In an earlier paper, 'Peter Geach on nonsense, confusion and sin' 1 , I suggested that what one c... more In an earlier paper, 'Peter Geach on nonsense, confusion and sin' 1 , I suggested that what one can say in explanation of one's own actions suffers from a severe limitation: one can shed little light on the question why one acted on one's reasons for an action rather than on one's reasons against that action. In this paper I want to explore this suggestion further. One of my tasks will be to distinguish my question from three standard philosophical questions that have tended to overshadow it: the question of freewill and determinism; that of the relation between fact and value; and that of the possibility of weakness of will. On these I shall, on the whole, maintain a studied agnosticism.
I consider the dispute, not with a view to reaching a final verdict, but for the light it sheds o... more I consider the dispute, not with a view to reaching a final verdict, but for the light it sheds on the notion of philosophical nonsense. How does it look to a sceptic about philosophical nonsense? It is generally agreed that the 'Tractatus' is an unsatisfactory work, if the traditional reading of, for example, G. E. M. Anscombe or Peter Hacker is correct. But is it any better on the ‘resolute’ reading of Cora Diamond or James Conant? I maintain that it is more difficulty to handle the concept of nonsense than nonsensicalists of any stripe realise. If the ‘ineffable truths’ and ‘important nonsense’ of traditional readings raise problems, so too do the contrast between meaningful frame and nonsensical core, Diamond’s idea that one can imaginatively identify with the nonsense-talker and the mysterious new entity, ‘transitional’ nonsense. Meaning and communication, I suggest, keep reappearing precisely where they should not.
(The puzzling passage discussed in the addendum is one in which Diamond seems to be denying that there is any such thing as understanding or imaginatively identifying with the nonsense-talker.)
I am planning a history of the concept of philosophical nonsense and naturally difficult historic... more I am planning a history of the concept of philosophical nonsense and naturally difficult historical and exegetical questions have come up. Charles Pigden has argued that it goes back at least as far as Hobbes and that Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant (on some interpretations) and pragmatists such as William James, as well as numerous Twentieth-Century philosophers make use of it. In this ‘paper’ I put forward for general discussion such questions as whether Hobbes was the first nonsensicalist, whether Kant was a nonsensicalist at all, which philosophers if any have considered contradictions to be meaningless and whether Wittgenstein thought that his concept of criterion could legitimately be used verificationistically. I shall continue to add further questions as they occur to me.
How do philosophical accusations of talking nonsense relate to the layperson’s notions of meaning... more How do philosophical accusations of talking nonsense relate to the layperson’s notions of meaning and meaningfulness? If one were to explain carefully what philosophical nonsense was supposed to be, would one be greeted with incredulity? How do people react to being accused of talking nonsense themselves? Is anything analogous to an illusion of meaning recognised in everyday life? In dream-reports perhaps? Or in the utterances of schizophrenics or those under the influence of drugs? Or in certain jokes and hoaxes? Are contradictions felt to be meaningless? I argue that, though it is clear that experimental philosophy could shed some light on these questions, their subject matter creates special difficulties. First, it is more difficult than usual to formulate questions and produce ‘vignettes’ that do not subtly encourage certain responses at the expense of others. Second, the fact that philosophical nonsense is a metaphilosophical concept ensures that its investigation is going to be more indirect than would be that of knowledge or intention, for example.
I consider the dispute, not with a view to reaching a final verdict, but for the light it sheds o... more I consider the dispute, not with a view to reaching a final verdict, but for the light it sheds on the notion of philosophical nonsense. How does it look to a sceptic about philosophical nonsense? It is generally agreed that the Tractatus is an unsatisfactory work, if the traditional reading of, for example, G. E. M. Anscombe or Peter Hacker is correct. But is it any better on the ‘resolute’ reading of Cora Diamond or James Conant? I maintain that it is more difficulty to handle the concept of nonsense than nonsensicalists of any stripe realise. If the ‘ineffable truths’ and ‘important nonsense’ of traditional readings raise problems, so too do the contrast between meaningful frame and nonsensical core, Diamond’s idea that one can imaginatively identify with the nonsense-talker and the mysterious new entity, ‘transitional’ nonsense. Meaning and communication, I suggest, keep reappearing precisely where they should not.
I consider the dispute, not with a view to reaching a final verdict, but for the light it sheds o... more I consider the dispute, not with a view to reaching a final verdict, but for the light it sheds on the notion of philosophical nonsense. How does it look to a sceptic about philosophical nonsense? It is generally agreed that the Tractatus is an unsatisfactory work, if the traditional reading of, for example, G. E. M. Anscombe or Peter Hacker is correct. But is it any better on the ‘resolute’ reading of Cora Diamond or James Conant? I maintain that it is more difficulty to handle the concept of nonsense than nonsensicalists of any stripe realise. If the ‘ineffable truths’ and ‘important nonsense’ of traditional readings raise problems, so too do the contrast between meaningful frame and nonsensical core, Diamond’s idea that one can imaginatively identify with the nonsense-talker and the mysterious new entity, ‘transitional’ nonsense. Meaning and communication, I suggest, keep reappearing precisely where they should not.
I consider the dispute, not with a view to reaching a final verdict, but for the light it sheds o... more I consider the dispute, not with a view to reaching a final verdict, but for the light it sheds on the notion of philosophical nonsense. How does it look to a sceptic about philosophical nonsense? It is generally agreed that the Tractatus is an unsatisfactory work, if the traditional reading of, for example, G. E. M. Anscombe or Peter Hacker is correct. But is it any better on the ‘resolute’ reading of Cora Diamond or James Conant? I maintain that it is more difficulty to handle the concept of nonsense than nonsensicalists of any stripe realise. If the ‘ineffable truths’ and ‘important nonsense’ of traditional readings raise problems, so too do the contrast between meaningful frame and nonsensical core, Diamond’s idea that one can imaginatively identify with the nonsense-talker and the mysterious new entity, ‘transitional’ nonsense. Meaning and communication, I suggest, keep reappearing precisely where they should not.
How do philosophical accusations of talking nonsense relate to the layperson’s notions of meaning... more How do philosophical accusations of talking nonsense relate to the layperson’s notions of meaning and meaningfulness? If one were to explain carefully what philosophical nonsense was supposed to be, would one be greeted with incredulity? How do people react to being accused to talking nonsense themselves? Is anything analogous to an illusion of meaning recognised in everyday life? In dream-reports perhaps? Or in the utterances of schizophrenics or those under the influence of drugs? Or in certain jokes and hoaxes? Are contradictions felt to be meaningless? I argue that, though it is clear that experimental philosophy could shed some light on these questions, their subject matter creates special difficulties. First, it is more difficult than usual to formulate questions and produce ‘vignettes’ that do not subtly encourage certain responses at the expense of others. Second, the fact that philosophical nonsense is a metaphilosophical concept ensures that its investigation is going to be more indirect than would be that of knowledge or intention, for example.
I originally entitled this paper ‘Why are there no uncontroversial examples of philosophical nons... more I originally entitled this paper ‘Why are there no uncontroversial examples of philosophical nonsense?’, but since this seemed apt to provoke rather superficial responses, I decided to re-title it. In it I ponder the fact that, not only are there no uncontroversial examples of philosophical nonsense, there are no uncontroversial examples of what one might call ‘analogue philosophical nonsense’. These would be non-philosophical cases of someone’s believing he means something when in reality he means nothing. (Someone’s saying, ‘It’s 5 o’clock on the sun’ is sometimes offered as an example.) I ask what conditions such cases would need to satisfy. What would count as a compellingly clear case of an illusion of meaning? Why has no one described one?
Cook’s paper ‘Wittgenstein on privacy’, though published over fifty years ago, is still one of th... more Cook’s paper ‘Wittgenstein on privacy’, though published over fifty years ago, is still one of the most impressive attempts to take seriously what philosophical nonsense would have to be. Cook argues that someone who says, ‘It is not even logically possible to feel another’s pain’ is experiencing ‘a queer sort of illusion, produced by seeing one pattern of grammar on analogy with another and quite different pattern of grammar’. I argue that he has identified a genuine philosophical illusion, indeed a grammatical illusion, that is quite close to what nonsensicalists are postulating – but I am not sure that it is IDENTICAL with it.
Here I bewail the slapdash and confusing way in which philosophers bandy about the word ‘incohere... more Here I bewail the slapdash and confusing way in which philosophers bandy about the word ‘incoherent’ (and ‘incoherence’ and ‘incoherently’). To some it appears to mean: inconsistent; to others: pragmatically self-defeating; and to yet others: nonsensical, i.e. meaningless. And often one is left guessing.
I suggest that, although the nonsensicalist challenge (obviously) matters, it has, at least in it... more I suggest that, although the nonsensicalist challenge (obviously) matters, it has, at least in its Wittgensteinian form, been widely ignored. On the other hand, those who still adhere to nonsensicalism (mainly Wittgensteinians) have been equally remiss in their failure to examine its presuppositions.
This paper goes naturally with my earlier paper 'The importance of Russell's Theory of Types for ... more This paper goes naturally with my earlier paper 'The importance of Russell's Theory of Types for the emergence of twentieth-century nonsensicalism'. In it I discuss the method Prior proposes in his paper ‘Entities’ for dealing with Russell’s Paradox without appealing to the concept of nonsense.
The four strands are (a) the ‘austere’ conception of nonsense; (b) the view that a perfectly acce... more The four strands are (a) the ‘austere’ conception of nonsense; (b) the view that a perfectly acceptable sentence of the language can be nonsense if it is uttered in unsuitable circumstances; (c) the view that rules of grammar are nonsense if construed as universal truths about the world; (d) the view that one cannot ‘mean a nonsense’. (I think that this last has to be ascribed to Wittgenstein, though it is surprisingly difficult to find knock-down textual evidence for it.) I argue that (c) is the odd man out and is not easily reconciled with the others.
I am planning a history of the notion of philosophical nonsense and naturally difficult historica... more I am planning a history of the notion of philosophical nonsense and naturally difficult historical and exegetical questions have come up. Charles Pigden has argued that the notion goes back at least as far as Hobbes and that Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant (on some interpretations) and pragmatists such as William James, as well as numerous Twentieth-Century philosophers make use of it. In this ‘paper’ I put forward for general discussion such questions as whether Hobbes was the first 'nonsensicalist', whether Kant was a 'nonsensicalist' at all, which philosophers if any have considered contradictions to be meaningless and whether Wittgenstein thought that his concept of criterion could legitimately be used verificationistically. I shall continue to add further questions as they occur to me.
This paper is a bridge between my interest in the notion of philosophical nonsense and my interes... more This paper is a bridge between my interest in the notion of philosophical nonsense and my interest in problems concerning ethics and action. Geach sees an analogy between philosophical error and moral error, more specifically between the problem of understanding the state of mind of someone who is duped by philosophical nonsense and that of someone who ‘sins’. In neither case does being confused oneself help one understand the confusion of others. I argue that Geach gives us no good reason to believe that there is such a thing as philosophical nonsense and that, even if there is, there will be no real analogy between the states of mind in question. For one thing, there is no obvious reason why there could not be ‘clear-headed sin’. For another, one who ‘sins’ and one who does not often have the same sorts of difficulty understanding each other, whereas, if there is such a thing as philosophical nonsense, it is hard to see how there could be any such symmetry between one who is taken in by it and one who is not.
Russell decided that the only way to avoid the paradox that bears his name was to reject certain ... more Russell decided that the only way to avoid the paradox that bears his name was to reject certain combinations of words that were apparently about classes as being in fact nonsensical. In doing this he was not accusing some rival school of philosophers of talking nonsense; only his own previous self. This gave his position an air of non-polemical neutrality. So long as no alternative was known to his treatment of the matter, it looked as though he had DISCOVERED that seemingly meaningful, well-formed sentences could be in reality nonsensical. In spite of the fact that Russell made only a limited use of this idea in his own philosophy, I argue that he gave a decisive impetus to nonsensicalism by providing what seemed to be a museum exhibit of philosophical nonsense.
This book is an introduction in a double sense. It is intended to introduce beginners in philosop... more This book is an introduction in a double sense. It is intended to introduce beginners in philosophy to the idea of philosophical nonsense and the problems it raises. But it is also addressed to professional philosophers, most of whom seem virtually unaware of the issue.
Certain philosophers, here called ‘nonsensicalists’, believe that much philosophy (philosophical questions as well as assertions) is simply nonsense in the strict sense of being meaningless. They proceed as though it were an established fact that there is such a thing as philosophical nonsense and the notion were quite unproblematic. By contrast, many other philosophers proceed as though either they had never heard of it or it were quite obvious that there is no such thing.
There can be little doubt that what the nonsensicalists are saying is of great importance – if they are right. But there are at least eight questions that must be addressed before anyone is in a position to start hunting down philosophical nonsense and they have all been woefully neglected.
The idea of philosophical nonsense goes back to Thomas Hobbes at least and yet its history remains largely unresearched.
In view of the neglect of the problems raised by the notion of philosophical nonsense, even by professional philosophers, it is not unduly optimistic to suggest that it is a topic to which relative newcomers to the subject might make a contribution.
Ludwig Wittgenstein thought that good philosophy unties the knots in our thinking that bad philosophy has put there and must make movements as complicated as the knots it unties. Is the notion of philosophical nonsense an essential aid to this – as Wittgenstein himself thought – or just another knot?
This paper starts from Tractatus, 6.53, and ask how one could show someone ‘that he had failed to... more This paper starts from Tractatus, 6.53, and ask how one could show someone ‘that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions’. Once one has fully mastered the ‘austere’ conception of nonsense – that nonsense has neither meaning, form, content, nor logic – the difficulties of the enterprise become evident. It is not clear how one could be in a position to conclude much about an utterance without first finding a meaning in it. Suggestions made by Guy Robinson, Edward Witherspoon and Hans-Johann Glock are considered but it is concluded that the last, best hope for nonsensicalism lies in a therapeutic approach. I end with a plea for someone who is sympathetic to this aspect of Wittgenstein’s philosophy to make a serious attempt to work out the details.
In an earlier paper, 'Peter Geach on nonsense, confusion and sin' 1 , I suggested that what one c... more In an earlier paper, 'Peter Geach on nonsense, confusion and sin' 1 , I suggested that what one can say in explanation of one's own actions suffers from a severe limitation: one can shed little light on the question why one acted on one's reasons for an action rather than on one's reasons against that action. In this paper I want to explore this suggestion further. One of my tasks will be to distinguish my question from three standard philosophical questions that have tended to overshadow it: the question of freewill and determinism; that of the relation between fact and value; and that of the possibility of weakness of will. On these I shall, on the whole, maintain a studied agnosticism.
I consider the dispute, not with a view to reaching a final verdict, but for the light it sheds o... more I consider the dispute, not with a view to reaching a final verdict, but for the light it sheds on the notion of philosophical nonsense. How does it look to a sceptic about philosophical nonsense? It is generally agreed that the 'Tractatus' is an unsatisfactory work, if the traditional reading of, for example, G. E. M. Anscombe or Peter Hacker is correct. But is it any better on the ‘resolute’ reading of Cora Diamond or James Conant? I maintain that it is more difficulty to handle the concept of nonsense than nonsensicalists of any stripe realise. If the ‘ineffable truths’ and ‘important nonsense’ of traditional readings raise problems, so too do the contrast between meaningful frame and nonsensical core, Diamond’s idea that one can imaginatively identify with the nonsense-talker and the mysterious new entity, ‘transitional’ nonsense. Meaning and communication, I suggest, keep reappearing precisely where they should not.
(The puzzling passage discussed in the addendum is one in which Diamond seems to be denying that there is any such thing as understanding or imaginatively identifying with the nonsense-talker.)
I am planning a history of the concept of philosophical nonsense and naturally difficult historic... more I am planning a history of the concept of philosophical nonsense and naturally difficult historical and exegetical questions have come up. Charles Pigden has argued that it goes back at least as far as Hobbes and that Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant (on some interpretations) and pragmatists such as William James, as well as numerous Twentieth-Century philosophers make use of it. In this ‘paper’ I put forward for general discussion such questions as whether Hobbes was the first nonsensicalist, whether Kant was a nonsensicalist at all, which philosophers if any have considered contradictions to be meaningless and whether Wittgenstein thought that his concept of criterion could legitimately be used verificationistically. I shall continue to add further questions as they occur to me.
How do philosophical accusations of talking nonsense relate to the layperson’s notions of meaning... more How do philosophical accusations of talking nonsense relate to the layperson’s notions of meaning and meaningfulness? If one were to explain carefully what philosophical nonsense was supposed to be, would one be greeted with incredulity? How do people react to being accused of talking nonsense themselves? Is anything analogous to an illusion of meaning recognised in everyday life? In dream-reports perhaps? Or in the utterances of schizophrenics or those under the influence of drugs? Or in certain jokes and hoaxes? Are contradictions felt to be meaningless? I argue that, though it is clear that experimental philosophy could shed some light on these questions, their subject matter creates special difficulties. First, it is more difficult than usual to formulate questions and produce ‘vignettes’ that do not subtly encourage certain responses at the expense of others. Second, the fact that philosophical nonsense is a metaphilosophical concept ensures that its investigation is going to be more indirect than would be that of knowledge or intention, for example.
I consider the dispute, not with a view to reaching a final verdict, but for the light it sheds o... more I consider the dispute, not with a view to reaching a final verdict, but for the light it sheds on the notion of philosophical nonsense. How does it look to a sceptic about philosophical nonsense? It is generally agreed that the Tractatus is an unsatisfactory work, if the traditional reading of, for example, G. E. M. Anscombe or Peter Hacker is correct. But is it any better on the ‘resolute’ reading of Cora Diamond or James Conant? I maintain that it is more difficulty to handle the concept of nonsense than nonsensicalists of any stripe realise. If the ‘ineffable truths’ and ‘important nonsense’ of traditional readings raise problems, so too do the contrast between meaningful frame and nonsensical core, Diamond’s idea that one can imaginatively identify with the nonsense-talker and the mysterious new entity, ‘transitional’ nonsense. Meaning and communication, I suggest, keep reappearing precisely where they should not.
I consider the dispute, not with a view to reaching a final verdict, but for the light it sheds o... more I consider the dispute, not with a view to reaching a final verdict, but for the light it sheds on the notion of philosophical nonsense. How does it look to a sceptic about philosophical nonsense? It is generally agreed that the Tractatus is an unsatisfactory work, if the traditional reading of, for example, G. E. M. Anscombe or Peter Hacker is correct. But is it any better on the ‘resolute’ reading of Cora Diamond or James Conant? I maintain that it is more difficulty to handle the concept of nonsense than nonsensicalists of any stripe realise. If the ‘ineffable truths’ and ‘important nonsense’ of traditional readings raise problems, so too do the contrast between meaningful frame and nonsensical core, Diamond’s idea that one can imaginatively identify with the nonsense-talker and the mysterious new entity, ‘transitional’ nonsense. Meaning and communication, I suggest, keep reappearing precisely where they should not.
I consider the dispute, not with a view to reaching a final verdict, but for the light it sheds o... more I consider the dispute, not with a view to reaching a final verdict, but for the light it sheds on the notion of philosophical nonsense. How does it look to a sceptic about philosophical nonsense? It is generally agreed that the Tractatus is an unsatisfactory work, if the traditional reading of, for example, G. E. M. Anscombe or Peter Hacker is correct. But is it any better on the ‘resolute’ reading of Cora Diamond or James Conant? I maintain that it is more difficulty to handle the concept of nonsense than nonsensicalists of any stripe realise. If the ‘ineffable truths’ and ‘important nonsense’ of traditional readings raise problems, so too do the contrast between meaningful frame and nonsensical core, Diamond’s idea that one can imaginatively identify with the nonsense-talker and the mysterious new entity, ‘transitional’ nonsense. Meaning and communication, I suggest, keep reappearing precisely where they should not.
How do philosophical accusations of talking nonsense relate to the layperson’s notions of meaning... more How do philosophical accusations of talking nonsense relate to the layperson’s notions of meaning and meaningfulness? If one were to explain carefully what philosophical nonsense was supposed to be, would one be greeted with incredulity? How do people react to being accused to talking nonsense themselves? Is anything analogous to an illusion of meaning recognised in everyday life? In dream-reports perhaps? Or in the utterances of schizophrenics or those under the influence of drugs? Or in certain jokes and hoaxes? Are contradictions felt to be meaningless? I argue that, though it is clear that experimental philosophy could shed some light on these questions, their subject matter creates special difficulties. First, it is more difficult than usual to formulate questions and produce ‘vignettes’ that do not subtly encourage certain responses at the expense of others. Second, the fact that philosophical nonsense is a metaphilosophical concept ensures that its investigation is going to be more indirect than would be that of knowledge or intention, for example.
I originally entitled this paper ‘Why are there no uncontroversial examples of philosophical nons... more I originally entitled this paper ‘Why are there no uncontroversial examples of philosophical nonsense?’, but since this seemed apt to provoke rather superficial responses, I decided to re-title it. In it I ponder the fact that, not only are there no uncontroversial examples of philosophical nonsense, there are no uncontroversial examples of what one might call ‘analogue philosophical nonsense’. These would be non-philosophical cases of someone’s believing he means something when in reality he means nothing. (Someone’s saying, ‘It’s 5 o’clock on the sun’ is sometimes offered as an example.) I ask what conditions such cases would need to satisfy. What would count as a compellingly clear case of an illusion of meaning? Why has no one described one?
Cook’s paper ‘Wittgenstein on privacy’, though published over fifty years ago, is still one of th... more Cook’s paper ‘Wittgenstein on privacy’, though published over fifty years ago, is still one of the most impressive attempts to take seriously what philosophical nonsense would have to be. Cook argues that someone who says, ‘It is not even logically possible to feel another’s pain’ is experiencing ‘a queer sort of illusion, produced by seeing one pattern of grammar on analogy with another and quite different pattern of grammar’. I argue that he has identified a genuine philosophical illusion, indeed a grammatical illusion, that is quite close to what nonsensicalists are postulating – but I am not sure that it is IDENTICAL with it.
Here I bewail the slapdash and confusing way in which philosophers bandy about the word ‘incohere... more Here I bewail the slapdash and confusing way in which philosophers bandy about the word ‘incoherent’ (and ‘incoherence’ and ‘incoherently’). To some it appears to mean: inconsistent; to others: pragmatically self-defeating; and to yet others: nonsensical, i.e. meaningless. And often one is left guessing.
I suggest that, although the nonsensicalist challenge (obviously) matters, it has, at least in it... more I suggest that, although the nonsensicalist challenge (obviously) matters, it has, at least in its Wittgensteinian form, been widely ignored. On the other hand, those who still adhere to nonsensicalism (mainly Wittgensteinians) have been equally remiss in their failure to examine its presuppositions.
This paper goes naturally with my earlier paper 'The importance of Russell's Theory of Types for ... more This paper goes naturally with my earlier paper 'The importance of Russell's Theory of Types for the emergence of twentieth-century nonsensicalism'. In it I discuss the method Prior proposes in his paper ‘Entities’ for dealing with Russell’s Paradox without appealing to the concept of nonsense.
The four strands are (a) the ‘austere’ conception of nonsense; (b) the view that a perfectly acce... more The four strands are (a) the ‘austere’ conception of nonsense; (b) the view that a perfectly acceptable sentence of the language can be nonsense if it is uttered in unsuitable circumstances; (c) the view that rules of grammar are nonsense if construed as universal truths about the world; (d) the view that one cannot ‘mean a nonsense’. (I think that this last has to be ascribed to Wittgenstein, though it is surprisingly difficult to find knock-down textual evidence for it.) I argue that (c) is the odd man out and is not easily reconciled with the others.
I am planning a history of the notion of philosophical nonsense and naturally difficult historica... more I am planning a history of the notion of philosophical nonsense and naturally difficult historical and exegetical questions have come up. Charles Pigden has argued that the notion goes back at least as far as Hobbes and that Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant (on some interpretations) and pragmatists such as William James, as well as numerous Twentieth-Century philosophers make use of it. In this ‘paper’ I put forward for general discussion such questions as whether Hobbes was the first 'nonsensicalist', whether Kant was a 'nonsensicalist' at all, which philosophers if any have considered contradictions to be meaningless and whether Wittgenstein thought that his concept of criterion could legitimately be used verificationistically. I shall continue to add further questions as they occur to me.
This paper is a bridge between my interest in the notion of philosophical nonsense and my interes... more This paper is a bridge between my interest in the notion of philosophical nonsense and my interest in problems concerning ethics and action. Geach sees an analogy between philosophical error and moral error, more specifically between the problem of understanding the state of mind of someone who is duped by philosophical nonsense and that of someone who ‘sins’. In neither case does being confused oneself help one understand the confusion of others. I argue that Geach gives us no good reason to believe that there is such a thing as philosophical nonsense and that, even if there is, there will be no real analogy between the states of mind in question. For one thing, there is no obvious reason why there could not be ‘clear-headed sin’. For another, one who ‘sins’ and one who does not often have the same sorts of difficulty understanding each other, whereas, if there is such a thing as philosophical nonsense, it is hard to see how there could be any such symmetry between one who is taken in by it and one who is not.
Russell decided that the only way to avoid the paradox that bears his name was to reject certain ... more Russell decided that the only way to avoid the paradox that bears his name was to reject certain combinations of words that were apparently about classes as being in fact nonsensical. In doing this he was not accusing some rival school of philosophers of talking nonsense; only his own previous self. This gave his position an air of non-polemical neutrality. So long as no alternative was known to his treatment of the matter, it looked as though he had DISCOVERED that seemingly meaningful, well-formed sentences could be in reality nonsensical. In spite of the fact that Russell made only a limited use of this idea in his own philosophy, I argue that he gave a decisive impetus to nonsensicalism by providing what seemed to be a museum exhibit of philosophical nonsense.
This book is an introduction in a double sense. It is intended to introduce beginners in philosop... more This book is an introduction in a double sense. It is intended to introduce beginners in philosophy to the idea of philosophical nonsense and the problems it raises. But it is also addressed to professional philosophers, most of whom seem virtually unaware of the issue.
Certain philosophers, here called ‘nonsensicalists’, believe that much philosophy (philosophical questions as well as assertions) is simply nonsense in the strict sense of being meaningless. They proceed as though it were an established fact that there is such a thing as philosophical nonsense and the notion were quite unproblematic. By contrast, many other philosophers proceed as though either they had never heard of it or it were quite obvious that there is no such thing.
There can be little doubt that what the nonsensicalists are saying is of great importance – if they are right. But there are at least eight questions that must be addressed before anyone is in a position to start hunting down philosophical nonsense and they have all been woefully neglected.
The idea of philosophical nonsense goes back to Thomas Hobbes at least and yet its history remains largely unresearched.
In view of the neglect of the problems raised by the notion of philosophical nonsense, even by professional philosophers, it is not unduly optimistic to suggest that it is a topic to which relative newcomers to the subject might make a contribution.
Ludwig Wittgenstein thought that good philosophy unties the knots in our thinking that bad philosophy has put there and must make movements as complicated as the knots it unties. Is the notion of philosophical nonsense an essential aid to this – as Wittgenstein himself thought – or just another knot?
This paper starts from Tractatus, 6.53, and ask how one could show someone ‘that he had failed to... more This paper starts from Tractatus, 6.53, and ask how one could show someone ‘that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions’. Once one has fully mastered the ‘austere’ conception of nonsense – that nonsense has neither meaning, form, content, nor logic – the difficulties of the enterprise become evident. It is not clear how one could be in a position to conclude much about an utterance without first finding a meaning in it. Suggestions made by Guy Robinson, Edward Witherspoon and Hans-Johann Glock are considered but it is concluded that the last, best hope for nonsensicalism lies in a therapeutic approach. I end with a plea for someone who is sympathetic to this aspect of Wittgenstein’s philosophy to make a serious attempt to work out the details.
Owing to illness, I was not able to prevent the session on 'What is an austere conception of nons... more Owing to illness, I was not able to prevent the session on 'What is an austere conception of nonsense?' from closing. I don't suppose there is anything to stop me simply re-opening it on the same paper but I thought it might be more interesting to continue with a paper on a related topic.
Since the demise of logical positivism accusations of talking nonsense in philosophy have mainly ... more Since the demise of logical positivism accusations of talking nonsense in philosophy have mainly been made by Wittgensteinians. But some of these latter are as free with words like 'nonsense', 'senseless' and 'meaningless' as any logical positivist. One such is Rupert Read, who is prepared to write off the whole of metaphysics as nonsense. Condemnations of this sort have in recent years largely been ignored by other philosophers, which is surprising in view of their apparent importance. It is equally surprising that the evident problems with accusations of talking nonsense have been largely ignored by those who are still prepared to make them.
Three points of view on the problem of the answerability of philosophical questions are developed... more Three points of view on the problem of the answerability of philosophical questions are developed:
a) the traditional view that the questions are perfectly genuine but just very difficult;
b) what I call the 'nonsensicalist' view, characteristic of logical positivists and Wittgensteinians, that they are largely meaningless pseudo-problems;
c) the 'mysterian' or transcendental naturalist view that they are genuine problems but ones that our intellects are unequipped, or at least very ill-equipped, to handle.
Sass, like R. D. Laing before him, wants to make sense of schizophrenic discourse. In 'Paradoxes... more Sass, like R. D. Laing before him, wants to make sense of schizophrenic discourse. In 'Paradoxes of delusion – Wittgenstein, Schreber and the schizophrenic mind' he uses Wittgenstein’s later work, particularly the Blue Book, to this end. Read criticises Sass for not taking Wittgenstein’s nonsensicalism seriously enough and suggests that some schizophrenic utterances cannot be understood at all. I argue that Sass’s position is more consistent than Read’s, though it is probably true that Sass is the less thoroughgoing Wittgensteinian. Read’s way of arguing his case exhibits all the difficulties that those who employ the notion of philosophical nonsense are apt to get themselves into. The denigratory vocabulary he uses to characterise schizophrenic discourse – ‘confused’, ‘inchoate’, ‘incoherent’, ‘empty’, ‘without content’ – is itself confused and confusing, but, more importantly, his talk of ‘transitional remarks’ and his admission that he is himself ‘trafficking in nonsense’ suggest that he is falling into the very error of which he accuses Sass.
I am planning a history of the notion of philosophical nonsense and naturally difficult historica... more I am planning a history of the notion of philosophical nonsense and naturally difficult historical and exegetical questions have come up. Charles Pigden has argued that the notion goes back at least as far as Hobbes and that Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant (on some interpretations) and pragmatists such as William James, as well as numerous Twentieth-Century philosophers make use of it. In this ‘paper’ I put forward for general discussion such questions as whether Hobbes was the first 'nonsensicalist', whether Kant was a 'nonsensicalist' at all, which philosophers if any have considered contradictions to be meaningless and whether Wittgenstein thought that his concept of criterion could legitimately be used verificationistically. I shall continue to add further questions as they occur to me.
Mackie’s claim that in general courage benefits its possessor seems inconsistent with his ‘error ... more Mackie’s claim that in general courage benefits its possessor seems inconsistent with his ‘error theory’ of value. But how plausible is it in itself? I suggest that his arguments for the claim fail in the same way as the arguments of those who more explicitly embrace ‘virtue ethics’ fail. We do not know any way of objectively weighing risks against other considerations, of deciding whether something is ‘worth the risk’. Since I have no PROOF that there could not be a way, I prefer to speak of ‘ignorance’ rather than ‘error’ here.
I argue that Mackie's thesis about courage and self-interest is neither consistent with his 'erro... more I argue that Mackie's thesis about courage and self-interest is neither consistent with his 'error theory' of value nor convincing in itself. The question of the objectivity of value needs to be distinguished from that of whether one value can objectively outweigh or outrank another. This is so even when the only values under consideration are self-interested ones.
Schopenhauer's views on how little we understand ourselves are examined with a view to isolating ... more Schopenhauer's views on how little we understand ourselves are examined with a view to isolating a particular issue: What has he too say about how, when we have reasons both for and against a contemplated action, we decide whether or not to perform it?
The two problems are:
a) Does one ever have sufficient reason for what one does; and if not, s... more The two problems are:
a) Does one ever have sufficient reason for what one does; and if not, should this be a cause for concern? If, when reasons for action conflict, reaching a decision is always a non sequitur, then it looks as though in such situations the answer is: No. But would it even be desirable to act according to the Principle of Sufficient Reason? It can be argued that, unless one can give sufficient reason for one’s actions, one can never really justify them; nor will rational persuasion be possible. On the other hand, the idea that there is only one rational thing to do in any given situation seems oppressive, almost totalitarian.
b) Is deliberation an inherently self-deceptive operation? Is the deliberator compelled to treat an irrational procedure with no right outcome as though it were the intelligent engagement with a problem that has a correct answer? And if so, what will become of deliberation once this is fully realised? Less nihilistically, what would a maximally rational decision be like?
There are obvious problems with the idea of translating nonsense or, for that matter, with paraph... more There are obvious problems with the idea of translating nonsense or, for that matter, with paraphrasing it. Whatever may be the case with literary nonsense, they have been largely ignored with respect to (supposed) philosophical nonsense. This paper looks at how they arise with Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. On the traditional ‘ineffability’ reading they are not entirely unfamiliar since similar problems arise with the translation of mystical works. But those arising from the so-called ‘resolute reading’ may well be unprecedented.
There are passages in Wittgenstein where he compares his method to psychotherapy and one or two w... more There are passages in Wittgenstein where he compares his method to psychotherapy and one or two where he seems to suggest that the ‘patient’ has the last word on his ‘illness’ and ‘cure’. This paper tries to take these seriously, especially in connexion with the idea that victims of philosophical confusion talk nonsense.
Philosophical accusations of talking nonsense made in a polemical spirit are bound to fail, since the only way one can effectively criticise another’s utterance is by attaching some meaning to it. But if the other acknowledges the possibility that his puzzlement arises from his having been taken in by nonsense, then perhaps a co-operative investigation of this suggestion might be fruitful. Indeed self-diagnosis ought in principle to be possible. Ought it not to have happened at least once in the history of philosophy if philosophical nonsense has ever been exposed?
But there are difficulties. For example:
a) We must ask whether or not philosophical nonsense, when exposed as such, is supposed to lose all appearance of meaningfulness. Either answer is problematic.
b) The acknowledged similarity of the methodology under investigation to that of psychoanalysis exposes it to many of the familiar objections to the methodology of psychoanalysis, especially those that draw attention to the misleading influence of suggestion by an authority-figure.
c) The proposal that relentless cross-questioning of a suspected nonsense-talker will eventually lead her to ‘dry up’ (if she really is talking nonsense) seems to involve a version of the so-called Socratic Fallacy.
Philosophers know a great deal about how reasoning can go wrong but very little about what can go... more Philosophers know a great deal about how reasoning can go wrong but very little about what can go wrong with the conclusions that philosophers try to establish by their reasonings. It is Stove’s great merit that he tackles the latter problem directly, though a certain dogmatism in his approach and a contemptuous attitude towards the ‘great’ philosophers have almost certainly led to a neglect of his work.
This paper inquires into the appropriateness of the label ‘neo-positivist’ that he applies to his own position and considers his view that there are probably, but not certainly, innumerable ways in which a philosophical claim can be wrong, mistaken, untrue, absurd even. An attempt is made to relate our lack of knowledge here to the Chomsky/McGinn thesis that there may be kinds of problem with which the human intellect is just not equipped to deal.
I discuss Charles Pigden’s paper ‘Coercive theories of meaning, or why language shouldn’t matter ... more I discuss Charles Pigden’s paper ‘Coercive theories of meaning, or why language shouldn’t matter (so much) to philosophy’ and ask whether theories of meaning whose primary purpose is to discredit rival philosophies as meaningless necessarily employ artificially narrow conceptions of meaningfulness. In the course of my argument I ask whether the colloquial-rhetorical use of words like ‘nonsense’ and ‘meaningless’ has made it difficulty for philosophers to see just how novel and radical their own accusations of talking nonsense are.
Almost sixty years ago Philippa Foot published an article that began: To many people it seems tha... more Almost sixty years ago Philippa Foot published an article that began: To many people it seems that the most notable advance in moral philosophy during the past fifty years or so has been the refutation of naturalism; and they are a little shocked that at this late date such an issue should be reopened. It is easy to understand their attitude: given certain apparently unquestionable assumptions, it would be about as sensible to try to reintroduce naturalism as to try to square the circle. Those who see it like this have satisfied themselves that they know in advance that any naturalistic theory must have a catch in it somewhere, and are put out at having to waste more time exposing an old fallacy. This paper is an attempt to persuade them to look critically at the premises on which their arguments are based. 1 The paper in question was one of a number written by Foot around the time that were highly successful in reopening the issue of naturalism in ethics. Nowadays no one can just take it for granted that naturalism has been refuted, that there is a sharp distinction (or indeed any clear distinction) between fact and value or that it is impossible to derive an 'ought' from an 'is'. This is not to say that the naturalists have been completely victorious, of course; only that naturalism is today a live option. I shall argue that Foot's paper contains an important insight and an equally important mistake; and that the insight and the mistake are linked. I believe that the thinking behind it has influenced the subsequent course of moral philosophy to a quite remarkable extent and that this has been in some ways beneficial and in some ways harmful – not surprisingly, if I am right in seeing it as containing both truth and error. I do not want to exaggerate the influence of this one paper 2 but I do not know of any other that so neatly encapsulates the coupled insight and mistake. The anti-naturalism that Foot is attacking she characterises as follows: It would not be an exaggeration to say that the whole of moral philosophy, as it is now widely taught, rests on a contrast between statements of fact and evaluations, which runs something like this: The truth or falsity of statements of fact is shewn by means of evidence; and what counts as evidence is laid down in the meaning of the expressions occurring in the statement of fact … It follows that no two people can make the same statement and count completely different things as evidence; in the end one at least of them could be convicted of linguistic ignorance. It also follows that if a man is given good evidence for a factual conclusion he cannot just refuse to accept the conclusion on the ground that in his scheme of things this evidence is not evidence at all. 3 But, on the view she is criticising, [w]ith evaluations, however, it is different. An evaluation is not connected logically with the factual statements on which it is based. One man may say that a thing is good because of some fact about it, and another may refuse to take that fact as any evidence, for nothing is laid down in the meaning of 'good' which connects it with one piece of 'evidence' rather than another. It follows that a moral eccentric could argue to moral conclusions from quite idiosyncratic premises; he could say, for instance, that a man was a good man because he clasped and unclasped his hands and never turned NNE after
When one deliberates one has reasons both for and against doing something. Could the reasons for... more When one deliberates one has reasons both for and against doing something. Could the reasons for OBJECTIVELY outweigh the reasons against, in the sense that someone who thought otherwise would simply be wrong? (This is not the same question as that of whether any of the competing reasons could be objectively valid in itself.) Three seemingly relevant kinds of ethical theory are examined: virtue ethics, utilitarianism and moral absolutism. It is suggested that the proponents of these have all so far failed to show that they can give compelling objective reasons for acting on certain reasons rather than others. We so far lack any conception of what sort of second-order considerations could adjudicate between competing reasons. This is not so much an ‘error theory’ in J. L. Mackie’s sense as an admission of ignorance.
There is stock argument against libertarianism: that the indeterminism it postulates makes human ... more There is stock argument against libertarianism: that the indeterminism it postulates makes human choice a matter of chance and this is no better as a basis for practical rationality and moral responsibility than the most rigid determinism. I suggest that a similar problem arises on deterministic assumptions: although human choice is no longer a matter of mere chance, it remains arbitrary since whatever explains a person’s choice to act on the reasons for an action rather than those against, it is not a matter of reasons that were reasons FOR THAT PERSON. The explanatory gap is closed in the wrong way for the impression of sheer arbitrariness to be cancelled. I discuss (via a digression on F. H. Bradley) whether Davidson’s ‘anomalous monism’ would, if correct, necessitate any modification to this conclusion. I also ask how the problem addressed in this paper relates to Galen Strawson’s rejection of the possibility of complete autonomy or self-determination.
Davidson and Kolnai in different ways emphasise that practical syllogistic reasoning can only tel... more Davidson and Kolnai in different ways emphasise that practical syllogistic reasoning can only tell one that one has a reason to do or not to do something. It cannot adjudicate between conflicting reasons. It can tell one the means to certain ends but not which ends to pursue. This paper considers possible responses to this predicament. What if anything can be done to put deliberation - the 'weighing' of competing reasons - on a rational basis?
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Papers by ian dearden
(The puzzling passage discussed in the addendum is one in which Diamond seems to be denying that there is any such thing as understanding or imaginatively identifying with the nonsense-talker.)
Certain philosophers, here called ‘nonsensicalists’, believe that much philosophy (philosophical questions as well as assertions) is simply nonsense in the strict sense of being meaningless. They proceed as though it were an established fact that there is such a thing as philosophical nonsense and the notion were quite unproblematic. By contrast, many other philosophers proceed as though either they had never heard of it or it were quite obvious that there is no such thing.
There can be little doubt that what the nonsensicalists are saying is of great importance – if they are right. But there are at least eight questions that must be addressed before anyone is in a position to start hunting down philosophical nonsense and they have all been woefully neglected.
The idea of philosophical nonsense goes back to Thomas Hobbes at least and yet its history remains largely unresearched.
In view of the neglect of the problems raised by the notion of philosophical nonsense, even by professional philosophers, it is not unduly optimistic to suggest that it is a topic to which relative newcomers to the subject might make a contribution.
Ludwig Wittgenstein thought that good philosophy unties the knots in our thinking that bad philosophy has put there and must make movements as complicated as the knots it unties. Is the notion of philosophical nonsense an essential aid to this – as Wittgenstein himself thought – or just another knot?
(The puzzling passage discussed in the addendum is one in which Diamond seems to be denying that there is any such thing as understanding or imaginatively identifying with the nonsense-talker.)
Certain philosophers, here called ‘nonsensicalists’, believe that much philosophy (philosophical questions as well as assertions) is simply nonsense in the strict sense of being meaningless. They proceed as though it were an established fact that there is such a thing as philosophical nonsense and the notion were quite unproblematic. By contrast, many other philosophers proceed as though either they had never heard of it or it were quite obvious that there is no such thing.
There can be little doubt that what the nonsensicalists are saying is of great importance – if they are right. But there are at least eight questions that must be addressed before anyone is in a position to start hunting down philosophical nonsense and they have all been woefully neglected.
The idea of philosophical nonsense goes back to Thomas Hobbes at least and yet its history remains largely unresearched.
In view of the neglect of the problems raised by the notion of philosophical nonsense, even by professional philosophers, it is not unduly optimistic to suggest that it is a topic to which relative newcomers to the subject might make a contribution.
Ludwig Wittgenstein thought that good philosophy unties the knots in our thinking that bad philosophy has put there and must make movements as complicated as the knots it unties. Is the notion of philosophical nonsense an essential aid to this – as Wittgenstein himself thought – or just another knot?
a) the traditional view that the questions are perfectly genuine but just very difficult;
b) what I call the 'nonsensicalist' view, characteristic of logical positivists and Wittgensteinians, that they are largely meaningless pseudo-problems;
c) the 'mysterian' or transcendental naturalist view that they are genuine problems but ones that our intellects are unequipped, or at least very ill-equipped, to handle.
a) Does one ever have sufficient reason for what one does; and if not, should this be a cause for concern? If, when reasons for action conflict, reaching a decision is always a non sequitur, then it looks as though in such situations the answer is: No. But would it even be desirable to act according to the Principle of Sufficient Reason? It can be argued that, unless one can give sufficient reason for one’s actions, one can never really justify them; nor will rational persuasion be possible. On the other hand, the idea that there is only one rational thing to do in any given situation seems oppressive, almost totalitarian.
b) Is deliberation an inherently self-deceptive operation? Is the deliberator compelled to treat an irrational procedure with no right outcome as though it were the intelligent engagement with a problem that has a correct answer? And if so, what will become of deliberation once this is fully realised? Less nihilistically, what would a maximally rational decision be like?
Philosophical accusations of talking nonsense made in a polemical spirit are bound to fail, since the only way one can effectively criticise another’s utterance is by attaching some meaning to it. But if the other acknowledges the possibility that his puzzlement arises from his having been taken in by nonsense, then perhaps a co-operative investigation of this suggestion might be fruitful. Indeed self-diagnosis ought in principle to be possible. Ought it not to have happened at least once in the history of philosophy if philosophical nonsense has ever been exposed?
But there are difficulties. For example:
a) We must ask whether or not philosophical nonsense, when exposed as such, is supposed to lose all appearance of meaningfulness. Either answer is problematic.
b) The acknowledged similarity of the methodology under investigation to that of psychoanalysis exposes it to many of the familiar objections to the methodology of psychoanalysis, especially those that draw attention to the misleading influence of suggestion by an authority-figure.
c) The proposal that relentless cross-questioning of a suspected nonsense-talker will eventually lead her to ‘dry up’ (if she really is talking nonsense) seems to involve a version of the so-called Socratic Fallacy.
This paper inquires into the appropriateness of the label ‘neo-positivist’ that he applies to his own position and considers his view that there are probably, but not certainly, innumerable ways in which a philosophical claim can be wrong, mistaken, untrue, absurd even. An attempt is made to relate our lack of knowledge here to the Chomsky/McGinn thesis that there may be kinds of problem with which the human intellect is just not equipped to deal.