The fundamental assignment problem is in search of welfare maximization mechanisms to allocate items to agents when the private preferences over indivisible items are provided by self-interested agents. The mainstream mechanism \textit{Random Priority} is asymptotically the best mechanism for this purpose, when comparing its welfare  to the optimal social welfare using the canonical \textit{worst-case approximation ratio}.  Surprisingly, the efficiency loss indicated by the worst-case ratio does not have a constant bound \cite{FFZ:14}.Recently, \cite{DBLP:conf/mfcs/DengG017} shows that when the agents' preferences are drawn from a uniform distribution, its \textit{average-case approximation ratio} is upper bounded by 3.718. They left it as an open question of whether a constant ratio holds for general scenarios. In this paper, we offer an affirmative answer to this question by showing that the ratio is bounded by $1/\mu$ when the preference values are independent and identically distributed random variables, where $\mu$ is the expectation of the value distribution. This upper bound improves the results in \cite{DBLP:conf/mfcs/DengG017} for the Uniform distribution as well. Moreover, under mild conditions, the ratio has a \textit{constant} bound for any independent  random values. En route to these results, we develop powerful tools to show the insights that for most valuation inputs, the efficiency loss is small.