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    Panzer Blitz

    Cargado por

    J. Alfredo Luque
    Manuales para wargames

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    © All Rights Reserved
    Descargue como PDF o lea en línea desde Scribd

    Panzer Blitz

    Cargado por

    J. Alfredo Luque
    233 vistas46 páginas
    Manuales para wargames

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    © © All Rights Reserved

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    Manuales para wargames

    Copyright:

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    Descargar como pdf
    233 vistas46 páginas

    Panzer Blitz

    Cargado por

    J. Alfredo Luque
    Manuales para wargames

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Descargue como PDF o lea en línea desde Scribd
    Descargar como pdf
    de 46
    Panzer Biitz,. bel ed i RS Re a ge Oe ay ysws0N ave 4 1ewon av sen 4 1ew0N av a1gn00 SdoLTIH 34018 20008 Iv 3 saNog foyoued ,6uie0, 0v) ee HWSO 581804, ouoawauis meta, | oemmwimiw (SeeAeH Burpr|ou) SaTOIHBAGaNOMNY 4A9UVL4O 3dAL (pena 6apapuy ‘suaHioTY anon NON 2 mon oes aut oniaa Noavamn js0ssv719 BAva1 oF aw saaawv: yo! ep Suayoene or 4 PRY savin sdouri 3ONVUO MOUS ON oot NON BONvO NMOUS s3g01s sp susyaene oF suo Poy 30P% amor ot s9ia3603 au snmon amon om 1B e10N 08 Boon eS BONvUO NMOUS 7 savow ‘sa01770H s340718 73A77 aNnoHD NON uvano NO Si 1394Vi N3HM 3UI4-JO-3NIT SHI 19nH1SBO HOIHN S108WAS 3015 XBH/3TOV1SEO DNINSANINE ainessy es013—peNY tunusag—peny feuoy 294 Pine syoee Tujenai uenBe vo on DNIGNSISO) '3SN3I30 NO 193433 _ = |ee acim > fae = Bi = raat ‘SOllwa SAO oneuejdxa a18VLSLINSaY LvaWoo sunivasNivuwaL Fr 8 project of this type the list of source publications is quite small. The type of data Considered “popular”. The two bes sources are US Army intaligonce publistions‘ewed during 1945. They contain the result of four yoor's work in gathering data on the Russian nd Gorman ormice, This data mae obtained {tom captured documents (frm the Germans) ‘and. information provided by the Rustons Much of the Russion ata could. be authenticated by using documents captured from the Germans (who in turn had captured tham from the Rumians). These two manls (IME_E 30451 HANDBOOK ON GERMAN MILITARY FORCES end TM. 20-420 HANDBOOK | ON USSR MILITARY FORCES), coch containing over 600 page, ferces (with the excoption of weepont in the USSR "mancall Organization, cacti, ‘equipment, taining are all covered in detail fsthough you must be careful to keepin in that these manuale wore published in somewhat of & hurry and that mistakes did fccur, But overall they were lvaluable, For the larger aspects of the wer one had to sor to “official” historic, ‘Noithor “Russa. nor Germany have, in the American sense, sctully poblisned an’ "official history” yet. The Russians published, between 1960 and 1963. ISTORIVA VELIKOY "OTCHESTVENNOY VOYNY SOVETSKOYO SOYUZE {'The Soviet Union"). It contained. many, many “official” history wes being prepared, the Prime Minister of the USSR. Using ths sores fof tx volumes fe like vaking on a minefield Instead of a mine detoctor you nesd 2 "BS. etector”, for these volumes contain’ much that can be described no other way. However, ft does contain some “hard” data se well a 8 tetions. If you ee either vigorous or deaperate Shortly after the publication ofthis erie an ‘ssially” 9 word for word translation with a bit of editing On the German se there isnot official” history. There i, honever, available he KRIEGSTAGBUCH. DES OBERKOMMANDOS DER WEHRMACHT (Wor Diary of the Armed Forces High Command). This" multivolume set wes published between 1981 and 1986. 1 containe 24 the actual “operational” documents of the Geman High Command during. the wer ‘ecthe Russian volumes it does contain much Sreter volume of useful data,” Further Tuchnical” data on weapons and operations ware obtained fom FM TOMO} STAFF OFFICERS’ "FIELD. MANUAL ORGANIZATION, TECHNICAL AND. LOGISTICAL DATA, and. the following Gaman language publications: DIE DEUTSCHEN PANZER 1926-1946 (F. M, von Senger und Etter, 1965), DIE PANZERGRENADIERE (F. M. von Senger und Etterin, 1961), DIE DEUTSCHEN GESCHUTZE 1990-1045 (Bohm, Kosar etal 1950), DIE ARMEEN DER OSTBLOCK STAATEN (F. Wiener, 1967: this supplied ff which re still in usa, | have notes taken fram Department of Defense publications of Russian WWII semomant|, KAMPEPANZER 1916-1966 (F. M. von Senger and Ettertn, 1986), DIE ROTEN PANZER (Andronikov and Mostonenko, 1963, « Germen translation ereral history of the "war in the eam” was Focontly published by the American Office of {he Chief of Military History: STALINGRAD TO BERLIN: THE GERMAN DEFEAT IN THE EAST (Gar! Ziomke, 1968). Iti the fist the Russo-German vir, It gies a good reviow of the frst two Years of the war plus more particular use were articles published in such Imogazines az" the FIELD. ARTILLERY JOURNAL, ARMOR end INFANTRY. unmentioned here) provided "mainly ‘confirming oF supplementary dats ta the titles though “microfilm reproduction from the Drobebly atl in print for oven in paperbeck) tne any book seller worth his eat should be able fo run them dowm for you should you be hers obviously not exhouste. It has not been given t0 ether impress You OF to prod You in tho direction of historical rossaren, The Imai function of WHERE ‘THE INFORMATION CAME FROM was jue that, 10 show you that the data presented in ths Siwavs been around. I's just @ matter of Fearanging it to suit your needs. That's what Iistorians are for Designers Notes & elle LO BUT OM ed OUT Ss a) Copyright 1970, The Avalon Hill Company, Baltimore, Md Designer's Notes A glance “atthe PANZERBLITZ come components gives You the impresion that you ‘can. pick up 9” considerable amount. of Fistorial date by just studying the game, ‘uch less actully playing it, There i 9 certain mount of truth to this, for 9 considerable ‘amount of historical data was incorporated into. the components of | the game Unforwnarsiy, you cannot tke this data, 3s modified in the game design, at face valve Instead you must understand some of the decisions’ that were made about this ate before it wes Incorporetod into the game ‘Take, for example, the “factors” assigned to ‘he unit in the game, Speed and ange factors ‘wore relatively easy to compute. The “scale ‘of the gine is such that ech “hexagon ‘measures. 250. meter. scross. Each "turn fale about six minutes, For speed ll we heeded 10 know was the top speed of the Vehicle andthe horsepower to weight rato ‘Ateady we can se that 9 “simplification” was performed at this point, as some vehicles fhould have had special restrietione placed on them bocaisy of a very low horsepower to ‘weight ratio. But t0 do this would havo addea Sil more “drt” 10 the mochanies of the game Te ig lite “simplifications” Tike this wich spall the difference between a playable game fad an unplayable one. Rules covering the fiferences in horsepower 1 weight ratios ware tested end found t0 add little to the ‘me, had ther effect born decisive such rules ‘Wout ave Boon Kept. Computing the range factors was somewhat ‘more complex. Considerable data was evelable fon the range and effectiveness of the various igh velocity gins used in the game (particularly on the tanks). What was not generally Known vas the copablitis of the fighting equipment on these guns. When this Sata ves considered it was found to reduce the ‘ange of same weapons considerably. This was Derticulary true for the Fussans, who. in ‘general had optical sighting equipment inferior fo" the German’ devices In addition tho Germans would mount antisivraft type ‘optical equipment on certain antitank gun (Gavally the 88rm guns) which wore well itd fr long rang fir. The same restrictions ‘vere. applied’ to all types of weapons. In ‘sddition, the generally acsopted tactics anc taining had. to be considered also. Certain ‘weapons were simply not employed at extrame anges, although they wer capable of it. This Uataly applied to Rustin “A clas weapons (euch as 122mm howitzer. ‘The above range factor had an important bearing on the computation of tho "attack" factor” Sut more important were such factors ‘8 weapons effoctivenoss, ammunition supply, ‘roe traning and tactical doctrine. Usually ne ‘eociate 2 weapon's effoctweness wath (ite ‘more than the data on the size of shell and what it ean do, But the ie only a part of i “The rate of fire is important (most German {anke had a power traverse for ther surrey, a8 dd MOST Ruston tenks, but the Rusion System was more. primitive and subject 10 breakdown) and tht is dependent not only on ‘such thinge as the design of the gun and ‘whether oF aot it has power traverse in the turret but algo on the size of the ammunition larger sizes, ike 122mm and 128mm care in two parts), Crew training and the general fedvcational level of the crows had an Important’ bearing on this aso, as did the quality and avalibiity of radio equipment Wor example, Soviet tanks used an AM radio while the Germans used a more offiient FM fe. Throughout mos of the war only one Soviet tank in tn Pad 2 fadio weil all Gorman ‘ones did. German radios were simplar and {sasir to maintain although by the end of the ‘var some” 30% of Soviet radios were of the fmore efficient American type (we also. sent the ‘Soviets some five milion radio. tubes ‘daring the war) By now you should be abla see how important the usually “unrecognized” tale a0 in ovslating unit's effectiveness (Overall, you could say shet the unit’s attack factor ‘mas_mainly” a function of the ponotration of the gun's shell But we mast tso consider the other factors mentioned. ‘Depending on the weapon being evaluated the other factor’ effect may very. Each woapon had to be evaluated indivcvally. In adaition the turrotles tanks (aeiault- gute) hod to be hada with particular care, fr their lock ofa fotating turret was pertiularly important In an Dffenshe situation. In this caso the ‘manouverabiity and tactical doctrine played a decisive rate, For the other types of weapons (Hand M cls) an overriding. factor was. ammunition fupply. One rearon for the short number of ture. in-the game situations i due to the fmmunition limitations which actually oxsted Sand was crually the couse of a battle being Terminated. Each weapon had. an assigned ‘unit of fea” ae usualy cari that number ‘of rounes into stion, though more than on lint of fire would be carted Into different ‘types. of action (two or tras for offensive ‘Operations, Ine for defense of 8 quit sector). ‘The German unit of Fire was invariably lxger than the Russian. For example, the Germans ‘cried 690 rounds for ach SMG while the ‘Russians caried only 300. German 120mm rrortars each had 150 rounds (4 tone) while tach Russian one hod 80 rounds (2.2 tons. German G's had 3450 to 6200 rounds while Fussan ones hed 800 to 2500, Of course, thi vas one reeson why German units usually hac mmore transport inthe units. It lap the Iajor reason why German weapons of eal faliber to Russian ones have 9 higher combat foesoe “The weapons class system and the Weapons Effect Chart point up. another important foctor which hae slresdy beon covered stove, If you haven’s already noticed It. Obvious. ‘antitank ("A lass) "woapont are most fective against armored vehicles. One shel Suil knockout a tank. vt against comething Tike ‘infantry (which’ has amore highly ‘developed sanse of sf preservation than do the inenimate tenks) one shell would. have Tittle fect. Infact, armor piercing ‘ammunition would have no effect stall unless actually hit aman. Tanks also earied high ‘oplosive (°H cls) shell (ap well = other ‘types, for example, the Gorman StGIN usually carried 22 rounds of armor plering sll, 27 founds of HE and 5 rounds of smake shal) isapone such 6 the 120mm mortar usually carried only HE. This sell could not knock fut tanke directly, but shell landing on oF ‘rear’ a tank could sabia it (usually by ‘damaging the running gear, tusret or engine). [As our game situations are too short for repairs to be made, this litle amount of damage tftetivaly pts the tank ‘out of action. HE ‘hell, which upon exploding releases hundreds (of motal fragments, is most effective against ‘armored weapons and infranty, Most ofthe ‘damage is done by either injuring the men oF feauipment or, almost az important, by “disrupting” the organization of the unit. Tt was found that @ unit coming under fie would Often be 0 disrupted es to be totally Inatteetve for hours. Thi i often what "X" ‘and "D” outcomes on the combat result table indicate ‘The defense factors were somewhat easier 10 compute than the attack factors. Defense ‘depended on two primary factors: cover and ‘coneaaimont. ‘The fist of thoes was, for ‘exmored vehicles, simply armor and how thick it was. For othor typos of targets it depended fon. "disporsion”, This applied very well to “alsperse” hengolt ae soon 96. the shooting started. Other types of weapons could alse benefit from this factor, depending on how 4 ‘mobile they were. The second facto Concealment, was similar to dispersion. alt primarily with how small unit was, or how "anctaled” it normally was while operating. Certain weapons, such a antiaircraft guns, tere dificult to conceal while im plac {lke the tube pointed "up". Othar hoavy weapons Varied in their “conesalment™ Tector In Felotion to thir sco. (One further complication is that we have three basi typoe of DIFFERENT units in tho game bach te cifferent in decisive ways, making eat: type of unit bascally incompatible with the other. The fst type isthe Infantry, and its Sexociated heavy weapons (machine guns, ‘mortars, infantry howitzors and, to linited batent. antitank guns). Ths type. i rte ierent from th original masaoe of firearm fequiped men raliod over three hundred years farlior, All weapons are clract fire and all ‘Operate, more or less, within sight of each ‘thar. ‘The next type ie. armored fighting ‘ohicles, While tesa weapons were originally ‘evloped for daaliog with infantry ‘heavy ‘weapons, they hea now grovn 80 potent that thir main tak was to destroy each other (or ‘enemy artillry, tha third type of weapon! Matters were farther complicated by” the prosenca of numerous antrtank weapons inthe hands of the infnery. These not only included ‘gine of vorious caliber, but also antisane ‘Reapens that wore portable enough for uso by antitank rifle [145mm which they continued to iawe in lage numbers throughout the war hilo the. Germans had, from 1943 on, an ‘xcallent sores ol ant-tank rockets (similar to the US "bazooka ). True, the tanks could stil "overrun" the in’antry using fittle more than imachineguns and their wn imposing bulk. But basicaly the tanks tock care of the tanks whila the heavy weapons took care of the infancy Thich tied to take caro of isl. The third clase of weapons wes really @ "type" all by Itai.” The atilory depended envicoly on frepower. The arilery batteries depicted in ‘the game are secend ony tothe infantry unite in the sumer of mon they contain. All this Just to keep the shells going into the cannon, Fr example, 2 Soviet 122mm battory cari found with 18 tons of ammunition (compared t0 55 tone for a itl company) Establishing workable relationships between these threo “quie differant “types” was {ecomplished through 9 ares of wil and error toss of vanous approaches to the game. You just keep looking until you find the one that {bles and otter such collcted data on ‘reapons effectiveness. These were pplied ‘anere appropriate. But since wo had to calculate ammunition expenditures £0. that tach weapon would, theoretically, be able to fire nearly every turn of the game, these ‘rious destruction tables had to be modifies Considerably. And, of cours, the lament of hanes had to bo added els, it wount al that ‘complicated, there was just 9101 of work and petty detail to be attanced 0, ‘To try and tle all the above together let ut once more review the weapon's class system. "A" clase weapons ae PRIMARILY. armor piercing shall" fired. fom ether armored Vehicles or non-mobile antitank gun ‘These weapons are alo supplied with HE (High Explosive) shel for uso against infantry and ‘other nor-ormored targets. In addition, the [rmunition supply of tanks is limited. Ae a ‘Compensation of sorts the armored vehicle has the dubious advantoge of being sie to stand in ‘he “open” and fro from the most favorable position. When operating aginst non-armored Targets these weapons. are naturally ata isedvantage due to lack of ammunition (at ‘nel as the proper type." class weapons are ‘mainly the SMG ard machinoguns of the Infantry’ Iplus han grenades and small mortars). Rifles and pistols ore not ‘ally counted 36 during the Second World War they layed a very minor role as casualty causing fagonts (a ow porcent at mort). These infantry ‘weapons, a0" well "at the infantrymen Themselves, were most effective at vory close ranges, Their main problem wae t0 got that Close to the enemy without being destroyed in the provers." and ™M cle wespone were practically identical in that both fired aa HE (High: Explosive) shell. These weapont had much greater range than "I" land often "A"? lass weapons. But their accuracy also daclined ‘their rango increas thus reducing thelr tfetivenss ‘The board provides its own explanation forthe ymbolization vsti on it Most of Rusts at ovoid of any large. levations beyond those shown on he board. Many areas di, however, contain numerous gules (often inthe form of Sraambed) whieh provided terain problems ‘of a different kind. The player who negloets to keep an eve on these depressions may have probleme mith hie coponer “The movement syste i fomowhat uneelitie. Movement shouldbe simultansous, ut sich @ system would be too dificult to reproduce in {playable game. However, the present sytem ‘eolistic movement system. First of al, you can't. move AND fire in reverts many une this rule changot the ontire “complexion” of the game. For example, if force moves up 100 Close t0 enemy units it exposes self to lnomy attack. As long as you Blok roads and "easy" approsches to your own units your opponent will sways have to plan one move ‘head. All this because you cannot move and fire nthe same tur, ‘A FEW NOTES ON TACTICS If you haven't already figured it out for Yourselt, this game i primarily concerned with ‘Enall unit tactics. IF you want t0 get anything {ut of the geme, if you vant t0 lesen ow 10 play it wal you had otter kop your mind on Tactics. Is what the game is all about, “The sale ofthe game (1:12200) can be given ‘one hexagon = 250 meters (measured from fone side to another). In generel, the tactice finally adopted by ‘both sider” conformed remarkably” well to the advantages ond linvtations inherent to the various units and \wmapone ivalved. The Garment, for the most bart, had superior taining and weapons on ‘er eke, Thoir traning was better thought jut and more thorough in its epolication. The ‘outcome of ail this wat that the average Germon_ small unit could “think for itl” German weapon wore designed with thi in mind. The suporirity of Garman weapons wat ‘ot absolute, or even pronounced, much of the ‘ime. Usuaiy it was just a matter of tho German oops being able to do things most Fussians simply were not tained to do. An excellent land widespread) example. canbe {ourd in German signal ane optical equipment. Whon ovailablo (although it wos aleve authorized “on paper") most German platoon Size units were equipped with a radio. Russian adios (of inferior construction most {Gorman models) were not uually found below battalion level (except. in. armored. unite Optical ‘equipment as decisive in. armored vehicles, Germany's optics industry was the ‘most eevanced in the world end their high ‘oloity guns and ertilry were more accurate 41 longer ranges as 8 result. The combination ‘of more highly trainod porsonnel, beter signals, and optical equipment also made the German artillery coneicerebly more efficient than the Russian. It also made the German artillery the backbone of thelr defensive tatics You can xsi sce this ia the game. ‘The Wespe and Hommel SP guns were more important than ‘you would think from reading most accounts [And then thee f the bread and butter aspects fof defenge. The following defense frontages 5 ‘are given in PANZERBLITZ hexagons (each ‘Savaling 250 mater). GERMAN: Platoon $2 hones, Company = 2-4 nexes. Battalion = 138 hexes. Regiment ~ 6-12 hexes. Division = Dado hexes, Unit in question i tho. "44 infantry division, Motorized unite were not hormally used for defense, if they. were Cnusly Only the infantry unite were putin the ling. RUSSIAN: Company = 1-2_hexes. Battalion = 42 hexes, Regiment = 1224 hhexes, Division = 37-72 hexes. Again, the unit ie tho rifle division. One readily apparent Giference between German and Russian Sefensive doctrine fs the Russian practice of “expending” rifle divisions inthe defence ‘Almost al their strength was “up Front” while {he Garman unit wae deoloved in more doth, ‘This was due to the greotr Germen rllance on their veety superior aruilery. The. Russians tlso usd artillery inthe defense, but usually in shorter range "direct fre” application. Offensive fromtagos wore usually half of the Cefensive frontages. In ths case the Russians {did use dopth. A regimane would attack on 3 frontage of 2-5 hexes, a dvision on a frontage ff 4-70 hexes. The Russane also ved heavily Feinforced exsult teams, Tanks, SP guns and thor artillery units, as well at combat engineers, wore added to the attacking rifle ues. This was normally done (when possibe) ‘ven in “mobile” situations. Although, in casos Iie this, motorized ile units were usolly the ‘only. ones available. and thero unite were normally supplied with “reinforcing” units. When clearly defined frontages were in effect it was usually because there were so many {tisndly unite inaction that to ignore nit boundaries would hrm you more. than it \weuld help. Thus some of the PANZERBLITZ Stations using the long narrow board covfiguration. accurately portray. this. In “ooen” situations there is stl the aspect of ‘tvontage” if only because the mobile unit aroncing is usually headed for a clearly Se'ined geonraonica objective (particulary in the caso ofthe Fusions, who did not have the Sophisticated radio nes or command stats 10 ‘low for quick changes in plan), FRathor than go on with 9 ist of tactical “do's land dont’s” it would be better to advise you ‘develop your own. The gamo is accurate fnough t@ allow you to use the tactics ofthe ‘Orginal batts in order 10 be successful After 1 ew gomer you should be on your way to eyeloping your oem tactics, or at least the ‘om that sult you best. ANOTE ON. ‘THE UNIT COUNTER PROFILES ‘Almost al ofthe vohiulaesihowotts used on the counters are in constant scale with each ther. The Wagons and Rustin Cavalry Shown in slighty large seale to maximize Fecognition. Certain extremely large vehicles fare shown in a sightly smaller scale (They are pie V, JodP2 VI, Tiger It, SU-100, JSU-122, 4-85, J! and SII) S00 the profiles in the Campaign Analysis booklet for strictly securate veual ize comparison Experimental Games EXPANDED GAME ‘Combine two oF more sets of the game boards into “macro-boards” of various configurations. Use additional units to make larger forces. REAL-TIME GAME Allow cach player only ix minutes to Complete his turn from wart to. finish \incloding combat resolution), ‘6 Fector Readout ‘2’ BELWO, Wen doseribing a unit by its factors, read the Units feetors In @."2" patorn, For exam Y&2H=10/6-8 descrbos the factors of German Wirbelwind count. A NOTE ON THE “SEQUENCE-OF PLAY’ (em the Rules Folder) Usually the German player moves fist (8 out. linc inthe saquenceot-play). Some situs tiens, however, call for the Fusion Player to Germans move second: that is, EVERY tun in EVERY. Situation Is 9 Complete Tur com siaing of two Player Turns. LENINGRAD FINDING THE BATTLES IN THE WAR ‘As you may have already novesd, all but one of the game situations given occured between Suly “43. ond duly "44. Why this portiulor Deriod? Simply because botore July "43 the ‘Gorman wore almost alias abe 1 defeat the Russians in a rather one sided fathion while aftr duly 74 It was the Russians who were winning most of the battles. This period, thon, oar the mitpoint of the war, the petiod in Which both sos were roughly “equal”, portculerly in a tactical sense. In a strategic Senco the Rusians had assumed superiority #9 ‘the first half of 1943. But tactical superiority "was harder to\come by. Yer the German forces in the East took 8 toribia beating from the middle of "43 to the middle of "44 and ie was this typo of ‘warfare. thet Sustain and stil maintain. the ‘hey had previously attained for their combat troops. The Stalingted campaign had been the SITUATION LOCALES VOWeA@ @ moscow beginning of the end for the Germans. After that campaign wor over the frone was ay shown fon the map stove (as of 6/7/43). Thon come the battle of Kursk. A mistake on the part of the Germans. And bacaueo they attacked \ahere the Russans were waiting for ther they lyere dren bale past the Dnieper curing the Russian's "1843 Summer Offensive. This ompaign is covered by game situations 5,8, 7 and 12. Sitations 2, 8 and 11 cover the Russion Winter and Spring 1944 Offensives, ‘These operations left the front line as shown above (23/6/44). The final battle, which finaly destroyed the power of the German ‘armies in the eat wae the Destruction of Army Group Center situations 1 and 4). In this ‘campaign the Germans lost three times at many men ae fey dc in the West during the [Bne period, At the end of this push the wont ‘was het cutlde of Warson. The next stop wes Bertin, 7 LARGE UNIT COMPOSITION Players may use the platoons and companies of one or more counter-sets to form higher echelon units as per the illustration below.and other higher ech felon units as per the charts on pages 10 to13, ADDITIONAL UNITS 150mm Rocket Launcher Battory (*Nebetweror") 504.80 | 604136 | 4032 250i a0 20H 28 | GOH 16 | wins, | rovincs, i > “&—_ | = | Zoe 0:|fue: Or uere B zz =f VOLKSGRENADIERS (vc) he 3,1, 561,39) BATTALION= e ee, x x6 ae = @ REGIMENT= 2 Battalions PLUS: iD 2 2¥o x Baye DIVISION= Fusilier Company Regiments PLUS: L3)3, 6) rca Oates Nea asl Engineer Br Tropa] 6 [apa = me lier | @|= 112 |1 "N83 Woot I cana Faaeexechind AntiTank Br Divisional Artery ar ola [aga 0-9 32]60 20] ae =o A rae a ana aaa ‘TAKE NOTE! — There are a number of unite In thoes charts which are NOT incded in the ‘une. Two of them, the BRIDGE units, equire special rulos for use. The "6" clas bre requires to enginoer units and 10 turns £0 emplace. You simply rave the bridge (on 8 ‘ehiela) up to the obetacl to be crossed, along Sdjocent and take part in no other action, ike Btacking oc moving, although they may be Stacked) for 10 turns. The "J" class brge irs four engineer units and 18 turns to fmplace. The mines, which ar cari! ie ay ‘ther unit in trucks or wagons, roquirs 16 turns t0 ampiace using one engineer unit. Two ‘nits can do itn eight tune and, four units in four turns. Mines may not bo emplaced any fostor—Does NOT opply te miner in Situation Cards * “These extra_units ere NOT avilable from Avalon hill. You must make them up yoursel GERMAN DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY ‘Add the indicated number of platoons to the Divisions shown on page 12. ‘ADDITIONAL LOW ECHELON UNITS DIRECTLY ATTACHED To HIGH ECHELON UNITS DIVISIONS. (Hcl ECHELON UNIT) 44 Infantry | alla Panzergrenadier eae 2|2 ‘SS Panzer an leet 2 al 2a aa) Panzer alt |e ‘QUANTITY & TYPE OF ADDITIONAL LOW ECHELON UNITS DIRECTLY ATTACHED TO HIGH ECHELON UNITS é 2 2 my 2 1 3 i i ae i 2 g GERMAN ‘QUANTITY & TYPE OF ADDITIONAL LOW ECHELON UNITS DIRECTLY ATTACHED TO HIGH ECHELON UNITS LARGE we _< < | = a 20 m1 UNITS Mee 1 5 or | ae gig c T ii a_i: [ : I : igo Sis noe “nie > intone ms 9 2 re Battalion Battin ame for $5) 2 m3 9!) Tia Sraten 2 a ese Be 2 Tank i ee, 1 1 14. aie 1 p Battalion | : Salah essed 2 113 “— Hs Bettaion 1 Sncrank earaion | 2 2 5 2 Mobile Divion ] rem BAnivtent Battin | 3 3 how + ‘Assault Gun Baton 1 4 ‘Mobile Division Engine Battalion Taft | aeeaetar 2 (al? «(2 3 Reamer” 1 a Regiment POO) | 2 a Motorized Infentry 1| Regione (P2 Div 3 1] fg 2 OM) my: ay 2 fo 3 2 1] Regiment 2 PER HIGH ECHELON UNIT i “LINN NO7SHOS S7GGWN Had (SU3LNAOD 3NVD) SLINA NOTH MOT 40 34AL ® ALLINYNO ag TGUANTITY & TYPE OF MIDDLE ECHELON UI a] | serene, if 2 i 22 $$ Armored 2] | tetanary Regiment @ 3} 3 am| | 27 |i3 3 2 ‘Assoult Gun Brigade LOW ECHELON ro ele ie Pic Ne ee pane 9 vai | an | a2 [aan sv0 [20] 531 | mio] 720 Campaign Analysis MOBILE FORCES Before 1943. the Soviet tank forces, while important, hod 0 toke second pice 10 the infantry. in such a defensive war, and without competent atiery to back them up, the Only fective defense opinst the numerous ord wel fxecuted. German advancot was. marie of Infantry. For example, atthe end of 1949 when the Russian "mobile offensive” was telly getting into geet, only some 320,000 of the 4,000,000 Russian "ground combat troops” at ‘he front wore inthe "mobile fores.” Thet's Cony 8%. The Gorman figure forthe same period ‘was 14%, and thay hod sen better days. The ‘organization of Soviet mobile forces had ‘hanged litle since 1941. The mein problem twas that it was only in early 1941 that the Fussansroalized wat the Germans had known since the mid ‘90's. The key to mobile wartare was the "balanced combinad arms toem." Ard {his was just the sort of unit the Soviets were least able 10 create, Most of the large mobile formations the Fusions had in early 41 were wiped out during the fist German advances, [After that, as more armored vehicles came off the production lines, smal! amored unite wore formed that would later be combined into the Funsion equivalot of the German “panera. Practical purboses, tank dhision, And a Particularly well ergonized. one. at that. It voided one glaring errr of al the early western tank civisions; too many tanks and not enough infantry. By 1943/48 most armies he! relied {heir error ad their tank divisions were about 30% infantry. The Tank Corps was the same, 452% ofits strength war infantry, almost all off ‘SMG armed. It also contained 240 ermored flohting vehicles | (AFV= tanks and other gun ‘armed and armored vehicle). Its one main ‘neakness was 3 lack of artillery, for all practical ‘urposee there was none. Thu if th tank cots {ame up against any organizad (backed up by rilery) fesitanco it had t0 oither try and smash its way through (arisky undertaking, 99 ‘round the resistance or pullback and walt for {tiendly Infantry and arlery *0 show up. This lest option usally signallod the end of whetever “offensive” the rank corps was parte;pating in Campaign analysis matoral i from Stavegy & Tactics Mogazine, copyright 1970, Simulation ‘Systems Corp, used with permission, “ ‘Another deficiney of the Soviet tank forces ‘was the lick of an efficient supply service, Pertcuiay a motorized one. One of the things hich prevented the Germans fom overunning all of Rusa in 1941 was a truly “motorized” ‘supply sve “Toa certain extont thisv' to trusof the Allied advance vos France | 1944, But inthis re, Were thewestern wore bos quipped anc the Germans scirewhat les well off, the Fussans were rally in rouble lok atthe proportions of" ‘the Soviet my 80% of the troops were in {combat uns in the German army 40% ware i ‘combet its n the Amrcan ermy only 23% were getting shot at. However, during the wor the Americans had the finest artery force ever put into the lets, the Russians the Teast efficient. They needed every men atthe front. Thus Ruslan “offeneves” were usualy limited ‘to theamount of milange the tanks could get out of ona or two load of fuel, But the tank corps hhad plenty of good points. It was» relatively seal force with a large “punch.” The Gorman “44 panzerdwsion hod 13,700 men, S200 Infantry, 213 artilry weapons and 150 AF. ‘The Soviet tank corps had 133 fener men (tbe fed and supplied and replaced when wounded), 27% fewer infantry (But all wore armed with ‘utomatic weapons), an equel_ amount of artilery weapons (although the German ones \were often more efficient, ard 60% more AFV (of equal i not superior desig). Moroover, by the end of 1943 the Fusions had more tank ‘corps (26) than the Germans. had. panzer

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