Freedom House

HOW CIVIC MOBILIZATIONS GROW IN AUTHORITARIAN CONTEXTS

Research Report | Annex 3 – Case Briefs

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Other materials related to this project can be found on the project website.

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Opposition supporters confront riot police during a rally in Nur-Sultan on June 9, 2019 - the day of Kazakhstan›s presidential elections. (VYACHESLAV OSELEDKO/AFP via Getty Images)

Annex 3: Case briefs for all cases

Case briefs were the core data source for our comparative case analysis, allowing us to systematically compare the same dimensions of mobilization episodes across many different cases. The case briefs are not intended to be comprehensive historical or political analysis, but rather to condense and summarize the comparative elements present in each case.

Once we had determined the main dimensions of mobilization episodes that we wanted to explore across the cases in the comparative analysis, we drafted brief descriptions of each case based on readily available sources in English. Once our drafts were complete, we reached out through our professional networks to scholars, practitioners, journalists, and activists to request a review of the brief on which they were an expert. We compensated reviewers with a $500 honorarium. All cases were reviewed by at least one country expert and most were reviewed by two. The country experts corrected and added to the facts and interpretations in our draft, and we incorporated their feedback into the case briefs below, sometimes verbatim. In some cases, the validators essentially became co-authors on the case briefs by conducting additional interviews and/or writing detailed narratives that were added to the relevant sections (noted with an asterisk).

We want to thank the reviewers below, as well as many anonymous reviewers, for validating and co-authoring our case briefs:

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ANGOLA

1. Episode summary

In 2-4 sentences, summarize what this mobilization episode was about.

Angola held an election, which the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the ruling party, won. The head of the winning party became the president. The sitting president stepped down, and his successor, also from MPLA, took the post. The opposition parties and informal civil society groups protested before the election as they had good reason to believe that the election was not going to be free and fair. These protests were disconnected from the economic protests that took place the same year, though both the rigging of elections and the persistent economic crisis were deemed by protesters to be a result of MPLA's bad governance and monopolization of power.

2. Dates, duration, and dynamics of the mobilization episode

What were the dates that mark the start, end, and scale-up (if any) of this episode? How long was the active phase of the mobilization? Can the mobilization episode be divided into stages? If yes, provide a brief (1-3 sentences) characteristic of each stage.

The first unauthorized demonstration was reported on April 24, 2017 (50 participants); 7 protesters were arrested and sentenced to 45 days in jail. On May 6, the main opposition parties (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola [UNITA], Broad Convergence for the Salvation of Angola-Electoral Coalition [CASA-CE], Social Renewal Party [PRS], and National Liberation Front of Angola [FNLA]) had a joint press conference to denounce the contracts for electronic vote tallying given to the Spanish company Indra, which had counted two previous postwar elections, and which the opposition suspected of doing the government's bidding in tallying the votes.

At the end of May, the Constitutional Court dismissed some candidates from opposition parties' lists. (May 27 is also a significant date due to a historic 1977 attempted internal coup against the government and subsequent repression and deaths.) UNITA had its Permanent Committee meeting to discuss the situation and called for a protest the next Saturday, June 3, 2017. The other major opposition parties did not formally join the protest on June 3; the largest, CASA-CE, was invited to join the protest but declined and distanced itself.

The June 3 protest was authorized and reportedly gathered (reported by a UNITA provincial secretary, so hard to verify) up to 50,000 people in Huambo Province, a historic heartland of UNITA support. Other cities and provinces saw smaller protests on the same day, for example, 7,000 attendees in Cuanza-Sul Province; 4,000 in Luanda; 3,000 in Moçâmedes, Namibe Province; and some marches in the smaller provincial capital cities of Sumbe and Menongue. On August 12, 2017, demonstrations by groups were banned.

The election took place on August 23, 2017, and there was not much public action other than court appeals of the results after that. Duration: about 4 months.

Protests about salary arrears and local secessionist protests were on the rise in 2017. They had different local triggers and were not organizationally connected, although many of these triggers had the same root cause—MPLA's corruption and political dominance.

There was only one large protest, on June 3. It seems that smaller acts of resistance took place before and after, for example, an unauthorized protest on April 24 and whatever activities groups had planned before the August 12 ban on demonstrations.

3. Size of mobilization

Provide any information available about the number of participants, their social and/or professional status, the geographic spread of the mobilization, etc.

The largest demonstration drew about 50,000 to 60,000 participants across different locations.

4. Episode background

What background facts does the reader need to know about the political and social context of the country to understand this episode?

The political regime in Angola is that of a dominant party (MPLA), which descends from one of the nationalist

movements originally backed by the Soviet Union. Other parties are also present in the parliament; the main oppositional party is UNITA, also originating from another nationalist movement backed by the United States. MPLA usually gets 60 percent and up of the vote in the parliamentary elections.

It is also important to remember that Angola has been devastated by three decades of civil war (1975–2002); many people were killed or displaced, and many others lived under the conditions of extreme food insecurity, very poor healthcare, and barely existent other public services. Since 2002, the situation has improved, but the country remains very corrupt. Its budget is very dependent on oil prices.

5. Prior mobilization dynamic

What were the characteristics of civic mobilization over the 20 years or so prior to this episode? Were protests a frequent occurrence? Did they tend to focus on different issues than this episode did (e.g., labor conditions)? What was the most recent mobilization prior to this episode? What role did previous protests (successful/unsuccessful; violent/nonviolent) and government responses to those protests play in this mobilization episode? How do the issues of any recent protests relate to this episode's framing of issues?

Some data are available since 2007, and the average protest level was much lower than in 2017. Since 2011, when there was an attempt to follow the Arab Spring, protests have been increasing both in frequency and in numbers. However, the repression also increased in 2012–16, that is, even smaller demonstrations were crushed immediately. The opposition protested the election results in 2012, but numbers-wise, there was no spike that year.

The year 2017 signified a significant upward scale shift in numbers, but that may be a coincidence of several unconnected kinds of protests: economic protests by teachers and government employees against salary arrays, electoral protests for fair elections, and local secessionist protests.

6. Trigger

What was the trigger for this mobilization episode (state response to an exogenous shock? Electoral or constitutional power grab? An unpopular policy?)

The trigger was the government's alterations to electoral law and the electoral commission among other things before the scheduled election.

7. Framing

What was the framing of this trigger, grievances, and demands during the episode? What was the role of different mobilization actors in shaping the framing? How/did the framing of why people should mobilize change over time? How did the framing help or hinder scaling up of the mobilization?

The electoral protests demanded fair elections and equal conditions for all parties; the opposition also promised corruption-free politics if elected. The problems in the election management process concerned the contracting of two foreign businesses considered friendly to the ruling party and complicit in previous election irregularities.

These demands did not seem to appeal directly to the population's grievances, especially youth unemployment. The ruling party's election year slogan was, "Correct what is bad, improve what is good," and the opposition did not attempt to appropriate and rethink the regime framing.

After the election, the popular demand for change was partially satisfied by the fact that the sitting president stepped down, and the new leader of the ruling party was elected. In the second to eighth months in office, he undertook some anticorruption measures and implemented some liberalizing policies, which brought him increased popularity and forced the opposition to focus on the figure of the previous president. In a few months, however, the liberalization stalled, and the same issues resurfaced.

8. Tactics

What kind of tactics did the movement(s) use? How was the presence or absence of an upward scale shift related to these tactics?

The reports on the episode do not mention any specific tactics used.

9. Actors: organizations

What powerful institutions, movements or parties were engaged in this mobilization episode (unions, religious organizations, opposition parties)? What are the key facts about any formal and informal organizations that joined or supported the mobilization?

UNITA, the largest opposition party, was the main organizer of the June 3 protest. Other parties as well as small groups of citizens not affiliated with any parties also participated.

10. Actors: leaders

What were the characteristics of the leader(s), prominent activists, and public figures who participated in the mobilization? What was their professional and social (ethnic/religious/class) background? What kinds of networks did they belong to and mobilize? Where did they get their organizing skills?

Party leaders seemed to be the main actors. One civic activist interviewed by DW (Deutsche Welle) was a 35-year-old artist.

11. Actors: civil society

What was the role, if any, of local human rights and civil society organizations and movements?

Over about five years before the 2017 election, a loose coalition of youth activists and opposition parties increased pressure on the government. These youth activists were seldom formally organized, as that would open them up to more repression by the government (for example, in administrative hurdles), so these were loose, ad hoc networks joining forces over specific issues.

12. Actors: youth

What was the role, if any, of youth organizations (formal or informal)?

Reports mention youth participation both in 2017 and 2011, but there is no information of any kind of organization. These seem to have been small informal groups.

13. Actors: diaspora

What was the role of diaspora groups?

There is no mention of diaspora participation apart from online commenting and support.

14. Actors: international organizations

What was the role of INGOs/IGOs?

Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch observed and issued statements.

15. Media and IT technologies

What media or IT technologies helped the mobilization to scale up (if at all)?

There was no mention of any special role for social media. There was one mention that the 2011 protests were organized through Facebook, so it is probably fair to say that social media was involved as a communication channel in 2017 for activist networks.

16. Precursors summary

[for positive cases that scaled up] In your analysis, what are the main precursors that explain how or why people took to the streets in large numbers at this time and not on other occasions? Are there any that are not already listed here that led to the upward scale shift?
[for negative cases that did not scale up] In your analysis, what are the main precursors that explain why the mobilization did not scale up despite the attempts to do so? Are there any that are not already listed here that prevented the upward scale shift?

a. There was a disconnect between the opposition framing (fair elections) and people's grievances (youth unemployment). The opposition framing stayed the same as in previous years, so it attracted some of the usual public attention but not more.

b. The president did actually change, although the party did not. The formal change of power at least briefly satisfied people's demand for political change.

c. MPLA, the ruling party, is associated not only with rampant corruption and mismanagement of public finances but also with the relative stability that followed the 1975–2002 civil war.

17. Key sources

What sources would be good for someone who wants to follow up on details of this case (up to five sources)?

"Angola – September 2017 Update | ACLED," September 22, 2017. https://acleddata.com/2017/09/22/angola-september-2017-update/.

GardaWorld. "Angola: Thousands of Opposition Supporters Protest in Luanda June 3," June 3, 2017. https://www.garda.com/crisis24/news-alerts/59571/angola-thousands-of-opposition-supporters-protest-in-luanda-june-3.

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Ndomba, Borralho. "Angola: UNITA manifesta-se em várias cidades e promete mais." *Deutsche Welle*, June 3, 2017. https://www.dw.com/pt-002/angola-unita-manifesta-se-em-v%C3%A1rias-cidades-e-promete-mais/a-39108695.

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Schubert, Jon. "Angola (Vol. 14, 2017)." *Africa Yearbook Online*, October 1, 2018. http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/africa-yearbook-online/angola-vol-14-2017-ayb2017_COM_0044.

Schubert, Jon. 2019. "Angolans Feel Let down Two Years into New Presidency." *The Conversation*, November 26, 2019. http://theconversation.com/angolans-feel-let-down-two-years-into-new-presidency-127455.

AZERBAIJAN

1. Episode summary

In 2-4 sentences, summarize what this mobilization episode was about.

In September 2016, a prodemocracy coalition and an opposition political party mobilized a series of street protests in Baku, the capital, in response to the president's announcement that there would be a referendum on changes to the constitution that would greatly expand presidential power and term limits and make it easier for his family members to succeed him. The protests did not scale up.

2. Dates, duration, and dynamics of the mobilization episode

What were the dates that mark the start, end, and scale-up (if any) of this episode? How long was the active phase of the mobilization? Can the mobilization episode be divided into stages? If yes, provide a brief (1-3 sentences) characteristic of each stage.

The episode took place between July and September 2016, and there was a clear attempt to scale up that was countered by state repression. The referendum was announced in July, and on July 28, the unregistered opposition group Republican Alternative (ReAL) announced a campaign against the referendum. However, in order to legally campaign, the group needed to become registered, so in August they undertook a campaign to collect the required signatures. However, they had to stop the signature drive because the leaders of ReAL were arrested, and the group deemed it too dangerous to continue. Similarly, the political party Musavat (Equality) tried to register a group to campaign against the referendum but was denied registration.

There was a public protest against the referendum on the 11th of September and subsequent protests on the 17th and 18th. It seems that after the protest on the 11th, the two opposition groups (Musavat and the National Council of Democratic Forces [NCDF]) were not able to coordinate their protest activities effectively, and the protests were also circumscribed by an atmosphere of extreme state intimidation. ReAL did not participate in these protests in part because their leadership had been arrested, and they wanted to distance themselves from the "old opposition."

3. Size of mobilization

Provide any information available about the number of participants, their social and/or professional status, the geographic spread of the mobilization, etc.

ReAL's signature collection was nationwide but short-lived. As for the street protests, the official reports say 2,500 people attended; organizers claim two to three times more attendees than that, but the actual number was likely under 10,000. The street protests were concentrated in Baku and involved mainly activists involved in opposition parties and a prodemocracy youth movement, that is, an urban elite that has worked professionally with European and US prodemocracy organizations over the years.

4. Episode background

What background facts does the reader need to know about the political and social context of the country to understand this episode?

Since 1993, Azerbaijan has been under the rule of a single family, with the presidency being passed from father to son upon the father's death in 2003. Azerbaijan has no secular or religious institutional power bases outside of the party-state apart from the military, which is aligned with the government. There are strong restrictions on public activity, such as the onerous registration requirements imposed on any organization legally conducting a campaign.

5. Prior mobilization dynamic

What were the characteristics of civic mobilization over the 20 years or so prior to this episode? Were protests a frequent occurrence? Did they tend to focus on different issues than this episode did (e.g., labor conditions)? What was the most recent mobilization prior to this episode? What role did previous protests (successful/unsuccessful; violent/nonviolent) and government responses to those protests play in this mobilization episode? How do the issues of any recent protests relate to this episode's framing of issues?

A decades-long conflict with Armenia over territory, even before independence from the Soviet Union, has been the civic focal point, with multiple mobilizations to put pressure on the government to take action against Armenia. Antigovernment protests have been rare,

small in scale, and met with repression and arrests. The antigovernment protests fall into two types: small street protests over economic or corruption issues in provincial cities and rights-based protests in Baku.

In 2013, in connection with the presidential election, there was mobilization potential, and momentum began to build toward a united opposition with youth movements involved. However, the prodemocracy community (political parties, civil society, and the international community) was paralyzed following the huge crackdown after 2013.

After the currency was devalued in December 2015, in January 2016 there were small but widespread and seemingly locally organized economic protests in the regions, targeting regional government officials, over prices for basic consumer goods. However, the government publicly blamed and arrested the opposition and "radical religious groups," though those arrested claimed they had nothing to do with the rallies. There may be ways that the disconnect between the opposition and the local protests, as well as the crackdown on the opposition, link to the failure of the August-September protests to scale up. The economic conditions led to real hardships, and the government's inability to live up to its promises to compensate for those hardships led to declining public trust.

More significantly for the formation of the opposition coalition, such as it was, that was involved in the mobilization episode in question, in 2013, there was a series of mobilizations in regions and in Baku after a military recruit was beaten to death in January and around the time of the presidential election in October. Framings drew on a number of issues where the public was dissatisfied with the government: rising rents for shopkeepers, low wages, public safety and corruption, the Arab Spring and related prodemocracy issues, the October presidential election, as well as follow-on protests against the state's increasingly violent repression of protesters. These protests involved both online (a Facebook group in support of the dead soldier's family) and street activities in the capital and in a provincial city where violent protests were directed against a government official. These events, and the opposition forces coming together to strategize around the 2013 presidential election, were a precursor to the 2016 events. In 2013, the framing was almost entirely focused on corruption of the presidential family, while the 2016 protests also focused on the family, they added a critique of dynastic succession.

6. Trigger

What was the trigger for this mobilization episode (state response to an exogenous shock? Electoral or constitutional power grab? An unpopular policy?)

The trigger was an upcoming referendum to extend presidential powers.

7. Framing

What was the framing of this trigger, grievances, and demands during the episode? What was the role of different mobilization actors in shaping the framing? How/did the framing of why people should mobilize change over time? How did the framing help or hinder scaling up of the mobilization?

There were no changes over the months of the episode. The framings were about monarchy and corruption. For example, the slogans, "No to monarchy, end to robbery!" and "Where is the $140 billion oil money?," were used. Posters and slogans also asked for the release of detained opposition figures and political prisoners. These framings were different from ones recent protests outside the capital used for their grievances, which may be one of the factors why the mobilization never scaled up. The opposition sometimes gets popular support for rallying behind political prisoners, but the anticorruption and dynastic succession frames did not seem to resonate with the public.

The implicit contract between the state and the people in Azerbaijan is more linked to security—and the war with Armenia—than to social welfare and personal economy. Economic prosperity has not been part of the government's framing, and maybe that is why the opposition's anticorruption framing has not been successful. On top of that, the security framing was particularly strong in 2016. Due to a four-day conflict with Armenia in April, the population probably saw the government as upholding the implicit contract, making them less inclined to challenge the referendum.

8. Tactics

What kind of tactics did the movement(s) use? How was the presence or absence of an upward scale shift related to these tactics?

It is possible that a long-standing lack of tactical innovation among prodemocracy groups is part of the problem. ReAL's drive to collect signatures was possibly a good opportunity to network and do some civic education, but the government arrested the leaders, and it had to stop.

The government pretty successfully channels and defuses opposition tactics. The opposition is only allowed to organize legal public rallies in one particular place, where the government has the only entrance covered by security cameras. Often people who participate in rallies are subsequently detained, which clearly deters participation by anyone who is not fully committed.

9. Actors: organizations

What powerful institutions, movements or parties were engaged in this mobilization episode (unions, religious organizations, opposition parties)? What are the key facts about any formal and informal organizations that joined or supported the mobilization?

Musavat and NCDF are considered the "old opposition," whereas ReAL could be considered a new actor, though they position themselves that way in deliberate contrast to the old opposition. The old opposition is fractured. Musavat left NCDF after the 2013 election and competed with the popular front that is the core of the NCDF. ReAL's strategy was different from previous prodemocracy movements in that it targeted the new generation's middle class. Street protests were organized by the NCDF; targeted arrests around the protests indicated that the government was most concerned about the leaders of the youth movement N!DA and Musavat.

The leaders of ReAL, which also has a youth wing, were arrested. ReAL had started trying to mobilize support across the country even before the referendum, but the referendum gave it a reason to try to organize and educate people about ReAL and its imprisoned leaders in a more targeted manner. The group was relatively successful, in part because of public sympathy for political prisoners, especially among the youth and the middle class, who do not like the traditional opposition. That grassroots success was probably why the government cracked down so hard on them during the signature collection.

10. Actors: leaders

What were the characteristics of the leader(s), prominent activists, and public figures who participated in the mobilization? What was their professional and social (ethnic/religious/class) background? What kinds of networks did they belong to and mobilize? Where did they get their organizing skills?

Jamil Hasanli was a leading figure of the NCDF after his presidential candidacy in 2013. He was a former National Assembly member, well-known public figure, and a history professor. Another leader was Ali Kerimli, head of the Popular Front party. The original Popular Front was described by historian Audrey Altstadt as "Azerbaijan's best and brightest," but they may have their strongest support among those who were part of parties during the short-lived heyday right after independence and in regions where their leaders were from. ReAL leaders were in their early to mid-40s, technocrats with experience abroad, most of them with jobs outside the nongovernmental organizations (NGO) sector, which helps with appealing to the middle class. N!DA was led by a board to avoid the appearance of a single leader.

11. Actors: civil society

What was the role, if any, of local human rights and civil society organizations and movements?

These organizations do not really function except in a dissident kind of way, for example, as individual human rights lawyers rather than as human rights NGOs, which are not allowed to register. The main players in this episode were parties and movements, some of which drew on staff from NGOs. Since the crackdown around the 2013 presidential election, civil society in Azerbaijan has been commonly described as "paralysed," "almost non-existent," or "destroyed" (Kamran Mahmudov, "Azerbaijan's paralysed civil society," OC Media, July 10, 2019, https://oc-media.org/features/azerbaijan-s-paralysed-civil-society/). Between 2014 and 2015, Azerbaijan adopted even more restrictive NGO legislation, imposing severe limitations on foreign funding of domestic organizations and further hampering the registration of NGOs as legal entities.

12. Actors: youth

What was the role, if any, of youth organizations (formal or informal)?

N!DA is a youth organization, and ReAL has a youth wing, as do the old opposition groups. But youth movement dynamism has either been crushed or co-opted by the state (Altay Goyushov and Ilkin Huseynli, "Halted Democracy: Government Hijacking of the New Opposition in Azerbaijan," https://philpapers.org/archive/GOYHDG.pdf).

13. Actors: diaspora

What was the role of diaspora groups?

There were some support actions and small protests, for example, in Georgia and Europe. Individual activists abroad tried to raise awareness about the illegality of the referendum and the repression.

14. Actors: international organizations

What was the role of INGOs/IGOs?

The main indications of international influence were human rights international NGOs speaking out against the arrests of activists and charges by the government that ReAL received funding from foreign governments.

15. Media and IT technologies

What media or IT technologies helped the mobilization to scale up (if at all)?

Mobilization groups appear to have Facebook pages where they circulate information; there are no media alternatives inside the country as mass media is tightly controlled. However, social media penetration is low—16 percent in 2016. Also, mobilization via internet was affected by a set of legislative changes to defamation and slander laws introduced in 2016 that made the criminal code protecting the president's honor and dignity even more comprehensive by including online journalism and social media.

16. Precursors summary

[for positive cases that scaled up] In your analysis, what are the main precursors that explain how or why people took to the streets in large numbers *at this time and not on other occasions*? Are there any that are not already listed here that led to the upward scale shift?
[for negative cases that did not scale up] In your analysis, what are the main precursors that explain why the mobilization did not scale up despite the attempts to do so? Are there any that are not already listed here that prevented the upward scale shift?

It seems that the protests did not scale up perhaps because the opposition's framing did not resonate with the masses, and repression worked: leaders were arrested; organizations were successfully painted by the government as "foreign agents" or seen as too focused on getting political power; and only the youth and middle-class movements and a few ordinary people have access to social media. An earlier mobilization around economic issues was not tapped by prodemocracy forces, and that was perhaps a missed opportunity, a lack of network connections between different groups, or an example of the divide ordinary people see between economic policy and formal politics.

17. Key sources

What sources would be good for someone who wants to follow up on details of this case (up to five sources)?

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Shiriyev, Zaur. "Protests in Azerbaijan: A Political and Economic Watershed." *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, February 1, 2016. https://jamestown.org/program/protests-in-azerbaijan-a-political-and-economic-watershed/.

Sultanova, Shahla. "Challenging the Aliyev Regime: Political Opposition in Azerbaijan." *Demokratizatsiya* 22, no. 1 (January 1, 2014): 15–38.

BELARUS

1. Episode summary

In 2-4 sentences, summarize what this mobilization episode was about.

Belarus president Alyaksandr Lukashenka was challenged by three strong candidates, whose developmental agenda was different from the old opposition agenda and appealed to a wide variety of social groups but primarily the urban middle class. The arrest of the main candidates forced their campaigns to unite behind the only registered opposition candidate, which drew even more people in. After the election, whose results were falsified, postelection protests and the crackdown on them resulted in another wave of mobilization.

2. Dates, duration, and dynamics of the mobilization episode

What were the dates that mark the start, end, and scale-up (if any) of this episode? How long was the active phase of the mobilization? Can the mobilization episode be divided into stages? If yes, provide a brief (1-3 sentences) characteristic of each stage.

The mobilization started in May 2020, and the active phase lasted through November 2020, so the total duration of the mobilization was about seven months. After that, smaller protests continued through March 2021. The diaspora structures formed by the activists who fled from repression continue their activities until today (June 2022 as of this writing).

The mobilization can be divided into three stages. The first one was the electoral campaign before candidates' registration. During this phase, the three oppositional candidates collected signatures on their own. After only Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya was registered, the campaigns in the second stage united their efforts and saw an increase in support. The third stage happened after the election and the crackdown of the first postelection protests, when the moral shock of witnessing violence motivated other people and social groups to join the protests.

3. Size of mobilization

Provide any information available about the number of participants, their social and/or professional status, the geographic spread of the mobilization, etc.

Hundreds of thousands of Belarus citizens participated in the protests (one estimate is 700,000 – see https://theconversation.com/belarus-protests-why-people-have-been-taking-to-the-streets-new-data-154494). It seems that a big part of that number joined the protests after violence by the government. Residents of all major cities participated in the protests. The core of protesters comprised the urban middle class; a smaller number belonged to other social groups; industrial workers joined en masse later, after the crackdown.

4. Episode background

What background facts does the reader need to know about the political and social context of the country to understand this episode?

Belarus is part of the former Soviet Union. Its president, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, has been in power since 1994. Belarus is dependent on exports to Russia as well as subsidies on Russian import resources. The Belarus political opposition has been weak over the years and focused primarily on human rights and ethnic nationalism.

5. Prior mobilization dynamic

What were the characteristics of civic mobilization over the 20 years or so prior to this episode? Were protests a frequent occurrence? Did they tend to focus on different issues than this episode did (e.g., labor conditions)? What was the most recent mobilization prior to this episode? What role did previous protests (successful/unsuccessful; violent/nonviolent) and government responses to those protests play in this mobilization episode? How do the issues of any recent protests relate to this episode's framing of issues?

Previous protests were sporadic and occurred either after elections or in response to an unpopular policy. In 2017, there were relatively large protests, with up to 40,000 participants, against the law that introduced a tax on people who did not work. The 2021 protests were not connected to previous ones, either in framing or organization. Some members of the established opposition actively supported the protests, but they were not the driving force.

6. Trigger

What was the trigger for this mobilization episode (state response to an exogenous shock? Electoral or constitutional power grab? An unpopular policy?)

The upcoming presidential election, arrest of the candidates, falsification of election results, and police violence were all triggers.

7. Framing

What was the framing of this trigger, grievances, and demands during the episode? What was the role of different mobilization actors in shaping the framing? How/did the framing of why people should mobilize change over time? How did the framing help or hinder scaling up of the mobilization?

Two aspects of framing stand out: (1) a shattering of the existing social contract, which used to sustain Lukashenka's rule, by the pandemic and the opposition YouTube channel; and (2) the emergence of a positive, developmental alternative agenda with strong elements of civic nationalism—solidarity, fairness, agency. The regime's framing used to monopolize those themes, but the new candidates broke that monopoly. Fairness in elections was the main demand during the first two phases of the mobilization. After the crackdown on postelection protests, state and police accountability became another common demand, which brought in new groups, such as industrial workers.

8. Tactics

What kind of tactics did the movement(s) use? How was the presence or absence of an upward scale shift related to these tactics?

The movement used the tactic of strict adherence to law and nonviolence. It used existing information technology (IT) solutions and social media to facilitate signature collection, electoral monitoring, and mutual aid networks.

9. Actors: organizations

What powerful institutions, movements or parties were engaged in this mobilization episode (unions, religious organizations, opposition parties)? What are the key facts about any formal and informal organizations that joined or supported the mobilization?

The protests seemed to be largely grassroots, organized through small social groups, local communities, or professional organizations. The leaders of the protests were Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the only registered opposition candidate, and the team members of other candidates who joined her. Various kinds of professionals (IT, lawyers, artists, and others) supported the campaign and civic initiatives related to fair elections. Civil society organizations as well as professional and local communities (*dvory*) self-organized to participate. Coordination of postelection protests was exercised through the Telegram channel Nexta.

10. Actors: leaders

What were the characteristics of the leader(s), prominent activists, and public figures who participated in the mobilization? What was their professional and social (ethnic/religious/class) background? What kinds of networks did they belong to and mobilize? Where did they get their organizing skills?

The candidates denied registration all had an entrepreneurial background, though of different kinds. The leaders who stepped in after the registration denials came from professional and artistic backgrounds: a former English schoolteacher, a musician, lawyers, the minister of culture. The skills that seemed to be important for this mobilization were primarily obtained through professional training and activities.

11. Actors: civil society

What was the role, if any, of local human rights and civil society organizations and movements?

Civil society organizations as well as professional and local communities (*dvory*) self-organized to participate. Coordination of postelection protests was exercised through the Telegram channel Nexta. Feminist civil society organized women's marches. Civil society and human rights organizations likely supported the mobilization together with other kinds of organizations and communities but did not play a leading role.

12. Actors: youth

What was the role, if any, of youth organizations (formal or informal)?

Youths (up to 30 years old) seemed to be involved in active protests in larger numbers than people of other age groups, but they did not play a leading role.

13. Actors: diaspora

What was the role of diaspora groups?

The diaspora mobilized after the start of in-country mobilization and launched several important initiatives that provided material means for the people who lost jobs or had to leave the country because of participation in the protests. Many active protest participants had to leave the

country; they joined the diaspora in its efforts to sustain the movement, document police brutality, and keep Belarus on the international agenda.

14. Actors: international organizations

What was the role of INGOs/IGOs?

International nongovernmental organizations and intergovernmental organizations issued statements supporting mobilization, help for political refugees, and sanctions and condemning violence.

15. Media and IT technologies

What media or IT technologies helped the mobilization to scale up (if at all)?

Belarus has a very high level of internet penetration, which made the growth of Siarhei Tsikhanouski's YouTube channel possible. The channel contributed to shattering of the social contract. Coordination of the protests via Telegram channels was extremely important. The internet also made possible several grassroots initiatives on electoral transparency and, later, police accountability.

16. Precursors summary

[for positive cases that scaled up] In your analysis, what are the main precursors that explain how or why people took to the streets in large numbers at this time and not on other occasions? Are there any that are not already listed here that led to the upward scale shift?
[for negative cases that did not scale up] In your analysis, what are the main precursors that explain why the mobilization did not scale up despite the attempts to do so? Are there any that are not already listed here that prevented the upward scale shift?

Several precursors made the unprecedented growth of the antiregime mobilization possible. Two social processes that had been going on for years—the weakening of the social contract with the regime and the growth of the urban middle class—created demand for political change among different social groups. Under the old social contract, Lukashenka was the guarantor of security and stability, but that guarantee had been undermined by the worsening conditions of state employment, shrinking social services, and especially the mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic right before the presidential election in 2020. As for the normally apolitical urban middle class, they disliked Lukashenka's neo-Soviet rhetoric but had not seen an attractive political alternative until the 2020 election.

The new presidential candidates—Tsikhanouski, Viktar Babaryka, and Valery Tsepkalo—presented an attractive alternative in the eyes of many Belarusians. Unlike the established political opposition, which was often perceived by the population as pursuing its narrow materialistic interests or of being all talk and no action, the new candidates were seen as doers who wished to use their talents to benefit society. The messages of their campaigns engaged with ideas of civic nationalism—solidarity, agency, dignity, and fairness—which Lukashenka had also engaged in in the early days of his political career. The new candidates were able to challenge Lukashenka on his terrain by speaking to the same societal values and concerns he spoke to, rather than by confronting his rhetoric with different values. The broad character of their agenda appealed to a wide audience with diverse socioeconomic backgrounds.

More immediate precursors that aided the growth of the mobilization were decentralized and nonhierarchical communities that had emerged over the previous few years, and the growth in social media and IT solutions these communities used for organizing collective action to solve social problems. These horizontal communities included different groups in the urban middle class: IT professionals, artists, nongovernmental organization (NGO) activists, creative class professionals, Tsikhanouski's followers on social media, and networks of mutual aid organizations that formed during the COVID-19 pandemic. These activists and organizations swiftly repurposed their skills and earlier experiences with collective action to help the growth of popular mobilization around the election.

Finally, poorly targeted and excessive repression by the regime contributed to the upward shift in citizen mobilization. The arrest of the three main alternative candidates led to the unification of the opposition behind Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the wife of Tsikhanouski, who built on the emerging demand for a fair election and used existing networks of supporters to take the mobilization to a new level. After the election, moral shock from the government's brutal crackdown on protesters led to another upward scale shift with new social groups joining the protests. The same moral shock led to defections by several high-profile state officials and rank-and-file members of the police force. Over the long run, however, systemic repression succeeded in keeping Lukashenka's regime in power.

17. Key sources

What sources would be good for someone who wants to follow up on details of this case (up to five sources)?

The Belarus case report is a key source.

BURUNDI

1. Episode summary

In 2-4 sentences, summarize what this mobilization episode was about.

The mobilization was triggered by the then president's 2015 bid for a third term, which was seen as violating the spirit of the 2000 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, an important document in the country's history that marked an end to the civil war in the 1990s. Civil society organizations and opposition parties made efforts to prevent the bid, but when it nevertheless happened, street protests erupted, in late April 2015. They were suppressed violently by the police. The protests were followed by a failed coup attempt by elements of the military in May 2015, which led to further repression and grave, widespread human rights violations.

2. Dates, duration, and dynamics of the mobilization episode

What were the dates that mark the start, end, and scale-up (if any) of this episode? How long was the active phase of the mobilization? Can the mobilization episode be divided into stages? If yes, provide a brief (1-3 sentences) characteristic of each stage.

Tensions had been mounting since the previous elections in 2010. They surfaced again in early 2014 when the ruling party attempted to amend the constitution. Before April 2015, there were a number of antigovernment protests, mostly organized by civil society groups, journalists, or opposition parties. Some of these, such as a confrontation between members of the Movement for Solidarity and Democracy (MSD) opposition party and the police in 2014, led to violent clashes. The active phase of protests was from April 25, 2015 (when Pierre Nkurunziza was nominated by the ruling party to run for a third term) through May 13, 2015. The duration was about two weeks.

At the first stage, in early 2014 to April 25, 2015, the mobilization was primarily driven by civil society organizations and opposition parties who tried to defeat the constitutional amendments in the parliament. At the second stage, mass public protests erupted after Nkurunziza's nomination. The police repressed the protests with lethal force. At the third stage, after the failed coup attempt, repression greatly intensified; although smaller protests continued, they quickly dwindled.

An increase in government repression against perceived opponents and critics in the run-up to the 2015 election was an additional grievance for many Burundians and contributed to the mobilization. However, when the security forces used lethal force against demonstrators, and several people were killed, the protests soon fizzled out; it had become too dangerous to demonstrate. In addition, many of the movement's leading actors, particularly civil society activists and opposition politicians, had to flee the country for their safety and could no longer play a direct role in keeping the movement alive.

3. Size of mobilization

Provide any information available about the number of participants, their social and/or professional status, the geographic spread of the mobilization, etc.

Thousands were mobilized. Most of the large protests were concentrated in Bujumbura, the economic capital. Smaller protests were held in other towns, for example, Bururi, in southern Burundi. Although many of the protesters were in the younger age bracket (young men, including many students), they cut across gender, ethnic, social, and professional lines.

4. Episode background

What background facts does the reader need to know about the political and social context of the country to understand this episode?

Burundi had suffered decades of armed conflict, including a deadly war that began in 1993, fought largely along ethnic lines between the Tutsi minority (then in power) and the Hutu majority. The 2000 Arusha Agreement formally marked the end of the war and established the principle of power sharing, but fighting continued in the years that followed. The current ruling party, the Hutu-dominated National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD, a former armed group), came to power in 2005. In the following years, some steps were made toward democratization, but the CNDD-FDD was generally intolerant of opposition and criticism. Violent government repression, directed against

political opponents and critics, increased after the 2010 elections, culminating in the April 2015 protests and what has become known as the "2015 crisis". The clashes in 2015 were not along ethnic lines but rather between the two main parties in the majority Hutu group.

5. Prior mobilization dynamic

What were the characteristics of civic mobilization over the 20 years or so prior to this episode? Were protests a frequent occurrence? Did they tend to focus on different issues than this episode did (e.g., labor conditions)? What was the most recent mobilization prior to this episode? What role did previous protests (successful/unsuccessful; violent/nonviolent) and government responses to those protests play in this mobilization episode? How do the issues of any recent protests relate to this episode's framing of issues?

The protests in April 2015 were unprecedented in scale, but smaller protests had taken place since 2010. Although government critics often faced harassment, threats, arrest, and detention, Burundi had a dynamic and brave civil society movement and media. Independent civil society organizations, as well as some opposition parties, organized protests on a variety of issues, the most significant of which (in the lead-up to 2015) was a campaign against the rising cost of living. Journalists also organized protests against repressive press laws and the arrests of journalists, among other issues. The arrest and imprisonment of leading human rights defender Pierre-Claver Mbonimpa, in 2014, and journalist and director of African Public Radio, Bob Rugurika, in 2015, triggered a huge outpouring of public support in the streets of Bujumbura.

6. Trigger

What was the trigger for this mobilization episode (state response to an exogenous shock? Electoral or constitutional power grab? An unpopular policy?)

The sitting president announced his third presidential bid, which triggered this mobilization. Many Burundians viewed it as a violation of the Arusha Agreement. Some claimed it also violated the constitution, although there was a loophole in the constitution due to ambiguous wording. An accumulation of other grievances relating, for example, to corruption, economic hardship, and political repression, added to public frustration and anger.

7. Framing

What was the framing of this trigger, grievances, and demands during the episode? What was the role of different mobilization actors in shaping the framing? How/did the framing of why people should mobilize change over time? How did the framing help or hinder scaling up of the mobilization?

The framing is closely related to the 2000 Arusha Agreement, which became an important symbol of peace in the country and which many Burundians view as a safeguard against renewed conflict. The specific grievance in April 2015 related to President Nkurunziza's decision to stand for a third term in the presidential elections. However, the protests also acted as channels for frustration and dissatisfaction with corruption, economic hardship, and political repression. While the demonstrators primarily protested against President Nkurunziza's third term bid (their campaign became known by the slogan "No to a third term"), that soon evolved into a broader protest movement against the government.

8. Tactics

What kind of tactics did the movement(s) use? How was the presence or absence of an upward scale shift related to these tactics?

The reports available do not mention any specific tactics that might have led to the upward scale shift.

9. Actors: organizations

What powerful institutions, movements or parties were engaged in this mobilization episode (unions, religious organizations, opposition parties)? What are the key facts about any formal and informal organizations that joined or supported the mobilization?

Civil society organizations, in particular the Forum for the Strengthening of Civil Society (FORSC), a coalition of more than 200 member organizations, were the driving force behind the protests. They managed to mobilize broad swathes of public opinion.

Opposition parties' members were involved in the protests, including members of older, established parties—such as the Union for National Progress (UPRONA), as well as members of more recently created parties, particularly the MSD, which had a broad base among the urban youth. Some of the parties played a key role in parliament in voting against a change to the constitution. The MSD opposition party did not have any parliamentary representation but mobilized large numbers of protesters.

Religious organizations were also engaged.

10. Actors: leaders

What were the characteristics of the leader(s), prominent activists, and public figures who participated in the mobilization? What was their professional and social (ethnic/religious/class) background? What kinds of networks did they belong to and mobilize? Where did they get their organizing skills?

Leaders of civil society organizations played a key role but did not always adopt a high public profile. They operated mainly behind the scenes. These organizations included Forum for the Strengthening of Civil Society (FORSC), headed by Vital Nshimirimana; Forum for Conscience and Development (FOCODE), headed by Pacifique Nininahazwe; and the human rights group Association for the Protection of Human Rights and Detained Persons (APRODH), headed by Pierre Claver Mbonimpa. Leaders of FORSC, which organized the campaign "Halte au 3eme mandat" (Stop the third term) were human rights lawyers and activists.

Civil society leaders were already used to organizing protests and other public events, albeit not on this scale. The fact that they enjoyed widespread public support facilitated the task of mobilizing large numbers of people.

Leaders of opposition parties also participated in the mobilization, some more actively than others. These parties included the MSD (despite the fact that it had been suspended by the government and its leader, Alexis Sinduhije, fled the country in 2014), UPRONA, and Union for Peace and Democracy (UPD)-Zigamibanga. Members of the National Liberation Forces (FNL) also participated, but their leaders were less prominent in the mobilization.

Some of the most outspoken leaders were Tutsi, but many Hutu also participated in the protests.

Repression of political opposition and dissidents had increased in the run-up to the 2015 election. Some political and civil society leaders opted for a low public profile to protect themselves and their members from government reprisals.

11. Actors: civil society

What was the role, if any, of local human rights and civil society organizations and movements?

Burundian human rights groups and other civil society organizations played a key role in the mobilization. They included FORSC, a coalition of more than 200 member organizations. To some extent, they worked with opposition politicians, but opposition parties mobilized their own members and supporters independently from civil society organizations.

12. Actors: youth

What was the role, if any, of youth organizations (formal or informal)?

Many youths participated in the protests. Some were mobilized by civil society or political parties. Others joined spontaneously. They included many students, but also young men and women from other backgrounds. A minority of youths involved in the protests resorted to violence and attacked police and members of the ruling party. At the other end of the political spectrum, members of the ruling party's youth wing, known as the Imbonerakure, frequently harassed and attacked political opponents and committed serious abuses against demonstrators, working hand in hand with the police and intelligence service.

13. Actors: diaspora

What was the role of diaspora groups?

Some Burundians in the diaspora reportedly provided financial support to the protest movement. They also provided political and moral support, for example, by publicizing information about the protests at the international level, particularly through social media, and encouraging the protesters.

Many opposition figures and civil society activists were forced to flee Burundi as the crisis unfolded, and the government suspended or banned many independent civil society organizations. Some of these organizations continued their activities in exile and regularly published information about the situation in Burundi, but their influence diminished over time.

14. Actors: international organizations

What was the role of INGOs/IGOs?

International nongovernment organizations denounced the government's violent repression of perceived opponents and critics in the lead-up to and during the demonstrations and published several reports documenting serious human rights violations. They also engaged in international advocacy to raise awareness of the crisis.

Governments and intergovernmental organizations also condemned the repression. Several governments, including the European Union (EU) and the United States, suspended direct aid to the Burundian government. The

EU and the United States also imposed targeted sanctions against several Burundian officials and opposition figures.

The *Political Handbook of the World 2020–2021* states the following: "After Nkurunziza announced his intent to seek a third term in April 2015, regional leaders, the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), and the United States all called for the president to reverse his decision. In response, Nkurunziza repeatedly postponed the polling. National elections held in June and July were widely condemned by various countries and international organizations as violence swept across the country.… Belgium suspended aid in October, prompting Burundi to call for the replacement of the Belgian ambassador. In November the United States imposed travel restrictions and other sanctions on Burundian government officials. In December the AU authorized the deployment of a 5,000-member peacekeeping force, but Nkurunziza threatened to use military force to resist the deployment, which was subsequently postponed" ("Burundi," ed. Tom Lansford [Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2021], 12:3503).

15. Media and IT technologies

What media or IT technologies helped the mobilization to scale up (if at all)?

While much information about the protests spread through word of mouth, social media also played an important role in mobilizing support, especially among youths in Bujumbura.

The government shut down the country's main independent radio stations after the failed military coup.

16. Precursors summary

[for positive cases that scaled up] In your analysis, what are the main precursors that explain how or why people took to the streets in large numbers at this time and not on other occasions? Are there any that are not already listed here that led to the upward scale shift?
[for negative cases that did not scale up] In your analysis, what are the main precursors that explain why the mobilization did not scale up despite the attempts to do so? Are there any that are not already listed here that prevented the upward scale shift?

Likely precursors to the mobilization include (1) the symbolic importance of the Arusha Agreement for peace in the country; (2) increasing public frustration with a corrupt and repressive government and the spiraling cost of living; and (3) the existence of a dynamic, independent civil society movement.

17. Key sources

What sources would be good for someone who wants to follow up on details of this case (up to five sources)?

"Burundi: Braving Bullets: Excessive Force in Policing Demonstrations in Burundi." Amnesty International, July 28, 2015. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr16/2100/2015/en/.

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"Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Burundi." United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council, August 11, 2017. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G17/237/46/PDF/G1723746.pdf?OpenElement.

Africa Center for Strategic Studies. "Burundi: A Multi-Ethnic Political Experiment at Risk?" *Africa Center for Strategic Studies* (blog), April 29, 2015. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/burundi-a-multi-ethnic-political-experiment-at-risk/.

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Vandeginste, Stef. "Burundi (Vol. 12, 2015)." *Africa Yearbook Online*, October 1, 2016. http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/africa-yearbook-online/burundi-vol-12-2015-ayb2015_COM_0030.

CAMBODIA

1. Episode summary

In 2-4 sentences, summarize what this mobilization episode was about.

After the 2013 elections, the newly formed Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), which united the opposition to the Cambodia People's Party (CPP), alleged poll fraud and called for new elections. Protests began immediately following the election in July 2013. A few months later, Cambodian garment workers' unions went on strike to demand a doubling of their wages. These protests began in December 2013 and were organized concurrently with the CNRP protests. That set off a year of antigovernment protests that combined claims related to government mismanagement of social issues, wages, and electoral fraud.

2. Dates, duration, and dynamics of the mobilization episode

What were the dates that mark the start, end, and scale-up (if any) of this episode? How long was the active phase of the mobilization? Can the mobilization episode be divided into stages? If yes, provide a brief (1-3 sentences) characteristic of each stage.

Following the 2013 election, the results of which the opposition CNRP refused to acknowledge, protests began immediately and escalated until December 22, 2013, when the CNRP began their formal boycott of the legislature. Protests began in September, with an estimated 40,000 protesters in attendance, and accelerated over the course of the fall and early winter, with peak protests in December exceeding 500,000 protesters.

Though there have been routine protests following elections in Cambodia, this cycle of postelection protests was unique in several ways. Principally, the 2013 election was the first time that the main opposition parties united in a single party and came close to unseating the CPP, which had been in power since 1979. The merger took place between the Sam Rainsy Party and Human Rights Party, led by Kem Sokha. Both Rainsy and Sokha were popular, known figures, but this level of collaboration was new and ignited a new wave of political engagement by youth, labor, and other opposition-inclined factions of Cambodian society. Though opposition parties had formed coalitions in the past, they often faltered and split when offered minor roles in government. This was the first time that the two major opposition parties formally merged in an attempt to unseat the CPP.

Second, the CNRP used innovative tactics not generally wielded by Cambodian political parties, including door-to-door canvassing, marches, voter registration drives, voter turnout drives, and organizing concerts.[1]

Simultaneously, garment workers' unions rallied large protests on December 29, 2013, in response to the government's failure to deliver on a promised wage increase and extensive corruption and tampering in the process that would have determined the level of the wage increase. The CNRP, having promised that they would raise garment workers' wages, joined the protests.

Protests regarding the election and garment workers' wages continued through January 2014 until a widespread government crackdown and a temporary suspension of the right to assemble. The government attempted to quell the garment workers with a small raise that was below the necessary wages for workers according to the Ministry of Labor's own research. Protests resumed in February after the suspension was lifted and continued through July until a political settlement was reached, and the CNRP agreed to return to parliament.[2]

According to an Amnesty International report, "In July 2014, Phnom Penh Police Chief Chhuon Sovann reported that there had been 445 demonstrations in the capital since the July 2013 National Assembly elections—an average of more than one assembly per day. In a meeting with Amnesty International in May 2015, senior officers of the National Police stated that police figures for assemblies and other gatherings recorded 852 events in 2013 compared to 2,439 in 2014. The officers stated that police figures showed 432 assemblies and other gatherings in the period of the 2015 preceding that meeting" ("Taking to the Streets: Freedom of Peaceful Assembly in Cambodia," 2015).

3. Size of mobilization

Provide any information available about the number of participants, their social and/or professional status, the geographic spread of the mobilization, etc.

Protests were continuous between September 2013 and July 2014 with the exception of when the government suspended the right to assemble in January 2014. At their peak, the protests led by the CNRP attracted at least 500,000 people on December 22, 2013.

The initial garment workers' strike on December 29 mobilized "tens of thousands" across the country.[3] The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) characterized this protest as being led by the CNRP with the garment workers joining them.[4]

Numbers for the daily protests that occurred throughout the year are unknown. Garment workers revived their strike in September 2014, attracting participants across 300 factories.[5]

4. Episode background

What background facts does the reader need to know about the political and social context of the country to understand this episode?

Prior to 2008, a party or coalition of parties in the National Assembly required a two-thirds majority to form a government. This meant that the CPP, formerly the Khmer People's Revolutionary Party—which, with the backing of Vietnam in 1979, seized control of the government to oust the Khmer Rouge—had to cooperate with various opposition parties. In 2008 the CPP changed the constitution to allow for a simple majority to form a government. After having spent several election cycles forming governments in coalition with other parties (although it won a two-thirds majority in 2008), the CPP won only a simple majority in 2013 and formed a government without the support of another party.

Their margin of victory, however, was slim. The CPP won 48.83 percent of the popular vote to the CNRP's 44.46 percent. The CNRP alleged massive electoral fraud, and with the stakes of a simple majority raised due to the 2008 amendment, argued that they would have taken control of the government away from the CPP for the first time since 1979 in a fair election.

Simultaneously, there was an ongoing labor conflict over the wages of garment workers. Successive CPP governments, comprised of and catering to business elites, used state power to suppress workers and the labor movement. Unions are allowed to exist, but their activists are often arrested or otherwise harassed.

Until 2014, the government did not mandate yearly wage increases, despite garment workers' wages being capped at around $80 monthly and the Ministry of Labor's own research showing that workers needed between $157 and $177 per month to survive. Finally, wage increases were traditionally decided by the tripartite Labor Advisory Committee (LAC), chaired by the Minister for Labor. An employer representative and a government-aligned labor union leader served as vice-chairs. The committee had 28 members: 14 government representatives, 7 employer representatives, and 7 union representatives. Out of the seven union representatives, five were from government-aligned labor unions. The selection of union representatives was at the rather arbitrary discretion of the ministry. The inclusion of two union representatives not aligned with the government was made based on their moderation and agreeability. The government's commitment to an ordered negotiation procedure saw the door shut to pro-opposition federations such as the Free Trade Union of Workers of the Kingdom of Cambodia. Ultimately, the framing was not just about minimum wages, but the "politics" of minimum wages and, therefore, a violation of the social contract.

5. Prior mobilization dynamic

What were the characteristics of civic mobilization over the 20 years or so prior to this episode? Were protests a frequent occurrence? Did they tend to focus on different issues than this episode did (e.g., labor conditions)? What was the most recent mobilization prior to this episode? What role did previous protests (successful/unsuccessful; violent/nonviolent) and government responses to those protests play in this mobilization episode? How do the issues of any recent protests relate to this episode's framing of issues?

The ruling Cambodian People's Party has controlled Cambodia since replacing the Khmer Rouge in 1979, with Hun Sen ascending to power in 1985. Sen and the party have routinely used specialized police and military forces to attack and terrorize political opponents, including an assassination attempt against his main political opponent in 1997. Large-scale civic mobilization has been infrequent, though labor unions have formally been allowed to exist and have consistently exercised some amount of political power. Certain groups of Buddhist monks affiliated with the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party have also supported various mobilizations.[6]

Cambodia experiences routine mobilizations following elections, but prior to 2013, they were relatively small and did not rise to the criteria of an upward scale shift. Most protests were related to land or labor disputes.

The nonprofit Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) collected data on Cambodian protests in 2010–18. It found that there were 1,450 demonstrations in that period. Of those, 44 percent were focused on labor issues, 34 percent were dedicated to land issues, and the remaining 22 percent were focused on all other issues.

6. Trigger

What was the trigger for this mobilization episode (state response to an exogenous shock? Electoral or constitutional power grab? An unpopular policy?)

Supporters of the CNRP felt that, due to electoral fraud, they were robbed of a real chance to depose Hun Sen and the CPP. That had not been the case in past election cycles due to larger margins of victory and the two-thirds majority requirement to form a government. That anger, combined with the Hun Sen government's failure to address the economic needs of garment workers, and an alliance between the CNRP and garment workers unions, were triggers.

7. Framing

What was the framing of this trigger, grievances, and demands during the episode? What was the role of different mobilization actors in shaping the framing? How/did the framing of why people should mobilize change over time? How did the framing help or hinder scaling up of the mobilization?

The principle mobilization framings were

a. Electoral fraud and

b. Violations of promises by the Hun Sen government in their failure to (1) raise living standards despite rapid economic development, and (2) preside over a fair process to balance the interests of management and labor when setting wage floors for workers.

It is important to note that these labor concerns, along with numerous other labor provisions, were featured in the CNRP's campaign platform in the 2013 election. The garment workers' salaries translated into postelection mobilization because their wage floor negotiation was taking place simultaneous to the election.

8. Tactics

What kind of tactics did the movement(s) use? How was the presence or absence of an upward scale shift related to these tactics?

The movement used street protest tactics, primarily. The presence of an upward scale shift was not related to these tactics, but these tactics were only possible because of the newly available information and communication technologies (ICT) infrastructure (described below).

At the initial stage, the opposition also engaged in electioneering tactics to mobilize and broaden their support base.

9. Actors: organizations

What powerful institutions, movements or parties were engaged in this mobilization episode (unions, religious organizations, opposition parties)? What are the key facts about any formal and informal organizations that joined or supported the mobilization?

The Cambodia National Rescue Party and garment workers' unions were the main actors in this mobilization episode. Key facts related to the unity of opposition parties in the creation of the CNRP are described above. This episode also saw a high degree of coordination between the CNRP and labor leaders.

10. Actors: leaders

What were the characteristics of the leader(s), prominent activists, and public figures who participated in the mobilization? What was their professional and social (ethnic/religious/class) background? What kinds of networks did they belong to and mobilize? Where did they get their organizing skills?

Sam Rainsy, Kem Sokha, and leaders of the CNRP participated in the mobilization.

11. Actors: civil society

What was the role, if any, of local human rights and civil society organizations and movements?

The Independent Democracy of Informal Economy Association (IDIEA), a civic organization dedicated to advancing the interests of poor workers, was present at the protests. Its leader Prak Sovannary was arrested during garment workers' protests in 2014. IDIEA is connected to the Cooperation Committee of Cambodia—one of the organizations receiving funding under Freedom House's (FH) 2015 Cambodia award. Ad Hoc, another human rights organization supported by FH, was involved in reporting human rights violations during the protests, but was not itself involved in the protest leadership.[7]

The key civil society organizations were the Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (LICADHO); Cambodian Center for Human Rights (CCHR); and Committee for Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia

(COMFREL). During wage protests among garment workers in November to December 2013, LICADHO played a role documenting the human rights abuses that were occurring as regime forces cracked down. Similarly, the CCHR documented human rights abuses against participants in the three-day protests organized by the CNRP in September 2013 to dispute the election results. Finally, COMFREL was—and always has been—the crucial nongovernmental organization (NGO) capable of assessing the integrity of Cambodian elections. As the National Election Committee and then the Constitutional Council dismissed opposition complaints about the election, people relied on COMFREL for an alternative nonbiased assessment of the election.

12. Actors: youth

What was the role, if any, of youth organizations (formal or informal)?

The 2013 election took place following slowly developing, large demographic shifts that resulted in the youngest electorate in Cambodian history, with 52 percent of Cambodians under the age of 25 at the time of the election. This demographic shift coincided with the growth in availability of smartphone devices and access to the internet (see below). These new technologies were widely used by youth in Phnom Penh, the capital, to obtain information about the election, instances of electoral fraud, and subsequent mobilizations.

13. Actors: diaspora

What was the role of diaspora groups?

Diaspora groups in the United States held protests alongside the CNRP but did not play a leadership role.

14. Actors: international organizations

What was the role of INGOs/IGOs?

International NGOs kept a close watch. Human Rights Watch wrote a detailed report on the garment industry in 2015 that drew on information about this episode.

15. Media and IT technologies

What media or IT technologies helped the mobilization to scale up (if at all)?

Between 2010 and 2014, Cambodia saw explosive growth in the internet penetration rate, from 2 percent to 25 percent.[8] This was largely due to the growth in access to mobile smartphones and marked the first opportunity for widespread exposure to media and methods of organizing that could not be surveilled by the government.

Facebook played a critical role as a communication platform outside the reach of government control. Not only were instances of electoral fraud publicized on social media, but Sam Rainsy repeatedly used his Facebook account to announce where and when a protest would take place. In fact, specific pages were created for some election-related protest events. Furthermore, many garment worker/wage increase protests were organized via Facebook, including via CNRP TV and CNRP Radio, both of which are broadcast via Facebook.

In response to the CNRP's use of Facebook as an organizing tool, the government attempted to grant itself sweeping new powers to criminalize certain forms of political speech in 2015. The law did not move forward that year, in part due to intense civil society pressure, but the government is now (in 2022, as of the time of this writing) attempting to expand its surveillance and authority.

16. Precursors summary

[for positive cases that scaled up] In your analysis, what are the main precursors that explain how or why people took to the streets in large numbers at this time and not on other occasions? Are there any that are not already listed here that led to the upward scale shift?
[for negative cases that did not scale up] In your analysis, what are the main factors that explain why the mobilization did not scale up despite the attempts to do so? Are there any factors not already listed here that prevented the upward scale shift?

Cambodia experiences routine contentious actions led by opposition political parties following major elections, including in 1998, 2003, 2008, and 2013. In addition, there are regular protests by diffuse groups focused on labor and land rights.

The factors that enabled the upward scale shift in the 2013–14 mobilization included the following:

a. Increased collaboration and coordination by opposition political forces;

b. Increased used of electioneering tactics to mobilize and broaden the support base;

c. A massive increase in internet penetration that allowed opposition forces to communicate with the public through channels that were not controlled by the government; and

d. The CNRP's close relationship with garment workers' unions, and the fortuitous timing of the garment workers' wage negotiations with the electoral cycle.

17. Key sources

What sources would be good for someone who wants to follow up on details of this case (up to five sources)?

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Ponniah, Kevin. "Fears over human rights in Cambodia as crackdown on protests continues." *The Guardian*, February 11, 2014. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/feb/11/cambodia-human-rights-crackdown-protests.

Endnotes

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7 Guardian News and Media. (2014, February 11). Fears over human rights in Cambodia as crackdown on protests continues. The Guardian. Retrieved July 25, 2022, from https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/feb/11/cambodia-human-rights-crackdown-protests

8 Finsen, Lawrence. "The Election Facebook (Almost) Won." In "The Whole World is Texting." Edited by I. Epstein. 161-195. Sense Publishers 2015.

9 According to The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) data (https://acleddata.com/dashboard/).

10 Wood, Colleen. "Wave of Creative Protests Threaten Kazakhstan's Elite Ahead of Elections." *Waging Nonviolence* (blog), May 29, 2019. https://wagingnonviolence.org/2019/05/wave-creative-protests-threaten-kazakhstan-elite-ahead-elections/.

11 Ibid.

CAMEROON

1. Episode summary

In 2-4 sentences, summarize what this mobilization episode was about.

In late 2016, lawyers in an Anglophone region mobilized to protest recent events that did not uphold their rights to a separate legal system. Teachers and students soon joined the protest with similar complaints about Anglophone education. The government offered to negotiate, and a coalition was formed to meet with the government, but negotiations were not successful, and the scale of protester demands escalated during the course of negotiations from restoring decentralization of law and education, to a demand for federalism, which was more broadly appealing but a red line for the government. The state violently repressed street protests, arrested movement leaders, and shut down the internet in mid-January 2017. Then the movement turned into a violent civil conflict as separatists broke off from the federalist coalition.

2. Dates, duration, and dynamics of the mobilization episode

What were the dates that mark the start, end, and scale-up (if any) of this episode? How long was the active phase of the mobilization? Can the mobilization episode be divided into stages? If yes, provide a brief (1-3 sentences) characteristic of each stage.

It started in October 2016 and ended in January 2017. After the harsh repression in January, the situation devolved into a violent civil conflict.

In October 2016, activists formed the Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium (CACSC), an organization consisting of lawyer and teacher trade unions in the Anglophone regions. In response to yet another change that adversely affected the English legal system, CACSC initiated a strike that was supported by nonviolent protests in a few other cities. The early phase involved lawyers filing requests, staging a sit-in strike October 11–14, and staging a street demonstration on November 8, where police violently dispersed them.

The lawyers continued their strike and were joined by teachers on November 21, the same day a street protest of a few hundred people was violently dispersed. Schools were shut down in many regions in November and December due to strikes. The government responded to protests with tear gas and assaults by soldiers on lawyers and teachers.

In late November and early December, the main opposition party and the Consortium staged several rallies while the ruling party held counter-rallies. A November 28 student protest was repressed with more than 100 arrests, and shocking videos of students being brutalized circulated on social media. In Bamenda, taxi drivers, motorbike messengers, and traders joined the strike action on December 5. On December 8, there was a clash between attendees of the opposition party rally and the ruling party rally. Youth used social media to coordinate themselves on the streets and in neighborhoods to stop the pro-government rally. They were effective, but government forces killed at least 3 and arrested at least 50.

These kinds of strikes and protests were not unfamiliar to the population, but this time, popular support swelled, supporting greater demands during negotiations with the government, leading to a harsher police response to the protests. That led to the moment where the mobilization scaled up significantly beyond previous mobilizations in the December 5 strike action. But it is also important to note that the mobilization involved formal negotiations with the government, with demands centering on changes to hindrances in the English legal system, such as the inadequate English language skills of magistrates or the decline in education on the common law system, and the general marginalization of Anglophones in Cameroon.

3. Size of mobilization

Provide any information available about the number of participants, their social and/or professional status, the geographic spread of the mobilization, etc.

During the scale-up, a wide variety of people were involved in different ways using different tactics: lawyers; teachers; students; members of civil society, informal professional unions, and professional organizations; and matriarchical community leaders, among others. The street protests numbered a few hundred people, many from the motorbike riders informal union. Lawyers, then students, had strikes or sit-in strikes, and there was

something closer to a general strike on December 5 that involved other professional organizations. Probably tens of thousands were involved in civil resistance. Besides lawyers and teachers, the presence of less elite professional groups, like the bike-riders' union, farmers' unions, food vendors in markets, and unemployed graduates organized participation by members of their groups.

Over time, the mobilization spread across different Anglophone districts and professional groups but did not seem to cross borders into Francophone areas.

4. Episode background

What background facts does the reader need to know about the political and social context of the country to understand this episode?

The current president took power in 1982, and Cameroon was a one-party state until 1990. The country is supposed to have a federal system with the Anglophone regions having English-language education at all levels and the courts operating on English common law. However, the reality of this autonomy has eroded over several decades. Since 1990 there has been an Anglophone opposition party, and civil society organizations have emerged in Anglophone regions.

5. Prior mobilization dynamic

What were the characteristics of civic mobilization over the 20 years or so prior to this episode? Were protests a frequent occurrence? Did they tend to focus on different issues than this episode did (e.g., labor conditions)? What was the most recent mobilization prior to this episode? What role did previous protests (successful/unsuccessful; violent/nonviolent) and government responses to those protests play in this mobilization episode? How do the issues of any recent protests relate to this episode's framing of issues?

There is a historical pattern of Anglophone resistance and subsequent military crackdown that nonetheless provides activists with a legacy of civil disobedience and a tactical repertoire, as well as a tradition of socio-professional resistance grounded in activism by lawyers, teachers, and students in particular. Activities such as lawyers making demands and students going on strike, and the corresponding response of tear gas and a military presence, were a continual feature of the decade leading up to this episode in multiple urban areas.

6. Trigger

What was the trigger for this mobilization episode (state response to an exogenous shock? Electoral or constitutional power grab? An unpopular policy?)

The failure to translate a law into English and the appointment of French-speaking judges with poor English language skills and little understanding of the Anglophone legal system were triggers. There is also the background of 2016 being an especially bad year for public perception of Cameroonian governance, with a transportation disaster that killed dozens and an embarrassing incident involving the breakdown of a car in the president's motorcade on a major national holiday. Such incidents enhanced the mood in the country of the end of a reign.

However, the specific timing was determined by a strategy formed by lawyers in 2015 when the bar association gave the ministry of justice about 12 months to provide solutions. Instead, the ministry introduced further changes in the appointment process for public notaries that disfavored the English legal system, took away a source of income for Anglophone lawyers, and favored presidential power. Those additional blows to decentralization coincided with the bar's time frame, leading the lawyers to walk out on their court sessions that day and begin their planned campaign of public protest.

7. Framing

What was the framing of this trigger, grievances, and demands during the episode? What was the role of different mobilization actors in shaping the framing? How/did the framing of why people should mobilize change over time? How did the framing help or hinder scaling up of the mobilization?

The framing initially was about maintaining decentralization, but given the lack of compromise by the government, the Consortium put forth the demand for federalism, which the government considered a red line. The federalist framing referred back to what is in the constitution. The next framing to emerge was public outrage over the brutalization of activists and protesters. That brutal treatment reinforced the public's perception that federalism was the right solution. Some groups in January 2017 moved from the federalist framing to a separatist framing, and the conflict became more violent on both sides.

8. Tactics

What kind of tactics did the movement(s) use? How was the presence or absence of an upward scale shift related to these tactics?

Tactics were somewhat diverse but did not reach beyond the local audience perhaps. Lawyers presented demands to the government, and there were subsequent formal negotiations. There were street protests, especially to express outrage against arrests and brutalization, but everyone knew to anticipate tear gas and violent arrests so the numbers protesting were small. Strike actions attracted more people, so any upward shift was related to strike tactics across diverse professional groups. Keeping shops closed to deprive the government of tax revenue was called having a "ghost town"—the CACSC called for Operation Ghost Town resistance in January with mandated stay-at-home days each week.

9. Actors: organizations

What powerful institutions, movements or parties were engaged in this mobilization episode (unions, religious organizations, opposition parties)? What are the key facts about any formal and informal organizations that joined or supported the mobilization?

Professional associations (lawyers, teachers) are a civic force. The CACSC, which was formed in October 2016 and banned in January 2017, represented the new/old framing of federalism (and some members of the Consortium broke off in favor of separatism in January). There were also several informal and traditional organizations involved in collective action, like Takumbeng, made up of elderly women who break taboo by leading local protests while partially unclothed. Major religious institutions were slow to take a side despite active participation in strikes by their members. Their silence angered people and was taken as complicity between church and state authorities.

Attempts to use national institutions to bridge the linguistic-territorial divide and build broader solidarity were not effective. One example around the time that the episode ended involved the National Episcopal Conference (NECC), with the Anglophone protests causing division among Francophones and Anglophones in January 2017. In the Catholic church, Francophone bishops criticized their Anglophone counterparts for respecting ghost towns by not allowing Catholic schools to operate. It is also important to note the role of Anglophone political parties that supported continued decentralization rather than federalism and mobilized their followers against pro-federalist activists.

10. Actors: leaders

What were the characteristics of the leader(s), prominent activists, and public figures who participated in the mobilization? What was their professional and social (ethnic/religious/class) background? What kinds of networks did they belong to and mobilize? Where did they get their organizing skills?

Lawyers, civil rights activists, professors/teachers, politicians, and journalists were leaders in the mobilization. Their skills were honed during decades of struggle over retaining the decentralization that is in the constitution and the original power-sharing agreement. They are not new actors, and their mobilization tactics and constituencies largely came out of their own experience.

11. Actors: civil society

What was the role, if any, of local human rights and civil society organizations and movements?

In order to provide a common front for negotiations with the government, civic and professional organizations formed a coalition, the CACSC, which was declared illegal in January 2017. Its leaders were arrested. Some of the leaders of the Consortium were experienced trade unionists and human rights defenders.

Informal professional organizations also played a role, in particular, motorbike couriers, who play an important role in transportation and communications in the region and have developed networks of solidarity and a professional identity that was mobilized during the protests. "Bike riders" was one of the groups that was willing to risk protesting in the streets and joined the Consortium in its activities. The group also spread word about the brutal treatment of protesters during the mobilization. Bike riders—mostly young people organized by locality and/or tribal origin—have been deployed by politicians to threaten strikers, as well.

During the scale-up, a wide variety of people were involved in different ways using different tactics: lawyers; teachers; students; members of civil society, informal professional unions, and professional organizations; and matriarchical community leaders, among others. The street protests numbered a few hundred people, many from the "motorbike riders" informal union. Lawyers, then students, had strikes or sit-in strikes, and there was something closer to a general strike on December 5 that involved other professional organizations. Probably tens of thousands were involved in civil resistance. Besides lawyers and teachers, the presence of less elite professional groups, like the bike-riders' union, farmers' unions, food vendors in markets, and unemployed graduates organized participation by members of their groups.

12. Actors: youth

What was the role, if any, of youth organizations (formal or informal)?

University students were prominently involved in demonstrations and strikes and were harshly repressed, triggering public outrage. Students also played a role in organizing and disseminating messages on social media. The youths used social media to coordinate themselves on the streets and in neighborhoods to stop the rally of the dominant political party on December 5. Youths in the diaspora also played a role in disseminating information over social media.

13. Actors: diaspora

What was the role of diaspora groups?

Several leaders of the movement went into exile in January 2017 and diaspora activism apparently kicked in after the crackdown though in support of the violent separatist cause. Youths in the diaspora did some organizing during the mobilization via social media.

14. Actors: international organizations

What was the role of INGOs/IGOs?

International reactions to the crisis came largely from the United States, multilateral organizations, and international civil society organizations. The US State Department on November 28, 2016, called for dialogue and the respect of fundamental human rights and freedoms. The United Nations Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Central Africa condemned the use of violence and asked the state to respect minorities. Strong reactions came from the UK bar association and other international civil society organizations like Amnesty International.

15. Media and IT technologies

What media or IT technologies helped the mobilization to scale up (if at all)?

WhatsApp and Facebook were used by both diaspora and in-country activists to coordinate, but the government also used those platforms to warn and intimidate activists for circulating "unprovable" information. Young people used social media to coordinate themselves on the streets and in neighborhoods to stop the rally of the dominant political party on December 5. When access to the internet was interrupted by the government, users resorted to virtual private networks (VPNs) and the sharing of printed information. Traditional media organizations that were friendly to the government initially provided a platform to counteract the rhetoric of the federalists and secessionists. The few private media organizations who remained neutral in their coverage were either suspended or completely banned.

16. Precursors summary

[for positive cases that scaled up] In your analysis, what are the main precursors that explain how or why people took to the streets in large numbers at this time and not on other occasions? Are there any that are not already listed here that led to the upward scale shift?
[for negative cases that did not scale up] In your analysis, what are the main precursors that explain why the mobilization did not scale up despite the attempts to do so? Are there any that are not already listed here that prevented the upward scale shift?

The presence of professional associations, unions, and informal and traditional organizations and a legacy of mobilization in previous decades allowed the coordination of widespread strikes and other forms of collective action that were more or less familiar, and people knew what to expect. The scaling up resulted from the existing ability of networks to mobilize using tactics with different levels of risk that appealed to different segments of the population. When the framing changed from demands grounded in a particular profession to demands for restoration of federalism, that shifted the popular view of what was possible and provoked a much harsher reaction from the state. The scaling up was also a result of moral outrage at the treatment of protesters and people, whom the population viewed as unjustly targeted victims who had been brutalized or killed by the state. On the other hand, the lack of mobilizing across the Anglophone-Francophone divide or solidarity from a broader prodemocracy movement meant that the mobilization could not spread beyond Anglophone regions.

17. Key sources

What sources would be good for someone who wants to follow up on details of this case (up to five sources)?

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CHAD

1. Episode summary

In 2-4 sentences, summarize what this mobilization episode was about.

Multiple civil society groups and umbrella organizations mobilized against incumbent president Idriss Déby Itno running for his fifth term. In the run-up to the election on April 10, 2016, the opposition organized several unusually large protests and strikes. The trigger for the largest ones was the rape of a 16-year-old girl nicknamed Zouhoura. It was the moral shock that united the opposition and civil society. The protest organizers were eventually arrested and given months-long prison sentences. Zouhoura's father, Mamahat Yesko Brahim, who was a presidential candidate from a small opposition party, stood down at the last minute in favor of Déby, probably having been threatened or bribed. Seven young men were found guilty of rape and sentenced to 10 years in jail.

2. Dates, duration, and dynamics of the mobilization episode

What were the dates that mark the start, end, and scale-up (if any) of this episode? How long was the active phase of the mobilization? Can the mobilization episode be divided into stages? If yes, provide a brief (1-3 sentences) characteristic of each stage.

The opposition parties and civil society groups have protested Déby's regime for years citing his corruption and monopolization of power, both of which have led to the population's poverty. In the run-up to Déby's fifth term, they prepared to protest again.

About two months before the presidential election scheduled for April 10, a trigger set this brewing protest in motion. On February 8, 2016, Zouhoura, the 16-year-old daughter of an opposition leader, was raped by some classmates, one of whom was the son of a government minister and another two sons of army generals close to the regime. While rape is a common problem in Chad, Zouhoura's case was unusual because she spoke up about it, unlike many other victims who remain silent. On February 15, 2016, Zouhoura's other classmates organized a protest in her support; while demonstrating, 17-year-old Abachou Hassan Ousmane was shot and killed by the police. Abachou's death amplified the public outcry against Zouhoura's rape and a lack of justice, spreading to unions, political parties, and civil society organizations and turning into a protest against Déby's regime.

The series of protests in February through March 2016 included several rallies between February 15 and 22, a general strike (leading to "dead cities") on February 24, a whistle protest on March 11, and large protests on March 30 and 31 against the arrest of opposition leaders. The protests were eventually repressed with protest organizers being arrested and jailed. Zouhoura was forced to call publicly for an end to the protests, and her farther withdrew his candidacy in favor of Déby, most probably having been threatened or bribed.

A series of small protests in solidarity with Chadians took place in France, Senegal, and Niger.

The total length of the active phase was about six weeks.

Apart from the mobilization related to Zouhoura's rape and the upcoming election, Chad's teachers, students, lawyers, and judicial workers have been on almost constant strike since late 2014.

3. Size of mobilization

Provide any information available about the number of participants, their social and/or professional status, the geographic spread of the mobilization, etc.

Reports do not contain reliable estimates of how many people participated in the protests; some mention hundreds of thousands. They do say that the strike on February 24 was largely followed by the population: shops at the capital's largest market were closed, and there was barely any traffic on the streets. The whistle protest was less successful, and the protests on March 30 and 31 were "huge."

The pictures of the first protests show many younger women with signs demanding justice for Zouhoura. The general strike was followed by people of different backgrounds. Nongovernmental organization (NGO) leaders, including those dealing specifically with human rights, publicly spoke about the case and participated in public protests.

4. Episode background

What background facts does the reader need to know about the political and social context of the country to understand this episode?

Déby has been in power effectively since 1990 when he led a coup against his former ally Hissène Habré. Déby's rule, however, has been constantly challenged by guerrilla movements and opposition parties as internal conflicts have never been pacified since the civil war of the 1960s and 1970s. Déby has survived multiple coup attempts. Inside the country, he constantly manages relations with different clans through the divide-and-rule principle, concessions, repressions, and even marriage (one of his wives is from a clan with which he needed to strengthen a relationship).

Déby has been supported by foreign governments (the United States, France, and African states) since he was an ally in the fight against the radical Islamist group Boko Haram.

Chad is an oil-exporting country plagued by corruption, which makes its population very poor and dependent on international aid. About 50 percent of the population is under the age of 15. In 2016, the government adopted austerity measures, including several months-long salary arrays in the public sector due to falling oil prices.

5. Prior mobilization dynamic

What were the characteristics of civic mobilization over the 20 years or so prior to this episode? Were protests a frequent occurrence? Did they tend to focus on different issues than this episode did (e.g., labor conditions)? What was the most recent mobilization prior to this episode? What role did previous protests (successful/unsuccessful; violent/nonviolent) and government responses to those protests play in this mobilization episode? How do the issues of any recent protests relate to this episode's framing of issues?

Déby's rule has been challenged ever since he came to power, by military groups, political opposition, and civil society. There are multiple opposition parties, politico-military groups, and civil society umbrella organizations in the country. In November 2014, labor unions of teachers and government workers organized large protests in response to salary arrays, commodity shortages, and a spike in fuel prices. By the time of the 2016 mobilization, the strikes had been ongoing. These grievances accumulated independently from the trigger for the 2016 protests (Zouhoura's rape), but all these issues contributed to the resistance since the regime's corruption and impunity was seen as the root cause by protesters.

6. Trigger

What was the trigger for this mobilization episode (state response to an exogenous shock? Electoral or constitutional power grab? An unpopular policy?)

The rape of a 16-year-old schoolgirl named Zouhoura, who happened to be the daughter of one of Déby's election contestants, was the trigger. She was raped by a group of schoolboys, one of whom was the son of a governmental minister and another two sons of army generals close to the regime.

7. Framing

What was the framing of this trigger, grievances, and demands during the episode? What was the role of different mobilization actors in shaping the framing? How/did the framing of why people should mobilize change over time? How did the framing help or hinder scaling up of the mobilization?

The antiregime framing was mixed with the framing related to violence against women. Violence against women is very common in Chad: many girls are raped by men, including classmates, who usually escape justice. The reports emphasize the commonality of that problem before they mention that Zouhoura was the daughter of an opposition leader, which seems to have been more of a coincidence. The fact, though, that some of the perpetrators were sons of high-level officials connected to the idea that the regime covers up crimes committed by those close to it (this framing was applied to other incidents, too, in sources published later). The opposition tried to connect that idea with people's demand that Déby step down as they've had enough of his regime.

8. Tactics

What kind of tactics did the movement(s) use? How was the presence or absence of an upward scale shift related to these tactics?

Besides street protests and gatherings, the movement also used general strikes ("dead cities") and a whistle campaign—a flash mob of people blowing whistles at the same time for a few minutes. The whistle campaign was less successful, but the general strike was largely followed by the population both in the capital and provinces. The general strike had a very low participation threshold given that teachers, students, and government workers had been on constant strikes for over a year by then.

9. Actors: organizations

What powerful institutions, movements or parties were engaged in this mobilization episode (unions, religious organizations, opposition parties)? What are the key facts about any formal and informal organizations that joined or supported the mobilization?

Civil society, which includes both existing and newly created organizations, seems to be the primary actor behind this mobilization episode.

The *Africa Yearbook* states the following: "The social movements 'Collectif Tchadien Contre la Vie Chère' (CTCVC), led by Nely Versinis Dingamnayal, and the 'Trop C'est Trop!', headed by Céline Narmadj, had been the leading social movements against Déby's regime for some time. Now, a great number of new, and seemingly overlapping, social movements were established, all calling for the departure of President Déby and the restoration of democracy by nonviolent means. Many of them were mere umbrella groups of already established civil organizations, while others were brand new creations. The most important included 'Iyina' ("We are tired" in local Arabic), established on January 11 and headed by former student leader Kaina Palmer Nadjo, 'Ca suffit,' established on February 22 and led by the well-known human rights activist Mahamat Nour Ibedou, the diaspora based 'Projet pour une Alternance Crédible au Tchad' (PACT), established on July 23 in Paris and led by Abdelkerim Yacoub Koundougoue, and finally 'Ça Doit Changer,' an umbrella organisation of 15 pupils' and young people's movements, established on November 11" (Ketil Fred Hansen, "Chad," *Africa Yearbook* 13 [Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2017], https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004355910_024).

The most important human rights organizations involved in the mobilization around Zouhoura's rape included the Chadian Association for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (ATPDH) and the Chadian Human Rights League (LTDH). Both are established human rights organizations that have existed since the early 1990s.

The teachers' union was the main organizer of the strikes, which continued in the background of this mobilization episode. The Union of Trade Unions of Chad (UST) and its leader, Michel Barka, played an important role in organizing the general strike.

10. Actors: leaders

What were the characteristics of the leader(s), prominent activists, and public figures who participated in the mobilization? What was their professional and social (ethnic/religious/class) background? What kinds of networks did they belong to and mobilize? Where did they get their organizing skills?

The organizers of Iyina (We Are Tired) were both students and community activists. Other leaders, including those who were arrested and jailed, were human rights and labor union activists of an older generation (in their 40s and 50s). Among them were lawyers, doctors, and small entrepreneurs.

11. Actors: civil society

What was the role, if any, of local human rights and civil society organizations and movements?

Civil society groups and their alliances have played the key role in this mobilization. Generally, Chadian civil society is more fragmented than in some other countries, such as Sudan. However, this time they were better in coordinating their actions and turning the protests against Zouhoura's rape into antiregime ones.

The *Africa Yearbook* states the following: "The social movements Collectif Tchadien Contre la Vie Chère (CTCVC), led by Nely Versinis Dingamnayal, and the Trop C'est Trop!, headed by Céline Narmadj, had been the leading social movements against Déby's regime for some time. Now, a great number of new, and seemingly overlapping, social movements were established, all calling for the departure of President Déby and the restoration of democracy by nonviolent means. Many of them were mere umbrella groups of already established civil organizations, while others were brand new creations. The most important included 'Iyina' ("We are tired" in local Arabic), established on January 11 and headed by former student leader Kaina Palmer Nadjo, 'Ca suffit,' established on February 22 and led by the well-known human rights activist Mahamat Nour Ibedou, the diaspora based Projet pour une Alternance Crédible au Tchad (PACT), established on July 23 in Paris and led by Abdelkerim Yacoub Koundougoue, and finally 'Ça Doit Changer,' an umbrella organisation of 15 pupils' and young people's movements, established on November 11" (Ketil Fred Hansen, "Chad," *Africa Yearbook* 13 [Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2017], https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004355910_024).

The most important human rights organizations involved in the mobilization around Zouhoura's rape included the Chadian Association for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (ATPDH) and the Chadian Human Rights

League (LTDH). Both are established human rights organizations that have existed since the early 1990s.

The teachers' union was the main organizer of the strikes, which continued in the background of this mobilization episode. The Union of Trade Unions of Chad (UST) and its leader, Michel Barka, played an important role in organizing the general strike.

12. Actors: youth

What was the role, if any, of youth organizations (formal or informal)?

An article by the Crisis Group states the following: "Students have played key roles in protests, including the 2016 movement against Déby's decision to stand for a fifth term, which they helped organize and in which they participated massively" ("As Chad's Problems Mount, What Role for Civil Society?," May 25, 2020, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/chad/chads-problems-mount-what-role-civil-society).

13. Actors: diaspora

What was the role of diaspora groups?

Solidarity protests were organized by the diaspora in France, Senegal, and Niger.

Chadian activists in the diaspora (Makaila Nguebla, Abdelkerim Koundougoumi) as well as online newspapers (Tchadactuel, Alwihda infos, Tchad Infos, Le Tchadanthropus Tribune) played an important role in condemning the regime, calling for demonstrations, and informing Chadian internet users about developments. Their role was important in maintaining pressure on the regime and forcing it to limit repression and to release the arrested demonstrators subsequently.

14. Actors: international organizations

What was the role of INGOs/IGOs?

International human rights organizations have been reporting on detentions of activists.

15. Media and IT technologies

What media or IT technologies helped the mobilization to scale up (if at all)?

Zouhoura's perpetrators threatened to post a video of her rape online, and they eventually did. Later, the video was taken down. The availability of that video helped to generate a larger public outcry.

Social media, especially Facebook, is the space for expression and political organization, especially for youths. However, internet access is rather expensive, which limits the potential of the internet as a resource for the resistance movement.

16. Precursors summary

[for positive cases that scaled up] In your analysis, what are the main precursors that explain how or why people took to the streets in large numbers at this time and not on other occasions? Are there any that are not already listed here that led to the upward scale shift?
[for negative cases that did not scale up] In your analysis, what are the main precursors that explain why the mobilization did not scale up despite the attempts to do so? Are there any that are not already listed here that prevented the upward scale shift?

The major precursor for the scaling up of this mobilization as opposed to other times seems to be the combination of (1) the moral shock from the documented gang rape of a 16-year-old schoolgirl who made it public, including the fact that one of the perpetrators was the son of a governmental minister, (2) the upcoming presidential election, for which civil society was already preparing to mobilize, and (3) the increasing significance of student activists and organizations and the growing opposition toDéby's rule among the youth. Chadian civil society, however, remains weakly coordinated and severely repressed by the regime. It appeals to a society that is divided into tribes and clans governed by chiefs who are often co-opted by the regime. Such co-optation undermines the potential for civic mobilization: even Zouhoura's father eventually withdrew from the presidential race in favor of Déby with rumors circulating that he received a large sum of money in return. This act shocked the opposition and undermined further mobilization.

17. Key sources

What sources would be good for someone who wants to follow up on details of this case (up to five sources)?

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CHINA

1. Episode summary

In 2-4 sentences, summarize what this mobilization episode was about.

In 2018, a Maoist activist network, which included worker activists, Marxist students, and party retirees, attempted to mobilize workers against illegal labor practices at the Jasic Technology factory in Shenzhen. The workers' attempt to form a union was eventually blocked by the company and state authorities. The students organized on campuses and traveled from other regions to Shenzhen; the retirees protested in support of the detained workers. Many of them were eventually arrested. Most detainees were released within a few days; several received prison sentences. The activities of many students involved were closely monitored by their universities after the campaign. The Jasic mobilization was a rare case of an alliance between workers and students, but its further growth was hindered by the emphasis on ideology at the expense of building organizational structures as well as by the state authorities' swift repression.

2. Dates, duration, and dynamics of the mobilization episode

What were the dates that mark the start, end, and scale-up (if any) of this episode? How long was the active phase of the mobilization? Can the mobilization episode be divided into stages? If yes, provide a brief (1-3 sentences) characteristic of each stage.

The mobilization episode started at a plant belonging to Jasic Technology—a company publicly traded on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and engaged primarily in manufacturing welding equipment. In mid-2017, several workers whom some reports connect to a network of Maoist organizations brought complaints about labor conditions to the local labor bureau and succeeded in partially rolling back some of the company's policies. In May 2018, they continued with their effort to influence the company through the labor bureau. This time, they were dissatisfied with the company's response and launched a unionization drive after seeking advice from the district-level unit of the government-controlled All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU). They managed to collect the signatures of several dozen of their coworkers in support of their petitions in forming a union.

In early July, the company began putting pressure on the worker activists, reassigning them to new roles that would limit their contact with other workers, physically harassing them, and finally firing them. The activists considered their dismissals illegal and attempted to show up for work and enter the factory, at which point they were arrested.

The arrest of the workers prompted a mobilization campaign among other activists within the Maoist network and some workers who supported the cause. In late July and August, there was an online campaign combined with protests outside the Jasic factory and the police station where the detainees were kept. The most active group among the protest supporters were students from several universities; they were members of Marxist clubs with tight connections to Maoist activists. They mobilized on their campuses, formed the Jasic Worker Support Group, and traveled to Shenzhen to participate in the protest campaign.

On August 24, the police raided the apartment where the students were staying and arrested more than 50 people. Most were released over the next two days, but they remained under close surveillance by their universities. Throughout the campaign, student detentions were also reported in at least five cities. A local labor nongovernmental organization (NGO) representative was also detained, although most people do not think he—or other labor NGO activists—had much of a role if any in the movement. Officials from the local district-level trade union branch who had provided early advice to the workers were detained as well. Some of the detained worker activists ended up receiving prison sentences.

The active phase of the mobilization lasted about three months.

3. Size of mobilization

Provide any information available about the number of participants, their social and/or professional status, the geographic spread of the mobilization, etc.

The mobilization was driven by a network of Maoist organizations whose members included university students and graduates, worker activists, and retired party cadres. There were several dozen in each group

who participated in physical mobilization (for example, protesting on the street): about 50 students, 40 retirees, and several dozen workers. The online campaign, online petitions, and student clubs probably involved hundreds.

4. Episode background

What background facts does the reader need to know about the political and social context of the country to understand this episode?

Labor protest is common in China, but authorities manage to keep it at the local level. Independent labor unions are illegal, but there is a network of labor NGOs that provide some resources to workers to help improve their labor conditions. This mobilization attempt, however, was staged by members of a Maoist network that has existed for years, congregating mostly online and having strong connections with Marxist student clubs in universities. Part of this network worked on implementing a specific strategy of worker mobilization: after graduation, some students took on factory jobs hoping to mobilize workers, though other parts of the Maoist network criticized such methods of political struggle. The mobilization largely left aside existing labor NGOs.

5. Prior mobilization dynamic

What were the characteristics of civic mobilization over the 20 years or so prior to this episode? Were protests a frequent occurrence? Did they tend to focus on different issues than this episode did (e.g., labor conditions)? What was the most recent mobilization prior to this episode? What role did previous protests (successful/unsuccessful; violent/nonviolent) and government responses to those protests play in this mobilization episode? How do the issues of any recent protests relate to this episode's framing of issues?

Labor protest is common in China, but the authorities manage to keep it at the local level. Independent labor unions are illegal; they can only exist within the framework of the ACFTU, which is controlled by the state. There is a network of labor NGOs, which provide resources for workers and engage in informal collective bargaining. This NGO network experienced a crackdown after 2010 when car factories in the Pearl River Delta experienced a chain of industrial actions that went nationwide.

6. Trigger

What was the trigger for this mobilization episode (state response to an exogenous shock? Electoral or constitutional power grab? An unpopular policy?)

Illegal labor practices at the Jasic Technology factory was the trigger.

7. Framing

What was the framing of this trigger, grievances, and demands during the episode? What was the role of different mobilization actors in shaping the framing? How/did the framing of why people should mobilize change over time? How did the framing help or hinder scaling up of the mobilization?

The framing the activists put forward was very much anticapitalist and based on the ideas of Lenin and Mao. These ideas were developed on Maoist discussion platforms, such as the website Utopia, and criticized the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for catering to capitalist forces instead of defending workers' interests. The framing used Maoist and Leninist ideologies to demand a labor union and address a wide range of workplace grievances, such as inflexible work schedules, late compensation for overtime work, and excessive and unreasonable fines. The activists' demands superficially dovetailed with some rhetoric from the administration of Xi Jinping, state president and CCP leader. Using labor rights and workplace grievances as reasons for mobilization is not new, but framing it in Maoist and Leninists terms is.

This framing likely helped the activists reach groups of people who might otherwise not be drawn into a movement. It also may have shielded them initially from reprisals.

Student-worker unity was another important element of the framing.

8. Tactics

What kind of tactics did the movement(s) use? How was the presence or absence of an upward scale shift related to these tactics?

This mobilization was part of a larger strategy by some members of the Maoist network to mobilize workers nationwide. The activists who started this mobilization sought employment at the Jasic factory to start the unrest from inside. This is in line with a tactic used by other activists in China—the "disguised collective action" (see Diana Fu's article), that is, encouraging and training individuals to take public action instead of doing things as an organization.

During the active phase, the activists combined online and offline campaigns. They protested outside Jasic company

buildings and the police station. The students held events on their campuses in support of the campaign. Activists also spread information on their blogs, websites, and forums by posting photos, videos, and their accounts of the events. The students recorded a video explaining why they came to support the workers. Several open letters, including those to Chinese authorities, were published throughout the campaign. The movement was able to receive support from foreign media and overseas social media channels such as Facebook and Twitter to spread word of and scale up their struggle. These tactics made sure this unrest received attention despite the government's strict censorship and internet control. Organizing both online and on campuses as well as the existing networks in which the activists were embedded likely helped shift the struggle onto a broader plane.

9. Actors: organizations

What powerful institutions, movements or parties were engaged in this mobilization episode (unions, religious organizations, opposition parties)? What are the key facts about any formal and informal organizations that joined or supported the mobilization?

The protest was coordinated by a Maoist network, which included Communist party members and retirees, students, and worker activists.

The network was part of a broader movement that had taken a variety of forms over the years: experiments with rural cooperatives, support for left-populist Chongqing mayor Bo Xilai, reading groups, and a bookstore, among others. There were disagreements within this network about the advisability of launching such a high-profile confrontation. But part of the network engaged in a specific strategy of worker mobilization: after graduation, some students took on factory jobs hoping to mobilize the workers. This strategy was behind the Jasic mobilization.

10. Actors: leaders

What were the characteristics of the leader(s), prominent activists, and public figures who participated in the mobilization? What was their professional and social (ethnic/religious/class) background? What kinds of networks did they belong to and mobilize? Where did they get their organizing skills?

Two types of leaders are mentioned in the reports: leftist students, some of whom became factory workers, and worker activists. All of them had at least some prior history of organizing workers or residents of a particular area to voice their grievances. The students, in particular, had held events for workers employed on their campuses. Some of that organizing activity had been successful in receiving concessions from authorities. One of the more prominent student leaders had been previously active in China's #MeToo movement.

11. Actors: civil society

What was the role, if any, of local human rights and civil society organizations and movements?

The Maoist network that staged this mobilization attempt may be considered a civil society organization of a kind. However, this organization does not operate in a liberal-democratic framework but in a communist one.

Labor NGOs, which are relatively common in China, have mostly remained uninvolved in this mobilization. Some authors suggest that the Maoist activists did not see much space for organizations operating within the traditional human rights framework in what the activists saw as a communist revolutionary movement.

12. Actors: youth

What was the role, if any, of youth organizations (formal or informal)?

Students and younger workers were the backbone of this mobilization, although it was not limited to them as retirees also joined the protests. University students, especially those who are club members of Marxism study groups, played a formal and important role in this struggle. They comprised the younger generation of Maoists who insisted on a more active and confrontational strategy. More than 50 students acted in solidarity with the Jasic workers.

This is in sharp contrast to what happened in Tiananmen Square in 1989 when, at the very beginning of the protests, intellectuals and students cordoned themselves off from the workers.

13. Actors: diaspora

What was the role of diaspora groups?

The diaspora involvement in the Jasic campaign was minimal. Sympathy protests were held in Hong Kong. Diaspora scholars, alongside others, coordinated a series of international responses to the protest: a complaint to the International Labor Organization (ILO), a United Nations agency, to which China was forced to formally respond; Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International highlighted the case; Cornell University cut its ties with a program at a partner university (Renmin) over Jasic; and

leftist scholars from abroad made statements, which were collected on a website, in support of the workers.

14. Actors: international organizations

What was the role of INGOs/IGOs?

Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International issued statements calling for an immediate release of the detained activists. The case was also brought to the ILO, and China was forced to formally respond.

15. Media and IT technologies

What media or IT technologies helped the mobilization to scale up (if at all)?

The online campaign was an important part of the mobilization attempt. Hundreds of Chinese university students penned open letters on social media in support of the workers. Activists effectively utilized online videos and had strong online branding—a shared slogan ("solidarity is power") and image (a black-and-white picture of the workers). After being detained, some students were apparently forced to tape confession videos that were shown to others. But after being released from detention, some also taped videos describing their mistreatment.

The campaign was subject to censorship online. Internet platforms were instructed not to report on the sentencing of activists. The censors also scrubbed posts about police detentions and Jasic workers and shut down chat groups circulating information about student activists. Nevertheless, Jasic campaign materials appeared outside China's Great Firewall on platforms like Twitter and YouTube.

Foreign reporters and media closely followed the event.

16. Precursors summary

[for positive cases that scaled up] In your analysis, what are the main precursors that explain how or why people took to the streets in large numbers at this time and not on other occasions? Are there any that are not already listed here that led to the upward scale shift?
[for negative cases that did not scale up] In your analysis, what are the main factors that explain why the mobilization did not scale up despite the attempts to do so? Are there any factors not already listed here that prevented the upward scale shift?

Two factors contributed to the failure of this mobilization to scale up. First, the focus of the protesters' strategy was the ideological struggle and desire to inspire a proletarian uprising rather than listening to the workers themselves and building up their organizational capacity. The existing labor NGOs were almost completely sidelined. Second, the Chinese government always suppressed any attempts to scale up a mobilization or build cross-group alliances. The Jasic case was unusual as it was a rare attempt to build a cross-group alliance, and the Chinese government's reaction was swift and effective: repression of the activists and censorship online kept the mobilization from growing further.

17. Key sources

What sources would be good for someone who wants to follow up on details of this case (up to five sources)?

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CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE)

1. Episode summary

In 2-4 sentences, summarize what this mobilization episode was about.

The mobilization happened because of the attempt of sitting president Denis Sassou Nguesso to amend the constitution to extend term limits. The protests attracted at least 30,000 people and were the largest since 1997. A coalition of civil society organizations and opposition parties called the Initiative for Democracy in Congo-Republican Front for the Respect of Constitutional Order and Democratic Change (IDC-FROCAD) played an important role in the mobilization along with a wide grassroots effort. This mobilization transcended the north-south political divide in the country. But control over the military, clientelism, and social fears of an armed conflict allowed the president to withstand the challenge and stay in power.

2. Dates, duration, and dynamics of the mobilization episode

What were the dates that mark the start, end, and scale-up (if any) of this episode? How long was the active phase of the mobilization? Can the mobilization episode be divided into stages? If yes, provide a brief (1-3 sentences) characteristic of each stage.

Tension over the potential constitutional referendum, which would increase the age limit for the president and extend the number of terms a president can serve, had been growing for a few years. Sassou Nguesso's allies began to sow the seeds for a referendum as early as 2011. Around the same time, dissidents began returning to Brazzaville to prepare for a potential revolution. In 2014, activist Andrea Ngombet founded an organization called #SassouFit, which sounds similar to "ça suffit" (that's enough) in French. In his year-end address on December 31, 2014, Sassou Nguesso signaled that the referendum was likely. Less than a month after that, on January 19, 2015, Charles Zacharie Bowao, an opposition politician and a university professor, wrote an open letter to Sassou Nguesso calling for the constitution not to be changed. On February 5, a range of civil society organizations and opposition parties launched FROCAD.

The active phase of the mobilization episode began on September 27, 2015, five days after the referendum was announced for October 25, with a protest that attracted about 30,000 people. An online campaign with the hashtag #SassouFit was developing in parallel. The protests continued through at least October 20–21 and then subsided between late October and February 2016 as the opposition regrouped. The opposition had a sense that the October 2015 referendum was the likely moment for a revolution, and after it did not happen, resignation set in.

The most active phase lasted for about a month, from September 27 through October 21, 2015.

3. Size of mobilization

Provide any information available about the number of participants, their social and/or professional status, the geographic spread of the mobilization, etc.

The mobilization numbered at least 30,000, or "tens of thousands," by some estimates. The protests were concentrated in the capital of Brazzaville and in the coastal oil hub of Pointe-Noire, but there was opposition across the country, including in the northern regions, which are generally considered the regime's constituency. Youths drove the protests, but many older people joined them too.

4. Episode background

What background facts does the reader need to know about the political and social context of the country to understand this episode?

In the 1990s, Congo had a civil war sustained by politicized ethnic differences. The current president, Sassou Nguesso, reclaimed power over the country in 1997 and was supported by France and the regime in Angola. Rival groups continued fighting, though, at least through 2003. Sassou Nguesso claimed to have won the 2002 election with roughly 80 percent of the vote; at the time, most of the opposition was still in exile. Sassou Nguesso won by a large margin the 2009 presidential election, but it was boycotted by the main opposition candidates. The long-term ethnic-based political and military rivalries partially drove the 2015 mobilization episode. At the same time, it was distinctive for how many northerners opposed the "constitutional coup," as many called it.

The regime's geographic base of support became much more circumscribed to a 50- to 75-mile radius around Oyo, Sassou Nguesso's native village, in Cuvette. The 2015 referendum broke the broader northern coalition that brought him back to power in 1997.

The country is plagued by corruption and poverty. Sixty-seven percent of youths is unemployed.

5. Prior mobilization dynamic

What were the characteristics of civic mobilization over the 20 years or so prior to this episode? Were protests a frequent occurrence? Did they tend to focus on different issues than this episode did (e.g., labor conditions)? What was the most recent mobilization prior to this episode? What role did previous protests (successful/unsuccessful; violent/nonviolent) and government responses to those protests play in this mobilization episode? How do the issues of any recent protests relate to this episode's framing of issues?

Protests have occasionally emerged in the years since 1997, especially around elections. They have focused on various socioeconomic issues (for example, student stipends or lapsed social security payments), but the subtext to each has always been Sassou Nguesso's corruption and human rights abuses.

6. Trigger

What was the trigger for this mobilization episode (state response to an exogenous shock? Electoral or constitutional power grab? An unpopular policy?)

The trigger was the current president's announcement of the referendum on constitutional amendments, which would allow him to run for a third term.

7. Framing

What was the framing of this trigger, grievances, and demands during the episode? What was the role of different mobilization actors in shaping the framing? How/did the framing of why people should mobilize change over time? How did the framing help or hinder scaling up of the mobilization?

The framing seems to be simple and consistent: the protest leaders accused the president of staging a "constitutional coup" by trying to change the constitution in order to stay in power for a third term. The online campaign used the hashtag #SassouFit, which sounded similar to "ça suffit" (that's enough) in French.

8. Tactics

What kind of tactics did the movement(s) use? How was the presence or absence of an upward scale shift related to these tactics?

Street protests developed in parallel with the online campaign. The opposition's plan was to get as many people into the streets as possible—and attract as much international attention as possible, including from Western governments—so that Sassou Nguesso would not be able to open fire on all of them. It does not seem, though, that any specific tactics helped the upward scale shift more than the trigger itself.

9. Actors: organizations

What powerful institutions, movements or parties were engaged in this mobilization episode (unions, religious organizations, opposition parties)? What are the key facts about any formal and informal organizations that joined or supported the mobilization?

Two organizations stood out during this mobilization: (1) FROCAD, which was launched on February 5, 2015, by a range of civil society organizations and opposition parties, and (2) the IDC. In August 2015, these organizations merged into IDC-FROCAD.

Although these organizations were important for the mobilization, their role should not be overstated as there was a large grassroots component not connected to these organizations.

10. Actors: leaders

What were the characteristics of the leader(s), prominent activists, and public figures who participated in the mobilization? What was their professional and social (ethnic/religious/class) background? What kinds of networks did they belong to and mobilize? Where did they get their organizing skills?

The leaders of the opposition political parties included defectors from the regime, a general with a strong prodemocracy reputation, and a political heir of a former Congo president (see source Carter, "President Sassou Nguesso Prepares for Final Stage of His Constitutional Coup," for more details).

Onetime Sassou Nguesso allies—especially those of northern extraction—who joined the opposition helped it coalesce and ensured it transcended the north-south divide. This group included Bowao (a northerner), Ngombet (from Cuvette, like Sassou Nguesso), Andre Okombi Salissa, a former Sassou Nguesso minister (from

Plateaux), and Jean-Marie Michel Mokoko (from Cuvette). Some prominent southerners in the opposition included former ministers Claudine Munari (from Bouenza) and Parfait Kolelas (from Pool).

11. Actors: civil society

What was the role, if any, of local human rights and civil society organizations and movements?

Civil society organizations were part of the antiregime coalition including, for example, OCDH (Congolese Observatory for Human Rights) and the Catholic Church, which is dominated by southerners at the leadership level.

Civil society in Congo-Brazzaville, however, was not nearly as strong as in, say, Burkina Faso.

12. Actors: youth

What was the role, if any, of youth organizations (formal or informal)?

Most protesters were young, but it was not an exclusively youth protest.

13. Actors: diaspora

What was the role of diaspora groups?

The diaspora was very engaged in trying to attract the attention of Western governments and to convince them to put pressure on Sassou Nguesso. Some diaspora activists returned to Brazzaville to help organize protests. Ngombet, in Paris, coordinated the social media effort. Others organized meetings at places like the nonprofit National Endowment for Democracy and even a few US congressional offices. The diaspora also organized a series of protests in Paris and Washington, DC. The Paris protests were substantially larger and at one point, blocked the Arc de Triomphe during rush hour.

14. Actors: international organizations

What was the role of INGOs/IGOs?

Amnesty International condemned the use of force against protesters. Generally, though, the international reaction was a profound source of disappointment for the country's opposition. Citizens hoped the international community would intervene and ultimately block the affair. Instead, French president François Hollande at one point said that, Sassou Nguesso, as president, had the "right to consult his people" in a referendum. Even though it was an off-the-cuff remark, which the Élysée Palace walked back after it happened, it damaged the spirit in Congo and was broadcast by Sassou Nguesso's propaganda apparatus.

15. Media and IT technologies

What media or IT technologies helped the mobilization to scale up (if at all)?

The protesters coordinated through internet and mobile technologies. The government cut off internet and text messaging along with the signal for Radio France International (RFI) to disrupt this coordination. The role of the internet, however, should not be overstated. Internet penetration and affordability was not great in Congo at the time, and the mobilization largely developed through traditional in-person communication.

16. Precursors summary

[for positive cases that scaled up] In your analysis, what are the main precursors that explain how or why people took to the streets in large numbers *at this time and not on other occasions*? Are there any that are not already listed here that led to the upward scale shift?
[for negative cases that did not scale up] In your analysis, what are the main precursors that explain why the mobilization did not scale up despite the attempts to do so? Are there any that are not already listed here that prevented the upward scale shift?

The protest seems to have scaled up because of the trigger more than anything else: it was the first time the current president attempted to amend the constitution to be able to run for a third term. The political rivalries were already in place in a country often driven by ethnic divisions, but the previous power arrangements were at least within the previously negotiated constitution. Once the sitting president attempted to violate it, the opposition political parties, together with civil society, mobilized.

17. Key sources

What sources would be good for someone who wants to follow up on details of this case (up to five sources)?

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CUBA

1. Episode summary

In 2-4 sentences, summarize what this mobilization episode was about.

Mass demonstrations broke out all over Cuba in mid-July 2021 amid an economic crisis caused by an inefficient economy, US sanctions, and the COVID-19 pandemic. The crisis led to severe shortages of food and medicine and fueled the societal discontent that had been accumulating for a few years. This discontent was expressed by artists and intellectuals from the San Isidro Movement (MSI) and 27N group. The demonstrations lasted for two days, July 11–12. The government reacted with limited concessions and repression. The online resistance and repression by the regime continued for months, although on a smaller scale.

2. Dates, duration, and dynamics of the mobilization episode

What were the dates that mark the start, end, and scale-up (if any) of this episode? How long was the active phase of the mobilization? Can the mobilization episode be divided into stages? If yes, provide a brief (1-3 sentences) characteristic of each stage.

Cuba has had a resistance movement for decades, but it never attracted as many participants as in 2021. The events related to the 2021 mobilization episode can be divided into two stages: the activities of MSI since its formation in September 2018, and the active phase July 11–12, 2021.

MSI involved artists, journalists, and academics protesting government censorship, in particular, Decree 349, which requires artists to obtain advance permission for public and private exhibitions and performances. In the summer of 2019, its members inspired at least one antigovernment flash mob (people wore the Cuban flag in response to the arrest of an artist who had done that) and participated in or inspired the protests against the high price of internet access. On November 26, 2020, some MSI members were arrested, which triggered a few hundred of their supporters to protest at the Ministry of Culture the next day (this group became known as 27N). Another protest was held in the same place exactly two months after, on January 27, 2021. In February 2021, rappers associated with MSI in collaboration with Cuban artists living in Florida released a song, "Patria y Vida" (Homeland and Life), which became a protest anthem in July 2021. In May, one MSI member who was on a hunger strike was kidnapped and tortured by the authorities.

The active phase of protests started on July 11, 2021, in the small town of San Antonio de los Banos, near Havana, where hundreds of people came out to the streets. Then, the protests spread to Palma Soriano, Santiago de Cuba, Alquízar, and other places in Cuba and abroad (with Cubans living in other countries protesting in solidarity). The next day, some protests continued, but they quickly dwindled because of arrests and disruptions in internet service. During the next few days, there were also counterprotests by government supporters.

3. Size of mobilization

Provide any information available about the number of participants, their social and/or professional status, the geographic spread of the mobilization, etc.

According to the website of the nonprofit Proyecto Inventario (Inventory Project), protests took place in about 60 locations in Cuba. In Havana, several thousand people demonstrated. Experts noted that this was the largest protest in the country since the 1959 revolution. Many protesters were young, but the social background of the protesters was very diverse: students, entrepreneurs, government employees, and activists from religious and local communities.

4. Episode background

What background facts does the reader need to know about the political and social context of the country to understand this episode?

Cuba has had a communist regime with a mostly planned economy since 1959. The current economic crisis is the second largest economic crisis in its history. The first one happened in the early 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union and its economic assistance. Starting in 2003, though, with the help of oil-rich Venezuela, the Cuban economy did better than in the 1990s.

The Cuban government has consistently blamed "US imperialism" for the country's problems in trying to make

the population rally around the flag. It has been at least partially successful, especially with the older generation.

In 2020–21, several factors coincided to lead to severe shortages of food and medicine and a decrease of trust in the government.

First, after a period of improved relations with the United States during the Barack Obama administration, the Donald Trump administration in 2017 imposed hundreds of sanctions on Cuba. The earlier investment of the Cuban government into the tourist industry, which collapsed more than 10 times under sanctions, was accompanied by a significant decrease in spending on education and health care.

Second, the COVID-19 pandemic led to a further reduction of tourism and significant reductions in remittances and other international income while putting extreme pressures on the already strained health care system. Cubans, used to a relatively well-functioning health care system, were shocked by COVID deaths and blamed the government for lying about case numbers.

Third, trust in the government was also undermined by the creation of military-controlled food stores amid the pandemic. These stores sold food only in foreign currency known as moneda libremente convertible (MLC, or freely convertible currency), which in practice meant that only foreigners (usually relatives of Cubans living abroad) could purchase food for their family members, while those who did not have relatives abroad could only browse windows full of food items. Elimination of another currency, the Cuban convertible peso (CUC), led to a 50 percent price inflation over one month and 300 percent inflation over the course of a few months.

In 2021, Cuba experienced severe electricity outages as well as food and medicine shortages, with people standing in line for many hours to buy basic supplies, pharmacies and hospitals having no basic medicines to treat patients, and the government implementing food rationing and persecuting those who tried to resell food on the gray market.

It is also important to note that in the last few years, before and during the COVID-19 pandemic, Cuba saw a sharp increase in internet accessibility and use. Facebook and Telegram became spaces where people could speak without fear of prosecution and coordinate grassroots relief efforts.

5. Prior mobilization dynamic

What were the characteristics of civic mobilization over the 20 years or so prior to this episode? Were protests a frequent occurrence? Did they tend to focus on different issues than this episode did (e.g., labor conditions)? What was the most recent mobilization prior to this episode? What role did previous protests (successful/unsuccessful; violent/nonviolent) and government responses to those protests play in this mobilization episode? How do the issues of any recent protests relate to this episode's framing of issues?

The last largest protest in the country happened in 1994, also amid an economic crisis.

Cuba has had for decades a dissident/human rights movement, which rather consistently uses the principles of nonviolent resistance to oppose the communist regime. The main dissident organizations and initiatives include the following:

a. The Christian Liberation Movement (MCL) was founded in 1987 by Oswaldo Payá. The movement is famous for its Varela Project, a petition to call a referendum on safeguarding freedom of speech and assembly, allowing private business ownership, and ending one-party rule. In 2002–03, MCL collected over 25,000 signatures under this petition.

b. Opposition Movement for a New Republic (Movimiento Opositor para una Nueva República, or MONR) was founded in 2002. It offers monthly workshops in different parks in 15 municipalities of Havana, where they inform citizens of their rights. It also works to help political prisoners.

c. Ladies in White (Damas de Blanco) is a women's movement demanding the release of political prisoners. It emerged after the Black Spring of 2003 when 75 dissidents were jailed. That happened after the Río Cristal meeting where dissidents developed a strategy proposing a regime transition.

d. The Patriotic Union of Cuba (Unión Patriótica de Cuba, or UNPACU), is an organization founded in 2011 by José Ferrer, one of the 75 dissidents imprisoned in 2003. This organization has been developing the opposition agenda, including through regular, small-scale street protests.

In the last few years before the 2021 mobilization, there were several protests that were limited in size and did not have explicit political claims:

a. In August 2017, private entrepreneurs threatened the government with a strike after it refused to consider their reform proposals, and the government conceded.

b. In April 2019, animal rights activists held a rally allowed by the authorities.

c. In May 2019, the LGBT+ community protested the cancellation of their yearly parade. The protest was dispersed by the authorities, and several activists were detained.

d. In May 2019, the community of gamers who congregated on clandestine network SNET (for Street Network) protested governmental restrictions of a private intranet that they used for gaming. The government ultimately allowed it under the supervision of state-run youth computer clubs.

Artists, some of whom would later become members of MSI, organized small protests as early as 2008 (for example, the March for Nonviolence [Marcha por la no violencia]). They did not begin protesting more actively, however, until about 2016 when many journalists and artists moved from the government sector to the private one. Since 2016, Cuba experienced a boom in independent journalism and art.

6. Trigger

What was the trigger for this mobilization episode (state response to an exogenous shock? Electoral or constitutional power grab? An unpopular policy?)

Severe food and medicine shortages and electricity outages amid an economic crisis were triggers.

7. Framing

What was the framing of this trigger, grievances, and demands during the episode? What was the role of different mobilization actors in shaping the framing? How/did the framing of why people should mobilize change over time? How did the framing help or hinder scaling up of the mobilization?

The protesters' grievances related to food and medicine shortages and power outages quickly became linked to the larger resistance framework and the symbols developed earlier by MSI and 27N, especially the song "Patria y Vida," released by MSI rappers. This song rethinks the patriotism promoted by the Cuban revolution and its motto, "Patria o muerte" (Country or Death). It blames people's suffering on the regime and its lies and propaganda; it suggests that, instead of sacrificing everything for the revolution, people should build the country they want.

This kind of framing is different from the older one, which is also often present in Cuban art both inside the country and abroad—a framing focused on US imperialism. The imperialist framing does not have much antiregime potential since the regime also uses it to maintain the effect of rallying around the flag.

One reason the framing suggested by MSI resonated with the population is generational change: the younger generations of Cubans are not nearly as loyal to revolutionary ideals as the older generations, and they more readily connect socioeconomic problems with the failure of the regime.

8. Tactics

What kind of tactics did the movement(s) use? How was the presence or absence of an upward scale shift related to these tactics?

The upward scale shift happened largely without a directed effort by a leader or organization. However, to the degree that MSI and other activists inspired previous resistance acts, protesters used the advantages of a newly available mobile internet and called for people to join relatively low-cost Twitter campaigns or Instagram flash mobs (for example, by posting a picture of themselves wrapped in a flag).

9. Actors: organizations

What powerful institutions, movements or parties were engaged in this mobilization episode (unions, religious organizations, opposition parties)? What are the key facts about any formal and informal organizations that joined or supported the mobilization?

Many civil society and political opposition organizations took part in the mobilization (for example, UNPACU, Ladies in White, MONR), but the artistic community, especially MSI and 27N members, took the lead. They consisted mainly of artists, journalists, and academics of the younger generation, which is different from the older generation of dissidents. This older generation had low public recognition and had internal conflicts. Having mentioned these groups, it is still important to remember that the protests were largely leaderless, and economic grievances were extremely important.

10. Actors: leaders

What were the characteristics of the leader(s), prominent activists, and public figures who participated in the mobilization? What was their professional and social (ethnic/religious/class) background? What kinds of

networks did they belong to and mobilize? Where did they get their organizing skills?

Many civil society and political opposition organizations took part in the mobilization (for example, UNPACU, Ladies in White, MONR), but the artistic community, especially MSI and 27N members, took the lead. They consisted mainly of artists, journalists, and academics of the younger generation, which is different from the older generation of dissidents. This older generation had low public recognition and had internal conflicts. Having mentioned these groups, it is still important to remember that the protests were largely leaderless, and economic grievances were extremely important.

11. Actors: civil society

What was the role, if any, of local human rights and civil society organizations and movements?

Many civil society and political opposition organizations took part in the mobilization (for example, UNPACU, Ladies in White, MONR), but the artistic community, especially MSI and 27N members, took the lead. They consisted mainly of artists, journalists, and academics of the younger generation, which is different from the older generation of dissidents. This older generation had low public recognition and had internal conflicts. Having mentioned these groups, it is still important to remember that the protests were largely leaderless, and economic grievances were extremely important.

12. Actors: youth

What was the role, if any, of youth organizations (formal or informal)?

Youths played the key role in the protests. Most street protesters were young. Youths were also a lot more involved in social networks and technology, which was crucial for the mobilization spread. Also, the younger generation of activists began the resistance campaign and developed the symbolic framework.

13. Actors: diaspora

What was the role of diaspora groups?

The recent developments in communication technology and internet access in Cuba helped develop collaboration between in-country activists and the diaspora. The diaspora in Spain, Uruguay, Brazil became better organized. Two members of the diaspora helped the MSI rappers produce the video for the song that became the anthem of the protests. During the protests, the diaspora supported them and increased their publicity around the world. Some diaspora members called for US military intervention.

14. Actors: international organizations

What was the role of INGOs/IGOs?

Human Rights Watch as well as Western governments released public statements in support of Cuban protesters.

15. Media and IT technologies

What media or IT technologies helped the mobilization to scale up (if at all)?

The recent expansion of mobile internet played a key role in scaling up the mobilization. Regular internet began expanding in 2008, but the expansion was mostly limited to the government elite and vetting professionals. In December 2018, third-generation (3G) mobile service was introduced. By July 2019, 2.2 million Cubans out of a total population of 11 million had access to 3G despite a very high price ($7 a month with the median monthly income being $44). By July 2021, more than 4 million people (35 percent to 40 percent of the population) had 3G access.

16. Precursors summary

[for positive cases that scaled up] In your analysis, what are the main precursors that explain how or why people took to the streets in large numbers at this time and not on other occasions? Are there any that are not already listed here that led to the upward scale shift?
[for negative cases that did not scale up] In your analysis, what are the main factors that explain why the mobilization did not scale up despite the attempts to do so? Are there any factors not already listed here that prevented the upward scale shift?

A combination of several causes resulted in the upward scale shift: (1) the recent expansion of mobile internet and smartphone ownership, which allowed people to record videos from different locations and share them on social media; (2) the economic crisis amid the pandemic, which overwhelmed a weak and inefficient economy; and (3) the activism of the MSI, which provided the protests with a symbolic framework.

17. Key sources

What sources would be good for someone who wants to follow up on details of this case (up to five sources)?

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Sánchez-Calderón, George. "The San Isidro Artists in Cuba Will Carry Their Fearlessness into 2021 | Opinion." *Miami Herald*. Accessed November 12, 2021. https://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/op-ed/article248157065.html.

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DJIBOUTI

1. Episode summary

In 2-4 sentences, summarize what this mobilization episode was about.

Amid popular discontent against Ismail Omar Guelleh's corrupt and authoritarian regime, a Djibouti air force pilot, Lieutenant Fouad Youssouf Ali, fled to Ethiopia on March 27, 2020. Before Ali fled, a diaspora member had released a video of Ali alleging corruption and clan-based discrimination by the air force commander (with the consent of the regime) and calling for a revolt against the government. On April 7, he was arrested in Ethiopia and deported a few days later to Djibouti, where he was charged with "provoking citizens to arm themselves against the authority of the State, provoking the military to disobedience, stealing of a military plane, [and] intelligence with a foreign power." On June 3, Ali released a video from prison in which he showed that he had been subject to degrading treatment, sparking public outcry and protests on subsequent days in the capital of Djibouti City, including in Balbala, on the outskirts of the city, and in Ali Sabieh, the second-largest city. A cycle of protests related to his detention carried on mainly through July 2020.

The authorities never authorize peaceful demonstrations and heavily deploy security forces to disperse them. In Ali Sabieh and even Djibouti City, security forces used live ammunition. They arrested hundreds of protesters and detained dozens of them, including three journalists for Paris-based Voice of Djibouti, (LVD). The public demonstrations continued throughout June and July, and even August saw some protests.

2. Dates, duration, and dynamics of the mobilization episode

What were the dates that mark the start, end, and scale-up (if any) of this episode? How long was the active phase of the mobilization? Can the mobilization episode be divided into stages? If yes, provide a brief (1-3 sentences) characteristic of each stage.

The mobilization episode took place in March through July 2020 mainly. Opposition members and some civil society activists made efforts to scale up the mobilization, mainly after Fouad Youssouf Ali released his video from prison. Aware of widespread popular discontent with the authorities, the opposition tried to move the protests toward an uprising against the regime. The strategy included an effort to alert international actors, notably through social media. But although the episode got a significant amount of outside attention, the regime's heavy-handed crackdown thwarted further scaling up. Notable public demonstrations took place on Monday, June 8; Friday, June 12; Monday, June 22; and Thursday, July 23, 2020.

3. Size of mobilization

Provide any information available about the number of participants, their social and/or professional status, the geographic spread of the mobilization, etc.

Demonstrators in street protests numbered in the thousands and were deliberately organized in several locations at the same time, particularly in Djibouti City, with protesters in Balbala, on the city outskirts, in the hope that the security deployment would be stretched thin and less heavily present in each place. Protesters gathered in the hundreds at each location in June and July. Additional information about some protests was not available because they were not covered—there is a lack of journalists and no authorized independent media. The locations of demonstrations were not publicly announced, but protesters were advised through word of mouth to protest in their respective neighborhoods. The protesters were mainly from the poor and middle classes. Protesters were youth, unemployed people, ordinary mothers, opposition members and supporters, and others. The higher social class (senior civil servants, private firms' senior executives, and elite business people) rarely took part in the protests for fear of the authorities' reprisals, but many of them discreetly supported the demonstrations. In the course of that period, hundreds of people were arrested at protests, including journalists covering the events.

4. Episode background

What background facts does the reader need to know about the political and social context of the country to understand this episode?

Protests are routinely and violently dispersed. This current regime is one of the hardest of the hard authoritarian

regimes in terms of civil liberties. It is one of the most corrupt, too, according to a report released by the International Federation for Human Rights on August 9, 2006: "Djibouti is a rich country, but the Djiboutian people are poor" ("Djibouti: Defending economic and social rights comes at too high a price," August 9, 2006, https://www.fidh.org/en/region/Africa/djibouti/Djibouti-Defending-economic-and). Although opposition parties exist, they are stifled and cannot work normally, and only a few less significant opposition parties are legally recognized. The last time a significant opposition party took part in elections was in February 2013. Its victory was denied by the regime, which only recognized 10 opposition National Assembly members, who were then further undermined by being placed under an umbrella coalition. This massive rigging sparked a post-electoral crisis. Opposition protests lasted through 2013 and 2014 before ending up in a political agreement signed December 30, 2014, by the government and the opposition. The latter accepted the 10 seats and entered the National Assembly for the first time since independence, in 1977, in exchange for a government promise of democratic reforms, such as an Independent National Electoral Commission made up of half opposition members and half regime members, chaired by an independent authority. However, President Guelleh did not implement the democratic reforms, leading to an electoral boycott by the opposition. (The president won his fifth term in 2021 with 97.30 percent of the vote). With a regime that does not hesitate to kill protesters, no independent news outlets inside the country, and the de facto impossibility of operating most kinds of civil service organizations (CSO), the opposition is largely dealt with by authorities through violence and repression.

5. Prior mobilization dynamic

What were the characteristics of civic mobilization over the 20 years or so prior to this episode? Were protests a frequent occurrence? Did they tend to focus on different issues than this episode did (e.g., labor conditions)? What was the most recent mobilization prior to this episode? What role did previous protests (successful/unsuccessful; violent/nonviolent) and government responses to those protests play in this mobilization episode? How do the issues of any recent protests relate to this episode's framing of issues?

In the context of Djibouti, it is difficult to mobilize civic actors and citizens. However, Djiboutians try to do so when and how they can, whether it is over economic issues (youth unemployment, salaries, food prices), or political issues. The two most significant episodes in the 20 years prior to this mobilization episode occurred on February 18, 2011, and in 2013–14. In February 2011, the opposition decided to build upon the Arab Spring—Djibouti has old links with the Arab World and is a member of the Arab League—and held a massive prodemocracy gathering in Djibouti City. In the afternoon of February 18, 2011, thousands of people came together on Nasser Avenue to call for democratic change. The gathering was violently dispersed, hundreds of protesters were arrested, and no political change came out of it. In 2013–14, protests started after massive electoral rigging in the February 22, 2013, parliamentary elections. The protesters held up against regime violence for a fairly long time, forcing President Guelleh to seek a political agreement with the opposition.

6. Trigger

What was the trigger for this mobilization episode (state response to an exogenous shock? Electoral or constitutional power grab? An unpopular policy?)

On June 3, 2020, Dijbouti air force pilot Lieutenant Fouad Youssouf Ali—who had exposed government corruption and clan-based discrimination, fled the country, and subsequently was deported back to Djibouti and imprisoned—released a video from prison in which he showed he had been subjected to degrading treatment. Moral outrage over his treatment combined with long-standing and widespread public discontent sparked public outcry and civic mobilization.

7. Framing

What was the framing of this trigger, grievances, and demands during the episode? What was the role of different mobilization actors in shaping the framing? How/did the framing of why people should mobilize change over time? How did the framing help or hinder scaling up of the mobilization?

The regime has been seen for years as unable to meet the expectations of the population, whether in social and economic areas or in democracy and the rule of law. Bad governance, corruption, nondemocratic practices and violence-based interactions with the Djiboutian people are blamed on the authorities. "We are against injustice, we demand justice" were among the words loudly repeated by protesters in this episode, as they had also framed the protests in 2013–14. They protested against injustice in every area, demanding justice in every area for everyone, not only for Fouad Youssouf Ali.

The protests occurred amid widespread popular discontent against a regime largely seen as authoritarian,

corrupt, and unable to meet popular expectations. The regime's wrongdoings are perceived as a violation of the promise of a democratic and inclusive society able to deliver on needs in every area: education, health care, employment, housing, energy, clean water, respect for human rights and liberties, and affordable costs of living.

Aware of the prior popular discontent against the regime, opposition actors and some civil society activists decided to reframe and scale up the mobilization episode toward political change. That effort helped the protests, especially in the early days, but the scaling up did not gain enough momentum over time due to the regime's violent crackdown.

8. Tactics

What kind of tactics did the movement(s) use? How was the presence or absence of an upward scale shift related to these tactics?

Protests were deliberately organized in several locations at the same time in the hope that the security deployment would be stretched and less heavily present in each location. The locations of demonstrations were not publicly announced, but the protesters were advised through word of mouth to protest in their respective neighborhoods. Youths led much of the door-to-door activity. The strategy of more formal organizations and journalists included the alerting of international actors, notably through social media. But although the episode got a significant amount of outside attention, the regime's heavy-handed crackdown thwarted further scaling up.

9. Actors: organizations

What powerful institutions, movements or parties were engaged in this mobilization episode (unions, religious organizations, opposition parties)? What are the key facts about any formal and informal organizations that joined or supported the mobilization?

Opposition parties such as the Movement for Democratic Renewal and Development (MRD), some religious leaders close to the opposition, and some human rights activists of the banned Djiboutian Human Rights League (LDDH) were engaged in this episode. La Voix de Djibouti journalists helpfully covered the mobilization.

The regime's predatory practices and clan-based discrimination had affected many in the military, who were angered by the detention and mistreatment of Fouad Youssouf Ali. The opposition and civic actors hoped that these discontented members of the military would side with the protesters, but only two of them publicly joined the mobilization. A noncommissioned female officer of the Djiboutian Republican Guard, Deka Issa Douhour, publicly resigned from the military on June 5 in support of Ali and the protesters. The next day, on June 6, a male noncommissioned officer of the army, Moustapha Aden Chireh, did the same. Douhour was imprisoned on June 12, and protesters subsequently rallied around her as well. But no others from the military publicly showed their support for Ali and the protests.

10. Actors: leaders

What were the characteristics of the leader(s), prominent activists, and public figures who participated in the mobilization? What was their professional and social (ethnic/religious/class) background? What kinds of networks did they belong to and mobilize? Where did they get their organizing skills?

Leaders and members of opposition parties such as MRD and Movement for Development and Liberty (Mouvement pour le Développement et la Liberté, or MoDeL), human rights activists such as those from the banned LDDH and some religious leaders, as well as LVD journalists were engaged in the mobilization, although all of them were not visible for safety reasons. It was part of the tactics. In this episode, LDDH and its emblematic leader, Zakaria Abdillahi Ali, were involved. This lawyer and human rights activist was active in assisting many arrested protesters and the three detained journalists. He is the most courageous and reliable lawyer when it comes to assisting opposition party members, civil society activists, and journalists in the authoritarian context of Djibouti.

Leaders and members of these organizations are experienced, and some of them have a national audience. A party like MRD has developed over the years ground skills and good mobilization experience. It was founded in 1992 as the Democratic Renewal Party (Parti du Renouveau Democratique, or PRD), had to change its name to MRD following political persecution. MoDeL is younger and was founded in late 2012. Journalists and opposition public figures were the target of arrests.

11. Actors: civil society

What was the role, if any, of local human rights and civil society organizations and movements?

There are two non-recognized (that is, banned or unauthorized by the authorities) human rights organizations: the LDDH and the Djiboutian Observatory for the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights

(Observatoire Djiboutien pour la Promotion de la Démocratie et des Droits Humains, or ODDH). While the LDDH is recognized by human rights international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as the Paris-based International Federation for human rights (FIDR), the LDDH remains banned by the Djiboutian regime. Instead, the authorities recognize a small version of the LDDH. In this episode, the unrecognized LDDH and its emblematic leader, Zakaria Abdillahi Ali, were involved.

12. Actors: youth

What was the role, if any, of youth organizations (formal or informal)?

The youths, whether organized or not, were active on the ground. They were doing door-to-door work when necessary and spearheading the protests on the streets. As an organized group, the MRD Youth Movement (Mouvement des Jeunes du MRD) was involved.

13. Actors: diaspora

What was the role of diaspora groups?

Diaspora groups were active. On social media, they held and shared videos of protests in support of the lieutenant and beyond. La Voix de Djibouti is largely considered to be the only independent Djiboutian broadcaster and is based in France. Their journalists in-country were the target of harassment and arrest for covering the events. While many of the diaspora were acting with established opposition like the MRD, of which they are members or supporters, some of them were acting as non-affiliated.

14. Actors: international organizations

What was the role of INGOs/IGOs?

The episode got more attention than the previous ones from international human rights organizations and foreign governments. International nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) spoke out against Ali's detention and torture, as well as the repression and killing of demonstrators.

15. Media and IT technologies

What media or IT technologies helped the mobilization to scale up (if at all)?

Social media, especially Facebook and WhatsApp, were actively used during the protests. They were used to cover the protests but also to keep in touch with one another. They were used by protesters, LVD journalists, and diaspora supporters of the protests. Attempts by the authorities to restrict internet access through speed reduction or the blocking of accounts and websites were observed. Facebook was the most used channel for messages and to cover the protests. Coverage was done either by LVD journalists, where they were present, the protesters themselves, or by both. This, amid repeated attempts by the regime to undermine internet connections.

16. Precursors summary

[for positive cases that scaled up] In your analysis, what are the main precursors that explain how or why people took to the streets in large numbers at this time and not on other occasions? Are there any that are not already listed here that led to the upward scale shift?
[for negative cases that did not scale up] In your analysis, what are the main factors that explain why the mobilization did not scale up despite the attempts to do so? Are there any factors not already listed here that prevented the upward scale shift?

Given the extreme repression and lack of independent media and civic space, popular mobilization needs some amount of outside support to be successful. A coordinated media and the attention of INGOs/IGOs before and during the mobilization would have been helpful. Despite its hardness towards the population, the regime is fragile and sensitive to outside pressure, especially from world powers, like the United States, that have military bases in Djibouti. The authorities know that these powers, to whom they owe something, have leverage over them. All the more so as the strongman is aging and seen as less able to retain control. Such coordination would help with movement building and galvanize protesters on the ground. For example, during the protests, an American military helicopter flight over the areas where people are protesting may have deterred a violent crackdown. That is an observed fact: when they see such a flight in the sky over their heads, the security forces scale down or refrain from violence against protesters.

17. Key sources

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EGYPT

1. Episode summary

In 2-4 sentences, summarize what this mobilization episode was about.

The mobilization consisted of two protests in April 2016 in multiple Egyptian cities against President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi's decision to return control over two islands in the Red Sea to Saudi Arabia. The islands were symbolically important for Egyptians, and many citizens and different political groups in the country, including liberals, leftists, nationalists, and Islamists, saw this move as damaging Egypt's national interests and national pride. The protests were quickly suppressed by the security forces, but the incident undermined Sisi's legitimacy as a nationalist and served as the beginning of a new series of protests after a quiet period since 2013.

2. Dates, duration, and dynamics of the mobilization episode

What were the dates that mark the start, end, and scale-up (if any) of this episode? How long was the active phase of the mobilization? Can the mobilization episode be divided into stages? If yes, provide a brief (1-3 sentences) characteristic of each stage.

The first protest happened on April 15, 2016, a few days after the decision about the islands was announced. Over 1,000 people gathered at the national Journalist Syndicate headquarters in Cairo and a few hundred more in Alexandria. Dozens of activists, including lawyers and journalists, were detained.

The second protest was planned for April 25, which is Sinai Liberation Day in Egypt (the day Israeli forces withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula in 1982). The security forces arrested hundreds of activists in Cairo in the days before and during the protest. There was a heavy police presence at the Journalist Syndicate, and the protesters had to stage several smaller protests in different parts of the city. Many of the arrested were subsequently given prison sentences and big fines.

The active street protest phase lasted about two weeks. After the crackdown by authorities, the activists moved their struggle to the courts, suing the government over its decision on the islands—a process that lasted another two years, until June 2017. Two separate rulings—one by the State Council, a court that considers litigation between the state and individual citizens, and another by the Supreme Administrative Court, a court where citizens can challenge government executive decisions—found against the government. The government responded by obtaining a ruling in its favor from a lower-level magistrate's court and claiming that that was sufficient for proceeding with transfer of the islands to Saudi control. The legal battle then moved to the Supreme Constitutional Court, which overruled all three previous rulings and decided that the government's agreement with Saudi Arabia could not be challenged in a court of law, thus effectively siding with the government. The final decision by the parliament to transfer the islands to Saudi Arabia in June 2017 was met with smaller-scale protests where several people were arrested.

3. Size of mobilization

Provide any information available about the number of participants, their social and/or professional status, the geographic spread of the mobilization, etc.

A few thousand people were involved in the mobilization. Most seemed to be young professionals. People with very different political views participated in these protests: liberals, leftists, young nationalists, and Islamists.

4. Episode background

What background facts does the reader need to know about the political and social context of the country to understand this episode?

This protest was driven by Egyptian nationalism, which has strong roots in the country and has been redefined several times, now being claimed by different political groups.

In the early through mid-20th century, Egypt nationalism was anticolonial (anti-British) and anti-imperialist (anti-Western and anti-American), with the ideas of Pan-Arabism strengthening in the middle of the century. After Egypt made a peace agreement with Israel, nationalism was used to justify the country's breakup with the Arab world.

Sisi's regime based its legitimacy largely on a version of nationalism that combines anti-Western undertones with explicitly anti-Islamist overtones. Sisi's coup toppled

Mohamed Morsi, a Muslim Brotherhood leader, and Sisi's regime waged violent repression against Islamists.

The uninhabited islands in question belonged to Saudi Arabia but had been guarded by Egyptian forces since 1949 under an agreement with Saudi Arabia because of fears Israel might take them over and gain a strategic advantage in the Red Sea. Egyptians, however, got accustomed to thinking of the islands as their territory.

5. Prior mobilization dynamic

What were the characteristics of civic mobilization over the 20 years or so prior to this episode? Were protests a frequent occurrence? Did they tend to focus on different issues than this episode did (e.g., labor conditions)? What was the most recent mobilization prior to this episode? What role did previous protests (successful/unsuccessful; violent/nonviolent) and government responses to those protests play in this mobilization episode? How do the issues of any recent protests relate to this episode's framing of issues?

After the Arab Spring, which resulted in the ousting of President Hosni Mubarak and the election of Morsi, Egypt went through a coup in 2013 led by the military and supported by opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood. General Sisi, though, quickly consolidated power and violently cracked down on protests in the summer of 2013, outlawing the protests altogether in November of that year. Apart from small-scale protests, there were no major mobilizations in the country until this episode took off on April 15, 2016.

6. Trigger

What was the trigger for this mobilization episode (state response to an exogenous shock? Electoral or constitutional power grab? An unpopular policy?)

The trigger for the protest was the decision by President Sisi to return control of two strategically situated islands in the Red Sea to Saudi Arabia, which claimed the islands. For Egyptians, control of the islands symbolized their sovereignty as the islands played an important role in wars on the Sinai Peninsula. Negotiations between the two countries were not public, and the islands' return coincided with a promise by Saudi Arabia to invest large sums of money into the Egyptian economy. The public largely interpreted the decision as selling Egyptian land and sovereignty for money.

7. Framing

What was the framing of this trigger, grievances, and demands during the episode? What was the role of different mobilization actors in shaping the framing? How/did the framing of why people should mobilize change over time? How did the framing help or hinder scaling up of the mobilization?

The framing of the trigger (returning control of the two Red Sea islands) was primarily nationalist as it was seen as selling Egyptian land and sovereignty for money. Very quickly, though, the general antiregime sentiment, which was a mixture of economic and political grievances, was added to the issue of the islands, and the protesters chanted, "Down with the military rule!" and "The people demand the fall of the regime!" Since Sisi's legitimacy was largely based on nationalism, the islands issue directly undermined it.

8. Tactics

What kind of tactics did the movement(s) use? How was the presence or absence of an upward scale shift related to these tactics?

Public protest combined with a long legal challenge were the main tactics used in this mobilization episode.

9. Actors: organizations

What powerful institutions, movements or parties were engaged in this mobilization episode (unions, religious organizations, opposition parties)? What are the key facts about any formal and informal organizations that joined or supported the mobilization?

The mobilization was driven primarily by political activists from different groups, such as nationalist and youth movements (for example, Tamarod, April 6, Revolutionary Socialists), as well as leaders and members of leftist (Socialist Party), liberal (Dustur), Nasserist (Karama), and progressive Islamist (Strong Egypt) parties. Many of these groups had been adversaries but united to defend the people's sovereignty over their homeland. It is also important to note that due to increased repression of the opposition since 2013, these organizations almost ceased their activities as organizations, although personal networks stayed in place. Their leaders participated in the 2016 protests in their personal capacities rather than in the name of their organizations.

10. Actors: leaders

What were the characteristics of the leader(s), prominent activists, and public figures who participated in the mobilization? What was their professional and social (ethnic/religious/class) background? What kinds of networks did they belong to and mobilize? Where did they get their organizing skills?

The mobilization was driven primarily by political activists from different groups, such as nationalist and youth movements (for example, Tamarod, April 6, Revolutionary Socialists), as well as leaders and members of leftist (Socialist Party), liberal (Dustur), Nasserist (Karama), and progressive Islamist (Strong Egypt) parties. The leaders of these organizations participated in their personal capacities rather than representing their organizations, which ceased most activities after the regime's crackdown in 2013. The most media-prominent of those leaders were lawyer and former presidential candidate Khaled Ali and member of Parliament and film director Khaled Youssif.

11. Actors: civil society

What was the role, if any, of local human rights and civil society organizations and movements?

The civil society did not seem to play a significant role in the mobilization, but they criticized the subsequent arrests and may have helped those who were arrested.

12. Actors: youth

What was the role, if any, of youth organizations (formal or informal)?

The revolutionary youth movements (for example, April 6, Revolutionary Socialists) were mentioned as part of the coalition leading the protest. Most protesters seemed to be professionals, that is, not students. Students have not been mentioned at all.

13. Actors: diaspora

What was the role of diaspora groups?

The diaspora did not play a significant role in this mobilization. It did help to put together a court case, though, by collecting archival evidence.

14. Actors: international organizations

What was the role of INGOs/IGOs?

International nongovernmental organizations and intergovernmental organizations issued statements condemning the repressions.

15. Media and IT technologies

What media or IT technologies helped the mobilization to scale up (if at all)?

The discussion of the islands issue likely happened online, but since the upward scale shift was mostly related to the formation of a short-lived political coalition rather than a big increase in protest numbers, internet and social media did not play a critical mobilizing role at the street protest phase. Later, during the legal challenges, the coordination between activists and their communication with supporters happened largely through social media.

16. Precursors summary

[for positive cases that scaled up] In your analysis, what are the main precursors that explain how or why people took to the streets in large numbers at this time and not on other occasions? Are there any that are not already listed here that led to the upward scale shift?
[for negative cases that did not scale up] In your analysis, what are the main factors that explain why the mobilization did not scale up despite the attempts to do so? Are there any factors not already listed here that prevented the upward scale shift?

The connection of the trigger (control of the islands) to the country's long tradition of nationalism combined with accumulated economic and political grievances led to the quick formation of a political coalition and the antiregime character of the protests. The quickly implemented repressions against the activists, though, prevented the mobilization from growing larger.

17. Key sources

What sources would be good for someone who wants to follow up on details of this case (up to five sources)?

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ESWATINI / SWAZILAND

1. Episode summary

In 2-4 sentences, summarize what this mobilization episode was about.

An ongoing political and socioeconomic crisis, coupled with extravagant spending and increasing intransigence by the king, led to a series of protests led by corporatist civic actors (professional associations, unions, student groups). Continuing a long-standing pattern of protests, events in 2017 gradually built into a mobilization that is still going on today with increasing violence. Upward scale shifts happened in April 2018 with a variety of groups coming together and in September 2018 with a three-day nationwide strike.

2. Dates, duration, and dynamics of the mobilization episode

What were the dates that mark the start, end, and scale-up (if any) of this episode? How long was the active phase of the mobilization? Can the mobilization episode be divided into stages? If yes, provide a brief (1-3 sentences) characteristic of each stage.

Student protests over living conditions have been a constant feature since the 1990s but gained momentum in October 2017. In January and February 2018, university students protested (that is, marched to deliver petitions and boycotted classes) over inadequate stipends. On March 15 in Lobamba, one of Eswatini's capitals, about 100 members of civil society groups, community organizations, and political groups formed a coalition for economic justice and marched to deliver a petition to parliament but were blocked by police. On April 17, pensioners delivering petitions to parliament and ministries (joined by the teachers' union, trades unions, and a youth group—about 2,000 people) protested a pension reform law being discussed in parliament. Police responded with violence. In June, the Trade Union Congress of Swaziland (TUCOSWA) organized a protest against the government's tax increases, lack of social welfare programs, and unfavorable labor laws. Also in June, civic groups registered 90 percent of the population for the upcoming elections in August and September. However, less than 30 percent of those registered voted in the first round (a historic low—also a form of protest), and there were street demonstrations against the unfairness of the elections in July and August. Teachers and then nurses marched in September to protest wasteful spending and low salaries for public servants, and factory workers staged several protests over wages. A three-day national strike started Tuesday, September 18, around the time of the election, coordinated by TUCOSWA. Public transport drivers clashed with police, and the protest turned violent. It is not possible to put an end date on the episode as it is ongoing, but for the purposes of this study, it might make sense to call September 2018 the end of this particular episode.

3. Size of mobilization

Provide any information available about the number of participants, their social and/or professional status, the geographic spread of the mobilization, etc.

It is a steady upward trend, from hundreds of students boycotting classes in September 2017, to a coalition of 100 civic actors in March 2018, to major corporatist actors in April staging a demonstration with 2,000 people, to 90 percent of the population registering to vote in June, and a nationwide strike in September. Ninety percent is quite high—in 2013 the registration was 70 percent but only after the king put pressure on people to register (before that, the figure had been 57 percent). So if registering is a form of mobilization, that indicates a surge in mobilization size in June 2018.

4. Episode background

What background facts does the reader need to know about the political and social context of the country to understand this episode?

Since 1973, protests have been a normal feature of civil contestation in the country, growing incrementally in the '80s, '90s and 2000s as civic actors found them an effective way to induce the monarch to change policies, laws, and even the constitution. The judiciary, though a source of social and political reform, lacks independence to apply the law or international and regional standards to bring meaningful change. The lack of independence of the judiciary is due to the fact that there is no separation of powers in the country: the king wields executive, legislative, and, through the appointment process of judges, judicial power. Parties are banned and not allowed to contest elections, but individual candidates with different views

are allowed to run for parliament. The country has been in economic distress since about 2011.

5. Prior mobilization dynamic

What were the characteristics of civic mobilization over the 20 years or so prior to this episode? Were protests a frequent occurrence? Did they tend to focus on different issues than this episode did (e.g., labor conditions)? What was the most recent mobilization prior to this episode? What role did previous protests (successful/unsuccessful; violent/nonviolent) and government responses to those protests play in this mobilization episode? How do the issues of any recent protests relate to this episode's framing of issues?

Demonstrations by prodemocracy activists and general strikes around election time are typical, with the demands usually around allowing political parties to officially compete in elections. State-society negotiations take place, absent political competition or outright dictatorship, through protests and petitions that raise issues the king then addresses in some form. That was the pattern for most of the 1990s and 2000s, until 2010, when the government started cracking down on union leaders and prodemocracy activists, and implementing a 2008 antiterrorism law to do so. The country's economic crisis plus inspiration from the Arab Spring came together in 2011: a mass protest in late March led to the government agreeing to a 10 percent cut in ministers' salaries. In April 2011, thousands of prodemocracy activists, including teachers, students, and trade unionists, among others, rallied in protest against cuts to social spending and, inspired by popular uprisings elsewhere on the continent, to show their dissatisfaction with the monarchy. Police detained about 100 people, including journalists and labor leaders, abducted and displaced thousands, and assaulted an unknown number. Clashes broke out again in September 2011 between police and protesters in several cities in what was called the Global Week of Action on Swaziland, as the government refused to accept a petition from civic groups calling for the introduction of multiparty democracy and reform of the judiciary.

6. Trigger

What was the trigger for this mobilization episode (state response to an exogenous shock? Electoral or constitutional power grab? An unpopular policy?)

The fact that 2018 was an elections year made it a prime time to call for political changes through the ballot box. Prodemocracy activists called for a multiparty democratic dispensation that would allow citizens to elect their government and thus begin the process of addressing various socioeconomic problems. Coupled with the abovementioned issues was the rampant corruption, increase in taxes, and human rights violations carried out by state actors with impunity, particularly the crackdown on freedoms of expression, assembly, and association, with many protests being brutally disrupted and stopped by police.

However, there is a longer cycle here: economic crisis leads to a crackdown on prodemocracy forces leads to international sanctions leads to human rights' improvements plus worsening governance equals more unrest.

7. Framing

What was the framing of this trigger, grievances, and demands during the episode? What was the role of different mobilization actors in shaping the framing? How/did the framing of why people should mobilize change over time? How did the framing help or hinder scaling up of the mobilization?

The framing of this trigger was primarily economic grievances and the perennial request that political parties be allowed to participate in elections. The framing clearly resonated with broad segments of the population and included these demands: respect for and protection of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms; accountability of public funds and consequences for corruption; an improvement in social protection mechanisms; the provision of scholarships and delivery of services; and the ceasing of the disproportionate use of force by police during meetings and protests.

8. Tactics

What kind of tactics did the movement(s) use? How was the presence or absence of an upward scale shift related to these tactics?

Peaceful and nonviolent means of struggle and protests are the strategies adopted by the prodemocracy, or social change, activists. Marching to deliver a petition seems to be a traditional and preferred tactic, which consists of certain groups delivering a petition to a specific target (for example, the relevant ministry, parliament, the US embassy). Activists brought cases before the High Court to contest the legitimacy of the elections on the basis of the ban on political parties. Strikes and student boycotts were also used, though strikes are continuously blocked by the Industrial Court. Government and other employers

use the Industrial Court as the means through which to "legally" block strikes by obtaining interdictions against trade unions and workers; the lack of independence of the judiciary would be relevant in such instances.

9. Actors: organizations

What powerful institutions, movements or parties were engaged in this mobilization episode (unions, religious organizations, opposition parties)? What are the key facts about any formal and informal organizations that joined or supported the mobilization?

Historically, trade unions were very powerful and sometimes included in the king's cabinet; through workers' struggles, trade unions acted as a conduit for calling for political reforms. Unofficial political parties have also existed for decades. They have formed coalitions with human rights groups and unions to create a "prodemocracy" movement that has existed since 1973, when the then ruler, King Sobhuza II, abrogated the 1968 independence constitution and created the absolute monarchy (https://www.eisa.org/pdf/swa1973proclamation.pdf). These groups had limited freedom to protest and negotiate but succeeded in acting as an influence on the king's policies for most of the 1990s and 2000s. There was a crackdown in 2010 in which union leaders and prodemocracy activists were arrested en masse at a meeting, and solidarity activists from South Africa were deported. The 2018 events can be seen as a symptom of a sharpening in the breakdown of normative contestation mechanisms (in essence, a corporatist pact with the king).

10. Actors: leaders

What were the characteristics of the leader(s), prominent activists, and public figures who participated in the mobilization? What was their professional and social (ethnic/religious/class) background? What kinds of networks did they belong to and mobilize? Where did they get their organizing skills?

Leaders of professional associations and unions, student leaders, lawyers, human rights activists—all of whom have been acting in concert for a long time—participated in the mobilization. Leaders also came from churches, the business community, minority groups, and youth organizations. They have continuously called for accountability from the government while conducting civic education and other activities in a very hostile environment. They have created strong coalitions and regional and international networks for solidarity and support.

Most leaders have been the recipients of capacity-building trainings, in addition to their academic and professional qualifications; they have been trained on organizing, mobilizing, and advocacy by local, regional, and international organizations.

11. Actors: civil society

What was the role, if any, of local human rights and civil society organizations and movements?

Because parties are banned, civic and political lines are blurred, but they are the drumbeat behind challenging the ban on political parties. Civil society has over the years acted as the conscience of the government on the political and socioeconomic problems of the country. They have created space for political parties to engage with people during civic education and continuously provided support to parties and activists.

12. Actors: youth

What was the role, if any, of youth organizations (formal or informal)?

Students have protested on their own issues several times. But organized youths and organized students, in particular, are part of the struggles at a broader level, and engage in protests and other activities as may be called or organized by civil society organizations and political parties.

13. Actors: diaspora

What was the role of diaspora groups?

There is an activist diaspora in South Africa. They staged their own protests at the border and called for pressure from international organizations during the mobilization. Their issues were allowing political parties and stopping the terrorism act from being used to crack down on civic organizations. The diaspora activists garnered support and solidarity across the region for the struggles of the people of Swaziland. They played a critical role in ensuring that the issues in the country remained topical in the region, to put pressure on the king to allow for political changes toward a multiparty democracy.

14. Actors: international organizations

What was the role of INGOs/IGOs?

International organizations provided support and solidarity to prodemocracy activists and organizations. They opened up spaces for discussions and debates on the Swaziland question and assisted with advocacy initiatives using regional and international mechanisms.

15. Media and IT technologies

What media or IT technologies helped the mobilization to scale up (if at all)?

There is no freedom of the press, and the media is heavily censored. The repression of journalists has increased over the years. In 2014, a writer and an editor of a magazine were both arrested and convicted of contempt of court and spent almost two years in jail (https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/the-case-of-bheki-makhubu-thulani-maseko/). There were more arrests and restrictions in 2018 (http://zimbabwe.misa.org/2018/09/05/misa-zimbabweregional-solidarity-statement-third-eswatini-journalist-assaulted-this-year/, https://www.pressreader.com/swaziland/swazibserver/20180911/281792809920787, http://www.panos.org.zm/index.php/2018/09/06/panos-condemns-attack-on-journalist-in-eswatini/). According to findings of the Southern Africa Report that were echoed by a Reporters Without Borders (RSF) report for 2021, "harassment, intimidation, and physical violence against journalists are all common and result in almost constant self-censorship."

There was not much about social media or information technologies in the reporting of this mobilization. During the unrest of 2021 and subsequent activities that are outside the boundaries of this mobilization episode, however, we have noted an increased uptake on social media as a tool for mobilization and information dissemination, and the internet was shut down at least 3 times in 11 months (https://www.accessnow.org/keepiton-eswatini-protests/).

16. Precursors summary

[for positive cases that scaled up] In your analysis, what are the main precursors that explain how or why people took to the streets in large numbers at this time and not on other occasions? Are there any that are not already listed here that led to the upward scale shift?
[for negative cases that did not scale up] In your analysis, what are the main factors that explain why the mobilization did not scale up despite the attempts to do so? Are there any factors not already listed here that prevented the upward scale shift?

This is something of a borderline case. Clearly there was an upward scale shift, but long-standing cycles and traditions of civic mobilization mean that the specific precursors of this upward scale shift are less concrete.

A corporatist pact between the king and civic/trade organizations and the traditional forms of addressing grievances began to break down in the decades prior to the mobilization. As the economy worsened and grievances were not addressed, and as the king was increasingly perceived as unresponsive to broad societal needs, the population increasingly mobilized through the organizational forms that had represented them in the past. The ability of all organizations to form coalitions to advance the struggle for a better life made the mobilization more effective. The civic education conducted in communities helped to awaken the populace on the reasons for poor delivery of services and other socioeconomic problems.

17. Key sources

What sources would be good for someone who wants to follow up on details of this case (up to five sources)?

There have been many reports in the media on these details, found mainly online. Civil society reports to the different international and regional mechanisms (Univeral Periodic Review, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights) on the situation in the country also carry a wealth of specifics and data. Several international and regional organizations (International Commission of Jurists, Media Institute of Southern Africa, Southern Africa Litigation Center, Southern African Human Rights Defenders Network) have conducted fact-finding missions, or observations, and their reports may also be of assistance, including the reports by the US Embassy that are issued annually.

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"2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Eswatini." United States Department of State, March 30, 2021. https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/eswatini/.

ETHIOPIA

1. Episode summary

In 2-4 sentences, summarize what this mobilization episode was about.

The mobilization was led by the Oromo people, supported by other ethnic groups in Ethiopia against the government, which is dominated by the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF). Initially directed against the Addis Ababa Master Plan, the protests resonated with a general framing of fair power sharing between ethnic groups. The mobilization was inspired and sustained by a student movement inside the country acting together with the diaspora. It used a combination of online and offline campaigns and resulted in a government resignation.

2. Dates, duration, and dynamics of the mobilization episode

What were the dates that mark the start, end, and scale-up (if any) of this episode? How long was the active phase of the mobilization? Can the mobilization episode be divided into stages? If yes, provide a brief (1-3 sentences) characteristic of each stage.

The mobilization episode began in April 2014 with the announcement of the Addis Ababa Master Plan; it ended in February 2018 with the resignation of the prime minister. Large protests began in November 2015, so the duration of the active phase was two years, three months.

The first stage of the mobilization included a November 2015 protest in Ginchi over a small playground taken away by the government from the Oromo people and a months-long school strike that followed in Oromia region. The second stage took place in the summer of 2016, when the leak of the final school exam was followed by protests in Amhara region in July and the Grand Oromia Rally in August. The third stage started two months later, after the Irrecha Massacre. Smaller protests, some of which turned violent, and the online resistance continued for months after that.

3. Size of mobilization

Provide any information available about the number of participants, their social and/or professional status, the geographic spread of the mobilization, etc.

The mobilization was led by youth, particularly university students, who acted with the diaspora. They were joined by farmers and, later, by Oromo people of all backgrounds. The Amhara people and their diaspora subsequently joined the Oromo protest. At its peak, during the Grand Oromia Rally, the mobilization spread to more than 200 Oromia towns; 3 towns in the Amhara region are mentioned as well. Good estimates of the number of participants are not available.

4. Episode background

What background facts does the reader need to know about the political and social context of the country to understand this episode?

Since 1991 and until recently, the country has been led by a government dominated by the Tigray people, an ethnic minority in Ethiopia. The Oromo people, who were historically pastoral, were denied education and economic opportunities and had accumulated grievances for decades. These long-standing grievances against the ruling party and the excesses of the regime reached a boiling point after the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) declared itself winner of all seats in the federal parliament and regional state councils in the May 2015 elections, which were massively rigged. The Oromo protest picked up significant momentum in November 2015, one month after the EPRDF formed a new government.

5. Prior mobilization dynamic

What were the characteristics of civic mobilization over the 20 years or so prior to this episode? Were protests a frequent occurrence? Did they tend to focus on different issues than this episode did (e.g., labor conditions)? What was the most recent mobilization prior to this episode? What role did previous protests (successful/unsuccessful; violent/nonviolent) and government responses to those protests play in this mobilization episode? How do the issues of any recent protests relate to this episode's framing of issues?

The organized Oromo struggle goes back to the 1960s when it was led by the Macha-Tulama Self-Help Association and later, by the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), which was an underground guerrilla movement with a goal of establishing an independent Oromia state. In 2010s, the movement's cause was reframed by a new generation of Oromos sometimes called the "Qubee generation."

They were educated in the Afan Oromo language, had a strong sense of ethnic identity, and learned of rights and power sharing in their civics classes. They established a clandestine organization in 2011 and held a few small protests and mobilization campaigns before 2015.

The issues of political representation, inclusion, and freedom of expression have also been raised by the Muslim movement led by Dimtsachin Yisema activists in 2011–14, shortly before the Oromo movement. The Muslim movement was triggered by the government's desire to promote a certain type of Islamic teaching and interfere in the affairs of the Islamic Council, but it went beyond that and raised larger issues.

6. Trigger

What was the trigger for this mobilization episode (state response to an exogenous shock? Electoral or constitutional power grab? An unpopular policy?)

The trigger was the announcement of the Addis Ababa Master Plan, which would extend the capital into the Oromia region, evicting Oromos from lands they historically occupied.

7. Framing

What was the framing of this trigger, grievances, and demands during the episode? What was the role of different mobilization actors in shaping the framing? How/did the framing of why people should mobilize change over time? How did the framing help or hinder scaling up of the mobilization?

The main framing of the mobilization was over power sharing and the political rights of ethnic groups. The new Oromo generation came up with this framing to replace the older one, which focused on secession from Ethiopia. As later events showed, this new framing appealed to other ethnic groups, too, especially the Amhara people. The Oromo leaders of the protest deliberately connected the Addis Ababa Master Plan to this new framing. This framing did not change over time, but the demands did. In the early stages of mobilization, the protesters demanded cancellation of the plan and power sharing; after the Irrecha Massacre, the demand for the TPLF-dominated government to step down entered the agenda.

8. Tactics

What kind of tactics did the movement(s) use? How was the presence or absence of an upward scale shift related to these tactics?

Tactics included combining online and offline campaigns and means of communication. For example, information spread through websites; social media, especially Facebook; and satellite TV to a network of supporters, who then used text messages and paper leaflets to pass the information on to those who did not have access to digital media.

9. Actors: organizations

What powerful institutions, movements or parties were engaged in this mobilization episode (unions, religious organizations, opposition parties)? What are the key facts about any formal and informal organizations that joined or supported the mobilization?

This mobilization was made possible by a clandestine decentralized organization of Oromo university students who acted together with the Oromo diaspora in other countries. The students used their access to mobile phones and the internet to spread information on the ground, through text messages and paper leaflets, while the diaspora provided international publicity, ran satellite television channels, and supported in-country resistance financially. Later, when the Amhara people joined the protest, the Oromo and Amhara diasporas communicated and developed common strategies.

10. Actors: leaders

What were the characteristics of the leader(s), prominent activists, and public figures who participated in the mobilization? What was their professional and social (ethnic/religious/class) background? What kinds of networks did they belong to and mobilize? Where did they get their organizing skills?

There was only one "face" of the protest: Jawar Mohammed, an active diaspora member living in the United States, who was a Stanford and Columbia University graduate with degrees in political science and human rights. He, however, was not the one who drove the protest on the ground. The student and youth organizations on the ground in Ethiopia had a decentralized structure based on traditional Oromo self-rule; online, the in-country protest leaders remained anonymous for security reasons. Many of their skills in handling communication technologies and their knowledge of politics came from university studies, but non-college educated youths were also very active in the movement. Protest leaders were connected to both the clandestine organization and their home communities.

11. Actors: civil society

What was the role, if any, of local human rights and civil

society organizations and movements?

Human rights organizations in Ethiopia were severely weakened as a result of government repression. Many human rights defenders fled. Some exiled human rights activists in exile formed organizations, coordinated with international human rights actors, and contributed greatly to the success of the movement by exposing violations, bringing attention to major political developments, connecting in-country activists with resources, and raising funds to support families of those imprisoned as a result of their activism.

12. Actors: youth

What was the role, if any, of youth organizations (formal or informal)?

This mobilization was made possible by a clandestine decentralized organization of Oromo university students who acted together with the Oromo diaspora in other countries. The students used their access to mobile phones and the internet to spread information on the ground through text messages and paper leaflets.

13. Actors: diaspora

What was the role of diaspora groups?

The Oromo diaspora played an important role in the mobilization. It acted together with Oromo students inside the country and provided publicity and access to satellite TV channels, as well as, possibly, financial resources.

The broader Ethiopian diaspora community beyond the Oromo people intensified their long-standing opposition to the regime during this period as well. Diaspora communities held protests in the US and European capitals, lobbied lawmakers, and raised funds to support dissidents and their families. For example, H.Res (House Resolution) 128: Supporting respect for human rights and encouraging inclusive governance in Ethiopia, which the US House passed in April 2018, was in large part a result of years of efforts by the Ethiopian diaspora.

14. Actors: international organizations

What was the role of INGOs/IGOs?

International human rights organizations and some human rights groups led by exiled Ethiopians extensively reported on human rights violations committed by the regime in the context of the protests. These groups organized forums in United Nations and African Union human rights bodies and advocated on behalf of human rights defenders, including Oromo protesters, inside Ethiopia.

15. Media and IT technologies

What media or IT technologies helped the mobilization to scale up (if at all)?

Although internet and mobile penetration remain low in Ethiopia compared to in other countries, the expansion of internet access played an important role in mobilization. Between 2011 and 2015, internet access grew from 1 percent to 14 percent. Coordination of the protest was done through a combination of internet, satellite TV, text messages, and paper leaflets.

Information and messages from the internet were rebroadcast in traditional media and spread through word of mouth, which helped them reach rural communities.

16. Precursors summary

[for positive cases that scaled up] In your analysis, what are the main precursors that explain how or why people took to the streets in large numbers at this time and not on other occasions? Are there any that are not already listed here that led to the upward scale shift?
[for negative cases that did not scale up] In your analysis, what are the main precursors that explain why the mobilization did not scale up despite the attempts to do so? Are there any that are not already listed here that prevented the upward scale shift?

The main precursors include (1) the reframing of the Oromo struggle to be about rights and power sharing, not independence, which inspired another large ethnic group, the Amhara, to join the protests; (2) the creation of a clandestine youth organization, which acted together with the diaspora; (3) new communication opportunities provided by the recent expansion of the internet; and (4) the mistakes of the EPRDF, which provoked a social backlash when it declared itself the winner of all seats in the federal parliament and regional state councils in the 2015 elections.

17. Key sources

What sources would be good for someone who wants to follow up on details of this case (up to five sources)?

The Ethiopia case report is a key source.

Horne, Felix. "US House Resolution on Ethiopia Passes." Human Rights Watch (blog), April 10, 2018. https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/04/10/us-house-resolution-ethiopia-passes.

GAMBIA

1. Episode summary

In 2-4 sentences, summarize what this mobilization episode was about.

Demonstrations by the opposition United Democratic Party (UDP) eight months in advance of the 2016 presidential election were brutally repressed, and President Yahya Jammeh took actions that insulted his supporters and increased public outrage. Active material and communications support from the diaspora provided opposition groups with hope that the election might be worth contesting, motivating opposition groups to unite and mobilize people to vote for their candidate.

2. Dates, duration, and dynamics of the mobilization episode

What were the dates that mark the start, end, and scale-up (if any) of this episode? How long was the active phase of the mobilization? Can the mobilization episode be divided into stages? If yes, provide a brief (1-3 sentences) characteristic of each stage.

On April 14, 2016, the UDP's youth wing led a demonstration against changes to election laws passed in July 2015. The demonstration was eight months before the election, but the timing may have been chosen to coincide with the ordinary session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights in the capital of Banjul. Police brutally arrested participants, killing the leader of the youth wing. On April 16, the UDP marched to protest these events, and again there was a crackdown, with the arrest of the party's elderly head, Ousainou Darboe, along with other leaders. On April 28, further demonstrations against these repressions circulated widely on social media. People openly called for the president to leave. The trial of Darboe drew more protests on May 9 and 10, leading to 50 arrests. On May 11, there were political defections from the ruling party (but to a party that would not join the coalition that eventually won the election). People, including members of the president's traditional base, were further outraged by rude and inflammatory remarks the president made in June, which, coupled with other unpopular things he had done that year, increased the range of framings that could be used to critique him. A coalition of opposition groups was formed in October with a first-time presidential candidate, who won the election on December 1. The former president at first conceded, then unsuccessfully tried to contest the election. A combination of at-times violent mobilization and international pressure (including an intervention by Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS] troops) led to the former president leaving the country in January 2017.

3. Size of mobilization

Provide any information available about the number of participants, their social and/or professional status, the geographic spread of the mobilization, etc.

The mobilization seemed largely to consist of opposition political party members. There was no reporting on other groups or ordinary citizens joining public demonstrations, but the ongoing mobilization was fueled by social media sharing, diaspora fundraising and social media campaigns, and political parties mobilizing their supporters. The street demonstrations probably numbered in the hundreds of protesters, but overall support for the movement grew internally, especially after different parties formed a coalition. This makes it hard to say exactly what the upward scale shift was—was it after the death of the UDP youth wing leader in April or after the coalition was formed in October? It seems like it should be the April events that marked a change in the public mood, but the empirical data is ambiguous on number and demographics. In some ways, this mobilization was not so different from previous mobilizations around elections except it was perceived as being more likely to succeed because of Jammeh's unpopularity and a united opposition rallying behind a new candidate. That perception of potential success is the scale up, but it is a challenge to measure or point to a particular moment in time.

4. Episode background

What background facts does the reader need to know about the political and social context of the country to understand this episode?

After the 2004 restrictions on the media and subsequent assassination of a prominent journalist, democracy went into a slow decline. The decline sharpened after a coup attempt in 2014, when Jammeh took several steps to consolidate power further, bringing religious and business leaders under state control and manipulating the civil service to show support for him. There was a struggle over

election laws in 2015 between opposition parties and the election commission. (The opposition parties presented electoral and constitutional reform proposals, including the extension of the electoral franchise to Gambians in the diaspora.) The election commission rejected these proposals, and the National Assembly introduced a new electoral law making it more expensive to run. Also, the same opposition leader who had run against the president in the last four elections was too old to run again, so people did not know how it would be possible to unseat the president nonviolently.

5. Prior mobilization dynamic

What were the characteristics of civic mobilization over the 20 years or so prior to this episode? Were protests a frequent occurrence? Did they tend to focus on different issues than this episode did (e.g., labor conditions)? What was the most recent mobilization prior to this episode? What role did previous protests (successful/unsuccessful; violent/nonviolent) and government responses to those protests play in this mobilization episode? How do the issues of any recent protests relate to this episode's framing of issues?

Political party mobilization, especially around elections, is the main form of mobilization. Even so, opposition demonstrations had been rare since a 2000 crackdown that resulted in the deaths of a dozen or so students.

6. Trigger

What was the trigger for this mobilization episode (state response to an exogenous shock? Electoral or constitutional power grab? An unpopular policy?)

A change to electoral laws and an upcoming presidential election were the triggers for political party mobilization, with the exact timing of a demonstration in April being related to a human rights conference taking place in the capital. The brutal detention of youth activists from the main opposition party and alleged murder of their leader while in detention was the trigger, based on moral outrage, for an upward scale shift. Ordinarily, human rights violations are not widely known, but this incident gained attention and triggered outrage. But the upward scale shift was also related to a perception that the opposition would succeed, with the mobilization of a broader set of actors than those motivated by moral outrage alone.

7. Framing

What was the framing of this trigger, grievances, and demands during the episode? What was the role of different mobilization actors in shaping the framing? How/did the framing of why people should mobilize change over time? How did the framing help or hinder scaling up of the mobilization?

The framing was mainly around getting rid of the president and around free and fair elections. It was not about manipulating regime discourse; it was just to get rid of Jammeh. During the period of mobilization, the president did more things that were unpopular, giving the opposition a wide variety of anti-Jammeh frames to work with, especially as related to preserving good relationships between ethnic and religious groups. It is important to note in this context that the 2016 coalition had a new constitution as part of its manifesto—and the call for a new constitution could arguably be construed as a call for a renegotiation of the power arrangement—though that effort was ultimately unsuccessful for the time being.

8. Tactics

What kind of tactics did the movement(s) use? How was the presence or absence of an upward scale shift related to these tactics?

Street demonstrations may have been too dangerous for anyone but the main opposition party (and many of them were brutalized). Instead, the tactics were more along the lines of networking with the diaspora to promote social media messaging, working with intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) to put pressure on the regime and publicize the situation, innovate funding tactics (such as with GoFundMe) to get support from the diaspora, and find a way to unite the opposition parties.

9. Actors: organizations

What powerful institutions, movements or parties were engaged in this mobilization episode (unions, religious organizations, opposition parties)? What are the key facts about any formal and informal organizations that joined or supported the mobilization?

Political parties were the dominant force, especially the main opposition party. By the tail end of the Jammeh era, most human rights organizations had been repressed or dissolved. Trade unions were still a prominent voice on rights issues, especially the Gambian Press Union and the

Gambia Bar Association. The smaller socialist political party also spoke out against Jammeh, as did a few high profile imams.

10. Actors: leaders

What were the characteristics of the leader(s), prominent activists, and public figures who participated in the mobilization? What was their professional and social (ethnic/religious/class) background? What kinds of networks did they belong to and mobilize? Where did they get their organizing skills?

The leaders were mainly established political party figures who had run in previous elections. The winning presidential candidate, Adama Barrow, had previously run unsuccessfully for a seat in the legislature and served as treasurer of the main opposition party. However, he was a real estate developer by profession who had emigrated to the UK and then returned 10 years prior, and owned his own business. The candidate who ran in the last four elections, Darboe, was in jail and too old to run, so the opposition was forced to field a new candidate who had other skills besides being a political oppositionist and who had good diaspora networks. Leaders from smaller opposition parties and some imams were also leaders.

11. Actors: civil society

What was the role, if any, of local human rights and civil society organizations and movements?

Civil society did not play a highly visible role.

12. Actors: youth

What was the role, if any, of youth organizations (formal or informal)?

Youth activists in exile drove social media political involvement. The youth wing of the opposition party led the first demonstration.

13. Actors: diaspora

What was the role of diaspora groups?

The diaspora, especially in Senegal, has been extremely active in domestic politics. The 2014 coup attempt was led and financed by a group of seven people in the United States, four of whom were convicted in that country. There were diaspora demonstrations against the president. Diaspora activists launched crowdfunding campaigns through social media and GoFundMe for the opposition. These forms of support may have not only materially supported the campaign but also gave hope to citizens in the Gambia that change might be possible.

The consensus in the scholarship is that the Gambian diaspora, especially in the United States but also in the UK, Germany, and Sweden, had become more politically strident in their criticism of Jammeh and better organized. Several opposition parties held meetings in foreign cities with significant Gambian diasporic populations. Atlanta, Georgia, for example, emerged as a major hub for this kind of diasporic activism.

14. Actors: international organizations

What was the role of INGOs/IGOs?

The role of governments and IGOs was important. The Gambia is closely connected to Senegal and ECOWAS troops were sent in January 2017 to end Jammeh's unwillingness to concede. Nigeria was also putting pressure on Jammeh via ECOWAS. Also, international attention was on the president constantly during 2016 because of his recent decisions to withdraw from the Commonwealth and the International Criminal Court (ICC), declaring the country an Islamic Republic, and the human rights abuses. It seemed like Jammeh had embarrassed many of his neighboring countries, and their criticism of him was very public.

The role of INGOs was relatively minor aside from groups like the Gambia Press Union. A few international NGOs paid much attention to the Gambia and worked with Gambian activists and politicians but mainly in the diaspora or remotely. There were no significant international NGOs on the ground in the country prior to the 2016 election. Major human rights groups like Amnesty and Human Rights Watch (and Freedom House) had certainly drawn attention to the deteriorating human rights climate in the country. There were a few smaller groups, such as the Robert F. Kennedy Center for Human Rights, that took an interest in the country and supported key opposition candidates—like Isatou Touray, who ran for president as an independent and later became the vice president for a brief spell—with training and exposure.

15. Media and IT technologies

What media or IT technologies helped the mobilization to scale up (if at all)?

Gambia-focused news sites run by Gambians in the diaspora played a large role (for example, Freedom Newspaper, Gainako, and Jollof News, though several of these are now defunct). Social media and radio broadcasts from Senegal were important. Online funding campaigns were also key because it was the first competitive election in a long time.

The government shut down the internet and mobile data just prior to the election. It was not the first time the Jammeh government did that; it had a history of shutting down the internet generally or specific services for political reasons. (Although in some cases, the government appears to have been motivated by a need to channel traffic to the para-statal cell phone company.)

16. Precursors summary

[for positive cases that scaled up] In your analysis, what are the main precursors that explain how or why people took to the streets in large numbers at this time and not on other occasions? Are there any that are not already listed here that led to the upward scale shift?
[for negative cases that did not scale up] In your analysis, what are the main precursors that explain why the mobilization did not scale up despite the attempts to do so? Are there any that are not already listed here that prevented the upward scale shift?

A constellation of factors made this election critical: the solidarity of the opposition, intense concern in the Gambia about Jammeh's handling of the migrant crisis (see Hultin et al. 2017), the worsening economy (in part due to the freezing of funds by the European Union because of the deteriorating human rights situation), increased access to social media, and the president alienating his base, especially women. So there were multiple inputs that reinforced each other and that the opposition was able to capitalize on with its unprecedented unity.

These factors changed public perceptions of what seemed possible, motivating different opposition parties to unite. In turn, this unity inspired further international support. Having a new candidate run instead of the old candidate, who had consistently lost, was an important new dynamic.

17. Key sources

What sources would be good for someone who wants to follow up on details of this case (up to five sources)?

Hartmann, Christof. 2017. "ECOWAS and the Restoration of Democracy in the Gambia." *Africa Spectrum* 52(1): 85–99.

Hultin, Niklas, et al. 2017. "Autocracy, Migration, and the Gambia's 'Unprecedented' 2016 Election." *African Affairs* 116(463): 321–340. https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adx007.

Hultin, Niklas, and Tone Sommerfelt. 2020. "Anticipatory Tribalism: Accusatory Politics in the 'New Gambia.'" *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 58(2): 257–279. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022278x20000178.

Perfect, David. 2017. "The Gambian 2016 Presidential Election and Its Aftermath." *The Round Table* 106(3): 323–337. https://doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2017.1326627.

IRAN

1. Episode summary

In 2-4 sentences, summarize what this mobilization episode was about.

A multiyear series of protests and strikes took place in Iran in 2017–21. The protests continued, but we will cut the episode at the end of 2021 for the purposes of this research project.

These economic protests in Iran were the result of both objective deterioration of living conditions and changed expectations. After the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear agreement with the United States, economic conditions in the country slightly improved in 2016–17. However, the economic gains expected by the public from the JCPOA did not materialize, leading to increased dissatisfaction with the president, especially in the provinces. In 2018, the United States withdrew from the JCPOA nuclear agreement and imposed additional sanctions on Iran, and in 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic made the situation even worse. A series of local and nationwide protests and strikes in 2017 through 2021 involved multiple social and professional groups, from students and teachers to pensioners. Some of these protests featured political demands and slogans, but economic grievances remained the main driving force behind them.

2. Dates, duration, and dynamics of the mobilization episode

What were the dates that mark the start, end, and scale-up (if any) of this episode? How long was the active phase of the mobilization? Can the mobilization episode be divided into stages? If yes, provide a brief (1-3 sentences) characteristic of each stage.

Four phases can be distinguished in this mobilization episode: (1) several days of nationwide economic protests at the end of December 2017 and the beginning of January 2018; (2) the 2018–19 strikes by different occupations and social groups; (3) the Bloody November 2018 nationwide economic protest; and (4) the 2020–21 continuation of strikes and protests by different occupations and social groups amid the COVID-19 pandemic.

The protests in late December 2017 through early January 2018 lasted for about 8 to 10 days. They attracted tens of thousands of Iranians in multiple cities protesting economic difficulties. The protests were leaderless and drew the biggest crowds in the provinces, not in Tehran, the capital. No organized political forces tried to lead this mobilization.

The 2018–19 nationwide series of protests and strikes was driven primarily by professional groups: merchants, industrial and railway workers, truck and bus drivers, teachers, university students, farmers. There were also protests by women and retirees. The protests happened in different cities almost every month from April 2018 through June 2019.

The Bloody November nationwide protest took place on November 15–19, 2019, in several dozen cities (37 according to some reports) and was triggered by a sharp increase in fuel prices because of a reduction in subsidies and enforced rationing of the amount of subsidized gas sold per car per month. The protests turned violent (property damage, buildings and cars on fire) and met with an especially brutal crackdown. At least several hundred, up to 1,500 people were reported dead, and the families of those killed were often intimidated not to organize large funerals for them. A spillover of this wave of protests took place on January 11–14, 2020, when students in several cities protested the Iranian military's shooting down of Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752, which carried mostly Iranian and Iranian-Canadian citizens.

In 2020–21, the strikes and protests by different occupational and social groups continued, now with additional grievances: the government's handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, the shortage of and pollution in drinking water in some areas, and the crash of Iran's stock market on January 24, 2021. In late 2021, the largest protests were coordinated by public employees, especially teachers, who successfully secured concessions from the government in the form of new pay scale legislation.

3. Size of mobilization

Provide any information available about the number of participants, their social and/or professional status, the geographic spread of the mobilization, etc.

The size of the mobilization is difficult to estimate. Given that dozens of cities were involved as well as many

occupational and social groups (merchants, industrial workers from different sectors, truck and bus drivers, teachers, university students, farmers, women, and pensioners), it must have been at least hundreds of thousands or even millions of people. The earlier protests in late 2017 were driven primarily by the youth; starting in 2018, the youth became just one of the groups involved in the mobilization.

4. Episode background

What background facts does the reader need to know about the political and social context of the country to understand this episode?

Iran has lived under Islamic rule since the 1979 revolution, when conservative religious political forces deposed the shah of Iran with the support of the poorer social groups unhappy about economic difficulties and the shah's tight connections with the United States. The current regime combines the power of religious authorities with the elements of a republic, in which conservatives and reformists compete. The religious authorities control the judiciary and favor the conservatives.

Since the Islamic Revolution, the resistance to Islamic rule has been punctuated by different groups and organizations, many of them in exile, favoring monarchist or Marxist views. After the 2009 presidential election, in which the victory of a conservative candidate brought millions of reform supporters out on the streets, many citizens, especially the younger ones, lost hope in the gradual transformation of the country and turned to secular nationalism. The nostalgia for pre-Islamic Iran and the popularity of the Pahlavi dynasty, to which the last Iranian shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, belonged, began to grow inside the country. So far, however, this alternative political agenda remains disconnected from the economic grievances inside the country.

The Iranian economy has been suffering from international sanctions for decades. They were partially lifted in 2015 after Iran signed a nuclear deal with the United States but were imposed again in 2017 by Donald Trump's administration. Unemployment among youth groups is as high as 40 percent and inflation is steep. The provinces suffer from the economic crisis significantly more than Tehran.

Gas prices have been heavily subsidized by the government, making gas prices inside the country some of the lowest in the world. Amid the economic crisis, some people smuggled gas to other countries to make money. At some point, however, the government had to remove the subsidies. Although Iran is an oil producing country, it struggles to meet the domestic demand for gas because international sanctions do not allow it to maintain refining plants or build new ones.

5. Prior mobilization dynamic

What were the characteristics of civic mobilization over the 20 years or so prior to this episode? Were protests a frequent occurrence? Did they tend to focus on different issues than this episode did (e.g., labor conditions)? What was the most recent mobilization prior to this episode? What role did previous protests (successful/unsuccessful; violent/nonviolent) and government responses to those protests play in this mobilization episode? How do the issues of any recent protests relate to this episode's framing of issues?

The last large mobilization in the country—the Green movement—happened in 2009. That protest was directed against alleged electoral falsifications and the victory of the conservative presidential candidate. The 2009 protest, however, was very different from the 2016–21 wave: it was concentrated in the capital, Tehran; had clear leaders and agenda; and attracted primarily the middle class. Small social protests were not unusual in the country, but they rarely turned into large mobilizations with political messages.

Another difference in the 2009 mobilization was the character of repression by the regime. In 2009, the regime cracked down brutally on the protests; during the 2017–21 wave, the regime used more sophisticated and targeted tactics of containment, a repertoire of which they had been developing since 2009.

Slightly over a year before the start of the protest wave in December 2017, there was a provincial protest of a political nature by Cyrus the Great's tomb. On October 29, 2016, 10,000 to 15,000 people (and up to 100,000 according to some reports), mostly educated youths, who opposed the current Islamic regime and shared a secular nationalist political stance, gathered by the tomb after the authorities prohibited the gathering that takes place there annually. The participants supported the monarchy disposed by the 1979 Islamic revolution and celebrated Persia's pre-Islamic glory. This protest, however, was disconnected from the economic protests that escalated in 2017.

6. Trigger

What was the trigger for this mobilization episode (state response to an exogenous shock? Electoral or constitutional power grab? An unpopular policy?)

The protests and strikes had various triggers, most related to economic grievances: removal of subsidies, new taxes, a spike in gas prices, salary arrays, shortage of drinking water, and general economic hardship.

7. Framing

What was the framing of this trigger, grievances, and demands during the episode? What was the role of different mobilization actors in shaping the framing? How/did the framing of why people should mobilize change over time? How did the framing help or hinder scaling up of the mobilization?

The framing focused on economic difficulties and inequalities. It addressed inflation; unemployment; low salaries; high prices, especially for gas; and geographic inequalities.

Some political slogans and signs calling for regime change were present as well: "Death to the dictator," "Death to [Ayatollah] Khamenei," "Mullahs get lost." Sometimes the protesters connected political slogans to the socioeconomic framing when they questioned the regime's focus on foreign policy and financial support for fighters in Syria, Palestine, and Hezbollah in Lebanon: "Forget Palestine," "Not Gaza, not Lebanon, my life for Iran." Some also expressed support for the Pahlavi dynasty ("Reza Shah, bless your soul") and called for it to come back, indicating a mix of monarchist views and the secular nationalism that is becoming more and more popular. The connection of the political framing to the economic one, however, remained loose, and calls for regime change did not seem to be supported by the majority of the protesters.

8. Tactics

What kind of tactics did the movement(s) use? How was the presence or absence of an upward scale shift related to these tactics?

Many protests in the 2016–21 wave were spontaneous, driven by the cascading effect of spreading information on social media, especially through Telegram and Instagram. The protests and strikes organized by specific professional and social groups were more coordinated. The labor protests were supported and led, in some instances, by semiautonomous organizations linked to state labor associations. These associations were created by the Iranian regime both before and after the 1979 Revolution to have organizational leverage over workers, but they have been acting with some degree of autonomy, using splits in the state apparatus to advance the interests of workers.

9. Actors: organizations

What powerful institutions, movements or parties were engaged in this mobilization episode (unions, religious organizations, opposition parties)? What are the key facts about any formal and informal organizations that joined or supported the mobilization?

The protests of the 2016–21 wave are generally characterized as leaderless. There does not seem to have been one entity coordinating from the center, but rather loosely connected social networks operating in the country and abroad.

Inside the country, labor protests were supported and led, in some instances, by semiautonomous organizations linked to state labor associations. These associations were created by the Iranian regime both before and after the 1979 Revolution to have organizational leverage over workers, but they have been acting with some degree of autonomy, using splits in the state apparatus to advance the interests of workers.

The labor associations driving part of the protest inside the country are disconnected from the antiregime opposition that mostly resides abroad. At least two organizations uniting Iranians in the country and abroad have emerged during the 2017–21 wave of mobilization. Farashgard (Iran Revival) was launched in September 2018 and declared secular democracy in Iran as its aim. It also stated that it "considers Prince Reza Pahlavi to have a key and pivotal role in coalescing all parts of Iranian society and the secular-democratic opposition toward a nonviolent overthrow." In 2019, Farashgard attempted to scale up the resistance campaign under the slogan, "My Face to the Nation! My Back to the Enemy!," originating from earlier protests, but that effort did not seem to have a large effect. Farashgard runs several crowdsourcing projects related to the continuing resistance. The Phoenix Project of Iran is a think tank organized by Reza Pahlavi, son of the last Iranian shah, and registered in Washington, DC, in February 2019 with the goal of developing policy solutions for Iran. As diaspora opposition groups, these organizations maintain a vocal online presence on Persian-language social media channels, but it is unlikely that they have the capacity or resources to lead offline protest actions inside Iran.

10. Actors: leaders

What were the characteristics of the leader(s), prominent activists, and public figures who participated in the mobilization? What was their professional and social

(ethnic/religious/class) background? What kinds of networks did they belong to and mobilize? Where did they get their organizing skills?

The protests of the 2017–21 wave are generally characterized as leaderless.

At least some of the in-country activists, such as one of the teachers' leaders, participated in the 2009 Green Revolution. Others, including one of the industrial workers' leaders, joined recently. Students are often mentioned as being most politically active. Numerous civil society activists have also emerged from lawyers' associations, given high-profile cases of lawyers themselves put into prison for defending civil society activities inside the country.

Part of the resistance movement, especially outside the country, sees Reza Pahlavi as a potential leader associated with secular nationalism. Pahlavi has a degree in political science from the University of Southern California and has studied nonviolent social movements. He claims that his only goal is democracy for Iran, although some of his critics claim he wants to take power for himself.

11. Actors: civil society

What was the role, if any, of local human rights and civil society organizations and movements?

Labor unions seem to be the only kinds of civil society organizations that the reports mention in connection with protests. Numerous civil society activists have also emerged from lawyers' associations, given high-profile cases of lawyers themselves put in prison for defending civil society activities inside the country.

12. Actors: youth

What was the role, if any, of youth organizations (formal or informal)?

The earlier protests, in 2016–17, were driven primarily by the youth, often students or college graduates, often unemployed or underemployed; starting in 2018, the youth became just one of the groups involved in the mobilization.

13. Actors: diaspora

What was the role of diaspora groups?

At least two organizations uniting Iranians in the country and abroad have emerged during the 2016–21 wave of mobilization. Farashgard (Iran Revival) was launched in September 2018 and declared secular democracy in Iran as its aim. It also stated that it "considers Prince Reza Pahlavi to have a key and pivotal role in coalescing all parts of Iranian society and the secular-democratic opposition toward a nonviolent overthrow." In 2019, Farashgard attempted to scale up the resistance campaign under the slogan, "My Face to the Nation! My Back to the Enemy!," originating from earlier protests, but the effect of that effort is unclear from the available sources. Farashgard runs several crowdsourcing projects related to the continuing resistance. The Phoenix Project of Iran is a think tank organized by Reza Pahlavi and registered in Washington, DC, in February 2019 with the goal of developing policy solutions for Iran. As diaspora opposition groups, these organizations maintain a vocal online presence on Persian-language social media channels, but it is unlikely that they have the capacity or resources to lead offline protest actions inside Iran.

The diaspora, potentially with the help of foreign governments, also runs some satellite channels beamed into the country. One example is the London-based channel named Manoto (Me and You), which clearly favors the Pahlavi dynasty. Possession of satellite reception equipment has been illegal in Iran since 1995, but the ban is rarely enforced.

14. Actors: international organizations

What was the role of INGOs/IGOs?

Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have reported on killings and arrests and issued statements on human rights violations.

15. Media and IT technologies

What media or IT technologies helped the mobilization to scale up (if at all)?

Telegram and Instagram are very popular in Iran and serve as the primary coordination platforms for the protesters. The Iranian government blocks certain platforms, such as Facebook, inside the country, but it seems that enough people are aware of how to use a VPN to go around the blockage. During the protests, the authorities had to shut down the internet almost completely for some time to slow down the spread of information through social media.

The diaspora, potentially with the help of foreign governments, also runs some satellite channels beamed into the country. One example is the London-based channel named Manoto (Me and You), which clearly favors the Pahlavi dynasty. Possession of satellite reception equipment has been illegal in Iran since 1995, but the ban is irregularly enforced.

16. Precursors summary

[for positive cases that scaled up] In your analysis, what are the main precursors that explain how or why people took to the streets in large numbers at this time and not on other occasions? Are there any that are not already listed here that led to the upward scale shift?
[for negative cases that did not scale up] In your analysis, what are the main factors that explain why the mobilization did not scale up despite the attempts to do so? Are there any factors not already listed here that prevented the upward scale shift?

This mobilization has been a multiyear process that is still in development. So far, the socioeconomic protests that have been driving this wave have not systematically connected to the antiregime political agenda, and the growth of the numbers were driven by (1) the economic deterioration and loss of hope for improvement after the failure of the JCPOA nuclear deal in 2016, (2) the growing importance of social media, and (3) the change in the government's repressive tactics from direct crackdown to containment. The more organized parts of this mobilization wave are focused on economic demands, not regime change. The calls for regime change do not yet have a good organizational base.

17. Key sources

What sources would be good for someone who wants to follow up on details of this case (up to five sources)?

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KAZAKHSTAN

1. Episode summary

In 2-4 sentences, summarize what this mobilization episode was about.

President Nursultan Nazarbayev, the autocrat who had been in power for more than 20 years, announced he would step down, and there would be presidential elections in a few months, with ruling party Nur Otan immediately backing the president's handpicked successor, Kasym-Zhomart Tokayev. A wide variety of activists mobilized during that period to protest the undemocratic process, but ultimately, the elections confirmed the predetermined result, and the arrest and harassment of activists dampened further street protests, though youth social movement activity continued the themes of the mobilization.

2. Dates, duration, and dynamics of the mobilization episode

What were the dates that mark the start, end, and scale-up (if any) of this episode? How long was the active phase of the mobilization? Can the mobilization episode be divided into stages? If yes, provide a brief (1-3 sentences) characteristic of each stage.

The mobilization episode examined here began in March 2019 with the announcement that the president would be stepping down, and elections would be held in June 2019. It scaled up in June just before the election date. It ended after postelection protests died down in the week following the election.

The first stage was a combination of public actions taken by individual activists followed by widespread circulation of information about those actions and the actions the state took to repress the activists. The second stage was street protests in May and June, organized by opposition leaders as well as by online activist and artist networks. The street protests were largest in the two main cities but took place in provincial cities as well. With the arrest of about 1,000 people between June 9 and 12, the episode wound down with protests in mid-June demanding the release of those detained, though the elevated level of small protests that started in 2018 only continued to rise into 2020.

The postelection 2019 period was critical for the formation of contentious politics within the newly emerged opposition. Even though the mobilization during this period was not as large as the one during the election period itself, the summer of 2019 became the "window of opportunities" for many new forces. Zhanbolat Mamay, a young and charismatic opposition leader, tried to consolidate the established opposition and pass a vote to get a leadership hold in the Social-Democratic Party (formerly Azat) in order to run for the parliamentary elections. His failure to get hold of the party leadership eventually led him to form his own party—Democratic Party of Kazakhstan—although its registration remains an unresolved issue. The youth activists from Oyan, Qazaqstan (Wake Up, Kazakhstan; hashtag #IWokeUp) who emerged on the wave of the Kazakh Spring (formed in the early days of the March resignation) found new ways to avoid police harassment during rallies the summer of 2019. They started walking rallies called locally *seruen* (literally, "a walk" in Kazakh) during which they gathered more supporters and discussed political alternatives. In the summer of 2019, everyone active in the political field awaited the changes Tokayev would propose, and all eyes were on the potential parliamentary elections in the fall. So, even though it was a relatively quiet period for mass mobilization, it was a crucial one for forming coalitions and gaining supporters—the processes that rarely get into the news but were decisive for the continuous protests throughout 2019 and early 2020 and even for the online protests during the pandemic.

3. Size of mobilization

Provide any information available about the number of participants, their social and/or professional status, the geographic spread of the mobilization, etc.

In March through May, the size was related to the audience for social media posts created by activists and thousands (probably tens of thousands) of people who shared these posts. Networks of youth who were academics, human rights activists, and artists were especially active in this phase. In early June, the upward scale shift occurred because of the election itself: protests with thousands of people in multiple cities took place both immediately before and after the June 10 election.

4. Episode background

What background facts does the reader need to know about the political and social context of the country to understand this episode?

From 1991 to 2019, Kazakhstan was ruled by one man and his political party, with occasional challengers during presidential and parliamentary elections. Opponents were jailed or exiled, and there were no powerful institutions or independent sources of power to challenge the central government. One banned opposition party operates in exile and attracts a small group of supporters from a generation that grew up during the Soviet Union.

5. Prior mobilization dynamic

What were the characteristics of civic mobilization over the 20 years or so prior to this episode? Were protests a frequent occurrence? Did they tend to focus on different issues than this episode did (e.g., labor conditions)? What was the most recent mobilization prior to this episode? What role did previous protests (successful/unsuccessful; violent/nonviolent) and government responses to those protests play in this mobilization episode? How do the issues of any recent protests relate to this episode's framing of issues?

Protests have been infrequent over the last 20 years in Kazakhstan and have tended to focus on labor rights (2011) and national sovereignty in relation to China (land ownership, 2016). Opposition groups and human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) staged a few small—and one nationwide (2018)—antitorture protests over the years and mobilized after the arrests of protesters. Between 2018 and 2020 there was a steady increase in protests,[9] and the change preceded the trigger for this mobilization episode. Online activism became popular as internet penetration rose from 31 percent in 2010 to over 70 percent in 2019.[10] While these earlier protests involved mostly the same sets of political and human rights activists, two mobilizations in the year just prior to this episode (in July 2018 and February 2019) mobilized different informal networks of artists and transparency/accountability activists and tackled issues around inadequate government capacity and related issues of corruption to ensure public safety.

In contrast with the corruption, torture, and state capacity framings of earlier protests, the framings of the March to June mobilization episode reflected a frustration among youth that they would not be allowed to decide their own future, as reflected in the popular hashtag #IHaveAChoice. The government responded to these governance-themed protests by dismissing some officials and including activists in policy discussions, but when a mobilization touches politics rather than policies, the government is more active in making arrests and targeting the opposition with disinformation campaigns.

6. Trigger

What was the trigger for this mobilization episode (state response to an exogenous shock? Electoral or constitutional power grab? An unpopular policy?)

The episode began in March 2019, when activists responded to the announcement of snap presidential elections and the ruling party's backing of its preferred candidate by mobilizing on a small scale around whether the elections would be fair and in accordance with the constitution. The new generation of protesters, or the so-called youth protesters, was also angered by the fact that everything remained the same after Nazarbayev's resignation. Many of them for years lived in hopes that the end of Nazarbayev rule would mean the end of authoritarianism. But when interim president Tokayev made no changes toward democratization and even renamed the capital city in March to Nur-Sultan to commemorate the old dictator, the youth activists got very upset and felt helpless. They took to the streets to protect their constitutional rights for fair and open elections.

7. Framing

What was the framing of this trigger, grievances, and demands during the episode? What was the role of different mobilization actors in shaping the framing? How/did the framing of why people should mobilize change over time? How did the framing help or hinder scaling up of the mobilization?

The Kazakh Spring mobilization demanded significant democratization and restructuring of the legal system to make it less authoritarian and more democratic. The protesters openly ridiculed the regime's dependency on Nazarbayev. One of the Oyan, Qazaqstan slogans at their numerous rallies was "Kazakhstan without Nazarbayevs," and it became a slogan for the January 2022 mass protests when the protesters demanded a complete "cleansing" campaign to remove all of Nazarbayev's family members and acquaintances from their politically and economically powerful positions. The Kazakh Spring mobilization stood in direct opposition to the political status quo, which at the time was completely dependent on elites' direct loyalty and accountability to Nazarbayev personally even when

he was no longer the president. His cult of personality remained the informal channel of ruling power relations in Kazakhstan up till the early 2022, when the rules of the game changed. Until then he was seen as the sole decision-maker, and the Kazakh Spring mobilizations openly criticized that by painting anti-Nazarbayev murals and public art negating his power. In doing so, they attempted to change the power dynamics or at least shed light on the illiberal aspect of such power monopoly.

The initial framing was whether the elections would be fair and in accordance with the constitution (for example, the slogans "For an honest election" and "The sole source of state power is the people," a quote from Kazakhstan's constitution).

The protests were tactically innovative in that they were small scale (individual activists alone or in pairs), highly visible (taking place at a public event or in a public square), and easily spread on social media, such as hanging a banner with the words "You can't run from the truth" along a marathon route. The activists who staged these protests were arrested and sentenced to short terms (for example, 15 days), and these arrests shifted subsequent framings and individual protest actions to also focus on the right to assembly and freedom of expression. In April, a number of artists and public figures picked up on these themes in their social media accounts.

While protests in April and May focused on the fairness of the election, they also tested the limits of freedom of expression in creative ways, creating a backlash domestically and internationally against the state for arresting people who showed up for national holiday celebrations displaying a particular color or holding blank signs.[11] One popular form of online protest was to post on social media a picture of oneself taking a walk with hashtag #seruen (a walk), daring authorities to arrest people for taking a walk and posting about it on social media.

In early June, the upward scale shift occurred because of the election itself: protests with thousands of people in multiple cities took place both immediately before and after the June 10 election, which the leading party's candidate won by a landslide. Protests focused on the illegitimacy of the election with chants of "boycott" and "Tokayev is not my president."

8. Tactics

What kind of tactics did the movement(s) use? How was the presence or absence of an upward scale shift related to these tactics?

The March and April actions were tactically innovative in that they were small scale (individual activists alone or in pairs), highly visible (taking place at a public event or in a public square), and easily spread on social media, such as hanging a banner with the words "You can't run from the truth" along a marathon route. These actions were clever or cheeky, directly challenging state power but in a way that was visually nonthreatening because it was just a sign or two people together. The involvement of artists in the movement meant that more subtle critiques circulated in the form of artistic images and also more direct critiques in video form such as "I woke up today," a video associated with Oyan, Qazaqstan that criticized governance issues directly.

9. Actors: organizations

What powerful institutions, movements or parties were engaged in this mobilization episode (unions, religious organizations, opposition parties)? What are the key facts about any formal and informal organizations that joined or supported the mobilization?

There are no powerful institutions or independent sources of power that challenge the central government. One banned opposition party, Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DVK), operates in exile and attracts a small group of supporters from a generation that grew up during the Soviet Union. In May through June, more traditional public protests were organized by the exiled opposition party, but others were organized by independent youth activists who did not want to be associated with the political opposition. Oyan, Qazaqstan activists specifically stated that they were not associated with Mukhtar Ablyazov, the opposition leader in exile, but Ablyazov continuously attempted to frame them as his supporters—a move that would immediately land them at the police station. Unfortunately, the opposition in exile continues to use the tactic of appropriating all protest movements inside Kazakhstan though Ablyazov's supporters make up a marginal share in the widespread protests. Other protesters get harassed simply for an association they have never claimed or communicated with.

Throughout this episode, organizers and people who became publicly associated with the protests because of their arrest included the following: musicians, poets, and artists; staff associated with NGOs working on human rights, civil society, and media; and a number of young people described in reports as activists and bloggers who comprised an informal network that bridged communities of artists, civic activists, and environmentalists. Youths were

a main force in organizing protests and spreading messages, especially via an overlapping network of activists, artists, and academics who founded a popular social movement (Wake Up, Kazakhstan; hashtag #IWokeUp) with a vision for political reform just days before the presidential election.

10. Actors: leaders

What were the characteristics of the leader(s), prominent activists, and public figures who participated in the mobilization? What was their professional and social (ethnic/religious/class) background? What kinds of networks did they belong to and mobilize? Where did they get their organizing skills?

Leaders were not a prominent feature of the movement, but those arrested early on for cheeky protest actions were at least inspiration for, if not actively led, subsequent actions. The opposition leader in exile organized activities via Facebook, triggering long internet blocks for the times when he addressed his audiences online (usually from 8 to 10 p.m. Almaty time), and Oyan, Qazaqstan was deliberately leaderless. Many Oyan, Qazaqstan public figures speak English and Russian and were educated abroad. Most of the mobilization's leaders were ethnic Kazakhs, though one NGO leader whose name is associated with helping young activists organize has a Slavic name. There are probably other older NGO staff and human rights activists who organized behind the scenes, as well as older folks who support the political opposition.

11. Actors: civil society

What was the role, if any, of local human rights and civil society organizations and movements?

This mobilization episode describes the emergence of the Kazakh Spring—the new political field of different actors and one specific social movement—Oyan, Qazaqstan (Wake Up, Kazakhstan). So, the regime challengers were very new social and political actors who tried to push the frames of political competition and change the regime. These actors cannot be seen as a coherent group of people with the same goals or slogans. For example, Oyan, Qazaqstan quite clearly stated its position that it will not stand for any elections until the country democratizes and all-important legal amendments it proposed are implemented. That can take years, albeit some small changes are currently underway. Other actors within this wave continuously aspired for political and institutional representation and called for the creation and registration of new political parties, for example, the attempts by Zhanbolat Mamay and Asya Tulesova in August 2019 and early 2020, respectively. While all the actors within the Kazakh Spring stand under the banner of democratization, they stand in sharp distinction from the established opposition, which consistently failed to address the regime. There is a deep generational and political gap between the Kazakh Spring actors and the old opposition that may not be entirely consolidated. (That said, Zhanbolat Mamay continues to work with some members of the old opposition who support his creation of the Democratic Party and rally with him at his protests, but those people are marginal in the overall picture of the great mobilizations.)

Two recurrent themes connected the Kazakh Spring protesters with the old civil society groups—commemoration of the Zhanaozen 2011 uprising victims and the demand to release political prisoners, for example, Aron Atabek, who was still alive at the time. Atabek's daughter, Aidana, was and remained an active member of the Kazakh Spring, and she was one of the first protesters to demand the release of her father and other political prisoners. With the advent of the elections, the Kazakh Spring protesters also started paying more attention to election observation and NGOs that dealt with these aspects. Over time, the connection between the civil society NGOs and different Kazakh Spring actors grew deeper precisely along these three main lines of engagement and also in connection to legal advice when protesters got arrested or were tried in court.

There was a huge wave of young electoral observers among the popular bloggers at the time (Madina Musina, known as Mada Mada; Assel Mukazhanova, an urban observer from Astana; and others) as well as young artists, poets, and other creative intelligentsia. They relied heavily on information and help from the civil rights and electoral observations NGOs. During the postelection rallies and mass arrests, the Kazakh Spring activists also built bridges with known NGOs and experts who were helping movements like Oyan, Qazaqstan to immediately come up with a rally information checklist (*pamyatka*) that had all the crucial information for activists who got arrested. These flyers were distributed in three languages in print form at the rallies and online on all social media platforms on the eve of the next rally. Among civil society figures, Tatiana Chernobil and the school for human rights defenders or Youth Information Service of Kazakhstan (MISK), were key in establishing an initial legal helpline for all arrested activists.

12. Actors: youth

What was the role, if any, of youth organizations (formal or informal)?

Youths were a main force in organizing protests and spreading messages, especially via an overlapping network of activists, artists, and academics who founded a popular social movement (Wake Up, Kazakhstan; hashtag #IWokeUp) with a vision for political reform just days before the presidential election.

13. Actors: diaspora

What was the role of diaspora groups?

While there was an international audience and sympathy for the protesters, there is no evidence of specific international or diaspora material support or guidance other than the Democratic Choice activists in exile. There were two protesting groups in exile—one in Paris and one in Berlin—that did not associate with the Democratic Choice and were formed sporadically on the wave of support for the Kazakh Spring protests in Kazakhstan. Because these groups in diaspora were spontaneous, they organized occasionally and on specific days of commemorations.

14. Actors: international organizations

What was the role of INGOs/IGOs?

Some of these activists built their networks and may have honed their messaging and tactics through their participation in a school for human rights defenders funded by international donors.

15. Media and IT technologies

What media or IT technologies helped the mobilization to scale up (if at all)?

Facebook was used heavily to communicate messages and memes and to organize. WhatsApp and Telegram were probably also used to coordinate protest actions and to get around internet blockages. Social media played a huge role in helping the mobilizations. Most conventional media in Kazakhstan are restricted and censored and provide mainly information that is pro-regime. Thus, activists needed additional space for gathering trustworthy information and resources when social media was essential. Activists used all social media platforms—Facebook, Instagram, and Telegram as well as Whatsapp, Viber, and other apps—to spread information and share details of the planned rallies and important legal information for all those who got arrested. Additionally, on the night after the election, many independent observers used online live streams to document the counting of the votes at their polling stations. Thousands of people tuned in to watch the count and see the result in real time. The night of June 9 to 10 was crucial in changing the paradigm and allowing citizens to see that they can observe democratic ways of holding elections even though the presidential candidates were handpicked. The authorities restricted internet use right after the elections when they feared it was being used to organize mass mobilizations in Almaty and Astana. Still, people managed to connect through VPNs and spread information about the major rallies that managed to happen in both cities.

16. Precursors summary

[for positive cases that scaled up] In your analysis, what are the main precursors that explain how or why people took to the streets in large numbers at this time and not on other occasions? Are there any that are not already listed here that led to the upward scale shift?
[for negative cases that did not scale up] In your analysis, what are the main precursors that explain why the mobilization did not scale up despite the attempts to do so? Are there any that are not already listed here that prevented the upward scale shift?

The most important precursors that explain why and how this protest was able to scale up at this time are as follows: a genuine, if tightly controlled, transition of power was going to take place; informal organization was made possible through a rapid increase in youths' use of social media since the last election; a series of recent state failures to maintain public safety made criticism of the government more common in public discourse; and the involvement of artists alongside civil society and environmental activists made the movement's messages and tactics more broadly appealing.

17. Key sources

What sources would be good for someone who wants to follow up on details of this case (up to five sources)?

Wood, Colleen. "Wave of Creative Protests Threaten Kazakhstan's Elite Ahead of Elections." *Waging Nonviolence* (blog), May 29, 2019. https://wagingnonviolence.org/2019/05/wave-creative-protests-threaten-kazakhstan-elite-ahead-elections/.

"2018–2020 Kazakh Protests." In *Wikipedia*, October 22, 2021. https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=2018%E2%80%932020_Kazakh_protests&oldid=1051294883.

Radio Free Europe, Eurasianet, and the Diplomat have provided good references to this mobilization episode.

RUSSIA

1. Episode summary

In 2-4 sentences, summarize what this mobilization episode was about.

The episode consisted of a series of street protests with primarily an anticorruption agenda inspired by Aleksey Navalny and his Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK) during the run-up to the 2018 presidential election. The first one was triggered by the release of a film about the corruption of Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev. The subsequent protests were tied to important dates and holidays and wound down after the fourth inauguration of Vladimir Putin, in May 2018. This was the first nationwide protest since the 2011–12 wave of electoral mobilization. It was during this wave that Navalny established himself as the leader of the Russian opposition.

2. Dates, duration, and dynamics of the mobilization episode

What were the dates that mark the start, end, and scale-up (if any) of this episode? How long was the active phase of the mobilization? Can the mobilization episode be divided into stages? If yes, provide a brief (1-3 sentences) characteristic of each stage.

Navalny's December 2016 announcement of his presidential bid in the 2018 election can be considered the start of this mobilization episode. Together with that announcement, he said his team would be creating an organizational network in the Russian regions to support the bid.

Two main protests happened in March and June 2017. On March 2, 2017, Navalny released an investigative documentary, "He Is Not Dimon to You," which accused Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev of corruption. After about two weeks, Navalny called his supporters to protest since the authorities did not open an investigation. On March 26, 2017, people took to the streets in 97 Russian cities and towns.

The next protest happened on June 12, 2017, which is Russia Day—a national holiday. Navalny chose that day for the next anticorruption protest in order to merge the themes of patriotism and anticorruption. This protest was even larger than the March 26 one with people in 154 cities and towns participating.

Three more protests connected to this episode followed on October 7, 2017, the day of Putin's 65th birthday; January 28, 2018, when Navalny was denied registration as a presidential candidate; and May 5, 2018, two days before the fourth inauguration of Vladimir Putin as president. These protests also took place in dozens of cities and towns but attracted fewer people than the ones in March and June.

3. Size of mobilization

Provide any information available about the number of participants, their social and/or professional status, the geographic spread of the mobilization, etc.

The March 2017 protest took place in over 97 cities and towns across the country. The number of participants is estimated to be between 36,000 and 88,000. The June protest attracted between 50,000 and 98,000 participants in 154 cities and towns across the country and is believed to be the largest during this mobilization episode.

The March protests were reported to have attracted a large number of younger people too young to participate in the 2011–12 mobilization wave who came to protest for the first time.

4. Episode background

What background facts does the reader need to know about the political and social context of the country to understand this episode?

Vladimir Putin had been in power in Russia since 2000, for 17 years by the time of this mobilization, including when he was formally prime minister while the president's office was occupied by his placeholder, Dmitry Medvedev. His first decade in power coincided with high oil prices and the economic boom in Russia, which significantly increased his popularity, together with his crackdown on the oligarchs and a tough stance in the international arena. By the end of the decade, however, his popularity decreased, and the 2011–12 electoral cycle was particularly challenging as it was accompanied by nationwide protests. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 boosted his approval for a few years, but by 2017, its effect had diminished. The Russian opposition during this time enjoyed limited support and suffered

from internal divisions, although it was clearly learning and becoming more creative over time.

5. Prior mobilization dynamic

What were the characteristics of civic mobilization over the 20 years or so prior to this episode? Were protests a frequent occurrence? Did they tend to focus on different issues than this episode did (e.g., labor conditions)? What was the most recent mobilization prior to this episode? What role did previous protests (successful/unsuccessful; violent/nonviolent) and government responses to those protests play in this mobilization episode? How do the issues of any recent protests relate to this episode's framing of issues?

The largest previous wave of nationwide protests before 2017 took place in 2011–12 at the time of parliamentary and presidential elections. Those protests were largely directed against electoral falsifications, and they gave rise to several grassroots initiatives related to election transparency and protection from police brutality, initiatives that were still in place in 2017. The 2014 annexation of Crimea significantly diminished the protest potential of the Russian population because of the population rallying around the flag and a series of repressive legislation, and in this sense, the 2017–18 wave was new. However, the themes of free and fair elections as well as corruption, which became much bigger than in 2011–12, were similar as well as the organizational structures involved. In 2011–12, Navalny was certainly one of the main protest leaders, but there were others who were similar in terms of their position in the protest movement. In 2017, he became undoubtedly the main leader of the opposition.

6. Trigger

What was the trigger for this mobilization episode (state response to an exogenous shock? Electoral or constitutional power grab? An unpopular policy?)

The release of an investigative documentary, "He Is Not Dimon to You," about the corruption of Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, was the trigger for this mobilization episode.

7. Framing

What was the framing of this trigger, grievances, and demands during the episode? What was the role of different mobilization actors in shaping the framing? How/did the framing of why people should mobilize change over time? How did the framing help or hinder scaling up of the mobilization?

These protests were largely framed as anticorruption ones. Navalny's presidential bid was also framed in the same way. Navalny had developed and sharpened that framing for years and had become very good in connecting corruption to the economic difficulties of ordinary people and the bad quality of public services. That connection helped to attract more people as did simple messages and images from the documentary's investigation. For example, one of the symbols of this protest was a duck, which referred to the house for the duck at the pond by Dmitry Medvedev's mansion. This house for the duck was seen as the symbol of luxury, and protesters came to the streets with toy ducks. A similar duck was also often featured in Navalny's videos, as an element of decor in the studio or as a moving icon to engage the audience.

8. Tactics

What kind of tactics did the movement(s) use? How was the presence or absence of an upward scale shift related to these tactics?

The tactic that may have been the most important for the upward scale shift was presenting the investigation in the form of a skillfully made video with a story and graphics that is relatively easy to understand and interesting to watch. That helped to reach a wide audience, especially the youth. This was not the first of Navalny's investigations to be done in that way, but it was never about a figure as big as prime minister.

The popularity of Navalny's anticorruption videos was partially due to two trends in the mass media in the mid-2010s: the rapid expansion of videoblogging and the rise of investigative journalism, which became popular among a highly educated public. Navalny's team managed to marry the highly sophisticated (and nerdy) trade of investigative journalism and flashy, professionally made entertainment content available to all online.

9. Actors: organizations

What powerful institutions, movements or parties were engaged in this mobilization episode (unions, religious organizations, opposition parties)? What are the key facts about any formal and informal organizations that joined or supported the mobilization?

Alexey Navalny and his Anti-Corruption Foundation were the main organizers. He announced the protest dates on his blog and provided templates of official requests to city authorities for a permit to hold a protest. These templates were used by activists in different cities to file their requests.

Navalny and his organization drew on the informal network of supporters they grew over the years, and especially in 2015–16, after the release of Navalny's first big investigation, about Russia's prosecutor general, Yuri Chaika. Navalny's team also likely connected activists in the same city since there were no reports of multiple groups in the same city.

10. Actors: leaders

What were the characteristics of the leader(s), prominent activists, and public figures who participated in the mobilization? What was their professional and social (ethnic/religious/class) background? What kinds of networks did they belong to and mobilize? Where did they get their organizing skills?

Navalny has a legal background, which has allowed him to organize different anticorruption initiatives since the late 2000s. He was the first one among the Russian opposition to master crowdfunding and crowdsourcing for his projects. For example, one of his projects was about potholes on Russian roads, in which people could submit pictures and addresses, and a system would generate an official complaint. Navalny used to specialize in auditing government procurement but eventually found the format of investigative videos, which helped to engage a much wider audience. Experience in crowdfunding allowed his team to hire professionals to help produce the videos for his YouTube channel.

11. Actors: civil society

What was the role, if any, of local human rights and civil society organizations and movements?

Civil society organizations, such as OVD-Info and Apologiya Protesta, were involved in helping those detained during the protests. They provided access to attorneys as well as collected and systematized information about detentions and arrests.

Navalny's FBK is also a civil society organization, although since Navalny was going to run for the presidency, it could also be considered a political group. Civic-political division does not work well in countries like Russia where any criticism of the current regime is presented as political.

12. Actors: youth

What was the role, if any, of youth organizations (formal or informal)?

There did not seem to be any youth organizations involved, but the protests attracted many young people who had never participated in protests before. It is very possible that some informal communities formed in the process of this mobilization episode.

13. Actors: diaspora

What was the role of diaspora groups?

The diaspora was not publicly involved in this mobilization in any organized way. Some diaspora members, such as Sergei Guriev, an economics professor currently living in France, has publicly supported Alexey Navalny for years. Others, such as Boris Zimin, a Russian businessman and philanthropist, have supported Navalny financially for years.

14. Actors: international organizations

What was the role of INGOs/IGOs?

International organizations were not involved except for releasing statements about arrests, which followed the street protests.

15. Media and IT technologies

What media or IT technologies helped the mobilization to scale up (if at all)?

YouTube as a popular media and various internet communication channels (Telegram, WhatsApp, Facebook, Vkontakte) were important for this mobilization. Without them, it would not have happened. Navalny's offices in the region used social media to spread information about the events.

16. Precursors summary

[for positive cases that scaled up] In your analysis, what are the main precursors that explain how or why people took to the streets in large numbers at this time and not on other occasions? Are there any that are not already listed here that led to the upward scale shift?
[for negative cases that did not scale up] In your analysis, what are the main precursors that explain why the mobilization did not scale up despite the attempts to do so? Are there any that are not already listed here that prevented the upward scale shift?

The main precursors were likely the combination of effective communication by Navalny, who connected corruption to everyday problems, which spoke to the younger generation in particular, and the presence, in different locations across the country, a network of his supporters, who were able to organize the protests where they were. The presence of a younger generation that did not remember the political battles of 2011–12 and saw Navalny and his agenda as something new also helped.

17. Key sources

What sources would be good for someone who wants to follow up on details of this case (up to five sources)?

Filipov, David. "Russian Police Arrest Anti-Corruption Leader Navalny, Hundreds More in Nationwide Rallies: The Demonstrations Appeared to Be the Largest in Russia in Years." *The Washington Post* (*Online*). March 26, 2017. 1881431085. Global Newsstream. https://proxy.lib.umich.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/blogs-podcasts-websites/russian-police-arrest-anti-corruption-leader/docview/1881431085/se-2?accountid=14667.

Higgins, Andrew. "Aleksei Navalny, Top Putin Critic, Arrested as Protests Flare in Russia." *New York Times* (*Online*). March 26, 2017. 1880891677. Global Newsstream. https://proxy.lib.umich.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/blogs-podcasts-websites/aleksei-navalny-top-putin-critic-arrested-as/docview/1880891677/se-2?accountid=14667.

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Walker, Shaun, and Alec Luhn. "Opposition Leader Alexei Navalny Detained amid Protests across Russia." *The Guardian*, March 27, 2017, sec. World news. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/26/opposition-leader-alexei-navalny-arrested-amid-protests-across-russia.

SUDAN

Note: Much of the information in this brief is taken (sometimes verbatim, with page numbers cited) from Stephen Zunes's analysis ("Sudan's 2019 Revolution: The Power of Civil Resistance," ICNC Special Report Series Volume 5, ICNC Press, Washington, DC, April 2021, https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Zunes-Sudans-2019-Revolution.pdf), which uses a very similar framework to ours.

1. Episode summary

In 2-4 sentences, summarize what this mobilization episode was about.

In August 2018, President Omar al-Bashir announced he would run for a third term, but the ruling coalition was divided about supporting that move, which would require changing the constitution. Record inflation and an economic downturn coupled with sanctions forced the government to lift subsidies on basic commodities, making it extremely difficult for ordinary people to get by. The ruling party split, and the opposition united in part because two social movements emerged, one led by the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) and the other by neighborhood committees headed by youth throughout the country. The revolution produced by this mobilization was successful because the military staged a coup, and the president was imprisoned. However, civic mobilization after the coup continued to keep the pressure on the military, which eventually negotiated power sharing with the civic coalition.

2. Dates, duration, and dynamics of the mobilization episode

What were the dates that mark the start, end, and scale-up (if any) of this episode? How long was the active phase of the mobilization? Can the mobilization episode be divided into stages? If yes, provide a brief (1-3 sentences) characteristic of each stage.

The escalation started somewhat behind the scenes in August 2018 when the National Congress Party (NCP) said it would back al-Bashir as its candidate in the 2020 presidential election. On December 13, 2018, a group of youths and women went to the streets protesting high food prices in Al-Damazin, and then, on December 18, angry protesters burned down the National Congress Party house in Shandi, the capital of president Bashir's home state, in protest against increased prices and the reduced size of bread sold. It is likely that civil society and political groups had been strategizing and organizing since the August announcement because they responded very quickly once the economic protests started. By January 1, 2019, they had a nonviolent civil resistance strategy and organization in place. In Feburary 2019, Bashir declared a state of emergency to quash protests, but a key military personnel (who later became vice president) refused to use force against the population.

In early April, a million people marched to the military headquarters (HQ), and organizers spontaneously declared a sit-in that involved hundreds of thousands of people and lasted months, despite violent attacks coming from pro-Bashir thugs. The movement took inspiration when similar protests forced out Algeria's president that same month. On April 11, the military took over "for two years," and a state of emergency was again imposed for three months. However, the sit-in continued and pressured military officers into resigning from key political leadership positions. Pressure was also coming from the organization of revolutionary neighborhood committees around the country, and the coalition of civilian leaders (civic, professional, political party, and armed group leaders) negotiated an agreement with the military by August.

3. Size of mobilization

Provide any information available about the number of participants, their social and/or professional status, the geographic spread of the mobilization, etc.

The first marches had participants in the hundreds, made up of youths and women in the first one and a broader group in the second. The march on the military HQ was at least a million, and the sit-in involved hundreds of thousands. The June 30 street protest involved millions across the country (one of the largest protests in history per capita).

4. Episode background

What background facts does the reader need to know about the political and social context of the country to

understand this episode?

Bashir came to power via a coup against a democratically elected leader in 1989, and his coalition was backed by ultra-conservative Islamists and right-wing military. Sudanese civil society organizations (CSOs), particularly labor unions, played a critical role in the successful prodemocracy uprisings against military dictatorships in 1964 and 1985. However, after its military coup, General Bashir's regime made sure to gut the power of unions. In 1992, the Labor Unions Act changed sector-based unions to institution-based unions and minimized their power from nationwide to limited micro unions. Other independent organizations—from human rights groups, political parties, and religious leaders, to the Rotary Club—were suppressed by the regime, and organizing was extremely challenging. According to Zunes, "The independent business sector was limited as well, with the government making it very difficult to run a successful company unless it was clearly pro-regime. Opposition political parties were severely restricted in their activities, and the older, more established parties had little credibility or support among younger Sudanese" (2).

5. Prior mobilization dynamic

What were the characteristics of civic mobilization over the 20 years or so prior to this episode? Were protests a frequent occurrence? Did they tend to focus on different issues than this episode did (e.g., labor conditions)? What was the most recent mobilization prior to this episode? What role did previous protests (successful/unsuccessful; violent/nonviolent) and government responses to those protests play in this mobilization episode? How do the issues of any recent protests relate to this episode's framing of issues?

Despite the government crackdown and suspension of unions, student organizations, CSOs, and political opposition since the 1989 military coup, the student movements within the universities persisted in the form of on-campus debates and demand-based protests. In October 2009, university students launched the Girifna movement (Girifna means "we are fed up" in Arabic) protesting war, corruption, and the regime's efforts to divide the country in two on a racial and extremist religious basis. There had been street demonstration in 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2016. The 2013 mobilization was violent, and the government had agents provocateurs escalate the violence, so movement leaders realized that a commitment to nonviolent tactics might be advantageous. Zunes writes that the Sudan Call declaration was organized in December 2014 and signed by leading opposition groups and the newly formed Civil Society Initiative (CSI) "led by a renowned human rights lawyer and activist. The Call demanded an end to one-party rule and the establishment of a transitional government that would lead to a constitutional process and prepare for national elections" (Zunes, 4). Protests broke out across Sudan against price hikes caused by government austerity measures. In November to December 2016, hundreds protested against a government decision to slash fuel subsidies, as required by the International Monetary Fund.

6. Trigger

What was the trigger for this mobilization episode (state response to an exogenous shock? Electoral or constitutional power grab? An unpopular policy?)

There was growing economic discontent fueled by international sanctions and International Criminal Court (ICC) indictments on the president, a power grab by the president in August, and in December, government-lifted subsidies on a number of basic consumer goods triggering the initial protests, but the timing of the scale-up is interesting. The trigger here was different than in other cases because the opposition was so well organized that they more or less picked the time to start escalating pressure on the regime. The SPA originally advocated just for an increase in the minimum wage, but when they saw that demonstrators were ready to call for regime change, they shifted their strategy. Then state-citizen interaction at the protests became violent, and the state cracked down hard with killings, curfews, and social media shutdowns, provoking further anger among the public. It was in this context that the huge scale-up began.

7. Framing

What was the framing of this trigger, grievances, and demands during the episode? What was the role of different mobilization actors in shaping the framing? How/did the framing of why people should mobilize change over time? How did the framing help or hinder scaling up of the mobilization?

The overall framing was removal of the Islamist's National Congress Party regime and a transition to a multiparty system, and then, after the military coup, a transition to civilian rule. The slogans used were "Fall, that's all!" for Bashir, "Fall, again!" for the Transitional Military Council, and "It fell twice, it will fall again!" several in the military were successfully pressured to resign their political positions.

Another framing was used to unite the country, a counterframing to the regime's discourse, which divided people by race and religion: "You are a racist regime, we are all Darfur." The slogan was driven by youths who felt the older generation's divisive thinking had led to a lot of the country's problems (Zunes, 17). A third framing was to call out the regime's alliance with Islamists as self-justifying propaganda, dubbing them "merchants of religion" and showing how they used Islam as a commodity to solidify their control on power. "Among other results, this effort led to some prominent members of the Islamist party's youth wing defecting to the side of the revolution" (Zunes, 20).

There was also a form of framing in action or prefigurative politics: "Each Saturday, under the slogan, 'We are going to build it,' activists engaged in cleaning up streets and sidewalks, painting walls, and other community projects underscoring that they were connected and committed to the community and that their goal was to build a better society.… An image of the empowered youth emerged, risking their lives, assuming leadership, and working hard for a better future for all" (Zunes, 21).

8. Tactics

What kind of tactics did the movement(s) use? How was the presence or absence of an upward scale shift related to these tactics?

People in the movement were tactically brilliant and nimble at adapting not just tactics but their overall goal when they got new information. They had years of practice, excellent training, and were following models of nonviolent resistance from other countries. One of the outstanding factors for the movement's success was its strength in remaining nonviolent despite the harsh forces. Since the 2013 protest, youths had formed local organizations called area committees responsible for door-to-door mobilization and community engagement. The area committees helped create safe areas fully controlled by the movement.

The SPA was mostly the lead on tactics coordinated by the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) and trickled those tactics down nationwide in weekly action timetables through resistance/neighborhood committees. The tactics were designed to be low-key (for example, holding an event at a neighborhood soccer field in the middle of the night)—nonviolent, visible, ubiquitous, low-cost actions to entice participation, shift public perception, and put constant pressure on the government through sporadic protests and the burning of tires. One of the best tactics to include more groups and expand the movement was the designation of weeks dedicated to specific groups. For example, a week would be dedicated to women and another one to war victims, and that tactic helped expand mobilization. The circulation on social media of images of protests in "villages no one had heard of" also changed the mindset of organizers in the center and gave them hope that they should keep going.

They also realized it was time to shift tactics and escalate, especially when divisions within the regime were made clear to them, and that is when the march on military HQ was decided on. However, they were not seriously considering a sit-in until hundreds of thousands of people showed up for the march. They announced the sit-in at the march. No doubt that also kept the military on their toes—they had decided to tolerate a march but were not prepared for the sit-in and responded by shutting off the power grid to the whole country. The sit-in was accompanied by strikes nationwide. On May 28 and 29, there was a general strike, and in response to the June 3 violence, they called a successful three-day general strike on June 9.

9. Actors: organizations

What powerful institutions, movements or parties were engaged in this mobilization episode (unions, religious organizations, opposition parties)? What are the key facts about any formal and informal organizations that joined or supported the mobilization?

The SPA began to form in 2012 but was not allowed to formally register due to the crackdown on trade unions, though they created a charter in 2016 and publicly supported strikes and economic protests. They are an alliance of mainly liberal professional associations, initially composed of the Sudan Doctors' Committee, the Democratic Lawyers' Association, and the Sudanese Journalist Network, later joined by associations and committees of pharmacists, teachers, and professors. The SPA was not the initiator of the revolution but emerged as a key coordinator of the popular uprising by proposing maps and an agenda for what became weekly demonstrations every Thursday and later the"million marches." Rooted in a longer history of leftist Sudanese professional associations, the SPA had been reactivated in 2018 and appeared during 2019 as a leading member of the FFC. The FCC declaration was signed on January 1, 2019, and built on five branches representing heterogeneous groups from civil society, professional associations, political parties, coalitions, and armed groups from

western, eastern, and southern Sudan.

Grassroots groups played a key role in the social movement and the revolution. Local youths made up groups, later on known as neighborhood resistance committees (NRCs), which supported the organization of the demonstrations and public awareness at a very local level in many neighborhoods. The NRCs were made up of small groups of people with different political and social trajectories; some already had experience in contestation, but the NRCs were not designed or controlled by any political party. They were very well organized and conducted underground actions to organize demonstrations in their neighborhood or in other parts of the cities, in coordination with other NRCs (Zunes, 19).

10. Actors: leaders

What were the characteristics of the leader(s), prominent activists, and public figures who participated in the mobilization? What was their professional and social (ethnic/religious/class) background? What kinds of networks did they belong to and mobilize? Where did they get their organizing skills?

One of the things that stands out about the leadership of this episode is the prominent role women played, especially considering their normally prescribed role in Arab-Muslim societies. A feature of the NRCs was that they were leaderless and decentralized.

Mohamed Yousif Ahmed Al Mustafa, who started the SPA, was a state labor minister and an anthropology professor. Another SPA leader was a doctor, Mohamed Nagi Al Asam.

Since the first week of the protest, government security detained almost all the SPA leaders. However, the detention never stopped the SPA's work. Instead, it became a ghost body operating with no publicly known leadership except two or three spokespersons in the diaspora.

11. Actors: civil society

What was the role, if any, of local human rights and civil society organizations and movements?

The role of formal and informal civil society was pervasive (see above on organizations). On January 1, 2019, less than two weeks after the initial 2018 protests, the first coordinating committee came together consisting of Sudan Call, the SPA, Sudan Revolutionary Front, No to Oppression against Women Initiative, Women of Sudanese Civic and Political Groups (MANSAM), National Consensus Forces, and the Unionist Gathering. The FCC declaration "was joined by 150 other groups, some of which were already coalitions, each of them nominating representatives to the coordinating committee" (Zunes, 4).

The main thing to add here is that after the public was well mobilized, the SPA facilitated the expansion of the vision and the movement. The SPA drafted the Freedom and Change Declaration, providing a road map for political transformation. The process of drafting and getting organizations to sign on to the declaration allowed the SPA to expand the alliance across political parties, armed movements, and civil society.

12. Actors: youth

What was the role, if any, of youth organizations (formal or informal)?

Youths were the leaders of the NRCs, which even before the coup had started to take over the neighborhood councils formed by the dominant party. The NRCs were very well organized and had a cell structure that allowed new leaders to replace a group if members were arrested. Students were very involved in the sit-in activities.

The resistance committees grew out of the 2013 protests, though some could trace their roots as far back as 2008, and formed loose networks that would engage in periodic small protests. According to Zunes, "The committees were informal, locally autonomous, and covered neighborhoods, villages, and other smaller networks of residents. These were particularly popular among young Sudanese, who did not feel included in the traditional opposition groups or adequately represented in the FFC" (18).

13. Actors: diaspora

What was the role of diaspora groups?

The SPA had its communications team abroad. The NRCs had diaspora funding and support. Social media across borders had an important role. The diaspora could spread news and calls for financial support, as well as put pressure on foreign governments. The diaspora also organized large rallies in support of the revolution in the United States, EU, Australia, and other countries with larger Sudanese diaspora. Furthermore, the diaspora raised the profile of the Sudan revolution via consistent lobbying and petitions to political leaders in their countries of residence as well as United Nations agencies. Volunteer medical practitioners from the diaspora traveled to Khartoum, the capital, and set up free medical care centers helping the protesters. In-kind support, such as medical supplies, and communications devices, such as satellite internet and other necessary tools,

were provided by the diaspora to protesters.

14. Actors: international organizations

What was the role of INGOs/IGOs?

The African Union and Ethiopia's president played a key role in negotiations.

The movement had access to materials provided by international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) "discussing the history, theory, and dynamics of strategic nonviolent action. In addition, a few activists attended in-person seminars and workshops on nonviolent organizing" (Zunes, 13–14). For several years leading up to the revolution, a number of international organizations, such as the US Institute of Peace and Freedom House, led workshops outside the country for civil society groups and youth leaders on civic education, conflict resolution, human rights, movement building, and other issues.

15. Media and IT technologies

What media or IT technologies helped the mobilization to scale up (if at all)?

During the first weeks of protest, youth launched an online campaign with the slogan "Tasgut bass" (fall, that's all) where individuals shared short personal stories on Facebook explaining their discontent and why the regime must fall. The sharing of those stories of individuals from different classes, regions, ethnicities, ages, and political affiliations allowed people to understand the magnitude of persecution everyone is going through. "Tasgut bass" stories also helped people experience each other's pain and resolve to collaborate for change.

The SPA and other formal opposition groups often lacked representatives on the ground, so the NRCs worked as their grassroots base, passing on messages received through social media to neighbors who did not have access to such communication technologies. "With the internet blackout following the June 3 massacre, the network of neighborhood committees was critical in coordinating ongoing resistance activities, printing out information and passing it around to local residents, and providing VPN addresses to people so they could circumvent the restrictions and get back online" (Zunes, 17)

Government snipers killed Mohamed Mattar, a man who had returned home from graduate studies abroad in order to protest, and that prompted the #BlueForSudan online movement, in honor of his favorite color. "Thousands of human rights activists around the world as well as celebrities such as Demi Lovato, Naomi Campbell, and Rihanna changed their social media profiles to blue with the hashtag in honor of Mattar and in support for the movement, bringing attention to a revolution which until then had received relatively little media coverage in the West" (Zunes, 22).

16. Precursors summary

[for positive cases that scaled up] In your analysis, what are the main precursors that explain how or why people took to the streets in large numbers at this time and not on other occasions? Are there any that are not already listed here that led to the upward scale shift?
[for negative cases that did not scale up] In your analysis, what are the main factors that explain why the mobilization did not scale up despite the attempts to do so? Are there any factors not already listed here that prevented the upward scale shift?

There were a number of structural and political faction factors in the background, but it seems that the main precursor was that the SPA learned lessons from past protests, had training and knowledge about successful nonviolent resistance strategies and tactics, was viewed by the people as nonpolitical leaders who were on their side, was able to negotiate both to build a coalition and to topple the government, and was nimble, making huge tactical and even strategic shifts based on new information. The emergence of the NRCs (and their coordination with the SPA) was also key. And finally, a game changer was that this time the revolt was led not just by Darfuri or even traditional political opposition but with middle-class Arabs from Khartoum and northern Sudan whom the regime considered its core constituency.

17. Key sources

What sources would be good for someone who wants to follow up on details of this case (up to five sources)?

Bach, Jean-Nicolas, and Clément Deshayes. 2020. "Sudan (Vol. 16, 2019)." *Africa Yearbook Online*, October. http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/africa-yearbook-online/sudan-vol-16-2019-ayb2019_COM_0040.

Zunes, Stephen. 2021. "Sudan's 2019 Revolution: The Power of Civil Resistance." ICNC Special Report Series Volume 5, ICNC Press, Washington, DC, April 2021. https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Zunes-Sudans-2019-Revolution.pdf.

VIETNAM

1. Episode summary

In 2-4 sentences, summarize what this mobilization episode was about.

About a yearlong nationwide mobilization campaign followed an environmental disaster caused by untreated wastewater from a steel plant owned by the Taiwanese conglomerate Formosa Plastic Group in April 2016. Release of the wastewater resulted in mass fish deaths along the coast. The incident and the plant that caused it became the center of public outcry. The government, however, was slow to recognize the responsibility of the foreign company and provide compensation. The affected communities, led by Catholic priests as well as environmental activists, staged public protests, held an online campaign, and filed lawsuits against the company.

2. Dates, duration, and dynamics of the mobilization episode

What were the dates that mark the start, end, and scale-up (if any) of this episode? How long was the active phase of the mobilization? Can the mobilization episode be divided into stages? If yes, provide a brief (1-3 sentences) characteristic of each stage.

The mobilization happened between April 2016 and April 2017, although some protests were organized in subsequent years too. There were several stages:

a. After the release of chemicals by Formosa on April 6 and the deaths of fish, until June 30, 2016, when the government recognized Formosa's responsibility, the goal of the online campaign and public protests was proper government investigation of the disaster and transparency.

b. From early July 2016 through early September, the focus of the protest campaign was both fair compensation and shutting down of the Formosa Steel Plant, which harmed the environment.

c. In mid-September through early October, the victims of the disaster sued Formosa in court. On September 29, the prime minister of Vietnam announced a decree establishing the size of compensation, which many considered insufficient, and on October 2, there was a large-scale protest against Formosa that convened in Ky Anh town, where the plant was based. About 13,000 protesters surrounded the steel plant, holding signs demanding Formosa get of Vietnam. Police and army troops were deployed to protect the Taiwanese investor, which closed its doors to the angry crowd.

d. Several protests took place in January and February 2017. At least two protests, by Catholics and by Green Trees, took place in early April, around one year after the disaster.

3. Size of mobilization

Provide any information available about the number of participants, their social and/or professional status, the geographic spread of the mobilization, etc.

Most protests attracted from a few hundred to a few thousand people. One of the biggest protests, on October 2, by Formosa's office attracted 13,000 participants. The protest on May 1 was reported to take place in six cities (Hanoi, Saigon, Da Nang, Nha Trang, Vung Tau, and Hai Phong); its size in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City was reported to be in the thousands.

The participants of the protests came from a variety of backgrounds, especially those who participated in urban protests in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. The two main groups involved in the protests that took place in the areas directly affected by the disaster were (1) the fishermen and their families and (2) environmental activists. Catholics also stood out as the disaster seemed to affect many of them, but all the actions included many non-Catholics too.

4. Episode background

What background facts does the reader need to know about the political and social context of the country to understand this episode?

Vietnam is a one-party state led by the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), which has been in power since 1930. In 1986, Vietnam embarked on a so-called socialist-oriented market economy (that is, combining socialist commitments and capitalist aspirations), also known as *doi moi* (reform). The reform transformed the country economically and socially, bringing millions of people out of poverty and raising people's living standards, but did not change the country politically. The Communist Party of Vietnam continues to maintain a monopolistic control of state institutions.

The government balances communist ideology and the needs of the market economy, especially the need to attract foreign investors. Civil society is tightly controlled by the government. Nationalism (especially anti-China sentiment) and the promise of economic growth for ordinary citizens are important for the legitimacy of the regime. An environmental disaster that affected the "proletariat" and was caused by a foreign (Taiwanese) company undermined those important pillars of legitimacy.

5. Prior mobilization dynamic

What were the characteristics of civic mobilization over the 20 years or so prior to this episode? Were protests a frequent occurrence? Did they tend to focus on different issues than this episode did (e.g., labor conditions)? What was the most recent mobilization prior to this episode? What role did previous protests (successful/unsuccessful; violent/nonviolent) and government responses to those protests play in this mobilization episode? How do the issues of any recent protests relate to this episode's framing of issues?

Public protests are relatively rare in Vietnam. Large rural protests in recent decades include the 1997 peasant uprisings in Thai Binh and Bong Nai (attracted 40,000 and 10,000 participants, respectively) as well as the 2001–04 unrest in the Central Highlands (over 10,000 participants). Both were caused by corruption over land acquisition. The Thai Binh protest shook the Hanoi leadership and triggered a review of the provincial bureaucracy. As a result, 600 party officials were sacked, including the provincial secretary of the CPV and the chairperson of the provincial people's council, and a total of 1,900 party members were disciplined.

Another recurring protest theme is anti-China sentiment. In 2009, residents of the Central Highlands region repeatedly but unsuccessfully protested Chinese-backed bauxite mining projects. The summer of 2011 witnessed the longest anti-China protest movement in the country since 1975. During the three months of that summer, a total of 11 protests waged across Vietnam every Sunday, primarily conducted in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, where the Chinese embassy and consulate, respectively, are located. Some protests were reported to have attracted up to 1,000 participants.

One environmental protest took place shortly before the Formosa disaster. In 2015, citizens of Hanoi protested the city authorities' plans to chop down thousands of trees; that mobilization is known as the Tree Movement. An environmental organization, the Green Trees, born out of that movement, took part in the protests related to the Formosa incident. It organized some of the protests and prepared a report about the incident, which it sent to Vietnamese authorities.

6. Trigger

What was the trigger for this mobilization episode (state response to an exogenous shock? Electoral or constitutional power grab? An unpopular policy?)

A release of toxic waste by Formosa Steel Plant into the sea, which led to the death of a lot of fish, destroying the economic lifeline of many seaside communities, was the trigger for this mobilization episode.

7. Framing

What was the framing of this trigger, grievances, and demands during the episode? What was the role of different mobilization actors in shaping the framing? How/did the framing of why people should mobilize change over time? How did the framing help or hinder scaling up of the mobilization?

At first, the protesters demanded transparency and a thorough government investigation. After Formosa's responsibility was established, they demanded fair compensation and protection of the environment by the government by shutting down the Formosa Steel Plant.

During the mobilization, environmental issues were framed in moral and political terms: "Clean water, clean government, and transparency" and "Clean environment, clean conscience, and clean morality." Such framing was especially appropriate since the mobilization was led in large part by Catholic priests.

One source (*New York Times*) compared the Tree Movement with the Formosa protests and argued that the latter grew into a nationwide mobilization because (1) it damaged the image of a large sector of the national economy and the food that anyone in the country might be eating, and (2) the damage was done by a Taiwanese company, which many ordinary Vietnamese saw as a symbol of China's economic influence.

8. Tactics

What kind of tactics did the movement(s) use? How was the presence or absence of an upward scale shift related to these tactics?

Tactics included public demonstrations, sit-ins, petitions, lawsuits, a Facebook campaign, and a "Knock pans for transparency" flash mob. (People were supposed to knock their kitchen pans at a certain time and live stream it to

Facebook, though it is unclear how large the flash mob turned out to be.) Specific tactics do not seem to be related to the upward scale shift, especially because one of the largest protests happened shortly after the incident, on May 1, 2016.

9. Actors: organizations

What powerful institutions, movements or parties were engaged in this mobilization episode (unions, religious organizations, opposition parties)? What are the key facts about any formal and informal organizations that joined or supported the mobilization?

Catholic priests from the affected communities often led the mobilization and established the Committee for Supporting Victims of the Marine Disaster. The Catholic Church in Vietnam has historically been oppressed by the Communist government and stood in opposition to it even if it could not express its views freely.

The Green Trees, an environmental organization born out of the 2015 Tree Movement, filed two petitions to the National Assembly, took part in the protests related to the Formosa incident, organized some of them, and prepared a public report about the incident, which included collecting witness testimonies in the affected provinces.

Activists of the Vietnam Path Movement, an unregistered human rights group existing since 2012, traveled to the affected areas to document the disaster and support local people as well as to spread firsthand information on social media.

Twenty unregistered (that is, independent) civil society organizations signed a declaration about the disaster on April 29 calling for action from Formosa, the government, and citizens in fighting the consequences of the disaster. There were also several calls from individual organizations throughout the campaign, including a petition on the US White House's petition website We the People.

A group of lawyers, Justice Partnership, traveled to the affected areas to provide legal assistance to the fishermen. They filed official complaints, requested a meeting with officials (unsuccessfully), and helped prepare documents to challenge the case in court.

Registered Vietnamese nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) did not participate in the protests, although some NGO leaders participated in a personal capacity.

10. Actors: leaders

What were the characteristics of the leader(s), prominent activists, and public figures who participated in the mobilization? What was their professional and social (ethnic/religious/class) background? What kinds of networks did they belong to and mobilize? Where did they get their organizing skills?

Several Catholic priests in the effected communities led the mobilization in their parishes using their public authority and leadership skills. They both organized public protests and helped prepare lawsuits, hundreds of which they personally delivered to the courts.

Green Trees activists used their access to journalists and academic experts to produce an investigative report and their prior experience of mobilization to organize public protests in cities.

Some activists involved in the Formosa protests acquired their protest experience during the 2011 anti-China demonstrations.

11. Actors: civil society

What was the role, if any, of local human rights and civil society organizations and movements?

The Green Trees, an environmental organization born out of the 2015 Tree Movement, filed two petitions to the National Assembly, took part in the protests related to the Formosa incident, organized some of them, and prepared a public report about the incident, which included collecting witness testimonies in the affected provinces.

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A group of lawyers, Justice Partnership, traveled to the affected areas to provide legal assistance to the fishermen. They filed official complaints, requested a meeting with officials (unsuccessfully), and helped prepare documents to challenge the case in court.

12. Actors: youth

What was the role, if any, of youth organizations (formal or informal)?

Most Green Trees activists are young, but youths were not

the main driving force behind the mobilization.

13. Actors: diaspora

What was the role of diaspora groups?

One international Vietnamese organization, Vietnamese Overseas Initiative for Conscience Empowerment (VOICE), which has offices in the United States, Philippines, Vietnam, Australia, Canada, and Europe, helped provide 20 tons of rice for the fishermen, helped local children who lost access to school, and helped financially divers who suffered health problems. They also assisted with preparing legal claims.

14. Actors: international organizations

What was the role of INGOs/IGOs?

International NGOs and intergovernmental organizations do not seem to play a significant role.

15. Media and IT technologies

What media or IT technologies helped the mobilization to scale up (if at all)?

Facebook was an important platform for spreading information about the incident and the mobilization campaign. The Vietnamese government blocked Facebook during the protests in May to slow down the spread of information, but at least some people were able to go around the blockage using VPN-like services. Media and information technology also helped to coordinate in-country and international efforts to call attention to the disaster.

16. Precursors summary

[for positive cases that scaled up] In your analysis, what are the main precursors that explain how or why people took to the streets in large numbers at this time and not on other occasions? Are there any that are not already listed here that led to the upward scale shift?
[for negative cases that did not scale up] In your analysis, what are the main factors that explain why the mobilization did not scale up despite the attempts to do so? Are there any factors not already listed here that prevented the upward scale shift?

Previous experience acquired during the 2011 anti-China movement and 2015 environmental protests (Tree Movement), the breach of the social contract (environmental disaster caused by a foreign company, the slow reaction of the authorities, and unfair compensation), the existence of a public authority willing to oppose the government (the Catholic Church), and access to Facebook combined to make the upward scale shift possible.

17. Key sources

What sources would be good for someone who wants to follow up on details of this case (up to five sources)?

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ZIMBABWE

1. Episode summary

In 2-4 sentences, summarize what this mobilization episode was about.

Between April and September 2016, increasing political factionalization and general socioeconomic discontent led to an increase in the number and intensity of protests against longtime president Robert Mugabe, with the mobilization of opposition parties, civil society associations, and grassroots movements. The mobilization episode was initially about calling on citizens to speak out against poor governance and its consequences for the welfare and daily life of citizens and moved toward calls for the president's removal. A prominent feature of the episode was Pastor Evan Mawarire's posting on Facebook of a series of videos—calling for citizens' nonviolent expression of discontent with the government—that grew into what is now known as the #ThisFlag movement. The broader mobilization took the form of protest gatherings, rallies, strikes, and acts of civil disobedience, as well as the using of social media as platforms for debate, mobilization, and coordination. The mobilization ended after a period of increasing repression, but the #ThisFlag movement continued beyond this mobilization episode, and subsequent mobilizations in 2017 and 2018 are closely linked to this episode.

2. Dates, duration, and dynamics of the mobilization episode

What were the dates that mark the start, end, and scale-up (if any) of this episode? How long was the active phase of the mobilization? Can the mobilization episode be divided into stages? If yes, provide a brief (1-3 sentences) characteristic of each stage.

Between January and August 2016, there were dozens of varied protests organized by movements or civil society organizations (CSOs) around political, economic, and governance issues. In April 2016, the #ThisFlag movement started with a video posted on social media that went viral globally. This movement was made up of ordinary, apolitical people speaking up; it merged with several other movements and union activities to coordinate a broad protest in July. In May, a student movement (Tajamuka) was started by a person with connections to the opposition political party and the new informal sector union. On July 6, #ThisFlag and Tajamuka built on strikes that had started on July 4 and organized the largest popular demonstration of the last decade, #ZimShutDown, a national stay away that led to the closure of banks, schools, shops, and roads. The July events resulted in dozens of arrests, which triggered further vigils and demands for the release of those arrested. The shutdown was joined by opposition parties and war veterans.

The calls for the second and third stay aways did not elicit responses as positive as the first, in part because state security agents intensified their efforts to discourage businesses from closing and because people saw no positive changes from the government in response to the first protest. The #ThisFlag movement waned in terms of sheer numbers following the July arrest and exile of their leader, Mawarire, and others, as nobody expected this kind of response from the government against a pastor, and the grassroots base found the developments demoralizing.

But the political moment was ripe for other movements and political parties to attempt different kinds of mobilization tactics, drawing on the energy and framings #ThisFlag had generated. In August, there was a new round of protests: members of Tajamuka marched to the Ministry of Home Affairs to deliver a petition protesting police violence, and there was a major protest organized by 18 civil society associations and opposition parties who were united against Mugabe. At the event, there were violent clashes between the riot police and demonstrators, and 67 people were detained. In October, the courts imposed a 30-day ban on protests, and the episode concluded.

3. Size of mobilization

Provide any information available about the number of participants, their social and/or professional status, the geographic spread of the mobilization, etc.

#ThisFlag mobilized all sorts of people who had access to social media, with several hundreds of thousands of active engagements at the peak of the movement. #ZimShutDown was widespread and very successful nationwide with at least a million people participating. Street demonstrations in August were in the hundreds, with about 5,000 showing up to protest the arrest of the

leader of the #ThisFlag movement. Additionally, youths collected around 15,000 signatures on a petition to have a minister fired for corruption.

4. Episode background

What background facts does the reader need to know about the political and social context of the country to understand this episode?

President Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party had been in power for nearly four decades. There was an extremely low formal employment rate, decreasing the sway of unions. The informal sector was huge, employing nearly 90 percent of youth. Since 2015 the political parties had split into opposition factions so the former hegemony was cracking. Social media use had expanded. Sixty percent of the population was under 30. In February 2016, the president declared a state of disaster in rural areas hit by a severe drought at a time when more than a quarter of the population was facing food shortages.

5. Prior mobilization dynamic

What were the characteristics of civic mobilization over the 20 years or so prior to this episode? Were protests a frequent occurrence? Did they tend to focus on different issues than this episode did (e.g., labor conditions)? What was the most recent mobilization prior to this episode? What role did previous protests (successful/unsuccessful; violent/nonviolent) and government responses to those protests play in this mobilization episode? How do the issues of any recent protests relate to this episode's framing of issues?

Zimbabwe does not have a history of civic mobilization, particularly in the form of mass protests, in part because of the risks involved and because the ruling ZANU-PF party pursues a corporatist strategy, including all sorts of civil society as being "on side" with the party and limiting the autonomy of trade unions and social movements by taking them under the organizational umbrella of the "revolutionary" ruling party. Most of the civic mobilization was related to dynamics between the dominant and opposition party around elections.

Mobilizations such as strikes were oriented to these specific corporatist communities and did not tend to reach a broader swath of citizens. Many of the strikes that happened between 2000 and 2015 were organized by the labor movement or involved government employees protesting against their salaries, conditions of service, and price hikes.

The most active human rights and women's groups led by professionals documented repressive conditions, electoral irregularities, and socioeconomic ills. But by 2010, most of these organizations had run out of strategies and drive. In some instances, the bureaucratization or professionalization of the CSOs distanced them from the social base of the citizens (L. Sachikonye, "The Protracted Democratic Transition in Zimbabwe," *Taiwan Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 1 [2017] 131–132).

In October 2014, journalist and political activist Itai Dzamara organized a sit-in (Occupy Africa Unity Square) to demand accountability from the Zimbabwean government for its reported "failure to satisfy the needs of its people." The sit-in was small, numbering in the dozens. The disappearance of Dzamara, its initiator, in March 2015 was a driver of mobilization among activists, supported by Zimbabwean and international human rights associations. In November 2015, some activists staged a protest at Rainbow Towers Hotel against then vice president Phelekezela Mphokos's long stay at the hotel—since December 2014—with taxpayers paying the bill.

6. Trigger

What was the trigger for this mobilization episode (state response to an exogenous shock? Electoral or constitutional power grab? An unpopular policy?)

The #ThisFlag movement was triggered by a video that was posted in April 2016 by Evan Mawarire, a pastor in the capital of Harare, expressing his frustration and venting his anger with the government, which he blamed for his failure to provide for his family, including paying school fees for his children and putting food on the table from his earnings as a pastor and entrepreneur. With his "impromptu" recording, Mawarire said he did not intend to be an activist or start a political movement as later unfolded. However, the video attracted thousands of online views and encouraged others to emulate the pastor and air their grievances.

7. Framing

What was the framing of this trigger, grievances, and demands during the episode? What was the role of different mobilization actors in shaping the framing? How/did the framing of why people should mobilize change over time? How did the framing help or hinder scaling up of the mobilization?

While Mawarire raised more or less the same issues as those raised in previous protests, including corruption, poverty, and injustice, he adopted a rather unique framing.

That is, he would reference the flag that would normally be associated with the ruling party's propagandist rhetoric. The #ThisFlag video used patriotism as a frame, talking about the official symbolism of the flag versus what it means to be a citizen who feels excluded from participation in the country they love. As Jesse Oberdorf writes based on his interviews with activists in the movement,

"The central #ThisFlag-message is that citizens have the right to express themselves and criticize poor governance freely and easily.… The movement is guided by six core values (integrity, dignity, boldness, nonviolence, citizenship, and diversity). It encourages Zimbabweans to be courageous in speaking out and seeking accountability from the government that should serve them.… After this campaign, the trichotomy 'speak, ask, act' is introduced, slowly paving the way for more offline-action.… In this phase, however, we also see the emergence of a more negative meaning attached to #ThisFlag. Disappointment and skepticism are fed by movement leaders publicly criticizing each other. At the same time, a more radical narrative takes over, under the banner of 'Mugabe must Go'" ("Inspiring the Citizen to Be Bold: Framing Theory and the Rise and Decline of the #ThisFlag-Movement in Zimbabwe." Master's thesis, Utrecht University, 2017: 27. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320729348_Inspiring_the_Citizen_to_be_Bold_Framing_Theory_and_the_Rise_and_Decline_of_the_ThisFlag-Movement_in_Zimbabwe).

Oberdorf also presents evidence that the post-July takeover of the mobilization by more hardcore activists calling for regime change led some self-proclaimed "ordinary people" to feel that the movement was no longer for the likes of them.

8. Tactics

What kind of tactics did the movement(s) use? How was the presence or absence of an upward scale shift related to these tactics?

Video and creative protests were important, with much of the mobilization taking place on social media and having a more discursive nature, trying to change the passive attitude of citizens and reframe grievances. Mawarire continued to use digital activism to advance civic mobilization and mass communication with other citizens beyond this mobilization episode. In his videos, Mawarire mixed English and Shona, thereby expanding his audience and reach.

Initially, Mawarire insisted on avoiding marches or gatherings. Only later was the #ThisFlag movement involved in organizing marches. The first thing Mawarire asked people to do was to carry a flag with them as they were going about their everyday business. In one of his videos, Mawarire said, "We are not trying to march because we know that marching is not a smart idea." The movement drew on the Gandhian and Martin Luther King Jr. traditions as well as on the more recent tactics introduced by Dzamara and his Occupy-style movement. It was also important to the movement to use tactics that distinguished it from a political or opposition-style mobilization and to avoid calling for a regime change.

Perhaps the most notable tactic that the #ThisFlag movement used was the stay away strategy employed to great success on July 6, 2016. The stay away coincided with a strike by doctors, teachers, and nurses over delayed salaries. Many roads were barricaded with no public transport to ferry people to work as this was a continuation of a public transit workers' protest that started on July 4.

Teresa Noguiera Pinto cites examples of the kinds of tactics that, after July 6, avoided confrontation with security forces: 2,000 women participated in a protest beating empty pots and chanting slogans against the president; a coalition of unemployed graduates staged "This Gown Demands Jobs," which they transformed into a soccer game (in graduation gowns) after security forces arrived; and the Tajamuka movement, which formed small groups to approach people waiting at bus stops or in bank queues ("Popular Protest in Zimbabwe: Mobilization, Repression and the Search for Alternative Spaces," University of Zimbabwe - International Conference on Social Media, 2018. https://www.academia.edu/42719985/Popular_Protest_in_Zimbabwe_Mobilization_Repression_and_the_Search_for_Alternative_Spaces).

9. Actors: organizations

What powerful institutions, movements or parties were engaged in this mobilization episode (unions, religious organizations, opposition parties)? What are the key facts about any formal and informal organizations that joined or supported the mobilization?

Behind the episode, there were multiple movements with different goals. While the Tajamuka movement explicitly declared its intention to topple Robert Mugabe, the movement #ThisFlag called for the adoption and implementation of reforms. Both, however, were supported by opposition parties and veterans, as well as by

newer organizations, such as the National Vendors Union of Zimbabwe, which represents the informal workers who are a large part of the population.

In a recent interview, Mawarire indicated that political parties, unions, and religious associations were involved in the #ThisFlag movement mobilization (interview with Mawarire, 09 June 2022). Political parties were involved in the sense that some leading individuals from certain political parties were among the first few people who came out to support the #ThisFlag movement's call. Mawarire says that in some instances, "The support from political parties was a bit overbearing," with the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) Alliance explicitly expressing its desire for the #ThisFlag movement to hand itself over at a time when the movement's leader was not well, and the MDC Alliance struggled to mobilize support. Mawarire said that the #ThisFlag movement stood its ground, and they later found agreement with the MDC Alliance.

Mawarire says that religious organizations were a little bit tougher, something he attributes to fear arising from Mugabe's stern warning to pastors not to dabble in politics when Mawarire started the #ThisFlag movement. But some associations of religious denominations, such as the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe (EFZ) and the Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC), supported the movement. A little less support for the movement was received from mainstream churches such as the Catholic Bishops' Commission.

10. Actors: leaders

What were the characteristics of the leader(s), prominent activists, and public figures who participated in the mobilization? What was their professional and social (ethnic/religious/class) background? What kinds of networks did they belong to and mobilize? Where did they get their organizing skills?

The #ThisFlag movement really did not have many publicly known individuals who could be said to be the leaders. Mawarire became and is the face of #ThisFlag movement. Mawarire is a pastor and was, at one point, Zimbabwe's "child president" when he participated in a mock parliament. He has said in interviews he feels both experiences influenced his future role in the movement.

Though they may not necessarily have been leaders of the movement, other prominent individuals who were visible include Fadzayi Mahere, a lawyer by profession who later ran as an independent candidate for a National Assembly seat, Douglas Coltart, a lawyer and activist, as well as Trevor Ncube, a prominent newspaper publisher and editor.

11. Actors: civil society

What was the role, if any, of local human rights and civil society organizations and movements?

This episode focuses almost exclusively on civil society organizations and movements. The #ThisFlag movement engaged with government officials, political parties, civic societies, citizens, and the mainstream media (T. Mawere, "The Politics and Symbolism of the #ThisFlag in Zimbabwe," *Strategic Review for Southern Africa* 42, no. 1 (May/June 2020), 175). The movement coalesced with other campaigns like #MyZimbabwe, by the MDC Youth Assembly, and #Tajamuka/Sesijikile, a defiant and proactive youth movement (Mawere). Tajamuka was a pro-opposition party group. Mawarire says the #ThisFlag movement also engaged new opposition parties such as the Zimbabwe People First (ZPF) party that had been formed in 2015 by former Zanu-PF senior members and former Zimbabwe vice president Joice Mujuru after they were expelled due to factional fights in the ruling party (interview with Mawarire, 09 June 2022).

Mawarire singles out the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR) as the leading local CSO that played a particularly critical role in supporting the movement and him personally (interview with Mawarire, 09 June 2022). For instance, a ZLHR assigned lawyer resisted having Mawarire taken from prison to an undisclosed location without his (the lawyer's) knowledge, something Mawarire strongly thinks saved his life. Mawarire also gives credit to Kubatana, an organization that, among other things, curates and disseminates information and amplifies the work of CSOs online, for remotely supporting the mobilization by amplifying the messages of the movement, albeit without direct engagement. Mawarire says some other organizations were in the background as they were not comfortable coming out openly in support of the movement.

12. Actors: youth

What was the role, if any, of youth organizations (formal or informal)?

The movement's use of social media means that it was able to mobilize young, educated urbanites. According to Mawarire, youth wings of the opposition parties in particular reached out and stood in solidarity with the #ThisFlag movement (interview with Mawarire, 09 June 2022). The Tajamuka group was essentially the youth wing of the political opposition in a different form that would

enable engagement with #ThisFlag movement without the threat of the #ThisFlag movement being perceived as partisan. Many other movements were inspired by the #ThisFlag movement, for example, the #ThisGown movement, which involved youthful university graduates.

13. Actors: diaspora

What was the role of diaspora groups?

With the coming of the #ThisFlag movement, the diaspora found a platform for expressing their views of a different Zimbabwe. They organized themselves into #ThisFlag South Africa, Australia, Canada, Kenya, USA, and UK. Restoration of Human Rights (ROHR) Zimbabwe—a human rights group in the UK that ran a number of protests at the Zimbabwean embassy in the UK predating the #ThisFlag movement—was quick to take on #ThisFlag when it started. The movement also got solidarity from Zimbabwe Human Rights Organization (ZHRO) and the Zimbabwe Vigil Coalition in the UK. There was very interesting mobilization in universities in South Africa, where many students from Zimbabwe study.

Selected individuals recorded and posted solidarity videos from countries such as South Africa, the UK, and the United States. There were also solidarity marches in the diaspora, such as one in South Africa where not only Zimbabweans were involved but also South African citizens, who joined in presenting demands to the officials at the consulate.

14. Actors: international organizations

What was the role of INGOs/IGOs?

There was a lot of money going to developing CSO capacity and advocacy strategy in the 2010s, and indeed, the support of these local CSOs was important for the movement. According to Mawarire, some those organizations were involved, and the #ThisFlag movement accepted their support because as a people's movement, they did not want to accept funding directly (interview with Mawarire, 09 June 2022). Mawarire says that the #ThisFlag movement was different from traditional or established CSOs, for example, in the sense of being formally registered and having a structure and known offices as it was thought that would make it easy for the regime to target the movement and its leadership. Directly receiving foreign funding would also make it easier for the regime to label the movement as pursuing a foreign-funded regime change agenda—the default criticism ZANU-PF commonly directs at any individual or formation that emerges to challenge it. Mawarire says that for this reason, the #ThisFlag movement was happy to go without funding, but where funding was accepted, it was in the form of capacity building initiatives or support benefiting the movement, from established civil society and rights organizations, including those with a history of funding by international donors, for example, trainings on nonviolent confrontation, how elections work, and preparation for being arrested and persecuted over time, among others. Such support was accepted from CSOs that were already receiving funding because they had been doing that work.

According to Mawarire, there was covert expression of interest from a collective of prodemocracy embassies in Harare that wanted to know more about the #ThisFlag movement, including who they were, where they had come from, and what they were doing. The embassies amplified the movement's messages (interview with Mawarire, 09 June 2022).

15. Media and IT technologies

What media or IT technologies helped the mobilization to scale up (if at all)?

The rise of social media use was key, and Zimbabweans embraced social media as a mobilizing tool in 2016—forums for debate and discussion, the dissemination of slogans and videos to change peoples' thinking, and coordinating actions like the national strike and street protests. Hashtag movements emerged in a context of betrayed aspirations and loss of hope in the official governance system as attempts to institute some form of citizen governance using social media as alternative governance platforms and reliable and open communication channels (Mawere, 171).

In response, the government in August put forth a draft Computer Crime and Cyber Crime Bill containing provisions that allowed police to intercept private communications and seize electronic devices. WhatsApp was unavailable for several hours on July 6, 2016, the day of the protest. Government also moved to try and curb internet use by hiking mobile data prices as on the day following the day of action, mobile network operators announced they had been ordered to wind down cheap mobile data promotions by August 31, 2016.

16. Precursors summary

[for positive cases that scaled up] In your analysis, what are the main precursors that explain how or why people took to the streets in large numbers at this time and not on other occasions? Are there any that are not already

listed here that led to the upward scale shift? [for negative cases that did not scale up] In your analysis, what are the main factors that explain why the mobilization did not scale up despite the attempts to do so? Are there any factors not already listed here that prevented the upward scale shift?

The main catalyst that made this mobilization different was Pastor Evan Mawarire. He was the right messenger with the right message on the right medium of communication with the right tactics. The pastor's ordinary but educated background and familiarity with historical nonviolent social movements, his ability to frame popular grievances in a compelling way based on his own personal everyday experiences, his ability to access Facebook and produce video content, and his lack of association with political and oppositional forces were essential to catalyzing the #ThisFlag movement. He also turned out to be skilled in leadership and forming strategic alliances with other movements and organizations.

Another important factor is that infighting within the ruling party increased defections and weakened the ability of the state to deliver a crushing blow to the movement. Finally, the use of nonviolent, nonconfrontational, and innovative tactics attracted a broader base and made it difficult for any one mobilization action to be stopped.

17. Key sources

What sources would be good for someone who wants to follow up on details of this case (up to five sources)?

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