

**Südasienwissenschaftliche
Arbeitsblätter
Band 7**

**Eurocentrism and the
Falsification of Perception
An Analysis with Special
Reference to South Asia**

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Halle (Saale) 2005

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**Südasienwissenschaftliche
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herausgegeben von

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1. What relevance do cultural considerations have for international relations? The answer lies in a realisation that, though not new, is only now — even though Robert Jervis' seminal *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* appeared already in 1976¹ — gaining adequate recognition as relevant when analysing international interactions, especially in the wake of Robert Kagan's hotly debated postulate of fundamental differences between Europeans and Americans.² This postulate was set forth in an essay beginning with the memorable sentence:³

It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world.

We are dealing, in short, with perceptions, and notions based on, as well as influencing, these. If one needed conclusive proof for their relevancy, then the recent article by John Rosenthal, accusing European anti-US sentiment of being fueled by anti-semitism and downright racism,⁴ should suffice. The study of varying perceptions thus proves to be rele-

¹ JERVIS 1976.

² "Europe" and "America" are used here not in their geographic sense, but in accordance with common usage, to refer to the European Union and the United States of America respectively

³ KAGAN 2002: 3.

⁴ ROSENTHAL 2003.

vant in the context of transatlantic relations too.

2. But is it not precisely questions of this sort that behaviouralism, which dominated political science for decades and remains influential even in this supposedly postbehavioural era of the discipline, can be expected to ask? This is true, and on one level the issue raised above is indeed nothing new. But on another level it is. For what we are witnessing is a process in which so-called cultural studies are beginning to exert their influence on political science including the study of international relations, bringing along with them other concepts and methods. Though it is yet unclear how this marriage is going to develop, it is already evident that the orientation towards concepts and methods of the natural sciences that have heavily influenced behaviouralism is going to come under increased scrutiny.

3. Nowhere is this probably more evident than when the emphasis is shifted from concepts, organisations and groups on to the human as such as the primal factor in all relevant interactions. For this makes it possible to view the relevant phenomena from a point of view that is perhaps best exemplified by the ideas of Ludwig von Mises in the field of economics. In her foreword to the fourth edition of Mises' *Human Action*, Bettina Bien Greaves wrote:⁵

⁵ MISES 1996: v.

Mises' contribution was very simple, yet at the same time extremely profound. He pointed out that the whole economy is the result of what individuals do.

It is precisely this that led Mises to develop the concept of praxeology in economic theory. As a rule, descriptions and definitions of praxeology recur to what Mises himself stated in the following words:⁶

We call contentment or satisfaction that state of a human being which does not and cannot result in any action. Acting man is eager to substitute a more satisfactory state of affairs for a less satisfactory.

The following explanation is an example:⁷

For Mises, praxeology's central axiom is that *human action is a purposeful attempt to substitute a more satisfactory state of affairs for a less satisfactory one.*

4. It is, however, often overlooked in this connection that "satisfaction" and "satisfactory" are contextualised and cannot be defined independently. As Mises pointed out explicitly:⁸

⁶ MISES 1996: 13.

⁷ ZANOTTI 1998: 61.

⁸ MISES 1996: 14.

The ultimate goal of human action is always the satisfaction of the acting man's desire. There is no standard of greater or lesser satisfaction other than individual judgments of value, different for various people and for the same people at various times. What makes a man feel uneasy and less uneasy is established by him from the standard of his own will and judgment, from his personal and subjective valuation. Nobody is in a position to decree what should make a fellow man happier.

5. What is relevant here is not Mises' concept of praxeology or on what ultimately motivates economic action of the individual. Rather, what deserves to be highlighted is, firstly, the concept of the individual entity as the starting point of discourse; secondly, the importance attributed to what goes on in the mind and brain of the individual; and, thirdly, the non-standardisable nature of such internal processes.⁹ This view contrasts with that of a school of thought best exemplified by the science fiction author Isaac Asimov's "psychohistory" as described in his *Foundation* series. Asimov's "psychohistory"¹⁰ is

⁹ A direct challenge to some schools of psychology.

¹⁰ Which later gave its name to an academic discipline concerned with the study of the psychological motivations of historical events. (A similarity of name does not necessarily imply a similarity of method.)

an exact or near-exact science that can predict the behaviour of populations; it seems to have been influenced by trends within political science which ultimately led to the "behavioural revolution".

6. Choosing individual "judgments of value" as the starting point of deliberations automatically leads to perceptions being accorded importance. These influence not only how something is seen, but also whether it is seen at all. The latter can be easily illustrated by the way in which the news to be disseminated is chosen from among a large mass of reports, in decisions regarding what is newsworthy and what is not. A small example may illustrate this importance of perceptions. The 2003 "Voice of the People" survey by *Gallup International* queried 43,000 persons in 51 countries on whether security and prosperity had increased or decreased in the previous ten years, and what the situation would be in ten more years.¹¹ Many answers were negative, some from Western Europe virtually devastating. In keeping with this, the leading German daily *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* painted a picture of the world utterly bleak except for stray rays of light, aptly captioning this with "Apprehension About the Future is Widespread in the World".¹² However, in this the FAZ

¹¹ See GALLUP INTERNATIONAL 2004.

¹² See ANONYMOUS 2004

was, like the majority of international media, merely following the lead of the press statement released on January 8 by the organisation which had commissioned the poll, the *World Economic Forum* in Geneva.¹³

7. This press statement highlights a pessimistic assessment of the security situation:

Survey representing the thoughts of more than ONE BILLION people finds that half those questioned think global security is "poor" and that the next generation will live in a less safe world.

But this also means that half see the situation in a *positive* light, as a glass half filled with water is not only half empty, but also half full. Actually, 48% of the voices evaluated were negative. Matters are similar with regard to the other categories of questions. The actual survey results¹⁴ show that the respondents from India, Pakistan and Afghanistan (strangely grouped together as "West Asia") gave answers so positive that they at times seem downright euphoric. To several questions answers which were positive, at times quite decidedly so, also came from North America, Africa and the Middle East.

¹³ WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM 2004a.

¹⁴ WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM 2004b.

Nevertheless, the basic tenor of the press release is negative, that of the FAZ article even more so.

8. Now one should not overrate this FAZ article; it was chosen chiefly to demonstrate how analyses may conform themselves to preexisting opinions and patterns of thought, in this particular case to a negative mood already prevailing in Western Europe. What makes the matter really interesting is, however, the diagram accompanying the article. According to it, 63% of the respondents from "West Asia" — actually South Asia — registered a rise in prosperity during the previous ten years; only 20% saw a decline. But this discrepancy with the text of the article, obvious even to the cursory reader, receives no comment. This does lead one to ask why this is so, why it is not seen.

9. A possible cause could be a worldview that, because it is autocentric and based in Europe, is usually labelled Eurocentrism. Much has been written and said about this, often from ideologically determined or moralistic positions, both not very helpful in the given context. Relevant here is, rather, an overvaluation of European notions, structures, and events resulting from this worldview, this overvaluation in turn affecting how the rest of the world is perceived.

10. That may hinder adequate appreciation of the actual significance of global developments, as

seems to have happened here. For in both the press release and the FAZ article “world” clearly refers mainly to the so-called West. Consequently, the survey disproportionately utilises data from “Western” countries;¹⁵ what strikes one particularly is that China is missing, whilst “Middle East” encompasses only Israel und Turkey, “Africa” just five states. And even if the 43,000 persons interviewed do actually, as claimed, represent 1.1 billion people, these still are only about a sixth of the global population.

11. Historically, the term “West” is based upon the contrast *Orient—Occident*; the “West” is, originally, Europe. Since about the sixteenth century European powers dominated global events, particularly during their global expansion. The military, political and cultural supremacy of Europe made its ideas, values and ideals prevail over large parts of the globe, so much so that they came to be regarded as the international norm. It is thus no surprise that Europe not only saw itself as the centre of the world, but also considered the prevalence of its ideas, values and ideals to be clear proof of their superiority or naturalness. Further, even within Europe there was a marked dominance of one particular, namely the western, part. As such, “Eurocentrism” refers primarily — though not exclusively — to the

¹⁵ Cf. <<http://www.voice-of-the-people.org/ContentFiles/files/VoP2003/Methodologies.pdf>>.

perception this western part has.

12. It exerts its influence in various spheres: in the centring of maps of the world on Europe; in the division of the epochs of global history in accordance with events in Europe; in the portrayal of history, philosophy or the arts as pertaining primarily to Europe; and so on. Obviously, such a perception, especially if it pertains for a long period of time, must lead to certain notions regarding one’s own importance and means, notions not reflected upon, but accepted unconsciously and maybe also thoughtlessly.

13. Europe no longer has its dominant status, but the associated perceptions remain in evidence. These can lead to its assessment of its own international standing and means being increasingly out of tune with reality, producing decisions and actions with the potential to severely harm not only Europe itself, but also others. Moreover, the notion of a Europe acting as a single entity is largely fictitious anyway; the chief actors on the European stage are still mostly nation states with their respective individual priorities and agendas. Therefore, the actual weight of Europe is surely much less than models referring to the single entity “Europe” may suggest.

14. Europe can, further, no more simply assume that those parts of the world that received its imprint through colonialism, and may thus be regarded as parts of an extended “West”, continue to regard Eu-

rope as their ideal, unconditionally accepting its values as their own. Should it, however, continue to assume so, then it runs the risk of massive misjudgments, such as are appearing with increasing frequency in its relations with the USA. The falsification of perception through Eurocentrism becomes palpable when European states, individually or collectively, confront the USA from an assumed position of parity or even superiority.

15. In point of fact, Europe must gradually reconcile itself to being viewed by many as on a par with, and in some respects even as subordinate to, Asian states such as China or India. But the historically developed European sense of superiority with regard to Asia markedly hinders accepting this and the consequences thereof. It took long for Europe to accept Japan as standing on an equal footing; the Japanese victory over Russia in 1905, the first by a modern Asian state over a major European one, was a shock seemingly overturning the natural order of things. China has been accepted as on a par with Europe, and in some respects even superior, only recently. India still hovers on the edge of the horizon of European consideration, and is only slowly achieving recognition as a major power by the European establishment.

16. By contrast, China and India by now carry so much weight in US deliberations that they might even already have eclipsed Europe. Colin L. Powell,

as US Secretary of State, wrote expressly:¹⁶

We work hard to have the best relations we can with nations large and small, old and new. But for practical purposes we concentrate on relations with major powers, especially those with whom we have had difficult relationships in the past, notably Russia, India, and China.

However, Powell also highlights the role of the NATO and EU as partners of the USA. But Dietmar Rothermund concludes that the power triangle USA-India-China will presumably increasingly determine global politics, especially as Europe already plays only a marginal role, the EU being hardly perceivable as a global political player.¹⁷

17. The impulses that significantly influence global events do actually seem increasingly to originate in Asia, be this through the influences of Asian powers, also coactively with the USA, or through the actions of the latter alone in Asia. Europe is being increasingly marginalised both as an actor and as the scene of action. Nikolas Busse says bluntly:¹⁸

The Europeans often complain that they are not taken seriously in Washington (and elsewhere).

¹⁶ POWELL 2004: 30.

¹⁷ ROTHERMUND 2003: 52.

¹⁸ BUSSE 2003: 69.

This also has to do with the fact that one does not have to take them seriously.¹⁹

18. From another angle, Natalia Narochnitskaia, deputy of the Russian Duma, writes:²⁰

Old Europe is losing its meaning as a historical project. ... Being purely materialistic and rational it is one of the most boring samples of what liberal planning can do. It confirms what conservative-minded philosopher of law Schmitt said, not without a great deal of sarcasm, in the 1920s about [the] similarity between the philosophical paradigms of Marxist and liberal economic doctrines The world and Europe as reflected in the minds of left Social-Democrats united into a new world-wide *fraternité* is nothing more than a huge economic venture in need of optimization to be able to satisfy the growing requirements of primitive individuals.

19. Should there really be a large discrepancy between Europe's self-perception and its actual international status, then there obviously is a very real risk of massive policy errors occurring. For instance, John van Oudenaren, carefully distinguishing be-

¹⁹ "Die Europäer beklagen sich häufig, dass sie in Washington (und anderswo) nicht ernst genommen werden. Das hat auch damit zu tun, dass man sie nicht ernst nehmen muss."

²⁰ NAROCHNITSKAIA 2004: 70.

tween "unipolarity" and "unilateralism" on the one hand, and "multipolarity" and "multilateralism" on the other, argues that the European assumption that a world not dominated by US unipolarity would automatically benefit Europe, this being the natural alternative, is wrong. Rather, a "diffusion of power to Asian giants such as China and India along with a partial revival of Russian power outside Europe's sphere of control"²¹ is more probable, either leaving Europe as the weak outsider in international power games, or forcing it to draw closer to the very USA from which it is striving to distance itself. Should this assessment be accurate, then much of present European policy is self-defeating.

20. Whether or not the preeminence of the USA can, in fact, be significantly altered by anything Europe does, is a matter of controversy anyway. This is, however, not the forum for going into this debate. Rather, one aspect of the debate pertinent to the discussion here shall be highlighted. Nicholas Eberstadt, analysing population data (absolute growth rates, birth rates, age and sexual ratios, percentage of HIV infections, etc.) concludes that:²²

For the time being, however, it would appear that demographic trends may, in some limited

²¹ VAN OUDENAREN 2004: 74.

²² EBERSTADT 2004: 27.

but tangible measure, contribute to the calculus of American strategic preeminence.

But though demographic trends inevitably influence global processes (cf. in this regard Table 1), they do not automatically make a state a major determining factor of global developments. For the global weight of a state cannot be depicted in absolute measures, but only in terms of relative dimensions contrasted with other dimensions, the parameters of whose valuation are variable in accordance with differing points of view. When describing and analysing such a process of relative and variable valuation one cannot, therefore, confine oneself solely to considering factors that arise from the nature of the state in question. It is, on the contrary, necessary to also take into account those factors that influence valuations, including the mechanisms and processes of perception of those valuing. Taking the cited article of Eberstadt as an example, one could, for instance, ask whether the deductions from certain population and related trends might not be skewed by the culturally conditioned preconceptions of the analyser.

21. In fact, it is difficult to determine precisely, and so that they be accepted generally, the parameters governing the conferral of great power status.²³ For

²³ For a pertinent discussion cf. NAYAR/PAUL 2003: 29ff., also MITRA 2002: 3, DAS 2004a: 6f., DAS 2004b: 3, PERKOVICH

instance, Martin Malek holds Russia to be a medium power economically, also pointing out that the standard of living in the provinces at times approaches that of developing countries. Nevertheless, he concludes that in several spheres Russia is, indeed, a major or even superpower; it is a rich nation with poor people²⁴ — a statement that might hold for India too.

22. How difficult it is to gauge the international weight of a state by statistical methods may be demonstrated by the example of gross domestic product (GDP). If one bases this on the market exchange rate (MER), as usual in Europe, then the economies of China and India rank below the major European ones. If, however, one calculates according to purchasing power parity (PPP), as the World Bank and US agencies usually do, then China and India move to the top of the table, ahead of Germany and France (Tables 2 and 3).

23. Or consider expenditure for military hardware. It is difficult enough not only to ascertain this precisely, but even to define the relevant criteria, since what is “military”, and what is not, is often not objective. This cannot but lead to discrepancies in what different data-collecting bodies present. If one

2003-4.

²⁴ MALEK 2003: 39.

then uses different methods of calculation, as in the case of GDP, then the proportions in this sphere too may vary, at times dramatically (cf. Table 4). Furthermore, the capacity of a state to influence developments is also measured in terms of its military capacities, even if this is not easily acknowledgeable publicly in some parts of Europe. But in actual fact the absolute size of armed forces (cf. Table 5) is no clear measure to go by, since it has to be correlated with factors such as territory and population, weaponry, degree of modernisation, and so on,²⁵ and also hard to measure factors such as morale and motivation.

24. Arms production, too, is often regarded as an indicator of a state's means for exerting influence, as the expression of its own capabilities, or as a means of supplying other states with such capabilities (cf. Table 6). Sales of arms, whether these be produced by the state in question, or by others, also may allow one to draw conclusions regarding the attitude of that state (cf. Table 7). But, as on the one hand the ranking particularly of Germany in such statistics (see Table 8), on the other hand the parameters of public discourse regarding military affairs in that country show, the worth of such statistics may be limited. Opinion polls in today's Germany might perhaps list, as in India, politicians, black-

²⁵ Cf. also PERKOVICH 2003-4: 136.

marketeers and pimps as least useful to society, but surely not soldiers, beside doctors and teachers, as among the most useful.

25. All this should suffice to show how fundamentally problematic attempts to determine global weight based on statistics are. These do, of course, convey important information (China, for instance, looks potentially very belligerent), but — as in the case of the “Voice of the People” survey described above — the interpretation of this may be influenced by perception, whilst this perception, on its part, may be influenced by the information. As it is, a particularly important factor, one that, however, does not easily lend itself to statistical ascertainment, is the will to claim global standing, and to act in accord with this. If certain basic parameters do not make this claim appear to be quite implausible, then such a claim may, inasmuch as it finds some acceptance through others, stimulate a process leading to the actual realisation of the claim, possibly even against all statistical data.

26. The importance of perceptions can be impressively demonstrated by the rise to prominence that India has experienced during the last few years.²⁶ On this rise Erich Reiter, Director-General of Strategic Affairs of the Austrian Defence Ministry, has re-

²⁶ Cf. WAGNER 2003, WAGNER 2004.

marked.²⁷

India's increased importance is certainly due in part to its own ambitions.

In this process, economic progress has surely played a role; this is shown not only by important international confidence indexes (Tables 9 and 10), but also by the large foreign exchange holdings that have catapulted India into the top group, consisting solely of Asian states, of foreign exchange holders. An important, and internationally widely acknowledged, factor is, however, also India's joining the club of nuclear powers, together with a corresponding comportment on the world stage. Nevertheless, the guidelines for German foreign policy on South Asia stress that this rise to prominence is not connected with India's nuclear standing. This is, of course, due to general German valuations of nuclear armaments.²⁸ The example shows how values influence analyses and corresponding deductions, and may serve to distort the perception of reality.

27. The association of India predominantly with poverty among the European public is another source of falsification. The GDP per capita of both China and India for 2003, expressed in terms of PPP, is

²⁷ REITER 2004a: 93.

²⁸ See DAS 2002: 139.

4020 and 2840 US-\$ respectively, well below the world average of 7376 US-\$.²⁹ But in the case of India, this leads to far more negative valuations in the common perception, even though the difference to China is small compared with the difference to the top-ranking countries. This is all the more remarkable because it is known that actual negative factors are not necessarily reflected in statistics relating to China. For instance, according to the *CIA World Factbook*³⁰ the percentage of those living below the poverty line in India is 25%, and 28.6% according to the *UNDP Human Development Indicators 2003*³¹; the respective percentages for China are 10% and 4.6%. These figures for China are hard to swallow; in fact, according to them the percentage for China would not only equal that for Ireland (10% according to the CIA), but even be below that for the USA (12.7% according to the CIA).

28. Clearly, disparate definitions of the poverty line, and maybe also fudged statistics, play a role in this; however, the general esteem of China is by now so high in Europe that such things are hardly paid attention to. Similarly, the — especially in comparison to Western Europe — relatively high number of poor

²⁹ UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME 2003a.

³⁰ CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 2004.

³¹ UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME 2003b.

US citizens proves of little relevancy in the public perception of US power. And indeed, the higher percentage of persons living below the poverty line has not prevented the US from becoming the international top dog; clearly social inequalities which might markedly destabilise Western European countries do not necessarily possess the same explosive force in other societies. Since, however, European analyses of various other states often do posit a destabilising potential of poverty similar to what it would have in European states, we end up with a further falsifying factor. This pertains particularly to India, which is often dismissed by Europeans as not to be taken seriously precisely because it is regarded as still too poor to really matter.³²

29. Obviously, such falsifications, when they appear, must affect analyses and also actions. This may have direct, palpable consequences, as in the case of Afghanistan, where German troops are stationed.³³ Afghanistan is the connecting link between South and Central Asia, and is, as well as the adjoining Central Asian regions, the scene of a struggle for influence pitting, apart from the states of the region itself and their immediate neighbours, also

³² Cf., e.g., BUSSE 2003: 66.

³³ V. 2004: 10: "For the first time since Alexander the Great, Europe has entered Central Asia".

India and Pakistan against each other in an intense rivalry,³⁴ a rivalry which is directly related to that in Kashmir, which borders this volatile region. And yet, German analyses of the regional situation, as also related actions, view events there largely against the backdrop of the situation in the Middle East adjacent to Europe, instead of in the more appropriate overall context of processes in South Asia and the adjoining Central Asian regions during and since colonial times. This is surely not due only to a lack of relevant expert knowledge, but also results from the different weightages the various regions mentioned possess in the German view.

30. Pakistan and Afghanistan also have a long-standing problematic relationship, including a dispute over their common border. This means that the Taliban issue was not just one of the Taliban as such, but also a conflict between the two countries which Pakistan intended to turn to its advantage by using the Taliban in Afghanistan.³⁵ Of course, this is a problem confronting not only the Europeans:³⁶

To its great surprise and discomfiture, the Pakistani press has reported that the United States finds itself embroiled in a 100-year-old dispute

³⁴ Cf. AKBARZADEH 2003, REETZ 2002.

³⁵ V. 2004: 10f.

³⁶ BAHADUR 2003: 12.

between Afghanistan and Pakistan but does not have the expertise or the desire to resolve it.

But there is a similar conflict on Pakistan's eastern border, in Kashmir. Clearly, the relevant issue is not just "terrorism", but also "traditional" territorial conflicts, which pit Afghanistan, inasmuch as we can at present speak of a state of this name, and India together against Pakistan. From this angle, the problem in Afghanistan is partly Pakistan, the ally of the USA and thus indirectly of the German forces in Afghanistan. German policy does not, however, seem to take note of such convoluted issues, and German soldiers may die because of this.

31. To my knowledge, neither public authorities nor the media in Germany, or, for that matter, Europe, have drawn attention to the fact that the Indian Minister for Foreign Affairs and, for some time, Defence, already in September and October 2001 several times emphasised that the Government of India welcomed the measures adopted by the USA after September 11, 2001, because these had finally made the USA a comrade-in-arms in the fight against global terrorism that India had been fighting alone for over two decades — also against al-Qaida.³⁷ Apart from the self-confidence that these statements document, they also highlight the regional strategic

³⁷ GOVERNMENT OF INDIA n.d.: 15, 24, 94f., 99f., 129.

component that is extremely important in the given context, a component that is, however, missing in the German debate on Afghanistan accessible to the public, but seems to be considered by US strategists, even though maybe not adequately in all its aspects, as we saw in the last paragraph.

32. The conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan leads to another facet of the falsification of perception. Herfried Münkler writes that wars between states have become less possible now because territorial gains have little attractiveness, it being cheaper to buy resources than acquire them through force; modern societies simply find wars too costly as a means of achieving power or resources.³⁸ This reductionism, blending out all other motives for war, is clearly inadequate in the given context. Similarly, none of the wars between India and Pakistan, China and India or China and Vietnam fall into the given categories. One cannot, of course, categorically deny that access to resources played a role too, and one can also cite perceivable economic, strategic and other similar factors, as in the case of Aksai Chin, the vital link between Tibet and Xinjiang. But this leaves ample space for status, face and ideology, also as motives for holding on to or coveting territory; indeed, in some cases it is hard to see other motives than these primarily at work. One could try

³⁸ MÜNKLER 2003.

to ignore the states mentioned as not having modern societies in Münkler's sense, but since some of them are actual or potential major powers, that will clearly not do. In fact, Münkler bases his generalised deductions primarily on Europe and part of its surroundings, as well as Africa, with indeed very unstable states, but also with only limited truly global relevance. In other words, we have Eurocentrism at work here too. It thus comes as no surprise to find Ran Halévi scathingly criticising those, mostly Europeans, who regard the nation/state as obsolete.³⁹

33. Differences in the perception of Europe already exert their influence on Europe's very doorstep. The NATO state Turkey, for instance, is gradually, but perceptibly, reorientating itself not only towards its seemingly natural hinterland, Central Asia, but also towards China, India and Pakistan, and above all towards the USA, whereas the EU is losing importance as a strategic partner.⁴⁰ Israel, which hardly heeds the Europeans any more, is cementing its relationship with India, and it is, against this backdrop, surely not unimportant that the present Indian President — a Muslim, incidentally — is also regarded as the father of the Indian ballistic weapons programme; he has worked together closely with Israeli

³⁹ HALÉVI 2004: 11f.

⁴⁰ KRAMER 2003: 282.

experts in the development of India's nuclear arsenal. India and Israel are lobbying intensely for a strategic triangle together with the USA, and plans are already being mooted to include Turkey in this alliance. But the European view is so fixated on its own interactions with the USA that it ignores these developments in its immediate neighbourhood, even though these could restructure the balances of power in the whole Middle East.

34. In this context an article by Borut Grgic is particularly interesting.⁴¹ It contends that the Arab Gulf States rely exclusively on US security guarantees and ignore security concepts of the EU, not the least because these seem a bureaucratic botch concerned primarily with balancing the interests of the individual European states, and contain no realistic notions on regional security, for instance regarding the danger of not only Iranian, but also Pakistani or Indian incursions into the Gulf region. And Europe is, in spite of its evident pro-Palestinian stance, simply irrelevant for the Palestine conflict. But most damning of all, according to Grgic, is that the Europeans have no proper relationship with power, and cannot portray the use of force as an option in a convincing manner. As such, they seem quite untrustworthy and no alternative to the USA — even in their immediate neighbourhood.

⁴¹ GRGIC 2004.

35. The attitude towards force and its use is indeed a problem for Europe's interaction with other major powers operating in Eurasia. The deep rift between the USA and Europe in this regard is by now obvious. In a recent essay, Rob de Wijk has drawn explicit attention to the problem. He considers Europe, which he deems unlikely to attain great power status due to its fragmented structure, to be characterised by a lack of hard power and unwillingness to use force.⁴²

Generally speaking, Europe tries to manage security problems at home and abroad, whereas the United States seeks to solve them. Europeans put more emphasis on intent; the United States stresses capability.

This leads him to conclude that "Europe and the United States differ fundamentally in their methods of dealing with contemporary security threats",⁴³ Europe tends to prioritise "soft security", the USA favours "hard security". Similarly, Michael Rühle concludes that Europe is still mired in the first (Cold War) nuclear weapons age, whereas the USA is already in the second (post-Cold War) era; while the former still pins its faith in non-proliferation, the latter is already devising means to cope with nuclear

⁴² DE WIJK 2003-4: 200, similarly DE WIJK 2004: 7.

⁴³ DE WIJK 2003-4: 201, similarly DE WIJK 2004: 7.

proliferation and deployment — means including the use of force, both retaliatory and preemptive.⁴⁴

36. Michael C. Desch, in an essay provocatively titled *It is Kind to be Cruel: The Humanity of American Realism*, argues that thinking in normative categories is unproductive, power and realism being necessary.⁴⁵ This linkage between "realism" and the willingness to exert power characterises a host of studies critical of the European position. That there is a fundamental divide on this question, and that this divide is not confined to differences between Europeans and the present US administration, is shown by a recent article by Bruce W. Jentleson, erstwhile special assistant to the director of the State Department's policy planning staff and senior foreign policy adviser to Democrat presidential candidate Al Gore. It argues forcefully that the chief weakness of multilateralists is their lack of credibility on the use of force, and their unwillingness to recognise that force cannot always be strictly the last resort.⁴⁶

37. There is no need to cite further literature to demonstrate the general tenor of this discussion. How-

⁴⁴ RÜHLE 2004.

⁴⁵ DESCH 2003.

⁴⁶ JENTLESON 2003-4.

ever, what is in this context often overlooked is that, with the exception of Japan, which is not enumerated among the *big four*⁴⁷ anyway, all the states increasingly assumed to be chiefly responsible for future global developments implicitly or explicitly display the same attitude towards the use of force as the USA.⁴⁸ Europe is, thus, internationally an outsider, but will be able to realise this only by paying adequate heed to the Asiatic powers in its perceptions and analyses. There is, however, a further, and important, sphere in which Europe plays the role of the outsider. Michael Kilian has characterised Europe as a region dominated by small and micro states; he holds that, historically, its idea of statehood has therefore largely been that of a small state, resulting in belief in the necessity for multi-state organisations, and faith in systems of order and international laws.⁴⁹

38. Other major powers, having undergone different developments, may lack this belief in overarching systems of order. This is, as is well known, a major bone of contention between Europe and the USA, whence many of the prominent critics of the European belief stem. This does not necessarily imply a

⁴⁷ The USA, China, India and Russia

⁴⁸ Cf., e.g., BURLES/SHULSKY 2000, LAMBROSCHINI 2003.

⁴⁹ KILIAN 2002.

wholesale rejection of such systems and the accompanying institutions, but it does mean that their worth may be relativised,⁵⁰ as is explained by Charles L. Glaser:⁵¹

Consequently, given their potentially useful roles, debate over the value of institutions should focus more on their risks and benefits in specific international contexts. In evaluating the potential contribution of institutions, their value should be judged relative to the state's policy alternative without the institution. Otherwise the value of institutions will be exaggerated, if states could have done almost as well without them

Glaser also makes the important observation that "willingness to work through international organisations should not be confused with necessity".⁵² Colin L. Powell phrases this more diplomatically:⁵³ "Partnership is not about deferring to others; it is about working with them." Joachim Krause is blunt: the USA is interested in results, and has lost tolerance for processes with no or pseudo results.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ Cf. also IKENBERRY 2003.

⁵¹ GLASER 2003: 410.

⁵² GLASER 2003: 411.

⁵³ POWELL 2004: 25f.

⁵⁴ KRAUSE 2004: 29f.

39. The opposing positions are also found differently characterised, e.g. as European populism versus US unilateralism,⁵⁵ but are most often contrasted as idealism opposed to realism, especially by those sceptical of the worth of such institutions. Robert Kagan argues that not only do Europeans lack realism, but that their antagonism towards those not sharing the same idealistic stance, particularly the USA, leads them to disregard dangers threatening Europe itself.⁵⁶ Alluding to the alleged dangers posed by the superpower status of the USA, he further writes:⁵⁷

Out of nervousness about unipolarity, they might underestimate the dangers of a multipolar system in which nonliberal and nondemocratic powers would come to outweigh Europe. Out of passion for the international legal order, they might forget the other liberal principles that have made postmodern Europe what it is today. Europeans might succeed in debilitating the United States this way. But since they have no intention of supplementing its power with their own, in doing so they would only succeed in weakening the overall power that the liberal

⁵⁵ KRAUSE 2004: 5.

⁵⁶ See also REITER 2004b.

⁵⁷ KAGAN 2004: 87.

democratic world can wield in its defense — and in defense of liberalism itself.

Joachim Krause actually calls the European stance unilateralistic, inasmuch as it consists of multilateralism without or directed against the USA.⁵⁸

40. Unfortunately, the sheer amplitude, and also vehemence, of the transatlantic debate on this question conceals that criticism of the European position also comes from some unexpected quarters. The influential Indian strategic analyst C. Raja Mohan says on the subject, caustically and making no bones about his views on Europe:⁵⁹

In the post-11 September world, Europe has become more of an irritation rather than an enthusiastic associate in America's new war. Europe has always whined about America's unilateralism when Washington acted with force, and it complained about American isolationism when it turned its back, but the carping about American unilateralism has become intense since 11 September.

He also holds that:⁶⁰

⁵⁸ KRAUSE 2004: 5.

⁵⁹ MOHAN 2004: 70f.

⁶⁰ MOHAN 2004: 77.

...at the very moment when Europe proclaims that power politics are passé, India is beginning to de-emphasize the notion of collective security and to stress the importance of comprehensive national strength and balance of power. At a time when Europe dismisses the notion of national sovereignty as the basis for dealing with global issues, India is committed to a strong defence of the concept.

41. This reflects the general tenor of influential Indian views drawn attention to by Klaus Voll, namely that Europe, in contrast to the USA, is not only a vague entity, but also lacks a sense of realism in strategic affairs and sufficient knowledge of the issues concerned, and is, in short, of no primary importance from a strategic point of view.⁶¹ This does not imply full-scale acceptance of US views, in spite of the growing closeness of Indo-US cooperation to which US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has drawn explicit attention in a recent interview.⁶² But it does show that factoring in the views of major “non-Western” powers would surely contribute toward a more realistic European assessment of its and its notions’ place in the world.

42. Even the views of influential circles in a major

⁶¹ VOLL 2003: 36f.

⁶² RICE 2005.

state Europe mostly views as “Western” might serve as a corrective. Consider, for instance, the view of the well-known Russian analyst Yury E. Fedorov:⁶³

Yury Fedorov observed that there is a division in Russia between Eurocentric and UScentric circles. But President Vladimir Putin had tended to choose the latter. Furthermore, the threat of international terrorism ... brought together countries as disparate as Israel, India, the US and Russia, with elements of a possible coalition between these four countries.

Where would this leave Europe? Similarly, the much discussed strategic partnership between Russia, China and India, an idea first mooted, with anti-US overtones, by the erstwhile Russian Premier Yevgey Primakov and still very much on the agenda especially in Russia, also does not envisage a role for Europe.

43. One of the chief differences between Europe, particularly the EU, and major powers such as the USA, China, Russia and India is the attitude towards the state and statehood. This attitude informs the inclination or disinclination to subordinate the state to other structures or bodies. But one should not *a priori* expect this attitude to be free of contradictions, as in most aspects of human thought and endeavor.

⁶³ HEISBOURG 2003: 2.

our. Thus, several EU states, even though they are part of the EU, cling to quite marked concepts of sovereignty based on their individual identities as states. Also, various European — and other — states allegedly direct their efforts against terrorism primarily towards seeing that terrorists spare them and their citizens, irrespective of the export of terrorism to other states, including the USA, thus occasioned.⁶⁴ And the European interventions in the Balkans did partly violate international law. But such caveats do not basically alter the perception of European reliance on organisations other than individual states in dealing with external problems connected with violence, either actual or potential.

44. The conflicts resulting are well exemplified by the International Criminal Court (ICC). Transatlantic exchanges on this issue have become so acrimonious that a North American scholar has even accused Germany, one of the main champions of the ICC, of actually not only seeking to dismantle the United Nations through it, but also of fostering war:⁶⁵

The ICC, so to say, has been made to be abused. It threatens to replace a classical inter-

⁶⁴ KATZENSTEIN 2003: 754f. This implies that the European, not the US stance, lacks a sense of global responsibility.

⁶⁵ ROSENTHAL 2004: 43.

national law whose purpose was to secure peace with a supposedly “new” international law whose *raison d’être* is war.

In the European view, by contrast, it is a matter of the USA being against most of the world. This, however, is another instance of falsification due to the European perception. Though a small majority of the states in the UN (99 of 191) has ratified the ICC treaty, this majority consists, if we leave aside European and South American states, nearly wholly of states that are of little weight internationally. Particularly important is that nearly all Asian, CIS and North African Arab states are missing; the few exceptions have little to say in global power politics.⁶⁶

45. What the absence of most global powers means for the acceptance of the ICC, and for the enforceability of whatever it decides, is obvious. But this absence also means that it is not a case of the USA against the rest of the world, but rather of the Europeans (particularly the EU) against the overwhelming majority of major powers. That this is not perceived in Europe could be because this majority consists mostly of states not belonging to the so-called “West”, and that international opinion is, in Europe, mostly equated with the opinion of the lat-

⁶⁶ See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL 2004; cf. also DAS 2004a: 12, DAS 2004b: 11f.

ter (cf. § 10 above).

46. Kilian’s observations on perceptions in Europe being mostly conditioned by the mentality of small states (§ 37 above) also lead to the conclusion — arrived at independently by Jochen Hippler, too⁶⁷ — that, with some exceptions like the erstwhile colonial powers France and the UK, Europe today exhibits a meagre grasp of international processes and complexities, and unconsciously bases what it applies internationally on experience derived from its immediate geographic surroundings. What is missing is the global view of a state like the USA, which is separated only by a narrow strait from Russia, looks across a sea not only towards Europe, but also Asia, and had a part of its territory (some of the Aleutian Islands) occupied by an Asian power in 1942-1943 — even if the area occupied was quite small.

47. Acknowledging deficits such as those mentioned could allow remedies to be found and utilised. But not wanting, or being able, to see these deficits, risks making decisions and acting in a manner misjudging actual conditions, and possibly harming both oneself and others. Eurocentrism being one of the factors preventing acknowledgment, an awareness of it and the falsification of perception it causes needs to be developed.

⁶⁷ HIPPLER 2003.

Table 1: Population by % of World Population
Based on data of the U.S. Bureau of the Census

2003					
1 China	20.48	8 Bangladesh	2.20	15 Egypt	1.18
2 India	16.65	9 Nigeria	2.12	16 Turkey	1.08
3 USA	4.60	10 Japan	2.02	17 Iran	1.06
4 Indonesia	3.73	11 Mexico	1.64	18 Ethiopia	1.06
5 Brazil	2.89	12 Philippines	1.34	19 Thailand	1.02
6 Pakistan	2.48	13 Germany	1.31	20 France	0.95
7 Russia	2.29	14 Vietnam	1.29	21 UK	0.95
2025					
1 China	18.57	8 Bangladesh	2.61	15 Egypt	1.32
2 India	17.40	9 Russia	1.69	16 Ethiopia	1.17
3 USA	4.47	10 Mexico	1.66	17 Iran	1.06
4 Indonesia	3.84	11 Japan	1.53	18 Turkey	1.05
5 Pakistan	2.92	12 Philippines	1.52	19 Germany	1.03
6 Brazil	2.48	13 Congo/Kinshasa	1.34	20 Thailand	0.94
7 Nigeria	2.64	14 Vietnam	1.33	21 UK	0.82

2050

1 India	17.69	8 Brazil	2.52	15 Russia	1.27
2 China	15.74	9 Congo/Kinshasa	2.00	16 Japan	1.10
3 USA	4.64	10 Mexico	1.63	17 Iran	0.99
4 Indonesia	3.71	11 Philippines	1.63	18 Turkey	0.95
5 Nigeria	3.40	12 Egypt	1.40	19 Sudan	0.93
6 Pakistan	3.26	13 Ethiopia	1.34	20 Uganda	0.92
7 Bangladesh	3.09	14 Vietnam	1.29	21 Afghanistan	0.90

Continents

Continent	2003	2025	2050
Africa	13.58	15.93	19.71
Asia	60.61	60.76	59.00
Europe	11.57	9.14	7.23
North America	7.98	7.94	8.15
Oceania	0.51	0.51	0.49
South America	5.75	5.71	5.42

Table 2: Gross Domestic Product 2002

Sources: CIA Factbook (for PPP), IMD International's World Competitiveness Yearbook (for MER)

Rank	Country	GDP, billion PPP \$	GDP, billion MER \$
1	USA	10,450.0	10,445.6
2	China	5,989.0	1,237.1
3	Japan	3,651.0	3,996.2
4	India	2,664.0	460.0
5	Germany	2,160.0	1,987.0
6	France	1,558.0	1,419.3
7	UK	1,528.0	1,555.2
8	Italy	1,455.0	1,186.0
9	Russia	1,409.0	346.5
10	Brazil	1,376.0	452.4
11	South Korea	941.5	468.7
12	Canada	934.1	729.3
13	Mexico	924.4	637.3
14	Spain	850.7	654.0
15	Indonesia	714.2	172.9
16	Australia	525.5	393.0

17 Turkey	489.7	183.5
18 Iran	458.3	not given
19 Thailand	445.8	124.0
20 Netherlands	437.8	418.8
(37) (Hong Kong)	(198.5)	(163.0)

21 France	26,000	126 China	4,700
		155 India	2,600
77 Russia	9,700		
94 Brazil	7,600	World	7,900

Table 3: 2002 Gross Domestic Product Per Capita (PPP \$)

Source: CIA Factbook

1 Luxembourg	48,900	11 Belgium	29,200
2 USA	36,300	12 Denmark	28,900
3 Bermuda	35,200	13 Japan	28,700
4 Cayman Islands	35,000	14 Aruba	28,000
5 San Marino	34,600	15 Austria	27,900
6 Norway	33,000	16 Hong Kong	27,200
7 Switzerland	32,000	17 Netherlands	27,200
8 Iceland	30,200	18 Monaco	27,000
9 Canada	29,300	19 Australia	26,900
10 Ireland	29,300	20 Germany	26,200

Table 4: Military Expenditure 2002

Source: CIA Factbook

(Military expenditure figures for Russia were not available)

Rank	Country	Million MER \$	% of GDP
1	USA	276,700	3.20
2	China	55,910	4.30
3	France	46,500	2.57
4	Japan	39,520	1.00
5	Germany	38,800	1.38
6	UK	31,700	2.32
7	Italy	20,200	1.64
8	Saudi Arabia	18,300	13.00
9	Brazil	13,408	1.90
10	South Korea	13,094	2.80

11	India	11,520	2.30
12	Australia	11,390	2.90
13	Iran	9,700	3.10
14	Israel	8,970	8.75
15	Spain	8,600	1.15
16	Turkey	8,100	4.50
17	Canada	7,861	1.10
18	Taiwan	7,574	2.70
19	Netherlands	6,500	1.50
20	Greece	6,120	4.91

6	Germany	27.7	4	6	UK	34.0
7	Saudi Arabia	21.6	3	7	Japan	32.8
8	Italy	21.1	3	8	Germany	31.0
9	Iran	17.5	2	9	Saudi Arabia	28.8
10	South Korea	13.5	2	10	Italy	26.9
11	India	12.9	2	11	South Korea	24.3
12	Russia	11.4	2	12	Turkey	23.0
13	Turkey	10.1	1	13	Brazil	22.8
14	Brazil	10.0	1	14	Iran	20.2
15	Israel	9.8	1	15	Pakistan	14.2

Sources: SIPRI Yearbook 2003, appendix 10A (for MER), and World Bank, World Development Indicators 2002 (for PPP)

Rank	Country	Billion MER \$	Global %	Rank	Country	Billion PPP \$
1	USA	335.7	43	1	USA	335.7
2	Japan	46.7	6	2	China	142.9
3	UK	36.0	5	3	India	66.5
4	France	33.6	4	4	Russia	55.4
5	China	31.1	4	5	France	36.8

Table 5: Armed Forces Personnel in Thousand Persons 2000

Source: nationmaster.com

(Iraq, definitely among the top ten, is missing due to insufficient data)

1	China	2,810	6	Pakistan	612
2	Russia	1,520	7	Turkey	610
3	USA	1,366	8	Iran	513
4	India	1,303	9	Vietnam	484
5	South Korea	683	10	Egypt	448

11 Ethiopia	352	19 Italy	251
12 Burma	344	20 Japan	237
13 Syria	316	21 Germany	221
14 Ukraine	304	22 Poland	217
15 Thailand	301	23 UK	212
16 Indonesia	297	24 Romania	207
17 France	294	25 Saudi Arabia	202
18 Brazil	288		

**Table 6: Employment in Arms Production in
Thousand Persons 2001**

Source: Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC)

1 China	2,500	8 North Korea	120
2 USA	2,320	9 Germany	90
3 Russia	835	10 Japan	85
4 France	250	11 Belarus	75
5 UK	240	12 Poland	55
6 Ukraine	200	13 South Korea	50
7 India	180	14 Pakistan	50

15 Egypt	45	21 Italy	30
16 Turkey	45	22 Sweden	28
17 Iran	40	23 Canada	25
18 South Africa	40	24 Czechia	25
19 Israel	35	25 Slovakia	25
20 Taiwan	35		

**Table 7: Conventional Arms Exports 2001 in
Million 1990 \$**

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database

1 USA	4,562	10 Sweden	486
2 China	3,100	11 Turkey	442
3 France	1,288	12 Algeria	365
4 UK	1,125	13 Italy	358
5 India	1,064	14 Iran	335
6 Pakistan	759	15 Jordan	280
7 Germany	675	16 Angola	255
8 Brazil	597	17 Netherlands	225
9 Egypt	486	18 Colombia	222

19 Israel	203	23 Norway	156
20 Bangladesh	180	24 Canada	152
21 Peru	178	25 South Korea	150
22 Thailand	162		

**Table 8: Major Arms Producing Countries
2001**

Source: SIPRI Yearbook 2002, appendix 7B

1 USA	8 China	15 Singapore
2 France	9 Israel	16 South Africa
3 UK	10 Italy	17 Spain
4 Germany	11 South Korea	18 Sweden
5 Japan	12 Australia	19 Taiwan
6 Russia	13 India	20 Ukraine
7 Canada	14 Netherlands	

**Table 9: FDI Confidence Index
September 2003**
Source: Global Business Policy Council (A.T. Kearney Inc.)

Rank	Country	Rating (3 to 0)	Rank	Country	Rating (3 to 0)
1	China	1.97	14	Canada	0.87
2	USA	1.63	15	Japan	0.85
3	Mexico	1.06	16	Thailand	0.85
4	Poland	1.06	17	Hungary	0.82
5	Germany	1.06	18	South Korea	0.81
6	India	1.04	19	Australia	0.72
7	UK	1.02	20	Taiwan	0.70
8	Russia	0.99	21	Vietnam	0.69
9	Brazil	0.94	22	Hong Kong	0.69
10	Spain	0.91	23	Malaysia	0.67
11	France	0.91	24	Turkey	0.66
12	Italy	0.91	25	Indonesia	0.64
13	Czechia	0.88			

Table 10: FDI Confidence Index for EU Investors

Source: Global Business Policy Council (A.T. Kearney Inc.)

Rank	Country 2003	Country 2002	Rank	Country 2003	Country 2002
1	China	USA	11	Brazil	Austria
2	USA	Germany	12	Mexico	Hungary
3	Poland	China	13	Hungary	Canada
4	Spain	Italy	14	Czechia	Netherlands
5	Italy	France	15	Slovenia	Baltic States
6	Germany	UK	16	Romania	Belgium
7	France	Spain	17	Canada	Switzerland
8	Russia	Poland	18	Belgium	Japan
9	UK	Czechia	19	South Korea	India
10	India	Russia	20	Turkey	Brazil

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