1. Introduction
Tradable green certificate (TGC) systems have been implemented in several countries as a policy measure to promote the development of renewable energy, reduce reliance on traditional fossil energies, and achieve sustainable development [
1]. The system issues renewable energy producers TGCs for each unit of electricity generated from eligible renewable energy sources such as solar, wind, biomass, or hydro power. TGCs represent the environmental attributes of renewable electricity and can be bought, sold, or traded on the market separately from the physical electricity to incentivize the generation of renewable energy by earning financial benefits [
2]. Although scholars agree that TGC systems can reduce financial pressure on the government to provide subsidies [
3], promote market-based investment [
4], and increase the installed capacity of renewable energy systems [
5], providing a good incentive for the development of renewable energy, previous research fails to provide a consistent answer regarding whether TGC systems promote actual carbon emissions reduction. This study investigates the impact of China’s TGC system on regional carbon emissions to examine the effectiveness of TGCs, and proposes targeted suggestions for future TGC policy to efficiently reduce regional carbon emissions and achieve regional sustainable development [
6].
Under the TGC system, renewable energy generation companies obtain environmental value benefits by selling green certificates [
7], which helps companies increase their investment in renewable energy and further reduce carbon emissions [
8,
9]. Electricity users purchase and hold green certificates to demonstrate that they have consumed renewable energy [
10], which encourages companies to use more environmentally friendly energy sources, promoting the development of the renewable energy market, reducing carbon emissions, and promoting the development of a low-carbon economy [
11,
12]. However, previous research does not reach a common consensus on the carbon emissions reduction effects of the TGC system. Huang et al. [
13] propose that the TGC system can increase renewable energy installed capacity and replace fossil fuel energy, reducing the carbon emissions. Feng et al. [
14] argue that under the TGC system, the growth rate of electricity industry carbon emissions may diminish. Pan and Dong [
15] use a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to explore the coupling effect of TGC trading on a low-carbon economy, finding that the TGC system reduces carbon emissions and mitigates negative environmental externalities. In contrast, some scholars argue that the TGC system has not been effective in promoting carbon emissions reduction [
16]. Using information disclosed by 115 companies, Bjørn et al. [
17] find that companies purchasing green certificates claiming that they use renewable electricity with zero carbon emissions exaggerate actual emissions reduction and do not adopt additional renewable energy generation, and therefore cannot effectively contribute to regional carbon emissions reduction. Brander et al. [
18] plot a green certificate supply–demand curve, suggesting that the green certificate market has difficulty in generating additional renewable energy investment and increasing renewable energy generation, failing to promote regional carbon emissions reduction. Liu et al. [
19] examine the TGC market, finding that TGC does not significantly promote industrial enterprises’ green innovation and has no impact on carbon emissions reduction. Yan et al. [
20] also argue that TGC trading in China has an uncertain effect on carbon emissions reduction and requires systematic reassessment, and the availability of additionality is key to advancing the ability of TGCs to reduce carbon emissions and improve the environment.
Why does the existing literature come to inconsistent conclusions? There may be two important reasons. Notably, when research examines the carbon reduction effects of TGC systems, the potential interference and impact of other renewable energy-related policies is often ignored, which may be an important reason for previous inconsistent conclusions. The impact of RPS policy must be considered when investigating China’s TGC system [
21]. The RPS policy specifies the proportion of renewable energy power that must be reached in electricity consumption [
22], determines the renewable energy consumption obligations of fossil energy producers, renewable energy producers, grid enterprises, and consumers, and TGC purchase by obligated entities becomes a necessary means to achieve consumption goals [
23]. This means that the RPS policy can promote the effective consumption of renewable energy power, reducing carbon emissions [
24]. Another reason for the inconsistent conclusions regarding the effect of the TGC system in China may be that scholars do not distinguish between the different categories of green certificates. As noted, China’s TGC system has successively implemented two TGC models (i.e., certificate-electricity integration and certificate-electricity separation). Significant differences exist in the additionality of carbon reduction between these two models [
25]. If the two models are not distinguished, their different roles will be mixed, leading to biased conclusions. Bjørn et al. [
17] argue that only the certificate-electricity integration model exerts an additional effect on actual carbon emissions reduction, but this perspective requires further empirical evidence for support.
To sum up, existing studies examine the impact of green certificate trading on carbon emissions reduction but do not reach consistent conclusions, leaving research gaps that merit further investigation. First, previous studies do not make a clear distinction between the effects of TGCs on carbon emissions reduction and similar policies such as the renewable portfolio standard (RPS) in China. Second, limited research engages comparative studies on the effects of TGCs on carbon emissions under certificate-electricity integration and certificate-electricity separation models. Third, although some literature examines the effect of TGC trading on carbon emissions reduction, it does not further explain the underlying mechanisms.
In order to achieve the goal of carbon emissions reduction and sustainable development, this study empirically estimates the effects of the TGC system on carbon emissions and explores the possible mechanisms based on the actual circumstances in China, which is currently the largest carbon emitter in the world. First, based on the different trading characteristics of China’s TGC market in each province, this study employs a difference-in-differences (DID) strategy to accurately estimate the impact of TGCs on carbon emissions at the provincial level and also applies the DID strategy to strictly control for the RPS system, to exclude the interfering effects. Second, this study respectively analyzes the different effects of the two TGC models (certificate-electricity integration and certificate-electricity separation) on carbon emissions. Finally, based on the concept of carbon emissions reduction and sustainable development, this study examines and explains the effects of TGCs on carbon emissions reduction. The results demonstrate that although the TGC system in China has effectively promoted overall carbon emissions reduction, these effects are primarily attributable to certificate-electricity integration TGCs rather than certificate-electricity separation TGCs, which implies that only certificate-electricity integration TGCs have actual carbon emissions reduction additionality, and future policies should encourage the issuance of integrated green certificates.
Compared with the existing literature, this study makes three marginal contributions. First, it assesses the effects of the TGC system on China’s carbon emissions reduction comprehensively and accurately, and enriches the related research in the field. This study takes the implementation of the green certificate policy as a quasi-natural experiment and constructs a DID model for estimation, and also constructs an interaction term to exclude the possible influence of the RPS system, providing more scientific evidence for assessing the effect of the TGC policy. Second, this study specifically analyzes the mechanism of carbon emissions reduction by dividing certificate-electricity integration and certificate-electricity separation TGCs and explains the limitations of the latter from the perspective of additionality. Third, this study concludes that certificate-electricity separation TGCs do not significantly promote carbon emissions reduction, which provides valuable insights and practical reference for improving related TGC policy, aiding regional governments’ carbon emissions reduction and achieving sustainable development.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 introduces the TGC system in China;
Section 3 details the study’s materials and methods;
Section 4 outlines the empirical results;
Section 5 is the discussion, and
Section 6 is the conclusion and policy implications.
2. The TGC System in China
To promote the large-scale development of renewable energy, the Chinese government has been subsidizing grid connection of wind and solar power generation since 2006. However, with advances in new energy generation technology, the costs of solar and wind power have achieved grid parity [
26], and continuous massive subsidies have put enormous pressure on the government’s finances. In 2017, the Chinese government implemented the TGC system to alleviate the financial pressure caused by renewable energy subsidies, hoping to employ market approaches to obtain additional benefits for the environmental rights of green power in place of government subsidies.
TGCs represent the environmental value of renewable energy power, where sellers (renewable energy companies) can obtain environmental value benefits through TGC trading and buyers (electricity companies or individuals) obtain environmental rights and can demonstrate that they are using green, low-carbon renewable energy. The original intent of the TGC system was to promote renewable energy development through issuing certificates to renewable energy companies in the form of financial subsidies. This increased funding support from the TGC market can encourage power generation companies to invest more in energy storage equipment technology innovation to produce more renewable energy power, ultimately reducing carbon emissions and promoting sustainable development [
27,
28].
In the initial stage, the Chinese TGC system adopted the certificate-electricity separation model, meaning that renewable energy (i.e., green electricity; GE) and TGCs were traded separately. In this case, companies can sell TGCs to other companies that need to demonstrate the use of renewable energy on the TGC trading market, while retaining the corresponding electricity for internal use or selling it in the electricity market, and the purchaser of this portion of electricity cannot claim that they have used renewable energy. This trading model decouples TGC prices and electricity prices, leading to fluctuations in TGC market prices and low trading volume. China established the RPS in 2019 to further promote the development of renewable energy, setting market shares for renewable energy generation for each province. RPS implementation enabled renewable energy power demanders to meet quotas by purchasing TGCs, which increased the TGC trading volume [
24]. Under the RPS, the TGC system is still based on the certificate-electricity separation model, and the trading activity of the TGC market did not change significantly, indicating that the TGC policy implementation effect was still not substantial enough [
25].
In September 2021, directed toward sustainable development, China began to pilot and explore the certificate-electricity integration model, which binds TGC and GE trading together. In this case, while settling the results of green power trading, power users also obtain the corresponding TGCs for the settlement of GE, ensuring that the GE traded is directly used for the purchaser’s electricity demand. The certificate-electricity integration model improves market transparency, reduces costs, promotes market liquidity, and increases the TGC trading volume and advances the development and use of renewable energy. The framework of China’s TGC system is illustrated in
Figure 1.
At the same time, due to differing distribution of renewable energy resources and electricity demand in each province, the number of green certificates traded varies considerably from province to province in the Chinese market.
Figure 2 shows the cumulative volume of TGC trading by province in China up to December 2023 [The data are obtained from the China Green Power Certificate Trading Platform:
https://www.greenenergy.org.cn/, (accessed on 24 July 2024)]. Eight provinces, including Ningxia, Jilin, and Hebei, among others, have traded more than one million certificates, among which Ningxia has the highest trading volume, with more than 3 million certificates, followed closely by Jilin. Notably, 20 regions have traded less than 500,000 certificates, and 6 regions, including Hainan province, traded less than 10,000 certificates. Statistics on the volume of TGCs traded in each province show significantly different impacts of the TGC system, indicating that carbon emissions reduction and sustainable development effects can be determined by comparing the impacts on high- and low-volume provinces.
6. Conclusions and Implications
It is crucial to assess the actual carbon emissions reduction effect of China’s existing TGC system to improve the future TGC system and effectively promote carbon emissions reduction and sustainable development. Although the existing literature presents some empirical studies, such research fails to reach consistent conclusions due to lack of accurate assessment strategies or structural decomposition of TGCs. This study constructs a DID strategy to precisely estimate the carbon emissions reduction effects of the TGC system in China. By controlling for the impact of RPS policy and using different carbon emissions accounting methods, the results demonstrate that the TGC system has significantly reduced carbon emissions in provincial regions in China. This study further divides TGCs into GE and NGE certificates for analysis, determining that the carbon emissions reduction effect of the TGC system is attributable to GE TGCs rather than NGE TGCs.
The study also references additionality properties to explain the differentiated results. The carbon emissions reduction of NGE TGCs has been accounted for in real-time electricity trading. If the physical (electricity) and environmental (carbon emissions reduction) attributes of GE are separately introduced into the electricity market and the TGC market in different periods (i.e., NGE TGCs), the amount of carbon emissions reduction will be double-counted, so that the NGE TGCs are not additional. GE TGCs combine physical and environmental attributes and will not calculate carbon emissions reduction twice. Moreover, China’s current oversupply situation in the TGC market includes more NGE TGCs, further weakening the additionality of TGC market.
The study scientifically evaluates the carbon reduction effect of TGC policy and enriches the research on the TGC system and carbon reduction. In addition, this study provides important insights for improving the TGC system to reduce carbon emissions and reach sustainable development goals in the future. Notably, some international organizations such as the European Union and the Climate Group RE100 (100% renewable electricity) have not fully recognized the validity of China’s TGCs due to unreliable additionality from the potential double-counted risk of carbon emissions reduction. In the future, China’s TGC system should focus on three primary considerations. First, the government should cease issuing NGE TGCs and purchase existing NGE TGCs via government procurement. Second, the separation of TGC and GE markets may increase the complexity and time cost of intermediate transactions, and may also lead to additional transaction costs. To address these challenges, the government should integrate the current TGC and GE markets and establish a unified GE TGC trading market to ensure the additionality of TGC trading. Finally, the government should actively align with international TGC standards to promote the recognition and trading of Chinese TGCs in the international market.
Of course, this study has some deficiencies, such as the lack of in-depth data support for the discussion on TGC additionality, and follow-up studies can further conduct empirical research on the additionality of the TGC system. In addition, follow-up studies can conduct further research on recommendations for differentiated management strategies tailored to different provinces.