Japanese occupation of West Sumatra

Japanese-occupied West Coast Sumatra West Coast Province of Sumatra スマトラ西海岸州 (Japanese) Sumatora Nishikaigan-shū (Romaji) Pendudukan Jepang di Sumatra Barat (Indonesian) Japanse bezetting van Sumatra's Westkust (Dutch)
1942–1945
Flag of the Empire of Japan Imperial Seal
Motto: 八紘一宇 (Hakkō Ichiu) ("Eight Crown Cords, One Roof")
Anthem: Kimigayo
West Coast Sumatra (dark red) within the Japanese occupation of the Dutch East Indies (red)
Status	Military occupation by the Empire of Japan
Capital	Padang
Common languages	Japanese, Indonesian, Dutch
Emperor
• 1942–1945	Hirohito
Army Commander (Gunshireikan)
• 1942	Tomoyuki Yamashita
• 1942‒1943	Yaheita Saito
• Moritake Tanabe	1943‒1945
Governor (Shūchōkan)
• 1942‒1944	Kenzo Yano
• 1944‒1945	Hattori Naoaki
Historical era	World War II
• Established	9 Agustus 1942
• Disestablished	17 August 1945
Currency	Netherlands Indian roepiah
Preceded by Succeeded by Dutch East Indies Indonesia Dutch East Indies
Today part of	Indonesia

The Japanese occupation of West Sumatra, officially known as Sumatora Nishi Kaigan Shū (Japanese: スマトラ西海岸州, Hepburn: Sumatora Nishikaigan-shū, lit. 'West Coast Province of Sumatra'), started from 1942 until 1945 when the region was controlled by the Empire of Japan. The occupation was notable and recognized as one of the rare instances where a civilian government was established, rather than being governed by someone associated with the Japanese Imperial Army. The Japanese entered Padang on 17 March 1942 and within ten days all important cities in the West Sumatra region were occupied without resistance from the Dutch. The Japanese occupation of the region ended on 17 August 1945 with the proclamation of Indonesian independence by Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta.

In the early days of the Japanese occupation, events in Padang were heavily influenced by Sukarno. In October 1943, Japan ordered the establishment of the Giyugun to help with defence. Led by Chatib Sulaiman, the Giyugun was the only army unit formed by the Japanese in West Sumatra. This voluntary army would later become the backbone of Indonesia's armed forces after independence.

Japanese arrival

Japan began its invasion of Sumatra in February 1942 by deploying paratroop units in Palembang. According to Audrey Kahin, the Japanese intended to preempt Dutch plans to damage oil installations near Palembang. From Palembang, the Japanese army soon spread across southern and northern Sumatra swiftly. By mid-March, larger numbers of troops landed on the northern and eastern coasts of Sumatra, and moved rapidly southwards.

Through the Agreement of Kalijati on 8 March 1942, the Dutch ceded the Indonesian colonies to Japan. After the occupation began, the Japanese divided Indonesia into three military administration areas. The Sumatra region was under the 25th Army Military Government Department (Rikugun) in Singapore led by General Tomoyuki Yamashita. However, the Dutch military commander in Sumatra, A. I. Spits declared the Dutch army in Sumatra would continue to fight to the last drop of blood.

The Japanese entry into West Sumatra almost coincided with their movements in other parts of Sumatra. Japanese army soldiers entered Padang City on 17 March 1942. Within days, all of West Sumatra was under their control and the Dutch military commander in Sumatra surrendered unconditionally to the Japanese.

Administration

The roof of Jam Gadang follows the shape of the pagoda roof (centre) during the Japanese occupation.

To academic Audrey Kahin, one of the focuses of the Japanese occupation army during the first year of occupation was to get the government apparatus in Sumatra functioning so that they could make efficient use of its vital resources, particularly the oil fields near Palembang and the rubber plantations in East Sumatra. The Japanese revived the Dutch system of government and reappointed most of the former Indonesian officials who had been in the previous bureaucracy.

Sumatra in the occupation government structure was initially under the control of the Singapore-based 25th Army. However, the 25th Army Command concluded that it was not possible to govern Sumatra from its headquarters in Singapore, especially in terms of protecting the area around vital installations. On 1 May 1943, the headquarters of the 25th Army was moved from Singapore to Bukittinggi in Sumatra, which had previously been attached to Malaya, was made a self-governing unit. The 25th army later renamed the city from Stadsgemeente Fort de Kock to Bukittinggi-Si Yaku Sho (or simply Shiyakusho, lit. 'Municipal office; council; city hall') and expanded the city limits for their needs. The Japanese divided Sumatra into 10 shū (identical to the administrative regions of the Dutch residencies and the former province system of Japan), each headed by a shūchōkan.

The West Coast Sumatra Province was formed in August 1942 under the name Sumatora Nishi Kaigan Shū to replace the residency system to the Shū (州) system. The prefecture has its capital in Padang. Former Toyama Prefecture Governor Yano Kenzo served as the first shūchōkan. As taskef for being the civilian leader for the West Coast Sumatra Province, Yano Kenzo arrived in Padang on 9 August 1942 along with 68 civil servants. The division of West Coast Sumatra's administrative units was almost entirely based on the division made by the Dutch in 1935, consisting of 5 afdeelingen, 19 onderafdeelingen, 20 districts, and 49 onderdistricts and at least 430 nagari. Historian Gusti Asnan noted that a slight difference from the division of administrative units by the Japanese was the exclusion of Fuku Bun Bangkinang and the inclusion of the area in Rio Shū. In running the wheels of government in West Coast Sumatra, the Japanese did not make many changes to the government structure, except for changes in nomenclature into Japanese. The Afdeeling, headed by an assistant resident, was changed into a bunshū (分周), headed by a bunshūchō (分周長). The onderafdeeling headed by a controller was changed to a fuku bunshū headed by a fuku bunshūchō. The district headed by a demang was changed to a gun (郡) headed by a gunchō. Onderdistricts headed by assistant demangs were transformed into fukugun headed by a fuku gunchō. Except for important positions in the administration, the Japanese still used native officials who had previously been in the Dutch East Indies administration on condition that they did not infringe on Japanese authority. The highest native official headed the gun and its subordinate structure, the fukugun (副郡). The smallest government unit, the nagari, was termed son and the head of the nagari was called sonchō or son (村).

Reception

Initial landing

The arrival of the Japanese army in Padang was initially hailed by the people, who chanted "Merdeka! Banzai! Long live Japan!" Historian Gusti Asnan notes that Japanese spies had previously exercised influence over the Minangkabau people. Some of the Japanese who had settled in West Sumatra since the 1920s acted as Japanese intelligence "sent to pave the way for their occupation." The people had been convinced that the Japanese were coming to liberate the nation from the rule of Western Imperialism. The Japanese invoked the slogan of Asia for Asians as a liberator of Asia from imperialism.

Ganting Grand Mosque, the headquarters of Hizbul Wathan in Padang. Soekarno stayed at the house of Umar Marah Alamsyah (the Chairman of the People's Committee) near the mosque and gave a speech at the mosque.

While in West Sumatra, Sukarno visited several figures, including Sheikh Abbas Abdullah at the Darulfunun Padang Japang College.

The Dutch in West Sumatra made a hasty retreat from reports of Japanese landings in Padang and across the East Indies archipelago, putting up no resistance. After the Dutch failed to take Sukarno to Australia, he was stuck in West Sumatra for a period of three to five months, from February 1942 to July 1942. Wanting to meet the recently arrived Japanese forces stationed in Padang, Sukarno traveled to the city in February 1942 and stayed for 15 days. Sukarno showed a co-operative attitude towards the Japanese. However, the leaders and figureheads of the National Party of Indonesia (PNI) were divided during a meeting at the Bumiputra office in Bukittinggi. Some supported cooperation with the Japanese, while others refused to do so. Anwar Sutan Saidi, the head of the pro-independence bank, Bank National, and various trade organizations, chose to avoid the political track that were of the result of Japanese collaboration and instead focus on the economic track. His aim was to raise funds and procure weapons to support the struggle for independence. Tamimi Usman led a group of people who followed Sutan Syahrir's non-cooperative way and mobilised underground activities. The group led by Chatib Sulaiman followed the path of struggle for independence of Indonesia rather than collaborating with the Japanese to gain it.

In West Sumatra, Sukarno managed to persuade most independence movement leaders to cooperate with Japan. In his speech in Padang, Sukarno urged the people not to resist the Japanese army because the forces were not equal. According to Sukarno, the Indonesian people must use Japan to achieve their goal of realising Indonesian independence. Through his cooperative attitude, Sukarno managed to prevent the Japanese army's harsh actions against the people of West Sumatra. Sukarno persuaded most of the national figures in West Sumatra to cooperate with Japan. When the Japanese army prohibited the raising of flags other than the Japanese flag, Sukarno ordered the people to lower the flag "until the time comes when we can fly Sang Dwi-warna freely from all forms of foreign domination". Sukarno and Hatta saw co-operation with Japan as the best way to achieve the goal of Indonesian independence, "sailing in one ship with the Japanese while carrying our own merchandise." Sukarno and West Sumatran leaders formed the People's Committee, as a temporary government to maintain calm in the region as Japanese troops consolidated their power. Meanwhile, Leon Salim, Chatib Suleiman and Mohammad Nasroen united all existing youth organisations into the Pemuda Nippon Raya organization. However, this organisation did not last long as the Japanese peeked the idea behind its establishment. Leon Salim was arrested by the Japanese on 14 November 1942 on suspicion of pretending to help them, but was released after a week.

Under Yano Kenzo's governorship

"Governor of West Coast Sumatra" Yano Kenzo (矢野兼三) in traditional Minangkabau dress

The civil administration of West Sumatra only became effective after the arrival of Yano Kenzo to West Sumatra on 9 August 1942 as 'Governor of West Coast Sumatra'. Before serving in West Sumatra, Yano had served as Governor of Toyama Prefecture. Gusti Asnan noted that Yano played a major role in realising good cooperation between the people of West Sumatra and the Japanese. Yano opposed many policies of the 25th Army Command, but maintained friendly relations with 25th Army Commander Moritake Tanabe in Bukittinggi. Tanabe had reservations about the increasing role of the Indonesian nationalist movement on Java, but responding to the “Koiso Promise” granting increased autonomy and eventual independence to Indonesia he established the Sumatra Central Advisory Council and trained locals for administrative leadership roles. However, he attempted to distance himself from local politics by as much as possible, leaving much leniency to the administration of West Coast Sumatra to the civilian government headed by Yano Kenzo in Padang. Yano Kenzo's sympathy for the local people's aspirations for independence and his disappointment with government policies that did not match his views were expressed in an article he wrote later in 1967. As a civilian leader, Yano Kenzo instead approached the Minangkabau people through culture and multiculturalism, rather than through force or authority much like his equivalent peers. He had an interest in nature, society, and the customs of Minangkabau, which adhered to the matrilineal tradition. According to Gusti Asnan, his political views, which were influenced by his keen interest in Minangkabau, became the basis for his idea to initiate the establishment of several civic, social and cultural organisations in West Sumatra. For persisting in his stance against the exploitative nature of the economic policies pursued by the Japanese authorities, Yano Kenzo resigned as governor in March 1944. Officially leaving on April 1944, he was then replaced by Hattori Naoaki. Yano argued that the Japanese occupying forces were well aware of Indonesia's abundant resources and were determined to maintain their hold on the country, even if it meant giving up the Philippines and Burma.

"...The Minangkabau of Sumatra, under my jurisdiction..., seem to be the most intelligent and economically advanced of all the tribes; and their political awareness is admirable. So, it is not surprising that they have a strong desire to end 350 years of Dutch oppression, and achieve full independence. Convinced that the Japanese occupation army would help them achieve their long-term dream, they co-operated. However, after two years of occupation, nothing changed."

— Yano Kenzo,

During his tenure as Governor of West Coast Sumatra, Yano established the Kerukunan Minangkabau (Gui Gan) as a consultation body between himself and Minangkabau leaders. The Kerukunan Minangkabau was established by Yano on 1 October 1942. Kerukunan Minangkabau met regularly at the governor's residence. Represented from each district, subdistrict, head of nagari, head of adat, scholars, youth, and the intelligentsia, Its members consisted of 10 to 20 people. Its members were representatives of ulama, politicians, traditional leaders (including datuks), and academics who acted as an informal advisory board to the shūchōkan. Gusti Asnan referred to Kerukunan Minangkabau as the early House of Representatives (DPR). When the 25th Army Command issued an order for the establishment of a regional representative councils (Template:Lang-ja) in each shū on 8 November 1943 for the Central Advisory Council, the civilian government of West Sumatra continued the existing Kerukunan Minangkabau as a Shū Sangi-kai and Muhammad Sjafei was appointed chairman, supported by the 25th Army.

Support from Minangkabau ulamas

See also: Ulama Minangkabau

Through his close ties with the Japanese, Mahmud Yunus endeavoured to have Islamic religious education taught in West Sumatran government schools.

In response to the transfer of power to the Japanese army from the Dutch government, the Minangkabau ulama group initiated the establishment of the Minangkabau Higher Islamic Council (MIT). Ahmad Husein noted that this assembly was established as a forum where the scholars deliberated on the politics of the Japanese government. Meanwhile, according to Datuk Palimo Kayo, the MIT was born thanks to the awareness of reformist ulama figures about how dangerous Japanese rule was. Established in 1942, the organisation elected Sulaiman Ar-Rasuli as chairman. With the aim of gathering all the forces of struggle of the Minangkabau Muslims, the MIT Minangkabau received the support of the entire Minangkabau people. Leaders of Islamic organisations at the time such as Perti and Muhammadiyah were united in resisting Japanese politics.

To gain acceptance from the people, the Japanese tried to approach the ulama group and give them a place in policy-making. The Japanese designed the formation of the Masyumi organisation at the centre. Religious Affairs Offices were established in each prefecture called Shu Muka. The clerics were given a special training programme called Kiyai Koshokai in order to prepare them to become Japanese propaganda tools. The "Principles Concerning Military Government in the Occupied Territories" (Senryochi Gunsei Jisshi Yoko) issued by the Japanese authorities on 14 March 1942 stated, "that religions should be respected as far as possible in order to keep the minds of the people stable... Muslims, should be given special attention in order to make use of them in order to grip the minds of the people". Minangkabau clerics took advantage of the offer of cooperation with Japan to gather the strength of the Minangkabau Muslim struggle against the colonisers. The Japanese gave the Minangkabau MIT a place in policy-making, including appointing Mahmud Yunus to represent the Minangkabau MIT as a resident advisor. In addition, several members of the assembly were invited to attend the Greater East Asia Islamic Congress in Singapore.

"...The Dutch do not allow us to be soldiers for them, but the Japanese do. Entering the Giyu Gun will be useful for us to fight them."

— Syekh Abbas Abdullah,

Despite encouraging the people to help the Japanese, the Minangkabau ulama at the same time fostered the growth of Indonesian nationalism. They encouraged young men to attend military training organised by the Japanese. Together with traditional leaders, they were involved in the recruitment process of prospective Giyugun officers to minimise the influence of Japanese propaganda and replace it with the spirit of nationalism. Historian Gusti Asnan noted that their involvement in the selection of officers was to select candidates who were over 25 years old to 30 years old and insert the spirit of love for the country in the Giyugun march. "They wanted the candidates to be mature enough to avoid the negative influence of the Japanese military upbringing." UIN Imam Bonjol academic, Irhash A. Shamad, stated that the pseudo-support given by Minangkabau scholars during Japanese rule had blinded the Japanese in seeing what was behind the support. Community leaders together endeavoured to achieve Indonesian independence. According to Irhash, fighting openly against the Japanese at that time was a wrong calculation, so the scholars motivated the people to fight quietly "while taking refuge behind the support for the Greater East Asia War echoed by Japan."

Mobilization of the population

See also: Giyugun and Rōmusha

Relief at Tugu Padang Area, Padang. Depicting the enthusiasm of the people to join the Giyugun

Within a year of the occupation, the Japanese shifted the focus of their policy from consolidating power and controlling the occupied areas in Southeast Asia to preparing to defend the region from Allied attack. The Japanese sought to mobilise the population's power for the Japanese cause. Previously, the occupation army had failed to supplement the strength of the armed forces by using the mercenary system. Chatib Sulaiman proposed to West Sumatran Governor Yano Kenzo the formation of a volunteer army in West Sumatra that could be utilised to supplement the strength of the Japanese army. After the Army Command based in Saigon, Vietnam issued an order to form a Kyōdo Bōei Giyūgun on 8 September 1943, the 25th Army Commander Tanabe gave full authority to the Governor of West Sumatra to implement the formation of a volunteer army.

Rasuna Said, a Permi figure who led the women's movement through the Haha No Kai organisation during the Japanese occupation in West Sumatra.

On 14 October 1943, Chatib Sulaiman led and pioneered the formation of a committee for the formation of the Giyugun called Giyugun Koenkai. To support this effort, Chatib Sulaiman traveled extensively around West Sumatra, recruiting prospective Giyugun officers and frequently shuttling between Padang and Bukittinggi. This committee under Japanese supervision screened prospective volunteer officers to be formed. The responsibility of recruiting prospective Giyugun officers was handed over to Chatib Sulaiman together with Mahmud Yunus, and Ahmad Datuak Simarajo. They convinced the officers that the military training provided by the Japanese was aimed at achieving the ideals of Indonesian independence. Young men in Minangkabau were encouraged to become Giyugun troops in order to receive military training from the Japanese. With the encouragement of traditional and religious leaders, many young men registered to become Giyugun. Among those listed were Dahlan Djambek, Ismail Lengah, Syarif Usman, Dahlan Ibrahim, Syofyan Nur, Syofyan Ibrahim. A. Talib, Nurmatias, Sayuti Amin, Alwi St. Marajo, Syefei Ali, Mahyuddin Tonek, Burhanuddin, Munir Latief, and many others. From here there were around 20,000 who applied for the Giyugun, but only 1,000 rations were available. Great encouragement for the development of the Giyugun was given by Yano at a large meeting on 20 November 1943 in Bukittinggi. Finally he was able to influence the penghulu, who had been able to recruit at least another 20,000 soldiers from each member of his descendants. The call of the penghulu was well received by his people group.

The Giyugun Koenkai became the only military force established by the Japanese in West Sumatra. The Giyugun force was initially formed in Padang and the coastal areas. In the highlands, the Giyugun was only formed at the end of 1944. Japanese propaganda intensified in 1944. The various groups were united in the Hōkōkai, led by Muhammad Syafii and Khatib Sulaiman from the nationalist or educated movement; Datuk Parpatih Baringek and Datu Majo Uang from the tradition group; and Djamil Djambek and Sutan Mansur from the religious group. The Giyugun Koenkai (later Giyugun Koenbu), an association of Giyugun supporters, was formed as a liaison between civilian and military leaders. Haha No Kai, the women's wing of the Giyugun, was established to prepare supplies for fellow officers. By the time of the proclamation of independence, the Giyugun had organised two drills for its officers.

As tensions in the Pacific War escalated, Japan increased its control over the population. In an effort to meet the need for labour, the Japanese authorities imposed compulsory rōmusha labour on the population for various Japanese purposes, such as building roads, railways, bridges, fortifications, and protection tunnels. In addition, civil servants, merchants, school children and residents who did not participate in forced labour were subjected to Kinrohoshi, voluntary work to collect river stones, sand and gravel and transport them to the necessary places. Japanese bunkers and protection tunnels were found in Padang and Bukittinggi. The Muaro-Pekanbaru railway line was the result of forced labour involving approximately 6,600 prisoners of war and 30,000 rōmusha workers. Through education, the Japanese made fundamental changes in West Sumatra. Schools were mobilised for Japanese interests. Indonesian was made the language of instruction in schools to introduce Japanese culture and at the same time, students at various levels were taught Japanese. Meanwhile, the educated classes, especially teachers, civil servants and students were made into "new Japanese." Seikeirei (bowing to the emperor's palace in Tokyo) and Mukto (commemorating the spirits of Japanese heroes) are performed at certain times. These activities are usually done after hearing the speeches of the shūchōkan or Japanese officials. Keirei (standing salute) is mandatory whenever passing Japanese dignitaries, even in cars. The Gregorian calendar is replaced by the Japanese imperial year, which is 660 years apart, while the time signature is adjusted to Japanese standard time, which is about 2.5 hours apart from Tokyo time. It is through this harsh acts done by the Japanese occupation government that made then civilian governor, Yano Kenzo, reign in protest.

References

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