we operate our UAVs. For example, commanders must weigh how they will employ their armed UAVs—as an ISR platform or a targeting platform.

HUMINT: HUMINT was so dedicated to targeting that often not enough was left for situational understanding development. Rather than using HUMINT to understand the enemy as a whole and development of the insurgency across the country, it was largely focused on target after target. In Iraq we had roughly 132 THTs working in support of MNC-I and subordinate MSCs. Whether the teams worked in a general support role to answer the MNC-I priority intelligence requirements or in direct support to the brigade combat teams (BCTs) developing actionable intelligence, they were the critical intelligence discipline for the counterinsurgency—helping us to develop long-term and short-term sources, identify enemy intentions, and cuing other intelligence disciplines to collect on people, places, and events. We could never have enough THTs.

As part of the Corps concept of "Every Soldier is a Sensor," we focused a fair amount of training on cultural awareness prior to deployment. Undoubtedly, our soldiers need to know the intricacies of Muslim life, the Arab mind, and how Iraqis view our American culture. Only then can we effectively operate in Iraq knowing how the Iraqis will perceive our actions, understand our environment, and integrate our mission into the battlefield with a higher degree of success. MTTs, academic courses, and other training events were executed to develop our soldiers' cultural awareness. We expected everyone, regardless of rank or position, to exhibit this awareness.

In conjunction with cultural awareness, language proficiency was, and is, a critical factor in THT success and proved to be one of the greatest challenges. Across the battlefield, a soldier who has Arabic language skills provides an invaluable service to his/her unit in terms of HUMINT capability. However, we will always be short Arabic linguists. This shortage is one reason the Army is reviewing our language programs, promoting the growth of our own Arabic, Chinese, and Farsi linguists in the long term.

As we develop our HUMINT, it is critical we share our intelligence laterally and up and down the chain of command. Again, in the counterinsurgency environment, the distinctions between enemy areas of operation are not as clear as in the traditional major combat operations; therefore, we must understand there are no intelligence handover lines, rather intelligence sharing lines. As we work the intelligence situation in our specific AO, it is highly probable that the intelligence may also bear fruit in another AO.

We face the challenge of time when we develop our HUMINT. However, time is exactly what you need to develop HUMINT capabilities not only at home station but also in country. Over time, relationships must be forged with contacts, and as units rotate through Iraq, we must examine how well we transfer these built-up relationships between rotations. In the Iraqi and Muslim culture, relationships with others—through religion, family, tribe, or work—are paramount to all other issues.

One emerging practice, which showed promise in Iraq and HUMINT, was the use of telephone hotlines. Telephone hotlines allowed Iraqis to anonymously telephone in tips to the MSCs. The tips did not always provide the necessary actionable intelligence; however, it was another method to develop our HUMINT in the country. The biggest challenge was working through the false tips, the misuse of the tip line to get back at another Iraqi or, in a few cases, the attempt to set up Coalition forces in an ambush based off a deceptive tip. However, this new practice warrants continued attention and support as it served us well in Iraq.

Directing and planning intelligence operations in a counterinsurgency is a very difficult process the commander must address, not just the "2." Before we can collect, ana-

lyze, and disseminate the intelligence to the forces we must first have a direct and precise plan on how we can gain our intelligence. As LTG Odierno commented during a visit to MNC-I in January of 2005, "Intelligence is an operation. You have to fight for Intelligence." How many times have we seen a great deal of time and effort put into a tactical operation and then watch as the intelligence collection plan is briefed as a supporting event instead of the main event it should be? In the HUMINT-centric environment of a counterinsurgency battle, the intelligence mission often must become a mission unto itself, receiving the same kinds of support and resourcing as a tactical operation. Otherwise, tactical operations will likely display the attributes of a movement to contact—not the optimal situation.

SCAN-FOCUS-ACT

During OIF II, the MNC-I promoted the "Every Soldier is a Sensor" concept with the SCAN-FOCUS-ACT Program. The soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines needed to understand that not only were they the eyes and ears of the Coalition but they were also capable of making a difference to save the lives of their comrades and, in some cases, their own lives through the simple process of scanning their area, focusing on what was not correct, and acting. The program was not only specific to what the troops were doing while out on patrol or in their movements in Iraq but also what they came across in their daily jobs. One example is a young intelligence staff sergeant who worked in the MNC-I Joint Operations Center (JOC). The staff sergeant, in executing his shift duties, was about to pass on a report about a suspected VBIED in Baghdad. Rather than simply passing the report on to the respective MSC, he reviewed the report and saw something that did not make sense. Plotting the grid coordinates, he realized the coordinates could not be correct. Instead of passing the report on, he contacted the report originator, shared his concerns about the grids, and found out that indeed the grids were incorrectly annotated in the report. As a result, a new report was issued and sent down to the respective MSC which in turn sent a patrol out to find the VBIED, which they did shortly afterwards. The staff sergeant's actions were exactly in line with SCAN-FOCUS-ACT and directly contributed to denying the enemy his ability to use a VBIED against Coalition and Iraqi forces.

"Intelligence is an operation. You have to fight for Intelligence."

— LTG Raymond T. Odierno, January 15, 2005

Conclusion

Intelligence played a critical role in our success in OIF II. IMINT, SIGINT, and HUMINT all contributed to the commander's ability to understand the enemy and the situation. As we continue to fight the counterinsurgency fight, our dependence on HUMINT will continue. Critical to understanding the decentralized insurgency fight, HUMINT provides the situational understanding we need to effectively engage the enemy on our terms. If we fail to develop our HUMINT to a higher degree, then our fight will become a battle of attrition as the enemy's mantra appears to be to simply fight another day. We must, however, continue to keep our technical intelligence capabilities sharpened as the major combat operation threats still remain in the world.

The 12 Major Victories of OIF II

1. Karbala. The 1st Armor Division and the Multi-National Division-Central South (Poles) were able to control the Shia Uprising in Al Kut and Najaf Provinces and defeat it in Karbala.

2. Al Kut. Special Forces, a Stryker Battalion Task Force and Corps enablers defeat the insurgents in Al Kut.

3. Najaf. The Najaf operation required most of the month of August, but in the end we defeated Sadr's militia, gave the Interim Iraqi Government its first major victory, and launched Najaf to follow Karbala as a model province.

4. Tal Afar. The Stryker Brigade took on the enemy in Tal Afar and gave the city back to the free Iraqis.

5. Samarra. The 1st Infantry Division was able to take back the city of Samarra from the enemy after a carefully planned and prepared operation was executed with overwhelming power and precision.

6. Sadr City. This victory was ours, by virtue of the brilliant leadership and management of the 1st Cav-

alry Division as they defeated the enemy in Sadr City not just militarily, but also politically, economically, and in the battle for information and public opinion.

7. Fallujah. The combined Coalition fight which the Marines spearheaded with the support of the 1st Cavalry Division and British forces was a textbook urban fight.

8. Mosul. The forces of MNB-NW took on the surviving elements of Fallujah who fled to Mosul before, during, and after the Fallujah fight.

9. North Babil and South Baghdad. The daily fights to secure these areas paid large dividends as the elections drew near.

10. MND-SE. The sustaining fight the British forces fought throughout their AO kept the insurgency from returning to this once volatile region.

11. MND-NE. The Korean brigade deployed to the northeast provided continued pressure on the insurgency.

12. The elections on January 30, 2005. 8.5 million Iraqis voted in free and fair elections.

Endnote

1. **FM 2-0, Intelligence**, May 2004, 1-24.

LTG Thomas Metz is Commanding General, III Corps and Fort Hood. He was Commanding General, Multi-National Corps-Iraq from May 2004 to February 2005 and previously Deputy Commanding General, Combined Joint Task Force Seven, both headquartered in Baghdad, Iraq. He graduated in 1971 from the United States Military Academy at West Point and holds a Master's Degree in Mechanical Engineering from North Carolina State University. He also holds a professional engineer's license from the Commonwealth of Virginia. His military schools include the Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, the Command and General Staff College, and the Army War College.

COL Jerry Tait is currently assigned as the G2, III Corps at Fort Hood, Texas. He served as the Multi-National Corps-Iraq C2 for LTG Metz during OIF II and was "dual-hatted" as Deputy C2 of Multi-National-Force-Iraq; prior to that he was Deputy C2 and Chief of the Intelligence Fusion Center for Combined Joint Task Force Seven. A 1980 graduate of the University of Alabama, he also earned Master's Degrees from Boston University and the Air War College. His military schools include the Military Intelligence Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Command and General Staff College, and Air War College.

Major J. Michael McNealy currently serves as the Executive Officer for the 163rd Military Intelligence Battalion, Fort Hood, Texas. He previously served in Iraq as the Battle Major of the C2 Watch Desk in the Multi-National Corps-Iraq Joint Operations Center. A 1992 graduate of the University of Virginia, he also holds a Master's Degree in Information Science from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. His military schools include the Military Intelligence Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, the Combined Arms Services Staff School, and the Command and General Staff College.

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By Colonel William "Jerry" Tait, Jr.

Serving as the Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO) for a warfighting commander during combat operations is what it's all about for a Military Intelligence (MI) Officer. At whatever level—S2, G2, J2, C2, or C/J2—the SIO job in wartime is the most relevant duty an MI officer can perform. It is something I spent twenty-four years preparing for before actually being able to perform it in a combat zone. As C2 for the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) while deployed with III Corps for thirteen months during Operation Iraqi Freedom II (OIF II), I got my chance. What a professionally and personally rewarding experience it was. I want to share my experiences as MNC-I C2 because they represent the challenges facing SIOs at every level—from maneuver battalion to Combatant Command J2. The purpose of this article is to emphasize the preeminence of the "2" job and provide some hints for doing it in today's environment.

Because of my experience as a G2 and Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Chief, I have been invited to brief at the G2/ACE Chiefs Course at Fort Huachuca on numerous occasions. I always tell the class that being a "deuce" is the hardest and best job an MI officer can have. And it's true. I have spent a significant portion of my career in troop-leading assignments, and rarely have they compared with SIO work in terms of difficulty and job satisfaction. For the most part, command was more fun. After all, leading troops is the traditional role of an Army officer. But the responsibility of being the SIO for a command—providing vital analysis of the enemy situation and orchestrating critically important intelligence operations—is "Job One" for intelligence officers. And doing it in combat is the pinnacle of our business.

I will do my best to avoid reinventing the wheel or rehashing what others have said about what it takes to be a good "2," but will recommend two previous publications and then add my advice. Aspiring Army intelligence officers should read the writings of MG Richard J. Quirk III and MG (Retired) James A. "Spider" Marks for tips on being a "2." MG Quirk, then a colonel, wrote "*Intelligence for the Division—A G2 Perspective*" as his U.S. Army War College Military Studies Paper in 1992 that was based on his experiences as G2 of 24th Infantry Division in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. MG Marks, after serving as C2 of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command during Operation Iraqi Freedom, coauthored "*Six Things Every '2' Must Do—Fundamental Lessons From OIF*" with COL Steve Peterson (***MIPB***, October-December 2003). The advice of these wartime SIOs together provides an excellent reference for MI professionals.

Although my points are similar to some of the things written by Generals Quirk and Marks, they were shaped by a combat environment that they did not experience—full-spectrum counterinsurgency operations. The similarities therefore validate what a "2" should do in all settings, and the differences highlight the challenges of a new paradigm. Again, these are hints rather than a complete guide to succeeding as an SIO.

Be the Commander's Alter Ego

The "deuce" should be as close, if not closer, to the commander than any other officer on the staff. Intelligence drives and leads operations—especially in a counterinsurgency fight—so the commander and his "2" have to be tight. It's all about relationships, so

this is often dependent upon the chemistry between two people—and sometimes their previous service together. In an era when commanders may have little or no influence over who is assigned as their "2," this can be problematic. But cultivating the commander to a "deuce" relationship is something that is critical for the success of both officers—and the command.

The common denominator I saw among commanders who had outstanding intelligence organizations and operations in their units during OIF II was that they empowered their "2" to truly be the synchronizer and orchestrator of intelligence. MI unit commanders had key supporting roles, but the "2" was the focal point and trusted agent for all things related to intelligence and played a key role in most other aspects of unit activities. In Iraq, I was fortunate to work for LTG Tom Metz, whom I have known for many years and served with in various settings. Our shared experiences and long-standing rapport made it easy for us to bond as Corps commander and G2 prior to deploying—a relationship that naturally grew stronger as we served as Commanding General and C2 of MNC-I, respectively. Despite being frustrated by the challenges of intelligence collection and analysis in a complex counterinsurgency environment, LTG Metz always knew and trusted that we were doing the best possible job considering the circumstances. I attribute that not only to his insight but also to the closeness of our relationship. He certainly empowered me to lead the entire Intelligence Battlefield Operating System in MNC-I. That kind of empowerment is essential because, otherwise, the "2" is simply another staff officer with awesome responsibility and no formal authority. I had the freedom to travel with the CG whenever and wherever I wished, which greatly enhanced my ability to orchestrate intelligence operations throughout Iraq. There is no substitute for personal interaction, and I recommend that "2s" at all levels get out with their commanders whenever possible.

The bonds that develop between commanders and their intelligence officers are often so special that they cause the senior officer to choose the MI officer for other positions of trust. Currently, at least two MI colonels are executive officers for four-star generals for whom they previously served as SIOs—and there are many more examples. The bottom line is that the commander and "2" have a symbiotic existence and must be close for the unit to succeed, especially in a combat zone.

Team with the "3"

This relationship is second only to the one with the commander. As a Division G2 for two years, I had a great rapport with the two G3s with whom I served. They ensured that everything, and I mean everything, related to intelligence went through me—not as a "stovepipe," but to ensure that intelligence operations and actions were synchronized. As a Corps G2, I have that same relationship with the G3. That was important for both of us when we served as C2 and C3 of MNC-I, because intelligence not only drives and leads operations in Iraq but also often is an operation unto itself. The "3" was my battle buddy, roommate, and best friend. I saw the same closeness in many subordinate units.

This relationship may be more difficult to forge at lower levels when the "3" is significantly senior to the "2," but remains imperative. For example, a junior MI captain serving as S2 of a maneuver battalion must cultivate a real bond with the combat arms major serving as S3—and it behooves the S3 to reciprocate. The best situations I have seen are when the S3 treats the S2 like a protégé and favored younger sibling. Prudent S3s never treat the S2 like a subordinate, and good commanders and executive officers will not tolerate it when they do. Incidentally the C3 of MNC-I, COL(P) Dennis Rogers, was far senior to me and was selected for promotion to BG while we were in Iraq, but we were like brothers.

Team with Intelligence Unit Commanders

This is obvious when there is a habitual support relationship between the "2s" headquarters and an MI unit—such as a brigade combat team and its MI company, or a corps and its MI brigade. But it is less clear-cut for the "2" of a combat formation which routinely associates with no MI headquarters at its level; usually the case with maneuver battalions and now occurring with two-star modular divisions. In those situations, the "deuce" must develop good relations with intelligence unit commanders at other levels. For example, maneuver battalions in Iraq sometimes have Tactical HUMINT Teams (THTs) in direct support; those S2s should team with company and battalion commanders of the MI units that provide those THTs. The reality is that many SIOs must team with several intelligence unit commanders to be successful. While in Iraq, I worked closely with COL Foster Payne, the

504th MI Brigade Commander. As the only two MI full colonels in III Corps, we had a strong relationship when we deployed that grew stronger throughout OIF II. The affiliation between the "2" and his or her primary supporting intelligence unit commander is one of the most natural and special partnerships on the battlefield. But in Iraq, there were numerous other intelligence unit commanders with whom I dealt in my role as MNC-I C2—from the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), sister services, and elsewhere. Of course, I also had dealings with commanders of Army and Marine intelligence units in subordinate commands. Not only does the "deuce" rely on all supporting intelligence unit commanders but also they rely on him or her to interface with the senior commander on their behalf. In Iraq, it was me, not COL Payne or the other intelligence unit commanders, who saw LTG Metz multiple times a day. Our teamwork ensured the intelligence effort was synchronized and correctly represented to the MNC-I commander via me as his SIO. I saw the same methodology work in major subordinate commands.

Team with Higher, Lower, and Adjacent Intelligence Staffs

This is common sense and may appear simple, but the truth is that it's often complex and difficult to achieve. In Iraq, for example, I had to work closely with the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) C2, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) J2, CENTCOM Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) Intelligence Chief, the "2s" of some Special Operations Forces units, senior representatives of several U.S. and Coalition national intelligence agencies, and the G2s/C2s/J2s of our major subordinate commands. Most of those relationships came easily and were mutually beneficial. For example, the intelligence staff at the CAOC relied on us for the ground commander's intelligence perspective and reciprocated with unprecedented cooperation from the air component. But a few counterparts were less cooperative at times and had to be coaxed into close cooperation. Again, it's all about relationships, and we ultimately succeeded at achieving the requisite good will. It may not be surprising that complex associations had to be developed at the corps and theater levels, but is often overlooked that such relations with other intelligence staffs had to be groomed at lower echelons. Division G2s and brigade S2s certainly had to deal with national agency representatives and others in addition to higher and lower level "2s," but even battalion S2s had such challenges. I remember visiting maneuver battalion S2s in Multi-National Brigade-North (Task Force Olympia) and marveling at the partnerships they had developed with a host of supporting intelligence agencies. Army and Marine Battalion S2s in other locations I visited—like Baghdad, Fallujah, Ramadi, and Tikrit—had achieved similar success.

Cultivate "Bottom up" Intelligence Reporting

This is a major difference between major combat operations and counterinsurgency operations. In the former, high-tech intelligence systems from national (top) down are key, while the latter depends on human intelligence (HUMINT) to paint the enemy picture. Commanders have traditionally required their "2s" to assist with satisfying lower echelon units' priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), but in a counterinsurgency lower-level units can greatly assist in meeting the senior commander's PIRs. Timeliness, accuracy, and dependability are the keys to success when it comes to "bottom up" reporting. Achieving good results is difficult even with THT reporting, but overwhelmingly so when it comes to reporting from patrols and individual soldier reporting. "Every Soldier a Sensor" is a prudent philosophy, but does little good unless the information gets into the intelligence system. SIOs must focus downward to harvest good intelligence from all collectors at lower echelons. When this happens right, the results are impressive. Without getting into the classified realm, I can say that combat raids based on "bottom up" intelligence grew exponentially in number while we were in Iraq and maintained an incredibly high success rate—capturing the primary target in the vast majority of cases. That is a tribute to outstanding intelligence collection and reporting at the lowest levels, leveraged by higher headquarters to facilitate victorious combat operations. Integrating that "bottom up" reporting into the analytical process at higher levels—using the full spectrum of tools including Analyst Notebook—was key to developing useful assessments for our commanders.

Build the Intelligence Staff

The staff under the immediate control of the "2" is obviously important to the SIO's success. A small subset of the overall intelligence team, this group is an extension of the SIO and must operate on his or her behalf and that of the commander. There are two

aspects to this: first, assembling the personnel; and, second, developing them. Whenever possible, it is beneficial for an SIO to have some people on his or her staff that he or she already knows and trusts. I believe this is particularly important when the unit is destined for a combat zone and will receive many of its personnel shortly before deployment; they must fall in on a cadre of intelligence soldiers who are in synch with the "2." The lower the echelon, the more difficult it is for the "deuce" to influence who is assigned to his or her staff, but it is worth the effort to get even just one known and proven individual assigned.

Developing the intelligence staff is probably the "2's" most important pre-deployment endeavor. Making every individual—regardless of rank, experience, or prior affiliation with the SIO—an effective member of the intelligence team is imperative. This requires going beyond the normal training and exercises to coach and mentor folks to achieve their potential. When this is done effectively, the intelligence staff will gel so that the newest members of the group will feel and perform similar to those known and trusted personnel originally brought on board by the SIO.

In III Corps, I had the good fortune of influencing the assignment to G2 of a few officers and NCOs with whom I had worked previously. They were joined by others who were soon up to speed because of close cooperation between the old hands and new personnel. When we deployed as the nucleus of the intelligence staff for Combined Joint Task Force Seven (before transitioning to MNC-I), we were a cohesive group ready for the mission.

Conclusion

Serving as a "deuce" at any level can be downright painful, especially during peacetime exercises and training. One former G2 was in the spotlight so much during a series of major exercises that he said, "I wouldn't get out of an electric chair to do this again." At the National Training Center and during Battle Command Training Program Warfighter exercises, the after-action reviews (AARs) are frequently so focused on intelligence that it is often joked that the "2" might as well keep the microphone or pointer for the entire AAR. But the emphasis on intelligence reflects its incredible importance, and the contributions an SIO can make to achieving victory and saving soldiers' lives in wartime are beyond words.

COL Jerry Tait has been the G2, III Corps, since June 2003. During that time, he deployed to Iraq with III Corps headquarters for 13 months, initially serving as Deputy C2 and Chief of the Intelligence Fusion Center for Combined Joint Task Force Seven, then concurrently as C2 of Multi-National Corps-Iraq and Deputy C2 of Multi-National Force-Iraq. His previous assignments include two years as G2 of 4th Infantry Division; Commander, 104th MI Battalion; III Corps ACE Chief and G2 Planner; MI battalion S3 and XO; and two MI company commands. A 1980 graduate of the University of Alabama, he also earned Master's Degrees from Boston University and the Air War College. His military schools include the Military Intelligence Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Command and General Staff College, and Air War College.

TEACH, COACH, AND LEAD: OUR RESPONSIBILITIES AS INTELLIGENCE LEADERS TO DEVELOP FUTURE LEADERS

by Colonel Keith G. Geiger, Lieutenant Colonel Orlando W. Ortiz, and Major J. Michael McNealy

Today's Army faces a tremendous retention challenge. Deployments, high operations tempo (OPTEMPO) and reduced personnel and resources personify the future of the Army. As we undergo continuous changes in the Army structure, our life in the military has become a growing challenge even for seasoned professionals. While a single stopgap measure does not exist to address our problem, one important and singularly impacting effort to retain our officers and noncommissioned officers is through a focused professional-development and mentorship program—a program that goes beyond the standard counseling, reading program, and professional "to-do" checklist. The program should contain component elements of officer professional development in rank and grade stages and be overseen by a senior officer who has invested himself into the development of the subordinate officer.

The Intelligence Leader

Few concrete descriptions of an intelligence leader exist, and most officers invariably hold different ideas concerning the requisite qualities of an intelligence leader. However, most would agree that an ideal intelligence leader holds the line in terms of standards, is acutely informed of intelligence capabilities and processes, focuses on the mission, and selflessly leads his or her team to success while demonstrating the core Army values. This ideal leader also recognizes that he must develop the leaders beneath him. He realizes that our legacy is that of tomorrow's leaders. As a part of good leadership, focusing on the active development of our younger officers is a key attribute that all intelligence leaders must demonstrate. Without this attribute, we will leave an unfulfilled legacy and compound retention challenges as younger officers, feeling isolated and alone, seek more fulfillment, certainty, and predictability outside the U.S. Army.

Each one of us has a responsibility to develop our subordinate officers; that is, all our subordinate officers not just junior officers. All too often leaders overlook the development of the senior captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels; our responsibility to develop our leaders does not stop at the company grade level. Senior officers in our organizations should accept and embrace the opportunity to grow and nurture future leaders through direct dialogue, exposure to professional challenges, and active involvement. Contrary to sometimes unconscious thought, there is no magic crossing line an officer passes after which he or she no longer needs active mentorship, development, or attention from senior officers. The traditional role in combat arms units, that brigade commanders are responsible for training captains, and battalion commanders are responsible for training lieutenants should not serve as, and is not, the only paradigm for professional development. This is especially true in Military Intelligence (MI) units where a brigade commander may not exist in the chain of command. Professional development should be an active and combined effort with every rank, in various capacities, participating in the development of officers junior to their rank.

What's the Program?

> *"We have to care enough to make it hard for them, to challenge them beyond doing their regular jobs; to grow."*

There is no definitive program that we should subscribe to in order to develop our officers. Each officer is different and has different needs. The Army has a great product: the Junior Officer Development Support Form (JODSF). However, we use it only for our junior officers and warrant officers. While we are not proposing a mandatory version for captains and field grade officers, this is the structure

we should have in mind when we develop our senior captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels. The senior intelligence officer at each level should assess his subordinate officers to identify strengths and weaknesses, establish a blueprint for continued development, and then work with the officer to build a history of success.

The Officer Evaluation Report (OER) Support Form (DA Form 67-9-1) is also an excellent tool that leaders have at their disposal to work with their officers and address these issues. Unfortunately, rather than being an active document, intended to be revisited no less than four times per year to assess and revise, the OER Support Form has become a passive document, outlining initial goals and then, when an OER is due, retroactively capturing whatever successes occurred through the normal course of the year. We, as leaders, need to emphasize the OER Support Form as a living document and a significant tool for us to use as we develop our subordinate officers. The proper use of the OER Support Form will provide regular intervals for formal sit-down counseling which we can then augment through the normal course of business with informal counseling.

MI Islands

However, the point of this article is not to emphasize the senior rater to ratee relationship. While this relationship is the cornerstone of the intelligence professional development system, we have a large number of MI officers who do not have an intelligence leader in their rating chain. These officers, a majority of which make up the MI Corps, need to be brought into the MI "fold." Consider this, who is working on the professional intelligence development of an Infantry Battalion S2? If you answered the Brigade S2, assisted by the Division G2, that's great—if it is occurring. But in reality, the major professional development that the Battalion S2 receives will be from his maneuver battalion commander, who may or may not know how to develop an intelligence officer. The fact is we have to look up above our "organizational cubicles" and see who else is out there who can use some mentoring, coaching, and intelligence leadership. If we don't, then our legacy will not be in our hands. Look around, there are more folks out there in need of intelligence leadership than you would expect: the brigade S2 of the separate brigade at the corps level who rarely interacts with other organizations, an MI captain serving in a recruiter command position, or the MI company commander in a BCT. While no one needs permission to connect with these "islands," care and finesse should be exercised when reaching out to an Intelligence officer in an established organization and chain of command. Military courtesies should not be overlooked.

Conversely, as intelligence leaders look around for officers in need of guidance and leadership, younger officers have the responsibility to likewise search for intelligence leaders around them and identify potential mentors. Mentorship is not a given practice within the Army; officers should seek out senior leaders and begin to develop a professional relationship with them which may in turn become a mentorship experience. Regardless of whether a mentor relationship evolves, as younger officers seek out mentors, they will develop networks within their own intelligence community which will, at the minimum, provide a great deal of professional support and development.

Conclusion

The Army faces a long-term challenge to recruit and retain officers; MI is no exception. New initiatives are under consideration to entice our newest officers to remain in the Army longer and in a more stabilized fashion. These initiatives are in most part the result of trying to stem the flow out of the Army. What we need to do as intelligence leaders is care enough to develop our officers into our future leaders who will stay for the long-term. We must take time to build our younger leaders; to acknowledge our responsibilities and take action, providing insightful guidance and recommendations to subordinate officers that personalize professional and personal goals in the midst of great uncertainty. However, in order for our efforts to be successful, the younger officers must mirror our active participation; taking the initiative to seek out mentors they identify with and soliciting their guidance. They must show as much interest in their own development as we do. Dedication on behalf of both elements will undoubtedly pay long-term dividends for the Army as a whole.

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While the Army has established Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) task sets for each enlisted rank, there are no prerequisite for what "career skills" each officer rank should be able to demonstrate. Below you will find recommended skills and tasks to consider incorporating into your professional development program.

Lieutenant

- ❑ Develop your professional book which will include (but not limited to): Officer Record Brief (ORB), OERs, command philosophies, awards, orders, etc.
- ❑ Update and maintain your ORB to include use of proper position titles; overall appearance.
- ❑ Develop a professional reading program incorporating the Chief of Staff of the Army's reading list, the MI professional reading list, as well as recommendations from the chain of command and personal intellectual initiative.
- ❑ Write a book review on a quarterly basis.
- ❑ Create a military journal of daily activities to capture accomplished work, lessons learned, and other information. This journal may be of significant value in later years when developing younger officers.
- ❑ Develop a "how to" on conducting inventories.
- ❑ Prepare an Intelligence OPD.
- ❑ Develop your anticipated career pathway.
- ❑ Develop your company command philosophy.
- ❑ Learn the TDY process.
- ❑ Develop your S2 survival kit.

Captain

- ❑ Continue professional book reviews.
- ❑ Continue the military journal; develop a command book to track all work, issues, lessons learned as a company commander.
- ❑ Become familiar with the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) process.
- ❑ Develop briefing skills.
- ❑ Continue to develop your S2 "how to" kit.
- ❑ Develop counseling techniques for your lieutenants.
- ❑ Present an OPD.
- ❑ Review your anticipated career pathway; discuss the post command job.
- ❑ Revisit inventory procedures.
- ❑ Prepare for Executive Officer, S3, brigade S2 positions.

Major

- ❑ Write a professional book review, submit to ***MIPB.***
- ❑ Attend intermediate level education (ILE) in some capacity.
- ❑ Continue the professional reading program.
- ❑ Develop reviewing and editing skills at the graduate level.
- ❑ Develop counseling techniques for company commanders.
- ❑ Review career pathway; discuss career enhancing positions, joint assignments, etc.

Lieutenant Colonel

- ❑ Continue professional book review.
- ❑ Prepare for command, G2, or other senior level MI positions.
- ❑ Prepare for the Army War College.

education includes the Military Intelligence Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, Defense Language Institute Basic Spanish Course, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and the Army War College.

Lieutenant Colonel Orlando Ortiz is the Commander of the 303d Military Intelligence Battalion, Fort Hood, Texas. During Operation Iraqi Freedom II, Lieutenant Colonel Ortiz served as the Chief of Operations, C2, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, and assumed duties as the Chief of Operations, G2, upon his return in February 2005. He is a 1987 graduate of the Saint Johns University ROTC program and holds an MS in Aeronautical Science from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. His military schools include the Military Intelligence Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, the Combined Arms Services Staff School, and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

Major J. Michael McNealy currently serves as the Executive Officer for the 163rd Military Intelligence Battalion, Fort Hood, Texas. He previously served in Iraq as the Battle Major of the C2 Watch Desk in the Multi-National Corps-Iraq Joint Operations Center. A 1992 graduate of the University of Virginia, he also holds a Master's degree in Information Science from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. His military schools include the Military Intelligence Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, the Combined Arms Services Staff School, and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

Challenges in Recruiting Military Intelligence Warrant Officers

by Chief Warrant Officer Three Stephen Beckham

The program to apply for and become a U.S. Army Warrant Officer is considered to be quite challenging, not to mention the day-to-day duties of being a technical expert in any Military Intelligence (MI) field. You will know that the lives of men and women of our Armed Services could be in the balance waiting on your reply when giving that important piece of intelligence to the commander. Knowing the challenges, what could motivate the MI non-commissioned officer (NCO) to become a U.S. Army MI Warrant Officer?

There are usually just over 11,600 active duty warrant officers. That number nearly doubles when counting the warrant officers in the Army Reserve and National Guard. This number, constituting about 2 percent of the total Army strength, is spread over fifteen branches. The MI Warrant Officer Corps is the third largest branch with about six to seven percent of the total Warrant Officer Corps.

It is no secret that MI soldiers are well known for wanting the "why" answered before making decisions. After all, it is one of the five "Ws" that we develop our intelligence around. My purpose in this article is to try to give the MI enlisted soldier the reasons "why" I became a warrant officer. Before I go into my reasons, I want to offer some background into the largely unknown efforts to fill the ranks of the smallest corps in the Army.

Recruiting

In the past, recruitment of future warrant officers was accomplished by warrant officers through word-of-mouth. Today, the U. S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) sponsors a six-person team of three warrant officers and three senior NCOs at Fort Knox, Kentucky. Their fulltime mission is to actively recruit between 1,300 to 1,400 soldiers for fourteen of the branches through email, telephone, and recruiting trips worldwide in order to maintain the entire Warrant Officer Corps. I currently represent the MI Corps at USAREC. Through maintaining MI representation at the Headquarters USAREC, it ensures that the MI mission for warrant officer accessions has an agent on the inside.

The Application Process

The application process itself is quite easy although sometimes it can be very time consuming, especially for those soldiers who are deployed or have elements of their unit deployed. The most difficult part of the process could be getting the physical examination and letters of recommendation, especially once deployed. Most MI missions require some separation of the command and its support elements and there are very few facilities available to obtain a complete physical examination in the CENTCOM region. So if you are thinking about applying and your unit is due to rotate, you should start work on both of these items.

USAREC has already made it easier for applicants to apply while deployed worldwide. The most recent change was to allow applications to be sent to USAREC via Digital Senders. The physical has been removed as part of the application packet and replaced with a physical coversheet for the applicant's privacy. The Department of the Army (DA) photograph can be made at a professional studio in lieu of a DA Visual Information facility or soldiers can include a photograph in Desert Camouflage Uniform if they are already deployed. Several other initiatives include accepting facsimile (fax) copies and documents sent by email and allowing applicants to resubmit their packets immediately after the second non-selection. The overall goal is to have a totally paperless process by FY 07.

Applicants should keep these considerations in mind when submitting their packet. First of all, neatness in a packet should always be a priority. A packet or packet updates should not be submitted by fax if there is ample time to complete the process through regular mail. If you resubmit your packet, be sure to update photographs, Enlisted Record Briefs and resumes. The process was not simplified so soldiers could take shortcuts, but to make it easier for soldiers to follow through while in combat zones.

Making the Decision

So, if it is easier to apply now and the MI fields have had very high selection rates, you might wonder where the major problem with the recruiting mission lies. Most of the attention for the program is focused on the three DA controlled processes (which are covered in **DA Circular 601-99-1, Warrant Officer Procurement Program**, 23 April 1999):

- ❑ Application processing.
- ❑ The selection board.
- ❑ The Warrant Officer Candidate School (WOCS).

The fourth, the most important part of the overall process, is the decision by an NCO to put the application together. It is sometimes taken lightly by leaders, but could be the hardest part for some soldiers since this decision involves their future, their family, and many other unknowns to include the possibility of rejection from the selection board.

This is where the Army has no control or input; it cannot just make a policy that will inspire soldiers to apply. The Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) made over forty-four suggestions to improve the Warrant Officer Corps through better pay, better training, and a more defined role as a fully integrated commissioned officer in today's Army. It will take several more years before the recruiting effort will feel the effect and benefit from these suggestions as they are implemented throughout the Army.

It is incumbent upon the leaders within the Army to get involved up front so the NCO receives the support needed to make the decision to apply. Through surveys we have found that up to 48 percent of the applicants apply because a senior warrant officer or commander approached them and suggested they were warrant officer material. It is very inspirational for soldiers to hear from their senior leadership that they are respected, that they have officer potential, and that someone senior has recommended they should apply to be a warrant officer. This is where we need our leaders to step in and fill the gap until the full effect of the ATLDP is felt in the field.

The Target Audience

Senior NCOs. The most qualified to apply are usually those senior NCOs who have the most experience and leadership time, but who usually feel that it will be like starting over or going backwards in their career. It is important to explain to them that it is still a step forward no matter how secure they are in their current status. Some wait because the timing is not right; they want to see the results of the next promotion board; or they feel that they may not be qualified; some may have had youthful indiscretions that they feel automatically disqualifies them—the list of reasons goes on. Unfortunately these NCOs wait until they are too far along in their careers when the Army will not let them transition. Although they may be more qualified due to the experience, there is a very important balance in the recruiting of the senior NCO. The Army has a stated goal of accessing these soldiers between their sixth and eight year of service.

Junior Troops. There are many junior troops who apply who will not yet have the experience to be fully qualified. Most will apply and become discouraged when they are "non-selected" and turn bitter towards the program. These individuals need to find a way to accept the evaluation they went through and find ways to improve their chances for a future opportunity. This may include education through correspondence, college, or online training courses; seeking the hard jobs; and seeking out a senior warrant officer as a mentor.

Mid-grade NCOs. Then there are the mid-grade NCOs who meet all the qualifications, but are at that awkward

stage between seven and ten years of service. This is the "should I stay or should I go" phase of every soldier's career. We approach that magical tenth year where we decide to become a "lifer" or decide to get out and go back into the civilian work force. This is the target audience that the Army is finding the most problems with in retention but it is also the target audience from which the best selections for the warrant officer program are made.

The challenge for the recruiting team is to reach out to these career soldiers in this seven to ten-year range and convince them to apply. It is even more challenging in the MI, Special Forces, and Criminal Investigation branches. These soldiers are offered other opportunities to include high paying civilian jobs, special incentive duty pays and, in some cases, quicker promotion opportunities in their enlisted field. Coupled with the avoidance of the dreaded WOCS and given the sometimes more comfortable enlisted careers, these soldiers see the warrant officer program as an easily avoided hassle.

Other Challenges

Another challenge comes from bitterness of those who were non-selected and now speak out against the program. Those who do not get selected should realize that it was nothing personal against them or their packet. The fact that their packet made it through the board process means that they were qualified; about 25 percent of the application packets are returned to soldiers, never reaching the board. These soldiers should get with a senior warrant to review their packet and try to discover what may have held them back, fix the issues, and then reapply.

Other challenges come from a senior NCO opinion that "going warrant" means abandoning the NCO Corps. Many Sergeants Major and commanders have benefited from having a squared-away NCO "go warrant" and then came back to be a leader, a mentor, a continuity piece for those sections that had junior NCO leadership.

Personal Thoughts

I truly believe in the warrant officer program and there are several reasons to apply, but it isn't right for everyone. The top three reasons I can give from personal experience but which may not apply to everyone are—

- *Promotion potential*. Promotions for SFC, MSG, and CSM have been at or below 30 percent, 14 percent, and 11 percent respectively. Promotions for CW2, CW3, and CW4 ranks have leveled off at 90 percent and higher over the last three years. I do not want to suggest that money is a good reason, but the retirement pay difference between an enlisted and warrant officer rank made a big difference in my decision.
- *Job satisfaction*. I always enjoyed working in the maintenance shop as a 33T (EW/Intercept Tactical System Repairer). As I moved up through the ranks, I experienced the responsibilities of Platoon Sergeant and Staff Sergeant. There is nothing wrong with moving up through the senior NCO ranks, but it took me away from that which I joined for and desired to stay in—electronics maintenance. After becoming a 353A (Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Technician), I have been in a maintenance role in every assignment until my assignment to USAREC.
- *Pride, respect, and the knowledge that your voice is heard*. As an NCO I rarely witnessed command respect for NCO experience and recommendations the way I saw it happen with warrant officers. I often witnessed the warrant officer with the right answers receiving the respect and sometimes envy from every level of soldier in the room.

So what does your future hold and where do you fit in? Are you a leader who can influence a great NCO with his or her decision? Are you that NCO who cannot make the final decision? Are you the Advanced Individual Training (AIT) student who wants to set a four to five-year goal to become eligible and apply once qualified? The key at this point is *communication, planning,* and *follow through*.

Any interested soldier can contact me at USAREC at 502-626-0271 or DSN 536-0271 or stephen.beckham@usarec.army.mil.

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Defining the Role of the Warrant Officer



by Chief Warrant Officer Five Michael Guzy

Two major events have occurred within the Warrant Officer Corps recently that have changed the perceived role of warrant officers (WOs). These events were the commissioning of WOs into the various branches of the U.S. Army and the significant rise in numbers of technical WOs.

These events (and a few others), without a more defined Army follow-on plan for WO roles and professional development, have clouded the understanding of the new roles of the WO. **DA PAM 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management**, dated 14 October 2005, makes a good start at addressing these WO roles. This article will offer a recommendation expanding the stated roles of the WO by function and task in several critical areas for each WO rank. [1]

The current definition of a WO as stated in **DA PAM 600-3** is "The Army WO is a self–aware and adaptive technical expert, combat leader, trainer, and advisor. Through progressive levels of expertise in assignments, training, and education, the WO administers, manages, maintains, operates, and integrates Army systems and equipment across the full spectrum of Army operations. WOs are innovative integrators of emerging technologies, dynamic teachers, confident warfighters, and developers of specialized teams of soldiers. They support a wide range of Army missions throughout their career. WOs in the Army are accessed with specific levels of technical ability. They refine their technical expertise and develop their leadership and management skills through tiered progressive assignment and education." [2]

Recommendations

The following is the stated definition of the WO by rank and my recommendations for role and task enhancements to that rank.

Warrant Officer One (WO1). An officer appointed by warrant with the requisite authority pursuant to assignment level and position given by the Secretary of the Army. WO1s are basic level, technically focused officers who perform the primary duties of technical leader, trainer, operator, manager, maintainer, and sustainer. They also perform any other branch-related duties assigned to them. They provide direction, guidance, resources, assistance, and supervision necessary for subordinates to perform their duties. WO1s have specific responsibility for accomplishing the missions and tasks assigned to them and, if assigned as a commander, the collective or organizational responsibility for how well their command performs its mission. WO1s primarily support levels of operations from team through battalion, requiring interaction with all soldier cohorts and primary staff. They provide leader development, mentorship, and counsel to enlisted soldiers and NCOs. [3]

My additions to the entry level WO skill sets are—

Communicator. Applies basic military writing structure, grammar, style, and content to produce information papers. Creates information briefings using multimedia. Applies the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) for problem solving.

Trainer. Instructs technical subjects at the entry level and applies automated system skills to classroom instruction.

Operator. Applies basic skills to operate systems and perform activities in support of organizational missions.

Maintainer. Supervises maintenance personnel to keep equipment and systems in a state of operational readiness.

Administrator. Applies basic understanding of personnel, logistics, information management, organizational operations, training support, and budget management.

Manager. Applies basic understanding of regulations and policies governing the Army. Manages assigned projects. Applies risk management procedures. Assesses readiness. Stays abreast of evolving technology. Provides input to the immediate chain of command.

Integrator. Coordinates basic functions and interoperability of Army systems at the unit level.

Advisor. Provides technical and tactical advice in their related fields of expertise to the immediate command structure.

Leader. Influences others by providing purpose, direction, team building, and motivation.

Mentor. Expands on professional development through increased responsibilities and develops basic mentoring and counseling skills.

Chief Warrant Officer 2 (CW2). A commissioned officer with the requisite authority pursuant to assignment level and position as given by the President of the United States. CW2s are intermediate level technical and tactical experts who perform the primary duties of technical leader, trainer, operator, manager, maintainer, sustainer, and advisor. They also perform any other branch-related duties assigned to them. They provide direction, guidance, resources, assistance, and supervision necessary for subordinates to perform their duties. They have specific responsibility for accomplishing the missions and tasks assigned to them and, if assigned as a commander, the collective or organizational responsibility for how well their command performs its mission. CW2s primarily support levels of operations from team through battalion, requiring interaction with all soldier cohorts and primary staff. They provide leader development, mentorship, advice, and counsel to NCOs, other WOs, and company-grade branch officers. [4]

My additions to the intermediate level WO skill sets are—

Communicator. Analyzes and interprets military documents, essays, and mission briefings. Conducts research to aid in problem solving.

Trainer. Executes training in technical fields, trains all aspects in specified work environments, and develops training materials.

Operator. Applies technical expertise based on equipment, activities, and systems in support of organizational missions.

Maintainer. Applies maintenance standards for equipment and provides technical knowledge to commanders.

Administrator. Applies supervisory skills and utilizes existing regulations necessary to execute assigned missions.

Manager. Applies management principles by monitoring unit readiness, risk management, and new technologies. Utilizes basic budget management procedures, available supplies, and equipment to accomplish the mission.

Integrator. Supervises incorporation of new technology and ensures interoperability at unit and staff level.

Advisor. Provides technical and tactical advice utilizing staff procedures to provide information to the appropriate level of command.

Leader. Applies increasing leadership skills, identifies duties and responsibilities at the intermediate level, and utilizes the ethical decision making process.

Mentor. Promotes professional development and performance of soldiers as well as provides feedback through individual counseling.

Chief Warrant Officer 3 (CW3). A commissioned officer with the requisite authority pursuant to assignment level and position as given by the President of

the United States. CW3s are advanced level technical and tactical experts who perform the primary duties of technical leader, trainer, operator, manager, maintainer, sustainer, integrator, and advisor. They also perform any other branch-related duties assigned to them. They provide direction, guidance, resources, assistance, and supervision necessary for subordinates to perform their duties. CW3s have specific responsibility for accomplishing the missions and tasks assigned to them and, if assigned as a commander, the collective or organizational responsibility for how well their command performs its mission. CW3s primarily support levels of operations from team through brigade, requiring interaction with all soldier cohorts and primary staff. They provide leader development, mentorship, advice, and counsel to NCOs, other WOs, and branch officers. CW3s advise commanders on WO issues. [5]

My additions to the advanced level WO skill sets are:

Communicator. Conducts research based staff studies, publishes results, and briefs at appropriate command levels.

Trainer. Establishes training time requirements, develops performance objectives and training aids to conduct courses of instruction.

Operator. Applies staff level tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in support of organizational missions.

Maintainer. Executes supervisory responsibilities and establishes work priorities that comply with technical requirements,

Administrator. Applies skills necessary to effect multidimensional coordination between staff agencies.

Manager. Manages staff projects and production of reports, plans, and briefs. Coordinates organic and nonorganic assets and executes command intent.

Integrator. Integrates and evaluates staff level systems, functions, and processes in technical fields.

Advisor. Conducts research and participates in staff functions to provide information to the appropriate level of command. Employs problem solving techniques to evaluate outcomes and determine courses of action.

Leader. Fosters soldiers' abilities to lead, build teams, and evaluate performance. Implements force protection and risk management measures to ensure safety of soldiers and their compliance to mission requirements.

Mentor. Implements counseling and mentoring networks and career development programs.

Chief Warrant Officer 4 (CW4). A commissioned officer with the requisite authority pursuant to assignment level and position as given by the President of the United States. CW4s are senior level technical and tactical experts who perform the primary duties of technical leader, manager, maintainer, sustainer, integrator and advisor. They also perform any other branch-related duties assigned to them. They provide direction, guidance, resources, assistance, and supervision necessary for subordinates to perform their duties. CW4s have specific responsibility for accomplishing the missions and tasks assigned to them and, if assigned as a commander, has collective or organizational responsibility for how well their command performs its mission. They primarily support battalion, brigade, division, corps, and echelons above corps operations. They must interact with NCOs, other officers, primary staff) and special staff. CW4s primarily provide leader development, mentorship, advice, and counsel to NCOs, other WOs, and branch officers. They have special mentorship responsibilities for other WOs and provide essential advice to commanders on WO issues. [6]

My additions to the senior level WO skill sets are—

Communicator. Writes executive reports for studies on Army issues and project proposals. Prepares and presents senior level briefings.

Trainer. Implements training in the technical field, utilizes TTPs to train and evaluate subordinates, and employs the train-the-trainer methodology.

Operator. Implements operational standards utilizing TTPs to accomplish higher echelon missions.

Maintainer. Maintains proficiency in existing systems. Implements emerging technologies for the Objective Force.

Administrator. Applies executive level skills necessary to plan, organize, and control all assigned projects or missions. Utilizes training support, personnel, and budget and procurement systems.

Manager. Manages personnel, resource allocation, support activities, and technical systems.

Integrator. Integrates new technology into existing operations at the senior level. Ensures interoperability of systems, functions, and processes.

Advisor. Provides advice through systems planning and coordination, analyzes current trends and predicts future requirements for command review. Interfaces between the proponent, the research and development (R&D) community, and the user.

Leader. Serves in command and staff positions, develops and implements leadership programs, and imparts critical skills to subordinates.

Mentor. Develops and executes the counseling program for leader development.

Chief Warrant Officer 5 (CW5). A commissioned officer with the requisite authority pursuant to assignment level and position as given by the President of the United States. CW5s are master level technical and tactical experts who perform the primary duties of technical leader, manager, integrator, advisor, or any other particular duty prescribed by branch. They provide direction, guidance, resources, assistance, and supervision necessary for subordinates to perform their duties. CW5s have specific responsibility for accomplishing the missions and tasks assigned to them. CW5s primarily support brigade, division, corps, echelons above corps, and major command operations. They must interact with NCOs, other officers, primary staff and special staff. They provide leader development, mentorship, advice, and counsel to WOs and branch officers. CW5s have special WO leadership and representation responsibilities within their respective commands. They provide essential advice to commanders on WO issues.

Additional master level WO skill sets are—

Communicator. Executes and manages the components and elements of military writing and briefing program at all levels.

Trainer. Develops and manages training standards in proponent and related MOSs.

Operator. Manages operational standards of the Army's equipment, activities, and technical systems. Develops policy and guidance for systems operation at all levels.

Maintainer. Integrates the Army's equipment and maintenance support. Identifies systemic problems and implements solutions.

Administrator. Executes and manages in a multidimensional environment at the Department of the Army, Major Army Command, Joint and Multinational levels. Reviews, validates, and writes policy recommendations and serves as systems planner.

Manager. Serves as program or project manager, and monitors critical readiness indicators to support overall command readiness. Manages personnel, resource allocation, support activities, and technical systems at Department of the Army, Major Army Commands, and joint/combined service levels.

Integrator. Manages and evaluates systems integration at the highest level.

Advisor. Provides subject matter expertise for objective force integration. Advises senior commanders on issues relevant to the integration of Army, joint services, and allied forces systems, equipment, personnel, and procedures.

Leader. Provides WO representation at senior levels. Commands unit and task forces. Provides leadership and organizational continuity and solves problems at all levels.

Mentor. Manages the professional development program pertaining to assignments and utilization.

Professional Development

The Army has developed additional leadership training for WOs over the last twenty years, but few additional technical training or other opportunities to maintain and expand their technical capabilities and their placement in assignments. It is my hope that with this information that the Army can focus the development for both leadership and technical training, as well as assignment placement for WOs, similarly to the career development program established for the traditional Branch officer.

I would further suggest that if the Army, after almost 100 years, cannot specifically define, train, develop and task the WO by grades, that it should consider what the U.S. Air Force (USAF) did in 1959. **"WOs are not sufficiently flexible for utilization outside of their technical specialty . . . Furthermore, officers provide the flexibility for use in a broad span of managerial and career broadening assignments, which are necessary to meet requirements . . ."** As a result, the USAF determined that structure, training, and retention

requirements were best served by "eliminating its WO program."

Endnotes

1. These recommendations were the result of a team project for the Warrant Officer Senior Staff Course in 2002.

2. **DA Pam 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management**, October 2005, 14.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., 15.

6. Ibid.

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The 2006 Army National Guard G2/S2 Workshop–Applauding Military Intelligence, A Total Team Effort

The Army National Guard will hold the 2006 Army National Guard G2/S2 Workshop on 7 and 8 April 2006, hosted by the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. The focus of the workshop is "*Military Intelligence–A Total Team Effort*." This workshop will applaud the successes of Military Intelligence (MI) in the Army as the Army National Guard, U.S. Army Reserve, and the U.S. Army Active Component teamed up to meet and fulfill mission requirements on the battlefield. The workshop will also explore ways to maintain these successes in the future.

Keynote addresses are scheduled to be provided by the Director of the Army National Guard, and the Deputy Chief of Staff, G2, Department of the Army. Insights will also be provided by the Commanding General, USAIC&FH, the Command Sergeant Major of the MI Corps, and the U.S. Army Forces Command G2. Briefings will be provided by a Division G2, a Brigade Combat Team S2, and a Tactical Exploitation Battalion commander from the Army National Guard, all of whom have recently redeployed from Iraq.

Teamwork is an essential ingredient for the success of any operation. A key component in this team effort is the support provided by all staff sections. Each staff section in an organization must not only understand the desired objectives but also how to achieve the end state. Cohesiveness among all staff sections is paramount to ensure mission success. This workshop will also focus on all the staff sections in the Army National Guard that enable MI mission success. Presentations are scheduled to be provided by Strength Maintenance, Training, Force Structure, Acquisition, and Operations organizations within the Army National Guard. Each of these organizations provides a valuable service to the readiness of MI in the Army National Guard.

Conference information and registration are available on the Guard Knowledge Online by accessing the Army National Guard link to the Operations Division, Intelligence and Security Branch web site or by contacting Major Jaime Castillo at jaime.b.castillo@ng.army.mil.

Seeks Original Essays: Get Published, Win Money, Contribute to the Cause

For the 2006 General William E. DePuy Professional Military Writing Competition, *Military Review* seeks original essays on subjects of current concern to the U.S. Army. This contest is open to all.

The Global War on Terror, evolving threats, force reform, insurgency and counterinsurgency, cultural awareness in military operations, tanks in urban combat, transitioning from combat to stability and support operations, ethical challenges in counterinsurgency, historical parallels to current operations, better ways to man the force—the possible topics are limitless.

Winning papers will be carefully researched, analytically oriented critiques, proposals, or relevant case histories that show evidence of imaginative, even unconventional, thinking. Submissions should be 3,500 to 5,000 words long.

First prize is featured publication in the May-June 2006 edition of *Military Review,* a $500 honorarium, and a framed certificate. Second and third prizes offer publication in *Military Review,* a $250 honorarium, and a certificate. Honorable mention designees will be given special consideration for publication and certificates.

Essays should be submitted with an enrollment form not later than 1 April 2006 to *Military Review*, ATTN: Competition, 294 Grant Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1254, or via email to milrevweb@leavenworth.army.mil (Subject: Competition). For a copy of the enrollment form and additional information, visit *Military Review*'s website at http://www.leavenworth.army.mil/milrev/.

Announcing the Inaugural Combined Arms Center Commanding General's 2006 Special Topics Writing Competition: "Countering Insurgency"

"The 'expert' thing just kills me. I thought I understood something about counterinsurgency, until I started doing it."

- LTC John A. Nagl, author, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*

The Army absolutely needs to understand more about counterinsurgency (COIN)—nothing less than the future of the civilized world may depend on it. If you have something smart to contribute, submit it to the Combined Arms Center Commanding General's 2006 Special Topics Writing Competition: "Countering Insurgency." The possible topics are near-limitless: relevant historical studies, cultural considerations, gaining and sustaining public support, ethical challenges, enhancing COIN coalition operations, transitioning from combat to nation-building, tactical and strategic issues, armor in COIN, winning hearts and minds, the battles for Fallujah, "lawfare," etcetera (for more ideas, see the contest rules, enclosure 3, at militaryreview.army.mil).

Winning papers will be well-written, carefully researched, analytically oriented critiques, proposals, or relevant case histories that show evidence of imaginative, even unconventional, thinking. Submissions should be approximately 3,500 to 5,000 words long.

First prize is $1,000, featured publication in the Combined Arms Center's *Military Review,* and a certificate of recognition signed by the commanding general, LTG David Petraeus. Second prize is $500, publication, and a signed certificate. Third prize is $250, publication, and a certificate. Fourth prize is $250, special consideration for publication, and a certificate.

Essays should be submitted with an enrollment form not later than 1 April 2006 to *Military Review*, ATTN: COIN, 294 Grant Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1254, or via email to milrevweb@leavenworth.army.mil (Subject: COIN). For a copy of the enrollment form and additional information, visit the *Military Review* website or call (913) 684-9330.

Focusing on the Critical, Not the Urgent

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Departments of the Army and Defense, or the U.S. Government.

by Jack Kem, Colonel (Retired)

"When you focus on the urgent tasks at hand, the critical tasks fall behind."

There simply isn't enough time to do everything that we want to do—so we must focus on the things that we *must* do. This is the prevailing idea that underpins several of our concepts in the Army, especially the concepts of the Mission Essential Task List (METL), the Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs), and the specific intelligence related concept of priority intelligence requirements (PIRs). Each of these concepts are developed by the staff and approved by commanders to provide focus and unity of vision in a unit, describing the tasks and requirements that *must* be met.

Frequently, however, commanders and staff alike develop these great tools to provide focus on the critical tasks and then get consumed with the urgent tasks, the 25-meter targets that continually "pop up" and need immediate attention. Focusing on the urgent tasks, or even worse yet, trying to get everything done, ensures that the critical "must do" tasks will take a back seat. *When everything seems to be the priority, there are no priorities.*

At the beginning of his tenure, one of the generals on post stated that "great units do everything well–the grass in the unit areas is cut, the motor pools are policed, PT scores are high, and soldiers look good." Net result: training and the important warfighting tasks were put on the back burner, and visible appearance issues became the priority for some units. No doubt that's not what the general meant, but it's what he got because of his stated definition of a great unit.

The real question is how do units focus on the critical? Here are some steps to help maintain that focus:

- **Commander's involvement**. The PIR cannot just be what the intelligence officer developed; they have to be approved by a commander who is actively involved in the development of the PIR. After all, they are the commander's, not the staff's PIR. Commanders have to be deeply involved in METL development; they have to ensure that the METL is an accurate reflection of the truly important tasks for the mission. In the same way, the CCIR has to be what the commander truly needs to know for mission accomplishment.
- **Keep the critical lists (METL, CCIR, PIR) to a minimum**. Preferably the METL and PIRs should be no more than five to six different items, which is a number low enough that they can be easily communicated and *remembered*. CCIRs (which includes PIRs and Friendly Force Information Requirements, or FFIRs) should be no more than ten items. Staff officers should be able to give the METL of a unit off the top of their heads; intelligence analysts should be able to tell you what the PIRs are without having to refer to a piece of paper. Battle Captains and Battle Staff NCOs should

be able to tell you what items are on the CCIR. If these lists are not inherently known or understood, then the risk is that the focus will be lost in training and operations.

- **Identify non-critical tasks**. Tasks which are not critical have to be explicitly identified. This is the hardest task, as well as the task that is rarely done. To ensure that you do not focus on everything, it is wise to determine those things that can be handled by a standing operating procedure (SOP), or are tasks of lesser importance (such as Intelligence Requirements, or IRs). It's also not a bad idea to identify those tasks that simply will not be done because they detract from the real priorities. There will never be enough intelligence assets to provide surveillance everywhere, so it makes sense to identify where there will be intelligence gaps. You cannot train on everything, so it is best to identify those areas you simply will not commit training resources and time to. Commanders also have to be involved in this process. In some cases, this will involve risk; in other cases, it is a case of common sense. *If commanders don't get involved in determining priorities and where risk is assumed, subordinates will do it by necessity.*

At the monthly G3/S3 conference at the division headquarters, the division Commander addressed the S3s throughout the division and told them, "I know I've given you a hundred balls to juggle and keep up in the air—but you don't have the authority to drop a single one of them." For the remainder of the CG's tenure, the standard greeting among S3s in the division was "hide the dropped balls."

- **Reassess continually**. Priorities change, and so our lists of priorities must be continually updated. METLs must be assessed continually—not just for training status but also for relevance to the wartime mission. PIRs and CCIRs must also be assessed continually, as some requirements are fulfilled and other requirements become more important. The assessment must be continual, and there has to be a set time to address whether or not the priorities are still correct.
- **Remind constantly**. Even though staff officers should be able to recite the METL off the top of their heads, it's also best to keep constant reminders evident. PIRs should be posted in prominent places. This helps to ensure that the reassessment is continual and provide a constant reminder of the priorities in the unit.

Mission Essential Task List (METL)

Field Manual 7-0, Training the Force, provides the doctrinal basis for determining the METL. Paragraph 3-1 in FM 7-0 states "the commander must identify those tasks that are essential to accomplishing the organization's wartime operational mission." Tasks are kept to a minimum; paragraph 3-3 states that "the METL development process reduces the number of tasks the organization must train and focuses the organization's training efforts on the most important collective training tasks required to accomplish the mission"; paragraph 3-16 states that the commander "narrows down the list of all derived tasks to those tasks critical for mission accomplishment." Doctrine also addresses those tasks that are "urgent, but not critical" in paragraph 4-16:

Senior leaders at all echelons eliminate nonessential activities that detract from METL-based training. In peacetime, however, certain activities occur that do not directly relate to an organization's wartime mission but are important to other Army priorities. Senior leaders limit these peacetime activities to the maximum extent possible. Those that are absolutely essential are included in long-range planning documents. When assigned these activities, commanders continually seek mission related training opportunities.

Finally, there must be constant reassessment and reminding of the METL within an organization. Paragraph 3-4 states that applying the METL development "provides a forum for professional discussion and leader development among senior, subordinate and adjacent (peer) commanders concerning the linkage between mission and training; enables subordinate commanders and key NCOs to crosswalk collective, leader and individual tasks to the mission; and leads to 'buy-in' and commitment of unit leaders to the organization's training plan."

Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR)

Field Manual 3-0, Operations, and **Field Manual 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production**, provide the doctrinal basis for determining CCIRs. Paragraph 11-39 in FM 3-0 states, "the commander's critical information requirements are elements of information required by com-

manders that directly affect decision making and dictate the successful execution of military operations." Paragraph 11-40 in FM 3-0 states that "CCIR directly support the commander's vision of the battle, commanders develop them personally," while paragraph 3-26 in FM 5-0 states clearly that "CCIR belong to the commander alone." Paragraph 11-40 in FM 3-0 defines CCIR as "two types of supporting information requirements: friendly force information requirements (FFIR) and PIR," although Joint Doctrine in **Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 (Revision First Draft)** on page III-41 states that for CCIR "the key subcomponents are priority intelligence requirements, friendly force information requirements, and essential elements of friendly information (EEFI)."

Doctrine also addresses keeping the CCIR to a minimum. JP 3-0 (RFD) states that CCIR "are normally limited in number." FM 5-0, in paragraphs 3-25 and 3-26, states that "in all cases, the fewer the CCIR, the better the staff can focus its efforts and allocate scarce resources" and to "keep the number of recommended CCIR to a minimum." Paragraph 3-79 of FM 5-0 provides specific information by stating "the CCIR should be limited to 10 or less at any given time to enhance comprehension."

CCIRs should also help to determine those items that are not critical; paragraph 3-29 in FM 5-0 states "CCIR also help screen the type and amount of information reported directly to the commander." Both FM 3-0 (paragraph 11-41) and FM 5-0 (paragraph 3-29) emphasize focusing on critical information by stating that "CCIR must be focused enough to generate relevant information. Unfocused requests, such as "I need to know if the enemy moves," may provide data but not much useable information." Paragraph 3-79 in FM 3-0 also indicates the coordination that is inherent in CCIR by helping to "focus the efforts for his subordinates and staff, assist in the allocation of resources, and assist staff officers in making recommendations."

Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR)

Field Manual 2-0, Intelligence, provides the doctrinal basis for determining PIR. As a subset of CCIR, PIR also belong to the commander. Paragraph 1-32 in FM 2-0 states that "the commander designates intelligence requirements tied directly to his decisions as CCIR," while paragraph 1-33 states that the PIR do not become CCIR "until approved by the commander." Since PIR belong to the commander, paragraph 1-33 also recognizes that "the commander may unilaterally designate PIRs."

As noted above, paragraph 3-79 of FM 5-0 provides specific information by stating "the CCIR should be limited to 10 or less at any given time to enhance comprehension." Since PIR are a subset of CCIR, this leaves the "fair share" of PIR to five or six requirements. One way to keep this number down is to ensure that PIRs are specifically associated with a decision to be made by the commander (FM 2-0, paragraph 1-32).

Identifying non-critical tasks is probably the most difficult in PIR development. Intelligence requirements (IR) are developed and the critical requirements, in the eyes of the commander, are designated as PIR. The tendency is to develop a detailed list of all of the possible requirements and then to send these requirements out to the collectors, who in turn feel that they have been tasked to "collect on everything." The key issue is that collectors need to know when to move on to the critical, and leave the urgent (or even worse, the available) behind.

Reassessment of PIR should also be continual. The use of the "latest time information is of value" (LTIOV) helps to assist this process. PIR and IR should be continually updated to reflect when requirements have been met or when the requirement no longer exists.

Summary

These steps should help you focus on the critical tasks at hand and not dwell on the urgent:

- ❑ Commander's involvement.
- ❑ Keep the critical lists (METL, CCIR, PIR) to a minimum.
- ❑ Identify non-critical tasks.
- ❑ Reassess continually.
- ❑ Remind constantly.

These steps will not always keep you focused, but they will go a long way to keep priorities straight. The Army's Leadership Manual, **FM 22-100**, states in paragraphs 5-28 and 5-29 that—

As a leader, you must also set priorities. If you give your subordinates a list of things to do and say "They're all important," you may be trying to say something about urgency. But the message you actually send is "I can't decide which of these are most important, so I'll just lean on you and see what happens." Sometimes all courses of action may appear equally good (or equally bad) and that any decision will be equally right (or equally wrong). Situations like that may tempt you to sit

on the fence, to make no decision and let things work themselves out. Occasionally that may be appropriate; remember that decision making involves judgment, knowing *whether* to decide. More often, things left to themselves go from bad to worse. In such situations, the decision you make may be less important than simply deciding to do something. Leaders must have the personal courage to say which tasks are more important than others. In the absence of a clear priority, you must set one; not everything can be a top priority, and you can't make progress without making decisions.

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Leading the Light Infantry Brigade Combat Team's Military Intelligence Company

Photo provided by PFC Kelly K. McDowell, 2nd BDE Combat Team PAO.

by Captain Jerry Moon

We, as the collective Military Intelligence (MI) Corps must resist the urge to morph the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) only company grade "green tab" MI leader, the MI company commander, into just another staff officer.

> *No leader ever managed a unit to take a hill…they were lead there.*
>
> *—General Nathan Forrest, U.S. Confederate Army*

Under the current Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) of a Light Infantry BCT, we have witnessed an incredible growth in the number of MI officers assigned to the BCT S2 shop. We are now authorized six officers within the S2 Section with expertise in multiple disciplines to include Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), and All-Source Intelligence (ASI). When coupled with the noncommissioned officers and enlisted soldier numbers, the team grows to twenty knowledge hungry intelligence professionals. This group, which now includes the Analysis and Control Team-Enclave (ACT-E) (in the MI company under the previous MTOE), more than meets the maneuver commander's requirement for the collection, analysis, production and dissemination of the BCT's tactical intelligence.

> *Leadership is intangible, and therefore no weapon ever designed can replace it.*
>
> *—General Omar Bradley*

Having recently completed a Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRX) rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) reinforced the importance of the "Out Front" placement of the MI company leadership on today's non-linear battlefield. Any MI team that conducts deliberate mission planning and preparation must be afforded the adequate time and diligent oversight by their respective leaders. Without this direct leadership involvement in the mission planning cycle, disastrous results are predictable that could well mean loss of life or a compromise in our intelligence mission. MI company leaders are obligated to ensure all tactical intelligence team members of the MI company are conducting comprehensive Pre-Combat Checks (PCCs) and Pre-Combat Inspections (PCIs). While the PCCs are the business of team leaders, the PCIs are clearly the duty and responsibility of the

MI company commander and the first sergeant. An objective look at the currently employed contemporary operating environment highlights the importance of mission rehearsals and back-briefs, the conduct of battle drills, the development of a contingency plan, and so forth.

When in war, men must die, they can't be managed to their deaths, they must be led.

—Colonel Dandridge "Mike" Malone, U.S. Army, Infantry

A workable balance must be found between the brigade S2's understanding of the MI company current level of readiness, as well as the separate intelligence discipline collector's unique capabilities and limitations. It is the responsibility of the MI company commander to inform the brigade commander and his staff of the company's current status. He must also assist the battalion level commanders, and their respective staff by recommending employment of what is often the BCT's single collection platform within a specific intelligence discipline. Experience in both Iraq and Afghanistan has proven to me that many missions are doomed from the start due to the simple lack of leader involvement in the critical tasks of rehearsals and inspections; all of which take place before the MI company soldier has even left the Forward Operating Base (FOB) front gates.

People cannot be managed. Inventories can be managed, but people must be led.

—Ross Perot

Given the current mission profile of the BCT's MI company, company level leadership is a critical component to successful execution of the BCT's intelligence requirements. In concert with the brigade staff, the MI company leaders must be able to plan, rehearse, collect, and report information of value, often all at the same time. As an example: While a Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (TUAV) is flying in support of an Infantry Company's cordon and search just south of the Yarmock Circle, a Tactical HUMINT Team (THT) prepares to depart the FOB, with the nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) Reconnaissance Platoon providing security. They are in search of a key piece of information needed in order to verify a fellow intelligence collector's single-source information. All the while, the SIGINT Platoon is scanning and searching increasing numbers of ever-changing targets in an effort to guarantee both the assured destruction of enemy forces, as well as assist in the "no-fail" mission of protecting our forces. While all of these missions are in various states of operational planning, one thread knits all of these loose ends together—Leadership. It is leadership alone that ensures the MI company is "firing on all cylinders" and that the company is properly trained, equipped, manned and rehearsed during the various critical stages of each of these complex and diverse intelligence missions.

The fact is that younger leaders [not generals] are the ones who really make history. They earn medals for valor and achievement. They are the ones who get things done and make the Army great.

—General John A. Wickham, Jr. Army Chief of Staff, 1983-1987

If we look to develop today's MI officers for positions of increased leadership responsibility within the new BCT's Brigade Troops Battalion (BTB), we must begin this much needed development at the MI company level with our platoon leaders, company executive officers and, of course, our MI company commanders. If we fail to do this, the critical pool of officers qualified to be future battalion commanders will dwindle precipitously and our competitive edge will be lost.

Lead, follow, or get the hell out of the way!!!

—Unknown

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Indications and Warning Post 9/11: Analyzing Enemy Intent

by Scott Swanson

With terrorist attacks against the Western interests in the last few years, there has been a massive shift in how the world is viewed with regard to enemies both known and unknown who continue to undertake devastating, surprise action without prior declaration of war or other conventional warning. Further, the decentralized organizational and operational structure of terrorists and their activities further complicates threat mitigation for both law enforcement and intelligence agencies alike. While numerous efforts have been made to develop the appropriate concepts, processes, and tools to prevent surprise acts of aggression toward the U.S., these approaches have typically been focused toward politics, diplomacy, military, science, and economics.

Despite the years of improvements toward a working methodology and practice of spotting indicators and creating early warning, failures persist and new evolving threats shift faster than those improving models can detect the many threats on the rise. Speculation would have it that many missed indicators were due to a failure to fully understand the enemy and its intentions from the enemy's view and removing the biases built in to some analysts' or field collectors' views. Most efforts to correct the errors have focused on restructuring the warning system and have ignored potential problems in the analysis or collection tasking.

Whether past challenges have been due to faulty models, overwhelmed analysts, poor collection, or uninterested policy makers, this article's intent is to address some viable go-forward components to construct new methods and approaches to analysis requirements for Early Warning. The focus is to identify critical processes and analytics used to see threats and understand hostile intentions, and improve their reliability by moving from an emphasis of simple cause-and-effect relationships to more intuitive, non-linear associative forms of pattern recognition to understand the enemy.

Warning Analysis

Warning analysis accepts the presumption of surprise and incomplete intelligence and requires exhaustive research upon which to build the case for specific warning.[1] Within the research there is a requirement to understand the attitudes and disciplines of potential adversaries as well as their capabilities, their history, their culture and biases. This means that perhaps the easiest task in an Indications and Warning (I&W) effort is assessing the adversarial capabilities, but the linchpin and most difficult task is predicting the intentions and will of adversaries.

To understand the adversary, research and analysis cannot merely be a compilation of facts; it includes an intangible abstract perception and belief but based on a comprehensive intimate understanding of the adversary. Religion and its influence on behavior and belief structures is a perfect example. Today's terror threats are directly linked to religion, culture, doctrine, tradition, and ideology. The will of any social group comes from the culture of the people and is inherent to the belief system of those people or within the individuals contributing to a group. While will is deeply driven, it can shift with a new understanding of concepts or new experiences, and can be suppressed through means of instilling fear or new enlightenment upon an individual's will. The influences, however, if it has permeated the foundational belief system, can be so deep that suppression and changes in experiences may never fully override the core will of an individual or the group they are embedded within.

Belief as Enemy

Understanding that mind makes reality; one must then understand why belief itself can be the actual enemy a nation must fight. Hitler, Stalin, and other dictators realized that through controlling what people believe there becomes a method of oppression better than armies or criminal penalties. Those who can get others to believe in an ideology have power through controlling "reality." Intelligence analysts who recognize certain ideological principles—norms, morals, ideals—will find that it is not disparaging to see that some are indeed practices of malicious social control.

Beliefs pertaining to authority, divine right, etc. are particularly useful for political, economic, and social control. We are seeing this today. Beliefs about the natural world, unlike beliefs about the social world, are given stronger truth-claims, due to the ideological nature. Terrorists following this pattern are rarely mindless or indiscriminate in their attacks, although they may appear to be so to observers who have not examined their ideological beliefs.

There are also a number of other variable factors which need to be considered when trying to explain or understand the selection of targets or intent by any terrorist group such as the security environment within which they operate, the desire to maintain traditional sources of support, and the situation of the group's logistics.[2] Nevertheless, even after taking these reservations into account, it is still ideology, which provides terrorists with the moral and political visualization that inspires their violence, shapes the way in which they see the world, and defines how they judge the actions of people and institutions. This in turn forms their views as to who or what may be seen as a legitimate target, and to a degree it allows the terrorists to dehumanize those individuals whom they intend to harm, seeing them as symbols rather than as flesh and blood human beings. By establishing such parameters, the influence of ideology is crucial in determining the range of terrorists' potential targets.[3]

Ideology—The Power Behind Belief

Like scientists, there is great value in intelligence analysts also understanding the basic concepts of the mind's capabilities to shape reality. Psychologists are beginning to understand how cognitive, motivational, and behavioral structure (personality, attitudes, preconceptions, worldview, socialization, repertoire, value questioning, habits, etc.) shapes the perception of reality. An ideology is the collection of beliefs, values, principles, and objectives by which a group defines its distinctive political identity and aims.[4] Some ideologies—particularly separatism and politicized religion, but others as well—may include elements of historical, semi-mythical, and supernatural beliefs.[5] What is important is that ideology provides a motive and framework for action.

There may be a distinction between the professed ideology of a group and the actual beliefs of individual members. The leaders of political groups usually have a fairly specific ideology with clear political objectives, but for many of their followers a sufficient motive for belonging to the group is provided by adherence to the group or an intuitive dislike of an "enemy." What this means to intelligence analysts is that even in small cells, opinions and beliefs may differ as well as the degree by which one is willing to go in an attack. This can also be a consideration for military, security, and intelligence professionals operating in the field. Whether through observations, interviews, or interrogation, certain indicators that may be apparent in one who is prepared to die would be different for another who favors making an escape, one who is willing to participate only to a certain point, or one who is entirely unaware that they are even involved in an attack plan.

Mindset on Beliefs

When biased contemporary Western perspective is used to gain ideological insight on religious extremism, it time and again misunderstands the impact that religion has on belief foundations. Experienced strategic analysts are mindful of this dynamic, which is gained through extensive regional research, direct ground exposure, or interaction and more communication with specialists in the focus area. This consideration in I&W analytical methodology is more of a mindset from a linear thinking pattern to include more abstract "out of the box" creative thinking and active participation in an area of interest that will embrace a combination of both intuitive and structured methods to fully examine the potential scenarios and the views of ever-changing free will and perceptions that alter indications and nullify possibilities. Mindset does become more formalized when it is employed in the use of Red Team exercises.

To avoid surprise, a formal yet creative approach with Red Teams is used for studying adversaries. ("Red Team" comes from the Cold War practice of assigning some officers to play the part of the Soviets.) In this approach teams try to analyze adversarial motives and methods,

trying to learn how they operate and how they think. This is done by developing full mind-immersion in an adversary's thinking to enhance the authentic signature in mock attacks against critical infrastructures and national assets in order to understand events, improve security, prioritize mitigation, and provide actionable information for decision makers. Offices within the Central Intelligence Agency have been very proactive in the expanded use of outside substantive experts to generate and test analytic assumptions. Analysts have increased their use of techniques such as Red Teaming, Devil's Advocacy (deliberate challenge of another team's strongly-held analytic views), and Team A–Team B Analysis (competitive assessments) in order to focus greater attention on High Impact-Low Probability threats to U.S. national security interests and reduce mirror-imaging biases of the analysts.

Other government agencies prior to 9/11 were concerned about the hijacking possibility by terrorists and had speculated in their analysis about various scenarios. The difficulty for some of them was to flesh out those scenarios, then figure out a way to turn a scenario into practical action. Regrettably, it never happened to the extent of being a conceivable option. Similarly, today's terror attacks against commuters and insurgent attacks against defense positions have been noted in threat assessments, but to defend against disparate individuals operating largely on their own initiative is quite difficult to diminish as a constant threat. Many of the surprise events in the history of global conflict have been far beyond range of the targets' comprehension. To address new hostile intentions, a bolder freethinking analytical thought pattern should continue to be encouraged throughout intelligence groups and can be used in conjunction with an unprecedented knowledge of what makes the adversary tick.

The vague perceptions of what adversaries are thinking, feeling, and how important the current issues are to them is fundamental to an I&W system's ability to understand what threats are at large by the knowledge or recognition that an adversary has decided to do something and what their intentions may be.

Conclusion

In presenting an approach to employ and encourage regular out-of-the-box emphasis on history, religion, and culture to leverage intelligence analysis for a better understanding of the enemy and their intentions is not to say that it is not being done today. As terrorists and other international criminals are constantly evolving so too must analytical methods across the entire Intelligence Community. Leveraging influencers such as social, cultural, and political indicators to create insight to the terrorist intent through beliefs also creates insight to their most basic thought and planning process. Therefore even at ground level when collectors come across inferences and indicators along these less empirical lines, those findings can still be pushed up as valuable intelligence relating to critical nodes or links in analysis. Field intelligence inferences and a continued study of adversarial behavior systems brings an analyst that much closer to actually thinking like the enemy in order to help preempt the next terrorist or insurgent threat and transforms an intelligence product to a more useful actionable intelligence warning.

Endnotes

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Scott Swanson specializes in strategic and tactical operation intelligence collection and analysis for both the public and private sector. He has given a number of presentations and published articles on Counter-Terrorism, Cultural Intelligence for Tactical Operation Support, Situational Understanding and Precognition, Globalization, Human Asset Development, I&W Threat Analysis, Intelligence Requirements Definition, and Maritime Security Vulnerability/Threat Assessments. He is also a strategic advisor at the California University of Protection and Intelligence Management in the area of propaganda and covert action. His latest research includes piracy in the Malacca Strait, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) "Sea Tiger" activities, and threats within North Africa. His educational background consists of a BA in Culture and Communication (Languages studied: French, Arabic, and Spanish) and an MS in Strategic Intelligence and is currently pursuing a PhD in Behavioral Social Psychology. Readers who wish to read the research paper from which this article was extracted can find the link at www.delphiresearch.us and can contact Mr. Swanson at s2@delphiresearch.us.

Military Epistemologies in Conflict

The views expressed are the personal views of the author and do not necessarily reflect the officially held views of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Army.

by Major David W. Pendall

Introduction

Military Epistemology? Epistemology is nothing more than the study of how we know what we think we know. It is a justified belief. Justified beliefs drive how military force is best applied and how military forces are best developed. In the military lexicon, this can also be called doctrine, rooted in military "science." [1]

Collective belief in the Ptolemaic solar system, based upon the truth that the earth was the center of the universe, lasted 1,500 years even during the emergence of scientific evidence to the contrary. As scientific explanations disputed this truth rather than change it, modifications were made to Ptolemaic theory and subsequent explanations of this truth were made to accommodate the incremental advances of science. [2]

The father of medicine himself, Hippocrates, was the first to attribute disease to natural rather than supernatural causes over 2,300 years ago. Hippocrates' theory of the Four Humors, or four essential body fluids, explained that all illness was due to an imbalance of these fluids. He often prescribed herbal treatments and bed rest. It was not until the 16th century that an alternate theory emerged, asserting that disease came from outside the body, disputing much of the Humors theory. However, 18th century medical "advances" revealed bloodletting and purging of even the anemic patient were better cures than plants and rest. Humors remained an underlying truth of medical science.[3]



Sir Isaac Newton

Sir Isaac Newton synthesized many of the scientific theory and insights in the 17th century to create the foundation of modern physics and mathematics. Newtonian science explains our physical world, the universe, and shapes much of our Western philosophy. Yet Newtonian science cannot explain quarks, theories of relativity, or the properties of photons. It seems quantum physics is also true. Rather than replacing Newton, however, quantum theory has its own place in explaining truth and the meaning of phenomenon.

For Newtonian science and quantum physics to both be different and yet true, we realize we lack a universal theory in explaining our world and the varied contexts we live within. In a new science world of Chaos and Complexity Theory, network science and biological science, we begin to think that just maybe a Brazilian butterfly can cause a storm in Texas, six or less people may link me to you, or that wasps really do follow three simple rules in the creation of vast and efficient colonies. Just maybe.

Truth has a date-time stamp. It always has. A review of civilizations reveals the truths of the age more than likely reflected the mainstream science and social beliefs of that age. Breakthroughs in science, which may better explain the world around us, gain acceptance over time.

A Basis for Acting

Relating epistemology to the "Intelligence" discipline is simple and fundamental. How we think determines what we consider to be true. What is considered true provides a basis for action. In foreign policy and national security matters, intelligence provides truth about adversaries to the policy maker and the warfighter. Intelligence drives action. Sometimes intelligence becomes the justification for action. In a complex, interconnected, increasingly ambiguous and dangerous world, "actionable" intelligence gets premium billing.

From left, J.F.C. Fuller, Antoine Henri de Jomini, and Carl von Clausewitz

What we consider to be true also depends on, and is derived from, the standards of thought applied and accepted by peers and institutional culture. Truth, then, is nothing more than what the peers vote on as "true." In intelligence, the meaning from observed fact or actions comes from the body of previously applied evidence and peer acceptance of the analysis. The standards of conventional intelligence analytical rigor may prove to be inadequate to base our actions upon in the future. This becomes particularly relevant as new or different methods of assigning value or meaning turn into accepted practice in the greater society.

The correlation of observed facts may not always translate into meaning. Ambiguous facts or activities may impede appropriate action; other times it may prompt action; other times it may prompt action against the wrong target. Lack of "actionable intelligence" limited the U.S. in acting decisively against alQaeda prior to September 2001. Air strikes in 1999 against a Yugoslav military facility in Belgrade hit the location as planned but the actual tenant was the Chinese Embassy. [4] The 1998 missile strike against a pharmaceutical plant suspected of producing precursors for VX nerve agents in Khartoum may well have been justified, however, dual-use technologies and materials raise the level of ambiguity for intelligence analysis and meaning to a higher level. Given that the U.S. has a preemptive National Security Strategy focused on the threat of weapons of mass destruction and effect, confidence in acting on intelligence requires understanding of both the facts and the meaning, beyond the peer vote standard.

Actionable intelligence is some set of actions taken on the basis of what we believe to be true. If what we believe to be true were false, then do we have actionable stupidity?

Epistemology and Military Science, or Rather, How to Act

Military "science" lags the "real" science of the world. Said another way, military epistemologies follow the social and scientific "truths" of the greater society rather than leading them. The military science predominant in the U.S. military is firmly rooted in Newtonian science. Carl von Clausewitz, the most prominent Western military theorist, was the first to use analogies to Newtonian science and metaphors about physical matter to describe warfare. Clausewitz, J.F.C. Fuller, and Antoine-Henri de Jomini each constructed military theory by applying portions of Newton's scientific theories to the theory of conducting war. [5]

Subsequent interpretations of Clausewitz's abstract theories on war imbued military planners and practitioners with desire to control the battle space of physical war by applying linear calculation and cause-effect planning against enemy forces. Ironically, Clausewitz emphasizes the unpredictability of real war, the impact of chance, systemic views, and introduces the notion of fog (inadequate intelligence) and friction. [7]

Table 1. Differences in science and belief characteristics. [6]

	Epistemology	Systems View	Characteristics	Natural State
1st Wave Agrarian Age	Direct Observation Natural Rhythms Lore/ Religion/Customs	Nature	Independent Observed Entities	Natural Order
2nd Wave Industrial Age	Science/Scientific Method Induction/Deduction Analysis/Synthesis	Closed	Independent Complex	Equilibrium
3rd Wave Information Age	Discern Behavioral Patterns Multi-Systemic Exchanges Emerging Characteristics	Open	Interdependent Complex	Disorder Continous Adaptations

The dominant themes of current military theory continue with these analogies and describe war and the interaction of combatant armies and supporting nations as a clash of closed systems. War planning is an attempt to sub-divide war and warfare into delineated battle space and frameworks. Distinct start and stop times schedule actions across planned and controlled phases of operations. This is a reductionism approach, decomposing opposing elements and their properties to understand them (observation, induction, and deduction), to determine where to apply force. These behaviors are consistent with second wave or Industrial Age scientific principles.

The ultimate effect and target of military operations remains oriented on imposing will. As Clausewitz says, "war is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will." [8] Using Newtonian science-based theories of war, the path to affecting the will of the enemy is by destroying the enemy's supporting mass and physical capability to continue the fight.

New Military Science

Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and Effects Based Operations both address new science theories such as cybernetics and the interdisciplinary Chaos Theory and Complexity Theory. Service Battle Labs incorporate Artificial Intelligence, Neural Network Theory, and Advanced Simulation Modeling into weapons system components, sensors, and planning systems. Other professional disciplines have incorporated new sciences and theories much earlier and more deeply than the military. Examples of how these professions have adopted new science to drive many of their actions include the following:

- Transaction analysis assists investigators looking for fraudulent financial exchanges, helps sales and marketing departments discover new or emerging consumer buying patterns, and supports stockbrokers in evaluating stocks and business mergers.
- Epidemic models for disease outbreaks are now using agent-based modeling and behaviors as well as network theory to improve assessments of outbreak potentials.[9]
- Advertisers use Small-World Theory to create a "buzz" for new product and services by targeting connectors and weak ties within networks.
- Human Genome Project insights lead pharmaceutical companies to create new drugs and treatments operating at the level of the genetic code.
- Micromechanical computing, supercomputing, and advances in chemical molecular engineering drive emerging nano-molecular construction of new materials.

Non-military professions embraced new sciences because of their improved explanatory power. New applications provide increased levels of confidence in the actions they take. These professions recognize required change when dealing with the external environment consisting of open, complex systems. For instance, Network Theory helps identify where key intersecting links or clusters exist. Connectors, whether human or not, provide disproportionate influences to a given phenomenon or network. Random links and so-called weak ties also provide stability to networks and resilience in the face of deliberate or random disruptions. The point is, by finding the inherent order in a chaotic world, smarter choices are made. By more completely understanding the phenomenon, as it exists, better predictions can be made about how it will act and adapt. Traditional decompositions and analysis of the parts cannot explain the emergent behaviors of the whole. [10]

NCW is achieving growing cultural acceptance in U.S. military. Effects Based Operations has not yet induced significant change in service doctrines and cultural views toward war, yet it is creating niche activities and "cells" within staff structures and Command and Control nodes. Even so, the incorporation of advanced technologies and the introduction of new science have been applied in the context of adapting them into the Industrial Age precepts. Even with the adoption of Information Operations and Information Warfare, the basic approach to the analysis of targets and effects are linear and attempt to find the adversaries' informational "centers of gravity." [11] For the mainstream military, little has changed in the world of military science since the age of Napoleonic campaigns; the military incorporates many elements of the Information

Age capabilities into the Industrial Age epistemologies of war. In a period of continuous change and rising ambiguity in the actions of our current and potential adversaries, can we afford this latency in the application of potential tools or thought as we prepare for and conduct war?

Conflicting Epistemologies

The underlying "science" of the first, second, and third wave societies differs in regard to how we know what we know. This challenges what is considered to be the truth or conversely untrue. What we believe to be true leads us to take action.

As briefly described, the basis of truth lies in the underlying knowledge structures and beliefs about our physical world and the world of human behavior. Epistemologies themselves can be in conflict. Meaning can be the referent of an object or fact. This usage contains implications based on language. A "lady" has different meanings and implications ranging from deep respect to an epithet. The propositional usage of meaning adds context and accounts for the structural environment for which the object or fact resides. "It is raining" is meaningful only if it is, in fact, raining. These become key determinants in what is considered true in meaning. [12]

Truth has been assumed to have an absolute quality, one of verifiability or at least the presence of objective fact. Mathematical certainty, the scientific method, and observations leading to explanation of cause and effect all shape the idea of what we believe to be truth.

Epistemologies of times past filled gaps in the mental framework of men by explaining remaining uncertainties in the face of science. [13] The truth, similar to beauty, therefore can be found in the eye of the beholder as often as it is present in the laws of Newtonian physics. And, just as truth can vary, epistemologies vary as well.

Thinking in Waves

The world is tri-sected. [14] However, we cannot clearly delineate the boundaries between First Wave, Second Wave, and Third Wave environments, nation-states, or societies (see Table 1). Somali tribesmen use cell phones; Microsoft engineers still rely on agriculture for daily bread. The steel worker watches CNN as he surfs the World Wide Web. And so on. Even tri-sected military worlds co-exist. Tribesmen use machetes with deadly efficiency as helicopters ferry peacekeeping troops to remote areas of Rwanda. Coalition partners in Operations DESERT STORM and IRAQI FREEDOM demonstrated second- and third-wave characteristics in terms of equipment, munitions, organizations, and information systems. Information warriors and cyber terrorists attempt to disrupt second-wave institutions and cultivate first-wave fears.

The First Wave

In the first-wave society, truth came from direct observation of the physical environment and the behavior of other men and animals. Gaps in understanding were filled by tradition, religious precepts, social taboos, and tribal lore. For the first-wave warrior or chieftain, the observation of the enemy clan, tribe, or army provided a truth and a basis for action, especially when combined with understanding of the seasonal timing and social history between the combatants. He could see his enemy directly or through the eyes of his scouts and spies. He could count the men and objects of war. The objects of war for the most part were extensions of the man and required muscle power to achieve a killing effect. He related these facts to the understanding that the harvest was complete and that his tribe had sacked the enemy last season. He created meaning from these direct observations and the understanding of human behavior. The knowledge required for making war on an enemy included very basic elements such as intention, time, location and numbers.

As the first-wave world ceded totemism, taboos and simple human observation to second-wave "scientific" explanations of disease, the universe, and the terrestrial world, truth changed for civilizations. It seemed Newton trumped the superstitious chieftains and clerics in explaining how the world really worked.

The Second Wave

In the second wave, science and philosophy ruled the mind of man. Industrial production required mass education, standardization, and engineered solutions to complex (but solvable) problems. From the atom to the Milky Way, things could be analyzed, reduced to its basic elements and characterized according to the appropriate scientific discipline. The second wave was an age of deconstruction and reassembly. Unexplained phenomenon, if it existed, was reformed to fit into mental frameworks and made to conform to the science that best explained it. The expansion of science, bureaucracy and warfare in the industrial age represented this topology. Science sprouted into separate disciplines and "schools of thought." Bureaucracies developed to plan and control ever increasing collective efforts of man.

Warfare theorists established separate theories of control and application of science onto segmented battle space. The Industrial Age was characterized by the

dominance of machines over muscle. When second-wave armies turned on each other in the 20th century, the mass destruction and killing power inherent in these war machines became self-evident, disturbingly so. No longer did a man face his opponent solely on a discreet field of battle and look into his eyes as he wielded a close combat weapon. Increasingly sophisticated machines, under the control of man, delivered the munitions and effects to kill other men and destroy machines. Some man-machine weapons attacked the production capacity of the enemy. The quest in preparing for and conducting war became a quest of enhancing firepower and the efficiency of delivering massed violence and destructive effects. Attrition warfare gave way to annihilation warfare as the Industrial Age systems matured; it was the time of the "war machine."

Embedded technologies within the killing systems enhanced their "combat power" and provided the operational edge on the battlefield. Men learned to produce, employ, combine, sustain, and repair these systems which were specifically designed for war. Science led to extensions of the human senses through radar, sonar, electronic signal intercept, and advanced optics. Medical science led to industrialized chemical and biological weapons. Formations respond to commands from the top. Commands flow through a standardized hierarchy and through standardized communications systems with standardized procedures and protocols. Operational executions adhere to strict schedules and occur within "lines of operations." [15]

The truth, or rather the intelligence supporting Industrial Age war, focuses on the enemy's offensive production or killing capacity available in weapons produced in his industrial base. We seek the Center of Gravity. The location of killing systems and the size of military formations still matter, as they did in the first wave, but on an exponentially larger scale. Intelligence requirements expand to include enemy campaign objectives, technical characteristics of weapons, training proficiency, support systems, and his lines of operations and logistics. Also of keen interest are his production capacity and its location within the nation to support the war. Observations from men and machines provide objective facts.

Meaning also comes from the assembly of facts about the enemy military-industrial complex, its proficiency, defense spending, and through an assessment of the political aims and objectives a nation-state may have in regard to its own security or interests. Posturing of capabilities indicates hostile intent or hostile will to conduct hostile acts. The means to destroy the will of the nation-state focuses on the destruction of the combined capacity of the military and supporting industry to conduct war.

The Third Wave

The third-wave world represents yet another shift in the science and philosophic underpinnings of truth. Information—who has it; how they got it; and, most importantly, how they use it—changes the characteristics of power. [16] Information substitutes for capital and for violence in the third wave. [17] Individual humans and social groupings gather, process, and create knowledge from disparate data and convert it to power. [18]

The ability to rapidly turn data into information and subsequently into knowledge becomes the "sine qua non" of winners in the third-wave competitive environment but only if the potential winner is able to act appropriately based on the knowledge created and do it faster than the loser in relative terms. Actors operate with outcomes in mind, self-organize, and self-direct actions to accomplish those outcomes. Increasingly, actions are taken without detailed orders or strict controls imposed from the top. Continuous innovation is required to keep winning.

The third wave complicates the notion of truth by reinforcing the idea that meaning can exist separate from truth or the existence of objective facts. Power structures are more reliant on knowledge than force. Third-wave entities are more conscious of the importance of information as a commodity and recognize networks as transaction arenas or marketplaces for the negotiation of truth. Meaning may come from how information is exchanged, who exchanges information, and why the information is being assembled. The ability to link specific brains to other specific brains for specific purposes become increasingly important.

Ambiguous Will

Identifying or counting hostile means in the third-wave world cannot determine hostile will. Unique military warfare systems, controlled by a hierarchy, are competing with equally dangerous flat networks of "Super Empowered Individuals". [19] Moreover, the knowledge and technologies involved in creating the super empowering capabilities flow through open communication channels and come from commercial and often dual usage components. Proliferation activities, as well as the actual production, hide within legitimate commercial or academic activities. [20]

The rise of dual use technologies and materials increases ambiguity and changes the meaning of many things

relevant to second world intelligence analysis and meaning. Box cutters, commercial airplanes, computer code, live small pox strains and nitrogen-based agricultural fertilizer all have legitimate use. With dual use comes dual meaning. Observation of the underlying objective facts (their holistic context), attendant connections to people and organizations, and systematic discernment of patterns of behaviors offer a greater certainty of the truth with meaning.

Newtonian science still makes sense of much of our universe. Nuclear medicine still drives many medical treatments, and rational actor theories continue to drive some economic and political theories. Quantum physics, the Human Genome Project, holistic medicine, and Complexity Theory all explain phenomenon applicable to the universe, health, economics, and political behavior in their own right. New sciences create new insight and shape how industries compete. The old science, by itself, doesn't explain as much as it used to.

Figure 2. This figure describes the influences of the various epistemologies across the three waves.

	Organization	World View	Key Influence	Actions	Power (Element Dependency)
1st Wave	Cooperatives	Local	Family/ Tribe	Controlled by Phenomenon	Wealth-Land Violence-Man Knowledge-Observed
2nd Wave	Hierarchy	Regional	Nation-State	Attempt to Control Phenomenon	Wealth-Industry Violence-Mass Knowledge-Science
3rd Wave	Network	Global	Transnational	Attempt to Exploit Phenomenon	Wealth-Knowledge Violence-Information Knowledge-Networks

First and second-wave epistemologies remain valid in the trisected world. Rather than replace the first and second-wave thinking, third-wave science should act to complement, challenge, and provide additional insight to inform actions. Table 2 describes the influences of the various epistemologies across the three waves.

Shortcomings of "Actionable Intelligence" in the Third Wave

1. It is Not Predictive Using All the Science of Our Age.

Except for small (but growing) elements within selected organizations, intelligence analysis continues to rely on non-integrated databases populated by sensor feeds from traditional collection disciplines. Much of the information is in the form of "data," collected and processed in such a form that it loses the surrounding context in which it was sensed or collected. Relationships among the data and the conversion of data or knowledge are difficult to determine.

Examples of second-wave methods failing to predict adversarial behaviors and limiting necessary action range from failure to predict the rapid collapse of the Soviet Union and the attacks of 9/11 to the rise of terrorism and disorder in Iraq following the end of the Saddam regime. Second-wave science and analysis missed the key links among the 9/11 cells and murderers. Policy and non-integrated information systems prevented the sharing and collective analysis of intelligence data in disparate, non-integrated databases. Limited analysis for operations in Iraq following the end of major combat operations did not provide the insight to what the power vacuum following the destruction of the Ba'ath regime would lead to.

Recommendations:

Master the New Sciences as a Community. New theories and commercial tools offer great capabilities. Many of them have three- to five-year track records in large-scale data pattern analysis and anomaly detection. Human interaction leaves signatures. Type or characterize these identified signatures as "markers" and share them broadly across the analytic community. These signatures may be different than the second wave science expects to find, but they are likely to be there just the same. Network theory describes the places to look and the behaviors to look for. Analyst training and development is part of this. Infusing the community with skilled professionals from the fields of financial analysis, risk management, biological science, and pathology offer another approach. Show customers how these techniques meet their needs. Link these analysts to the emerging concepts.

Broaden the Analyst Pool. Third-wave, second-wave, and first-wave sciences are all valid. Anthropologists and complexity theorists can explore tribal patterns and influences on behaviors. Computer science experts can model these hypotheses and run scenarios to determine likely behaviors and adaptations to our operations. Hire and develop broad skill sets from across these wave sciences. Retirees, even working from home with secure, biometric and encrypted systems, can assist in analytic surges or work long term, non-time sensitive reviews. Academia, industry, and selected partners can provide expertise when required or, more importantly, when asked.

Integrate New Technology. Integrate the technologies of the new science with the human analyst trained in the

newest theories. Automation and smart filters assist in the volume problem. Artificial intelligence and modeling assists in the prediction process. Humans will still control these tools.

2. It Presents Point Solutions and Sub-Optimizes.

Current Intelligence methods are based upon the intelligence cycle. [21] Much like the first-wave man, governed by the seasons and the daily solar and lunar schedules, so are many single "INT" analysts. Collection orientations affect some analysts by making them overly dependent or overly confident in one type of collection or collection system. The daily "take" becomes the focus of effort in analysis and often presents the analyst with only a narrow view of target. Narrow views on the input often lead to a narrow range of analytical perspectives. Narrow perspectives in the analysis process lead to limited outputs and "INT" centric view of the truth. Actions taken on these "INT" centric products may limit the full range of options otherwise potentially capable. Thus, intelligence is sub-optimized and actions are oriented on point solutions.

Persistent collection and time-sensitive targeting also creates pressure to produce actionable products in tighter and tighter response times. The linear process is too slow. Moreover, it produces that which it can, rather than that which it must. Analytical focus on the collection of facts and the observed truth can miss the underlying patterns or characteristics that may actually provide better targets and result in more effective actions.

Recommendations:

Create a Community Culture Versus an "INT" or Agency Culture. Charge into the future as an army of analysts rather than a confederation of "INT" minded analysts. Increase the cross-discipline exchanges by design rather than by individual preference. Champion success stories that are multi-INT and customer focused. Operational elements deployed to support military operations in places like Afghanistan and Iraq quickly become solid teams and informally task-organize to support missions without the interference of rice bowl concerns or parochial bias. Learn from them and advertise their great successes. Single source or single "INT" successes reinforce the point solution and sub-optimization problem.

Reorganize Community Programming and Budget Processes. Shift the bulk of programming funds into collaborative analytic ventures. Increase funding to cooperative projects leading to operational successes. Limit the analytic funding for single INT focused systems or architectures. Partner with the customer and make him an advocate of the analytic funding to specific programs.

Unite Operations and Intelligence. The closer an analyst is to the supported customer or customer set, the better the product will be. Presentation formats add mission specific relevance and require less manipulation at the end user level. This enhances speed of action. Operators who know what intelligence can and cannot do will plan actions accordingly. Intelligence will drive many operations in the future and sets the pace for current continuous operations. Intelligence supports operations and operations supports further intelligence. This is an increasingly symbiotic relationship. It is time to integrate.

3. It is Produced by Industrial Age Processes and Systems.

Admiral James Ellis, former Commander of the United States Strategic Command said, "…if you apply computing power to a flawed process, you merely get the wrong answer faster" [22] Intelligence hierarchies and collection systems are functionally organized based on structures akin to the five senses. Hierarchies form within each domain. Peer factors limit the range of outputs. Analysts may be risk adverse. Worst-case analysis and caveats fill the gaps and cover uncertainty. Reaching the wrong conclusions while using accepted analytical practices is accepted more readily than being wrong by using innovative analytic practices. Automating or applying new tools without rethinking the structural changes and budget procedural changes required to break down cultural barriers limits the ability to achieve desired outcomes.

Recommendations:

Network The Community and the Customer. Speed the demand to response times. Allow customers to interact with the producer. Integrate new customers with demands for new types of intelligence. The culture should change to view analysts and customers as one integrated group.

Expand the Application of Scientific Tools. Many tools are already proven in other professions. Integrate them into intelligence. Commercial systems should increasingly be applied to the analytic environment. Demands from the intelligence analytic community should drive some commercial ventures.

Network Global and Local Experts. Organize analysis into phenomenon and regional teams using multiple analytic approaches. For example, the global drug trade is one phenomenon. Some characteristics or patterns of behavior from drug traffickers operating from Asia's Golden Triangle may have commonality with drug trafficking from Latin America. Some patterns may not. Regional experts

can use the expertise from the phenomenon experts and apply broader analytical techniques to their own regional requirements. [23] In essence, what will occur is a culture of cross-cueing leveraging multiple analytic insights or techniques. An approach like this fosters learning, adaptation, and "teams" multiple analytic perspectives against discreet problems.

Support Diversity in Analysis and Among Analysts. Patience and visible support for alternative methods and backgrounds will be required. Traditional analysis and analysts are not being cast aside. Identify risks inherent to each analytical approach. Customers require confirmation from multiple sources; why shouldn't they inherently demand analysis from multiple sciences?

Conclusion: Resolving Conflicts of the Mind

Our preemptive National Security Strategy really has a knowledge gap to cross if we are to go from detection of hostile intent or hostile will to actions involving global manhunts and the preemptive application of force (violence). The ability to describe the assembly of hostile capabilities by observing the production chain from the "foundry to the foxhole" does not cover dispersed, networked minds and the simultaneous engineering of the new tools of warfare. Discerning exactly which brains and knowledge processes are connected to what other brains and knowledge processes matters. Focus shifts to discerning the locus or the nexus rather than focusing solely increased collection and the presence of details. Rather than replacing second-wave military theory, perhaps these third-wave concepts should at least broaden the thinking and provide alternatives to traditional analysis.

More than one perspective (science/theory) is required to examine potential dangers in a tri-sected world. There is no universal military theory and analytic perspective to enable action. Military and analytic art should match the circumstances of the problem presented, be it a first, second, or third wave. This is like matching Newtonian science to the right physical science problem, while at the same time, recognizing when to apply quantum physics to other problem sets found in our universe.

Limiting or constraining the application of new and emerging knowledge structures and technology limits our ability to assert confidence in the resulting "truths." Resultant actions, based on our belief of what is true, therefore, may be incomplete, inappropriate, or just plain wrong.

Endnotes

1. **JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, 141.**

2. Robert P. Pelligrini, *The Links Between Science and Philosophy and Military Theory: Understanding the Past; Implications for the Future* (Maxwell Air Force Base: School of Advanced Air Power Studies, Air University, June 1995). This paper traces the evolution of military science and presents the impact of Newtonian science and Kantian philosophy on Carl von Clausewitz.

3. Chris Rohmann, *A World of Ideas: A Dictionary of Important Theories, Concepts, Beliefs, and Thinkers* (New York: Balantine Publishing Group, 1999).

4. See the transcript, Cohen Briefing on Chinese Embassy Bombing, 10 May 1999, U.S. Information Service, Washington File at http://usembassy-australia.state.gov/hyper/WF990511/epf203.htm.

5. J.F.C Fuller, *The Foundations of the Science of War* (London: Hutchinson and Co., Ltd., 1926), 33-47. Chapter 2 reflects Fuller's interpretation of the Scientific Method and Darwinist theories establishing a framework for Fuller's theories of warfare and strategy.

6. This table depicts the author's synthesis of the scientific descriptions and comparisons found in this article's two main references. See Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *The Third Wave: The Classic Study of Tomorrow* (New York: Bantam Books,1990) and Mark Buchanan, Nexus: *Small Worlds and the Groundbreaking Theory of Networks* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 2002). The Toffler's Wave Theory of explaining dramatic change and upheavals in human history is used throughout this article as a framework to describe differences in perspectives of the world. Also see M. Mitchell Waldrop, *Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992).

7. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (London: Penguin Group, 1962). See Chapters II (122-137) and VII (164-166).

8. Clausewitz, 101.

9. See the Center for Disease Control and the Santa Fe Institute paper "Applying Network Theory to Epidemics: Control Measures for Mycoplasma Pneumoniae Outbreaks" at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol9no2/02-0188.htm.

10. Mark Buchanan, *Nexus: Small Worlds and the Groundbreaking Theory of Networks* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 2002).

11. **JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, 9 October 1998**, V-5.

12. Rohmann, 255-256. Meaning actually has multiple definitions. Meaning can be the referent to an object, a propositional or contextual meaning, a definitional meaning, or a particular cultural or historical meaning.

13. Ibid., 410-411. See Concepts of Truth.

14. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the Twenty-first Century* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993), 35-96.

15. **JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 10 September 2001**, III-16.

16. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *Powershift: Knowledge, Wealth, and Violence at the Edge of the 21st Century* (New York: Bantam Books, 1990), 1-19. Power is composed of three elements—wealth, violence, and knowledge. These elements have differing relationships and characteristics across the different wave periods.

17. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *Creating a New Civilization: The Politics of the Third Wave* (Washington, D.C.: The Progress and Freedom Foundation, 1994), 35-40.

18. Ibid., 42.

19. Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalism* (New York: Anchor Books, 2000), 14-15.

20. Anthony H. Cordesman, "Intelligence Failures in the Iraq War," *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, 16 July 2003, 306-324.

21. See **JP 2-02, National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, 28 September 1998**, I-2. The associated concept of Task-Process-Evaluate-Disseminate has changed to Task-Post-Process-Use. This will cause the analytical process to change as well, becoming much more timely, distributed, and decentralized. Users will interact with data vs. analyzed reports, in many cases. Custom products for specific operations can be assembled and disseminated inside operational elements much faster than before. This will still present some problems in terms of data quality, context, and of course meaning. The community will need to address this with the customer.

22. Remarks at the 34th Annual Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis/ Fletcher Conference: Security Planning and Military Transforming After Iraqi Freedom, 2 to 3 December 2003, Washington, D.C. Available on line at http://www.ifpafletcherconference.com/transcripts.htm.

23. The term "phenomenon" is used to describe a particular kind of problem set or issue for intelligence. It could be transnational such as proliferation, terrorism, or drug trafficking, or it could be intra-national such as tribal wars, political competition and organized crime. The idea is that some phenomenon will have characteristics, behaviors and patterns common at the global, regional, and local levels, and also distinctively different patterns at the same levels, based on the originating culture or sponsoring organization, environmental factors, specific histories, etc. Broader understandings come from approaching phenomenon for multiple perspectives and result in greater confidence for taking actions.

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Effects-Based Targeting at the Brigade

by Captain Kyle Teamey

Conducting counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere forces tactical intelligence personnel to operate in novel ways in order to deal with a flexible, adaptive threat. One of the more important tasks of tactical intelligence personnel is to support targeting. In conventional military operations, targeting is focused on an opposing military force and revolves around the doctrinal Decide, Detect, Deliver, Assess targeting cycle. Intelligence personnel are a very important part of this process as they identify High Value Targets (HVTs), develop collection plans to detect enemy High Payoff Targets (HPTs), collect intelligence on the effects of munitions delivered on targets, and provide assessments on an enemy force's remaining capabilities.

A civil military affairs officer makes friends with an Iraqi boy during a medical services mission in Saba Al Bor.

Targeting in COIN differs greatly from that in conventional operations. Soldiers often find themselves conducting a wide variety of tasks ranging from direct fire engagements to support to local governments and support to reconstruction operations. In this environment of full spectrum operations, intelligence personnel must provide support to a huge variety of missions including the targeting for deliberate attacks, raids, cordon and search operations, psychological operations (PSYOP), information operations, and civil-military operations (CMOs). This task is often more demanding of tactical intelligence personnel than is the conduct of conventional operations as it requires a much greater depth of understanding about the enemy and the operating environment (OE). It also requires that intelligence personnel work closely with civil affairs (CA), PSYOP, and other personnel with whom they do not normally work. In addition, COIN operations may occur in an environment where there are multiple targets available, not enough resources to address all of the targets, and limited windows of opportunity for affecting the targets. This means the decision of which target to address at which time is crucial.

The Targeting Cell

The differences in the OE mean that the targeting process differs as well. The targeting cell in a maneuver brigade will normally consist of a representative from S2, S3, S5, fire support officer (FSO), PSYOP, CA, public affairs, and possibly personnel from subordinate battalions and division headquarters, Special Forces, and/or the other governmental agencies. This variety is necessary in order to ensure that the entire spectrum of friendly operations is covered and the 2nd and 3rd order effects of operations are accounted for. Although the cell itself may only meet once a day or once a week, S2 personnel should make an effort to continuously interact

with others involved in targeting in order to ensure they maintain a common operating picture.

The COIN Targeting Process

The phases of the targeting process vary from conventional doctrine. Rather than Decide, Detect, Deliver, Assess, the process often changes to **Detect, Decide, Deliver, Assess**. This alteration of the process was briefly outlined by Captain Brian Gellman in "Lessons Learned from OIF: An SF Battalion S2's Perspective." [1] Intelligence personnel in Iraq generally detect a wide variety of targets at any given time. They have to work with other personnel involved in the targeting process in order to prioritize which targets to expend resources on, how to expend those resources, and to make changes to the collection plan in order to support the brigade's priorities.

A Soldier passes out pro-coalition flyers to the citizens of Fallujah, Iraq, during Operation Salm.

Detect

The Detect phase, constantly ongoing and similar to Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), is done on a continual basis and requires a great deal of analytical work by tactical intelligence personnel. The S2 and the Analysis and Control Team (ACT) (in legacy brigades that still have an ACT) have to go through reams of all-source intelligence reporting to determine the validity of threats and how important different potential targets actually are. This requires an understanding of tribal networks, social networks, insurgent networks, insurgent actions, and community atmospherics. Products that aid in this are link diagrams and "target folders" containing summaries of information on a target and the reporting associated with the target.

Complicating the task is the fact that people will make false claims against individuals they do not like and may also misrepresent themselves as having more influence than they actually do. This means that multiple source reporting is necessary to ensure that a target is really a target. In addition, there are multiple kinds of targets that can be identified, and not all of them are the enemy. The brigade will also have to target its CMOs in order to ensure they have the desired effects. The kinds of targets a unit will prosecute can be broadly differentiated as target personalities and target areas.

Target Personalities (also called HVTs or High Value Individuals)

- ❑ Kinetic targets: insurgents or leaders who can be captured or killed.
- ❑ Non-kinetic targets: personnel who can be engaged through negotiation, meetings, contracts, information operations (IO), etc.

Target Areas

- ❑ Areas controlled by insurgents.
- ❑ Areas where insurgents commonly operate.
- ❑ CMO opportunities, areas where the population may be receptive to CA projects or PSYOP.

A technique for simplifying the Detect phase is to split up targeting tasks by echelon. For instance, a maneuver battalion would be responsible for tracking target personalities such as cell leaders and below, localized community or city leaders and below, and area targets within their area of operations (AO). The brigade would have responsibility for tracking insurgents from the cell leader to facilitator or regional leader level, community leaders up to the provincial level, and area targets that cross battalion boundaries. This separation of tracking greatly lessens the load of battalion and brigade S2 sections and ensures that they are still capable of supporting the targeting decisions of their commanders.

It is also very beneficial to have an officer or noncommissioned officer in the S2 section or the ACT who does targeting and plans full time. This soldier should not be responsible for day-to-day operations, but focused completely on identifying and keeping track of targets. This allows them the time to sift through the large amount of reporting coming in daily, analyzing it appropriately, continuously fusing the information with other members of the targeting cell, and considering the next move of enemy personnel. Poor target identification leads to wasted effort by soldiers in the field as they raid the wrong house or

establish ambushes in the wrong place. Therefore, having personnel dedicated to doing it right is extremely important. In addition, because detection of a time-sensitive target may occur at any time, it is best if target information is continuously maintained, readily available, and easily briefed. This ensures personnel involved in the targeting process can aid the commander in coming to a rapid course of action decision when one is necessary.

Decide

The Decide phase is the culmination of previous intelligence work and arguably the most important phase of the targeting cycle in COIN. The targeting cell will use its knowledge to try and achieve effects consistent with the brigade's campaign plan and the commander's intent. This is where a thorough understanding of the OE becomes very important to predictive analysis of the effects of friendly actions. Personnel in the targeting cell will make recommendations on how to use the limited resources of the unit to address multiple threats or opportunities. They will also have to determine appropriate means for dealing with each. The key to these decisions is an understanding of the operating area that allows for a reasonable idea of the effects of friendly actions.

The S2 section must provide information on the relative importance of different target personalities and areas. The intelligence available to the S2 section and the ACT is often complementary to information that maneuver companies and battalions, the S5, CA, and PSYOP maintain. This greatly adds to understanding the effects that an operation will have. For instance, the S2 may have identified an insurgent leader. Using link analysis they will have an idea of the effects on insurgent networks, tribal networks, and social networks that detaining the leader will have. The maneuver company or battalion responsible for the area in which the insurgent leader is operating may know the popularity of the insurgent there. CA and PSYOP may have specific atmospherics information on the neighborhood that give an idea of how locals feel about insurgents and the means for winning support after the insurgent

Soldiers, from the 346th Psychological Operations Company, and paratroopers of the 82nd Airborne Division's 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, conduct a dismounted patrol in Al Fallujah, Iraq.

leader is detained. Fusion of this information allows for prioritizing various target personalities and target areas.

As the targeting cell determines the relative importance of various targets, it also must determine the best means for addressing each. Inappropriate targeting decisions can have major negative effects. For instance, an area supportive of insurgent activity may be easily won over with a CA project or turned even more pro-insurgency by a cordon and search operation. In another area, a CMO's approach may only embolden the insurgents. The correct course of action must be taken with each target, and it must be focused on the effects of the course of action. There are a wide variety of ways a target can be prosecuted in order to achieve the positive effects:

Target Personalities

- ❑ Capture or kill.
- ❑ Threaten (must be credible and backed by appropriate action).
- ❑ Subvert.
- ❑ Offer surrender terms.
- ❑ Negotiate terms for normalized relations.
- ❑ Use IO to build or undermine legitimacy.
- ❑ Conduct leader engagement to build rapport.

Target Areas

- ❑ Deliberate attack.
- ❑ Counter-battery.
- ❑ Cordon and search operations.
- ❑ Ambushes.
- ❑ Establish outposts.
- ❑ Patrolling.
- ❑ Provide support to security forces.
- ❑ Distribute PSYOP materials
- ❑ Build or rebuild infrastructure.
- ❑ Provide job programs.

At the end of the Decision phase, there is a prioritized list of targets and a recommended course of action associated with each. As the Detect phase is similar to IPB, the Decide phase is similar to an abbreviated form of the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). Fragmentary Orders by the S3 planner often come about as a result of the Decide phase of the targeting process. It should be noted that meetings between indigenous leadership and commanders must also be targeted. The targeting cell should identify and prioritize who to meet with and how often. They should also look at the desired effects for each meeting with local leadership and have a basic plan in place for how to achieve the desired effects. Intelligence personnel support this by providing background information on the personnel who will be at each meeting.

Deliver

The Deliver phase of COIN targeting differs only from conventional operations in that a very wide variety of operations are undertaken. In order to support these, intelligence personnel must adapt the collection plan appropriately.

Assess

The Assess phase differs from conventional operations in many ways. Intelligence personnel must look for reporting that indicates the effects on insurgent networks and the community due to an operation. Depending on these effects, commanders may choose to expand the operation, maintain it as is, halt it, change to a branch or sequel plan, or try to contain the damage of a mistake. Metrics often include—

- ❑ Changes in atmospherics.
- ❑ Changes in intelligence provided by individuals or groups.
- ❑ Changes in the economic or political situation of an area.
- ❑ Increases or decreases in enemy actions.
- ❑ Captured or killed enemy personnel.
- ❑ Captured equipment and documents.

Raids often provide a wealth of information that must be rapidly exploited. Intelligence personnel in the brigade often must be prepared to do a great deal of exploitation work. Though arduous, it is worth the time committed. Exploitation of documents and detainees often provides intelligence of enormous value on the structure of local insurgent organizations and may create a "snowball" effect whereby additional insurgents can be captured.

Conclusion

Maneuver brigades have a unique position when involved in COIN operations. By doctrine, a unit should always understand what is occurring two echelons above it and two echelons below. The brigade is therefore monitoring what goes on at the company level and at the corps/theater level. In many ways, this makes the brigade staff a link between day-to-day tactical operations line soldiers and the theater-level campaign. For intelligence personnel, it means they are looking at everything from local insurgents to major regional financiers and organizers who may cross international boundaries.

The targeting decisions made by the brigade staff not only have local effects, they may have strategic effects on the conduct of a war. The success or failure of the brigade will be tightly linked to the manner in which it conducts targeting. An efficiently run, full-spectrum targeting process can help ensure the brigade meets goals outlined in its campaign plan. A poorly run targeting process can undermine the war effort for an entire theater and unnecessarily cost the lives of soldiers. It is therefore crucial that intelligence supports the targeting process by providing a robust, comprehensive understanding of enemy forces, the indigenous population, the local economy, social and political organizations, political leaders, and how they all interconnect. Further, intelligence personnel must understand their OE well enough that they are able to recommend targets and means of engaging those targets in order to achieve desired effects on the battlefield.

Endnotes

1. Published in the April-June 2004 issue of ***MIPB.***

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A Soldier, from 361st Psychological Operations Battalion, hands out literature and shakes hands with Iraqis in Mosul.

Training the Corps

21st Century Infrastructure Meets Military Intelligence Training

by Andrea Malone and George Stemler

The Global War on Terrorism has substantially increased the Army's demand for Military Intelligence (MI) Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs) 96B10, Intelligence Analyst, and 97E10, Human Intelligence Collector. Both MOSs are trained at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, by the 309th MI Battalion, 111th MI Brigade. The two courses are the largest of the five Initial Military Training (IMT) courses and one functional course trained by the 309th MI Battalion.[1] The Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS) projects the 309th MI Battalion will train substantially more soldiers in Fiscal Years (FYs) 2006 and 2007 than previous years. To meet the increased annual student throughput, the 309th MI Battalion was reorganized (as depicted in figure 1) from three to six training companies FY 05.



Figure 1. 309th MI Battalion Reorganization.

Fort Huachuca modified its training infrastructure to provide the 309th MI Battalion orderly rooms for A and C Companies, student housing, multi-purpose classrooms, and field training exercise (FTX) Tactical Operation Centers (TOCs) for course Capstone exercises.

Open-bay barracks are employed to provide housing for students assigned to A, C, and F Companies. Each soldier is assigned a wall locker containing a personal pull-out desk, which provides each soldier personal space to write letters and work on school assignments. The student housing is wired to provide a modern telephony capability.

Other buildings house 32 general purpose classrooms with seating for 992 students. In addition, other buildings provide the 97E10 course with space for over 100 questioning and interview booths. Each general purpose classroom contains up-to-date audio visual (AV) equipment enhancing the instructor's presentation of course material. The AV suite includes manual projection screens and ceiling projector units connected to the instructor's desktop. All classrooms were installed with network drops sufficient to handle the maximum student capacity for each classroom.

For a number of years the U.S. Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) sought the capability to tie together the Capstone exercises conducted by certain MOS-producing courses trained within the 111th MI Brigade. While the 309th MI Battalion is the architect for MOS training, the Digital Training Office (DTO) is the architect for the infrastructure to execute the training plan. The DTO's efforts to upgrade and modernize the communication infrastructure at field training Sites Papa, Uniform, and Maverick have made this a realistic goal. The 97E10 course uses field training Sites Papa and Uniform for their Capstone FTX; while the 96B10 course uses field training Site Maverick. The

309th MI Battalion soldiers training in the field.

newly installed digital communication infrastructure gives the two courses at the three FTX sites, the ability to digitally communicate with each other and other 111th MI Brigade courses.

Sites Papa and Uniform are literally "across the street" from one another, but to connect the two sites approximately 6,900 feet of fiber-optic data and 50-pair copper voice communications lines were required. The 6,900 feet of fiber-optic and 50-pair copper voice cable were installed in an aerial configuration, using existing power poles. An additional seven poles were installed expressly for aerial communications cabling. The installation was conducted by members

11th Signal Brigade soldiers installing aerial fiber optics.

of the 504th and the 69th Signal Battalions, 11th Signal Brigade in conjunction with the Sulphur Springs Valley Electric Cooperative (SSVEC). By performing the aerial installation, the Signal soldiers received real world training from experienced SSVEC linemen that will be invaluable during future real world deployments. The 309th MI Battalion and the DTO benefited from a drastic reduction in installation costs estimated to be at least $70,000.

To achieve data and voice connectivity from Site Uniform to the Fort Huachuca garrison, line-of-site microwave radios are employed. The microwave radio site is located above Site Uniform; the other end is located on the roof of Greely Hall, 5 to 6 miles away. To complete the connectivity between these sites, an aerial installation of fiber-optic cable was installed from the microwave radio site to an operations building located inside Site Uniform.


Site Uniform's microwave radio site.

Future communication work includes installation of switches and network cabling to all training buildings located on both sites to support network connectivity. In addition, both Sites Papa and Uniform are scheduled to receive Information Processing System (IPS) safes and encryption devices.

Site Maverick is configured to replicate eight TOCs. Sufficient network drops were installed in the TOCs to support the increased 96B10 student load throughout the course's ten day FTX. Connectivity to the existing Fort Huachuca data backbone was extended to Site Maverick in the 3rd Quarter FY04 by the Fort Huachuca Director of Information Management (DOIM). The Site Maverick communications network is distributed via fiber-optic cabling from the main


309th MI Battalion soldiers training in field.

communications closet located in an existing building through manholes to each of the eight TOC buildings. This communications closet currently houses racked switches for complete network connectivity, the IPS safe and encryption device.

Change is a constant feature in today's training environment, adapting to change is necessary in order to take advantage of lessons learned and to incorporate advanced technology. Increased student loads, a new digital communication infrastructure, and the aggressive incorporation of lessons learned have provided the 309th MI Battalion and the DTO numerous opportunities to improve and enhance the training experience. By taking advantage of change, a rare opportunity now exists to utilize three cutting edge IMT training facilities to incorporate relevant lessons learned with a world class communications infrastructure.

Endnote

1. The other courses trained by the 309th MI Battalion are 96R10, Ground Surveillance Systems Operator; 98H10, Communication Locator Interceptor; 97B10, Counterintelligence Agent (until February 2006). The 3C-35E/351B/244-97B20, Basic Counterintelligence Special Agent Course replaces the 97B10 course effective 1 October 2005. The functional course is 3C-F17/244-F9, Source Operations Course.

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

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Language Action

Update:
Notes from the Military Language Conference, Foreign Language and Culture: Force Multipliers, 8 to 9 November 2005

by Peter A. Shaver

The joint U.S. Army and Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) and the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) Military Language Conference was held in Washington, D.C. on the 8th and 9th of November 2005. Around 240 government, military, academic, and industry linguists attended. The event was jointly sponsored and supported by USAIC&FH and MITRE Corp. in McLean, Virginia. Some of the keynote speakers included Ambassador John Negroponte, Director National Intelligence; The Honorable Rush Holt, Representative from New Jersey; Lieutenant General H.P. Osman, Director, Manpower and Reserve Affairs Marine Corps; and Major General Barbara G. Fast, Commanding General, USAIC&FH.

Groups were organized to discuss the use of military and contract linguists; survival language and cultural knowledge; accuracy of translated documents; coalition language requirements; linguist proficiency maintenance; professional skills integration; surge language capability; the education system in support of the Department of Defense (DOD) language requirements; non-linguist devices such as the Phraselator; civilian language corps; national language priorities, and Reserve Component (RC) language issues.

Major Recommendations of the Discussion Groups

Use of military versus contract linguists

- ❑ Design a multifaceted approach to support operations including linguists from the military, government civilians, and contractors.
- ❑ Define various roles, missions, and language domains. For each role, mission leaders must determine whether these could best be supported by military, government civilian, or contract linguists.

Survival language and cultural knowledge required by unit soldiers

- ❑ Recommend Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) direct organizations to outline their efforts relating to cultural expertise.
- ❑ Improve screening and training of translators and interpreters.
- ❑ Provide electronic dictionaries accessible from Word documents and develop more automated means of providing feedback to translators and editors.

Accuracy of information and intelligence derived from translated documents

- ❑ Improve user training and screening of translators and interpreters.
- ❑ Improve Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB) presently based on English grammar models to improve the capability to recruit native speakers to serve as translators, interpreters, and language instructors.
- ❑ Improve training in source and target culture and language proficiency.

Coalition language requirements

- ❑ Identify coalition languages that require support early and often.
- ❑ Leverage coalition partners to provide additional translators and interpreters.
- ❑ Develop language and cultural strategies that will improve the accuracy of communication between the U.S. and coalition forces possibly through professional military education (PME).

Maintaining linguist proficiency

- ❑ Use DLI Lingnet and Langnet as a training clearinghouse.

- ❑ Use the National Virtual Translation Center Language Technology and Resource Nexus (LANTERN).
- ❑ DLI refresher and immersion training to improve linguist proficiency in the target language to meet the 2/2 requirement and, in some cases (as for the National Security Agency), a 3/3 requirement.
- ❑ Expand Language Training Detachments (LTDs) to more locations making them easily accessible to military linguists.
- ❑ Increase development of tactical language products such as the USAIC&FH Language MOS Enhancement Program and the DLI Language Familiarization training; translation diagnostic aids from private companies such as MITRE, as well as other training developed at the Regional SIGINT Operations Centers (RSOC), and the I Corps Foreign Language Training Center (FLTC) at Fort Lewis, Washington.
- ❑ Add colloquial (informal) language training to the DLI basic course.
- ❑ Wider use of diagnostic assessments and Individual Language Training Plans (ILTP).

Education system in support of military and DOD language requirements

- ❑ Think globally; act locally. Tailor efforts to respond to local communities and local foreign language support opportunities.
- ❑ Ensure that all language learners receive strictly defined high quality instruction based on current foreign language instructional methodology.
- ❑ Rethink the teaching and learning paradigm of "*one teacher serving one group of learners.*"
- ❑ Expand the use of technology and share technology resources across the language education community.
- ❑ Provide context for language learning. Show relevance beyond college admissions (career paths).
- ❑ Broaden support base beyond DOD for making language and cultural competence a national priority.

Non-linguist devices such as the Phraselator

- ❑ Provide links to the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) on the DLI and Foreign Language Resource Center (FLRC) websites to access the results of evaluations of devices.
- ❑ Concerted effort on the part of the Army Civilian Training Education and Development System (ACTEDS), Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) and DOD labs such as the Army Research Lab (ARL), the Army Research Institute (ARI) and DARPA to collect user feedback and evaluations on automated language translation and interpretation aids such as the Phraselator and post them for government personnel.
- ❑ Acquaint military personnel early, as in initial training, that this technology is available.

Recommendations on National Language Priorities for DOD and Intelligence Community Planning

Executive Branch

- ❑ Presidential emphasis needed.
- ❑ Create a special advisor to the President for language and cultural awareness.
- ❑ Establish a national language policy:
  - ❑ Implement strategy for language education in the U.S. school system, K–12.
  - ❑ Provide scholarships for immersion and experiences at university level.
  - ❑ Synchronize DOD language priorities to the U.S. university system.
  - ❑ Identify and involve second generation foreign language speakers (the Heritage community); provide incentives such as citizenship.

Legislative Branch

- ❑ Support the Executive Branch.
- ❑ Provide funding and authority.
- ❑ Recruit and sponsor foreign language teachers, provide incentives such as accelerated visas and citizenships.
- ❑ Provide grants to education; develop and implement programs based on a foreign language assistance program model to fund kindergarten through high school language education.
- ❑ Pass a new "Lodge Act" to recruit non-U.S citizens with critical language skills into the U.S. Army.[1]
- ❑ Develop national testing standards for students and certification requirements for language teachers.

State and Local Governments

- ❑ Establish language learning centers in Heritage enclaves and in language pioneering school districts.
- ❑ Research current successful grades K–12 language programs—replicate success.
- ❑ Implement funding, grants, and incentives.

- ❑ Integrate DOD language requirements with university programs.
- ❑ Link language programs and proficiency to successful positions in private industry and government.

Academic Community

- ❑ K–12 language programs need to be standardized.
- ❑ Use scholarships for overseas experiences as an incentive.
- ❑ Establish visiting professor programs.
- ❑ Seed money to Academe to start language programs.
- ❑ Expand Title 6 (International Education) programs and review return on investment.
- ❑ Develop certification program as a way to provide a pipeline of linguists which will assist DOD and other government agencies to meet foreign language requirements with standardized, proficient linguists. Get money, produce product to a standard, or lose funding.
- ❑ Establish incremental performance-based grants and multi-year programs.
- ❑ Provide incentives to colleges and high schools to increase output of foreign language teachers.
- ❑ Increase scholarships to capture teachers (2 to 5 year grants).
- ❑ Promote use of language and technology in education.
- ❑ Mandate language proficiency skills across academic disciplines.

Private Sector

- ❑ Implement corporate language sponsorship with universities.
  - ❑ Microsoft / Computer Science – Chinese, Hindi, Urdu.
  - ❑ Exxon Mobile / Shell – Arabic, French African.
- ❑ Language employment options/track to provide private industry with the best possible solution to linguist requirements and provide linguists with foreign language career opportunities.
- ❑ Provide internships with multi-national corporations (Coca-Cola, SC Johnson).
- ❑ Language Technology development to provide more accurate machine language support that will assist linguists in producing a more accurate translation or interpretation and assist non linguists in understanding basic language meaning.
- ❑ Benefits to private industry such as more accurate and timely contract negotiations, improved product quality and sales through concept exchanges, and enlarging markets.

RC Language and Cultural Priorities

- ❑ Use of Army Reserve Intelligence Support Center (ARISC) for classified and unclassified language training.
- ❑ Implement practical, constructive interactive language training and immersion.
- ❑ Balance CTT and specified language training time.
- ❑ Explicitly state expectations for language proficiency skills.
- ❑ Improve Open Source Information System Document Exploitation (OSIS-DOCEX).
- ❑ Adjust incentive programs.
- ❑ Merge tuition assistance, Foreign Language Proficiency Pay (FLPP), and higher education offerings to motivate soldiers toward off-duty study and long-term sustainment training.
- ❑ Reduce unit commander's training accountability; transfer to senior NCOs.
- ❑ Offer reclassification to become Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 09L, Interpreter/Translator.
- ❑ Establish Department of the Army G2 as the single source visibility for all linguist training opportunities regardless of proponent or school.
- ❑ Units provide language training during battle assemblies.
- ❑ Units provide four hours of language training every other drill. Encourage and provide incentives for linguists to study at home.
- ❑ Encourage and provide incentives for linguists to attend 8 to 16 hour language events i.e., community support for immigrants, lectures, fairs, tutoring on weekends other than battle assembly weekends.

Endnotes

1. The "Lodge Act," more properly known as Public Law 597 and named after Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., the bill's sponsor, was passed in 1950. This law provided for the recruitment of non-U.S. citizens with critical language skills into the U.S. Army.

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Intelligence Philatelic Vignettes

Intelligence Activity on Pitcairn Island

by Mark Sommer

Pitcairn Island lays claim to a secret space satellite program featured on a July 7, 2000 souvenir sheet. The accompanying text to the sheet mentions a secret program that was initiated in 1966 to build an airstrip on Henderson Island, a small uninhabited island near Pitcairn. The base was to be used for planes recovering film canisters detached from spy satellites circling the earth.

Although U.S. Air Force planes did indeed catch jettisoned satellite film containers in mid-air over the Pacific for many years, the aircraft were based in California and the idea of an airbase in the Pitcairns was never approved. It is unlikely that the scene depicted on the two stamps—that of survey and supply operations—ever took place.

The souvenir sheet was released on the opening day of the World Stamp Expo 2000 show in Anaheim, California. Like many of the other stamps and souvenir sheets issued in conjunction with the World Stamp Expo, this sheet reflects the show's space theme.

Pitcairn Islands Space Issue

This stamp issue commemorates the joint venture between the Governments of Great Britain and the United States of America in the mid 1960's. This top secret mission was to investigate the feasibility of building an airstrip on Henderson Island, part of the Pitcairn group in the South East Pacific.

Henderson was identified as a potential base to facilitate 'Polar Orbit' satellite recovery from the California launch site of Vandenberg Air Force Base.

This mission was conducted in 1966, and consisted of the uninhabited Henderson Island being surveyed by personnel of the United States Air Force with assistance from the satellite recovery vessel USNS Sunnyvale. The plan was submitted recommending the airstrip proceed but failed to gain support at higher levels and the project was abandoned.

In 1988 Henderson Island was declared a World Heritage Site. Today it is visited by just a few small cruise vessels and yachts and the Pitcairners still visit occasionally to collect Miro wood to carve as souvenirs for tourists.



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